(1) Peace Process in Nineteenth Century:

The destruction caused by international wars has compelled statesmen to turn their attention to positive construction of peace by international organization. Probably the first example of organized peace was the Olympic Truce of ancient Greeks. But on the other hand the peace of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries try to conclude general contracts which would define the possession and the privileges of all the sovereigns in the European community although the kings and queens and princes, chafing from restraint or restless in ambition, denied any international power save God and broke their oaths again and again. Nothing pricked their conscience, nothing bridled their power. The search for an enduring peace after widespread international war, nevertheless, has continued from Vienna in 1815 to San Francisco in 1945 and the states of the world, incapable of achieving security by themselves, have looked about and consulted with each other.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a large number of conferences were called for the establishment of peace. But the peace of Westphalia in 1648 was the landmark of world history, because as an
international assembly, the Congress of Westphalia bore little resemblance to the intricate organization of twentieth century peace conferences.

During the nineteenth century a large number of conferences were called for restoring peace; here a mention will be made of the Hague Conferences (1899-1907) and the Paris Peace Conference.

(a) The Hague Conferences:

During the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century two important international peace conference were held at The Hague (Netherlands) which are milestones in world history.

The first Hague Conference was called by Czar Nicholas II on 24 August 1898. All governments represented at the Imperial Court were invited, a total of 24, with indication that the conference was to deal with the establishment of peace through disarmament and pacific settlement of disputes. The conference met at The Hague in the Park House in Bosch Park from 18 May to 29 July, 1899, with major statesmen present. The United States was represented by Ambassador Andrew D. White, former President of Cornell University, Seth Low, President of Columbia University, Stanford Newell, minister to the Netherlands, Captain William Crozier of the army, Captain Alfred T. Mahan of the United States Navy and G.F.W. Holls of the New York bar. Baron de Steal of Russia was...
chosen Chairman. The conference failed to reach agreement on disarmament but agreed on conventions concerning the pacific settlement of international disputes, the rules of land warfare (based in considerable measure on the United States code of land warfare issued during the Civil War), and the application of naval war of the principles of the Geneva Convention of 1864 for care of the sick and wounded in war. Declarations prohibiting the launching of projectiles from balloons, the use of poison gases (not accepted by United States and Great Britain), and the use of dumdum bullets were also approved.¹

The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes codified the experience with arbitration during the nineteenth century with attention to proposals made by International Law, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and Resolutions of the British and American Parliaments and of many peace societies. Efforts to create a genuine court of international justice and to confer upon it obligatory jurisdiction were unsuccessful though states were urged to conclude conventions, agreeing to arbitrate future disputes, and many did so.²

(b) The Second Hague Conference:

The second Hague Conference of 1907, though first proposed by U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, was officially convened by Nicholas II. This Conference sat
from 15 June to 18 October 1907, and was attended by the representatives of 44 states. Again the proposal for the limitation of armament failed of acceptance. The conference did however adopt several conventions relating to such matters as the employment of force for the recovery of contract debts; the rights and duties of natural powers and persons in war on land and sea; the laying of automatic submarine contact mines; the status of enemy merchantship; bombardment by naval forces in wartime; and the establishment of an international prize court. The conference of 1907 renewed the declaration prohibiting the discharge of projectiles from balloons but did not reaffirm the declarations prohibiting asphyxiating gas and expanding bullets. The final acts of the conference were the unanimous acceptance by the delegates of the principle of compulsory arbitration and the stating of a number of resolutions, the first of which was the recommendation that another conference be summoned in eight years, thus establishing the concept that the best way to handle international problems was through a series of successive conferences. Although the conference scheduled for 1915 failed to meet because of the outbreak of the first world war, the conference idea strongly influenced the creation of the more highly organized League of Nations after the war.
A leading feature of the Hague System was its approach towards universality whereas the first conference was attended by only twenty six states, and bulk of the Latin American republics. Thus, the world achieved, in 1907 its first General Assembly; as the President of the conference put it, "This is the first time that the representatives of all constituted States have been gathered together to discuss interests which they have in common and which contemplate the good of all mankind". This was a significant step towards broadening the focus of international diplomacy, towards escaping the increasingly unrealistic European-fixation and defining more accurately the boundaries of the community of nations with whose problems statesmen had to deal.  

The Hague concept was not revolutionary; it pointed towards encouragement of avoidance of war and mitigation of the evils and barbarities of warfare rather than recision of the legal of status to make war, and toward the evolution of tolerable conditions of international life within the multistate system rather than drastic transformation of the system itself. But the business of the hague was clearly the reform of the rules and methods of the system, rather than the solution of the problems arising out of the particular cases of conflict within the system.
The urge toward institutionalization was expressed first in regard to the Hague Conferences themselves. At the 1907 assembly, the view clearly predominated that these should be not simply Hague Conference, but a Hague System. The concept of regular, periodic international conferences, which had received acceptance as a basic plank in the platform of the concept of Europe, was reintroduced. The interval between the two Hague Conferences had been eight years, and the American representatives in 1907 favoured the establishment of machinery by which future conferences would be regularly convened without the necessity of initiatory action by any state. This proposal was not fully accepted, but the second conference did recommend "the assembly of a Third Peace Conference, which might be held, within a period corresponding to that which has elapsed since the preceding conference, at a date to be fixed by common agreement between the powers". This action led Joseph H. Choate, a member of the American delegation, to comment:

"Friends of peace; friends of arbitration, may now be depended upon it that every seven or eight years there will be a similar conference, and that where the last conference left the work unfinished the new conference will take it up, and so progress from time to time be steadily made". The hope for a reunion at the Hague in 1915 was dashed by the outbreak of a general war, but the
revitalization of the idea of a regular assembly of the nations was to prove a more significant event than the gentlemen of 1907 could have imagined.\textsuperscript{6}

The Hague approach to the problem of peace was distinctly rationalistic and legalistic. The focus on the peaceful settlement of disputes was a clear indication of the underlying assumption that war was a product of misunderstandings and emotional flurries that could be eliminated by elucidation of the facts in dispute, clarification of the applicable law, and invocation of the calmness and self-possession of reasonable men. This reliance upon rational prudence and the judicial temper may have been excessive. Postponing evaluation, let it be said here that it was, for better or for worse, a leading characteristic of the Hague approach which was transmitted to subsequent conferences on international organization and is today a significant element in the operative theory of international organization. The Hague ideal of rationally self-restrained states submitting to a kind of Olympian judgement has not been realized, but neither has it been abandoned.\textsuperscript{7}

Almost everyone is for peace in the abstract and is likely to be for war in certain specific situations; thus international organization is likely to attract a volume of enthusiastic verbal support from public opinion when it works against war which may prove to be meaningless and
ephemeral when it throws its influence against wars. On the other hand, experience shows that statesmen are unlikely to develop deep interest in the process of international organization, conceived as an approach to problems of peace in the abstract. The leaders of governments are almost by definition men who are preoccupied with the events and dangers of the present, with the crises of the moment, and they are not inclined to attach much importance to activities directed toward the solution of less concrete and immediate problems.

The problem cannot be solved simply by avowing that statesmen are selfish and short sighted and should become world minded and farseeing. Some change in that direction is essential but it is equally necessary for international organization to achieve a proper balance between the projects of building a world system and of solving current international difficulties, between transforming international relations in the long run and saving international peace in the short run. This present problem of international organisation was foreshadowed at the Hague Conference.

Once more, and with still more ominous significance, the most sustained exertions of the delegates were devoted to further elaboration of laws of war. In the development of peaceful institutions, their achievements were hardly perceptible to reach agreement between the great powers and the small on the method of
appointing the judges, and the scheme had to be abandoned. Proposals concerning obligatory arbitration came to nothing, again owing to German obstinacy; and the delegates contented themselves with a formula which shows only too clearly the completeness of their failure. The convention of 1899 had stated, as already recorded, that arbitration was in certain cases the most effective and equitable mode of settlement. To this the convention of 1907 added this paragraph: "consequently, it would be desirable that, in disputes regarding the above mentioned questions, the contracting powers should, if the case arise, have recourse to arbitration, in so far as circumstances permit".  

Though it reached agreed texts on some other matters of less importance, the second Hague Conference was on the whole much less encouraging than the first of those who hoped that the power might be wise enough to put an end to that international anarchy which could end only in war. Its most significant act was to resolve to meet again in eight years, without waiting to be convoked by the Tsar or by any government; and to setup a preparatory committee two years before hand, with the mandate of collecting and studying the proposals which could be submitted to the conference. This decision was deprived of all effect by the outbreak of the First World War. But it was a true international act, indicating that even the
dreary diplomatic conference which had dragged on for over four months at the Hague had developed the first beginnings of a corporate life.\textsuperscript{10}

During the Twentieth Century the first of outstanding international stature to bring up the idea of peace coercion in the present century was Theodore Roosevelt, proponent of the "international sheriff". He spoke of such a scheme in a message to congress in 1904. In an address delivered to the Nobel Prize Committee at Oslo in 1910, he advocated a forceful combination of those great nations which sincerely desire peace\textsuperscript{11}.

In June of the same year, a resolution was submitted to the Congress by Bartholdt from Missouri and Bennet from New York, and received the consent of both Houses. To limit armaments, mankind was invited to consider the expediency of constituting the combined navies of the world into an international force for the preservation of universal peace.

(2) Peace efforts during the Twentieth Century:

We have seen that it was a common failure of wisdom and decency that led the nations into war. By subtle distinctions between predisposing and determining causes it may be possible to pin most of the immediate responsibility for the outbreak of the war should rest on certain politicians and military chiefs in the three great autocratic empires - Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary.
At present we know enough and only enough to say quite
definitely that no one nation is entitled to cast the
first stone or adopt an air of moral superiority over
others as regards the origins of the war. We are not only
all in the same boat, we are all tarred with the same
brush. 12

When the First World War broke out all talk and
thought of peace was silenced and forgotten. The nations
of Europe stumbled into war, understanding little what
they were doing, why they were doing it, or what
irreparable destruction and misery awaited them all.
Powerful and exciting emotions filled the hearts of the
peoples - patriotic fervour, military enthusiasm, the will
to conquer or die. The plans for a general strike in
Germany and France were swept away as though they had
never existed: except for a few extremists, the socialist
parties in every country were as ready to work and fight
for victory as any of their fellow citizens. Even the most
rigorous upholders of the theories of pacifism were forced
to realize that if they attempted to make themselves heard
they were merely encouraging the enemy in his hopes of
winning. 13

Political leaders on both sides claimed to be
fighting for a durable peace. Such words in a Germany
completely controlled by the Army Command could mean
nothing except a peace which left Germany supreme in
Europe coming from Asquith or Vivani, they were sincere, but indefinite. Edward Grey was without doubt the only responsible statesman among the belligerents who in the first months of the war, had already formed the outlines of a plan for peace.14

During the first winter of the war, a slow change of mood came over the scene. Both sides still hoped for victory; few foresaw that there were still four years of fighting ahead; but all vision of swift and splendid triumph had faded away. Month by month it became more and more evident that, even for the winner, the advantages would be less and the cost greater than man had realized at the beginning. Slowly the feeling grew that all this should never have happened and that the nations must find some way to ensure that it should not happen again.15

Here, then, was the effective spring and motive of the movement which was to bring the League of Nations into existence. It was a movement inspired, indeed, by hatred of war; but it was not a pacifist movement. On the contrary, it was everywhere based on the conviction that any effective system for the prevention of war must be backed by the United force of peace-loving states. Nor was it directly concerned with the problem of bringing the world war to an end, though many of those in Britain and America who joined in promoting it hoped that their proposals might lead public opinion in Germany and Austria to turn against their military rule.16
(a) Paris Peace Conference (1919):

The peace conference which met at Paris in January, 1919, provided a far from perfect environment for the birth of the League of Nations. The delegates who met there, the political leaders and the victorious Generals of the Allied powers, were in a hurry. They were driven by the demands of their war-sick peoples. It was their job to usher in the new era, when, all over the world, there would be peace. Peace, but little enough goodwill. The four years of the war (1914-1918) had not only left millions of dead on the battlefields of Europe; it had also maimed the minds of those who survived. The war had exalted nationalism, enthroned hate, nourished a huge appetite for revenge. The Germans must be punished, the Germans must be made to pay. The Germans must be made important; never again could they be allowed to take up arms to march against their neighbours. The bureaucrats at Paris, the representatives of the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay, were sceptical and intolerant of new concepts for conducting the affairs of man such as world forum and an international court. They knew that the old tried ways in which they had been trained and to which they were dedicated, were the best ways nation to nation, secretly behind closed doors in the language of diplomacy. Everyone at the Conference wanted peace all right, but, in all but a few, the dominating ideas of how that peace should be achieved, of how the new world should
look like, of the materials with which it should be built, gave little hope that man had learned his lesson. 17

After the overthrow of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, the Allied statesmen met at Paris to decide the future map of Europe. The choice of Paris as the venue of the conference was not a happy one; that was due to the fact that a lot of fighting and destruction had taken place in the neighbourhood of Paris and unhappy memories and associations were bound to have their effect on the compulsions of the conference. It would have been better if some other suitable place in Switzerland had been chosen for that purpose. However, the conference met at Paris and President Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando played a very important part in the deliberations of the conference. The work of negotiation was not an easy one. Germany had surrendered on the basis of Fourteen Points of President Wilson, but those could not be made the basis of settlement. They had to be adjusted to fit in with the secret treaties among the Allies regarding the distribution of the possessions of the enemies. The force of circumstances compelled president Wilson to compromise on many points.

When the delegations assembled in Paris, then, there was, particularly among the British and French, this distrust of the president's intention and a resentment of
his intellectual and moral arrogance. Nevertheless, although the French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, presided over the main conference, American president Woodrow Wilson's role as a great peacemaker was freely conceded. It was under his chairmanship that a committee was set up to draft the Covenant of the League of Nations, the statement of aims, responsibilities of membership, the rule by which it should conduct its business and the precept for corporate action, which was at once, the foundation stone of the League of Nations and also the holy book to which, throughout its life, members so often turned for guidance and authority. The creation of the covenant was the supreme work which had brought Woodrow Wilson to Paris. The word 'Covenant' he chose himself, because he said; "I am an old Presbyterian and the setting up of the League of Nations should be an internal part of the business of the Peace Conference, indeed that it should be given major priority, taking precedence over even the most pressing of all the massive and bitter problems associated with the redrawing of borders and the award or surrender of territory". It was Wilson who said that there should be no distinction between the Covenant and the Versailles Treaty (1919). They should not be considered as separate entities; nations which ratified the Treaty pledged themselves to observe the terms of the Covenant. 18
Given the haste with which delegates were expected to put the world rights and the animosities which were already beginning to fester, it would not have been surprising if the Covenant had been a shoddy, inadequate thing. The chances of its commanding universal confidence were not improve by the restriction of membership of the drafting committee to representatives of the Allied Powers. Initially, too, it was weighed heavily in favour of the five great powers, the United States, (but it should always be remembered that United States could never become its member). France, Italy, Japan and the British Commonwealth, each of which had two spokesman, while five other countries, Belgium, Brazil, China, Portugal, and Serbia, were allowed just one each. It was only after these small powers had protested that four more representatives, from Greece, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, were admitted. There was no question of neutrals being included and even when they were consulted later it was only informally. The defeated had no say whatsoever. The way in which the Convenant was drafted and the League established lent substantial justification to the charge, which was frequently to be levelled by Germany, that the league of Nations was really no more than a "Victors Club".19
3. Peace efforts in the post Second World War Era:

"Three monstrous wars have led to three sane attempts to institutionalise peace by international organization. The consuming struggles of Napoleon drove the world powers to consultation, the raw excesses of the First World War which cost no less than 180 billion dollars and ten billion lives, further impelled men and women to seek a system of collaboration against international violence; and out of the man to the Second World War, more terrible than all the hecatombs of the past, came the plans for the United Nations".

- Prof. Gerard J. Mangone

Instinct to fight, which almost an animal instinct, is inherent in human nature since the creation of human life. With the advancement of science and technology, the art of fighting underwent tremendous change resulting in the invention of tools to fight. The fight is replaced by war. The history of our civilization is in fact the history of wars which man has fought against man. The fear of death, destruction and annihilation which directly accrue from war, has made human mind to search for means to avoid war. This rational urge found its manifestation in the form of the League of Nations after the First World War. This was the first organization of its kind which had been incepted at the world level. Unfortunately, the human desire for peace was shortlived as then followed the
Second World War. This war unleashed destruction and annihilation. A sizeable number of people lost their lives. It was the failure of the League which led to the outbreak of the Second World War, the most horrific, so far in human memory. A greater need for peace was felt by human mind and this led to search for an effective international alternative to guarantee peace and security. Protracted deliberations and mutual negotiations led to the inception of the United Nations Organization in 1945.

It is true to say that the foundation of the United Nations were laid on the ashes of the League of Nations because League of Nations failed to prevent the War and promote the cause of peace. It was the year of 1939 that Second World War broke out. Millions of people were killed. The loss of property was incalculable. The use of an atom bomb at Hiroshima (6 August 1945) and Nagasaki (9 August 1945) in Japan by United States of America shook the world. It brought untold sorrow and suffering to mankind. The Second World War once again compelled the nations of the world to endeavour to establish an international organization which could prevent future war and maintain international peace and security in the world. So, it was the reason that during the Second World War itself the great powers had started making efforts in this direction. Their efforts led to the holding of the San Francisco Conference in which the UN charter was adopted and signed by 51 nations of the world. After the
Charter was ratified by the prescribed number of states, it came into force on 24 October, 1945. Thus the United Nations was finally established. It may however, be noted that it was the uniting efforts of a number of countries which led to the establishment of the United Nations.

It is not possible to appreciate the post war peace treaties without reference to the conferences, declarations and decisions arrived at by the statesmen of the United Nations during and after the Second World War.

United Nations is an organization established to maintain international peace and to foster international cooperation in the resolution of economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems. The UN was founded on 24 October 1945, when the major powers ratified the Charter that has been drawn up earlier in the year in San Francisco, there were 51 founder members including the USA which thus abandoned the isolationist stance it had taken to the UN's predecessor, the League of Nations. Most of the countries of world are now members of the United Nations, the chief exceptions being North and South Korea, Switzerland and Taiwan, which lost its seat to the Peoples Republic of China.

The name United Nations was coined by President F.D. Roosevelt in 19141 to describe the countries fighting against the Axis. It was first used officially on 1 January 1942, when 26 states joined in the Declaration by
the United Nations pledging themselves to continue their joint war efforts and not to make peace separately. The need for an international organization to replace the League of Nations was first stated officially on 30 October 1943 in the Moscow Declaration issued by China, Great Britain, United States and the former USSR. At Dumbarton Oaks Conference (September-October, 1944) those four countries drafted specific proposals for a charter for the new organization. Not until the Yalta conference (4-11 February) Great Britain, the United States and the USSR reached agreement on the "Veto" system of voting in the Security Council. 21

At the San Francisco Conference the UN Charter was voted and was ultimately unanimously adopted. The Charter did not come into force immediately after its adoption. It was provided that the Charter would come into force only when China, France, Britain, America and Russia signed and ratify it. This requirement was completed on 24 October 1945 and consequently the Charter of the United Nations came into force from that date. Every year 24 October is observed as United Nations day.

(a) Potsdam Conference: (17 July to 2nd August 1945)

An important meeting of the principal Allies in the Second World War (the United States, the USSR, and Great Britain) was held to supplement, clarify, and implement agreements previously reached at the Yalta Conference. The
meeting is also known as the Berlin Conference. The chief representatives were President Harry S. Truman, Premier Joseph V. Stalin, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and after Churchill's defeat, Prime Minister C.R. Atlee. The foreign ministers of the three nations were also present.22

The conference discussed the substance and procedures of the peace settlements in Europe but did not attempt to write peace treaties. That task was left to the council of Foreign Ministers. The chief concerns of the Big Three, their foreign ministers, and their staffs were the immediate administration of defeated Germany, the demarcation of the boundaries of Poland, the occupation of Austria, the definition of the Soviet Union's role in Eastern Europe, the determination of reparations and the further prosecution of the war against Japan. The amity and goodwill that had largely characterized former wartime conferences was missing at Potsdam, for each nation was most concerned with its own self-interest, and Churchill particularly was suspicious of Stalin's motives and unyielding position.23

The main theme of the Potsdam declaration was the liquidation of Germany's military power.

4. Peace Treaties:

According to the Potsdam agreement the Big Three (American President Truman, Soviet Premier Staline, and
British Prime Minister Attlee), decided to establish a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the preparatory work for the peace settlement. It was also decided that the Council was to meet the London where its headquarters were fixed. So it is the reason that the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was held in London between 11 September - 2 October 1945, the meeting ended in a stalemate. An interim meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Big Three powers was held in December 1945 in Moscow. The procedure with regard to the preparation of the peace treaties was agreed upon. The second meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was held in Paris in April and May, 1946 and June and July 1946. The same old differences arose among the powers and very little progress was made. Mr. Byrnes, American Secretary of State, was forced to observe that "The Council of Foreign Ministers was formed to facilitate and not to obstruct the peace". Ultimately, after about 15 months of preparatory work, the peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland and Rumania were given a final shape by the 21 participating countries. The Conference adopted 107 recommendations. The next meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was held in New York in November and December 1946. The final shape was given to the five treaties and these were signed in Paris on 10 February, 1947 by the representatives of the five enemy states and the Allied States.
(a) Italian Peace Treaty:

The Italian Peace Treaty, the longest of the five negotiated in 1945 and 1946 and the only one to be concluded with a major Axis power by all major Allies, was in general considered first by the Council of Foreign Ministers and at the Paris Conference. In instance in which the provisions of the five treaties were similar, agreement on the clause in question for the Italian Treaty generally meant agreement on the same clause in the other four treaties.24

While there was no formal decision to have a draft treaty prepared for the London Council meeting by any particular state, the Council took a United Kingdom draft, together with a suggested directive from the Council to the Deputies submitted by the United States, as the bases for later discussions. These two provided the outlines of the treaty eventually concluded.25

Certain problems which developed during the negotiations assumed such importance that the fact of all five treaties depended on their resolution. Some, such as the future of the Italian colonies, were never "settled" in the treaty but rather postponed for future discussion. Others, particularly Trieste and reparations, led to most of the deadlocks and delays that featured the sixteen months of actual negotiations.
Main consideration of the Italian Treaty at the Paris Conference took place in three Commissions: The Political and Territorial Commission for Italy on which all members of the Paris Conference but Norway were represented, held 43 meetings under the chairmanship of the Union of South Africa; Senator Tom Connally, James C. Dunn and Samuel Rober represented the United States.

The Economic Commission for Italy, of which again all but Norway were members, held 39 meetings with India as chairman; Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Willard L. Thorp and J.J. Reinstein represented the United States. Twenty one meetings of the Military Commission were devoted to the Italian Treaty; Poland furnished the Chairman for the Commission, on which Vice Admiral Richard Coloddy, Brigadier General J.D. Balmer, Captain Roland F. Prye, USN, Theodore C. Achilles, Lieutenant Colonel R.G. Stilwell, and captain William J. Galloway, Jr., represented the United States. Italy submitted to the conference in all 53 documents commenting on various aspects of the draft treaty and Mr. de Gasperi, Italian Foreign Minister, made an oral statement to the Conference on 10 August. At the conclusion of the work of the Commission, the Conference spent four plenary session, from 7 to 10 October, 1946 in general debate and voting on the various articles of the Italian Treaty.
The Treaty with Italy contained 90 Articles and 17 annexes. Italy was to give to France small districts in the regions of Little St. Bernard, Mont Thabor Chabertan, Mont Ceins, Tenda and Briga. She was to give to Yugoslavia, Zara, Pelagosa, Lagosta and other islands along the Dalmatian coast. The Istrian Peninsula and most of the remainder of the province of Venetia, Guilia, with Trieste were to become a "free territory to be governed under statute approved by all Security Council. Italy was to give up her sovereignty over African colonies. She was also to recognise the independence of Albania and Ethiopia.

Italy was to submit to the demilitarisation of frontiers with France and Yugoslavia. She was not to have atom weapons, guided missiles and guns with a range over 30 kilometers. She was not to have mines, torpedoes, aircraft carriers, submarines, etc. She was not to have more than 200 heavy medium tanks. Her navy was reduced to 2 battle ships, and 25,000 officers and men. Her army was reduced to 250,000. The air forces was reduced to 200 fighters and reconnaissance and transport aircraft to 150. Italy was to pay to the Soviet Union 100 million dollars in 7 years. She was to pay to Albania 5 million dollars in 7 years.
(b) Bulgarian Peace Treaty:

The Bulgarian Treaty had a preamble similar to that of the Italian Treaty. Its territorial clause provided simply that Bulgaria's frontiers should be those of 1 January, 1941. This meant that the Southern Dobruja, which had been transferred to Bulgaria in 1940, would remain Bulgarian. The Political clauses referring to civil liberties, the suppression of fascist activities, and the surrender of the war criminals were identical with those in the Italian treaty as were the military clauses relating to new weapons. The Bulgarian Army was not to consist of more than 55,000 men, the antiaircraft artillery force of more than 1,800, the navy of more than 3,500, or the airforce of more than 5,200. The navy was not to be limited 7,250 tons, the airforce to 90 planes. Installations for offensive warfare were not to be maintained along the Greek frontier. As for reparations, raw materials and agriculture products to the value of $70,000,000 = $45,000,000 to Greece and $25,000,000 to Yugoslavia, in addition the Soviet Union was to be accorded little to most German assets in the country. Aside for a special clause providing for free navigation of the Danube River, the rest of the treaty was also similar to the Italian.27

(c) Hungarian Peace Treaty:

The draft Hungarian Treaty submitted to the Paris Conference by the Council of Foreign Ministers provided
for the return of Hungary to its 1 January 1938 borders, although decision on the Czechoslovak-Hungarian frontier was tentative pending consultation with the two governments concerned. The frontiers with Austria, Yugoslavia and Soviet Union were confirmed by the Paris Conference without alteration or dissent. Indirect cognizance was taken of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Agreement of June 1945 by which the Soviet Union obtained the Subcarpathian Ukrain (Carpatho-Ukraine or Ruthenia) for prior to that transfer, the Soviet Union and Hungary had not had a common frontier. In reaffirming the 1 January, 1938 frontier between Yugoslavia and Hungary. The Treaty complemented Article 2 of the Hungarian Armistic under which Hungarian forces were withdrawn from the Brachka-Baranja area in northern Yugoslavia which Hungary had occupied from 1941 to 1945.28

The treaty with Hungary had 42 Articles and 6 annexes. Her frontiers of 1 January, 1938, with Austria and Yugoslavia were restored. She had to give to Yugoslavia three villages west of the Danube. The Vienna award of November 1938 was cancelled. The result was that Transylvania went to Rumania. The army of Hungary was limited to 65,000, airforce to 5,000 and air planes to 90. Hungary was to pay 200 million dollars to the Soviet Union and 50 million dollars each to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.
d) Rummanian Peace Treaty:

The Peace treaty with Romania had 40 Articles and 6 annexes. Her frontiers of 1 January, 1947 were restored. Her army was limited to 120,000, anti-aircraft artillery to 5,000, navy to 5,000 men and 1,500 tons; Her air force was reduced to 8,000 men and 150 airplanes, she was to pay 303 million dollars to the Soviet Union in kind in 8 years.

e) Finnish Peace Treaty:

The Peace Treaty with Finland had 36 Articles and 6 annexes. Her frontiers of 1 January, 1941 were restored. However the province of Petsamo was to be given to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Finnish Peace Treaty of March 1940 was restored. The Soviet Union gave up the lease hold at Hnago and acquired 50 years lease of Porkkala-Udd area for a naval base. The Finnish army was limited to 34,400 navy to 4,800 men and 10,000 tons and airforce to 3,000 men and 60 airplanes. She was to pay 300 million dollars to the Soviet Union in kind over 8 years from September 1944 onwards.

f) Japanese Peace Treaty (1951):

Meanwhile, the United States government had grown increasingly impatient about maintaining an expensive, and, in its judgement, no longer necessary occupation of Japan. Consequently, in 1950 President Harry S. Truman circularized the various governments that had been wartime
allies, proposing the drafting of a Japanese Peace Treaty. A special presidential mission then visited many capitals, including Tokyo, and formulated terms that the majority world accept. A conference was called to meet in San Francisco on 4-8 September, 1951 and 51 nations including the USSR, agreed to send representatives. Although the Soviet, Czchoslovak, and Polish delegates did so. An adequate number of governments then ratified the document and it came into force on 28 April, 1952.

Making no reference to war guilt, the preamble merely asserted that the Allied powers and Japan were "resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those of nations which, as sovereign equals, cooperate in friendly association to promote their common welfare and to maintain international peace and security". It stated that Japan would apply for membership in the United Nations and conform to the principles of the United Nation Charter. By the territorial clauses of the treaty, Japan recognized the independence of Korea and renounced all claims to Taiwan (Formosa). The Penghu Islands (Pescadores), the Kuril Islands, the southern part of Sakhalin, and the mandates which she had held from the League of Nations. It stated that it would concur in any United States proposals to make the Ryukyu Island, the Bonin Islands, the Volcano Islands, Parece vela, and Marcus, Island into United Nations trusteeships under the exclusive control of the United States. 29
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14. Ibid., p.17
15. Ibid., p.16
16. Ibid., p.17