CONCLUSIONS
AND
SUGGESTIONS
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

Analysis of the data in the present research was carried out in two phases. In the first phase, the percentages of all the seventeen dimensions were obtained to make comparisons of different dimensions of political behaviour. In the second phase Bar diagrams were made with the help of statistical package for social sciences (SPSS).

Changing Socio-economic Bases

It is evident from the table 4.1 and figure 4.1 that both urban and rural Muslims differed from each other on different dimensions of political behaviour. The political behaviour like – voting participation, campaign participation and level of political interest of rural Muslims are much greater than that of urban Muslims. It is found that the rural Muslims might be backward as compared to their urban counterparts in terms of political information level, symbol and heritage awareness and their exposure to mass media but as far as their involvement in political activities is concerned their attitude towards candidate (ATC) and attitude towards democratic system (ATS), political efficacy (PE) and political trust (PT) - all are much higher than that of urban Muslims. As a result, rural Muslims are more politically mobilized (M) than those of urban Muslims.

Regarding voting preference (V.Pre) the overwhelming rural majority opted for party (74%) than candidate. In Party Affiliation, rural population is more outright and clear cut in making their minds than that of urban. Among urban Muslims’ choice of party affiliation (P.aff) the
Samajwadi Party (49%) has an edge over Bhaujan Samajwadi Party (27%) and Congress (24%) but in the rural Muslims’ psyche the congress still haunting as an initiator of Babri movement. As a result, only 19% rural Muslims favour congress. As regard to, the Opinion Deciders (OD), opinions of friends(OD f), caste groups (OD c) and co-workers (OD cw) play heavily over the minds of Muslim voters in both rural and urban areas. Almost 75% voters in rural areas and 64% in urban make up their mind due to these factors.

Table 4.5 and figure 4.2 have shown male-female differences among urban and rural Muslims. It can be seen from the Table: 4.5 that women voted less than men by 3.43% points. It is reasonable to expect as women are less active politically as compared to their male counterparts as they remain confined to domestic chores. The difference in campaign participation (C.P), communal activity (C.A), political action (P.A) and mobilization (M) between male and female is quite large. This shows females are discouraged from actively participating in politics. In opinion decider (OD), males are more guided by friends (34.2%), caste groups (29.7) and co-workers (27.5) and females are dependent on family members (44.1) and spouses (41.3) in deciding about whom to vote.

Differences in the political behaviour of urban and rural Muslims due to education are evident from table 4.6 and figures 4.3 and 4.4. the tables show voting participation (60%), campaign participation (38.3%) along with political information index (43.0%) and political interest (36.2%). All seem to be fairly higher among rural Muslims as compared to those of urban Muslims, with literacy level below high school. Only in two dimensions –symbol and heritage awareness (SHA) and attitude towards system (ATS) –the rural Muslims are lower than urban. The
mobilization of Muslims in rural area is phenomenal with 57.7% involved in this activity. (Fig: 4.3).

The voting preference (V.pref.) among urban Muslims is heavily loaded in favour of party than in candidate, with 77.5% supporting party candidate. The party affiliation (P.aff.) in rural Muslims shows a clear bias towards Samajwadi party. In opinion decider (OD) dimension, family members (fm) play a more meaningful role in urban area (12.0%) than in rural whereas in both the places the combination of friends, caste and co-workers play a decisive role in make up of mind for voting.

When we analyze the political behaviour in rural and urban Muslims above high school, we find a lot many surprises in store, the political interest (PI) level has fallen up to 7% point. The mobilization (M) activity fell up to 4% point, only attitude towards candidate (ATC) and political trust (PT) shows an upward movement. The awareness about issues and problems (IPA) in both the rural and urban area has remained untainted by the increase in the level of literacy.

In the category of Muslims' education above high school, urban preference for voting to party remains of same higher trajectory but among rural preference for candidate over party takes a clear precedence. Nevertheless, the preference for Samajwadi party remains intact as usual. In opinion decider (OD), yet another new trend is visible, in rural Muslims with education above high school, caste group (39.1%) plays decisive role in determining voting choice, whereas role of family member is almost negligible. Among the urban Muslims, the role of friend (34.5%) and co-workers (30.0%) takes an upper hand in opinion decider.

When two groups aged between 36 to 50 years and above 50 years are compared on the different dimensions of political behaviour. It
is evident from table 4.9 and figure 4.5 and 4.6 that both the age groups of urban and rural Muslims differed on various dimensions. Voting participation (VP) of urban Muslims increases from 50% to 53.1% with advancing age. The greater voting turnout among the older persons may also be as a result of “faith in parliamentary system”. It is found from the Table: 3.9 that variation is age is not significantly related to campaign participation (CP), political interest (PI), political information index (PII). Overall the difference is insignificant but between rural-urban comparisons, it is found that rural masses are more active in all these activities.

Advancing age is also positively related to mobilization (M) to attending meetings, contacting officials to influence decision. The mass media exposure (MME) is found to be less with advancement in age; this could be as result of elderly being less internet savvy and restricting to oral communication of information. In making voting preference (V.pre.) between party and candidate, it was found that party was given precedence over candidate in both the age groups of urban and rural Muslims. In making choice about party affiliation (P.aff.), Samajwadi Party (SP) is preferred by majority of Muslims cutting across the age divide and rural-urban difference.

So far as opinion decider (OD) is concerned, family members (17.7%) and spouse (21.6%) play a decisive role among the urban Muslims between 36 to 50 years age group. Whereas, in above 50 years age group rural Muslims- the family members alone play a decisive role in 29.4% of Muslims while caste group plays role in 28.3% of rural Muslims. Spouses in rural masses, in both the age groups (3% & 3.8%), play almost second fiddle which verges close to insignificant contribution.
Table 4.13 and figures 4.7 and 4.8 shows political behaviour of urban and rural Muslims across lower, middle and higher income groups. If we compare the voting participation (VP) of the three income groups of Muslims, it was found that the Muslims who are in the highest economic status classification in urban area vote somewhat less than those who have a lower and middle income status (Fig: 4.7). But Muslims in the middle income group (57%) in urban area vote 15% more than lower income group (42%).

In cognitive activities like- symbol and heritage awareness (SHA), attitude towards system (ATS), and mass media exposure (MME) the people of both rural and urban areas show a positive relationship with income, i.e, with increase in income, these cognitive activities also increases (Fig: 4.7&4.8). So far other forms of political participation are concerned there is no symmetrical impact of increase in income on these forms of behaviour. It was found that in urban area the activities like-political interest (PI), issue and problem awareness (IPA), attitude towards system (ATS), attitude towards candidate (ATC), political efficacy (PE) shows positive correlation with income.

The Voting preference (V.Pre) for both rural and urban Muslims, in all the three categories is Party, not candidate; and Party affiliation (P.Aff), as tables 4.12 and table 4.14 indicate, is found with Samajwadi Party (SP) to lesser or higher extent in all the three income categories. As regard to Opinion Decider (OD), urban Muslims find guidance in friends and spouse where as the rural Muslims of lower income groups find guidance in friends, caste group and co-workers whereas higher income group find friends, caste group and family members as ideal combination to help decide about whom to vote in elections.
Cultural Orientations

Cognitive orientation is a very potent determinant of Political behaviour in which dimensions like political information index (PII), issue and problem awareness (IPA), political interest (PI) and symbol and heritage awareness (SHA) are included. Table 5.1 shows cognitive orientation of urban and rural Muslims. Since urban people are more literate as compared to rural people, and their exposure to mass media in urban centers are more than that of rural ones, so PII of urban Muslims is 29% and rural Muslims only 22%.

Another dimension measuring cognitive orientation and which is directly influenced and determined by the level of education is symbol and heritage awareness (SHA), the Table 5.1 shows very clearly that the urban Muslims have SHA of 28% and rural Muslims have SHA of only 8% which is abysmally low. Nevertheless, the rural Muslims have high issue and problem awareness (IPA) of 20% and high level of political interest (PI) of 22% as compared to issue and problem awareness (IPA) of 18% and political interest (PI) of 14% of urban Muslims.

To measure evaluative orientation another set of four dimensions like- attitude towards system (ATS), attitude towards candidate (ATC), political efficacy (PE) and political trust (PT) are measured in both urban and rural areas. Table 5.4 and figure 5.2 show that the urban Muslims have more positive and supportive attitude towards the democratic system of representation and governance as compared to rural Muslims which is 25% in urban and 21% in rural areas respectively. The increase of 4% point in urban area could be due to the positive and more visible fruits of system in the form of better development and availability of economic opportunities.
In the second dimension of evaluative orientation i.e. attitude towards candidate (ATC), rural Muslims seem to take special and personal interest which is 25% point in contrast to only 12% of urban Muslims (Figure 5.2). It shows that rural Muslims have more positive attitude towards candidate and take the capability of candidate to perform into reckoning while making voting decision. The political efficacy (PE) and political trust (PT) both show leaning towards higher side. The political efficacy might be same (17%) in both rural and urban areas, but the political trust among the rural Muslims is much higher at 37% points than those of urban Muslims of 25% points, which shows strong commitment of Muslims vis-à-vis democratic institutions.

The table 5.10 and figure 5.3 depict about the overall affective orientation of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh. For the measurement of affective orientation, four dimensions namely, voting participation (VP), campaign participation (CP), communal activity (CA), political activity (PA) among the Muslims residing in urban and rural centers were investigated. In all the four categories, the rural Muslims showed higher level of affective orientation than that of urban Muslims. Rural Muslims look politically awake as their overall affective orientation is high. Urban Muslims show less interest in campaigning and communal activities than that of rural populace. This could be due to the life-style of urban people who remain less interested in affairs of others.

Types of political participation- Urban

Table 6.1 and figure 6.1 depicts voting participation of four groups of urban Muslim males across high, middle and low income groups. It was found that with 38% of VP in lower income group, 42% of VP in middle and 40% of VP in higher income group, the general level of
voting participation in group I is average. A possible reason could be that because of low education level and high family responsibility, and exacting and arduous struggle for survival in urban areas, people in group I category are more busy in meeting their two ends.

The group II category of Urban Muslims, on the contrary, show very encouraging level of voting participation (VP). It consisted of all those Muslims in urban area who are above 50 years and educated up to high school. As can be seen from the figure: 5.1 that increase in the age from 36-50 to above 50 has brought about 4% of increase in the voting participation of lower income group, 6% of increase in the voting participation of middle income group and about 10% of increase in the higher income group. This could be explained by the accepted social practice in Indian sub-continent that old age is considered a period of rest and retirement. So it seems fifty plus Muslims have more leisure time at their disposal to involve in politics.

In the group III, urban Muslims with education above high school and age between 36-50 years are considered across high, middle and low income groups. VP will remain higher when education is higher (above high school) and income group is of middle category (from 5000-20,000).

In the group IV of urban Muslims with education above high school and age above 50 years in urban area, the results show a high voting percentage (VP) of 44% for middle income group and lower voting percentage (VP) of 39% for high income group and 40% of voting percentage for lower income group. The trend of voting which becomes perceptible here is that those Muslims who are in the category of higher education and higher age group, for them the increase in income, decreases their voting participation (VP).
The changing pattern that is found during the two decades is that the overall voting participation of Muslims is lower than the general voting participation of all the people (Table: 6.2). Second changing pattern found among the Muslims is that the middle income category people are more politically active than the lower and the upper income category unlike the general pattern wherein the people of lower income category are politically more active than those of middle and upper income categories.

An examination of table 6.4 and figure 6.2 presents *political information index* (PII) of urban males across high, middle and low income groups in four different groups. Group I represents urban male with education up to high school and age up to 50 years. As can be seen the lower income Muslims of group I have PII of 39%, which is lowest when we compare it with Middle and higher income Muslims. One possible reason could be that low level of education, lower age and lower level of income results in lowest Political Information Index of 39% only.

The middle income category presents a consistently increasing trend of 47% in the Group II and 49% in Group III, but the lower and the higher income category Muslims show a fluctuating trend. However, the Muslims of group IV, representing education above high school and age above 50, reverses the trend of previous three groups. In the Group IV the lower income group Muslims, with high education level and high age (above 50) show highest PII. The reason as we know is that the increase in education and increase in age, increases the political activity of people in general.

Table 6.5 and figure 6.3 measure the *political trust* (PT) among urban Muslims surveyed in four different groups, on the basis of Age, Education and Income levels. The level of political trust (PT) among the
Muslims of U.P showed a changing trend of increasing confidence on the
government and political representatives of their respective constituency.
As the income levels of Muslims living in the urban area, increases from
the lower income category to higher income category, the political trust
among them shows a positive effect. In the 1st group the percentage of
political trust (PT) for lower income group was 32%, for the middle
income category was 49% and for the higher income was 53%, it presents
a consistently increasing pattern.

In the group II, III and IV the trend of political trust was almost
similar to that of group I. This showed that with increase in Income of the
people the political trust also increases. This trend in the Muslims of U.P
conforms to the accepted pattern across the globe that increase in level of
income brings in its fold increase in status and prestige of the people as a
result people are more satisfied with the system’s delivering abilities.

After investigating the table 5.6 and figure 5.4 for testing the
level of attitude of Muslims towards system, it was found that in the
group I of Muslims consisting of those having education up to high
school and age from 36 to 50 years, as the income level of Muslims
increased from lower to higher, their attitude towards system as well
became more and more positive. In the lower income group the attitude
towards system was 31 percent only which increased to 42 percentage
point as the level of income increased to the high level.

The group II of Muslims consisted of those having education up
to high school and age above 50 years. The second group Muslims as
well showed the similar pattern as that of the first. The increase in the
level of income led to the increase in the attitude towards system of the
urban Muslims of U.P. If we compare the group I and the group II to find
the ATS among Muslims with control of education, it was found that with
the increase in age the attitude towards system of Muslims remained almost constant for high income group. The 2 percentage point of reduction in the level of ATS of middle income group and 2 percentage point increase in the ATS of lower income category of Muslims is insignificant.

The group III of Muslims consisted of those Muslims who have education above high school and the age is from 36 to 50 years. Here as well the patterns of attitude towards system (ATS) remained similar to that of group I and group II. On comparing the group III with the groups I with the control age, it was found that increase in education among the Muslims of similar age group does not lead to any significant change in the overall attitude towards system. The ATS remained almost same in the high income group.

In the IV group the trend changed. It showed increase in ATS as the income category of Muslims increases from lower to middle, but then the attitude towards system shows a steep fall of 7 percentage point in the high income group.

After investigating the table: 6.7 for the testing the level of political efficacy of Muslims, it was found that in the I group of Muslims consisting of those having education up to high school and age from 36 to 50 years, as the income level of Muslims increased from lower to higher, their political efficacy (PE) showed steep rise from 30 percentage point to 44 percentage for the Muslims of middle income category.

The II group Muslims as well showed the similar pattern as that of the first. The increase in the level of income led to the increase in the political efficacy of the Muslims of U.P. However, what is noticeable is that in the group II, as the level of income increases, there is a consistent increase without any steep fall. In the III group the pattern of political
efficacy (PE) remained similar to that of group I and group II. It showed that the increase in the level of income leads to increase in the political efficacy of the urban Muslims of U.P. The IV group of Muslims consisted of those who have education above high school and the age is above 50 years. In this group as well a similar pattern is found wherein with the increase in the level of income, the political efficacy of the Muslims increases as well.

After examining the table: 6.8 for testing the level of mass media exposure (MME) of Muslims, it was found that in the group I of Muslims consisting of those having education up to high school and age from 36 to 50 years, as the income level of Muslims increased from lower to higher, their mass media exposure as well became more and more positive. In the lower income group the mass media exposure was 30 percent only which increased to 43 percentage in high income group.

The group II of Muslims consisted of those having education up to high school and age above 50 years. The second group Muslims as well showed the similar pattern as that of the first. The increase in the level of income led to the increase in the mass media exposure (MME) of the Muslims of U.P. but then just as the level of mass media exposure (MME) rose sharply from 32% to 40% as the income level rose from lower to the middle, the mass media exposure (MME) fell steeply from 40% to 35% as the level of income rose from the middle income to the higher income level.

The group III of Muslims consisted of those Muslims who have education above high school and the age is from 36 to 50 years. In this group, as the level of income increases the MME shows a steep rise of 17 percentage point from 33% to 50% as the income level rose from lower to
middle. But for the higher income category, the level of MME fell to 1 percentage point from 50% to 49% which is insignificant.

The group IV of Muslims consisted of those who have education above high school and the age is above 50 years. In this group as well a similar pattern is found wherein with the increase in the level of income from lower to the middle income category leads to steep rise in the MME from 39% to 46.5%, but from middle income category to the higher the level of MME decreases to 2.5 percent point.

After analyzing the table: 6.9 for the level of mobilization (M) of urban Muslims, it was found that as the income level of Muslims increased from lower to higher, their mobilization became more and more negative. In the lower income group the mobilization level was 58 percent which decreased to 56 percentage point as the level of income increased to the middle.

Further, the increase in the level of income category from middle income level to higher income level brought the level of mobilization of Muslims further down to 43 percent only. The group II Muslims as well showed the similar pattern as that of the first. The lower income category of Muslims had the mobilization participation of 55% which reduced to 40% point as the level of income increased to the high income group.

In the group III, as the level of income increases the mobilization reduces to 45% for the higher income category from 59% for the lower income category.

Here as well if we try to examine the impact of education on the mobilization level of Muslims with the control of age, we find that the increase in the level of education had a positive impact on the level of mobilization. The group I and group III shows this impact very clearly, as we can see that the percentage of mobilization increases from 43% to
45% from those Muslims in higher income category, and for the middle and lower income the increase is 56% to 57% and 58% to 59% respectively.

The group IV of Muslims consisted of those who have education above high school and the age is above 50 years. This group of Muslims as well shows a similar pattern of increasing mobilization level except for the higher group of Muslims where the total mobilization level remains stable at 45% mark. The pattern that is found is that with increase in age, income level and education the level of mobilization also increases.

**Types of political participation- rural**

Table 6.10 to table 6.23 revealed the political behaviour of Male Muslims in rural areas.

Table 6.10 and figure 6.8 present the voting participation of rural male Muslims in low, middle and high income categories. When the group I of the table examined, it was found that the Muslims of lower income group had a higher voting participation (61.5%) than the middle (50%) and high income category (59.5%) of rural Muslims of U.P. As the income level of the group I category of Muslims increases, the voting participation (VP) shows a steep fall of 11.5% point and come to 50% for the middle income category of Muslims. Again as the level of income further increases from middle to higher the level of VP also shows a rise of 9.5% point. It indicates that the level of income plays positive role for those Muslims who are in lower and higher income categories.

On examining the group II it was found that the lower income category of Muslims have a higher voting percentage (64%) than the middle (45.5%) and high income (49.5%) category. If we find the impact of age on the voting percentage in the rural area by comparing the group
II with the group I of the table, it is found that the advance in age decreases the level of voting participation for the middle and higher income category of Muslims but the voting participation for the lower Muslims increases with increase in age.

On examining the group III of the table it was found that the lower income group of Muslims had higher voting participation of 66% and the middle and the higher income category had 38% and 45% of voting participation respectively.

Table: 6.11 and Figure 6.9 present the political information index (PII) of rural male Muslims. If we analyze the group I of rural Muslims with education up to high school and age from 36 to 50 years. It was found that lower and higher income groups have 61% and 62% of political information index (PII) respectively and 40% of political information index (PII) for the Muslims in the middle income category. As the level of income increases from lower to middle the political information index shows a steep fall of 21% and comes down to 40% mark. Again when the level of income rises to higher level from the middle income category, it was found that the political information index rises to 22% points and reaches 62%.

In group II of rural Muslim males with education up to high school and age above 50 years, it was found that the higher and the lower income category shows higher political information index (PII) of 56% and 64%, however unlike group I, in this group the lower income group has highest 64% Political Information Index than those of higher income group unlike the case in group I.

The group III consisted of those Muslims with education above high school and age from 36 to 50. On examining the table it was found that it represented the trend of previous group wherein the lower income
category of Muslims have 59% of PII which is 16% point more than those rural Muslims who are in the higher income category of 43%.

Table: 6.12 and Figure 6.10 presents **attitude towards system** (ATS) among rural Muslim males in three groups across- low, middle and high income categories. On examining the group I, it was found that the higher income category of Muslims showed 50% of ATS, 31% for middle and 37% for lower income category. The group II consisted of those Muslims with education up to high school and age above 50 years. On analyzing the table it was found that attitude towards system (ATS) was lowest among lower income group unlike the first group wherein it was the middle income category of Muslims in rural area that showed the lowest ATS.

The group III of Muslims with education above high school and age from 36 to 50 shows similar trend as that of group I. Higher income group with 60% of ATS had the highest attitude towards system, with 40% lower income group stands 2nd and the middle income group shows lowest ATS. Reason could be that the lower and middle income group expects more from the system which probably fails to come up to their standards.

Table: 6.13 and Figure 6.11 present the **political trust** (PT) among rural Muslims. It was found that lower and middle income groups have 46% and 38% of political trust respectively and 57.5% of political trust for the Muslims in the higher income category. As the level of income increases from lower to middle the political trust shows a steep fall of 8% and comes down to 38% mark. Again when the level of income rises to higher level from the middle income category, it was found that the political trust rises to 19.5% points and reaches 57.5%.
In group II of rural Muslim males with education up to high school and age above 50 years, it was found that the higher and the lower income category shows higher political trust (PT) of 54% and 50%, and like group I, in this group also the high income group has highest 54% Political Trust. The middle group also follows the similar trend as of group I and continues to remain lowest at 32.5%. If we try to find the impact of age on the PT of group II of rural Muslims with the control of education, it was found that with increase in age the level of PT also increases in lower income group. But in the high and middle income category of Muslims, the increase in age has a negative influence on the political trust.

The group III consisted of those Muslims with education above high school and age from 36 to 50. On examining the table it was found that it represented the trend of II group wherein the high income category of Muslims have 58% of PT which is 24% point more than those rural Muslims who are in the middle income category.

Table 6.14 and figure 6.12 show that the political efficacy of rural Muslims in the lower and the higher income category is same at 40% point where as the political efficacy of middle income category of Muslims is at 25%. The group II also showed the similar pattern as that of the group I. As can be seen in the table that lower income category of Muslims had 48% of political efficacy, the middle income category had 27% of political efficacy and the higher income category had 43% of political efficacy among the rural Muslims of U.P.

As can be seen in the table the lower income category of Muslims had higher PE of 46%. And as we move from the lower income to the middle income category, we noticed that the PE falls from 46% point to
30% point, but it increases to 38% from 30% as we move from middle income category to higher income category.

It can be seen that lower income category of Muslims have mass media exposure of 26%, which increases to 27% as we move from lower to middle income group. The level of mass media exposure (MME) increases to 30% as we move from middle income to higher income category. In the group II the lower income category of Muslims have mass media exposure of 20%, the middle income category has MME of 25% and the high income group has the MME of 28%. In the table as we move from lower income group to the higher income we find income has a positive relation with mass media exposure.

The group III consists of those rural Muslims who are in the age group of 36 to 50 years and who have education above high school. As can be seen from the table that the level of mass media exposure increases with increase in the level of income.

It can be seen from the table 6.16 and figure 6.14 that the Muslims of lower income category have mobilization level of 60%. The mobilization level of Muslims of middle income category is 62%. The group II consists of those Muslims in the rural area who are in the age of above 50 years and who have education below high school. As can be seen in the table that the group II as well has a similar trend in the level of mobilization as that of the group I, the Muslims of lower income category have a mobilization level of 59%, the Muslims of middle income category have a mobilization level of 64% and the higher income category of Muslims have 55% of level of mobilization. If we try to find out the impact of age on the level of mobilization with the control of education, we find that as the age of a rural Muslim advances, their level of mobilization also increases.
The group III exhibits almost similar patterns and trend. As we move from lower income category to the high income category, we find that the level of mobilization also increases. If we find the impact of education on the level of mobilization with the control of age and compare group III and I, we find that the education has a positive correlation with the mobilization level.

**Types of political behaviour- urban / rural**

Table: 6.17 and figure 6.15 presents the *party affiliation* of rural and urban Muslims in the state of Uttar Pradesh. The Muslims with the level of education up to high school, whether living in urban or rural centers, have a strong predilection for Samajwadi Party (SP) as 46% urban and 61% rural Muslims supported it. The intensity and amount of support of the urban Muslims in the group is 15% point less than that of the rural Muslims. The support for Bahujan Samajwadi Party (BSP) in both the areas-urban as well as rural- is almost $\frac{1}{4}$ of the total population, but as can be seen in the table, the Muslim supporters for Congress Party are more than double in the urban areas than in the rural ones.

The group II consists of those Muslims who have the level of education above high school and who are residing in both the urban and the rural areas. Here as well the trend is similar to the one in the previous group. In this group the support for both SP and Congress is reduced and BSP is the real gainer as seen in the table.

The group III consists of those Muslims who are in the age from 36 to 50 years. As we can see in the table, in this category the rural support of the Muslims for the Samajwadi Party (SP) marginally increases from 58% to 60%. It seems that this group of Muslims who are
in the age group from 36 to 50 years, have a special liking for Congress party as in both the urban and the rural areas the support base for the Congress Party increases.

Group IV of above 50 years age, as can be seen in the table, consisted of Samajwadi Party (SP) supporter in both the urban and the rural areas. So far as income groups are concerned, we can see in the table that in the lower and in the middle groups, in both the rural as well as in the urban areas the majority of Muslims are Samajwadi Party (SP) supporters in first choice and the Bahujan Samajwadi Party (BSP) supporters in the Second choice. However the trend and pattern of party affiliation for those Muslims who are in the high income groups are more prone towards Congress.

Table: 6.18 depicts voting preference (V.Pre.) among the Muslims in both the rural and the urban areas. To measure this dimension of political behaviour, the respondents were asked to make a choice between party or the candidate as their preference while voting in the elections. In education, both the groups show preference for party than candidate.

In the two divisions of age groups, one grouped from 36 to 50 years group III and the other grouped as above 50 years group IV, it was found, as can be seen in the table, the most of the Muslims preferred ‘party’ than ‘candidate’ while voting in parliamentary and assembly elections.

In the income category, the majority of Muslims in lower income group, consisting of 84% in the urban area support ‘party’. In the middle income category, it was found that 79% of Muslims living in urban area support ‘party’, in comparison to those Muslims living in the rural area.
This trend suggests that ‘independent’, ‘non-party’ candidates and candidates other than those of major parties stand no chance to win the elections from the Muslim majority seats. It indicates very strongly that if any reform with regard to elections and representations for different communities has to be implemented, it has to start from the Party which in an indirect democracy, as in India, has become font of all the democratic activities.

Tables 6.19, 6.20, 6.21, 6.22, 6.23 depict about the role that various factors like family members, friends, caste groups, co-workers, and spouse play in shaping the opinion of the Muslim voters in the urban and the rural areas. It was found that friends, caste and co-workers play a significant and decisive role in the decision making of both the rural and urban Muslims. The role of family members is contributive in decision making of Muslims in urban area but not so in the rural area. With regard to the spouses it was found that in the urban area, their opinion has some role, however in the rural area, the role of spouse in decision making is negligible.

**SUGGESTIONS**

The researches carried out in behavioural sciences, inspite of taking all precautions, can not be perfect because many things remain unexplored either due to time constraints, non availability of resources and not getting full co- operation from the respondents. Some times the tools used for research work are too lengthy and time consuming, due to which respondents hardly co-operate the investigator and many things required in the research can not be probed. What ever may be the results of a research it does not mean that it blocks the way to future researches.
In the same way, present research is not a dead end for further explorations. Results of the present investigation could be enhanced by taking other important factors of the Indian political culture to find out the impact of these factors on the political behaviour of urban and rural Muslim voters.

Researches conducted on the relationship of minorities with majority groups may be helpful to the political culture in identifying the important factors that favorably or unfavorably influence political behaviour. Better results could also be obtained if we could have taken into consideration biographical characteristics of the respondents.