Chapter - II

Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism

2.1 Structural Psychoanalytical Criticism

2.1.1 Lacanian criticism:

The psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan (1901-81) could be said to have been founded on the failure of language to match the body. The relation between the identifications of objects and the accession to language is taken up by Lacan. According to him the unconscious is more than the source of primal instincts linked to ideas and images. The randomness is discarded by him and he rather believes that conscious and unconscious are 'asymmetrically copresent'. The inner structure maps the outer conceptualizing. This mapping is structured like language, linguistically.

According to Lacanian principles of psychoanalysis an infant is an amorphous being, with no boundaries to its experience or of need; it does not identify the distinction between itself and others; it is a 'shapeless mass' of egg. Lacan extracts the metaphor of narcissism and mirror from Freud's concept of ego, 'On Narcissism' (1953; Vol. XIV). This stage of infancy is mirror stage where an infant gets the whole idea of its physical entity through imaginary identification with its reflection in a mirror. But even before this mirror reflection an infant gets the idea of its wholeness and completeness through others and mother is the closest being with whom it experiences this wholeness. Thus, when a child looks in the mirror it is delighted by several qualities of its own image simultaneously. The experience of being a shapeless mass is replaced by a sense of wholeness, an ideal completeness. Lacan finds this gratifying experience of a mirror-image to be metaphorically similar to an
unbroken union between outer and inner and a perfect control which fetches immediate satisfaction of desire. According to Lacan this pre-linguistic and pre-oedipal stage is the realm of 'Imaginary'. The mother model is an illusion for the child since the mother does not respond to every impulse like the mirror-image. Imaginary precedes the mirror-stage. Before going to the next phase of infant's development that is 'Symbolic Order', one must digress to discuss 'desire of the Mother' for this concept creates a precursory gap which leads to the finding of the 'Symbolic Order'. 'Desire of the Mother' is a double genitive which refers to both mother's desire and the desire for the mother. This belief is typical of the 'Imaginary-Order' because:

First the child imagines itself to be the desire of the mother in the sense that it is all that the mother desires. The child wants to become all that would satisfy the mother's lack, in psychoanalytical term becoming the 'phallus' for the mother, all that would complete her desire. Second, the 'Desire of the Mother' is the child's own desire for the mother, as that part of its own experience which has been prompt to satisfy its needs. Hence it too is, drawn into this fantasy of completion. (Wright 100)

Since repression is neither experienced nor acknowledged, there is, according to Lacan, no unconscious at this stage, except, of course, the mother's. Both of these aspects of the 'Desire of the Mother' combine to keep the child's ego-concept in a profoundly illusory state. The concept is inadequate in that it does not signify the gap between a concept and its application. The gap appears with the initiation of the child into the order of language, what Lacan calls the 'Symbolic Order'. According to this concept:
... the structures of the language are marked with social imperatives - the father's rules, laws and definitions, among which are those of 'child' and 'mother'. Society's injunction that desire must wait, (ego-psychology), that it must formulate in the constricting word whatever demand it may speak, is what effects the split between conscious and unconscious, the repression that is the tax exacted by the use of language. (Wright 101)

Lacan's involvement in the Saussurean Structuralist ideology gives birth to the concepts of psychoanalysis which carry an impingement from Structuralism. Saussure's signifier/signified notion of structuring of language asserts that the link between them is entirely arbitrary, for any sound can be linked with any concept; once the combination acquires recognition the two become firmly bonded together as two sides of a single sheet of paper (Saussure 113 orig. 1915). The expression coined by Saussure for the combination: s/S where S stands for the signifier and s for the signified. Lacan however questions the security of the combination. Lacan's famous example where what appears to be the same signified, namely a door, can be marked with two different signifiers, 'Ladies' or 'Gentlemen' (Lodge 86). The example refurnished something what the linguistic-critics had already doubted, that Saussure ignores the problem of reference, the process whereby parts of the world come to be referred to as things or persons. The sign-system is prone to illusion because human judgments influence the identification of the signified, which can differ. Owing to this, a gap between signifier and signified opens up.

Lacan very interestingly and in a very decisive manner transposes the effect of this division on the assigning of gender roles. According to him without language there is neither gender nor gender - oriented desire; the fact of having a male or
female body is irrelevant before the division according to Lacan. He believes that once inserted into a language the subject becomes at once 'discordant' with it as he says:

There is nothing in the unconscious which accords with the body. The unconscious is discordant. The unconscious, determines the subject as being but as being to be crossed through with that metonymy by which I support desire, in so far as it is endlessly impossible to speak as such (qtd. in Mitchell and Rose 165)

The unconscious is capable enough to subvert any definitive permutation provided by language to the subject in the chain of words. As soon as the subject is placed in the language-system it is bound to one gender or another.

Another significant mark left by Lacan on the Sassurean concept is that he indicates the dominance of the father's signifier over the signified; he inverts Saussure's formula: s/S to S/s. This metaphorically suggests the place of unconscious desire as beneath the range of the conscious level of language, out of sight and unnoticed, yet able to shift unpredictably. Lacan's endeavor to clarify this subversion leads to another double-edged notion. He talks about the interaction between the Imaginary and the Symbolic in their operations upon Real. Lacan stressed Real of a subject inhabited by a signifier. He decentres the subject of being from its consciousness (qtd. in Ragland-Sullivan 187). According to Lacan the Real is the given field of brute existence over which the Imaginary and the Symbolic range in their rival attempts to control. 'The Real, therefore, is that before which the Imaginary falters, and over which the symbolic stumbles' (188).

'One can say that it is that to which all reference and action has relevance, but which can only be handled through signifying practices' (Wright 102). In this Ecrits,
Lacan said the idea that the Real is to be found at a named point precedes even the exact sciences (197). His distinction here is between the confusion over naming a point and the subsequent belief that the point is then fixed (even though it may change). The Real itself is immoveable and complete but man's interpretations of the Real is moveable. The latter combines language with "self experience. The resulting interprets on compose "reality", but not the real. The "real" Real is both beyond and behind imaginary perception and symbolic discipline. Real is compared to a Mobius strip (a band of flat paper with one twist in it, making two sides into one), where Imaginary and Symbolic ambiguously meet. The strip is like the Real; the ambiguity of the side (s) represents the conflict between Imaginary and Symbolic. The Real according to Lacan is the umbilical cord of the Symbolic, the residue behind all articulation which cannot be eliminated (Lacan 189). This is the place where illusions occur.

According to Lacan Freud's formulations 'condensation' and 'displacement' correspond to the basic poles of language identified by Jackobson 'as metaphor' and 'metonymy' respectively. In 'metonymy' one thing represents another by means of the part standing for the whole. So, ten hands would stand for ten laborers. In Freudian dream interpretation an element in a dream might stand, for something else by 'displacement': for example, a lover who is Italian might be represented in a dream by, let us say, an Alfa Romeo car (Barry 112). According to Lacan this is the same as 'metonymy', the part standing for the whole.

In 'condensation' several symbols are compressed into one symbol, just as a 'metaphor' like 'the ship ploughed the waves' condenses into a single item two different images, the ship cutting through the sea and the plough cutting through the soil.
These notions have been used by Lacan as evidence for the claim that the unconscious is structured like a language for here the unconscious uses these linguistic means of self-expression. Unconscious desire can mistake one appearance for another similar to it and be led to substitute one signifier for another, or it can shift from one thing to another associated with it, discerned as being more significant for desire, so producing a metonymy. Such metaphorical and metonymic effects are constantly at work in language without speakers being aware of it (Wright 102).

Lacan finds an identity between language-forms and the response to repression: the dictum 'the unconscious is structured like a language' is more than an analogy, for the unconscious is born to be no more than its linguistic birth marks. The unconscious, the child that is born of language faces the frustration owing to the fact that every word indicates the absence of what it stands for; and the absence of satisfaction has now to be accepted. Languages impose a system of words along which the ego must move while the unconscious remains in search of the object it has lost.

Lacan's 'metaphor-metonymy' transposition onto various linguistic and literary symbols gives birth to an implication of an incessant referral of the subject into the symbol of patriarchal law whereas it is a signifier of loss, the result of the split caused in the subject upon entry into the Symbolic.

The Father's words, those definitions out of which the object-world is ready-made for the child, are thus fraught with illusion. This is a new development in Freudian theory every single utterance, spoken or written, is invaded by the unconscious. Lacan's own style, frustrating for the reader, continually mimes this illusion by means of puns, innuendos and outrageous conceits.
Elizabeth Wright opines that the overriding impression, according to Lacanian principles, is that the Imaginary and the Symbolic are by no means given equal status, although Lacan advocates in favour of every single utterance being invaded by the unconscious but he is disinclined to give the unconscious any power to correct the order which has created it (Wright 104).

2.2 Literary implications and applications of Lacan's theory of the Subject:

The new developments in French psychoanalysis have changed the relation between psychoanalysis and literature. The classical psychoanalysis on one hand provided interpretations of actual texts; the Lacanian psychoanalytic principles on the other hand revitalized literary theory. Wright opines, 'With the help of such new theoretical understanding, approaches may indeed be made to actual texts, but it is as a result of the light they cast upon language and communication that they are most valuable' (Wright 111). According to Elizabeth Wright Lacan's own example of critical practice is not to be taken as exemplary. She takes Lacan's treatment of Poe's story for two purposes:

(i) to explicate it as a form of textual criticism

(ii) to use Lacan's 'Seminar on "The Purloined Letter" ' as a point of departure for more general critical issues, namely its implications for the reading-process (the unconscious as a reader) and, analogously, for the seeing-process (the unconscious as a viewer).

Unlike the traditional Freudian psychoanalytic approaches to literature which centre on the analysis of the personal psyche, the new psychoanalytic structural approach centres on the workings of the text as a psyche, based on the theory that the
unconscious is structured like a language. Where Gradiva, for Freud, was an allegory of the return of the repressed, in the form of specific imagery, for Lacan, in the words of Elizabeth Wright:

Poe's 'The Purloined Letter' is a symbolic repetition of a structuring fantasy, his linguistic version of the repetition compulsion. The way subjects are at the mercy of the repressive differences inculcated by the structure forever, projects the supremacy of the signifier over the subjects it brings into language, a repetition of its own creation is enforced upon it. 'Lacan's reading of the story concentrates on a repeated scene, only loosely connected with the mundane events, yet inadvertently structuring their dramatic import. (105)

Here is an account of Lacan's way of reading 'The Purloined Letter':

The Minister and the Queen are engaged in a discussion in her apartment. The king enters and the Minister notices that the Queen is anxious about a letter lying there, for not to be read by the king. The Minister stealthily replaces the letter with another from his pocket. The Queen helplessly observes this. Later she engages the prefect of the police to search for the letter from the Minister's apartments in his absence. He fails to do so. Then she asks detective Dupin to find the letter from the Minister's residence. To quote Peter Barry:

Dupin reasons that carrying letter on his person would be too great a risk, but its usefulness lies in the Minister being able to produce it at any time, so it can't be hidden outside the house. But if it had been hidden inside the house the search would have discovered it, so it must be in the house but not hidden, sure enough, he sees the letter above
the mantelpiece, carelessly pushed items of correspondence. (116)

Dupin visits again and substitutes a letter for it. The original letter is returned to the Queen. The Minister unaware of the fact that he no longer possesses it meets his downfall. A note inside the fake letter reveals the truth that Dupin avenged on the Minister for being duped by him in love affair earlier in life.

For Lacan the story is structured round two scenes, which he calls 'primal scene' and 'repetitive scene'. There is a change of locale and a repetition of a pattern involving three protagonists: scene one in the royal boudoir, with the king, the queen, and the minister; scene two in the minister's apartment, with the police, the minister, and Dupin. It is the repeated structure, rather than the theft itself, which interests Lacan:

Thus three moments, structuring three glances, borne by three subjects, incarnated each time by different characters.

The first is a glance that sees nothing: the king and the police.

The second, a glance which sees that the first sees nothing and deludes itself as to the secrecy of what it hides: the Queen, then the Minister.

The third sees that the first two glances leave what should be hidden exposed to whoever would seize it: the Minister, and finally Dupin.

In order to grasp in its unity the inter-subjective complex thus described, we would willingly seek a model in the technique legendarily attributed to the ostrich attempting to shield itself from danger, for that technique might ultimately be qualified as political,
divided as it here is among three partners; the second believing itself invisible because the first has its head stuck in the ground, and all the while letting the third calmly pluck its rear. (Seminar 44)

We can say that Lacan's analysis is more attached with viewing the text as a metaphor which throws light upon aspects of the unconscious, on the nature of psychoanalysis, and on aspects of language as against Marie Bonaparte's reading of the tale as a symptom of the author's neurotic inner life. Following three conclusions which can be reached upon for the Lacanian analysis of the story are based on the insertions of Symbolic-Imaginary, Signifier-Signified, metaphor-metonymy and transference notions:

Lacan finds the stolen letter as a symbol of the unconscious itself. The content of the letter is not revealed in the story but it keeps affecting the actions of the characters in the tale. It is in verisimilitude with the notion of the unconscious but it impinges on everything we do. The nature of the content of the unconscious can be had only by guesses on the basis of its effects. Similarly we can infer the general nature of the letter's content from the anxiety it generates in the story. Freud's investigations resulted in confident assertions about the precise nature of the content of the unconscious, but Lacan's probe roots itself in his skepticism about such certainties. The things which might seem to give some import to our inner world have been purloined like the letter and one has to learn to operate without them. To quote Wright:

Each time the letter is appropriated, the subject is captured by the signifier, for which the real letter stands: a love-letter whose content is never revealed, a metaphor for desire, and, pun on the common metonym (letter for letter). (106)
Another underlining aspect of Lacan's probe is the identification being sought between the detective and the psychoanalyst. Dupin through Lacan's revelation comes up as a personification of the link between the psychoanalytical aspects and the text of the tale. He defines the transferential structure of language and its effect. He works like a psychoanalyst who uses repetition and substitution in analysis: while trying to enable the patient to verbalize painful repressed memories, the original event is repeated in verbal form, but the verbal account is then substituted in the conscious mind for the repressed memory in the unconscious. Once it is conscious and verbalized, the memory is disempowered and mental well-being is restored. Dupin's theft of the letter from the Minister is a repetition of the Minister's theft of it from the Queen, and the theft is fulfilled by substitution, a false letter being used as a substitute for the real one (Barry 116-118).

Finally the letter with its unknown content signifies the nature of language. This side of the Lacanian triangular structure re-emphasizes that language is an endless play of signifiers, but no simple connection with any signified content beyond language. The signified is always lost or purloined. Similarly the significance of the letter throughout the tale is exacted but we never find precisely what is signified within it. It is merely signification and not a sign of some specific thing. To quote Wright: 'If a subject tries to deny the difference, (retains the letter), there is a loss of contact with the symbolic, hence of determined identity, even gender. The minister has turned the envelope inside out and addressed it to himself [Lacan] 'in an extremely delicate feminine script' (Seminar 65 qtd. in Wright 107): the signifier is floating away from him. Sexuality (guaranteed only by different) and textuality (the language system) are thereby in equation, for each depends on a signifying system' (Wright 107).
Lacan's 'Seminar on the "The Purloined Letter" ' (1972) is the centre of all applicative criticism which oriented towards literature, having implications for both reading and writing. It evokes something from one text that can be inferred to authors, readers and texts in general.

While going through a study of text in light of Lacanian psychoanalysis the attraction of the text lies in a disclosure, of veiled turning to be unveiled, of characters who face shock at this unveiling. The 'Seminar on "The Purloined Letter"' is an amazing example of Lacan's way of extracting psychoanalytical imports in the structural notions of the text. Great expectations are juxtaposed to sudden reversal in analysis: the detective story with its collocating of clues by a detective/analysist with understanding of transferential structure of language (letter stands as a construct of language). 'Oedipus, the would-be detective, expects to read the letter according to his narcissistic dream of kingly knowledge, but finds what is unveiled is his blindness' (Wright 111). This illusion not only hands over the characters but writer and reader also, according to Lacan, find an enticement and pleasure in the letter in which they get expressed through the embodiment of their unconscious. 'They can each play Dupin and Minister upon each other. One can have his desire while the other lacks, and vice-versa: hence Lacan's claim that desire and lack are together shared by them both' (Wright 111). The desire's inducement on his part which is the desire of the other, as well, the reader may set in to explore the 'images beyond what the text may apparently control' (Wright 111). The symbolic may be subverted, but only to the level of unveiling an unperceived figure, the one hidden in full view whereas in the past to subserve interpretation leading to extract universal meaning was the chief aim of image study. Lacan views the new meanings as the manifestations of the shifting desires in language.
Also, the awareness of the Other is required by psychoanalysis and the reading process. Like Lacan's grey area (*Ecrits* 197), the Mobius strip over which the purloining takes place where the power of the letter, of interest to kings and the police implies an Other for both of them, not a transcendental signified, but language, of language, of which it is not the case that only two can play. Lacan's aim is not just converting analysis into the 'relation of two phantasmic communications' but to orient 'psychoanalysis toward the kernel of the Real in the heart of experience. Here, the Real refers to the trauma and impact that first created the human subject in terms of division and Desire, an impact which never ceases to command the paths of behavior and language, (qtd. in Wright 112). This, according to Wright, complicates the implication of any act of reading and writing for it underlines the task of modern psychoanalysis of being a general role play in theory. 'What is wanted is not a spade, but a pen' (Wright 112).

The Reader/Writer focus on psychoanalysis implies two things: reader/writer being considered as a site where meaning is produced and the distinction between the two blurs to the extent of negligibility and the second aspect is that the reader and writer are turned alike owing to all-pervasive phenomena of transference in reading and structures of desires in reading. The psychoanalytic criticism in structuralism focuses on the reader in the text, both text of life and literary text, both determined by history and hence written before the subject arrives on the scene.

In post-Structuralist psychoanalytic criticism the reader can reason out a new meaning, shattering the old power and extracting new power by exposing the text as self-contradictory. Lacan challenges the readings of Freud as being humanist (Ernst Kris) or biologist (Salloway) as against Freud's being a semiotician. And above all, to quote Wright, 'Freud's texts too are at odds with themselves and cannot be frozen into
a meta-psychology' (Wright 112). But in both structuralism as well as post-
structuralism the reader writer distinction is not at all valid because making sense of
the sign-system implicates both: each is caught in the net of signs, is up against
language. Wright says that reading, writing and criticism are part of a continuum
whereby readers write in the act of reading and writers are shown to read in the act of
writing. Texts can be made to turn upon themselves, meaning both less and more than
the writer may have extended. The psychoanalytic concept of transference in its
extended form has changed the way in which the production of meaning is to be
conceived, as in Roland Barthes' A Lover's Discourse (1979) and Shoshna Felman's
'Turning the screw of interpretation' (1977). Both focus on the dilemma of the
reader/lover transference, although in different ways.

In her article 'Turning the screw of interpretation' (1977) Shoshna Felman is
concerned precisely with keeping the text open and on the move. The text in question
here is Henry James's The Turn of the Screw.

She shows how the discourse of the critics is caught up within the
transferential structures of the story so that one set of unwitting
analysands (the critics) are merely repeating the antics of another set of
unwitting analysands (the characters). The act of interpretation
('turning the screw') links literature and psychoanalysis in a joint and
hazardous enterprise, since both set the process of transference going,
unknownst to naive and sophisticated readers alike, who believe
there is a meaning there to be disclosed. (Wright 117)

The story is set in a large country house. A new governess takes charge of two young
children in the absence of the owner, their uncle and guardian. She is assisted by the
housekeeper, Mrs. Grose, and hindered by what she takes to be the 'ghosts' of two
past servants who appear to visit at intervals. Felman probes whether the governess is trying to save her charges from the evil (the ghosts exists) or whether the governess is hopelessly neurotic (the ghosts thereby being the projection of her repressed passion for the absent master). In an elaborate deliberation Felman projects the efforts on both sides to be doomed, already anticipated by the canny/uncanny textual strategies she uncovers:

The reader of the *Turn of the Screw* can choose either to *believe* the governess and thus to behave like Mrs. Grose, or *not to believe the governess*, and thus to behave precisely *like the governess*. Since it is the governess who within the text plays the role of suspicious reader, occupies the place of the interpreter, *to suspect* that and that position is therefore, *to take it*. To demystify the governess is only possible on one condition: the condition of repeating the governess's very gesture. The text thus constitutes a reading of its two possible readings, both of which, in the course of that reading, it deconconstructs. (Felman 190)

Critics observe that Felman deconstructs because she knows the transferential structure of the language that is she 'knows what to repeat' as Johnson would put it (Johnson 496). Felman acts as anal-seeing reader/analyst who knows the crux of the transferential structure of the language which the reader would take as their capture. As Elizabeth Wright puts it:

She is the analyst, anticipating the capture of her analysand - readers, neatly turning their very misreadings against them, while making James, Freud and Lacan work for her own reading strategy, by citing them out of context, as part of a general intertext. (Wright 117)
And Felman endorses this view when she says: 'I didn't describe to you the purpose of it ... at all, I described to you ... the effect of it - which is a very different thing' (Felman 94 citing James, *The Sacred Fount*). And 'The unconscious ... is most misleading when it is caught in the act' (Felman 199 citing Lacan).

As already witnessed Lacanian model of transference takes the analyst to be absent in order to facilitate the analysing by the analysand, this way the analyst is denied the role of 'subject presumed to know', playing dummy instead (Lacan 1977a 229). In the context of Felman's probe the subject-turned-dummy is a master who will not play, both within the story (the owner of the house to whom the governess addresses letters), and outside the story (the author of the text who is addressed regarding the meaning of the tale). Felman expresses: 'The Master's discourse is very like the condition of the unconscious as such; Law itself is but a form of censorship' (Felman 145). Thus she makes object-language of the text act as her meta-commentary, in the words of Wright: "the story won't tell", said Douglas "not in any literal, vulgar way" (106). The literal is the vulgar because it hails signifier to signified, stopping the production of meaning, closing up the gap that is the conscious, the 'won't tell'.

Felman emphasizes the rhetoric functioning of the text, its putting off of meaning through figures of desire, 'how' the story means, rather than 'what' it means (Felman 119). In the story Jamesian metaphor for transference is enlisted as a metaphor for transference because it becomes a part of the sequences of the transferential structure. Elizabeth Wright in this context discusses that:

...it [the metaphor] becomes part of a chain, seeing-reading-interpreting-viewing through the eyes of the unconscious, links by which meaning is transferred and agonized over: 'what it was most
impossible to get rid of was the cruel idea that whatever I [the children] had seen, Miles and Flora [the children] saw more - things terrible and unguessable and that sprang from dreadful passages of intercourse in the past' (Felman 158 citing James). The business of passing on the story involves both the actual transferring of a manuscript, and the transference of love between the couples who pass it on, and this, in turn requires the exchange of looks: "Yes, she was in love ... I saw it, and she saw I saw it; but neither of us spoke of it'' (Felman 132 citing James; her italics). The manuscript, since it was sent through the post, had (presumes Felman) an address on it: the story of the governess is a letter and a story about letters. Hence 'letter' becomes a metaphor of the manuscript of the story and of the narrative as a whole, sent to the reader. There is thus a parallel between the letters in the story we and the characters never get to read and the story as a whole which defeats our reading, but which nevertheless determines a story (for the readers in the text) and a history (for the critics, in the world'). Thus in the story the governess begins as detective and ends up as analysand, reactivating her past traumas. Instead of the reader getting hold of the story, says Felman, the reading effect is that of the story getting hold of readers, catching them out in a fiction of mastery. (Wright 118-9)

2.3 Post-structural Psychoanalysis;

In the discussion on structural ideology the focus was on reading and writing as interdependent activities so much so that both involve a continuing act of interpretation that is never final. The psyche of the readers and writers was the centre
of emphasis and the way they were being written by the very text they thought they were reading. It is for this reason that Elizabeth Wright tries to sort out the two phases by entitling them as: 'Psyche as Text' (Structural) and 'Text as Psyche' (Post-Structural).

Derrida's sustained attack on the western metaphysical tradition is based in a notion of writing as devalued and repressed by that tradition. Almost all the activities which sort out the world into differing units are under paradigmatic scrutiny which included writing. Where Lacan stresses the supremacy of the signifier in determining subjects in their acts, Derrida finds the signifier not so supreme and he substitutes and resubstitutes a set of terms of his own devising in pursuit of that argument. He shows how the text undermines itself and the terms like 'writing', 'trace', 'difference', 'dissemination', show this undermining under Derridean treatment. According to him writing represses and reveals desire ('writing is unthinkable without repression" (In Writing and Difference 226). Words, whether spoken or written, are subject to 'difference', differing from and deferring and transient fixation of meaning. Derrida refers to the process as, the sign being 'under erasure', the rubbing out being performed by past memories ('traces in the unconscious, 'archives which are always already transcriptions' (211), not copies, but unconscious interpretations. Thus Derrida finds the unconscious to be a weave of pure traces, whereas Lacan believes the unconscious to be structured like a language. The former believes the unconscious to be operative in language all the time and the latter finds that the entire Unconscious, like a language. According to Elizabeth Wright more than the matter of being different it is a matter of marked distinction; Lacan places the spotlight on language's imposition of a mould which creates the unconscious, Derrida places it upon the ability of the unconscious to escape the mould (Wright 121). Also because
both the masters work in different forte, Lacan thereby being a psychoanalyst uses
texts as illustrative material for a theory of the production of the subject in relation to
language and thus 'subject' is his primary concern; Derrida being a philosopher looks
at texts in order to undermine their power over subjects and thus Wright illustrates
this in critiques of Poe and Kafka respectively (Wright 121). Derrida's reading of
Freud is rooted in his notion that the unconscious, through memories non-verbal as
well as verbal, becomes active in the production of meaning, its traces being present
in every word. Wright observes that Derrida's derivation from his reading of Freud is
not only a deconstruction of Freud's texts but a self-reflection upon the very activity
of deconstruction itself. Infact, Freud's discovery of the unconscious prepared the
way 'both for a theory of textual deconstruction and for a deconstruction of the mode
of that discovery'. For Derrida, Freud becomes a Derridean 'avant la lettre',
paradoxically, by showing this very idiom to be mere figure of speech/writing. There
is no 'before the letter': the subject is the subject of writing, both its product (as
already written) and its producer (as rewriting the written). According to Derrida,
while describing the perceptual apparatus through the terms that illustrate this double
movement, 'Freud performs for us the scene of writing' (229). The metaphors of
which Freud avails himself describe a graphic system of representation; Derrida
pursues these images of writing through a series of texts spanning thirty years:

From the Project (1985) to the 'Note upon the Mystic Writing-Pad'
(1925), a strange procession: problematic of breaching is elaborated
only to conform increasingly to metaphoric of the written trace. From a
system of traces functioning according to a model which Freud would
have preferred to be a natural one, and from which writing is entirely
absent, we proceed toward a configuration of traces which can no
longer be represented except by the structure and functioning of writing. (200)

That is to say, Freud's neurological metaphors, such as 'breaching', (Bahnung), can retrospectively be seen to perform the movements of writing, instituting 'difference' among a set of resistant neurons that 'breach' and thus record the traces in response to external stimuli, these traces are continually left in the memory. They are not to be conceived of as emerging pristine at some future date. According to Freud they already exist loaded with feelings of fear and desire, but are open to further interpretation (as his example of 'Emma' shows (353-4; vol.1). Like the dream-thoughts in Freud's theory of dream interpretation they cannot be directly transcribed but have to be 'reproduced', after the event' (Wright 121-22). Derrida's pursuit of the metaphor: the psyche as a writing machine with a potentially disruptive element built in it, is rooted in, Freud's 'Note upon the mystic Writing-Pad'.

The perceptual apparatus and this writing apparatus have been detected to be having three analogies by Freud, which Derrida studies:

(1) the celluloid or the paper on which one writes on the mystic writing-pad relates to the defense that the psyche institutes for itself against any invasion from outside stimuli;

(2) the paper in the writing-pad is re-usable : this fact corresponds to the endless capacity of the perceptual system for responding to sensory stimuli without becoming burdened in any way;

(3) the impressions that actually remain on the underlying wax - are 'legible in suitable lights', as Freud has put it (230; vol. 14) - stand for unconscious traces which remain hidden in the unconscious.
Derrida undertakes to study writing metaphor through the third analogy; according to him the impressions that actually remain on the underlying wax and bring out continuous interaction with the succeeding script. This process is analogous to the working of unconscious, in that it is active at complex and profound levels as the marks of repression are inscribed. Blurrings and blottings take place beneath the concealing paper. For Derrida this comes as the possibility of the unconscious being active in all experience (of the celluloid protection mechanism of psyche) with the signifiers of the repressive order. This also leads to his notion of the deconstructive potential of all reading which, according to him, is only a form of re-writing that is explained as: 'becoming legible in certain lights'.

But Derrida points towards the inadequacy of the model: in using a material metaphor for the psyche, Freud is omitting its spontaneity. He did not see the significance of his own metaphor: that the unconscious is actively productive in the signifying system. The discoverer of the unconscious has had his writings examined for their unconscious effects. Freud saw the mind as being inscribed upon by what it perceived. Thus a mechanical image of the brain was inadequate in itself to account for the influences of history. (Wright 123)

Derrida focuses on the signifier and proposes that all the forms involved in the construction of the signifier be taken as the centre of attention than the logocentric fixation upon illusory signifieds. The unconscious is hypersensitive to the signifying machines of repression. Derrida quotes Freud as noting the link of pen and penis, writing on white paper and sexual penetration, and praises Melanie Klein for her revelation of the way school activities - we might rename the three Rs as Reading, Writing and Repression - show the presence of strong unconscious investment. (Wright 123)
According to Derrida the teaching of reading and writing is in both method and content the establishment on the channeling of desire, and sexuality will invade them both. The deconstructive notions of Derrida come in same line with the ambivalence of Klein's good and bad objects co-present in the equipment of writing, 'an uncaring mingling', 'writing as sweet nourishment or excrement, the trace as seed or mortal germ, wealth or weapon, detritus and/or penis etc' (In Writing and Difference 231).

This is the theme of deconstruction itself - literature being questioned with, juxtaposed notions of whether it is 'wealth' generously spread for readers or a 'weapon' to be used against authority or whether writing is the chief instrument of repression, or is it the means by which the symbolic may be subverted.

2.4 Freud's Studies on Jokes:

After the deconstructive critique of Freud, the next mode of reading Freud came in the form of studying the jokes and the uncanny as formulated by Freud in his works: Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905) and 'The Uncanny' (1919). According to the critics the content of his theory relating to the jokes and the uncanny is not that important but what is significant is the way his writing reveals or conceals unconscious intention. Jokes and the unconscious are analogous in that the uncanny works like a joke and the joke has a part of uncanny; both are engaged in the double movement of the return of the repressed and the return of repression.

Freud's investigation into Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905) and his inquiry into 'The Uncanny' (1919) provide material for deconstructive insights. Samuel Weber in his The Legend of Freud (1982) shows 'the conflictual dynamics of the unconscious' at work in the very theory of the conscious. He undermines the duplicity in the theory of the jokes which Freud detects in the ego's
attempts to systematize the external in response to its narcissistic desires. The
discussion on jokes gives a proper estimation of the force of unconscious.

Ego-psychology assumes that the pleasure gained from the jokes is due to its
bringing about the play of energies in the psyche, for the ultimate benefit of the
rational ego, which emerges refused and fortified (Wright 125). Deconstructive
criticism of Freud, however, finds in his theory of the joke (1905) an anticipation of
his theory of narcissism (1914), with a consequent shift of emphasis through the
works of Mehlman and Weber. The ego is no longer seen as a force that synthesizes
and stabilizes, but as an ego committed to the affirmation of its illusory power.

Weber's study centers on his questioning of the distinction Freud maintains
between the 'innocent' joke of pure pleasure and the 'tendentious' joke, the joke with
a purpose. Freud's three stages in the evolution of the joke: The first one is based 'at
the level of child's delight in games of recognition, which often manifests itself in
verbal play, for 'children, who, as we know, are in the habit of treating words as
things, tend to expect words to have the same meaning behind them' (120; vol. 8).
The pleasure of such recognition, Freud maintains, does not come from a sense of
power but from a saving of 'psychic' energy' (Wright 125). This saved psychic
energy is enjoyable for, according to Weber 'it saves the effort of discriminating and
'the games founded on this pleasure make use of the mechanism of damming up only
in order to increase the amount of such pleasure' (Freud 122; Vol.8). This pretence of
frustration on the child's part, making the play not quite so innocent, is a throw-away
insight that should perhaps be attributed to Freud.

At the level of the second stage the joke graduates to the 'jest'. It caters to the
need of growing demands of the intellect, which is not fulfilled with mere absurd play
of words. Although there is a meaning, it does not produce result: 'the meaning of the
joke is merely to protect that pleasure from being done away with by criticism’ (131; Vol. 8. The jest differs from the joke on the account of being solely a pleasure-giving notion.

The third stage, then, is the joke proper, the ‘tendentious’ joke, in which there is a distinct purpose, taking the form of challenging either a person or a social inhibition. There are two forms, the hostile and the obscene: the first giving the opportunity to express ‘aggressiveness, satire, or defense’, the second ‘serving the purpose of an exposure’ (97; Vol. 8). The verbal play is now working in conjunction with this tendentious purpose.

Weber’s deconstructive insight looks to dismantle the distinction between the ‘innocent’ core and the ‘tendentious’ caring. The continuum of the playful aspect of the joke in Freudian intent is negating a narcissistic desire according to Weber. This makes all that is alien in the external, same with unity. Even a rhyme is an attempt at reducing the difference and extract sameness, as Weber puts it, serving ‘the interests of the narcissistic ego bent upon reducing alterity to a variation of identity’ (Weber 98). Elizabeth Wright exemplifies this with a well known post-Freudian Jewish joke which employs a Jewish practice of using a rhyming tag as a dismissive gesture, one that denies difference. It is about the Jewish mother, who on being told about the Oedipus complex, says:

‘Oedipus-Schmoedipus - What does it matter as long as he loves his mother?’ In the very rejection of the classification she is exemplifying the actual narcissistic idealization which it defines. The play on words can hardly be defined as innocent. (127)

The Joke is in fact a place of conflict and not simply a ‘comforting collusion’ in which temporarily the demands of repression effect a relief. Freud while dealing with
the notion of the third type of joke finds it to be embedded in a three-person situation: The teller requires a listener as 'ally'; the first and the third person are thus linked in being in an alliance against the second person or object, the butt of the joke. Weber unravels Freud's distinction by zeroing on the position of the third person, the listener. It is the combination of a spontaneous unconscious element (the laughter itself) with a desire for complicity with the other ('the third person'). The 'third person' symbolizes ambivalence in that it represents the spontaneous break through of the id through the physical let out: laughter and it also stands for the superego which 'characteristically voices its demands in the public grammatical third person'. The other being an accomplice reaffirms the narcissistic confidence in the 'continuity of Self and Other'. The ambivalence in the third person is analogous to the fusion of the first and third persons thereby making id and superego identical in the illusion of the joke. In the words of Freud:

'The third person is the nameless Other who is listening to you; the laughter is an id confirmation of a superego agreement. The 'classical' double-bind in the superego's command to the ego - 'Be like me! Be Yourself!' - is thus apparently resolved. (107; vol. 8)

The readiness of the hearer to provide such a laugh, however, exposes him to be caught out by an unscrupulous teller. There are jokes which capitalize upon the joke situation itself, exploiting the hearer's willingness to challenge the taboo. Weber considers the most narcissistic of jokes to be the take in joke. The distinction between the private and the public definition of the self is precisely one where the joke of the gap between interpretation and action can go several ways at once for there is more than one interpretation of an action.
Some of Freud's most interesting speculations on literature emerge when he avoids the two previously discussed psychoanalytic approaches to art - teaching invented characters as real people with real parts that can be analyzed, or assuming that one can understand a work of art fully by analyzing the author's childhood sexual fantasies, psychic motivations, etc. In his article 'The Uncanny' he explores a single concept, as it treads its way through literature and life. 'The Uncanny' is a manifestation of insightful speculation and heavy-handed readings to combine together. For Freud, the feeling of the 'uncanny' is an aesthetic concept which he tries to explore for its meaning. He discusses the term uncanny (in German, \textit{unheimlich}) as a specific form of frightening phenomenon that we find in literature and life. When we encounter the uncanny we are left feeling spooked and perhaps, uncertain of the exact source of that fear. What strikes people as frightening varies from person to person. In the article, Freud attempts to find a common thread amongst differing forms of the uncanny. He traces the changing meanings of \textit{unheimlich} and he also analyzes a number of literary works that he considers uncanny. He comes to the following conclusion about what unites all these experiences when he says: 'the uncanny is that class of the frightening which leads back to what is known of old and long father'(340; vol. 18).

Freud's essay is a long critique; Helene Cixous' study of it gives all its peregrinations (Cixous, 1976). 'The Uncanny' is divided into three sections whose subject matter overlaps. The first course involves studying the connotations of the words \textit{heimlich} and \textit{unheimlich}. Freud observes that the distinction between them is into as exclusive as it may appear, but that \textit{heimlich} contains within itself a secret, in that the word signifies on the one hand the familiar and domestic, and on the other what is concealed and hidden, the two meanings coexisting: 'Thus, \textit{heimlich} is a word
the meaning of which develops in the direction of ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, *unheimlich* (226; vol. 17). The second course involves taking a more tortuous path, one that branches out in two main directions. Freud is concerned with a close scrutiny of a variety of uncanny phenomena, and he proceeds by way of free association. In the first instance this leads to Hoffmann's 'Sandman', its uncanny effects. [Hoffman's story is a complex narrative, beginning with three letters and continuing with a third - person narrator, who makes intermittent appeals to the reader. The plot concerns the fortunes of a student, named Nathanael, who is suffering from a haunting childhood memory, to do with a lawyer named Coppelius who used to come to the house on a mysterious errand, and whom the boy associated with the grim nursery tale of the 'Sandman', a bogey figure who threatens the eyes of children. Nathanael recalls how on one occasion he is caught spying and is manhandled and nearly blinded by Coppelius. The dreadful memory is revived by a visit from a seller of spectacles and telescopes, named Coppola, and by a figure associated with him, the Professor Spalanzani. Nathanael is caught between the desires for the latter's daughter, Olympia, and the girl to whom he is betrothed, Clara. Olympia turns out to be a mechanical doll and is torn to pieces before his eyes by the two men. A further incident, in which a variety of motifs combine, causes him to jump to his death.] In the story the uncanny effect lies in the hero's fear of losing his eyes to the Sandman, then the motif of the double as the primitive man's 'harbinger of death', the compulsion to repeat, the dread of the 'evil eye' as part of an animistic world-view as Freud says, 'The *unheimlich* is what was once *heimlich*, familiar; the prefix 'un' is the token of repression' (245; vol. 17). The third course involves Freud's taking to the testing of this insight and the assuaging of a number of doubts, involving the role of the repression in producing the uncanny. He explores that when
do such bizarre motifs as dismembered limbs, buried alive, death and the return of the dead produce an uncanny effect and when do they not? Also, he endorses a crucial move from psychology to aesthetics: what is the distinction between the uncanny of the immediate experience and the uncanny of fiction?

The deconstructionists like Cixous and structuralist critics have lent many readings to the Freudian piece. The views of the critics by and large portray the fact that it would be a mistake to let Freud's analysis of Hoffmann be the last word on the uncanny. Wright to quote:

'What is precisely the inadequacy of his interpretation, and how this inadequacy has produced a whole series of after-effects. As was the case with the stories of Poe and James, Hoffmann's tale and Freud's essay are yet another 'case' of transference - story par excellence'.

(Wright 128)

The central issue of the essay is the extent of ambivalence in fiction and reality. The way the uncanny lies on that problematic boundary between fiction and reality absorbs the spotlight in the essay and Freud is biased towards keeping them firmly apart. Freud's study centers on the castration complex, which for him is the source of the uncanny in Hoffmann's story. Freud dabbles with the attempt of discovering the truth in fiction having acknowledged that there is fiction in truth.

Elizabeth Wright analyzes Freud's discussion of Hoffmann's story in 'The Uncanny' by categorizing three omissions regarding literary perspective. These carry structuralist and deconstructive aura as they are inspired by critics like Hertz, 1979 (he studies within a Bloomian framework) and Kittler, 1977 (he studies within a Lacanian/Foucauldian framework). The general observation of the critics is that Freud has ignored the narrative strategies and textual devices employed
(consciously/unconsciously) by Hoffmann. According to Wright, 'The Sandman' itself illustrates what psychoanalysis has to do with text structures: the return of the repressed works at the level of narration, plot and figuration.

Firstly, Freud does not mention a narrator who speaks of his desire and entwines reader, author and character; not only the narrator, but also the hero has some trouble in the beginning. Hoffman begins the story with a cunning planting of the three letters whose 'real'/fictitious' status is unfolded by him and Freud ignores this tendentious unfolding.

Secondly, at the level of plot of story does not enact the return of the repressed solely in the figure of the Sandman. According to Wright there is a repetition in the structure besides the content. The structure of delay is repeated, that is to say the delay of the death, the scenes of dismemberment, the unscrewing and rescrewing of the child Nathanael's limbs in the spying scene, the violent death of the Father, the tearing apart of the doll, and Nathanael's brains dashed out on the pavement, all these incidents repeat a feeling of the death which has been repeatedly delayed. The structural implication of this delay is perhaps creating a heightened expectation for the consummation i.e. death; the plot performs a detour to death, as Wright puts it.

Thirdly and finally at the level of figuration the effect of the uncanny has been perceived by the critics to be most clear. Neil Hertz's 'Freud and the Sandman' in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structural Criticism (296-321) presents a brilliant study of the Freudian critique. Wright extracts her observation from the same, 'To restore color to fading images is to invest with desire. Both the narrator and Nathanael have trouble in describing the brilliant colors of their inner vision and feel impelled to add even more color to the narrative, to keep alive the images which torment them (and by further extension the reader), to stop them from fading, to play
and replay the compulsive fantasy. Hence the images of glowing grains of coal, dazzling eye-glasses, blood-red rays, bleeding eyes, warm glances, soul-scorching words. Such figures of repetition (disregarded by Freud) are at their most uncanny when they are seen as 'merely coloring, that is, when it comes to seem most gratuitously' (Hertz 301), for at that moment one does not know what it is that is doing the turning (Wright 132). The psychoanalysis is also said to have been put down with the omissions by Freud according to the critics. While finding eyes and penis analogous under the light of literal castration he overlooks the notion that eyes are the most powerful organs of desire and ignores the relation between perception and desires, in particular that moment when the child 'perceives' what the mother 'lacks'. The eye, therefore takes on a special significance because it bears such a threat to desire, both for its role in this discovery and as an organ of perception, itself part of the satisfaction of desire. Loss of eyes becomes a metaphor for the dismembering of the self-image and subsequent loss of identity. Another aspect of the psychoanalysis being not taken up to the full potential by Freud is in the context of narcissism, notes Bernard Rubin, in 'Freud and Hoffmann : 'The Sandman' (205-17). According to him Freud's repressing everything Hoffmann that allows to emerge, is a blow to narcissism. 'The double, once a comforting spare soul, because at a later stage of civilization, 'a thing of terror” (Rubin 236 qtd. in Wright 133).

According to Wright, above all, the uncanny is explained in experience by Freud: as a revival of an infantile complex or as a reviving of an animistic mode of perception, or both, but he has none for the uncanny in fiction. Fiction itself has more resources of the uncanny in that Freud spins out his own narrative and he seems to need more and more fiction in order to keep the uncanny off, perhaps, in the words of Wright, 'hoping that death may be indefinitely postponed'. Freud has propagated the
notion of castration in an infinite play of substitution, explications from the fiction like Hoffmann's story and some other literary examples and allusions (Dissemination). What is worth noting here is that fiction comes as something required as a supplement to life endorsing the fear that there were supplementary resources to be found there. Thus in his essay, what he left out of Hoffmann's story is displayed by Freud: images of death and dismemberment, anxiety regarding unbinding operations of the primary process. Hence death, the final castration, the uncanniest thing of all, can only return in fiction.

The uncanny being treated in Hoffmann's story thus explicates the notion that literature and arts can present us with forms of the uncanny that life cannot, because the writer/artist has more access to illusion. He can contextualize as he wishes, choose whatever frame he likes, and discuss illusion. Whereas in life one is at the mercy of repetition, the artist can play with the repressed. Elizabeth Wright says that it is here that the uncanny rejoins the joke. Both the trickster and artist can 'turn' the listener/reader and make her participates in a shift of desire. The result can be the changing of the old categorizations; the text may be re-interpreted, the poem reframed, the poem rewritten, indefinitely (Wright 134).

Harold Bloom's deconstructive approaches to Freud witness the return of the author who, in 1968, was declared to be dead by Roland Barthes in its structuralist critique. Bloom's anxiety of influence is his notion of the return of the repressed. The author not only returns but expects to be recognized. But this recognition is sought from the site of the poem itself and this seeking comes to the elect only: that is to say, a chosen poet/critic feels himself overcome by 'election-love' (Misreading 51), as if a divine gift was bestowed on him. The gift that is, the act of seeking recognition turns into a powerful fixation, which according to Bloom is an analogy to the Freudian
notion of primal repression. The unconscious of the young poets gets under a spell of the influence of the poetic father-figure. Young poet is the 'ephebe' and the father-figure is the 'precursor'. The Bloomian form of transference is manifested in the intertextual, rivalry set off by the 'ephebe' - 'precursor' interaction. Bloom believes that ephebe (mis) reads the precursor and the critic (mis) reads the ephebe-precursor relationship and thus he concludes that criticism is rhetoric of challenge of a newcomer to the work of an established poet which takes essentially the form of a turning of his meaning, a troping. This arises from the newcomer's reactions of defense against the strong paternal assertion, for each major trope identified by classical rhetoric can be matched, according to Bloom, with certain psychic defenses. As compared to Hoffmann's study by Freud, the Bloomian study of Freud's uncanny translates the previous suffering anxiety as death as castration to a threat, to his poetic strength and his priority. A newcomer is converted into a 'strong' poet in the final stage by the anxiety of influence and is marked by the moment when the precursor's image-structure appears uncannily in the new-comer's poem, as if it were now his. Early and late have become reversed and it is for this reason that it is uncanny. Introjection of the precursor's images and projection of the reappearance as the newcomers are the defence mechanisms put in play. The spell of the uncanny in the resurgence of the precursor is strong enough to make the late-comer (the new poet) seem to be the true author. 'Freud has hardly anything to envy in Hoffmann for his "art" or "craftiness" in provoking the unheimliche effect' to use the phrases of Helene Cixous (547). Thus the Bloomian insight finds that Freud successfully tropes against the precursor's id and thus this strength of his poetic-will, lends him triumph over time and death. Bloom opines, 'tropes are necessary errors about language, defending ultimately against the deathly dangers of literal meaning {The Anxiety of
Influence 94). Since desire has been stopped so the literal meaning is death. Bloom reads Freud 'antithetically', as Wright puts it that is as one strong poet reads another strong poet, against the establishment.

According to this antithetical viewing of Freud by Bloom, in the essay 'The Uncanny', Freud stumbles upon a psychology of the sublime. But this is mere stumbling and Freud moves on neglecting a well-established philosophical tradition of what Bloom calls the 'negative sublime'. The importance of the great feeling than of great thoughts overtakes the classical emphasis on rule and order. The great feelings can be of terror which can mingle with awe through illusive omnipotence of narcissism. This is the misreading which according to Bloom is imbibed in Freud's 'strong' reading of 'The Sandman' for he reduces the uncanny to an infantile and archaic complex. He argues that Freud's poetic will turns canny into the uncanny which he ignores again due to the misreading. According to Wright, Bloom finds that Hoffmann seems to trope excessively to hide the repressed, namely the return of death, 'It is not naming that counts, and which results in what Bloom in another context calls an over-determination of language and an underestimation of meaning. Freud repeats this configuration in transference to Hoffmann: the figural is a defense against death. The sublime, as Bloom will argue, is the overcoming of the catastrophe of death, or rather of being born into death' (Wright 137).

Critics have found Bloom's Freud to be very much literary. He makes 'The Uncanny' a juncture to link a group of Freud's metapsychological texts, concerned with the concept of defense ('Freud and Sublime', in Bloom 1982). Such a study is about the precursor that is a poet/self who finds a new poem already written instead of his. He can only snatch victory from defeat by rising sublimely to the occasion. For e.g.: Beyond the Pleasure Principle overcomes the catastrophe of falling in love with
the self. For Bloom body is equally significant: anxiety is his pleasure. The process of producing a poem is similar to reliving the primal anxiety. For producing poetry repression is a necessary condition for it produces the rhetorical strategies overcoming anxiety. The sublime is the outcome of repression, not of sublimation because the energies are sexual and have not their desire-quality: the uncanny imagination produces poems. Bloom gets into the Romantic poetry in order to explicate his theories: he is of the view that the sublime (of the poetic will) produces the dominant lyric form of 'post-Enlightenment literature'. The 'High Romantic Crisis-poem' celebrates the triumph of the poetic will. Bloom revives the notion of an individual poet and poetic gene. 'It seems as if the Romantics had to overcome the rules of their neo-classical fathers to follow (Mother) nature, the point being that they do not follow nature, and hence one might also see it, as Bloom does not, as a, rebellion against the Mother', opines Wright with regards to the Bloomian insight into Romantic literary tradition. This characteristic feature of rebelling against the tradition was set after Milton; Bloom observes that poets after Milton have to be 'strong' to fight against the tradition, competing against one another, instead of laboring in the service of representation. Inspiration no longer comes from nature but from another poet.

According to Bloom, the meaning of a poem is another poem. 'The freedom to have a meaning of one's own ... is wholly illusory' (*The Breaking of Form* 3). It is an illusion to be achieved against a prior plenitude of meaning, a meaning already 'authorized' by another. Bloom's critical practice makes room for the critic as brother-poet. In fact Bloom's insight has combined the old orthodoxy with the new in that there is 'an author in crisis belated, wounded and mortal and there is always a prior plenitude of meaning to struggle against; the return of the author is followed by
typology, textuality and a myth which are juxtaposed with unstable archetypes, doings of persons and random effects of language, and a psychological base respectively'.

Harold Bloom combines the two i.e. the literature and psychoanalysis with a dictum like revival of the old schools by increasing their contemporaneity with inputs from the new critical genres. This produces for a very enlightening field in psychoanalytic literary criticism.

Thus, Structuralist and Post-Structuralist psychoanalytic literary criticism stand as formidable components of modern criticism practices. One such modern critique is now aimed to be achieved in the ensuring chapters.
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Shaw and Psychoanalysis
Summary

This chapter provides with various significant observations, insights and references based on the survey work done to extract the fact that how could an iconic and well-read person like Shaw miss the discussion on Freud or psychoanalysis. This is all the more significant because given the facts that Shaw always had something to say about almost everything under the sun, Shaw and Freud were almost contemporaries and shared a great deal of fame which make it all the more intriguing to know that what and how the things might have unfolded for Shaw about psychoanalysis. This chapter also deals with an analysis of Shaw himself based on the interpolations provided by Norman Holland. Among various studies taken up by various psychoanalytic and psychological critics Holland’s study provides with best deliberations as it helps in furthering the analysis of the two plays in subsequent chapters.