CHAPTER THREE

THE SEPARATE ELECTORATE

The period between 1900-1905 had seen the rise of militant nationalism which directed its vigour against the British Government. Lord Curzon had refused to recognise the Indian National Congress and it has been seen in the preceding pages how Curzon partitioned Bengal against the will of the people and antagonised them. But unlike Curzon, Minto did not hasten to under-estimate the Congress character all of a sudden. He made an effort to know it from close quarters. He studied its past, and met a number of leaders, including M.Malabari (1853-1912), who were actively associated in its foundation and concluded finally: 'That the air was full of change. That the Government were faced with what amounted to a revolution - a revolution that took its initiative not from the oppressed masses, but from the educated class' - mostly the Bengalis. The Congress demanded a real voice in the

1. In his article 'Imperialism and Nationalism in India' Dr. Anil Seal says 'Among the dominant themes of world history during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been the imperialism of the west and the nationalism of its colonial subjects. Nowhere were these themes more spectacularly developed than in South Asia; its history quite naturally came to be viewed as a gigantic clash between these two large forces. The subject then was held together by a set of assumptions about the imperialism of the British and the reactions of Indians against it.' Modern Asian Studies, Vol.7, Part 3, 1973, p.321.

Government of the country and an increase in the number of elected members. In his presidential address to the Benares session of the Indian National Congress (1905) G.K. Gokhale said: 'The goal of the Congress is that India should be governed in the interests of the Indians themselves, and that in course of time a form of government should be attained in this country similar to what exists in the self-governing colonies of the British Empire.' The Congress thereafter resolved 'that in the opinion of this Congress time has arrived when the people of India should be allowed a large voice in the administration and control of the affairs of their country.' Lord Curzon considered Congress demands extravagant and impracticable. The adverse attitude of the Government towards the educated class, who were moderate in their demands, created a new school within the Congress known as Extremists. Their activities appealed to the younger generations who were tired of the evolutionary methods of the moderates. The difference in their approach to political problems is evident from their names and methods.

Indian nationalism had become a matter of serious concern in India and England. How to deal with it was the main

5. P.C. Ghosh, op. cit., See Chapter IV.
question? The outgoing and succeeding Viceroy's, both, belonged to the same political school - the Conservative - but the latter had no admiration for the former because of his policy that had invited sedition and revolution against so powerful a regime as British. But he was helpless and wrote to Morley that "We all feel that we are mere sojourners in the land, only camping and on the march."

The agitation was great. 'Everybody warns us' wrote Morley to Minto, 'that a new spirit is growing and spreading over India. Lawrence, Chiroi, Sidney Low, all sing the same song: "you cannot go on governing in the same spirit; you have got to deal with the Congress party and Congress principles, whatever you may think of them; be sure that before long the Mahometans will throw in their lot with the Congress-men against you", so forth and so forth.' The embarrassed Morley further continued, 'Your way of putting this helps me to realise how intensely artificial and unnatural is our mighty Raj, and it sets one wondering whether it can possibly last. It surely cannot, and our only business is to do what we can to make the next transition, whatever it may turn out to be something of an improvement ..... Will your Reform policy,

7. Minto Papers, Correspondence with the Secretary of State 1905-1906 - Morley to Minto, June 6, 1906.
Natives on my Council, Decentralization, Economizing of Taxation and the rest of our virtuous deeds really make a pin of difference in their feelings about British rule? Minto replied. 'It is indeed a problem. India is, as you say, in a transition state. It is our duty to make the best we can of the present. One can only wonder as to the future.'

Morley again wrote: 'I wonder whether we could not now make a good start in the way of reform in the popular direction. If we don't, is it not certain that the demands will widen and extend into "National" regions, where I at least look with a very doubting and suspicious eye? Why should you not now consider as practical and immediate things - the extension of the Native element in your Legislative Council; ditto in local councils; full time for discussing Budget in your Legislative Council, instead of four or five skimpy hours; right of moving amendments. Either do you write me a despatch, or I'll write you one - by way of opening the ball. It need be no long or high-flown affair. I suppose the notice of a native on Your Executive Council would not do at all. Is that certain? I dare say it is - and it would frighten

that nervous animal (naturally nervous), the European-India."

Thus on the inception of his regime, Minto found the Congress a formidable political organisation - impossible to ignore but difficult to accept. Writing to Morley he held, "I think we are bound to look upon the Indian National Congress as a factor in Indian politics, and that it would be best not to ignore it." Morley was also aware of these developments but he was, inspite of his liberal ideas, cautious and reluctant to give Indians political concessions. His interview with the heir-apparent, the Prince of Wales, who had toured the country in the beginning of Minto's Viceroyalty had convinced him that they could get on better if English administrators showed "wider sympathy."

Minto after a careful study of the national movement conveyed to Morley his opinion that to ignore the Congress was a mistake. "As to Congress", he wrote, "we must recognize them and be friend with the best of them. Yet I am afraid there is much that is absolutely disloyal in the movement and that there is danger for the future. I have ... extracts

10. Minto Papers, Correspondence with Secretary of State for India, November-June 1906-6, Morley to Minto, June 15, 1906.
11. Ibid., May 9, 1906.
13. Ibid., Minto to Morley, May 9, 1906.
from the vernacular Press, the great bulk of the tone of it can only be termed disloyal, and the Bengali editor is spreading his influence throughout India." His conversation with Gokhale had further convinced him, as the latter himself pointed out, that the whole younger generation of India was going over to the extremist's side and they were attracted by the idea of getting rid of British rule. He was fully convinced and wrote to Morley that they had to deal 'not with an honest desire for administrative improvements, but with a deliberate attempt towards the ultimate overthrow of British rule.'

But Morley was, on the contrary, sceptical. He did not like the Congress, but he wanted to go deep into its aims and objects. After his interview with the Prince of Wales he had come to accept the Congress as a factor in Indian politics. The Prince of Wales had told him that the Congress was 'becoming a great power', but Morley thought 'that it will mainly depend upon ourselves whether the Congress is a power for good or for evil.'

15. Ibid., Correspondence with the Secretary of State for India, July to December 1906, Minto to Morley, August 1st 1906.
17. Minto Papers, Correspondence with Secretary of State, November-June 1905-6, Morley to Minto, May 11, 1906.
The Congress demand for popular representation was in full swing. Gokhale in his presidential speech at the Benares session of the Congress (1905) had demanded the gradual entrance of Indians in the administration. Minto, disapproving Gokhale's views said, 'His (Gokhale's) ideas and his ambitions certainly appear to me high spirited and patriotic, but one cannot disguise from oneself the risk that would surround popular representation to any large scale in the government of this country.' He held that representative government was not suited to India and it would be fatal to import into India English political institutions. To him the English constitution was a piece of admiration. It was the result of a long process of historical development and they should not encourage its blind imitation by the Bengalis. But to save India from a tremendous convulsion the only device Minto could think of was to recognise the rights of the loyal Indians to a greater share in the Government of the country. Writing to Morley he emphasised that "we must recognise individual ability and invite it to rule together with us." He also uttered a caution that "If we don't do so, we shall are long have a force opposed to us of a strength of which we have had no previous experience."

19. Minto Papers, Correspondence with Secretary of State - January to December 1907. Minto to Morley, May 16, 1907; See also Morley's speech on Indian Budget, Minto Papers, 1910.
Morley was in line with the Viceroy and he wrote to Minto: 'Fundamental difference between us, I really believe there is none. Not one whit more than you, do I think it desirable or possible, or even conceivable, to adapt English political institutions to the nations who inhabit India. Assuredly not in your day or mine. But the spirit of English institutions is a different thing, and it is a thing that we cannot escape even if we wished, .....' This indicates that despite his liberal views, Morley did not desire to give India, British democratic institutions but only reforms, and of them also as little as possible.

The nationalist movement was gaining momentum and both the Viceroy and the Secretary of State were aware of these developments. Nevertheless, in the general context of the increasing momentum of the nationalist movement in India, the Viceroy, on the spot, and the Secretary of State, at the ultimate centre of power, both, were aware of the need for


21. Dr. S.R. Mehta also opines the same and says that 'Morley and Minto were both agreed on certain essentials of Indian policy. They were both convinced that the safety and welfare of India depended on the permanence of the British administration, that the Government of India was always to remain autocratic, and that the sovereignty must be vested in British hands and could not be delegated to any kind of representative assembly. Besides being incompatible with British supremacy, representative government was, in their view, wholly unsuited to Indian conditions the only representation for which the country was fit was one by classes and communities, and that, too, to a very limited extent.' See India and the Commonwealth 1885-1920
fulfilling the aspirations of educated Indians. It was felt by the Government that initiated reforms in the popular direction would preempt the radical schools of opinion among Indian nationalists, and strengthen the moderate elements. A series of communications between the two, the Viceroy and the Secretary of State, revealed a broad agreement over the possible issues of reform and led to a number of concrete proposals. As Minto wrote to Morley: "Ideas can only be combated by ideas, and you won't keep the younger generation away from the Congress unless you have another programme and another set of ideas to set up against theirs." This marked the beginning of the Reform Scheme, which formed the central theme of Minto-Morley politics.

22. Professor B.B. Misra is of the opinion that 'What dominated the whole body of correspondence on the Indian question was the anxiety of the Viceroy and his bureaucracy to devise an electoral system which might with success secure representation by classes, communities and interests, an object which, in spite of their declared intentions, the regulations made under the Act of 1892 had signally, failed to accomplish. The Administrative History of India 1834-1947 (Bombay 1970) p.51.

23. A general account of the correspondence between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State, and their discussions and negotiations with various British and Indian individuals, may be found in Mary, Countess of Minto, op.cit., Syed Razi Wasti, op.cit., and M.N. Das, op.cit.

Among the specific proposals that emerged, were the appointment of one or more Indian members to the Secretary of State’s Council and the Viceroy’s Executive Council; greater Indian representation on the Imperial and Provincial Legislative Councils; liberalization of procedure in Legislative Councils, with increased time for debates on budgets, considerably more latitude for discussion and the grant of the power to more amendments; the formation of a Council of Princes; and the general augmentation of the powers and functions and the role of the Indian element in Local Self-Government institutions.

These reform proposals were bound to meet strong objections and opposition from the Anglo-Indian lobby and Conservative circles, both in India and Britain. Indeed, there was great hostility to and scepticism about the wisdom of the various reform proposals in these circles, while Indian opinion ranged from cautious approbation to criticism for their inadequacy. Nevertheless, Minto and Morley consistently promoted their proposals, the former demonstrating greater steadfastness and perseverance than the latter in this regard, 'since to him the path of executive partnership between the races seemed the simplest and most hopeful', with the result

25. Morley Papers, Minto to Morley, July 31, 1907.
that some of these suggestions were salvaged from the generally devastating effect of the clamour of opponents. The appointment of Indians in the Secretary of State's Council, was initially not welcomed by Minto, but when in July 1907, Morley informed him of his decision to appoint K.G. Gupta, I.C.S., an officer of the Revenue Department and S.H. Bilgrami, a senior civil servant in the Hyderabad Government, he promptly conveyed his approval. Accordingly, Morley secured Parliamentary sanction for the scheme through the Act of August 28, 1907, amending the constitution of the Council of India, and Gupta and Bilgrami were appointed to the Council, the former joining in March 1908 and the latter in November 1907.

As for the other reform proposals, Minto desired to have them discussed and given a concrete shape by his Government, whereafter they would be formally forwarded for the consideration of the Secretary of State and his Council, for finalization, to display that the initiative in matters of reforming Indian polity was with the Viceroy and his Council, and to avoid giving the impression of dictation by the British Government. Accordingly, on August 16, 1906, he appointed a committee of his Executive Council to consider the question of Reforms, under the chairmanship of Sir A. Arundel (1841-

1929), with Sir Denzil Ibbetson (1847-1908), W. M. Baker (1857-1913) and Erle Richards (1861-1922) as members and H. Risley (1851-1911) as Secretary. The subjects proposed for the Committee's consideration, as outlined in a minute written prepared for its guidance, were: (a) the appointment of an Indian member to the Viceroy's Executive Council, (b) the feasibility of establishing a Council of Princes, or otherwise the representation of ruling chiefs in the Imperial Legislative Council, (c) an increased representation of Indians in the Imperial and Provincial Legislative Councils, and (d) the Provision of more time for budget debates and increased powers of interpellation and of proposing amendments by members. The members

27. Member of the Council of Madras Government, 1898-1901; Member of the Viceroy's Council, 1901-06.

28. A very reputed Civil Servant who acted as Director of Public Instruction in the Punjab, Secretary to the Government of India in the Department of Revenue and Agriculture, 1896-98; Member of Viceroy's Council 1902-05; Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab 1905-09.

29. Financial Secretary to the Government of India, 1902-05; Finance Member of the Council of India, 1905-08; Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, 1908-11.

30. Sir Henry Erle Richards was Legal Member of the Viceroy's Council, 1904-09; Counsel to the India Office, 1911-21; Professor of International Law; Fellow of All Souls College Oxford.

31. Home Secretary to the Government of India 1902-09; Member of the Viceroy's Council 1909-10; India Office 1909 1910-11.

32. Morley Papers, File entitled 'Indian Councils Reform', October 1906, August 1907.
of the Arundel Committee represented diverse political inclinations. Arundel himself pointed out to Minto that Ibbetson was a traditional Conservative, Baker a progressive Liberal, Richards politically uncommitted and he, himself, of Liberal-unionist persuasion.

This, no doubt, made a unanimous verdict of the Committee on most of the issues difficult, but it nevertheless discharged its functions earnestly. On the question of the appointment of an Indian member to the Viceroy’s Executive Council the members of the Committee were not in agreement. Sir Arundel and Baker favoured the scheme and they recommended to increase the number of members of the Viceroy’s Executive Council by one. Sir Denzil Ibbetson argued that whosoever might be appointed, he would at once become a focus of intrigue and enormous pressure, both social and political, would be brought to bear upon him. He believed the time was inopportune for concession. The appointment of a Bengali would arouse indignation throughout northern India and especially among the Mussalmans all over the country. Richards shared Ibbetson’s views. He was convinced that it would be unwise to appoint an

33. Minto Papers, Correspondence with Secretary of State July to December 1906, Minto to Morley, September 10, 1906.
34. Ibid.
Indian to be a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council. He
was satisfied from his experience that "questions not infre­
quently come before Council which could not be freely discussed,
or in some cases discussed at all, in the presence of an
Indian." Thus while two members (Sir A. Arundel and Mr. Baker)
considered that steps should be taken to appoint an Indian
member, the other two (Sir D. Ibbetson and Richards) were of
opinion that the objections to this suggestion out weighted
its advantages. This disappointed Minto who like Morley had
considered it the best possible solution for pacifying Indian
aspirations. But in course of time the official opinion gra­
dually turned in favour of Minto and despite many hurdles,
the Government of India sent a despatch to Home Government
suggesting for the appointment of an Indian member on the
Viceroy's Council. But this was an issue on which official
opinion was not unanimous in England. Members of the Council
of India and leading public men like Sir John Edge, Sir Hugh
Barnes, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, Sir D.W.K.Barr, Sir Henry Fowler,

35. Morley Papers, Files entitled 'India-Councils Reforms'
October 1906 - August 1907. See Confidential Report of the
Committee appointed to consider reforms in the Indian
Councils, October 12, 1906.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., Minto to Morley, October 28, 1906.

38. Morley Papers, See Despatch of the Government of India
No.70 to the Secretary of State - Home Department (Public)
March 21, 1907.
Theodore Morison and Lord Lansdowne did not favour the proposal. To Sir John Edge it was harmful and in his confidential note (April 17, 1907) he wrote that "A Native member who had not been trained in Indian Civil Service would be useless for practical working purposes, and no Native could be found who would or could represent all parties." Sir Hugh Barnes in his confidential note (April 15, 1907) remarked that the weight against the measure was more important while Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick in his confidential note (April 11, 1907) expressed the idea that 'a man so appointed would be expected by his own people to support their views, and would find it difficult at times to avoid doing so irrespective of the real merits of the case, and there would be introduced into the council a disturbing element from which it has hitherto been free.' Sir D.W.K. Barr in his confidential note (April 11, 1907) said that he was opposed to the proposal as it was fraught with grave risks and ran contrary 'to the determination which His Majesty expressed from the Throne that he would guard the strength and unity of the executive power in India.' Sir Henry Fowler, Theodore Morison and Lord Lansdowne were also opposed to it. To them it was a concession to the Congress.


40. See Resolutions of Special Committee appointed by the Secretary of State to consider the Government of India's Despatch No.70, March 21, 1907 (Confidential).
Minto had to deal with this controversy. He was clear in his belief that the proposal would not be a concession to the Congress but to the moderate Indian opinion which were bound to assist the Government in dealing with extremists that were threatening to become a serious problem. He believed that the legitimate demands of the moderate Indians must be sympathetically considered and met. He also felt, as has been previously stated, that India was patently unfit for representative Government and must be autocratically ruled for many years to come but her best men ought not to be prevented from sharing largely in the administration of their country.

With regard to the doubts about the maintenance of secrecy of the official transactions in the presence of the Indian members, Minto explained to the Secretary of State:

'This very letter I am writing you will pass through many native hands in my office before it reaches you, and so does every State secret in India that is once committed in print. The Government Printing Presses are full of Natives. I am far from saying secrets do not get out. The issue of the warrant for the arrest of Lajpat Rai is said to have been known in the Bazar here long before it was executed, and one cannot reasonably doubt that any State secret would be far more likely to be kept by a Native Member of Council whose known integrity would be one of his first qualifications than by the numerous irresponsible native clerks through whose hands State papers of
the greatest importance pass.' But at the same time Minto held that one could do a good deal by keeping in touch with such leaders as Surrendra Nath Banerjea (1848-1925) and Moti Lal Ghose (1847-1922).

The Arundel committee, referred to above, was also to discuss increased representation on the Viceroy's Legislative Council to meet the nationalist demand. It suggested that between 1893 and 1906 the working of the elective principles had not justified the expectations and recommended that special interests should be represented on the Viceroy's Legislative Council.

41. Morley Papers, Minto to Morley, May 21, 1907.

42. Minto Papers, Correspondence with the Secretary of State, November-June 1906-06, Minto to Morley, May 9, 1906.

43. Graduated from Calcutta University, 1868; proceeded to England for I.C.S. which he qualified and returned to India, 1871 but was soon dismissed from the service, became Professor of English and delivered very inspiring lectures to his students, became proprietor and editor of the Bengalee; elected to the Bengal Legislative Council, 1893; became a very active member of Indian National Congress and twice became its President, 1895 and 1902; wrote A Nation in Making.

44. A nationalist; demanded simultaneous examination of I.C.S. in England and India; led agitation against the Partition of Bengal; joined Home Rule League in 1915.

45. Morley Papers, Report of Committee appointed by the Viceroy.
By the Act of 1892, the Councils were enlarged and so was the elective principle. Since territorial representation was not considered suitable, an attempt was made to secure the representation of more important classes and interests. The main interests desired to be represented by the above Act were Universities, Landlords and Commerce etc. But this desired aim proved infructuous, as the majority of elected members consisted of barristers or pleaders while landlords got a very nominal representation in the Provincial Legislative Council. To bring the landholders and moneyed-classes to the Council, the Government of India suggested to Morley that it intended to create an additional electorate for them without depriving due share to the professional classes. The Local Governments did not oppose the landed-classes in having a separate representation of their interests and therefore the Government of India incorporated the proposal of separate representation of few interests in their scheme.

As cited earlier, the budget speech of Morley delivered in July, 1906 had awakened the middle-class Muslims, resulting ultimately in the Simla Deputation which demanded preferential treatment for the Muslims. Therefore when the Reform scheme was in the making, the Muslims were not uninformed. They were

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aware of the new situation which had been engaging the atten-
tion of the co-authors of Ainto-Morley Reforms. Sahibzada
Aftab Ahmad Khan of Aligarh wrote: "It seems proper to point
out that the interest of the Indian Mussalmans should receive
special consideration on such an important occasion and some-
thing should be done to secure their due representation in
the Imperial and Provincial Councils of the country. Indian
members are appointed to those councils either by nomination
or by election, but so far as Mahomedans are concerned nomi-
nation has been almost the only means whereby their represen-
tatives have obtained seats in these councils; and so long
as the present system of election remains in force it is doubt-
ful whether Mahomedans will ever have a fair chance of being
duly represented either in the Imperial or Provincial Councils.
The reason is obvious, the majority of electors being Hindus,
they naturally prefer to elect one of their own community. As
to appointment by nomination its practical utility can easily
be measured by the actual results. The Government naturally
selects those whom they regard as influential and deserving
of official recognition, but such gentlemen, unfortunately,
are not always the best fitted to represent the interests, of
their community. Thus neither election, as conducted at
present, nor nomination are suited to the requirements of the
Indian Mussalmans. Their position in this country demands
that a certain number of seats be allotted to them both in
the Imperial and Provincial Councils, and those seats should
be filled up by Mahomedan members elected by voters of their
own community."

The Siala Deputation which waited upon the Viceroy on
October 1, 1906 was quite opportune. The Deputation acknowled­
ged with gratitude that whatever representation the
Muhammadans of India enjoyed till then had been due to the
sense of justice and fairness of the British Viceroys by whom
the Muhammadan members of Legislative Chambers have almost
without exception been nominated. The Deputation regretted

47. The Pioneer, August 11, 1906, See Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad
Khan's letter 'Mohammedan Representation'. It will not
be without interest to note that 70 years after this
letter to the Pioneer, a noted Indian historian, Professor
B.B. Misra, has made a similar conclusion. It will be
worth-while to cite his words: "The fears of the Muslims
were not without foundation. Forty-five per cent of the
non-official members elected to the Imperial Council since
1893, ... belonged to the professional Hindu middle-class;
the landholders obtained 27 per cent of the seats, and
the Muslims only 12 per cent against 23 per cent of their
total population in the country. In Madras and the United
Provinces no Muslim had succeeded in obtaining a seat by
election between 1893 and 1906. The number of elective
seats by the Muslims in Bombay during the same period did
not exceed 17 per cent, while in Bengal, a Muslim majority
Province, this percentage was hardly 5.7. Nobody denied
that the Muslims were slightly backward educationally. But
since in the past Hindu members who knew no English had
been nominated to the Viceroy's Legislative Council, there
was no reason why a Muslim should be disqualified on that
score. What was in question therefore was a lack of
honesty and fair play on the part of those who controlled
the press and public opinion, not a lack of knowledge of
one language or another." See B.B. Misra, The Indian
Political Parties - An Historical Analysis of Political
Behaviour up to 1977.
that the representation thus accorded had been inadequate to their requirements. The Deputation said 'it is most unlikely that the name of any Mahomedan candidate will ever be submitted for the approval of Government by the electoral bodies as now constituted unless he is in sympathy with the majority in all matters of importance. Nor can we in fairness find fault with the desire of our non-Muslim fellow-subjects to take full advantage of their strength and vote only for members of their own community, or for persons who, if not Hindus, are expected to vote with the Hindu majority on whose goodwill they would have to depend for their future re-election.' The Deputation further remarked that 'Mahomedans are a distinct community with additional interests of our own which are not shared by other communities, and these have hitherto suffered from the fact that they have not been adequately represented', and 'they have too often been treated as though they were inappreciably small political factors that might without unfairness be neglected.'

Minto calmly listened to the deputationists and said:

'You have addressed me, gentlemen, at a time when the political atmosphere is full of change ... Hopes and ambitions, new to India, are making themselves felt. We cannot ignore them ...

your address ... is a claim that, in any system of representation — whether it affects a Municipality, a District Board, or a Legislative Council, in which it is proposed to introduce or increase an electoral organisation — the Ahommedan Community should be represented as a community, ... I am entirely in accord with you ... the Ahommedan community may rest assured that their political rights and interests as a community will be safeguarded by any administrative reorganisation with which I am concerned.'

The above statement of Minto was praised both in India and England and Morley also approved of his commitment that the Muslim demands were just, moderate and practicable. The Viceroy sent a copy of his reply to Arundel Committee which had started working a few weeks back on the question of proposed reforms. The committee also discussed the reforms proposals with Mohsin-ul-Mulk within a few weeks of the Simla Deputation. It satisfied the powerful Muslim leader who said that the members of the Committee were so good as to provide him an opportunity of discussing with them the question of Ahommedan representation. Mohsin-ul-Mulk in a letter to Dunlop Smith

49. The Aligarh Institute Gazette, October 24, 1906.

50. Minto Papers, Confidential Correspondence with persons in India, July to December 1906, Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk's letter to Dunlop Smith, October 7, 1906.
explained his viewpoint on the question of Muslim representation. He wanted an adequate number of seats to be reserved for the Muslims both on the Supreme and Provincial Councils. While asking the Government to continue the current system of election applicable to the general body of the people, he demanded reservation of seats for the Muslims and the creation of separate electorates. Laying down the franchise qualification for the Provincial Councils he mentioned that every Muslim of British India paying income tax on an annual income of Rs. 1000, or every landowner having a net rent of Rs. 1000 a year, or every Muslim member of the Senate of a University or a graduate of 5 years standing, shall have a vote, but no single individual should have more than one vote, though he may happen to combine several qualifications. He suggested that each Presidency or Province should, where local conditions required, be divided into two or more electoral divisions or constituencies. Each of these constituencies would be entitled to return a member at every election, or by turns, as may be determined in view of the number of seats reserved on the particular Provincial Council. For instance, West Bengal, ought to be divided into Bihar and the rest of West Bengal, the U.P. into Oudh, and the rest of that Province, and so on. This he considered essential in order to safeguard against
For the Supreme Council, Jhonsin-ul-Mulk said that the Mussalman members of different Provincial Councils, the Mussia Fellows of the Indian Universities, and Mussalams having an annual income of Rs. 25,000 should be given the right to elect men out of their own community and to make sure that the interests of the Mussalams of any particular province may not be overlooked. He laid down that the choice of the electors should be confined to the Mussalas inhabitants of that particular province. The copy of above letter was sent to the Committee of the Executive Council, which was considering the question of Reforms in India.

Contrary to expectations, Arundel Committee completed its work earlier and its recommendations were included in the Government of India's despatch of March 21, 1907. The Government conceded that the Mussias had received adequate representation on neither the Provincial nor the Imperial Legislative Councils in accordance with their strength and political importance. It also accepted the Viceroy's commitment that

51. Indian Papers, Confidential Correspondence with Persons in India, July to December 1906. Nawab Jhonsin-ul-Mulk to Dunlop Smith, October 7, 1906.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., Dunlop Smith to Jhonsin-ul-Mulk, October 12, 1906.
any electoral representation in India would be doomed to
dischievious failure which aimed at granting a personal en-
franchisement regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the
communities composing the population of this continent.' The
Despatch complained that "under the current system of election
Hindus largely predominate to almost all the electorates, with
the result that the few Mahomedan members that have been
elected are not really representative of their class. These
have been supplemented by nominations made by Government. But
the total representation thus affected has not been commensurate
with the weight to which the Mahomedan community is entitled;
and it has, moreover, been strongly urged that even the
system of nomination has frequently failed to secure the appoint­
ment of Mahomedans of the class of whom the community deserves
to be represented." It, therefore, suggested that a certain
number of seats should be filled exclusively by Muslim through
special Muslim electorates.

Morley received the despatch in April 1907 and, after
a thorough study, accepted the principle of separate represen­
tation. This was what the Muslims desired. The Muslim Press

54. Government of India, Home Department (Public) Despatch to
Morley, March 21, 1907, p.3.

55. Ibid., p.23. See also papers relating to An Imperial
Advisory Council and Provincial Advisory Councils. The
Enlargement of the Legislative Councils, and the Discussion
on the Budget. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by
command of His Majesty (1907).
gave its profound satisfaction on the acceptance of the principle of separate electorates. The Vakil of Writsar, the Watan and Rai Sahib Akbar of Lahore and the Aligarh Institute Gazette praised Morley for safeguarding 'the interests of minorities so as to prevent any single preponderating section of the people from tyrannising over its weaker neighbours.' The Press further asked the Muslims to rejoice that although they did not agitate yet their prayers had been listened to.

In a personal letter to Aohsin-ul-Mulk Ebrahim Adanjee Peerbhoi and Rehaddin Ahmed, two great Muslims leaders from Bombay, called it 'a new era in the administration of British India' and asked the members of the Simla Deputation to tender their sincere and grateful thanks to Morley for the 'foresight and courage of a real statesman.'

But later on Morley changed his mind under the pressure of Lord MacDonnell and appointed a Reform Committee of his Councillors. MacDonnell presented a scheme for the formation of joint electoral colleges, quite contrary to what had been agreed upon previously between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. "I can only say", Morley wrote to Morley, "that it is

56. The Pioneer, September 13, 1907.
57. The Pioneer, September 7, 1907. See also the letters of Nawab Hayatullah Khan and Mirza Shujaat Ali Khan in the Pioneer of September 8 and 22, 1907 respectively.
58. Morley Papers. See memorandum by Lord MacDonnell (Confidential), see also Report of Special Committee, October, 1908, as to the Representation of Minorities.
quite as simple as any scheme for representation of minorities can ever be. The system of a single vote, which is an essential part of it, is said to work satisfactorily in places where it is already in existence...."

Minto informed Morley that the scheme had received widespread applause but expressed his doubts about the electoral college and echoed the general prophesies about its impracticability. Thereafter the Under-Secretary of State for India, Mr. Bonhouse (1907-08), on behalf of the Home Government, declared that 'the method proposed is simply that in general electorates such as municipalities, district boards and members of Provincial Councils, all seats and classes including Ahomedans, will vote together. By this means some, but not sufficient representation will be obtained for Ahomedans. In addition a certain number of seats will be reserved for Ahomedans, and none but Ahomedans will have a voice in filling these.' These seats would be filled differently in different provinces. This further confused the issue and produced great controversy and resentment among the Muslims of India and London. The Indian


60. Minto Papers, Correspondence with the Secretary of State January-December 1908, Minto to Morley, December 24 & 31, 1908.

Muslims took it gravely. They desired that their own representatives be elected to all the councils and they should be given a greater number of seats than they were numerically entitled to, and also that for every Hindu given a seat on the Governor-General's Council, there should be a Muslim counterpart.

The All-India Muslim League was going to hold its annual session on December 30, 31, 1908 at Amritsar. Khan Bahadur Yusuf Shah, President of the Reception Committee regretted that Muslim interests had not received the consideration due to them. Mr. Syed Ali Imaam, the President of the session, criticised the reform scheme and remarked that the despatch of the Secretary of State had failed to recognise the interest of the great minority. "I feel persuaded," he said, "that closer acquaintance with the internal problems of Indian politics will put Lord Morley in the possession of facts and circumstances that will amply justify the pronouncement his great Viceroy made in reply to our address at Simla." The Amritsar League session resolved that representatives of League would wait upon Lord Morley to explain the serious disadvantages for the Muslims resulting from the proposed reform

62. The Englishman, December 31, 1908.

63. The Pioneer, January 3, 1909 - See "All India Moslem League: Its attitude to the Reform Scheme."
scheme. A memorial presenting 'just grievances' was also submitted to the Viceroy by the sub-committee appointed by the League's session at Amritsar under the chairmanship of Mr. Ali Ilam. The memorial dwelt upon the dangers to the Muslim interests of a mixed electorate and entertained the hope that it would receive a favourable consideration from the Viceroy. "There is no desire", the memorial stated, "that an iron wall should be permanently raised between Mahomedans and Hindus, but in the conditions prevailing in India, real and effective Mahomedan representatives are essential in the best interests of the country." Mass meetings, convened all over India, expressed their abhorrence for the scheme. The Punjab, the Deccan and the Madras Leagues, the Central National Muhammadan Association led by Moulvi Abdul Jabbar Khan and Nawab Bahadur Syed Ameer Hussain, the Anjuman-e-Mussalman, Bengal, under the leadership of Prince Jahandar Mirza and Dewan Fazal-e-Rubbi, the Mussalmans of Rangoon, Patna, Fyzabad, Allahabad, Rai-Bareilly, all emphatically condemned the provision of mixed electorates. Nawab Sir Salimullah Khan at a

64. The Times, January 2, 1909.
65. The Pioneer, February 8, 1909.
66. The Times, February 8, 1909.
67. Horley Papers, Pamphlet entitled, 'The Indian Mohammans and the Government' issued by the All-India Muslim League London Branch Appendix I.
68. The Pioneer, June 11, 1909; The Times, May 4, 1909 See also The Times, February 8 & 17, 1909, April 2, and 22, 1909.
general meeting of Muslims in Dacca on April 18, 1909 called the whole scheme 'a farce', and insisted that the Government should take steps to have a separate register for Mahomedan elections, and separate electorates for the election of Mahomedan representatives from top to bottom.'

In London Justice Ameer Ali, President of the London Branch of Muslim League, too viewed the MacDonnell Scheme with apprehension. He led a vigorous campaign against the mixed electoral colleges, explaining through a number of articles and pamphlets, the Muslim viewpoint. His opposition to the Morley scheme was not motivated by sectarian hostility for the Hindus. He was above communal bias and during the course of his public life he had consistently laboured to promote unity and goodwill among Hindus and Muslims. What he wanted was that under the projected reforms Muslim representation on the councils and other representative bodies should be 'real and not illusory, substantial and not nominal.' In refutation to Lord MacDonnell's Scheme of Joint Electoral colleges, Ameer Ali wrote to The Times that under the proposed scheme the electoral machinery at every stage would be controlled by an overwhelming non-Muslim majority versed in

69. Morley Papers, India-Question of Muhammedan Representation, Appendix II.

70. The Times, January 14, 1909.
modern political tactics, and expressed his fear that under
the proposed scheme every effort would be made to divide
Muslim votes, and to return to the electoral colleges and
councils only such Muhammadans as would be acceptable to the
majority. "If Muhammadan representation", he said, "is to have
any real meaning, it must be, as the Muhammadans urge, adequate
and substantial ... The importance of a nation cannot always
be adjudged on numerical considerations. Whatever may be the
view regarding the historical and political position of the
Muhammadans, to which the Government of India attaches some
value, Muhammadan loyalty is an asset to the Empire which I
venture to submit ought not to be lightly put aside."

Ameer Ali led a deputation of the London Branch of
Muslim League to Lord Morley, on January 27, 1909, which
included Mr. C.A. Latif, Major Syed Hasan Bilgrami, Mr. Ibh
Ahmad, Mr. S.M. Anik, Mr. Zahoar Ahmad, Mr. Assoodul Hasan
Siddiqi, Dr. Abdul Majid and Dr. A.A. Ansari. The deputation
was received by Morley, T.R. Buchanan, Sir A. Godley and Sir
C. Lyall. Addressing them on behalf of the deputation Ameer Ali

71. Ibid.

72. The Times, January 27, 28, 1909. Morley wrote to Dinto:
"I have agreed to receive the sons of the crescent next
week. I wish the Prophet, himself were coming. There are
not many historic figures whom I should be better pleased
to summon up from Paradise, or wherever he now abides.
Your languages to the Islamic near their "Just claim to
something more than numerical strength" was perhaps a
trifle less guarded than it might have been if you will
allow me to say so. But I hope I execute my sword dance
without cutting either ..."
said: 'We are anxious that whatever boons, whatever concessions are made to the people of India, we should have our legitimate share ... it would be an evil day for India if any class or community comes to think that the interests of one community are in any way subordinate to the interest of another.' Commenting on the Scheme he remarked, 'we feel that to confide the election of our representatives to a joint electorate would be most detrimental to the Muslim people. Your lordship is aware of the divergences which exist between Muhammadan and other communities in India, divergences which ramify in all directions ... Having these divergencies in view and the cleavage which has taken place recently it is extremely important that our representation should not be dependent on the goodwill of anyone else. It should begin as was said when the Viceroy received a deputation, from the lowest rung of the ladder and go up to the highest viz., the Viceregal Council. In that way alone we feel we shall get the benefit of the concessions which you are so generously going to inaugurate in India ... It is extremely important that our community should be represented in sufficient numbers to be able to exercise some weight, some influence, in the deliberation of these assemblies. We cannot be content with any representation which is less than substantial and adequate.'

The London branch of the Muslim League prepared a statement of the Muhammadan case in the form of a pamphlet entitled "The Indian Mahomedans and the Government" which dealt extensively with the various schemes that had been put forward by the Government "as constituting the official solution" of the position of the Muhammadan community. It appended copies of resolutions passed by Muslim associations in India demanding separate electorate and adequate representation. Ameer Ali was afraid that in the mixed electorates the Muhammadans so returned would be "mere mandatories of the majority" by whose good-will and support they secure their return; they would come pledged to the political programme of their supporters and constituents, the, would be constantly at variance with their Muhammadan colleagues. The Mahomedan party will thus be split up into two factions; Mahomedan opinion will lose all weight and influence; its usefulness will be lost both to the Government and the community, and Mahomedan representation will become an unedifying spectacle and a farce." "Surely," concluded Ameer Ali, "it cannot be the intention of either the Government of India or of His Majesty's Government that the 'Reforms' should end in this impasse."

74. The Times, June 4, 1909.
75. Ibid., May 20, 1909.
76. Ibid.
The Aga Khan addressing the London Branch of the Muslim League during a visit to London in June 1909 also regretted that even well-informed circles in England did not realise that the percentage of Muslims in India had been steadily rising and they constituted 21% per cent of the total population. He emphasised that the Muslims who had never indulged in violent agitation or claimed "self-government", and had always been law-abiding simply asked that this 'indisputable fact should be recognised in rearing the new electoral fabric.' Ameer Ali, moving a vote of thanks to the Aga Khan, said that the Muslims had recognised that unless in the new order of things their position was assured to them, as promised first by Lord Minto and then by Lord Morley, it would mean their political subordination to another community differing from them in worship, laws, customs, ideals and habits of life. Moreover the projected electoral system was contrary to the democratic principles on which the British Government laid great stress. The Muslims would not, therefore, willingly accepted the arrangement proposed, and it would not

77. The Times, June 25, 1909 (Aga Khan had also expressed such views before. To a correspondent of the Times he said that "I trust his lordship will take an early opportunity of making definite his intimation that he may be willing to concede the principle of an exclusively Mahommedan electorate sending their representatives to an exclusively Mahommedan electoral college." The Times February 15, 1909).
be surprising if the bulk of them were to decide on absolute aloofness from the scheme.

The London Branch of Muslim League also submitted a memorial in September 1909 to the Under-Secretary of State for India at White Hall, recalling the pledge repeatedly given by him when he said that 'from these solemn promises, the Government could not go back, ought not to go back, and would not go back.' It also brought to light the resolution of the Central Committee of Muslim League, placing on record the conviction that 'a full, adequate and effective representation of All-Indian Mussalmans cannot be secured without providing for them special and separate electorates composed entirely of Muhammadan electors, and a number of seats as pledged ... fixed not only on the basis of numerical proportion, but also in accordance with their political importance.' The memorial reaffirmed the conviction expressed by the Aga Khan that 'if in the final shaping of the plans of Government the pledges made to us are not carried out to the full, in the spirit as well as in the letter, the Reforms of which Lord Morley spoke so hopefully the other day are doomed to failure.'

78. The Times, June 26, 1909.

79. A typed copy of the memorial is found in the Maulana Azad Library, Archives, Aligarh Muslim University.
Syed Hasain Bilgrami in reply to a letter of Lord MacDonnell, published in *The Times*, wrote that the League firmly stood in favour of communal representation as the only way of securing to the Muslims their full electoral rights and that he considered it far more workable in practice than the proposed scheme of electoral colleges.

A meeting of the delegates of the All-India Muslim League had been earlier convened on May 23, 1909 in Lucknow, with Viqar-ul-ululk in the chair. There was intense excitement among the participants. Dr. Ali Ilaa pointed out that Muslims occupied a position, wholly different from that of the other races inhabiting India, having a history and a tradition of their own and dynamic force in them that necessitated special treatment. He warned the Government of the dangerous reaction of the Indian Muslims in case of a departure from the pledges for a separate electorate. Writing extensively on this to the editors of almost every paper he asserted in one of his letters that the 'aspiration of the All-India Muslem League ... is United India', and this I am convinced is not possible without recognising the wisdom of preferential treatment where such treatment is a necessity in the interest of the general good of India. I have said before, and I repeat, that dissatisfied

80. *The Times*, January 12, 1909. See also his article "Indian Mahomedans and the Electoral Colleges" in the *Times*, January 4, 1909.

Muslims in India will be no small drag on the wheel of national progress and the only way to kindle territorial patriotism in them, the only way to wean them away from non-Islamic attractions and the only way to inspire them with Indian nationalism is for the insular, stay-at-home and indigenous community, the Hindus, to bind their Moslem countrymen with ties of confidence and obligation, which is impossible without extending to the Muslims liberal treatment and generous concessions. In the name of India the Hindus must embark upon a course of courageous conciliation and in the sacred name of the land of their birth the Moslems should respond by lessening the rigidity of their sectarianism. In another meeting of the U.P. Muslim League, resolutions were passed protesting against the adoption of any scheme of partly separate and partly mixed electorates. Mr. (Later Sir) Wazir Hasan said that the Muslims firmly believed in the redemption of pledges solemnly and repeatedly given to them by the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. H. Muhammad Shafi while emphasising that the claims of the Muslims were not new, drew the attention of the Indian Government to the fact that a breach of faith in an oriental country was most dangerous and that dissatisfaction and discontent would follow if

82. Letter found in the Maulana Azad Library, Archives, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.

83. The Times, September 8, 1909.
the pledges of high authorities were not fulfilled. Maulvi Ravjiuddin of Bombay also expressed the same views, expostulating in indignation: 'This is a most critical period in the history of Muslims in British India. We are face to face with a revolution in the future administrative machinery of this country and all our united efforts are necessary to protect our national interests at the present time.' From Bengal to Peshawar and from Lucknow to Hyderabad there was no dearth of the League's meetings in which resolutions, condemning the Morley scheme, were passed and a demand for separate electorates made.

Muhammad Ali Muhammad Khan, Raja of Mahaudabad (1879-1931) in a personal letter to the Viceroy warned that the failure to secure the rights and privileges of the minorities would lead to the failure of the whole scheme. He reiterated Muslim claim for the retention of the principle that Muslim representation should be granted on the basis of historical and

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86. The Pioneer, April 29, 30, May 1, 3, 31, 1909 etc.
87. A very influential taluqdar of Mahaudabad in Sitapur district; Aligarh trustee, 1909; Member of the Viceroy's Council 1907-20; president of the All-India Muslim League, 1915-19; actively participated in Kanpur mosque issue, 1913; presided the All-India Muslim League at Calcutta, 1917; presided also the special session of the League at Bombay, 1918; Home Member of U.P. Government, 1926; Vice-Chancellor Aligarh Muslim University, 1920-3; presided the Calcutta session of the All-India Muslim League, 1928.
political importance rather than on the grounds of numerical proportion and the grant of a separate Mahomedan electorate throughout i.e., for all elections, at all stages, wherever possible, for representation on the Imperial Legislative Council, Provincial Legislative Councils, Municipalities, District Boards and Universities, and where not possible the principle of nomination to be applied.

Allan Muhammad Shafi wrote a series of letters to Dunlop Smith, expressing his own views and the Muslim concern over Morley's reform scheme. In his opinion Morley's scheme had created dissatisfaction amongst Muslims and was contrary to the promises made by Morley. He pointed out to Smith that the result of conceding to the Indian Muslims representation on the basis of their numbers alone would work most injuriously and would be disastrous for them in the majority of Indian provinces. "Nay, I go so far as to assert that the state of things resulting from the carrying into effect of this principle will, in the end, prove a political danger. The community, therefore, is justified in expressing its dissatisfaction in this respect and, from what I knew of my own people, I am afraid the dissatisfaction is general as well as real ... I had thought it my duty to give the above warning, as I regard it incumbent on all truly loyal subjects of the British Crown (and particularly on followers of the Anglo-Moslem school of politics)

88. The letter is found in the Maulana Azad Library, All-Badr
to warn the Government in time whenever a serious danger of
this kind looms large in the distance', he added.

Official reaction in India to the Morley scheme was
largely sceptical. Both Minto and Arundel disliked the idea
of electoral colleges, regarding it the weakest point of the
whole despatch, while provincial Governments were no less
doubtful. The Government of Bombay observed that the principle
of electoral college was unsuited to the conditions of Bombay
where Mussalmaans were comparatively few and scattered. The
Government of Bengal felt that, owing to sectional jealousies,
Mussalmaans would find it difficult to act together. The Govern-
ment of United Provinces asserted that the provinces were not
sufficiently advanced for the system and that the Mussalmaans
would not accept anything less than the separate electorate.
The Government of Assam expressed similar views and remarked
that the system of election would place the minority entirely
at the mercy of the majority.

89. Martin Gilbert, Servant of India - A Study of Imperial
Rule from 1905 to 1910 as told through the correspondence
and diaries of Sir James Dunlop Smith (Longmans 1966)
p.181. Mian Muhammad Shafi to Dunlop Smith, Lahore
January 13, 1909. Mian Muhammad Shafi wrote letters to
Dunlop Smith in connection with the Minto-Morley Scheme
on January 8, 10, 18, 1909. See Martin Gilbert, pp. 176-185.

90. Minto Papers, Letters from Minto to Secretary of State
January to December 1908, Minto to Morley, December 31,
1908. See also Minto’s letter to Morley December 24,
1908.

91. Morley Papers, Proposals of the Government of India and
Despatch of the Secretary of State, Vol.I.
The Parliamentary debate on the Bill produced a diversity of reactions. Curzon strongly disapproved the Bill and the whole policy of which it was the instrument. Brodrick (1856-92) was silent; Amphill (1869-1935), an enthusiastic supporter; Wenlock (1849-) not friendly to the Bill; Northcote (1846-1911), doubtful and Sandhurst (1855-), a conscientious opponent. The debate on the Bill was "spiritless", though Asquith (1852-1928) and Balfour (1848-1930) were among the speakers.

92. William St. John Brodrick—President of the Oxford Union Society; M.P., 1880-5; Financial Secretary to War Office, 1886-92; Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 1898-1900; Secretary of State for India 1903-05.

93. Governor of Madras, 1899-1905; Viceroy of India during Lord Curzon's absence, April to December 1904.

94. Governor of Madras, 1891-6; paid great attention on public works.

95. Financial Secretary to War Office, 1886-8; M.P. 1880-99; Governor of Bombay, 1899-1903.

96. Under-Secretary for War, 1886-4; 1892-4; Governor of Bombay, 1895-9.

97. Minto-Papers, Correspondence with the Secretary of State January-December 1909, Morley to Minto, March 5, 1909.

98. Prime Minister of England, 1908-16; leader of the Liberal party; Held key positions in the Conservative Party; Prime Minister.


100. Ibid., Morley to Minto, April 2, 1909.
The Earl of Ronaldshay (1876-1961) supported the Muslim standpoint during the debate in the House of Commons. He was of the view that claims based upon historical reasons could not be ignored. It was from a Muslim sovereign that the East India Company acquired their rights in three of the richest provinces in India. The significance of this could not be gainsaid, and in attempting to form a just estimate of the political importance of the Mahomadans one should see beyond the confines of the Indian Empire. 'We must remember,' he said, 'that countries with whose destiny the destinies of our own country as an Eastern Power are indissolubly woven - Afghanistan, Persia and Turkey - are countries peopled by Mahomedan power. But the influence of Mahomedans does not stop here, for we find that this race speaks itself over Africa, Central Asia, and some parts of China. Therefore upon historical and political grounds alone, Mahomedans have a just claim to a substantial share in any political privileges which may be granted to the people of India.'

Criticising the speech made, on the Committee stage of the Bill, by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury who had

101. Conservative M.P., 1907-16; Governor of Bengal, 1917-22; Secretary of State for India, 1935-40; wrote a voluminous biography of Curzon and a number of other books on India

said that the 'method proposed is simply that in general electorates, such as municipalities, district boards, and members of provincial councils, all sects and class, including Mahomedans, will vote together', the Earl of Konaldshay warned that the words appear to me to constitute a direct reversal of the pledge given by the Viceroy. How the Government proposes to reconcile their action with their promises passes my comprehension, he wondered. For, as he further pointed out, in paragraph 16 of a Circular of August 29, 1907, the Government of India stated: "Under the system of election hitherto in force, Hindus largely predominate in all, or almost all, the electorates, with the result that comparatively few Mahomedan members have been elected. These have been supplemented by nomination made by the Government." But even so, "the total representation thus effected has not been commensurate with the weight to which the Mahomedan community is entitled." I would like to ask the Government, how, by this mixed electorate, the Mahomedans will secure representation. He brought to the notice of the members a cable received from India to the correspondent of The Times in reply to the speech of Mr. Hobhouse made in the Commons. The Cable said - "The Mahomedans are indignant at what they conceive to be the violation of the

103. Ibid., p. 36.
pledges given by Lord Minto and Lord Morley guaranteeing separate electorates. They consider Mr. Hobhouse's statement in the House to mean that the Government accept Mr. Gokhale's proposal, which would virtually place the Mahomedans absolutely in Hindu hands. Under mixed general electorates Congress Mahomedans will be freely elected to count as genuine Mahomedan representatives. Mahomedans protest against the surrender of their rights at the dictation of political agitators and are demanding separate electorates throughout. The Earl quoted telegrams of Raja of Mahmudabad and the Nawab of Dacca as well and said that 'the Mahomedans throughout India are at present suffering under a sense of grievous wrong and of grievous injustice. They consider that the pledges which were given to them in the most explicit language by the Viceroy and the Secretary of State are being broken ... I have no reasons for espousing the cause of the Mahomedans except this, that I believe, in the first place, that their demands are not only just, but that they are expedient under the present circumstances.'

Mr. Joynson-Hicks and Mr. J.D. Rees supported the views of Lord Ronaldshay. Rees said that he was disappointed with

104. Ibid., p. 33; See also The Times, April 22, 1909.
105. Ibid., p. 38.
the policy of the Government, and sympathised most deeply with the Muslims at 'this critical juncture.'

When the Bill came for debate in the House of Commons the Labour Party voiced its view through Keir Hardie who objected to the communal electorates. He argued that out of 300,000,000 people in India, there were about 60,000,000 Muslims, that of these 60,000,000 only 30,000 were Mughals, the rest being converts to Islam and that Hindus and the Muslims were basically the same people. Hardie further emphasised that over-representation for the Muslims was unfair to the Hindus and urged the Government to retain the mixed electorate. He stated that communal representation would obstruct the formation of a united Indian nation and it would further sharpen the religious differences between the Hindus and the Muslims.

The communal plan was also criticised by James O'Donnell who alleged that the scheme would accentuate the tension between Hindus and Muslims resulting ultimately in an outbreak of violence in India. Notwithstanding these opinions in support

106. Ibid., p. 39.
109. Ibid., p. 598.
of Morley's suggestion, parliamentary opinion was, in general, against the idea of mixed electorates. The general public debate on the issue brought home to the Government the great resentment of the Muslim community towards Morley's proposals, and it was forced to take cognisance of the Muslim demands. Consequently Lord Morley had to drop his idea and during the second reading of the Indian Council Bill, he gave an assurance to the House of Lords to implement the Mahomedans demands.

Lord Ampthill supported Morley and said that he was glad to hear that the Secretary of State had abandoned his proposal for introducing a system of proportional representation in India. "I am myself an advocate of the system of proportional representation", he continued, "but although I advocate this system for England, I am very clear that it is not applicable to India ... Proportional representation is all very well for getting the right compound in a homogenous community, but what it will not do is to blend antagonistic elements ... Hence it is quite certain that anything which causes discontent to the Mahomedan community in India is a distinct weakening, not only of the power, but of the prestige and influence of British Government in India."


111. Ibid., pp. 158, 162.
In view of the changed stance of the Government and to assuage their feelings on the Reform Scheme, Dunlop Smith, on behalf of the Government of India, assured the agitating Muslims that every effort would be made to secure the separate electorate for them. "After all", he told the Nawab of Dacca and Ali Imam, 'Lord Morley's proposal for an electoral college was only a suggestion, and I am in great hopes that it may be possible to secure some modification of the scheme by which Lord Minto's communal system may be utilized so as to safeguard the proper representation of minorities."

As against the general Muslim clamour for separate electorates, there was a small section of Muslims who did not treat the scheme favourably. Mr. Aushir Husain Kidwai (1878-1957), Bar-at-Law, in an article 'Separate and Excessive Muslim Representation' characterised the principle of separate electorate as demoralising and out of date. He praised the framers of the Turkish constitution who avoided it in spite of the heterogeneous population of Turkey. He based his criticism on the grounds that (a) the system of separate electorate would introduce religious consideration in political matters and would


113. Educated at London; member of the Legislative Assembly for three terms, the Sultan of Turkey conferred on him "Osmania" with the title of 'His Excellency'; wrote many articles in support of the Muslims.
accentuate tension between Hindus and Muslims, (b) it would prove fatal to the interests of the general Muslim public as it would tend to array against the Muslim minority a non-Muslim majority, (c) it would create communalism, (d) it would retard the progress of nationalism and unification of India, (e) it would be against the spirit of Pan-Islamism.

Nawab Sadiq Ali Khan, a barrister of Lucknow, also expressed the same views. To him the principle of class and religious representation was a most 'mischievous feature' of the reform scheme. It would not do good to Muslims as their political interests were not different from those of the Hindus.

A Muslim correspondent in an article on 'All-India Moslem League and the Reform' in the Pioneer also objected to the League's demand for separate electorates. He put the following questions to the Leaguers:

'(1) Do the Ahommedans require greater rights in the reform scheme as the subjects of His Majesty, the King Emperor, or as Ahommedans as such?

(ii) How do they occupy a position different from other communities?

(iii) Is there no other community holding the same position as that of the Mahomedans to be treated similarly?

(iv) Have not the Parsis, Sikhs, Anglo-Indians, Eurasians got their own traditions to put forth?

(v) On what legal grounds do the Mahomedans ask the Government to extend them special rights?

Thus, despite the general overwhelming support Muslim opinion gave to the 'separatist' campaign of the Muslim League, there was nevertheless an influential minority of Muslims who looked upon the demands of the League with disapproval, and represented the 'unionist' element in the Muslim community. A number of leading Pro-Congress Englishmen, including Sir Henry Cotton (1868-1939), Lord MacDonnell (1844-1925), Charles O'Donnell, K. Hardie (1856-1915), and Ramsay MacDonnell (1866-1937) disfavoured the scheme of separate electorate, mainly on


117. A prominent Liberal A.P., President of the Bengal Legislature, 1922-25; Knighted, 1925; Editor of India, the London newspaper of the Indian National Congress, 1906-18; author of New India and Indian and Home Memories.

118. Lieutenant-Governor of the M.W.P. 1896-1901; Chairman of the Famine Commission, 1901; Under-Secretary of State in Ireland.

119. Independent Labour A.P., 1892-95; Labour A.P., 1900-15; Visited India, 1908; Editor of the Labour Leader; he advocated self-Government for India.

120. First Labour Prime Minister and one of the founders of the British Labour Party.
the ground that it would antagonize Hindu opinion. Sixteen Hindu leaders including Surrendranath Benerjea, had already signed a statement declaring that if separate electorate and special representation were granted to the Mussalmans they would prefer the whole reform scheme to be dropped. The preferential treatment demanded by the Muslims was characterized in the Hindu Press as "the Gatekeepers buksesheeh." The Tribune satirically wrote that "... separate carriages may be similarly provided for the representatives of a race of superior historic and political importance who have taken it upon themselves to do no less than keep the gates of India." Morley was in a dilemma. If he recognised the principle of the separate electorate, the Hindus would be offended while if he modified it the Muslims would agitate. Besides, he feared that any injustice to the Muslims in India would certainly provoke a severe and injurious reaction in Constantinople. That Muslim resentment on the electorate colleges was wide had become amply clear by now, and whatever course Morley chose to adopt would prove troublesome. At this juncture, Morley approached into to work towards soothing the ruffled Muslim feelings in India, and

121. The Times, 23 March 1909.
122. The Tribune, February 24, 1909.
123. The Tribune, March 9, 1909.
directed Morison, member of his Council, to re-examine the entire question. Morison in his *Note upon the Pledges given to the Muhammadans* pointed out that the provisions of the announced scheme had created misunderstanding in the Muslims and their discontent would be allayed only by fulfilling completely the promises held out to them earlier. Morley wrote to Ainto, 'Morison is pertinacious up to the eleventh hour about his Muhammadan friends; insists on our pledges, and predicts a storm of Muhammadan reproach and dissatisfaction.' On the other hand, K.G. Gupta, the 'Hindu' member of Morley's council, quite naturally gave a note of dissent on the draft despatch prepared on behalf of the Special Committee. He admitted that Mussalmans formed a substantial and influential minority but emphasised that the Mussalmans were not the only community living in India. He warned that it would be fatal to concede to Muslim demands at the expense of the majority community.

In this entire controversy Ainto's sympathies were with the Muslims, as he was convinced about the justice of Muslim demands. On April 7, 1909 Ainto wrote to Morley that 'Muhammadan

125. Morley Papers, Vol. 31-35, See Note upon the Pledges given to the Muhammadans, pp. 1-5.

126. Ainto Papers, Letters from Secretary of State for India - January to December 1909, Morley to Ainto, August 10, 1909.

127. Morley Papers, Note of Dissent by Hon'ble K.G.Gupta, August 16, 1909.
electorates are absolutely necessary - if we retreat at all from that view, we shall have an infinitely worse trouble than anything that can arise from Hindu opposition.' However, he also felt that the Muslims had misunderstood the electoral college scheme.

A press communiqué was issued which stated "... The recent discussions in the House of Commons has given rise to considerable misapprehension of the intentions of the Government of India regarding the representation of Mahomedans. It seems to be supposed that the proposals contained in the despatch of 1st October are to be modified in a manner disadvantageous to Mahomedan interests. This impression is entirely erroneous. The Government of India have no intention of departing in any material respect from the arrangement outlined in their despatch of which the special committee of the All-India Moslem League expressed their approval in a letter from their Chairman which was forwarded officially to the Home Department so recently as the 4th February last. The Committee then said, 'this arrangement was in keeping with the maintenance of the principle of effective Mahomedan representation and had also the virtues of linking various class interests together with the rural or territorial electorates. The Mahomedans are

under a heavy debt of gratitude to Your Excellency and your Executive Council for the despatch which was characterised not only by far-sighted statesmanship but had the great virtue of adjusting divergent claims and interests on considerate and equitable bases and unless in some form or other the reform scheme is carried out on the principles on which Your Excellency's despatch was based, I cannot foretell its grateful acceptance by the Mahomedans or any other minority, great or small."

To clarify the scheme further, he organised a meeting of June 1909, at Simla, with seven prominent Muslim 'moderates', namely the Nawab of Dacca, the Raja of Ahmedabad, Ali Imam of Patna, Abdul Majed (1859-1924), barrister of Allahabad, Mian Muhammad Shafi of Lahore, Ibrahim Rahimtoola (1862-1942), of Bombay and Abdul Aziz of Peshawar. A heated discussion followed. The Viceroy ultimately convinced the Muslim representatives that the intention of the Government was in no way inimical to Muslim interests, and that exclusive Muslim representation would, by excluding them from the political main-stream, be detrimental to their community. However these leaders extracted the concession of six, instead of five fixed seats for Muslims

130. A very eminent lawyer at the Allahabad High Court; attended the foundation session of the All-India Muslim League at Dacca, 1906; first President of the U.P. Muslim League founded in 1909; participated in meetings for separate electorate; he was the most influential landowner in U.P.
131. A wealthy Khoja Muslim; presided League's annual session in 1912; President of Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1899; Member Bengal Legislative Council, 1892-1912 and President of...
on the Imperial Council. But they were not able to carry the Muslim League with them at a special session held in Lucknow on July 10 and 11, 1909, to discuss the decisions arrived at Siala. The hurriedly convened meeting of the League became a subject of vehement criticism by the provincial league leadership which challenged its constitutionality. The provincial leagues of Bombay, and Madras which staunchly pleaded for 'exclusive separate electorates' were found absent from the Lucknow meet and of the Punjab and Bengal which also stood for 'exclusive separate electorates' were represented by one or two representatives. It was, therefore, for the Leagues of U.P. and Bihar to decide the fate of the proposed meeting. But lack of quorum prevented its proceedings, leading to its dissolution. Objections were raised against the acceptance of only a limited number of separate seats for Muslims, and the general trend of the speeches specially those of senior members like Vqar-ul-Mulk, was to insist that the principle of entirely separate Muslim representation should have been stressed and that the deputation should not have accepted anything less than that. However, Minto's rigid stand in this context gradually dampered Muslim opinion, and at the same time the League moderates, added by the efforts of Muslim sympathisers

132. Minto Papers, Ibid., Minto to Morley, July 1, 1909.
like Morison, attempted to bring round dissenting opinion in the League towards acceptance of the Minto scheme.

Morley thus came round to accepting the standpoint of the Muslims. Speaking on the Second Reading of the Indian Council Bill 1909 for Separate Electorate Morley said: 'Only let us not forget that the difference between Mahomedanism and Hinduism is not a mere difference of article of religious faith or dogma. It is a difference in life, in tradition, in history, in all the social things as well as articles of belief, that constitute a community ... Do not let us forget that, in talking of Hindus and Mahomedans, we are dealing with, and are brought face to face with, vast historic issues. We are dealing with the very mightiest forces that through all the centuries and ages have moulded the fortunes of great States and the destinies of countless millions of mankind.'

The Muslims were satisfied. To Dunlop Smith Mian Muhammad Shafi in a letter expressed the gratefulness of the entire Muslim community for the interest shown by the Viceroy. "I assure", he said, "that all this will bind the Mahomedan community still closer to the British Rule with the silken chains

of sincere gratitude and loyalty, and will strengthen the Anglo-Mahomedan bond of union a hundred-fold." When the scheme was republished, the Muslims received it well. Welcoming it, the Aga Khan said that it was accepted not because they constituted 'all that we could have desired, or that they constitute an ideal solution of the problem', but because 'of our readiness to co-operate with our rulers and to help them in their difficult task of introducing the principle of constitutional government in so diversified a country as India, and also, as exhibiting our cordial goodwill towards other communities.'

But the Hindus were averse to the idea of separate electorate to the Muslims. Aftab Husain Ahmad Khan's letter to the editor of the Pioneer, August 11, 1906, published on the eve of the announcement of the scheme which demanded a fair number of seats for the Muslims and those also to be 'filled up by Mahomedan members elected by voters of their own community', was not favourably read by the Hindus. Mahoharlal condemned the allegation that a Hindu would not elect a Muslim candidate. "The fact is" he wrote, "that the Hindus do not make a distinction between a Mahomedan and a Hindu. The Mahomedan themselves

136. Cited in Syed Razi Wasti, op.cit., p. 188.
have studiously avoided offering themselves for election, as they have fought shy of the competitive examinations and have never tried to win the confidence of the public. Unfortunately, their attitude has been to avoid co-operating with their Hindu brethren in their struggle for promoting public good. It is not unnatural therefore that they do not inspire confidence among those from whom they held aloof." To prove as to how far Hindus had lent their support to Musliims the above writer further continued that in 1896, when the late Syed Mahmood (1850-1903) was a member of the local council the Hindus had tried to send him as their representative in the Supreme Council. He was supported by the Advocate of Lucknow, a Congress paper, and Pandit Bishambhar Nath (1832-1908), the leader of the educated Hindu community of these provinces, then a member of the local Legislative Council, had not only expressed his wish but was anxiously desirous of retiring in Mr. Mahmood's favour.

137. Son of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan; educated at Delhi, Benares and Christ Church, Cambridge; called to the Bar at Lincoln's Inn, 1872; practised in the High Court, Allahabad; made District Magistrate at Rai Bareli in Oudh, 1879; member of Education Commission, 1882; acted as a Puisne Judge of the High Court, N.W.P., 1883 and retired in 1893; assisted his father in the development of A.A.O. College, Aligarh; author of Law of Evidence in British India; edited Muhammadan Law books in Arabic; published a History of Education in India.

138. He was associated with the Indian National Congress from 1888; twice elected Chairman, Reception Committee of Congress session held at Lucknow in 1892 and Allahabad in 1899; member of Imperial Legislative Council, 1895-1902; was a member of U.P. Legislative Council also.

139. The Pioneer, August 20, 1906. See Manohar Lal's reply to Sahibzada Aftab Ahmad on Mahomedan Representation.
When morley had accepted the principle of separate representation, as laid in the Despatch of April 1907, Hindus again expressed their anxiety. The main comments against the separate electorate in the Hindu Press were that it would result in heart burning between the two communities and that the Muhammadans had their full share of representation on the local bodies under the existing system. Mr. Iswar Saran in 'An Open Letter to the Musalmans of India' wrote: 'An unholy attempt is being made to make the two communities regard each other with feelings of suspicion and distrust. Any man, be he a Hindu or a Mahomedan, who undertakes this task, is a traitor to the best and abiding interests of his community and country.'

C.Y. Chitamani (1880-1941) also vehemently opposed the scheme. "I do not feel", he wrote "the least hesitation in saying that the 'reforms' proposed are not worth the paper on which they are printed." To him the reform scheme was 'a worthless and even mischievous production of the bureaucratic mind. Durga Charan Banerjee expressed the alarm created in the minds of the non-Muslim communities regarding the Muslim representation. On behalf of the United Province Association, Allahabad, he sent a telegram to the Viceroy pointing out the injustice done to other communities. The Muslim Nationalists, as cited earlier,

140. The Modern Review, October 1907, p. 338.
141. The Modern Review, December 1907, p. 486.
142. The Pioneer 18, July 1909.
also did not like the scheme and considered separate electorate 'a most mischievous feature of the (reform) scheme.'

Meanwhile the pendulum swung and the scheme of electoral college was envisaged.

At the time of the announcement of the scheme, the Congress was meeting at Madras. Dr. Rash Behari Ghosh (1845-1921), the President of the session (1908) welcomed it 'not in a spirit of fervent criticism, but with the deepest gratitude.' Later on when the scheme was revised in the light of Muhammadan pressure which provided separate electorate to the Muslims, it created profound dissatisfaction among the Hindus. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya (1861-1946) in his Presidential Address to the Lahore session (1909) condemned the scheme for the special representation of Muslims and the session also condemned 'the unjust, insidious, and humiliating distinctions made between

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143. See The Hindustan Review, April 1909 quoted in Ram Gopal p. 104.
144. Passed A.A. and Law, 1867 and 1871 respectively; awarded LL.D. degree in 1884; a staunch believer of Hindu-Muslim unity; Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Congress Session, Calcutta, 1906; President of the Surat Session, 1908; a moderate in politics; took prominent part in Swadeshi movement; member of Indian Legislative Council from 1891-1895 and again from 1906-07.
145. Congress Presidential Addresses from the Foundation to the Silver Jubilee (Madras, pp. 784-85.
146. Regularly attended Congress Sessions from 1886-1937; presided Congress sessions, 1909, 1918, 1932 and 1937; founded Hindu Ahicasabha; started the Abhyudaya the Marvada, the Kisan in Hindi and the Leader in English, founder member of the Benaras Hindu University.
147. The Indian National Congress - Presidential Addresses, Part I, p. 961.
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separate electorate ... led to widen the already wide breach between the two communities and hit the spirit of nationalism hard from all sides." Dr. R. C. Majumdar is of the opinion that the Act of 1909 was a concession given to the Muslims as promised by Minto. 'This set the seal of Government approval on the theory of two nations or two races, or two separate communities, with distinct interests and outlook, which were preached by Sir Syed Ahaad and formed the basis of the Aligarh movement. Hence forth, there was no turning back and as years rolled on, this idea of the Muslims being a separate political entity got greater and greater momentum, like a ball moving down an inclined plane. But such views fall short of the real assessment. The memorial presented to the Viceroy by the Muslim League in February 1909 very specifically mentioned that they "have not the least desire that an iron wall should be raised for ever between the Muslims and their Hindu countrymen" and

153. The Muslim League, Its History, Activities and Achievements. (Agra 1954) p. 23. See also Professor R. C. Majumdar, Raychaudhuri, and Kalikinkar Datta in their An Advanced History of India, p. 914, opine 'By conceding the demand of the Muhammadan community for separate representation by members chosen by the votes of a Muslim electorate the Reforms of 1909 introduced the principle of communal representation, which, as the Indian Statutory Commission observed in 1929, became a "cardinal problem and ground of controversy at every revision of the Indian electoral system."'

further expressed that "it will be a satisfaction to them to be associated as much as possible with their non-Muslim countrymen." Hence there was no desire on the part of the Muslims to create a gulf. They only wanted their due representation. Even Ameer Ali, the leader of the separate electorate, who pleaded that the two communities were widely divided in habits, customs, traditions and religion did not wish separatism and urged that throughout his life he had laboured to promote communal harmony and his remarks were free from 'bias of any kind.' What he wanted was only adequate representation which could safeguard their interests.

The conclusion that Sir Syed preached two nation theory and his Aligarh Movement stood to widen the gulf is a fallacious conclusion. As shown earlier the Aligarh Movement was a positive movement which directed its energy solely to the uplift of Muslims socially and educationally and Sir Syed throughout his life continued his efforts for Hindu-Muslim unity.

What led the Muslims to demand separate electorate was their realisation of subjection to an educationally and economically advanced community. They were in minority and could not compete with a non-Muslim candidates. This is clear from

the fact that in 1913 for the Imperial Council, two members were to be elected by the non-official members of the U.P. Legislative Council in the mixed system of election. Out of 29 non-official members there were 8 Mussalman members, of whom one was absent. The number of non-official members present was therefore 28. Each member had the right of giving two votes. The following were the results:

i. The Hon'ble Rai Sri Ran Bahadur...............22
ii. The Hon'ble Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya...........19
iii. The Hon'ble Nawab Muhammad Ishaq Khan...........15

The Mussalmans had taken care to put forward the best candidate amongst them in the province. Nawab Muhammad Ishaq Khan (1860-1918) had been in the Government service as a District Judge and on his retirement was unanimously elected as the Honorary Secretary of the M.A.O. College Aligarh. It appears from the above results that the 7 Mussalmans present all voted for him. He got one vote from a European non-official member and not a single vote came to him from any Hindu member. On March 1, 1909 there happened to be the election of a member for the Provincial Council by the Municipal Boards. There were twenty three

157. He was appointed to the Statutory Civil Service, 1884, acted as Minister in Rampur state and retired from there, 1913; Honorary Secretary to the M.A.O. College, 1913-18.

158. The Comrade, January 25, 1913; See letter of Ibn Ahmad Bar-at-Law - Hony. Secretary U.P. Muslim League to editor - 'A Mussalman's Position in a Mixed Electorate.'
electors—thirteen Hindus, eight Mussalams and two Christians. Abdul Majid, barrister, Taluqdar of Jaunpur and Pandit Aadan Mohan Malviya, Advocate High Court contested for the seat. Both the gentlemen were known for their representative character. The Hindus carried the election by 13 votes to 9. The Mussalaman candidate was supported by Muslims; he got one vote 159 from the Christian member and none from the Hindus. Again at an election held to fill a vacancy on the U.P. Legislative Council, a very capable Muslim Sheikh Shahid Husain (1878-1924) B.A.(Cambridge) Bar-at-Law, Taluqdar of Oudh was rejected by an overwhelming Hindu majority in favour of their candidate. On hue and cry raised by the Muslims, a certain Hindu gentleman wrote to the editor of the Pioneer, "Even supposing for the sake of argument that the Hindus voted for their man simply because he was a Hindu, what right have the Mahomedans to grumble? Have they not been proclaiming from the house top that their interests are separate from those of the Hindus and have they not been asking for the gate-keeper's bakshish on that very account? What wonder then if the Hindus


160. Belonged to Kidwai family and taluqdar of Gwdia in Bara Banki; related to the famous pan-Islamist Mushir Husain Kidwai; participated in agitation for separate electorate, held many Government offices.

161. The Alhaq, November 6, 1909.
are driven to adopt a separatist attitude in sheer self-defence." This forced the Mussalmans to demand separate electorate not only for the councils but for local boards as well. The fear of the Muslims 'to be dragged at the wheel of a majority along any course it may choose to take' was not unfounded and the above instances justify that the fears of the Muslims were real and deep-seated. Indeed the result of separate representation of Muslims was so satisfactory that unfriendly relations which existed under joint election system totally disappeared and their relations besides other factors, became so cordial that the League and the Congress entered into an alliance called the Lucknow Pact in 1916: according to which separate electorates were proposed in all provinces even where the Muslims were in a majority and wherever they were numerically weak the proportion suggested was in excess of their numerical strength. Hence Wolpert's assumption that 'Morley's capitulation to the separate electorate demand of


163. Francis Robinson in his article 'Municipal Government and Muslim Separatism' says 'Before the grant of separate representation in the 1909 reforms, no U.P. Muslim succeeded in elections to the provincial council and so Muslims began to demand separate representation for the councils as well.' Modern Asian Studies, Vol.7,3,1913, p.414.

164. The Times, January 14, 1909, Ameer Ali to the Editor.
Muslims only helped intensify communal tensions and conflict,' can not be taken as an objective assessment of the Minto-Morley scheme. Certainly it can be said that no 'other solution could have been found because of the basic hostility between the Hindus and the Moslems ...' The British cannot be held responsible for perpetuating communal conflict through the separate electorate. Conditions as existed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth with the economic and educational backwardness of Muslims it was logical that for an elected council Muslims should be represented as a community, which it was not. The Indian Council Act of 1892, gave the Muslims under representation and 'rightly did Muslims begin to entertain the fear that they could not get representation on the Councils even in proportion to their population', in the future constitutional set up.

Communalism in Indian politics had come to stay and in the beginning of the twentieth century, Aga Khan told Gokhale to prevent it in the Congress, failing which, as has been cited earlier, the Muslim League was founded. The 'Unionist' elements existed in both the communities but it was too weak to defeat


the rising forces of communalism which had crept in both the communities. Gulf had already been created and it could only have been bridged through the acceptance of the demands of the Muslim League of separate electorate by the Congress, whose opposition led the minority feel of its permanent subjugation by the majority. Thus the wide breach between the two communities was not an innovation and Minto or Morley cannot be totally held responsible for dividing Indian nationalism by communal electorates, nor did they think it the greatest victory for the British empire in the twentieth century. "Indeed" to quote Professor C.H. Philips, "it was the march of events - the rise of Indian middle-classes, the falling behind of Muslims on the road to power, place and wealth and their consequent tendency to invoke the whole strength of their community, rich and poor, educated and ignorant, to redress the balance that produced this modern form of communalism. Essentially, modern Indian communalism emerges as a middle-class problem and its chief causes arise through political and economic as much as through religious rivalry." Sharp separatism in Indian politics developed in the thirty's when Nehru Report failed to provide adequate seats to minority and Jinnah left Congress to reorganise the scattered pieces of League.

Hon'ble Gokhale recognised the justice in the claim of the Muslims for 'adequate, real and genuine' representation in the Councils. He believed that in the Indian Council Act of 1892, Muslims had received under-representation, and a separate representation was essential for them. Praising Minto and Morley as the joint authors of the Reforms, he wrote to Minto 'My Lord, I sincerely believed that Your Lordship and Lord Morley have between you saved India from drifting towards what cannot be described by any other name than chaos. For, however strong a government may be, repression never can put down the aspiration of a people and never will.' It was certainly a correct assessment.