CHAPTER -III

THE IMAGE OF MAN IN NIETZSCHE'S PHILOSOPHY

(i) MAN AS AN EXISTENT BEING

Nietzsche is regarded as the second founder of existentialism in general, and the founder of atheistic existentialism in particular. Having declared the death of God, he developed a philosophy of existence, a philosophy of the will to power, without belief in God and without any recognition of morality based upon Christianity or any other theological system. According to him, Man is not the image of God, but existence par se, the Will to Power. Man is not just a mind-body continuum, but man is essentially existence—the Will to Power. Man is not merely being, man is becoming. Existence is becoming; being is simply non-existence.

According to Nietzsche, 'existence' is different from 'being' in this respect that 'existence' belongs to the self-conscious and self-determined individual man; while 'being' has a wider application, it stands for everything that is. Whatever is, is a being; but only an individual man who is self-conscious and has free will to power is an existent being, or it may be said with brevity, is existence par se. The individual man alone is an existent being, an authentic being, while all other kinds of being are inauthentic beings.

For Nietzsche, the free will to power is an essential characteristic of existence. What makes a man existent is his will to power—the will to power over himself and over others.
In Nietzsche's philosophy, the individual man—the concrete individual man is all-important; and there is no place for the abstract concept of the so-called Absolute Reality.

Nietzsche does not believe in any transcendent world of realities behind and beyond the empirical world of appearance. In his own words, "The apparent world is the only one, the 'real world' is merely added by a lie". (1) He does not also believe that there is a true conception of the world. As there is no true world behind the apparent one, Philosophers have taken mistakenly for granted that philosophy is a search for truth in this sense. As he says, "what is needed is that something must be held to be true—not that something is true". (2) He rejects the two-world thesis on the ground that the conception of a transcendent world makes no possible difference to an existent human being, who is guided by the principle of practicability, no theoretical principle being of any avail to him for his becoming an authentic being and living an authentic life from the existentialist point of view.

Reality is not being, but becoming. It is man who turns it into being imposing fixed or stable patterns on the flux of becoming. This activity is an expression of man's Will to Power. So, science is nothing but the 'transformation of Nature into concepts for the purpose of governing Nature.' Knowledge is a process of interpretation, based on vital human needs and it is the outcome of the human will to dominate over the flux of becoming, which is unintelligible otherwise. As for instance, the concept of the self or ego as a permanent substance is an interpretation imposed by man upon the flux of becoming for practical purposes. However, it cannot be logically argued that an interpretation is objective, because it has practical utility. The only justification for an interpretation is that it is required by our practical needs.

The concept of absolute truth is an invention of the
philosophers who are not satisfied with the world of becoming, and therefore, seek an abiding world of being. Says Nietzsche, "Truth is that sort of error without which a particular type of living being could not live." (3) It is for the sake of life that the concept of a thing or that of a substance is imposed on the constant flux of phenomena. The law of causality has similarly become a necessary object of human belief. Thus all truths are fictitious, all fictions are interpretations, and all interpretations are perspectives. "In the last analysis, there are only practical sciences, founded on the basic errors of mankind, the admission of things and identical things." (4) Hence, Being is a falsity, Becoming is the truth.

According to Nietzsche, Man as an existent being is a kind of becoming, who is always in motion having as his end the attainment of supermanhood by the exercise of his free will to power. A man incapable of becoming has no existence; he is but he does not exist.

Thus Nietzsche develops his concept of Man as an existent being by giving up belief in the existence of God, and all other conceptual truths: by making a transvaluation of all traditional values; and by giving supreme importance to the concrete individual endowed with the will to power as the ability to overcome oneself, whose ultimate destiny is to become sublimated to the Superman.

(ii) MAN AND 'NO GOD' : GOD IS DEAD

Nietzsche speaks of God most clearly in his 'Joyful Wisdom' in which he refers to a mad man running into the marketplace, calling "I seek God! I seek God!" But God is no more, because he and the spectators there in the market-place have killed him. "Whither is God?" he cried. "I shall tell you." We have killed him -you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? who
gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun—Whither it is moving now, whither are we moving away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? backward, sideward, forward in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not staying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us?.........God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him."

(5) Thus the murder of God has its grave cosmic consequences, it is as aweful occasion for man to have to become Gods. There was never a greater event, because after it all men would belong to a higher history than any history hitherto. Nietzsche prophetically envisages himself as a mad man—to have lost God means madness; and when mankind will discover that it has lost God, there will break out universal madness. Nietzsche's Overman is a person who has become Godlike by murdering God; he is the person who not only chooses between good and evil, but who himself establishes new values and affirms the significance of life in so doing, just as the God of the old Testament established commandments. But whereas according to Nietzsche, the commandments of God constituted a denial of life, those of the Superman are an affirmation of life. The Superman is one who seeks to overcome, to achieve, what he is to be—"....the new, the unique, the incomparable, making laws for ourselves and creating ourselves". (6)

Nietzsche turned the structure of traditional theology upside down. Instead of justifying a relative personal effort by an absolute end, he made an existential effort absolute for justifying a relative end. He replaced the Christian theology by the penitential theology of a universe without God. By saying that God is dead, Nietzsche does not signify the non-existence of a being who once existed but the disappearance of the belief in such a being. Hence, he challenges the relevance of the belief
in God. As he says, 'That we find no God—either in history or in nature or behind nature is not what differentiates us, but that we experience what has been revered as God, not as "Godlike" but as miserable, as absurd, as harmful, not merely as an error, but as a crime against life.' (7) According to Nietzsche, the age-old belief in God being held astray, the task of the philosopher becomes only to re-evaluate all values, to stab "vivisectionally to the very virtues of the time." (8) He wanted to re-establish values on a new foundation, the old theological foundation being inadequate. His rejection of the Christian ethics is primarily the outcome of his rejection of the absolute foundation of it in God. Thus his attack on Christianity is first an attack against its claim to absoluteness, and then against its values which lose their significance once the absoluteness claim gives way to a naturalistic standard. He does not dismiss the absolute values of Christianity, good and evil, out of hand, but he rejects their absoluteness. With the rejection of God as the source of values, sin, as a Christian concept of evil, is also rejected. As Nietzsche says, "Let us remove the concept of Sin from the world". (9) Thus the move of the 'revaluation' is to deny the absoluteness of every value, and to see which values can stand without theological support. Of course, 'Nietzsche's attack on the absolute foundation of morality is not aimed only at the Christian ethics. The thesis of 'the death of God' is only a particular instance of the general thesis of nihilism, from which he finds escape in the Will to Power. According to him, all previous value systems can be evaluated according to their efficiency as a means to the ultimate value, viz., the will to power, which is implicitly accepted by all people.

Thus Nietzsche's 'God is dead' thesis ultimately leads to his concept of the Superman.

(51)
Nietzsche found the death of God to be a matter of great concern. Sometimes the idea of the death of God led him to madness, because, it meant, for him, the beginning of an age of barbarism. Once the belief in God is lost, morality becomes impossible, because morality in the traditional sense is possible only with the belief in God. Nietzsche attacked Christianity for its devaluation of this-worldly values. His rejection of the Christian ethics is mainly the consequence of his rejection of the absolute foundation of moral values in God. Nietzsche does not reject the values of good and evil, what he rejects is their absoluteness. Sin is central to the conception of evil in Christianity. If God is no longer, sin, the source of value, loses its significance as a value. However, his move to re-evaluate the values does not mean that the absoluteness of every value is lost, it means that we have to see which values can stand without theological support. The attack on the absolute foundation of morality is not directed only at Christian ethics. The thesis that God is dead is only a particular illustration of the general thesis of nihilism. There are also many non-theological foundations of morality which make absolute claim to morality. As a matter of fact, every philosophical theory is an attempt to give justification for absolute claim to morality, and in this respect Nietzsche wants to isolate Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer.

Nietzsche criticises the Christian view of morality and constructs his own view of morality. He finds the escape from nihilism in psychological analyses. According to him, the value systems might be different, but there is a single function in all these systems—it is the single value for which all value systems have created themselves. All value systems can be evaluated according to their efficacy as means to this ultimate value, viz. the will to power. In terms of this ultimate value,
Christianity is found to be defective.

According to Nietzsche, the standard of all morality is the will to power, and judged by this standard, the Christian morality is inadequate, it is an inadequate expression of the will to power. This inadequacy amounts to internal inconsistency, as Christianity is valuing the will to power and rejecting it at the same time.

However, as a moral nihilist Nietzsche was not in favour of stimulating the power of instinct and awakening passion. His view of morality is not based upon passions. He holds rather that every morality is a 'constriction of passion', a prohibition to impulsiveness, a priority of reason to passion, a sacrifice of immediate impulses for rational ideals, an overcoming of the beastly or animal nature.

In fact, Nietzsche has combined the rational with the instinctive and the beastly. He is not in favour of the freedom of passions, nor the complete extirpation of passion. According to him, reason is not the absolute ground of moral life, because it upholds the formal principles to the exclusion of passion. But 'reason' as 'careful thinking' is acceptable to him. He cannot be regarded as an irrationalist, in so far as he does not hold that we should act only on our instinct or passion. Although reason is only a 'tool' of the will to power, it is not, like passion, without intelligence. It is reason that makes the distinction between the higher and the lower man, and as such, it is the key to the Superman and spiritualization.

According to Nietzsche, reason is necessary for morality but it is insufficient, passion is also equally necessary for morality. So far as morality is concerned, a proper balance has to be maintained between reason and passion.

According to Solomon, Nietzsche's scattered writings can be combined for getting an idea of his three inter-related (53)
theories: (a) reason and passion are indistinct; (b) both reason and passion are reducible to a single basic psychological principle, viz., the will to power; and (c) reason directs passion, but it is not a force in itself. The first thesis is limited to a few notes recurring throughout Nietzsche's career. To quote him, "The misunderstanding of passion and reason, as if the latter were an independent entity and not rather a system of relations between various passions and desires; and as if every passion did not possess the quantum of reason." (10) The second thesis is found in his Thus Spake Zarathustra, where both reason and passion are reduced to a single psychological principle, viz., the will to power, which is the basic principle of all morality. As he says, "A tablet of the goal hangs over every people. Behold, it is the voice of their will to power." (11) The third thesis is found in Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy, where he speaks of 'harnessing' and 'challenging the Dionysian passions.' According to him, it is the passion which provides the content of any value system, the value of values. Although reason cannot weaken or change passions, it can determine their object of expression of certain passions at the expense of others: a morality is a set of principles which restricts only the life-stultifying passions, which may be fatal, where they drag their victim down with the weight of their stupidity."(12)

Nietzsche holds that the key to the operation of reason in the sublimation of passion and the distinction between life-preserving and life-stultifying passions lies in the will to power.

According to Nietzsche, there are two distinct types of morality, viz., master-morality and slave-morality, both of which express the will to power, but in different ways—while master-morality explicitly recognises the will to power, slave-morality explicitly denies it. The Christian morality is characterized by him as slave-morality. The two types of morality are according to him, two types of values, they do not refer to social classes.
Master-morality should not, however, be misunderstood as involving selfishness and egoism; it consists in self-perfection and self-control, self-overcoming through the will to power. To the master good stands for success, victory and achievement of power; while 'bad' stands for failure, defeat and loss of power. The virtues of master-morality are determined by an explicit appeal to that which helps to attain self-perfection and which is good. Thus in master-morality virtues are primary, which lead one to good life. On the contrary, slave-morality gives secondary importance to virtues and primary importance to vice.

The master creates his own values by his will to power; but the slave does not create his values, he starts by having a set of values imposed upon him, which are the values of the master. However, the slave finds it impossible to become virtuous by these values. Master-morality asks him to be strong, but he is weak by nature, he has to be courageous, but he has no courage, he has to be creative and assertive, but he does not have creative power and he does not know how to assert himself. The slave cannot acquire the virtues of the master, so he wants to assert his own will to power in the face of his defeat. Failing to prove that he is strong, the slave thinks that it is not necessary to regard strength as a virtue. He regards it as a vice and feels happy that he is not tempted by it, as it is said in the Bible, 'The meek shall inherit the earth'. He always finds himself poor and so he regards wealth as a vice and the root of all evils, which one should get rid of. Thus the slave makes a trans-valuation of values and considers those things to be evils, which are regarded as virtues by the master. He now regards humility and modesty, patience and abstinence as virtues, with which he can resist temptation, and he does no longer consider himself to be a failure. He determines his morality by not asserting his will to power, and rejects those values which can not make him successful in life. Thus both
of the types of morality are expressions of the will to power. Slave-morality can have power by the express denial of the will to power.

Nietzsche was in favour of the master-morality, and his philosophy of the Superman is mainly an attempt to restore the ideals of master-morality. According to him, the prevalence and the domination of the slave-morality is due to the fact that the masters themselves have accepted the slave-morality. This had happened by the spread of Christianity which recognized Divine sanctions against the daring to be strong. But with the death of God, now there being no such sanctions, the will to power can have its free play for the establishment of master-morality that is, according to Nietzsche, the true moral ideal for man.

(iv) MAN'S WILL TO POWER

Man as an existent individual is endowed with the will to power, by the exercise of which, he can become a Superman, and that is the highest end of his life. The will to power that is implicitly present in every man has to be developed to its fullest extent and has to be cultivated regularly for becoming 'existent' in the truest sense of the term.

Nietzsche rejected Kierkegaard's religious solution to the problem of the meaningfulness of modern life, because it represents the human individual as weak, powerless and cowardly. Kierkegaard was the champion of the orthodox Christianity of the past, trying to solve the problems of modern man by turning the clock back to an older Christian absolutism that requires absolute self-surrender to God. But Nietzsche considers this to be impossible, because according to him. 'God is dead', that is to say, the belief in the existence of God has become obsolete now-a-days. With the death of God, human beings must now find the courage themselves to become gods in a Godless world. The greatest need of civilization now is to
develop a new type of individual supermen who will be hard, strong and courageous, and who will be both intellectually and morally independent. They will break the stone-slabs on which the old Judaic-Christian moral laws are inscribed—the old life-denying moral laws to which the masses are still enslaved. The only morality of the supermen will be to affirm life—to be powerful, creative, joyous and free. While Kierkegaard advises us to sink into despair in order that we can take the leap of faith to God; Nietzsche counsels us to become gods—joyous, hard and independent supermen.

Nietzsche says that he created his philosophy of the strong, life-affirming Superman, out of his will to be in good health, out of his will to live; self-preservation forbade him to practise a philosophy of wretchedness and discouragement. He experienced the problem of man in a peculiarly personal and violent form. He became a Professor of Classical Philosophy at the early age of twenty-four at the University of Basel in Germany and showed extra-ordinary literary promise. He was also a gifted musician. But he was a very delicate and sickly youth, with weak eyesight and a nervous stomach. His excessive study habits along with a weak physical constitution, had ruined his health. Thus he had experienced the way between culture and vitality. Because of his poor health, he resigned his professor-ship. However, in his study of the Greek tragedy, he had come to know Dionysus, the patron deity of the Greek tragic festivals. The cult of this God was associated with the most sublime and formally beautiful products of human art. Dionysus was the god of the vine, the god of drunken ecstasy and frenzy, who made the vine come to life in the spring and brought all men together in the joy of intoxication. Thus he united, in a miraculous way, the height of culture with the depth of instinct. Thus it brought together the warring opposites which divided Nietzsche himself. He thought that the rebirth of Dionysus might save the whole human race from
decay, as the race showed everywhere the symptoms of fatigue and decline; and he dedicated his life to the service of Dionysus.

However, Nietzsche did not stop here. Later on, he made a synthesis of the Dionysian ideal with the Apollonian ideal of self-control.

He addressed himself to Apollo as well, who would confer on man his sublating influences, and man's life would be a work of art. Nietzsche was an advocate of the aesthetic ideal and believed that man's salvation lies in the creation of a beautiful life.

Now the question is: what is the nature of the will to power? According to Nietzsche, 'will' is nothing else than 'will to power' and 'power' is nothing else than 'the essence of will'. That is to say, every will is essentially will to power, a 'will', that is not a 'will to power', is not a will proper. The 'will to power' has been variously interpreted by different scholars. While Baumler interprets it as a political power, Kaufmann thinks that it is central to Nietzsche's philosophy as the ground of his theories of master-salve morality, and the transvaluation of values, his concept of the superman and his critique of Christian morality, which make no sense without it.

The will to power is pronounced first in Thus Spake Zarathustra, where it is regarded as the foundation of all morality. According to Nietzsche, the greatest expression of power is to overcome oneself: "A tablet of goal hangs over every people. Behold, it is the tablet of their overcomings: behold, it is the voice of their will to power." (13)

In the middle 'aphoristic' period of Nietzsche's philosophical writings, 'power' is regarded as a psychological principle, in terms of which man's behaviour is explained. In his 'Genealogy of Morals' and 'Anti-christ', he criticises the Christian morality from the point of view of his will to power. Pity, gratitude,
humility and charity are regarded as expressions of the weakness of power. In this period, Nietzsche makes some comments on 'freedom'. According to him, 'one strives for independence (freedom) for the sake of power, not the other way around'. (14) His will to power does not share the Kantian or the Hegelian notion of freedom; its forcefulness lies in its connotation of struggle and fight, which is much in tune with his inclination to Darwinianism. It is from Thus Spake Zarathustra onwards that the will to power has been a central conception of his philosophy. Still his concept of the will to power has replaced the Darwinian concept of survival as the basic drive of all living beings. As he says, "Above all, a living thing wants to discharge its energy; life as such is will to power. Self-preservation is only one of its indirect and most frequent consequences."(15)

In the opinion of R.C. Solomon, "The most important employment of Will to Power, however, is the dual role as psychological theory and ethical standard. These two are not only compatible but depend on each other. The Will to Power is argued empirically as the basic human drive partly on the evidence that every morality takes the Will to Power as its implicit foundation. The claim that every morality is basically a morality of power is strengthened by, as well as, strengthens the general thesis that every human striving (all actions and values) is a striving for more power."(16)

Unlike John Stuart Mill who makes the pleasure principle the basis of his utilitarianism, Nietzsche holds the view that pleasure or happiness is not the real motive of action, not the ultimate good, but only an accompaniment of the exercise of the will to power. As he says, "The will to power is the primitive form of affect, that all other affects are merely its derivatives.....there is no striving for pleasure, but pleasure supervenes when they achieve what they strive for : pleasure is an accompaniment, pleasure is not the motive." (17)
According to Nietzsche, power is a better explanation of human behaviour than pleasure. Self-imposed human suffering cannot be explained by the pleasure-principle; but it can be well explained by the will to power. As for instance, it makes no sense to suppose that martyrs sacrifice themselves for some pleasure; they rather prove their power for endurance, and self-righteousness. However, Nietzsche does not simply want to found morality on the psychological principle of will to power, but makes the claim that every morality accepts the power-principle implicitly.

Nietzsche's concept of 'power' is like the Aristotelian concept of 'potentia'. It is the ability to overcome, the ability to be strong. 'Power' may refer to physical power for overcoming obstacles to body, political power for overcoming obstacles to society, health for conquering disease, mental power for overcoming problems, and so on; in short, 'power' stands for the ability to overcome. All overcomings are the manifestations of power; but all powers are not equal. While physical power is of the lowest type, the will to power is of the highest type. The highest will to power is called by Nietzsche 'the ability to overcome oneself', 'the ability to have mastery over oneself', 'the power of self-control'. Self-overcoming is the sublimation of impulses by reason, and as such, the will to power underlies every morality, since every morality, according to Nietzsche, aims at self-control for self-perfection.

The will to power, thus, does not stand for military strength. The powerful, according to Nietzsche, are not the politician and soldier; but the artist, the philosopher and the aesthete. The will to power is ultimately control over one's own self. It is not license, but restraint, not the power to hurt or destroy, but the power to create, to fulfil life's mission by attaining self-perfection. As Nietzsche says, "Live your life as a work of art."(18).
MAN AND SUPERMAN

From an analysis of Nietzsche's concept of morality and that of the will to power, his concept of the Superman can be explained easily. As he says, "Man is a rope fastened between animal and Superman—a rope over an abyss". (19) "I teach you the Superman. Man is something that should be overcome." (20) The Superman is the return of the master-morality, it is the ruthless search for self-perfection without any moral or religious constraint. He is the creator, the ultimate synthesis of Dionysian passion and Apollonian control. He lives his life as a work of art. He overcomes himself by controlling or sublimating all the beastly, destructive, particularly self-destructive drives within himself. The all-too-human passions would make his life too comfortable and secure, rather than creative. The superman is not really the reckless warrior, as popularly imagined; The Superman is one who succeeds in the rational mastering of instinct. But no such success is found as yet. As Nietzsche says, "Never yet has there been an Ubermensch. Naked I saw both the greatest and the smallest man. They are still all-too-similar to each other. Verily ever the greatest I found all-too-human." (21) Napoleon, the man(not the conqueror) grasped the will to power and self-overcoming, but in the end he himself had been corrupted by the means he had to employ and lost the nobleness of his character. Similarly, Julius Ceasar is often considered to be an approach to the superman, but it was due to his strong self-control, not due to his political victories. Brutus also may be said to have been an approach to the superman in so far as he had the will to power to sacrifice even his dearest friend at the time of necessity.

According to Nietzsche, the power over oneself is always greater than the power over others. As he says"; "I have found strength where one does not look for it: simple, mild and pleasant people, without the least desire to rule—and conversely, the desire to rule has often appeared to me as a sign of inward weakness." (22)
R.C. Solomon thinks that the example of Napoleon and Caesar do not fit the vision of the superman; on the other hand, the lives of Socrates, Mozart and even Jesus Christ illustrate the Superman of Nietzsche, who has always lauded the life of the ascetics and who, like Aristotle and Hegel, has all praise for the artist; the truly religious man and above all the philosopher, as the highest specimens of Man. Sometimes Nietzsche regards them as the only true human beings. (23) This specific characterization of the ideal of the superman does not stand in opposition to Nietzsche's insistence on the primary necessity of individuality. In fact, Nietzsche thinks that giving style to one's character consists in ultimately setting oneself off as unique. He even criticises monotheism in general for its insistence upon a uniform ideal for mankind. The ascetic best characterizes the superman, only because to him, power over others relative to self-control is quite unimportant. The very essence of the ideal of the superman is the refusal to recognize an ideal other than what one sets for oneself.

Unlike Darwin who considered the struggle for power to be the central drive of life, Nietzsche regarded the struggle for existence as the central life-drive. According to him, the superman will not come naturally, but on the contrary, the nearly total extinction of master-morality at the hands of the weak is sufficient historical evidence that the survival potential of the truly strong is less than that of the herd. To put emphasis upon this point, Nietzsche gives us a startling picture of the evolutionary creature which will succeed the present mankind, i.e. the last Man. As he observes, "The earth hath then become small, and on it there hopeth the last man who maketh everything small. His species is ineradicable like that of the ground-flea; the last man liveth longest. 'We have discovered happiness'—say the last men, and blink thereby". (24) The superman is a projected ideal, something to be striven for. The great suffering of the bad conscience is a
necessary pre-condition for the superman. The reason for this can be understood with reference to the parable offered by Nietzsche concerning the three stages to the superman—the Camel, the Lion and the Child. The suffering of the bad conscience is the burden of the Camel and such discipline is necessary for combating nihilism for the total independence of the Lion. The image of the Child is a symbol of rebirth, a newfound freedom to create oneself, after one has mastered the discipline of self-control. However, Nietzsche's philosophy unlike that of Lord Buddha, does not ultimately resemble the ascetic search for peaceful wisdom. While the discipline of Lord Buddha is directed towards an extirpation of passion, Nietzsche's discipline like that of a Camel is directed towards a heightening of passion together with increased self-control. For Nietzsche, the life of the superman is not a life of peace, but that of frenzy. Thus with the rejection of the thought of the East, he dramatically breaks with his teacher Schopenhauer.

In this connection, it may be pointed out that Nietzsche believed in the hereditary transmission of acquired characteristics, and he was convinced that race-mixing through marriage might be favourable to the attainment of true culture both in the nations and in the individuals. He thought that different people had acquired different valuable characteristics, and that the offspring of mixed races might be able to draw on the accumulated capital of many people. In Human, All-Too-Human, Nietzsche states that the son 'uses the father's head-start and inherits his habits'; he decries 'nationalism' as dangerous, advocates inter-marriage between different nations, and expresses his hope for a 'mixed race, that of the European man'. He thinks that it may be possible, through inter-racial marriage, to breed will, responsibility and other qualities of character, such qualities as he has in mind when speaking of 'a stronger race'. (25)

Nietzsche passes on from his concept of 'breeding' to that
of 'overcoming', and from his concept of 'overcoming' to that of 'eternal recurrence' as related to his concept of 'superman'.

(vi) THE DOCTRINE OF ETERNAL RECURRENCE

The concept of the Superman is considered to be the culmination of Nietzsche's philosophy of the will to power; but he himself considered his philosophy to be completed by a different but related doctrine, the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, according to which, every event and every sequence of events repeats itself an infinite number of times. The doctrine is important as a test for the worth of man's life and for its moral implication. The ideal of the superman is the ideal of the perfect life, and recurrence acts as a test for this perfection. The test lies in the magnification of the faults which are generally ignored. The life of the superman is a life that can treat the prospect of eternal repetition with delight. "Joy wants the eternity of all things, wants deep, deep, deep eternity." (26)

Although the main importance of the doctrine of recurrence lies in its moral implication, Nietzsche defends the doctrine as a physical or metaphysical theory having a scientific basis. His argument operates with three premises based on physical mechanics of the time: (1) the amount of energy in the universe is finite and fixed; (2) the number of possible energy states in the universe is finite; and (3) time is infinite. (will to power, 55). From these premises, Nietzsche argues that every event, i.e., every configuration of energy-states will recur infinitely many times; and similarly every finite sequence of energy-states will be repeated in one’s life and a man’s life as a relatively short sequence of energy-states will also recur and has occurred eternally.

The importance of the doctrine of recurrence does not, however, lie in its scientific sophistication, but in its ethical
implication, the effect of the recurrence on an ethical standard is the emphasis on the moment, a stress on the immediate rather than an appeal to future that is quite indefinite. According to R.C. Solomon, the doctrine of eternal recurrence can be defended on psychological ground, rather than on scientific or logical grounds. As he says, "Powerful arguments are not always valid, however, and although the ideal of recurrence may be far more exciting than Kant's categorical imperative, its defense cannot go beyond its psychic effect. The Recurrence argues that every present sequence of energy states will repeat indefinitely, and this is the reason for giving ultimate priority to one's choices of courses of action. But, according to the argument every possible sequence of energy states will repeat infinitely. This means I will also live all those lives I do not choose an infinite number of times as well. If I must choose, for example, whether to remain dedicated to my studies, I find that the doctrine of recurrence tells me that I shall enact both of these courses of action infinitely many times any way. The 'test' is therefore worthless even as a psychological test if we take the arguments for the recurrence seriously. Yet we must still conclude that the idea of the Eternal Recurrence has an impact which makes it a valuable philosophical metaphor". (27)

(vii) Man and Man: Inter-Personal Relationship

As an absolute individualist, Nietzsche considers man to be an existent individual endowed with the will to power who is solely responsible for whatever he does and what he makes of himself. Thus, in his existentialism, each and every individual human being is distinct from every other, and therefore, the usual inter-personal relationship as found in society does not fit with his system of thought. A Man is either a master or a slave, as he makes use of his will to power. Nietzsche is often regarded as an egoist, and egoism or self-interest generally stands in the way of the congenial human relationship.
However, Nietzsche has removed himself from the traditional theories of self-interest. "Nietzsche thinks that the goals that he set up, are according to him, highest and the most spiritual. These are the values of the artist, the saint, and the philosopher. These are not selfish in any meaningful sense. The values which are self-imposed in the case of these persons need a discipline which is very different from self-interested values." (28) Values are relative, no doubt, but it is not possible to judge or even compare the values of different societies unless they have something in common. There is a common element that makes possible comparative judgments of value about the moral codes of various societies. As he says, "A table of virtues hangs over every people. Behold, it is the table of its overcomings; behold, it is the voice of its will to power. Praiseworthy is whatever seems difficult to a people; whatever seems indispensable and difficult is called good; and ..........the rarest, the most difficult ....that they call holy."(29) It might seem that Nietzsche means by the will to Power, not only the will to overcome oneself, but also to overcome one's neighbour. In his discussion of the striving for excellence in the Dawn, he presents scale of degrees of excellence, and the striving to the awe and envy of one's neighbour was placed almost at the bottom of that scale than the striving to arouse his admiration or to show one's power by elevating him. But as a matter of fact, Nietzsche is ultimately concerned with self-perfection and sublimation of the baser instincts and passions, by which alone, man can lift himself to the status of supermanhood. He believes in love and friendship, peace and harmony among human beings. According to him, the highest degree of power consists in self-mastery, the ascetic is the most powerful of men. The asceticism of the most powerful men consists in the sublimation of their impulses, in the organisation of the chaos of their passions, and in man's giving style to his own character.
According to Nietzsche, "The good Four. Honest with ourselves and with whatever is friend to us; courageous toward the enemy; generous toward the vanquished; polite-always; that is how the four cardinal virtues want us." (30) Here Nietzsche wants to say that one should be honest to oneself, loyal to one's ideals, kind to others, harsh and demanding regarding one's own tasks, understanding and forgiving for the deeds of others. The values advocated by Nietzsche concerning dealings with other people are far closer to sentiments of the soft-hearted than to the merciless power-crazy tyrant. Thus, even in the predominantly individualistic philosophy of Nietzsche, there is scope for congenial inter-personal human relationship. The man-to-man relation is not for him, always a relation of enmity, and indifference, but also of love and friendship of mutual trust and fellow-feeling.

However, Nietzsche has not worked out the details of inter-personal relationship within the structure of his system of thought. Of course, he gives greatest importance to human conscience which restricts one from ill-treating others in one's passionateness and instinctiveness, and keeps one on the right track. Even "bad conscience has ........been the real womb of all ideal and imaginative events and has thus brought to light an abundance of strange new beauty and affirmation...and perhaps beauty itself. --What would be "beautiful" if contradiction had not first became self-conscious, if the ugly had not first said to itself, "I am ugly"? (31). Bad conscience is a necessary evil, it is like pregnancy through which one must pass to be reborn in beauty. With the rebirth of man, the state of pregnancy terminates. Man has, as it were, two selves...one rational and the other irrational. The rational self tries to give form to the irrational ; man tries to remake himself, to give a style to himself, by self-overcoming. If every one does likewise, then there would be an uniform life-style and consequent harmony of relation among the human individuals living in
society; and the evolution of a race of superhuman beings would strengthen further the inner cord of inter-personal human relationships. In Nietzsche's philosophy, the ideal of humanity is given the supreme importance, for the fulfilment of which what is required is not hate and indifference, but love and friendship, fellow-feeling and consideration of others for the establishment of an ideal human society, in which the Superman will be at the top of everything and guide the common men towards self-perfection in the light of conscience through self-purification and self-overcoming by the exercise of the will-to-power.

(viii) MAN AND THE WORLD

According to Nietzsche, "This universe is a monster of energy, without beginning or end.....a sea of forces storming and raging in itself, for ever changing........."(32) This powerful picture of the world is super-imposed upon the metaphor of a cosmic will in Nietzsche's concept of the will to power. Perhaps the metaphor of will as an ultimate reality underlying the particular things and events of the universe is borrowed by Nietzsche from the German Philosopher Schopenhauer who had developed a comprehensive theory of life and the world from the metaphor of will. Nietzsche had such unflinching faith in the will to power that he emphatically declared: "This world is the will to Power and nothing else: And even you yourselves are this will to power and nothing besides."(33) He was interested in and concerned with 'the world of existence' rather than 'the world of truth'. According to him, the secret to the greatest fruitfulness and enjoyment of existence is to live dangerously. (34) In contrast to the scientific and philosophical pursuit of a world of truth; a debasement of existence, he praises the life of ambiguity and danger. He holds that man's earthly life is sacred. In the Christian conception of existence, the life on earth is taken merely as a path towards sacred existence in the future; but Nietzsche takes a tragic view of
existence and says that this is the proper view for man. As he says, "...... existence is considered sacred enough to justify even a tremendous amount of suffering." (35) Again, he says that it is for"......man alone, of all the animals, that there are no eternal horizons or perspectives."(36) But the absence of eternal horizons, the lack of a rational structure or purpose in the universe, is not in itself, a justification for a nihilistic orientation. Hence, Nietzsche says, "We require, at some time, new values."(37) To be more explicit, man requires new values not only for shaping his life, but also for determining the significance of the world, in which human life is lived. According to an uncritical common sense, it is unusual to speak of man's 'determining the significance of the world', because it is presumed that either the world possesses significance or it does not, just as the beauty of the rose lies in the rose, not in the eyes of the observer. But Nietzsche interprets the subject of significance or value of the world in quite a different way. To quote him, "It is we, who think and feel, that actually and unceasingly make something which did not before exist; the whole eternally increasing world of valuations, colors, weights, perspectives, gradations, affirmations and negations...... whatever has value in the present world, has not it in itself, by its nature—nature is always worthless—but a value was once given to it, bestowed upon it and it was we who gave and bestowed; we only have created the world which is of any account to man." (38)

Here Nietzsche makes out the point that man is responsible for attributing significance to the world ; and it has remarkable similarity to Kierkegaard's assertion that man is responsible for the use to which he puts his life. But while Kierkegaard is a staunch theist, Nietzsche is a staunch atheist. Hence, according to the latter, Christianity is irrelevent to man's valuation of the world, man must make his own values because, after all, God is dead.
According to Nietzsche, the open horizon is a horizon of this world, not some true realm beyond appearance or beyond the clouds. The reality of the apparent world is not, in any way, dependent on a true world conceived serving as a transcendent ground. As he says, "......the 'true' world is merely added by a lie." (39) He rejected the notion of a world lying beyond experience ......both the Christian and the philosophical postulation of other worlds, particularly those of Kant. Both theological and metaphysical conceptions of another world are found in the philosophical system of Kant. As to the question why man should be moral, Kant's ultimate answer is that there will be a never-ending life after death, a life during which God (postulated by Kant) will reward us for our earthly virtue. Nietzsche calls Kant the 'underhanded Christian', who removed the centre of gravity for this life from earthly existence and transferred it to a life after death, where it appears in the guise of the awkwardly earthly notion of a reward. Again, in Kant's philosophy, there is also a conception of a realm of things-in-themselves, i.e. of a realm of entities whose action upon our sense-organs causes us to have experience. According to this view, the world encountered by us in our experience, is a construction, a private possession of each person having experience, rather than the commonly possessed, publicly observable world that it seems to be. According to Nietzsche, both this technical conception of another realm of existence and the theological conception of an after-life or heaven are really conceptions of what is not. The very belief that such realms are set over against this world is only a suggestion of decadence, a symptom of the decline of life. (40) But no such decadent view lies before the healthy body of which Zarathustra says: "......it speaks of the meaning of the earth". (41) According to Nietzsche, with the death of God, nobody is any longer held responsible for the world. As he says,"The concept of 'God' was until now the greatest objection to existence. We deny God, we deny the responsibility in God : Only thereby do we redeem
the world." (42) Not God, but man redeems the world by becoming himself the creator of the world, and the world thus redeemed, its new value achieved, will be a site of recovery, and a place for the Superman.

According to Nietzsche, the concept of God is hostile to life. As he says, "The concept of God was up to now the greatest objection against existence". (43) Again, "With God war was declared on life, Nature and the will to live; God is the formula for every calumny against this world and for every life concerning a beyond." (44)

While treating on biological evolution Nietzsche attacks Darwinism and says that during most of the time taken up in the formation of a certain organ or quality, the inchoate organ is of no use to its possessor and cannot help it in its struggle with external circumstances and enemies. In his own words, "The influence of external circumstances is absurdly overrated by Darwin. The existentialist factor in the vital process is precisely the tremendous power to shape and create forms from within, a power which uses and exploits the environment." (45)

Nietzsche has been also critical of Socialism and Democracy which stand against man's realization of his true self, his true existence, by disregarding his unique nature—his individuality, and the basic inequality of man. He says that Socialism can be maintained only by force and terrorism, because it demands, for the state, a power such as despotic rulers alone possess. The state intimidates man into conformity and tempts and coerces him to betray his proper destiny. Socialism as such will ultimately lead to the end of progress by engendering general indolence, and revolution will inevitably lead to a boring mediocrity and the tyranny of stupid men, a flock without a shepherd. However, in spite of his disapproval of contemporary Democracy, Nietzsche seems to be sympathetic to the truer Democracy of the future which "wants to create and guarantees

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independence for as many as possible, independence of opinions, way of life, and business." (46) According to him, "The practical result of this spreading of democratization will first be a European League of Nations." (47)

Nietzsche says that 'world-peace' can be attained not by war, but by love, by removing hatred and fear from the mind. "Rendering oneself unarmed when one has been the best-armed, out of a height of feeling—that is the means to real peace, which must always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the so-called armed peace, as it now exists in all countries, is the absence of peace of mind. One trusts neither oneself nor one's neighbour and, half from hatred, half from fear, does not lay down arms. Rather perish than hate and fear, and twice rather perish than make oneself hated and feared—this must someday become the highest maxim for every single commonwealth, too."(48)

According to Nietzsche, the potentialities of Man have not yet reached terms. The emergence of the latent destructive forces will have the way for the rise of the highest specimens of Man in the form of outstanding individuals as Super-human beings, who will form the classless society of the future. While Kierkegaard rediscovered the individual, Nietzsche made a gift of a new earth to him for his habitation as a truly existing individual with his will to power over himself and others.

"That your dying be no blasphemy against man and earth, my friends, that I ask of the honey of your soul............

Thus I want to die myself that you, my friends, may love the earth more for my sake............"(49)
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