In the period immediately preceding the First World War the Muslim community was in the process of undergoing a thorough metamorphosis. The moderate leadership had been relegated to the background and radical Muslim leaders were catching the imagination of the Muslim masses. Even the Muslim League had not been able to escape from these influences and its 'creed', as has been seen in the foregoing pages, had been redefined at the Lucknow session, March 1913, which was reiterated at the Agra session, December 1913, to approximate with the Congress goal of Swaraj wherein its President Sir Ibrahim Rahmatulla said, "....No country such as India is, can remain for ever under foreign rule, however beneficent that rule may be; and though British rule is undoubtedly based on beneficence and righteousness, it cannot last for ever ... India is our motherland, our proud heritage, and must in the end be handed over to us by our guardians ...' The World War brought these developments to a climax. The most effective catalyst in this regard was the entry of Turkey in the Great War on the side of the Axis Powers, which necessarily brought her in opposition and conflict with Britain. In view of the emotional

dedication of the Indian Muslims to the fate of Turkey, this created severe dilemma for the community.

Moderate and radical Muslim leaders alike, as stated earlier, realized the difficulties Turkey would create for the Muslims by entering the war. The moderates knew that the community would be torn between England and Turkey, for support for the former would be offensive to their religious sentiments, while support for the latter would not be compatible with their status as British subjects. The Aga Khan with his friend, Abbas Ali Baig was very active in dissuading Turkey from joining the Axis powers. He got in touch with the Turkish ambassador but in vain.

The radicals, too, were forced with a dilemma of their own. In the event of Turkey's participation in the War their course would be clear — to support Turkey, and this would bring them into open conflict with the authorities at home. In the earlier events of the Balkan war, their vigorous support for Turkey had not brought them in confrontation with the Government, but now the position would be different. Not that

2. Graduated in 1878 from Bombay University; served Janjira state as Dewan 1886-1889; Fellow of Bombay University, 1887; Dewan of Junagadh, 1906-1910; appointed member of the Indian Council in place of Bilgrami, 1910. Glasgow University conferred on him the degree of LL.D., 1912; Knighted.

they were afraid of crossing words with the authorities -
their main concern was that any false move by them might react
to the detriment of their co-religionists in India. Therefore, initially, the attempt of the moderate and radical Muslim leaders was to persuade Turkey to refrain from joining the war. The radicals - Maulana Muhammed Ali and Maulana Zafar Ali in particular - appealed to Turkey to desist from participation in the conflict by indicating the difficulties such a course would create for Indian Muslims. However, these approaches bore no fruit, and Turkey declared war on the Allies and simultaneously called upon Indian Muslims to declare Jehad against the British Government in India.

The British authorities realised the gravity of the situation and the implicit danger of Muslim disquietude. To dispel Muslim apprehensions, they announced that Britain would ensure the immunity of the holy places of Arabia and Mesopotamia and the port of Jeddah against the effects of warfare. The indication was also given that Britain did not seek to dismember or destroy Turkey, but was forced to press an armed campaign on Turkish soil only as a part of the wider anti-Axis

4. The Comrade, November 7, 1914; The Tribune August 28, 1914.
strategy. This modified Muslim sentiments to some extent, and the moderate leaders took the initiative to pacify Muslims, and indeed to mobilize their support for the British effort.

The council of the All-India Muslim League and its London Branch expressed 'deep-rooted loyalty and sincere devotion of the Mussalmans of India to the British Crown' and assured the Viceroy that the participation of Turkey in the war could not affect the loyalty of the Indian Muslims. Aga Khan and Abbas Ali Baig visited Egypt, tried to remove the uneasiness among the Muslim soldiers garrisoned there and told them the injunction of Islam for 'the duty of being true to the salt of the Sarkar under whose aegis they enjoyed complete religious liberty...'. The Aga Khan came out with a more conciliatory programme, accepted the indignation of the Mussalms due to Turkish loss of sovereignty in North Africa and Balkan, and the treatment of British with the Indians in South Africa, but he praised the British for Minto-Morley reforms and assured the Muslims of the British support in their nation-building activities. Ameer Ali also addressing an audience eulogised

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6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., Secretary of State to Viceroy, November 7, 1914. See also The Tribune, November 6, 1914.
9. The Edinburgh Review, January 1914, pp.1,10. See his article 'The Indian Moslem Outlook'. In another article 'Turkey and the Moslems' he explained the British policy towards the Holy Places of Islam. See the Asiatic Review, November 16, 1914, p.493; See also a speech of Aga Khan in the Time, October 2, 1914 in which he said that the Mussalms 'would never break down the strong wall of their
the British system of equality and justice and told the Muslim soldiers to do their best on all fronts. Haji Muhammad Ishaq, Secretary of the Aligarh College, in a telegram conveyed their sincerest cooperation to British and Haji Rahim Bukhsh in his Presidential Address to the 28th Session of the Muhammadan Educational Conference held at Rawalpindi assured their fidelity to the British Raj.

However, the anti-Turkish and to a degree anti-Islamic statements of British statesmen which came to the notice of Muslim leaders and divines in India proved the undoing of the policy of the Indian authorities and moderate leaders, and created widespread restlessness among Indian Muslims. The Muslim radicals who had been very active during the Tripoli and Balkan wars and who were calmly watching the trend of British diplomacy, seriously took to the statements of Lloyed George (1863-1945) and Lord Asquith (1853-1928) who publicly declared

10. The Times, December 17, 18, 1914.
12. Started career as a teacher; appointed Manager of Karnal State, 1901-1903; Private Secretary to Nawab of Bawalpur; Chief Judge of Bawalpur; Foreign Secretary to Bawalpur States, 1905; C.I.E., 1909; K.C.I.E., 1919; presided Muhammadan Educational Conference, 1914 and 1919.
14. One of the most brilliant statesmen; Prime Minister of England, 1916-1922; a radical reformer and leader of Britain in World War I.
15. Prime Minister of England, 1908-1916; and leader of the Liberal Party.
that 'Turkey is to be wiped off the map of the world.' The remarks of Lloyed George on Islam and the Holy Prophet further added fuel to fire. Religious heads and radical Muslim leaders called upon the Muslims to exert themselves to safeguard Turkey and Islam. Countless pamphlets supporting the Turkish cause and inflammatory speeches condemning the British policy were in the air. This was felt by the British authorities and Lord Willingdon, the Governor of Bombay, in a letter to Hardinge wrote: 'Really our politicians at home are helpless. They do not seem to know, or care to try and realise, the true situation here and they make your task and that of your subordinates doubly difficult.' Hardinge accepted the fact and wrote back to Willingdon: 'Asquith is so much imbued with the "bag and baggage" policy of Gladstone that he evidently felt compelled to give vent to his feelings. Personally I quite agree with him on the occasion, although I never did before, but it is the very last thing in the world that I would say except in a private letter to you. Whatever people may think, there is absolutely no doubt that the Indian Mohammedans feel very strongly any diminution of the authority and territory

16. Hardinge Papers, July to December 1914, See Nawab of Rampur's telegram to Viceroy, October 21, 1914. Sir H.C. Butler also wrote to Hardinge that the speech of Asquith was untimely (Butler to Hardinge, November 12, 1914).

17. Ibid., Lord Willingdon to Hardinge, November 12, 1914.
of Turkey, since they realise that it is the only Mahomedan Power ... that can be said to hold any position among the nations of Europe. Consequently even the most loyal do not want to see Turkey absolutely crushed and wiped off the map of the world, and that is what these foolish people at home cannot see'. This reply amply justifies that the British were not friendly to Turkey and the Muslims of India even the loyalists did not look upon the British without suspicion. The Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaba formed to protect the holy places of Islam created considerable ferment among the Muslims. A number of Pan-Islamic pamphlets were found in currency which exhorted the Muslims to do and die for the cause of Islam. Some of the pamphlets mentioned about the maturity of time for the overthrow of the British rule in India. At Lucknow and the Punjab the topics of discussion were Balkan, Gallipoli, Persia and Afghanistan and a great Muhammadan rising supported

18. Ibid., Hardinge to Willingdon, November 16, 1914.


by Germany was feared.

The radical Muslim leaders—Maulana Muhammad Ali, his brother Shaukat Ali (1873–1938), Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Maulana Zafar Ali etc. —called upon the Muslims through their fiery public speeches and writings in their journals to rise up in revolt against the imperial regime, and not to be misled by any offer of constitutional reforms. Maulana Muhammad Ali in his historic essay 'The Choice of the Turks' condemned the British policy. 'Let us repeat,' he concluded, 'that whatever England may do to Turkey or Egypt, our anchor holds. All truly loyal people have closed the chapter of civic controversy with the officials ... Even if the Government were to concede to us all that we ever desired or dreamt, if, for instance, the Moslem University were offered to us on our own terms, or the Press Act repeal were to be announced or even if self-government were to be conceded to us, we would humbly tell Government this...

22. Ibid., See Secret D.O. 41-103, S.B. January 18, 1916 from the Hon'ble Mr. C.A. Barrow, Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab to the Hon'ble Mr. H. Wheeler, Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

23. The elder brother of Muhammad Ali; graduated from Aligarh and took service in Baroda State in the Police Department; left service in 1910 and became Private Secretary to Aga Khan; elected Trustee of M.A.O. College, 1905; founder member of All-India Muslim League; organised Old Boys Association; organised Muslim University Fund Collections; founded with Maulana Abdul Bari Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Kaba; edited Hamdard with Muhammad Ali and interned with him during war; organised Khilafat committee and activism the Khilafat Movement; attended Round Table Conference at London, 1931.
is no time for it, and we must for present decline such concessions with thanks. Concessions are asked for and accepted in peace. We are, not Russian Poles, we need no bribes.' Maulana Azad and Maulana Zafar Ali in their papers Al-Hilal and the Zamindar respectively wrote very inflammatory articles, exciting Muslim feelings against the British and asking them to subvert the British rule. So powerful were their articles that whosoever read them called their editors 'very truculent and dangerous.' The influence of their speeches and writings was so great that the Comrade was forced to suspend its publication and its press with its security of Rs. 10,000 being confiscated; the Al-Hilal and the Zamindar met the same fate and while Maulana Muhammad Ali was interned Azad and Zafar Ali were strictly warned. The Government used all sorts of repressive


27. Government of India, Home Department, Pol1.A. Proceeding November 1914, Nos. 33-38. The entry of a number of other Papers were banned. Some of them were the Ghadar, the Ghadar Ki Gunj, the Jehan-i-Islam, the Hindustan, Zulum Zulum, Qoray Shahi Zulum, Al-Jehad etc. etc. See also Government of India Home Department, Poll.A, Proceeding October 1915, No.671-684 & K.W.
measures against these leaders and others accused of conspiracy. The policy of repression, far from suppressing the Muslim unrest, stoked its fires all the more. With the result that in many areas of India especially in Sindh and the North-Western regions a number of spontaneous terrorist conspiracies and activities were initiated. The proclamation of the Sultan of Turkey which indicated the fear of British attack on Mecca attracted students of Lahore who left their studies to join the *Mujahideen* on the western frontier of India. Abdul Ahad, a moulvi of Lahore, visited Mirza Mahmud Ahmad of Qadian, the head of the Ahmadiya sect and inquired from him regarding the interpretation of certain passages in the Quran on the subject of *Jehad*. A report had also gained currency in Jabalpur that two emissaries had been sent by the local *Mussalmans* - one to the Punjab and other to the *Nizam* of Hyderabad - with the message that *Muhammadans* should seize the present opportunity to revolt against the British. In Lahore city a gang with bombs and arms, contemplating an attack on the armoury and magazine was captured. In Rawalpindi and Firozpur efforts to approach the troops


was detected. A mutineer named Jalal Khan was arrested who disclosed the authorities that he had previously fought against the Muslims, but now he would not fight against the head of religion, the Sultan of Turkey.

About the year 1914, a Turkish paper known as Jahan-e-Islam of Constantinople achieved great popularity among the Indians. The paper contained articles in Arabic, Turkish and Hindi. Its Urdu text was prepared by Abu Syed, a resident of the Punjab who left for Egypt about the time of the outbreak of the Turco-Italian War. Copies of the paper were very easily accessible in Calcutta and Lahore containing anti-Christian overtone. In the issue of November 20, 1914 the paper quoted a speech of Enver Pasha in which he said: 'This is the time that the Ghadr should be declared in India, the magazines of the English should be plundered, their weapons looted and they should be killed herewith ... Hindus and Muhammadans, you are both soldiers of the army and you are brothers, and this low degraded English is your enemy; you should become ghazis by declaring Jehad, and by combining with your brothers, murder the English and liberate India.' This enboldened the people of


31. Hardinge Papers, January to June 1915, Governor of Stratis Settlements to Viceroy - February 20, 1915.

India and the anti-English echoes were heard in many places. The paper was proscribed.

The Turkish involvement in war affected the Cis-and-Trans-frontier Pathans. The Afghans were quite ready to attack the British on the frontier. The Amir of Afghanistan had engaged Turkish official as Military Instructors and a higher Turkish official was in Afghanistan to induce the Amir to conclude a treaty of alliance with Turkey. A good deal of drilling and recruiting was in progress in Afghanistan. In frontier people generally conceived Jehad a necessity and the Amir of Afghanistan to join them. A strong disinclination to fight against Turks existed among Pathans and Afridis and recruitment of these classes seriously affected the mobilization. Hardinge wrote to Meston: '...it is quite on the cards that within a few weeks there will be a general jihad preached ... This will make our position on the North-West Frontier extremely difficult, for our military position there is decidedly weak, and I do not feel that in such circumstances we shall be able to rely implicitly on the staunchness of our Mahomedan troops.' The Allies


35. *Hardinge Papers, Viceroy to the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, January 11, 1915.*

operation against Constantinople was seriously felt as the Indian Muslims did not like the humiliation of Turkey. It affected the Muhammadan troops in France.

At this time the Ghadr Party founded in 1913 of expatriate Indian nationalists were planning an uprising in India. Geneva in Switzerland and later Berlin in Germany served as the headquarters of the Ghadr Party with Shyaaji Krishna Verma, Virendra Chattopadhyay (brother of Sarojini Naidu), Tarak Nath Das, Champak Raman Pillai, Lala Har Dayal and Barkatullah, as their leaders who spearheaded the movement to bring about the downfall of the British Empire. The British were alarmed of their propaganda and the German support to the revolutionists.

Parallel to the Ghadr Party the Deoband Dar-ul-Ulum which had come into being in the middle of the nineteenth


39. Deoband is a small town in the district of Saharanpur (U.P.) Here in 1857 a small Arabic Madrasah was raised to the status of a Darul-Islam. It played a conspicuous role in the struggle for freedom against the British. It trained religious leaders, the prominent being Muhammad Qasim Nanavtavi (1837-1880) and Rasheed Ahmad Gangohi (1828-1905). Both were the disciples of Haji Imdadullah who migrated to Mecca in 1857 after his unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the British yoke. W.C. Smith says that Deoband school 'was founded by men who had fought in the 1857 struggle ... to produce a corps of 'ulama', devoted to the cause of Islam and the freedom of India.' See 'The Ulama in Indian Politics in Politics and Society in India, ed., C.H. Philips (London 1968) n. 61
century under the shadow of the great catastrophe of 1857 to uproot the British Imperialism was very active. The Turco-Balkan episode fanned the fire and brought Aligarh and Deoband somewhat close to each other. But Aligarh during the World War re-changed its course of thinking and once again wore the gown of loyalty. Nevertheless Deoband school continued with its old programme and attempted to mobilise Muslim support for the revolution planned by them. A conspiracy was hatched by Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hasan (1851-1920), popularly known as Shaikh-ul-Hind to oust the foreign rule. He is said to have imbibed from his reputed teacher, Haji Imdadullah, all the qualities of a stubborn revolutionary, having a keen desire to end British rule.

During the Great War his name was household for his pro-Turkish attitude. He and Maulana Azad, being the closest friends, fought shoulder to shoulder with the weapon of underground activities against the British rule in India and abroad.

40. Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hasan was a favourite student of Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanutawi and a disciple of Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi of Deoband School.

41. Haji Imdadullah was one of the Moulvis who fought ferociously against English in 1857 at Shamli. He commanded the army of the Moulvis. After his defeat he left India and settled down at Mecca-Madina and came to be known as Mahajir-e-Meccai.

The Shaikh-ul-Hind plotted to bring Afghanistan and Iran close to each other and sought military support from Turkey to attack India. On receiving a letter from the Shaikh the Amir of Afghanistan called a meeting of his nobles and asked them if he could join the war on behalf of Islam and were they ready to support him? They replied in the affirmative. The nobles then toured the country and reported the Amir that a million of men would be raised to fight against the British. The Sittana Colony of the Northern Indian frontier had still the remnants of Syed Ahmad Shaheed's followers. Hundreds of students of the trans-frontier came to study at Deoband and returned home with anti-imperialist sentiments. The Government suspected them and kept a close vigilance over their activities.

In 1909 Shaikh-ul-Hind organised a Jamiyat-ul-Ansar.

Secret meetings were held at his residence and men like Maulana Asad, Jassat Mohani (1877-1951) and Hakim Ajmal Khan partici-
pated in it. Secret correspondence was also going on among them. In 1915 he sent Maulvi Obeidullah Sindhi (1872-1944) to Afghanistan to prepare and finalize with the Ghadr Party the programme to overthrow the British. He reached here with his three companions—Abdullah, Fateh Muhammad and Muhammad Ali. But on the eve of his departure Obeidullah had founded a school in Delhi in which two books preaching militant fanaticism to Indian Muhammadans and impressing on them the supreme duty of Jehad were prescribed for students as compulsory reading. The object of the books was obvious—'to promote a great Muslim attack on India which was to synchronize with a Muslim rebellion.' Maulvi Obeidullah Sindhi contacted the members

47. Government of India, Home Department 1916, F.No. 45.

48. Obeidullah Sindhi was born of Sikh parents in the Punjab. In his teen he embraced Islam and left home. Thirst for Islamic knowledge took him from one place to another till he came to Deoband in 1889. Under the guidance of Sheikh-ul-Islam he became an arch-rebel against the imperialists. Besides other activities, mentioned above, he founded the Indian National Congress in 1923 at Kabul. He went to Moscow and Turkey to contact Lenin and Sheikh Abdul Aziz Chaos. He was accompanied by a band of revolutionary Muslims, prominent being—Maulvi Basheer, Dr. Rahmat Ali, Dr. Noor Muhammad, Iqbal Shaedai, Fateh Muhammad, Muhammad Ali, Ahmad Hasan, Comrade Kushi Muhammad, Maulvi Zafar Hasan Panipati, etc. etc. For detail see Moulana Obeidullah Sindhi by Professor Muhammad Sarwar (Urdu).

49. Sedition Committee Report, 1918, p.177. The whole book Naqsh-e-Hayat by Syed Hussain Ahmad Nadni (1964) bears testimony to these facts. See also Government of India Home Department, Police Deposit January 1916, No.47. Subject—Further Correspondence regarding Muhammad Hasan of Deoband College and report of the result of an interview His Honour the Lieutenant Governor of the U.P. had with Shams-ul-Ulema Maulvi Muhammad Ahmad of Deoband.
of a Turco-German mission and the leader of the Ghadr Party to seek their help. Both the Shaikh-ul-Hind and Obaidullah Sindhi were included in the provisional revolutionary Government set up in Afghanistan by the Ghadr Party.

In 1915-16 when the war was in full swing the Shaikh proceeded to Hejaz to contact the Turkish Government for military aid to finalise his projected fighting against the British arms in India. In Delhi the Shaikh was greeted with great honour by a large crowd, prominent among them being Dr. A.A. Ansari who motored him to his residence. According to Mrs. Ansari, the doctor had given the Shaikh a large sum of money and that 'she had overheard conversation between them about Medina and Anwar Beg.' Dr. Ansari's brother escorted him to Bombay. His contacts with Ghalib Pasha, the Turkish Governor at Madina and Anwar Pasha, the Turkish Minister of War, convinced him of all possible assistance. A most reliable man Moulvi Muhammad Mian Ansari who accompanied the Shaikh to Hejaz was sent to Maulana Sindhi with a declaration of Jihad against the British. While coming to Kabul, Muhammad Mian Ansari distributed copies of this document, known as the 'Ghalibnama' among the frontier tribes. The photostat copies of their agreement were also

secretly sent to India on the pieces of cloth and therefore this came to be known as 'Silk Letter' conspiracy.

A provisional Government of India after the overthrow of British power was also planned with Raja Mahendra Pratap (1886-1979) as its President, Barkatullah (d. 1928), a member of the Ghadr Party, its Prime Minister, Shaikh-ul-Hind, as its Commander-in-Chief and Maulana Obeidullah its minister. Letters to the Governor of Russian Turkistan and the Czar of Russia were sent, inviting them to end the British rule over India. Madina was to be the headquarters of the proposed provisional Government. Other headquarters were to be established at Constantinople, Tehran and Kabul. From Madina the Shaikh intended to come to North Western Frontier of India, a place from where the great Mujahid, Syed Ahmad Shaheed (1786-1831),

51. The Times, September 17, 1918; The Sedition Committee Report, 1918, p.177. See also Government of India, Home Department, Poll, July 1918, No.39.
52. In 1914, Mahendra Pratap was granted a passport to travel in Italy, Switzerland and France. In Geneva, he met Har- dayal, the revolutionary leader and the founder of Ghadr Party, who introduced him to German Consul. He then visited Berlin. He is still alive and is living near Mathura.
53. Son of a servant of Bhopal State, Barkatullah visited England, Berlin and Japan. When Hardayal started the Ghadr Paper in San Francisco in 1911 whose object was to preach murder and mutiny to Indians against the English, Barkat- ullah assisted him; appointed a Professor of Hindustani at Tokyo from where he edited an anti-British paper called 'The Islamic Fraternity' which was banned by the Japanese authorities; died in 1928 at California.
54. W.W.Hunter says that Syed Ahmad Shaheed's spiritual gifts were soon recognised, and his disciples rendered him 'menial services' and men of rank used to run 'like common servants, with their shoes off, by the side of his palanquin.' See The Indian Musalmans (London 1872) p.77.
started his campaign in the nineteenth century. But the routes going to Kabul were unsafe and possibilities of the plan being detected were apprehended. Meanwhile the Britishers were busy with their own diplomacy. Brisk correspondence was going on between the Governor-Generals of India and Sudan to instigate Sharif Husain (1853-1931) of Mecca to revolt against the Turkish domination. To the Governor-General of Sudan Sir Reginald Wingate, Hardinge wrote: 'I quite share your view that the present Sharif of Mecca would be a most suitable successor to the Sultan of Turkey as Khalif. From all accounts, he is a very ambitious man, hates the Turks and is anxious to be free of them. I still think, however, that it is too soon to make any move, and that to do so would probably do the Sharif more harm than good. We must wait till the Constantinople is fallen and the Sultan has been driven into Asia Minor, so that Mahomedans may generally realise that his temporal power is broken. That will be the moment for us to come forward and encourage the Sharif to declare himself ...(Caliph).'

Efforts were made to come into direct communication with the Sharif and some ways were founded out. Sir Reginald wrote to Hardinge: 'Now that we have succeeded in getting into direct communication with the Sharif of Mecca, I am very hopeful that it will be possible to give some practical assistance to the

anti-Turkish movement in Arabia. ..." After a while with the help of the British, Sharif Husain of Mecca revolted against the Turks and threw off the Turkish yoke. Lord Chelmsford (1868-1933) the Viceroy, wrote to Austin Chamberlain (1863-1937), the Secretary of State: "Our difficulty throughout is that we do not feel that we have clean hands. The instigation of the Sharif and the bombardment of Jeddah would, if known, create a very unfavourable impression. We are already suspects as to this and we have to keep our mouths closed with regard to these matters." In India the British gave great publicity to the Arab revolt, painting them as original Muslims fighting against Turkish tyranny in an effort to rally the support of Indian Muslims for the Arabs, and thus turn them away from the

56. Ibid., Sir Reginald Wingate to Hardinge, September 23, 1916.

57. Chelmsford Papers, April to December 1916, Viceroy to the Secretary of State, August 26, 1916; See also Hardinge Papers: May 1915-March 1916, see encloser attached with the letter of Sir Reginald sent to Hardinge, July 19, 1915.


59. The Secretary of State for India in the Ministry of Lord Asquith, 1915-17; also acted as Foreign Secretary 1924-1929.

60. Chelmsford Papers, April to December 1916, Chelmsford to Chamberlain, June 30, 1916.
Turkish camp. They even toyed with the idea of declaring Sharif Husain as the Caliph to divert Pan-Islamic sentiments in India away from the Turkish Sultan and associate them into the Arab leaders who supported the British cause. But this attempt was not successful, for the Muslims of India tended to regard the Arab rebels as betayers of the Islamic cause and feared the probable devastation of the holy shrines in the event of a Turco-Arab war. Even among the moderates in the Muslim League, there was no enthusiasm for the Arab revolt. The revolutionary and radical movements among the Muslims had been suppressed, yet they succeeded in the sense that the foundation of a radical political tradition had been laid among the Muslims. The profound unrest that had been stirred in the Muslim community continued to smolder, and was inflamed once more, at the time of the Khilafat agitation in a very intense form.

The Shaikh was called upon to issue a Fatwa, declaring the Sharif as Khalifat-ul-Muslemeen and that the Sharif was right in attacking the Turks in Decca and turning them out. But he refused to sign it as he did not accept the contents of Fatwa. Shaikh's activities were keenly watched since his arrival as he was out and out a revolutionary. He was, therefore, arrested and deported to Malta as a state prisoner where he was kept till 1920. It was during the Arab revolt against the Turks.

61. Government of India, Home Department, Political July 1918.
through the British diplomacy that the feelings of the Indian
Mussalmans were deeply hurt.

The attitude of the Muslim League on the Arab revolt
was obvious. The Council of the All-India Muslim League met
at Lucknow and recorded 'its deep abhorrence' for the Arab
rebels headed by the Sharif of Mecca, 'whose outrageous conduct
might have placed in jeopardy the safety and sanctity of the
Holy Places of Islam in Hedjaz.' The resolution also called
Sharif's 'sympathisers as the enemies of Islam.' The attention
of Raja of Mahmudabad was drawn to the distorted version of the
resolution by the Anglo-Indian Press who wrote to the
Viceroy that it was right that the Government of India should
know of the true Muslim attitude. The Secretary of State did
not like the League's attitude and wrote to the Viceroy: 'Your
difficulties are great and the future of the Arab movement is

62. Government of India - Home Department, Political July 1916,
Proceeding No. 26. Fortnightly reports on the internal
political situation with special reference to the war rece­
ived from all the provinces for the second fortnight of
June 1916. Keeping in view the profound Muslim unrest dis­
cussed in the preceding and the present Chapter, it is
difficult to agree with Dr. S.R. Mehta's assessment that
'Hardinghe's policy of trust and conciliation had done much
to restore the waning faith and confidence of educated
Indians in the British Government'. A large section of the
Muslims had actually lost confidence in the British Govern­
ment. (See India and the Commonwealth, p.66).

63. Chelmsford Papers, April to December 1916, Viceroy to the
Secretary of State, July 7, 1916.

64. Ibid., See letter of the Viceroy to the Secretary of State,
July 21, 1916.
not clear, but we obviously cannot tolerate the open support of the Turks which was recorded in the Lucknow resolution.'

At this time there was emerging among the Muslims a third party - intermediate between the moderate 'loyalists' and the extremist 'radicals.' This party of constitutionalist liberals was represented by leaders like M.A. Jinnah who had joined the League in 1913 and who had retained his Congress membership also. The liberals discarded the passive loyalism of the moderates and the revolutionary anarchism of the radicals. They adopted the programme of the latter and the constitutional method of the former, and sought further constitutional advances from the British authorities. They were inclined to work with the Congress, but desired the Congress to change its attitude towards the Muslim League and the separate electorates. They desired the League and the Congress to work together for further constitutional changes in India. The Congress under 'moderates' and the 'moderates' and 'liberal' sections of the League had been working to help the Indian Government in its war effort and hoped that the British Government would in its turn grant further reforms in India. Jinnah's efforts had brought the Congress and the League nearer to each other and a stage had reached when it was considered a crying need to hold annual sessions of both the organisations simultaneously to take a

65. Ibid., Secretary of State to Viceroy, August 3, 1916.
unanimous decisions on issues affecting both the communities. Aga Khan wrote to Hon'ble Sir Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy Thabhin that if the Congress met in Bombay in 1915 the League should also have its session in Bombay. Thus he foreshadowed some sort of union between the League and the Congress. Jinnah, true to his liberal ideology, also believed in the above rapprochement and wrote to the Secretary All-India Muslim League at Lucknow that there was a strong feeling amongst the Mussalmans that the League's annual session should be called at Bombay. But there was a considerable opposition to this as well. A conservative section of the Mussalmans maintained that it was an effort of the liberalists to merge the League with the Congress which they considered detrimental to the larger interests of the Muslims in India. Moreover, they also felt that it was impolitic to present any scheme of constitutional reform which was to be presented by M.A. Jinnah in the League session.

Jinnah, to counteract the propaganda, issued an appeal stating that there was no truth in the baseless statement made in some quarters that the Muslim League would be merged into the Indian National Congress. He declared that his object was to

66. Home Department, Delhi Records - Political (A) Proceedings February 1916, Nos. 425-428. Subject: Regarding the meeting of the Moslem League held at Bombay in the week of 1915.

67. Ibid., See Jinnah's letter to Wazir Hasan, April 12, 1915 with 29 signatories favouring the calling of the League's session in Bombay.
call a conference in collaboration with the Congress to frame a scheme of reform to be presented to the Government of India. But despite Jinnah's clarification the Muslim opinion continued to oppose any plan for the session of Muslim League at Bombay. Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy who occupied an outstanding position in Muslim League circle wrote to Jinnah that the opposition was considerable and it would be foolish to ignore it. "There is a growing feeling in Bombay", he wrote, "that a meeting of the Muslim League is, for political reasons, inadvisable at a time when war with Turkey may still be in progress and when the question of the future of the Caliphate and other matters of the utmost importance to Islam, may as yet be undecided." At long last, the liberalists gained an upper hand and it was agreed upon that the League would appoint a Committee empowering it to confer with such political and other organisation as it might deem fit with a view to framing a scheme of reform having due regard for the needs of the Mussalmans besides passing a resolution of loyalty to the Government. The Congress and the League were to be presided by Lord Sinha (1863-1928) and Mr.

70. Ibid., See Enclosure C.
71. Satyendra Prasanna Sinha : Called to the Bar, 1866; acquired great distinction in Law and became the standing Counsel of the Government of India; a moderate in politics; an...
Mazhar-ul-Haq respectively. Such a perfect unanimity of views had reached between both the Presidents that comparing the tone of their Presidential Addresses Maulana Muhammad Ali humorously remarked: "So rapid had been the progress of the Mussalmans that a mildewed critic from among their own community observed that Lord Sinha, the Bengalee President of the Bombay Session of the Indian National Congress, had travelled thither by the same train as his Behari neighbour and brother-lawyer who presided over the Muslim League, and the two had borrowed one another's Presidential Addresses in order to compare notes. By some unfortunate mistake, Lord Sinha read out the halting and hesitating address of the ever loyal Muslim while the ever loyal Muslim read out the piquant and pungent address of the ever disloyal Bengalee (laughter). But, said the critic with more wit than wisdom, the two Presidents forgot to take back their own productions, and by an irony of fate Maulana Mazhar-ul-Haq had read to his Muslim audience as his own the pungent oration characteristic of the Bengalee, and Lord Sinha had done

(Continued footnote from the previous page)

active member of the Congress from the beginning; presided the Congress session, 1915; a member of the Bengal Executive Council, 1917; went to England as the Indian representative to help the Secretary of State in the Imperial War Conference; raised to the peerage; under-Secretary of State, 1919; Governor of Bihar and Orissa, 1920: returned 1924.
likewise and read to the Congress delegates the cautious and halting address of the 'ever loyal' Muslim.'

Before the commencement of the proceedings of the League at Bombay in 1915, Hasrat Mohani, gave notice to the chair of his intention to move an adjournment for not taking any resolution save that of loyalty to the 'crown'. Having finished his speech, the President Mazhar-ul-Haq asked Jinnah to move his resolution. But Hasrat Mohani raised a point of order and said that his motion for adjournment must be discussed first. The President thereupon ordered him to sit down and not to dictate the chair. Cries of sit down, sit down were also heard. But Moulvi Abdul Rauf, former Secretary of Anjuman-e-Ziaul Islam of Bombay, who was sitting on a front row rose and shouted that Mohani should be given a chance to speak. He held that they would not rely on a Kafir Mussalman who did not dress like a Mussalman and keep beard. This divided the House. Confusion arose and wild scence of disorder ensued. Moulvi Abdul Rauf was followed by Abdullah Samad Khan, head of the Pathan community and Sardar Suleman Cassim Haji Aitha C.I.E. to the dais. The Pathan leader objected League's proceedings being conducted in English and pleaded its substitution by Urdu or Persian. Suleman Cassim Aitha also objected the proceedings of

73. Mohammad Noman, op.cit., p. 146.
the League being conducted in English. Criticising the participation of Congressmen in the League session, he charged them for transacting business for the Congress in the name of League. Acrimonious slogans were raised and tumult prevailed. Hasrat Mohani was brought to the dais who explained that it was not advisable to raise the question of self-Government or reform till the war lasted. Finding themselves helpless to control the furious mob and apprehending the worst they managed to send the ladies by car through the back door and adjourned the meeting.

The next day the League session met in the Taj Mahel Hotel, Bombay, under closed doors and it was there that M.A. Jinnah was able to move a resolution that a committee be appointed to prepare a scheme of reform for consideration of the British Government.

It is the opinion of some writers that rowdiness was caused by the effort of the English officials who wanted to prevent League from passing resolution on 'Self-Government and constitutional reforms.' The presence of the Police and


Rao Bahadur C.H. Setalvad, Acting Presidency Magistrate outside the Pandal, was also objected to. While the Government records throw no light on it or it merely defends its action, the leaders of the League had much to say about it which go to prove the above apprehension. After the session was over Raja of Ahmadabad called on the Lieutenant Governor of U.P., Sir James Meston, and in an unpleasant tone he said "... the All-India Moslem League was forcibly broken up through official agency. The Commissioner of Police, Mr. Edwards, collected a number of Badwashes, armed with pistol and sent them into the meeting to break it up, standing at the door of the pandal himself, while this went on we were not fools, and we did not lose our temper over this piece of official tyranny." In an excited tone he again said that they 'must be prepared with a new form of administration' and that 'in five years India must have either self-government or martial law.' Jinnah also complained later that the session of the All-India Muslin League was allowed to be broken up under the very nose of the police. Thus it appears that the authorities were indirectly trying to disrupt the business of the League. The presence of scores of C.I.D. and police men in civilian dress in and outside the Pandal was obviously to make the session a failure.

75. **Hardinge Papers, January to March 1916, Sir James Meston to Hardinge, 31 January 1916.**

76. **Ibid.**
The other reason for the disturbance was Shia-Sunni faction. The Sunni believed that the Shia being more advanced educationally and economically profit themselves more by the attainment of self-Government. The Khojas and Bohras could have availed of those opportunities better than the Sunnis. It was declared to be a Shia meeting and not to be called an All-India Muslim League because the Bombay Presidency Muslim League, a branch of the All-India Muslim League, had been kept in dark about the Bombay session of the League and well-known spokesmen of the Muslim community as Maulvi Rafiuddin Ahmad, Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola and Fazulbhoy Chinoy had been ignored. The move to form a new Muslim organisation was therefore also taken with Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola as its head. This appears from the letter of C.H.A. Hill, member of the Viceroy's Council, who was as a matter of chance staying in the Taj Mahal Hotel Bombay those days. To the Viceroy he wrote:

"In his Presidential address wisely delivered in English, so that the Sunni should not understand, Mazhar-ul-Haq broke the spirit of compromise ... His speech was far more malicious than was reported. When the Sunnis read the translation of his speech next day in the vernacular papers they were furious at the breach of faith and felt (rightly) that they were being made cat's-paw by the Congress extremists and Mrs. Besant and

they were being used as the stalking horse to facilitate the merger of the League and Congress with the Home Rule League. Hence the Break-up. Luckily there was no violence." Secondly the handbills distributed by the League invited people to come and see Moulvi Mazhar-ul-Haq. The majority of the Muslims considered him very learned exponent of Islamic teaching but when they found him clean shaven, dressed in European costumes they were extremely shocked. Lord Willingdon also wrote the same to Hardinge:

"I, really, am delighted the way things have gone here... all went well, more particularly the break-up of the Moslem League. The Lucknow patriot will soon realise that the Sunnis are not to be dragged at their tail and I rather gather that the latter may start a separate organisation."

Thus it is clear that while Government had its own strategy to check the rise of League, the conservatives were also alarmed at the prospect of a close collaboration of League with the Congress. But the liberals ultimately triumphed and continued to gain an upper hand till the end of war when the Radicals captured the League with Khilafat as their main issue.

