As we have seen, from the turn of the century the Muslim community (i.e. the articulate section) was in profound turmoil over various developments, and their concern for cultural solidarity led them to assert their political identity. The leaders of the community, drawn from the aristocratic and land-owning classes, considered a loyalist orientation towards the Government to be best suited to Muslim interests. The British Government, in its turn, was extremely satisfied at 'the pulling back of sixty-two millions of people from joining the ranks of the seditious opposition.' The Anglo-Muslim conciliation was further cemented by the grant of separate electorates in the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 to the Muslim League which was to consolidate and perpetuate this alliance in the best interests of the Muslims. But a momentous internal change was going on in the Muslim community. The tempo of Anglo-Muslim co-operation could not be maintained for long, and soon there arose compulsive forces which were to force the Muslim League away from passive loyalism, and the Muslim community into political activism. These forces were the products of the following factors.

(A) THE EMERGENCE OF MUSLIM MIDDLE CLASSES

in Muslim political life,

The emergence of other classes whose interests, attitudes and activities were at variance with the upper-class 'elite' hitherto dominating the community, took place in the Muslim public life at this stage. With the spread of education to new sections of Indian Muslims and their becoming aware of the conditions and developments in different parts of the country, new elements entered in their 'political thinking.' These 'new sections' were the Muslim middle classes, especially their youthful elements 'who were educated and vocal ... (and) ... outgrew their dependent position without the imperial system, and began also to express their dissatisfaction.' There were two distinct trends in these emergent classes.

1. The 'liberal constitutionalism' of the Congress moderates like Gokhale had its echo in Muslim circles in men like Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Mazhar-ul-Haq. They insisted on the rights of Muslims to retain their political and cultural identity but, nevertheless, 'felt that Hindus and Muslims should get together to evolve a common nationality and serve their country by awakening public opinion in support of political

2. K.P. Karunakaran, Continuity and Change in Indian Politics (Delhi 1964), p. 12ff.

reforms.' They were not loyalists like the Siala Deputationists, but had faith in 'constitutional' methods, and were totally opposed to 'agitational politics.' It is significant that Jinnah, the perfect representative of this school, was initially a Congresseman; retained his Congress membership till 1920 forced his two sponsors - Maulana Muhammad Ali and Syed Wazir Hasan at the time of his enrolment in the League in 1913 to make a solemn preliminary covenant that 'loyalty to the Moslem League and the Moslem interest would in no way and at no time imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national cause to which his life was dedicated.' In his speech, at the annual session of the Bombay Provincial conference, at Ahmedabad, in October 1916, he said, obviously addressing his remarks to the Hindus:

"As far as I understand the demand for separate elect-
torate is not a matter of policy but a matter of necessity to the Muslims, who require to be roused from the coma and torpor into which they have fallen for so long. I would therefore appeal to my Hindu brethren that in the present state of


position they should try to win the confidence and trust of the Muslims, who are, after all, in the minority in the country. If they are determined to have separate electorates, no resistance should be shown to their demands. And in his Presidential Address to the Muslim League, at its Lucknow session in December 1916 he observed: 'Towards the Hindus our attitude should be of good-will and brotherly feelings. Co-operation in the cause of our motherland should be our guiding principle. India's real progress can only be achieved by a true understanding and harmonious relations between the two great sister communities. With regard to our own affairs, we can depend upon nobody but ourselves.' These indicate sufficiently the political philosophy and programme of the liberal school.

(ii) Akin to the 'Extremists' in the Congress there arose a school of 'Radicals' in the Muslim community, whose leaders were not necessarily members of the Muslim League. Like the Extremists, these radicals too were motivated by a religious fervour. Since the Mutiny of 1857 there was an anti-British tradition in Muslims which continued unabated in the orthodox religious circles despite the efforts of Sir Syed

6. Cited in H.V. Hodson, op. cit., p. 16.

Ahmad Khan. These radicals felt that Muslims could gain much in politics having come to a political alliance with Hindus while keeping their separate religious entity. The most important representative of this school was Maulana Shibli Numani (1857-1914). He asked the Muslims to disavow religious exclusiveness with regard to all India problems and to fight for India's freedom in concert with the other religious communities. A staunch critic of the short-sighted policies of the Muslim League leadership he propagated through his articles, the need of a comprehensive and constructive political and economic programme like that of the Congress. In his article entitled, A Turning Point in Muslim Politics, Shibli compared the political and economic programme of the League with the Congress and denounced not only the Leagues but the very root from which the Muslim League was born i.e. Sir Syed's policy of loyalty, co-operation and constitutionalism. To him the articles of Viqar-ul-Mulk could have been effective had he not advised the Muslims to be aloof from the Congress. If Dadabhai


9. A series of articles of Shibli were published in the Muslim Gazette, Lucknow on February 12, March 4, October 9, 1912. These were later on compiled and entitled Maqalat-e-Shibli.

10. See Maqalat-e-Shibli, Vol.8, Azamgarh, 1938, p.158.
Naoroji (1825-1917) could win the parliamentary election in England, Gokhale could lay the foundation of the grand Reform scheme of 1909 and if the Parsi community with its total population of one lakh could not be swept away by the Hindus how could the Muslims with 5 crores of population be assimilated by the Hindus, he asserted. He desired the involvement of the Muslim masses in political activity through a concerted programme of mobilizing Muslim opinion by using mass media, public meetings and local branches of political parties. But his main emphasis was on Hindu-Muslim unity and a joint Hindu-Muslim effort to attain their political goals. His above quoted article which runs into three dozen pages is the most penetrating analysis of Muslim politics, convincing them to join hands with their countrymen and assuring them the sincerity of others towards them.

In 1911 this trend in Muslim politics was represented by two radical leaders—Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958) and

11. Son of a Parsi Priest, educated at Elphinstons College, Bombay; Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy, 1854; Professor of Gujarati at University College, London; worked for the East India Association; advocated admission of Indians in the Civil Service, 1870; A.P. for Central Finsbury, 1892-5; Presided National Congress, 1886 and 1893; author of many papers and books.


Maulana Muhammad Ali (1878-1931). The political programme of these two leaders, though not exactly the same, was quite similar, but they differed considerably in their political philosophy.

Mohiuddin, popularly known after his pen name as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, was a great theologian and his political approach was imbued with religious sentiments. But he used Islam not to assert the separate identity of the Muslims, but to arouse the fervour of nationalism among them. Unlike many other Muslim leaders who were dissatisfied with British Government on sectarian and religious grounds, Azad joined the nationalist movement, primarily on political grounds. His political beliefs were moulded by his visit to some Arab countries in 1908, where he came across a number of young radicals. According to Azad, 'Contact with these Arab and Turk revolutionaries confirmed my political beliefs. They expressed their surprise that Indian Muslims were either indifferent to or against nationalist demands. They were of the view that Indian Muslims should have led the national struggle for freedom, and could not understand why Indian Muslims were mere camp-

14. Mushir-ul-Haq says that Maulana Azad started his career as a member of an Indian revolutionary party in Bengal. But this phase of his life was very short. See Muslim Politics in Modern India (Deerut 1970), p. 78.
followers of the British. I was more convinced than ever that Indian Muslims must cooperate in the work of political liberation of the country. Steps must be taken to ensure that they were not exploited by the British Government. I felt it necessary to create a new movement among Indian Muslims and decided that on my return to India, I would take up political work with greater earnestness."

On reaching India, Azad started an Urdu journal Al-Hilal (The Crescent). Its first number was published in 1912 and marked a turning point in the history of Urdu Journalism. It 'created a revolutionary stir among the masses' and headed 'a powerful political awakening in the land.' The unprecedented popularity which the new journal achieved can be assessed from the fact that within the first three months all the subsequent issues had to be reprinted as every subscriber desired to have the entire set. Within a brief span of six months its circulation rose to eleven thousand copies and at the completion of two years it jumped to twenty-six thousand copies.

---

16. Ibid., pp. 6,7.
per week, a figure unheard of in the history of Urdu journalism till then. J.B. Kripalani says that his acquaintance with Maulana Azad dated as far back as 1913. It was through the columns of his weekly Urdu journal, Al-Hilal. 'Those were the great days of Indian journalism - the days of Tilak, Bipin Pal and Aurobindo and a host of other writers. Maulana's journalistic contribution ranked among the best.'

Azad held that the Aligarh School had 'paralyzed the Muslims', and the apprehensions regarding the danger from the Hindu majority had been deliberately planted 'in the minds of the Muslims by the British because they wanted to enlist Muslim support to consolidate their rule in India. And Muslims offered to play this role. The result was that Hindus were in the forefront of the struggle for Indian independence', while it appeared that 'Muslims, like lifeless puppets, danced to the tune of the British Government and obstructed the efforts of those who were fighting for their country's independence.' His activities were keenly watched and the Pioneer in 1914 in an article entitled 'Pro-Germanism in Calcutta' drew the attention of the Government.

19. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
On the eve of the First World War (1914-1919) when the Aga Khan advised the Indian Muslims, through an article 'Indian Muslims and War' published in the Times of India, to do nothing with the Turkish war or peace and also asked the Turks to leave their European possessions the Maulana burst out and called it a most inopportune and misleading apprehension. 'What is going to be for Islam in the world', he said, 'the Muslims of India will equally share it.' Having heard about the confiscation of Zamindar (a weekly of Lahore by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan) he wrote: 'It appears to be the will of God that now the Muslims of India should wake up and wake up in a way that no one may make them sleep again.' In another article, 'The declaration of Crusade in the Twentieth Century' the Maulana remarked, 'Remember, so long as you are alive, you will have to be in continuous state of warfare with Christianity. Don't forget that you are the upholder of Taubah, the defender of the Quran and ... the protector of the Prophet's tomb. Therefore you have to be prepared for an unavoidable war which will inevitably destroy your Holy religion ...'

25. Ibid., January 15, 1913.
27. Ibid., January 8, 1913.
Azad's ideas had a widespread popularity and an enormous influence on the general disposition of the Indian Muslims.

Another radical, Maulana Muhammad Ali, was as uncompromising an opponent of the Government as Maulana Azad. But the essential difference between the two was in their motivation. Whereas Azad was enthused by a passionate desire to imbue his community with revolutionary nationalism, Maulana Muhammad Ali's political activism sprang from his deep commitment to the Pan-Islamic cause. Jawaharlal Nehru described him as being 'an odd mixture of Islamic tradition and an Oxford education.' And it was this Islamic tradition which dominated over western rationalism in Muhammad Ali's chequered political career. But this does not imply that national sentiment was absent in him. In his own words: 'where God commands, I am a Muslim first, a Muslim second and a Muslim last and nothing but a Muslim ... But where India is concerned I am an Indian first, an Indian second and an Indian last and nothing but an Indian.'

A brilliant graduate of the Aligarh College and Oxford University, he disseminated his radical anti-Britishism through

the columns of his journals, the Comrade (English) and the Hamdard (Urdu) founded in 1911 and 1913 respectively. The Comrade took the 'journalistic world of India by storm' and was 'hailed as the new star in the firmament of Indian journalism.' In his paper he advocated co-operation with the Hindus and the Congress in their anti-Government struggle. Shibli's penetrating articles published in the Muslim Gazette of Lucknow and Maulana Altâf Hossain Bâli's inspiring poems moulded his political conviction. The former's work on Islamic History so thoroughly influenced the young graduate that he intended translating his Sirat-e-Nabvi in English and quoted him frequently in his writings. Assessing the political role of Maulana Muhammad Ali, Khalid Bin Sayeed rightly says that in his political attitude he 'stood between the two schools, that of Westernized parliamentarians like Jinnah, and orthodox leaders like Maulana Shibli and Azad.'

There were a number of other radical Muslim leaders who supported the policies of Azad and Muhammad Ali, e.g. Hakim Ajar Khan (1863-1917), Dr. A.A. Ansari (1860-1936), Maulana

31. Dr. Muhammad Ashraf, Hindustani Muslim Siyasat Per Ek Nazar (Urdu) Delhi, p.27.
32. Pakistan: The Formative Phase, p. 35.
33. A member of Slala Deputation and also participated in Dacca Conference held for the formation of the All-India Muslim League, December 31, 1906; a great Hakim by profession and the Government conferred on him the title of Hazîq-ul-Mulk in 1907; entered politics in 1911; renounced his official title in 1922 in response to Gandhiji's call; presided Congress session of 1921; supported the movement.
Zafar Ali Khan (1873-1956) (editor of the radical journal Zaminder), Maulana Shaukat Ali (1873-1938) (elder brother of Maulana Muhammad Ali) and Hasrat Mohani (1878-1951) etc. Their views struck a responsive chord in the Muslim community to a great extent, because of the general misgivings among Muslims over what they regarded as the detrimental policy of the Government.

(B) Muslim Dissatisfaction Over Government Policy

During the Viceroyalty of Lord Hardinge (1910-16) a number of internal and external developments created doubts

(Continued footnote from the previous page)

Nizam's scholarship; got L.R.C.P. and M.R.C.S. in 1903; qualified A.D. and A.S. in 1905; joined national movement in 1911; led a medical mission to Turkey in 1911-12; both a Leaguer and a Congressian and played an important role in Lucknow Pact, 1916; presided League session, 1918 and 1920; joined Khilafat Movement; General Secretary to National Congress in 1920; 1922; 1926; 1929; 1931-32 and its President in 1927; took leading part in Unity and All-Parties Conferences; a great fighter of freedom.

35. Graduated from M.A.O. College, 1895; worked with Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk as his Secretary; took editorship of the Zamindar, 1909 and thus came in politics of the day; a founder member of the All-India Muslim League; associated with the Congress and the League; took active part in Khilafat Movement; imprisoned, 1920-25; elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly 1937-46.

36. Graduated from M.A.O. College, 1895 and appointed as Assistant Opium Agent at Baroda; left service and joined Muhammad Ali; founded Khuddaa-e-Kaba; became bitter critic of the British; started Khilafat Movement; participated in almost every conference which fought for independence.

37. Graduated from M.A.O. College Aligarh; edited Urdu-e-Joalle; popularised Swadeshi Movement; presented resolution for complete independence in 1921 Congress session; both a Congressian and a Leaguer; opposed the scheme of Pakistan.
in the minds of Muslims about the *bona-fides* of the Government in relation to their community and its desire to safeguard their interests. The foremost internal factor in this context was the annulment of the Bengal partition in December 1911. The zeal with whichinto had upheld 'the settled fact' of the Bengal Partition and the indirect support the Government had given to the pro-partition agitation had paved the way for the close and intimate cooperation between the Muslims and the Government and had set the stage for the loyalist politics of the Muslim League. Nawab Salimullah Khan of Dacca in one of his articles 'The New Province - Its Future Possibilities' wrote: 'There are many good things in store for us which will no doubt come to use by and by, and the Mohammedans being the largest in number in the New Province, they have the largest share ... This is the golden opportunity which God and His Prophet have offered us, but if we do not now profit ourselves by the opportunity, we may not get another chance. Now or never our destiny is in our hands. We must strike while the iron is hot.' The complacent and placid loyalism of the community had been based upon its faith in the professions of


the Government of upholding their rights and interests. To Hossain-ul-ulk the Mussalmans of Eastern Bengal considered it a boon to their national cause. But with the re-unification of Bengal, obviously, to the Muslims, under pressure of Hindu agitation, 'before Muslim's eyes, the first big obvious crack in the British regime's moral structure had opened up.'

The Muslim community was severely shocked at the volte-face of the Government while it 'had healed a festering sore' of the Hindus. Nawab Sir Salimullah Khan, though seriously ill, attended a public meeting and put a resolution of regret. The London Branch of Muslim League did not lag behind in expressing its profound regret in a representation to the Secretary of State and to Nawab Vigar-ul-ulk, the influential Muslim League leader, it administered 'a real shock to all the Indian Moslems.' He told his co-religionist not to depend upon the assurances of the Government. 'This is not the time for placing such trust. That which we should now lean upon, must be the power of our own arm, trusting alone in the protection and blessing of our God. In this respect the example set by our honoured countrymen is before us', he said.

40. The Aligarh Institute Gazette, August 29, 1906.
43. The Tribune, January 6, 1912.
44. The Times, March 30, 1912.
45. The Aligarh Institute Gazette, January 10, 1912.
46. Ibid.
Lord Minto was sad to see the Government's policy. Addressing the House of Lords on this development in February 1912, he remarked: "We told the Mussalmans that the partition was a settled fact and we over and over again asserted that it must continue to be so. We assured the Mussalman population of Eastern Bengal of our appreciation of their loyalty and our determination to safeguard their interest. I should think there could have been scarcely a civil servant in India who had not declared that it would be impossible for the British Government to reverse the decision it had come to as regards the partition of Bengal." As a result of Muslim disappointment over the reversal of the partition, 'young Muslims' realised their mistake of keeping themselves aloof from the Hindus and they even thought of abolishing the League and joining the Congress instead.

It was under this confusion and despondency that the fifth session of the All-India Muslim League was held at Calcutta in March 1912 with Nawab Sir Salimullah Khan as its Chairman. The Nawab in his presidential address commented: "The annulment of the Partition had all the appearance of a ready concession to the clamours of an utterly seditious

agitation. It has appeared to put a premium on sedition and disloyalty, and created an impression in the minds of the irresponsible masses that even the Government can be brought down to its knees by a reckless and persistent defiance of constituted authority. Moreover, it has discredited British rule to an extent which is deeply to be regretted. It has hitherto been felt throughout the East that the word of the British Government is its bond, and that, come what may, Government cannot go back on its plighted word ... To us, the Muslims of East Bengal, the annulment means the deprivation of those splendid opportunities at self-improvement which we had secured by the Partition. But it is not the loss of these opportunities merely, heavy as that is, that forms the burden of grief over the annulment of the Partition. It is the manner in which the change has been brought about without even warning or consulting us, which adds to the poignancy of our grief."

The dominant feeling among Muslims was that the old policy of loyalty to the Government as advocated by their pioneer, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and the founders of the Muslim League would not be of any use to the Muslim community.


Hardly the shocks of the Muslim intelligentsia were pacified that their attention was drawn towards developments affecting their co-religionists in other parts of the world, where the imperialist ambitions and activities of the western powers were conspiring against the Muslim interests. The fate of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire, then facing the threat of disintegration and domination by European nations, especially became a cause for concern. The Franco-German machinations in Morocco, the Italian conquest of Libya, and the threat to Turkey's European possessions implicit in the Balkan wars agitated Muslim opinion.

Accounts of the sufferings of the Turks and Arabs in Tripoli and Balkan were constantly received by the Muslim Press which stirred the feelings of the Indian Muslims. Never before in their recollection had that feeling been so stirred as in the case of the events outside India. They were convinced that not only had their co-religionists been ill-treated but that all this had been done by a pre-planned conspiracy to wipe out the Turkish domination. In the Jama

51. Hughson Franklyn Dooney says that 'the Young Indian Moslems as a result veered towards the Congress and the ideal of home rule.' It was recommended by the conservative Press that attention should be given to 'the need of administration' rather than modification of foreign policy, as the most advisable way to retain Moslem Loyalty'. See unpublished thesis The British Policy of Devolution in India, 1911-1919, (Stanford University 1952) p.54. Microfilm available in the Nehru Museum, New Delhi.

52. Hardinge wrote to Chirol: 'There is great agitation.'
Masjid of Delhi Maulana Muhammad Ali delivered a soul-stirring lecture and characterised the Balkan war as the last fight of the Turks. He affirmed that the Turkish cause was theirs and it was a cause of righteousness. Hardinge wrote to Sir Arthur Nicolson, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that he did not like the Turco-Italian war as it had created considerable effervescence among the Muslims of India which could not be ignored. In another letter to Nicolson he stated: "You have no idea of the irritation among the Mahomedans of this country upon the subject of Persia and the treatment of Turkey by Italy. They are simply seething with excitement." Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali visited Aligarh and lectured to the students on the evils falling upon Islam in Tripoli and Balkan with the result that the college was becoming 'a hot bed of sedition.'

(Continued from the previous page)

....in the Mahomedan circles over the war in the Balkans, and a general feeling that the Christians are combining to thrust the Mahomedans out of Europe. Of course it is true to a certain extent ... 'See Hardinge Papers, July to December 1912, Hardinge to Chiroli October 22, 1912.

53. The Comrade, October 26, 1912.
55. Ibid., Hardinge to Nicolson, January 11, 1912, See also Hardinge's letter to Nicolson May 14, 1912.
56. Hardinge Papers, July to December 1912, See Hardinge's letter to Butler October 29, 1912. Hardinge also wrote to Sir James Aeston, the Governor of U.P. in his letter of December 16, 1913: "At the present moment Mohammad Ali and his brother appear to reign supreme and I think we must be cautious how we deal with these two."
The immense involvement of Indian Muslims with the future of Turkey resulted not only from the fact that Turkey was the repository of the holy institution of the Caliphate, but also because Turkey was the sole remnant of the tradition of Muslim political greatness. Even Sir Syed Ahaad Khan towards the closing years of his life was very anxious to see Turkey as a powerful independent Muslim state and is said to have remarked: 'When there were many Muslim kingdoms, we did not feel much grief when one of them was destroyed, now that so few are left, we feel the loss of even a small one. If Turkey is conquered that will be a great grief, for she is the last of the great powers left to Islam. We are afraid that we shall become like the Jews, a people without a country of their own.'

Pan-Islamic sentiments, which had remained dormant for a long time, its last burst being during the last years of Curzon's tenure, once again captured the imaginations of the Muslims. The indignation of the Muslims readily turned into anti-British channels, not only because Britain's attitude in the case of such Muslim countries as Afghanistan and Persia had been suspect in the eyes of the Muslims, but also because there was a wide-spread feeling that under the guise of neutrality in the Turkish developments, British policy was harbouring

anti-Turkish designs. A number of concrete instances, e.g. the refusal of Britain to allow Turkish garrisons on way to Libya to reinforce the forces fighting against the Italians through Egypt, etc., supported this belief. The statements of the British statesmen also confirmed this conclusion. Viscount Errington, Private Secretary to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs wrote to Hardinge: 'Now we are actually facing the struggle between the Moslem and Christian.' Dr. (later Sir) Winston Churchill, the then cabinet minister, supported the Balkan states and said that they were quite justified in waging war against Turkey to drive the Turks from the Christian Europe. British Prime Minister's statement that 'The map of Eastern Europe has to be recast, and ... the victors are not to be robbed of the fruits which has cost them so dear', was a clear indication of British

58. The Ulama of Madras expressing their resentment in a letter dated April 4, 1912 wrote to the Victory: "The prohibition of the passage of Turkish volunteers through Egypt, and the non-prohibition of the supply of provisions to the Italian forces from the same country though it is recognised to be under Turkish suzerainty, is a cause of deep regret to the Moslem world as well as one of grave insult to the rights of the Kaliphate." See Government of India (Foreign Department) Simla Records - 2, Section G Proceedings, June 1912, Nos. 2,3.


60. The Mussalman, December 6, 1912.
policy towards Muslim states. As Maulana Muhammad Ali observed later: 'The attitude of England towards the enemies of Turkey, Persia and Morocco had begun to alienate the sympathies of Indian Mussalmans ever since 1911; and their estrangement could not but react on their relations with the British Officials in India, who in spite of their detestation of the Radical politicians in power at home could not help looking askance at Indians daring to criticise an English Government with a courage unusual for a subject race.'

Inspired by the call of radical Muslims through the columns of the Al-Hilal, the Courade, the Hamdard and the Zamindar, Muslims all over India began a campaign to collect funds for Turkey to succour her in the hour of her crisis. At Aligarh, the students unanimously resolved to abstain from 'delicious dishes' served in the dining hall and contributed the saving to the Turkish Relief Fund. They had already decided to give up meat during the Tripoli war and now they stood for much more austerity. Within a year they were able to save


62. The Aligarh Monthly, November 1912, p.357. See also Sahebzada Aftab Ahmad's article 'Huqqul Akhuvat' in the Aligarh Institute Gazette, November 13, 1912.
rupees eight thousand. Distribution of anti-British leaflets and the boycott of the Italian goods became a common fashion in the college campus. Since the enthusiasm among the Aligarh College students was tremendous Sir James Meston (1865-1943), the Lieutenant-Governor of U.P. (1912-1918) paid a visit to the college and asked them not to ruin their health by starvation. Replying to the address presented to him by the Trustees he exhorted: 'I ask you (Trustees) to set your faces resolutely against everything which distracts or deters them (students) from their work.' But such expression had no effect. The Aligarh Institute Gazette, the main organ of the Muslim politics, had also changed its course of loyalty and pointed out that the ideas of Sir Syed himself had started undergoing a change and had he lived to see the woeful incident he would have definitely turned anti-British. 'The Mussalmans have eyes as well as ears.'

References:
63. The Aligarh Institute Gazette, November 13, 1912. Mahmooda Begum, wife of Syed Mahmud, son of Sir Syed also collected a lot of fund from the rich Muslim ladies.

64. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore 1961), p. 20. See also the Aligarh Institute Gazette, October 30 and November 12, 1912.

65. The Comrade, December 14, 1912.

66. Ibid., The Aligarh Institute Gazette, December 4, 1912.
God has given them brain also. When they see that what great effect the agitation leaves on the Government and impossible things can be made possible through it, then how long the Mussalmans should continue to follow the policy of Sir Syed.

The number of the injured in the Balkan war was colossal. Sir Gerard Lowther of the British Embassy at Constantinople telegraphed to Hardinge about the great loss of life of the Turks and that of the refugees which were estimated about 120,000. A medical mission under Dr. M.A. Ansari was despatched to Turkey, and a Red Crescent Society, the Muslim counterpart of the Red Cross, was set up. A number of students of the Aligarh College, Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Abdul Rahmon Siddiqui, Shuaib Qureshi, Mansur Mahmud and Abdul Rahmon Peshawari being prominent, left their studies and joined the medical mission.

67. The Aligarh Institute Gazette, June 26, 1912.
69. The Aligarh Institute Gazette, November 20, 1912. When the mission reached Turkey strict watch was kept on the activities of Dr. Ansari and Zafar Ali Khan and every information regarding their movement was supplied to the Home Government (See Government of India-Home Department Proceeding July 1913, No. III). Lord Kitchener also wrote to Sir Edward Grey about Dr. Shams-ul-din-al-Bari and Syed Malawy Abru Said-al-Arabi who accompanied the Indian Red Crescent Mission to Constantinople and who were charged of inciting Mussalmans against the English in India. (See Home Department, Pol. Part B Proceeding May 1913, No. 32/33).
70. The Times, April 8, 1912.
Foundation of the Red Crescent Society was also laid at London under the Presidentship of Ameer Ali to receive the funds and provide necessary help to the refugees. Aga Khan expressed a hope that all projects of the Indian Muslims including the foundation of the Muslim University at Aligarh be set aside. Maulana Muhammad Ali even appealed to Muslims to transfer the Muslim University Foundation Fund (Rs. 30 lakhs) to Turkey to assist her in their struggle. Though it was not done yet Rs. 30,000 was sent to the Red Crescent Society, London, to provide medicine to Turks.

Mass meetings were held all over India to express Muslim solidarity with the Turkish cause. A number of Muslims volunteered to fight along with the Turkish garrisons against the enemies of Turkey. So great was the Muslim discontent that the Government became seriously alarmed at its probable repercussions. Butler was a keen observer of the situation and wrote to the Viceroy that even Aga Khan felt that Sir Syed's policy

71. The Comrade November 2, and December 14, 1912.
72. The Aligarh Institute Gazette, December 11, 1912.
74. Sir Harcourt Butler (1869-1938), Deputy-Commissioner, Lucknow, 1906; Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and Member of Viceroy's Council; Governor of U.P., 1922-23.
was wrong, and that Muslim should join the Congress. Muslim League was told by its co-religionists to follow the Congress policy and Haji Musa Khan, a very influential Trustee of the Aligarh College, asked the Muslims to follow the verses of the Holy Quran which read them for Pan-Islamism. Nevertheless the Turkish problem did not lead to any wide anti-Government agitation among the Muslims, though the radical Muslim leaders continuously called for it. But the unflinching 'loyalism' of the community was severely shaken. There were demands, as referred to above, at the various Muslim League meetings for the League to come closer to and even collaborate with the Congress. The Turkish problem was to further embitter Anglo-Muslim relations from the outbreak of the First World War as in this conflict Britain and Turkey were pitched in opposing camps, and after the war when Britain would have a decisive voice in settling the future of Turkey.

The dissatisfaction of the Muslims over Government policy on these two counts was further aggravated by other issues, e.g. the formation of the Aligarh Muslim University.

75. Hardinge Papers, July to December 1912, Butler to Hardinge, September 15, 1912.

76. The Pioneer, January 15, 1912, editorial 'The Future Policy of Mahomedans.'

77. The Aligarh Institute Gazette, January 24, 1912.
The Simla Deputation in its Address to Minto (October 1, 1906) had asked for the elevation of the Aligarh College to the status of a University. Initially the Government was receptive to the idea, but later it began to have second thoughts. Probably the Government was apprehensive at the growing radical sentiments among the students, and if the trend continued, the University, if established, would become the centre for intellectual inspiration to anti-Britishism in the Muslim community. The students strike of 1907 at Aligarh College for which Sir J.P. Hewett, Lieutenant-Governor of U.P. informed Minto about the growing anti-Britishness, was an example to the Government. The coyness of the Government to the proposal served as yet another cause of frustration to the articulate sections of the community over the pro-Government policy of the leadership. Hardinge impressed upon the Nawab of Rampur of the futility of Muslim agitation and wrote to Butler, "Can nothing be done to prevent the students at Aligarh being tampered with. It looks as though Mahomed Ali is suffering from swelled head and wants to gain importance by making trouble."

78. *Hardinge Papers*, July to December 1912. See the letter of Nawab of Rampur to Nawab Muhammad Ishaq Khan, August 8, 1912.

79. *Minto Papers*, July to June 1907, Hewett to Minto February 24, 1907.

80. *Hardinge Papers*, July to December 1912, Hardinge to Butler July 30, and October 29, 1912.
The changed temper of the Muslim community was amply brought out by the indignation expressed through agitational activity of the Muslims over the 'Kanpur Mosque incident.'

The demolition by the local authorities at Kanpur of a portion of a mosque in order to widen a local road, in the face of assurances given to the Muslims created a great furore, not only at the act of sacrilege itself, but also because of the knowledge that a similar attempt to demolish an encroaching temple had been abandoned on the face of Hindu opposition. A protest demonstration of the Muslims was fired upon, killing 17 men and injuring thirty three. There were country-wide protest meetings and numerous letters and telegrams of protest were sent to the authorities. Mian Muhammad Shafi apprised the Viceroy of the resentment of the Muslim community and

---


83. The Comrade, July 5, 1913.

Mr. Wazir Hasan, Secretary to the All-India Muslim League, telegraphed to the Viceroy a resolution passed at its emergency meeting which stated the 'utter disregard of the representation of Muslim feeling on the subject by which the religious susceptibilities of the Indian Muslims in general have been seriously wounded ...' Muslim resentment was ventilated through the columns of the newspapers. Besides the Comrade and the Al-Alam, the Mussalman of Calcutta also exhorted the Indian Muslims to carry on agitation from 'generation to generation' till 'the ultimate Victory' was won. The radical Press asked Muslims to agitate over the matter. Calls were given to Muslims to forsake the path of loyalism and take to the methods of the Congress and even to join forces with the nationalists. A number of deputations met the various local, provincial and central authorities, but Government's attitude was not found satisfactory. A deputation consisting of Mr. Wazir Hasan, and Maulana Muhammad Ali was sent to England on September 6, 1913 to acquaint the Home authorities and statesmen about the situation but it too was unsuccessful. Ultimately the clamour subsided when the Government reversed its action and assured the

27. The Tribune, August 19, 20, 1913.
Muslims of no change in Government's policy towards the religious beliefs of the Indian Muslims. Though the dispute was decided yet the entire episode demonstrated that a 'credibility gap' had developed, between the Government and the hitherto loyal Muslim community which has its origin in the decision to reverse the partition of Bengal and had been accentuated by the general discontent over British policy towards the Turkish predicament.

The growing alienation of the loyalist leadership from the rank-and-file of the League and from the dominant political attitudes of the Muslim community is the marked feature of this period. The first sign of a potential cleavage between the loyalist leadership and the general opinion of the Muslim community was witnessed at the fifth session of the League held at Calcutta in March 1912, where the leadership, though agreeing with the delegates in their grief over the annulment of the partition of Bengal, had to chide some of them when they suggested that the League should seek the co-operation of the Congress and give up its loyalist policies. After the outbreak of the Balkan wars, the loyalists were anxious to see that Muslim concern for Turkey did not transgress the good relation between the Government and the League. But circumstances were

89. The Times, October 15, 16, 1913.
not in favour of such a sustenance. The radical Muslim Press
not only attacked the British Government, but severely criti-
cised the Aligarh School of loyalists as well. In his Al-Hilal
Azad referred to 'those heretics and hypocrites who, during
the last forty years had co-operated with the Sultans of Europe
to weaken the influence of Islamic Caliphate and Pan-Islamism.'
This refers to the Aligarh Movement. The loyalist, tried to
restrain Muslim feelings against the Government, by involving
the policies of Sir Syed and Mohsin-ul-Mulk and by trying to
confine Muslim sentiment by calling for donations to aid Turkey
and helping in establishing the Red Crescent Mission. The
Aga Khan was most energetic in pursuing this line.

In a number of articles he called upon Muslims not to
involve themselves in Turkish Question but to keep their atten-
tion turned towards their own position in India. But the efforts
of the loyalists were not successful and the opinion of their
community steadily proceeded into anti-Government channels. It
was the agitated mood of the Muslim community that led to the
postponement of the Muslim League session scheduled to be held
in December 1912. Syed Ameer Ali, the President-designate, had

90. Khalid B. Sayeed, op.cit., p. 43.
91. The Comrade, July 27, and August 10, 1912.
92. The Aligarh Institute Gazette, February 19, 1913.
sought postponement, pleading heavy pressure of work at London. Later the loyalist tried to cover up the postponement by claiming that the session had not been called as a protest against British policy. Surely the more reasonable method of protest would have been to hold the session and pass a resolution to that effect. During meetings of the League Council to discuss the matter, leaders like the Raja of Mahmudabad and others, who were not blind loyalists criticized postponement as unjustified and contrary to Muslim interests. The Radical Muslim Press too, attributed the postponement to the 'moribund' nature the League had acquired and suggested that the League had lost the confidence of the community and that it required to be replaced by a more vigorous institution.

Forced under the pressure of circumstances the council of the League met on December 31, 1912, Ameer Ali being absent. After a heated discussion in which Muhammed Ali and other young Muslims played a vital role, though they could not gain an upper hand, a resolution was adopted which stated: "The object of the League shall be to promote and maintain among the Indians feelings of loyalty towards the British Crown." Mazhar-ul-Haq and M.A. Jinnah objected to it and pointed out why of all the people in India the Mussalmans should make a speciality of

93. The Tribune, December 15, 1912.
94. Ibid.
expressing their loyalty. To Mazhar-ul-Haq, 'it was no good to profess their own chastity. They were true to their salt and were born loyalists and there was no need of the declaration.' Jinnah supported Mr. Haq in his assertion. The other objects passed in the meeting of the council were: "(2) To protect and advance the political and other rights and interests of the Indian Mussalmans, (3) to promote friendship and union between the Mussalmans and other communities of India, (4) without detriment to the foregoing objects, the attainment to the system of self-government suitable to India by bringing about through constitutional means a steady reform of the existing system of administration by promoting national unity and fostering public spirit among the people of India; and by the said purposes."

The last resolution which stated 'the attainment to the system of self-government suitable to India' marked a departure from the old policy of the League. It was obviously the repercussion of Balkans on Indian Muslims. Syed Wazir Hasan, when criticised by his pro-Government colleagues, explained extensively the restlessness of the Muslim community and said that without an ideal no nation ever lived and it was time to

95. The Tribune, January 5, 1913; The Times, January 1, 1913.
96. The Tribune, January 5, 1913; The Pioneer, January 4, 1913.
put an ideal before the community. Mr. Mazhar-ul-Haq objected the words "self-government suitable to India." He thought it 'a meaningless sentence' and wanted it to be substituted by the words 'self-government on colonial lines.' But Mr. Jinnah objected to it and he pointed out that a system of self-government on colonial lines was not feasible for India where conditions and things were quite different from the countries where it existed. He commended the League which put the right ideal before the community and congratulated it for going ahead even of the Congress in the formation of the ideal. As a Congressman he prophesied that the Congress would also adopt the same ideal. But the loyalists still held the old dogma and opposed the resolution of self-government. Nawab Viqar-ul-Hulk maintained that the time was not yet opportune for India to ask for 'self-government.' But Jinnah replying to the Nawab said that 'nobody asked for it to be given tomorrow or the day after. It was the goal and ideal of the nation and might be attained, say, a century hence.' Thus the Muslim League had changed its

97. The Tribune, January 5, 1913.
98. The Tribune, February 1 & 15, 1913. The Nawab of Dacca wrote a letter to the editor of the Tribune saying that the draft resolutions involved changes of a most violent nature, marking a distinct departure from the 'established' principles of the League founded on the lines chalked out by Sir Syed Ahmed. See The Tribune, March 18, 1913.
political creed and formulated a new one. Maulana Muhammad Ali, while commenting this session, was not far from the truth that 'this memorable session held within it the significance of a hundred resolutions, for it gave expression to a solid fact which no Viceroy or Secretary of State can unsettled.'

The postponed session of the All-India Muslim League was ultimately held on March 22-23, 1913 at Lucknow, with Sir Muhammad Shafi as President of the session. Hon'ble Pandit Bishan Narain Dhar and Mrs. Sarojini Naidu (1879-1949) also attended the League's session, the latter even made a furious speech, asking the Mussalams 'to serve the national cause and help India in her regeneration.' She further urged them to revive the true spirit of Islam which would lead them to the 'patriotism.' The ultimate goal of Muslim League, after a careful analysis of the Indian political situation and of the trend of political events in the country was declared 'the attainment,


100. Eldest daughter of Aghornath Chattppadhya - educationist and philosopher; raised her voice against Rowlatt Act; participated in Khilafat Movement; worked actively in the Congress; Governor of U.P. after independence.

under the aegis of the British Crown, of a system of self-
government suitable to India”, and towards which all the acti-

tivities of the League were to be directed. Sir Muhammad Shafi
in his presidential speech not only criticised the policy of the
Government to drive a wedge between Hindus and Muslims, but
also called upon Muslims to co-operate with the Hindus in a
national endeavour by settling their mutual differences. Mr.
Mazhar-ul-Haq in proposing a resolution made a powerful appeal
for Hindu-Muslim unity and persuaded his co-religionists to
co-operate with the Hindus for the attainments of self-governant
for India. The resolutions proposed in the last meeting of the
League Council were again put to vote and were declared passed
unanimously.

The extent of the retreat of the loyalists can be judged
from the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge who in a letter to Sir Valentine
Chirol (1852-1929) remarked: 'The All-India Moslem League had

102. The Pioneer, March 24, 1913.
103. Ibid.
104. The Times, March 24, 1913; The Indian Review, April 1913,
105. Government of India - Home Department Poll, Deposit A
1913, Nos. 85-8, p.5.
106. A reputed journalist and author; wrote Indian Unrest and
Indian Old and New, 1910, 1921 respectively Director of
the Foreign Department of The Times, 1899-1912; Knighted,
1912.
just held its conference at Lucknow. Mohammed Shafi, a somewhat foolish young Mohammedan with his head full of gas, was in the chair. He made several foolish suggestions ... At the present moment the Mohammedans are playing up to Congress, but I cannot help thinking that in a very short time they will see the error of their ways. In the meantime I feel certain that our best policy is merely to watch closely and to wait for the end of the Balkan War ... I do not bother any more about the Aga Khan. He will never regain his position as a leader, and we must hope for some other man of moderate views to come forward in the near future as leader of all Muslims." An annoyed Sir Harcourt Butler just after the League session also gave expression of his feeling in a letter which he wrote to Hardinge about the Muslim loyalty: "There never was any splendid loyalty. Mohsin-ul-Mulk and others came to me at Lucknow to take my advice. They were quite frank. They could not hold their young men and feared their joining the Hindus, which meant ultimate absorption of the Mohammedans." He planned to isolate Aligarh College and its University movement for its being extremely hostile to British and advised the Viceroy to


108. Butler is mistaken. It was not Mohsin-ul-Mulk but Vigar-ul-Mulk. Mohsin-ul-Mulk had passed away in 1907.

strengthen the Islamia College, Peshawar, the Islamia College, Lahore, the projected college at Bombay and at Dacca and perhaps also at Calcutta to weaken Aligarh's influence and also to disintegrate the Muslim community. The official opinion can further be judged from the review of the responsible British officers. To C.W.E. Cotton (Director Intelligence) 'the declared objects of the League had gone through a process of considerable evolution.' C.R. Cleveland (Home Department) regretted on the new constitution of the League which embodied 'a mistaken and dangerous policy.' R.H. Craik dock felt that the League had definitely joined hands with the Congress while Sir Ali Imam hoped that it was not 'too late to bring it (the League) back to the fold.'

The disagreement of the old leadership with the shape of Muslim politics was acquiring ultimately broke out in the form of the 'League Crisis' of 1913, caused by the resignation of the permanent President of the League, the Aga Khan, the President of London Branch, Syed Ameer Ali, and the entire membership of the London Branch. Ostensibly the resignations had been caused by the personal misunderstanding between Syed Nazir Hasan and Syed Ameer Ali, while the former was in London in October 1913, as a member of the Deputation, formed after the Kanpur Mosque

110. Hardinge Papers, January to June 1913, Butler to Hardinge, April 3, 1913.

111. Government of India, Home Department Political A. February 1913, Nos. 85-86.
incident, but beneath the clash of personalities lay the fundamental conflict between the radicals and the loyalists. Though the resignations were later withdrawn, the hold of the loyalists over the League, and their influence over the community, weakened considerably. The loyalists themselves began to dissociate with the new politics of the League. The Aga Khan's Memoirs throws sufficient light on this tangible problem. "I found myself involved in a distressing difference of opinion with the majority of my Muslim brethren in India over our attitude to this conflict - a difference of opinion which, I am sorry to say, disrupted for some time to come the hitherto close and intimate associations, in thought and action, which has sustained between myself and other Muslim leaders in India." To quote Aga Khan again:

'The League came into existence only some seven or eight years ago and so far from its work being done, it has reached a stage of evolution in which, if wise counsels prevail, it can do greater service than in the past. The crisis in the affairs of the London League brought to a head by Mr. Ameer Ali's resignation affirms my conviction that the time has fully come for the Indian Muslims to realise that the future of the community depends not upon this or that particular leader but upon the people themselves ... I am confident that the great

112. See Memoirs, p. 128.
mass of educated Muslim opinion is sound and sober, and I believe that in India open discussion on the platform of League free from the restraint of a permanent presidency, will be the best means of bringing the weight of this opinion to bear on the questions of the day. The London Times viewed these developments with great concern and in one of its articles entitled: 'Mohomedan Movements in India' it commented:

"Two noteworthy movements have recently become manifest among Mahomedans in India ... The first is tendency in their political leaders to identify themselves very closely with the programme of the Indian National Congress. The second is a disposition ... to foment angry excitement about the fate of Turkey and to attack British policy in the Near East ... It would easily be possible to attach too much importance to both these movements; but they cannot be passed over in silence."

It objected to the new policy of the All-India Muslim League; praised the Aga Khan for his efforts, calling him the most experienced leader that the Muslims of India possessed and reminded the Muslims of the concessions given to them by the Government. With very significant sentences which appeared to be a warning, it concluded, "Their duty is, in return, to abstain from acts which will weaken the increasing confidence of Great

113. The Edinburgh Review, January 1914, p.10. See article "The Indian Moslems Outlook"
Britain in the loyalty and restraint of their community. In the past few months the demeanour of the wilder spirits among them has perceptibly diminished that confidence, so slow in its growth, so certain in its good intentions, until the recent unguarded outburst. We are not disturbed by the new craving of the younger Mahomedans for self-government, though we hold, with the Aga Khan, that in any case it is 'an ideal which can be reached only by generations of effort, by generations of self-sacrifice.' We fully appreciate their not unnatural concern for the future welfare of Islam in other Mahomedan countries. But the reckless agitation about the Balkan War which has been conducted of late in India make it necessary to remind them that the foreign policy of British Empire cannot be dictated by a section of the people of one portion of the Empire. We are ready to respect and consider their susceptibilities, but it will be difficult to do so unless some of their prominent men show a stronger sense of responsibility." A little later the Times, criticising the agitation of Young Muslim party, suggested that

114. *The Times*, April 19, 1913. The Manchester Guardian and the Morning Post also reminded the Mussalmans of their impoverished condition and the concessions given to them by the English rulers. The Morning Post persuaded the Mussalmans to follow the old argument of Sir Syed who said: 'The English and the Mohammedans have certain natural affinities. They have both a ruling tradition, and they have both a certain code of honour, of moral, and of belief that serve as a common interpreter of modes of action and ways of thought.' See The Comrade, November 29 and December 6, 1913.
what the English people wanted from them was 'the cultivation of sobriety of statement and calmness in the contemplation of external affairs.'

The First World War led to the final passing away of the influence of the loyalists. The decisive blow to their position had been dealt by the entry of Turkey into the war on the Axis side. The loyalists realized that the Muslims of India would be torn between England and Turkey, as support for the former would be offensive to their religious sentiments, and for the latter incompatible with their status as British subjects. In a last bid to save their position they impressed upon Turkey the disadvantages of entering the War, but without success. They then attempted to use their personal influence to keep Muslims, especially those serving as soldiers in the British army, loyal. However their hold on both the Muslim League and the Muslim community at large had been irretrievably lost. The former had passed under the influence of the liberal constitutionalists like Jinnah while the latter came under the increasing influence of the radicals, like Muhammad Ali. But the liberal wing of the Muslim League led by Jinnah was gaining an upper hand. This, in fact, ushered in a period of Hindu-Muslim unity leading to the Congress-League Pact of 1916.

115. The Times, July 15, 1913.
Nevertheless this does not mean that there was no loyalist or radical element left in the League. Indeed, the disturbances in the Bombay session of the All-India Muslim League in 1916, as will be cited in the subsequent pages, were the product of dissatisfaction of both these wings with the policy of the officials (i.e. liberal group). Besides other things, conservatives were alarmed at the prospect of close collaboration with the Congress, while the radicals were dissatisfied at the moderate stance of the liberals. Describing the new trend in Muslim politics Professor B.B. Misra rightly says, "What arose from the new situation was something far more significant: the emergence of a powerful pan-Islamic group which for some years to come swelled the ranks of the Muslim League. It called for a new kind of leadership, based not on property qualifications, but capacity for identification with Islam. This group might be called Nationalists in the sense that it was strongly anti-British. But it was essentially religious and revivalist in aim and character. This new element in the rank and file of the League served for a number of years as a link between the leadership and the Muslim masses. Economically, there was some degree of correspondence between a Muslim Nationalist and a Hindu Nationalist. But in religious matters they were poles apart. What brought them together was not an identity of economic status, but common political aims against the British Government."