CHAPTER II

POLITICAL BEHAVIOR-
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
CHAPTER II

POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR-
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The study of political behaviour is concerned with the action of men and group of men in politics. It is concerned, at the minimum with the activities of governments, political parties, interest groups, and voters. It attempts to discover the extent and nature of uniformities in the actual behavior of men and groups of men in the political process. Lester Milbrath (1975)\(^1\) emphasizes it as those, “behavior which affects or is intended to affects the decisional outcomes of government”. According to Gorden Marshall (1998)\(^2\), “Political Behavior refers to any form of (individual or collective) involvement in the political process, or any activity which has political consequences in relation to government and policy”. This broad definition embraces both legitimate forms of political participation such as voting in elections, activism in interest groups, or social movements etc, and illegitimate political activities including coups d’e’tat, terrorism, and revolution. While formal participation aims at containing social conflict within the extent political system, so that the political order remains stable. Dissent, which cannot be channeled via existing political structures, is likely-not only to pursue changes in policy-but also to challenge the political order itself.

The study of political behavior also embraces the study of inactivity and apathy, as well as the analysis of political ideologies, values, and attitudes as the basis of participation and non-participation in the political sphere. According to Verba and Nie (1972)\(^3\), “it includes only activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and / or the actions they take.”. This
definition may be apt for western countries where the emphasis is on purpose, instrumental behaviour relevant to public policy making or decisions but may not be adequate for all societies. In Indian context, the public participation may be ‘passive’ as well as ‘expressive’ demonstrating general support or opposition, or merely demonstrating interest and attention to politics without seeking to, or expecting to influence decision at least not specific decisional outcomes.

Political participation is defined here not in the narrow sense of voting behavior only. The term is used with broader implications, including many behavioural activities such as working in campaigns, discussing politics, contacting public officials, financial contribution to a political party, or a letter to an M.P or an MLA. Its emphasis is on the role and place of the individual in the political system, as demonstrated by the nature of his political activities. Political participation is only one aspect of political behaviour. Leadership behaviour, Decision-making, Administrative behaviour- are some other aspects which have a decided impact on individual behaviour.

The Political Behaviour of an individual or a group can be comprehended in at least eight levels and contexts:

1) Acts or expressions of allegiance or non allegiance for the system or the regime and its political institutions.

2) Voting in the Schumpeterian sense of participation in the selection of political leaders.

3) Information seeking and knowledge acquiring behaviour exposure to politics and ‘paying attention’ to politics.
4) Leadership contacts for a variety of purposes – help on a personal problem, maintenance of a personal social relationship, or a desire to influence a governmental action.

5) Mass protests and demonstrations aimed at opposing or supporting governmental leadership or decisions.

6) Acts of associating with others in a social-political context which may or may not be designed to influence governmental personnel or policy.

7) Campaign participation which may result from many types of motivations. It may be concerned with decisional outcomes or relevant to procuring immediate support for party and / or candidates.

8) Potential participation, or an indication of a willingness or readiness to be involved under certain conditions in the future.

**Typology:**

Milbrath (1975)\(^4\) indicates three types of political involvements in a hierarchical order, namely:

**Gladiatorial Activities-**

a) Holding public and party office.

b) Being a candidate for the office.

c) Soliciting political funds.

d) Attending a caucus or strategy meeting.

e) Becoming an active member of a party.

f) Contributing time in a political campaign.
**Transitional Activities** –

- a) Attending political meeting or rally.
- b) Making monetary contribution to a party or a candidate.
- c) Keeping contact with a political official or leader.

**Spectator Activities** –

- a) Wearing a button or putting a sticker on the car.
- b) Attempting to talk to another to vote in a certain way.
- c) Initiating political discussion.
- d) Voting.
- e) Exposing oneself to political stimuli.

According to Rush and Althoff⁶ set of types of political participation in hierarchical order includes –

- a) Holding political or administrative office.
- b) Seeking political or administrative office.
- c) Active membership of a political organization.
- d) Active membership of a quasi-political organization.
- e) Passive membership of a political organization.
- f) Participation in public meeting, demonstrations.
- g) Participation in formal political discussion.
- h) General interest in politics.
- i) Voting
- j) Total apathy.
Path Models of Political Participation

Nie et al. (1969) and Burnstein (1972) drew upon the classic verbal theories of political behaviour (notably, Lane, 1959; Lipset, 1960; Campbell, 1964; Almond and Verba, 1965) to develop their causal models. But they take markedly different approaches to the problem. Nie et al. attempt to fill in the causal links between macro-socioeconomic processes and citizen participation by examining socio psychological variables such as resources, attitudes, and needs of individuals (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 1: Nie et al. (1969) Model Of Political Participation
The five hypothesized intervening variables which they consider (sense of citizen duty, information about politics, perceived stake in political outcomes, sense of political efficacy, and attentiveness to political communications in the mass media) do mediate some of the effects of the social variables on political participation, but organizational involvements such as labour force participation and club memberships continue to show a strong independent effect on participation even when the socio-psychological variables are included in the model.

Burstein (1972) focuses, instead on the social processes which determine the Nie et al. (1969) study's exogenous variables (see Figure 2.2).
He attempts to examine the, "process by which an individual comes to occupy a given social position in the first place and the consequences of his position for his political participation". These social indicators will be related to political participation, Burstein argues, because they measure the extent to which individuals are integrated into social networks and are tied into larger society. The ascribed characteristics (e.g. race, age) are exogenous since they are determined at birth. Burstein finds empirical confirmation of most of his ideas and explains the same amount of variance (41%) in the political participation scale as Nie et al. (who use the same data).

**Different Orientations to Political Behaviour:**

Political behaviour of an individual is consequent upon the three types of orientations which are shaped by the political culture of that political system. These orientations are as follows –

a) **Cognitive Orientation** – It prepares individuals to participate in political culture by means of subjective interests or knowledge.

b) **Affective Orientation** – It determines individuals participation, alienation, likes, dislikes, interests and acceptance in a political system by directly appealing to individual’s emotions.

c) **Evaluative Orientation** – It provides meaning to political problems and political questions of the day. It helps an individual in evaluating various problems in the light of his belief, values acquired from the system over a period of time and, determine his actions and behaviour towards day to day political challenges.
Aspects:

There are three aspects of political participation –

a) Conventional participation –
   It includes such participation as – registering to vote, voting and contesting in elections, discussing issues and joining party etc.

b) Unconventional participation –
   It includes – organizing and participating in sit-ins, marches and demonstrations, riots, social movement, boycotts etc.

c) Communication of support and protests–
   It includes – sending messages to leaders, writing letter of protests, letter to editor of newspapers and magazines, signing petitions etc.

In the present thesis, the Following aspects of political behaviour will be investigated:

(a) Voting in the elections.
(b) Attending public meetings.
(c) Having interest in Politics.
(d) Discussing Politics.
(e) Attempting to influence political decisions.
(f) Making a monetary contribution.
(g) Meeting or Sending messages to leaders.
(h) Signing of petition.
(i) Organizing or participating in marches and demonstrations.
(j) Participation in boycotts, riots and destruction of property.
(k) Political Efficacy
(l) Political Trust
**Approaches to Political Behaviour:**

While discussing approaches to the study of political behaviour, it must be emphasized that the terms 'Political behaviour' and 'voting behaviour' are not meant to suggest a behaviour-study which is essentially different in a conceptual sense from many other types of studies, what is different in studying political behaviour or voting behaviour is not the principle of behaviour, or the content of behaviour, but rather the context in which the Individual's behaviour is being examined (Eldersveld, 1956). Voting, 'the most common and important act citizens take in a democracy is one of the most studied political behaviours' (Aldrich, 1993).

**Rational Choice Approach**

The rational choice model of political behaviour was given by Downs in 1957. According to it, the calculus of voting takes the form of the equation $R = BP - C$, where the net rewards for voting ($R$) are a function of the instrumental benefits from the preferred outcome compared to others ($B$) and the probability ($P$) of casting the decisive vote that secures these benefits, minus the costs of becoming informed and going to the polls ($C$). The model predicts that rational individuals will vote only when $BP > C$. In this set-up, someone might attach great importance to who wins the election, and thus have a very large $B$ term, but because the probability of casting the deciding vote is almost always extremely small in large electorates, it follows, generally, that $BP < C$. So the model predicts abstention. The fact that large numbers of people actually do vote poses an obvious problem for the model,
one that has come to be known as the ‘paradox of voting’ (Mueller, 1989). According to it, it is irrational to vote, but most people do so.

2) Consumption Benefits of Voting Approach:

Some analysts like Riker and Ordeshook (1968) tried to remove the deficiency of rational choice model by incorporating ‘citizen duty’—as act of voting affirm one’s allegiance to the political system. Thus, the revised calculus of voting becomes $R = BP - C + D$. According to it, the reward of voting are of two types—instrumental (or investment) benefits, captured by the B term, and consumption benefits, captured by D. Because investment benefits are contingent on the probability of casting the deciding vote (P), they are normally bound to be small. Consumption benefits, however, do not depend on this contingency. It is not necessary to cast the deciding vote in order to feel that one has affirmed one’s commitment to the democratic system, for example. In fact, the benefits associated with D may not even require that one’s preferred candidate win; these rewards flow entirely from the act of voting itself.

3) Ethical Voting Approach:

Goodin and Roberts (1975) were the first to introduce ethical preferences into the individuals’ turnout calculus. According to them, people may also serve their self-interest by taking into account someone else’s welfare. Hence, each voter will have two sets of preferences. A first set - selfish preferences and second - ethical or altruistic preferences. The selfish preference includes only the individual’s own utility. The ethical preference contains (the
individual’s perception of) the utility of others. Hence, an individual’s utility function is written as:-

\[ w_i = u_i + \alpha \sum_{j \neq i} U_j \]

Where \( \alpha \) is the weight we attach to other’s happiness (with \( 0 < \alpha < 1 \)) experimental evidence supports the view that people often behave in altruistic ways—often even bearing a cost to improve the welfare of others. (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Camerer, 2003).

Goodwin and Roberts (1975) stated that ethical preferences are likely to dominate the individual’s electoral decisions as the probability of affecting the election outcome is negligible. They argue that ethical behaviour occurs when the stakes are low and/or when any individual has little effect on the outcome (that is, low efficiency). Only when the stakes and personal efficacy are high, egoistic preferences are most important. Jankowski (2002, 2004) more specifically distinguishes between ‘pure’ and ‘warm glow’ altruism. In the ‘pure altruism’, individual’s happiness from altruistic behaviour is dependent upon the recipient’s increased happiness, while in the ‘warm glow altruism’, people experience a personal satisfaction independent of the outcome of that action.

Fowler (2005) recently extended this model by arguing that, when political activity is redistributive, only those with different preferences with regard to the benefits of some groups within the population (discriminating altruists) are motivated to vote by altruism. People caring equally about the benefit of all others (unconditional altruists) in the case refrain from voting because there is no net gain from pure redistributive activity (as a zero sum game).
4) Minimax Regret Approach:

Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974)\textsuperscript{25} asserted that rule in this approach is to choose the action that yields a minimal regret in a worst-case scenario. The regret (Rij) the individual feels after some action (ai) in state of the world (Sj) can be defined as the difference between what the decision maker could have attained had he known the true state of the world before he choose his action and what he actually gets by choosing ai.

Tideman (1985)\textsuperscript{26} extends the model by introducing the concepts of ‘remorse’ and ‘elation’. These are ‘emotions’ that arise as a consequence of being responsible for one’s circumstances by one’s own actions. The introduction of remorse and elation are intuitively appealing. Nonetheless, their inclusion does not change the bottomline, as they must again be multiplied by the probability of making a difference (P), making them very close to zero. (Struthers and Young, 1989)\textsuperscript{27}. Although, as pointed out by Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974)\textsuperscript{28}, the minimax regret model predicts higher levels of voter turnout then expected utility model. Several other predictions are (much) less satisfactory. First, if a voter is indifferent between two competing parties, it is rational for him or her to abstain. However, if a small third party – which the voter would hate to see winning—enters the race, he or she is forced to the polls to avoid the unlikely event that this party wins the race by a single vote (Mueller, 2003)\textsuperscript{29}. A serious methodological criticism is leveled by Goodin and Roberts (1975)\textsuperscript{30} by pointing out that people often rationalize a wrong decision by the reflection that it seemed a good idea at the time. Regret avoidance might thus not be an element in a voter’s decision.
(5) Game Theory Approach:

Proposed by Ledyard (1984)\textsuperscript{31} and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983\textsuperscript{32}, 1985)\textsuperscript{33} – the approach holds that people take the decisions made by others into explicit account. The reasoning is as follows. If everybody votes, the chance of having an effect on the outcome of the election is very small. Because this holds for everyone, it would be rational for all to abstain; in which case one vote would become decisive. If everybody came to this conclusion, all would vote—once again making it useless to vote. This line of reasoning can be repeated endlessly. Hence, the probability of being decisive is not fixed and determined—as assumed under the expected utility and minimax regret models—but is instead determined through the strategic interaction between all potential voters. As such, $P$ becomes endogenous to the model. A voter does not face a decision theoretic problem, but rather a strategic game with other voters.

This approach shows that there is often multiple (mixed-strategy) equilibrium. Some of these involve substantial turnout rates. However, the finding of positive turnout rests critically upon the assumption that all voters are certain about the voting costs and preferences of other voters (perfect information). This assumption is not very realistic, still, when it is abandoned, the rational individual once again abstains when he or she has positive net voting costs (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985)\textsuperscript{34}. Moreover, as the strategic interaction between voters weaken in large electorates; the game theoretic approach can only perform well when considering small electorates (Aldrich, 1993)\textsuperscript{35}. All in all, the attempt to explain voter
turnout by resorting to game theory does not succeed (Mueller, 2003).6

(6) Group Based Models:

The Aristotelian idea that man is a social animal has led a number of scholars to look at social network to explain turnout at the polls. (Morton, 1987; Schwartz, 1987; Uhlanes, 1989; Morton, 1991; Schram, 1991; Schram and Van Winder, 1991). The argument is that voting might be rational for the group of individuals because the expected benefits may exceed the voting costs at the group level (Filer et al., 1993; Grossman & Heipman, 2001). First, groups are likely to have larger benefits than individuals from political participation. The reasoning is that politicians may provide groups with extra benefits—in terms of policies that come closer to the group’s optimum—to win the support of the group. (Lapp, 1999). Second, as the political influence of a social group can be assumed to be proportional to its size. (Schram & Van Winden, 1991), the group as a whole is more likely to have a non-negligible impact on the election outcome.

Models of turnout incorporating group behaviour show that positive turnout can be optimal for the group as a whole. Schram (1991) developed a theoretical model concerning an individual’s decision within a group. He divided group members into producers and consumers of social pressure. Both have different reasons for turning out. Producers of social pressure try to induce other group members to turn out, and need credibility to obtain this goal. This can be obtained by voting. Non-producing individual may be induced to vote by the social pressure generated by other members of their group (that is, the leader)
(Overbye’s 1995)\textsuperscript{48}. Bufacchi (2001)\textsuperscript{49} likewise differentiated between opinion leaders and other voters. While the former vote to increase or enhance their credibility, the latter turnout to invest in their reputation as trustworthy people in the eyes of the opinion leaders.

Grossman and Heipman (2001)\textsuperscript{50} argue that turnout is stimulated by the enforcement of a social norm at the group level, whereby in contrast to Schram’s(1991)\textsuperscript{51} and Bufacchi’s (2001)\textsuperscript{52} models, every individual is both a producer and a consumer of social pressure. These elements affect the voting norms enforcement (Grossman and Heipman, 2001)\textsuperscript{53}. First, the frequency of interaction: more frequent interactions increase the opportunity to reward desirable behaviour and punish non-co-operation. This is also supported by experimental evidence indicating that within group communication tends to increase co-operation in participation games (Schram and Sonnemans, 1996\textsuperscript{54}; Goren and Bornstein, 2000)\textsuperscript{55}. Second, enforcement is more effective (and turnout higher) if the ‘deterrent effect from social isolation is larger’ (Grossman and Heipman, 2001)\textsuperscript{56}. Finally, enforcement is easier if group members can observe the action of other members without much effort.

Coate and Conlin (2004)\textsuperscript{57}—building on the works of Harsanyi(1977)\textsuperscript{58} and Feddersen and Sandroni (2002)\textsuperscript{59} argue that people are ‘rule utilitarian’ that receive a (warm glow) pay-off for following the rule that maximizes the aggregate utility of their group if it were followed by everybody in the group. Individuals may, thus, turn out because of the inclusion of other group members’ welfare in their utility function. Turnout is, thus, regulated by wanting to do what is best for the group.
In the final analysis, it can be said that the Group-based model has several important advantage. First, by embedding individuals into social groups, the group based model is more realistic than the standard model in which voters are treated as isolated individuals (Lapp, 1999). Second, it is shown that turning out may well be rational in a group context in order to build a reputation of trustiness towards other group members (and/or opinion leaders) or because of the benefits from (discriminating) altruistic or rule-utilitarian behaviour. Turnout increases significantly with group identity (Schram and Sonnemans, 1996) and one observes ‘allies’ voting (Grober and Schram, 2004).

7) Behaviour Decision Theory:

Until a few decades ago, the study of decision making was limited almost entirely to economists, statisticians, and philosophers who developed chiefly normative models of how decisions ought to be made. According to the normative model, decision makers should carefully define the problem and clarify their own preferences, gather as much information as possible (given time constraints) about alternative course of action, consider the possible consequences of each alternative and their relative probabilities of occurrence, evaluate those consequences in terms of their underlying preferences, and choose among the alternatives according to some value-maximizing decision rule that takes into account value trade-offs among their different goals (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).

With this normative model as a benchmark, scores of studies in the diverse fields of decision making have recognized that most
decisions, whether mundane or earthshaking, fall short of the prescriptive ideal in a number of ways. People do not make optimal use of available information; they do not follow the guidelines of statistical theory in responding to uncertainties and probabilities; they do not always make reasonable trade-offs among conflicting values; and they do not always follow value-maximizing decision rules (Edwards, 1954; Simon, 1978). These experimental and empirical findings have led to the development of the field of behavioural decision theory, or the study of how people actually make decisions.

Decision theory approach is context specific. It is highly contingent on such factors as,

First, the complexity of the decision.

Second, the nature and the structure of information.

Third, the expertise of the decision maker.

Fourth, the amount of time available and incentive for careful information processing and so on (Beach and Mitchell, 1978). Further, the decision theory is based on number of postulates, that is, People lack both the knowledge and the computational skill necessary to achieve the degree of rationality prescribed by normative models of choice, and basically humans are cognitively limited information processors (Simon, 1978). So, people develop a number of cognitive ‘heuristics’ or shortcuts that allow them to act and make decisions that are generally quite reasonable (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982). People behaviour is not random or unpredictable (Jacoby et al. 1987). They select information about alternatives and combine it into choices in systematic ways (Hogath, 1987). Thus, the human
behaviour is still purposeful, but it is characterized by 'bounded rationality' rather than the ideal type rationality postulated by economic theories of decision making (Simon, 1955).

8) Learning Theory Approach:

The learning approach of political behaviour is based on the assumption that people have the ability to learn 'good' strategies from observing what worked well in the past. There are two learning sources—**First**, people can learn from their own past actions—consistent with processes known from reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998). **Secondly**, people can learn from the behaviour of others. They observe the strategies followed by others and imitate these strategies if they prove successful (Sieg and Schulz, 1995). It is, however, important to note that not all learning models link action to outcome. Plutzer (2002) and Gerber et al., (2003), for example, argue that voting (abstaining) in a given election in and of itself makes people more likely to vote (abstain) in future elections, independent of rewards / punishments origination from the election outcome. 'Voting and abstention, in other words, are habit forming'.

It has been argued that learning mainly affects the D—term from the calculus of voting model (Kanazawa, 2000). Citizens who are rewarded for their vote (via the election of their preferred candidate) or punished for their abstention (through the election of a less—preferred candidate) acquire an increased preference for voting. In contrast, if their voting is punished or their abstention is rewarded, they lose some of their preference for voting. Still, this reliance on the D-term does not make the approach vulnerable to the criticism of tautology leveled at the 'consumption' models discussed previously.
However, given the variance in the costs of voting over different groups in the population and different types of elections, learning model is also compatible with the observed differences in turnout levels across groups (and type of elections). The only deficiency leveled against it is that the approach mainly concentrates on voter turnout as such and makes no claims concerning which candidate one votes for. Nothing, however, prevents an individual casting a strategic vote.

9) Public Choice Theory:

Public choice theory borrows the basic assumption of neoclassical economics about the nature of human rationality and applies them to the explanation and prediction of behaviour in the political domain (Downs 1957). An attractive, and seductive, feature of the theory is a very strong rationality assumption (maximization of subjective expected utility) that appears to permit a great deal of explanation and prediction without the painful necessity of first constructing an empirically based theory of human behaviour, in particular, a theory of the nature and limits of human rationality. To an important extent, deductive reasoning from the theory’s basic postulates of rationality substitutes for a great deal of costly empirical inquiry.

10) Information Models:

The masses in general suffer from twin problems, they lack knowledge about the different consequences of their decision and secondly, they have limited intellectual capacity to analyze all available options. Simon’s (1957) pioneered this view initially in his
theory of ‘bounded rationality’. What he implied was that people are not-and can not be-utility maximisers, but can be described as ‘satisficers’. They cannot choose the best alternative, but they have to content themselves with the most satisfactory alternative.

Another effort at incorporating information in the turnout model was made by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996\textsuperscript{80}, 1997\textsuperscript{81}). They employed a game-theoretic, rather than a decision-theoretic, reasoning. Nonetheless, in line with Matsusaks (1995)\textsuperscript{82} and Larcinese (2000)\textsuperscript{83}, they found that uninformed voters have an incentive to abstain and—as such— to delegate their vote to those who are better informed. This holds even when voting is costless and is explained by the ‘swing-voters curse’. As informed voters are assumed to vote for what they see as the best option, uninformed voters are only able to affect the outcome by voting for the ‘wrong’ candidate. As such, uninformed voters are better off abstaining (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996\textsuperscript{84}, 1997\textsuperscript{85}). Extending the model by Feddersen and Pesendorfer, Caillaud and Tirole (1997)\textsuperscript{86} found that these information effects become much weaker in a setting where allowance is made for heterogeneous populations.

Recently, Degan and Merlo (2004)\textsuperscript{87} provided yet another attempt to incorporate information in a model of voter turnout. Indeed, from a perspective resembling that of the minimax approach, they stated that uninformed voters are more uncertain about the optional candidate. This increases their expected regret from voting (as the probability of choosing the ‘wrong’ candidate is higher), and thus implies a positive relation between information and turnout.
(11) **An Opportunity Model (Motivated Approach)**

Matthew B. Platt (2008)\(^8\) offered an opportunity model of participation that begins to study how policy goals shape individual participation and how aggregate participation shapes policymaking. The central argument is that individuals' policy goals allow them to recognize those moments when it is most efficient and / or effective to take action. It is based on the simple assumption that individuals engage in political action because they want to influence policy. Given this assumption, we should expect individuals to strategically participate when it is relatively more effective and / or efficient to do so; when the ratio of benefits to costs is higher. Opportunities are those contextual features that set the cost / benefit constraints within which participation decisions are made. More broadly, 'constraints' can also be thought of as the individual-level attributes highlighted by the civic voluntarism model—resources, political engagement, and / or high levels of recruitment activity.

**Factors Influencing Trends in Political Participation**

The number of factors influencing Trends in political participation are divided into following category (Listhang and Gronflaten, 2007)\(^9\)

1) **Individual Resources**

This model involves those capacities and motivations of individuals' that stimulates participation. It can be divided into two broad groups:

(A) Socio-economic or Demographic Variables.

(B) Psychological or Attitudinal Variables.
Fig. 2.3 a diagrammatic representation of the interrelationships between these two groups of variables (Mathews and Prathro, 1966)⁹⁰. The box on the extreme right C represents the dependent variable, political participation. Boxes A and B represent socio-economic and psychological variables respectively. In terms of time sequence, the set of variables at the right B have a more immediate impact than those toward the left A. These two types of variables affect not only the dependent variable but also one another. In socio-economic variables factors like – (1) place of residence, (2) education, (3) occupation, (4) income, (5) age, (6) marital status, (7) sex, (8) religion, (9) caste, (10) mass media exposure, (11) geographical mobility are included; and in Psychological variables factors like – (1) Political information, (2) Attitudes towards political recruitment, (3) Party preferences, (4) party evaluation, and (5) the feelings of civic competence are included.

An important point to remember is that the effect of socio-economic factors on political participation is never direct. It is always mediated by individual personality. Education, income level, and the place of residence affect political participation only because they have impact on the personality and the belief system of the political participant. Fig 2.3 therefore includes no direct causal links between A and C; the direct causal link is only from B to C, individual belief system to political participation. Thus, for example, the level of an individual’s political
activity is a function of his political information and knowledge, which in turn are affected by the level and quality of his formal education, and which in turn are a function of the economic level of the respondent.

Individual resources are the most commonly used factor to explain variations in political participation. Citizens with higher socio-economic status are more active in politics than those at lower status levels. In the classic Verba and Nie model, 1972⁹¹ (Verba et al. 1978)⁹², the resource concept is framed within a modernization model where economic growth, increase in education levels, and the elimination of normative and other barriers that make it difficult to participate are key factors that will work to increase participation levels in societies. Among resources, formal education stands out as a key element in the individual’s capacity to collect political information and to make use of information for political purposes. The steadily increasing levels of education that we see in most societies would lead us to expect that participation would increase gradually.

Martinussen (1977)⁹³ argues that participation in Norway is limited and skewed along social and economic lines. This conclusion triggered a tierce response by Lafferty (1981)⁹⁴ who painted a more positive picture of political participation in Norway. The debate has been evaluated by Stromsnes (1993)⁹⁵, partly using new data, staking out a middle position between the two contestants. In a major study of political participation in Norway, Stromsnes (2003)⁹⁶ gives a broad presentation of participation using new survey data from 2001, but she does not systematically analyze trends in participation.

Research has emphasized the removal of normative barriers that prohibit women from being equally active as men. Using data from 1969,
Listhang and Kindseth (1979)\textsuperscript{97} show that men are more active than women in electoral campaigning and that most of this effect is mediated through education, organizational membership and political involvement (political interest, political information and political efficacy). Using time series data until around 1990, Raunum (1995)\textsuperscript{98} shows that the difference between men and women is disappearing on a number of participation indicators. In a multivariate model applied to the results of eleven elections from 1957 to 2001, Listhang (2006)\textsuperscript{99} demonstrates that political efficacy differences in favour of men recorded in all elections 1957-1985, disappeared in 1989 and have not shown up again in the elections that followed.

The central tenet of the Socio-Economic Status (SES) model is that people of higher socio-economic status—those with higher education, higher income and higher status jobs—are more active in politics. SES has been found in many contexts to be a powerful predictor of political activity. (Verba et al. 1995)\textsuperscript{100}. The citizen audit (based on a representative sample of over 12,000) confirms the link between SES and political participation in contemporary Britain. The researchers conclude that: political engagement is very much dominated by the already well-resourced; in other words, the most highly educated, the rich, and those from the top educational echelons.

2) Mobilization:

The mobilization model of trend study emphasizes on how political elites and organizations work to activate their supporters in various forms of participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993)\textsuperscript{101}. Some authors conclude that mobilization works, but that the effects of these variables pales in comparison to the power of Socio-Economic Status (Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady, 1995)\textsuperscript{102}. Wrinkle, Stewart, Polinard, Meier, and Arvizu, (1996)\textsuperscript{103} find that mobilization is a more powerful predictor of political involvement than SES. While the focus of the resource model is on how the capacities and motivations of the individual stimulate participation, the mobilization model emphasizes the influence from the outside: how elected officials, parties and interest organizations affiliated with parties work to recruit voters. Activity is often associated with the election cycle as parties and MPs mobilize their supporters to vote and participate in political campaigns. Diaz (1996)\textsuperscript{104} finds that Latino turnout is significantly affected by organizational affiliation. Hritzuk and Park (2000)\textsuperscript{105} find that “integration in politically active social networks, exposure to mobilization efforts, and affiliation with at least one organization significantly increase the likelihood that Latinos will participate at higher levels”. De la Garza has been arguing for some time that mobilization is critical to Latino voter turnout. Most recently, De la Garza and Abrajano (2002)\textsuperscript{106} found that Latino-on-Latino mobilization efforts during the 2000 presidential election worked in some states, but not in others.

Observational (survey-based) studies of voter mobilization of the general population (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993\textsuperscript{107}; Kramer, 1970)\textsuperscript{108} and of Latinos in particular (De la Garza and Louis, 1999\textsuperscript{109}; Diaz, 1996\textsuperscript{110}; Garcia, 1997\textsuperscript{111}; Shaw et al, 2000\textsuperscript{112}; Verba et al, 1995\textsuperscript{113}; Wrinkle et al, 1996\textsuperscript{114}; Hritzuk and Park, 2000\textsuperscript{115}) examine the correlation between voting and contact with campaigns and political organizations. Factors like --- (1) Cleavage-based parties with mass membership, (2) Strong party organizations, and (3) well developed linkages between parties and interest groups are important determinants of political mobilization. However, in recent decades, electoral politics in
Norway has been characterized by de-alignment and volatility. The impact of cleavage on the vote has weakened (Listhang 1989\textsuperscript{116}, 2006\textsuperscript{117}; Franklin et al. 1992\textsuperscript{118}; Ringdal and Hines 1995\textsuperscript{119}), party identification and party membership began a marked and continuous decline in the mid-1980s (Jenssen 1999)\textsuperscript{120} and individual voter mobility has increased (Aardal 1999)\textsuperscript{121}. Larger studies conducted in various major cities have recently been conducted by Gerber and Green (2000)\textsuperscript{122} and by Green, Gerber, and Nickerson (2002)\textsuperscript{123}. These efforts find strong evidence of the effectiveness of mobilization.

3) Events And Issues:

In studying trends, participation can also be modeled as a reaction to events and issues. Issue Importance mediates the impact of public policy issues on electoral decisions. Individuals who consider that an issue is important are more likely to rely on their attitudes towards that issue when evaluating candidates and deciding for whom to vote.

Incumbent performance evaluation regarding an issue has a stronger impact on the vote choice of individuals who find that issue important. The analysis (Fournier. et al, 2003)\textsuperscript{124} demonstrates that there is a significant interaction between performance evaluation and issue importance. People concerned about an issue assign more weight to their evaluations of the government’s or candidate’s views and performance on that issue when making up their mind. An important contribution to issue importance is the Krosnick’s (1988)\textsuperscript{125} work on the mediating role of issue importance in political behaviour. The impact of various policy attitudes on candidate appraisal and vote choice is stronger among those individuals who feel that the issue in question is important. For example, those who believe that anti-
Muslim riots is a very important issue should pay greater attention to the party’s or candidate’s performance and policy on riots than those who think otherwise.

Krosnick (1990) defines policy attitude importance as, “the degree to which a person is passionately concerned about and personally invested in an attitude”. Surveys often ask respondents to rate the performance of political dispensation in office. Performance ratings are sometimes used as dependent variables capturing approval of a political actor’s job handling (Brody, 1991; Edwards, 1990; Mueller, 1973; Neustadt, 1960). They are also included in models of candidate appraisal and vote choice as measures of retrospective judgment on the incumbent’s accomplishments (Abramson et al, 1999; Butler and Stokes, 1969; Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1981; Flanigan and Zingale, 1994; Rose and McAllister, 1990).

Issues and Events have often been linked to activity in direct forms of participation like the signing of petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, and, in some cases, rioting and destruction of property. Research findings from Olsen and Satren (1980), and Goul and Hoff (2001) show that political action has a diverse political origin, with environment, local and regional policy issues, the European Union (EU) and economic issues important categories. In Norway, the EU referendums in 1972 and 1994 were key events that led to an increase in political action.
(4) Learning:

Participation may also be the result of political learning. The learning mechanism is especially important for new forms of political action that are used first by small groups who demonstrate that they can be useful in achieving political goals. After some time, other groups might engage in the same forms of action and participation rates will increase. Following a resurgence of interest in the role of political culture in shaping political behavior, social learning theories have pointed to the importance of cultural factors as influence on political participation. In this approach, citizens absorb certain values from the political culture within which they are socialized and these, in turn, influence political behavior.

Such a theory builds on the ‘law of effect’, and assumes that people have the ability to learn ‘good’ strategies from observing what worked well in the past. Two sources of learning successful behavior are available.

First, people can learn from the own past actions. They perceive a relation between their action (vote or abstention) and the outcome of the election (win or loss of the candidate voted for) in the previous period and interpret this as a reinforcer or a punisher. The satisfactory actions are repeated while unsatisfactory ones are avoided. (Cyr, 1975; Grafstein, 1991; Geys, 2006) . The result is a so-called ‘win-stay, lose-shift’ strategy (Kanazawa, 2000) —consistent with processes known from reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998).

Second, people can learn from the behaviour of others. They observe the strategies followed by others and imitate these strategies if they prove successful (Sieg and Schulz, 1995). Sniderman, one of the first advocates of social learning theory, argues that political tolerance in
the United States is the result of socialization to democratic norms. Recent research conducted in the United States (Herbert and Alida, 1983; Nunn, Crockett and Williams, 1978; Sullivan, Piresen and George 1982) and in countries as diverse as Israel and New Zealand has endorsed Sniderman's emphasis on the importance of learned cultural values. A key difference between the original Downsian model and the learning models is that the former implicitly assumes a causal link between an action and an outcome in the upcoming election, whereas a link between an action and an outcome in the past is the central issue in most learning models. In other words, whereas Downs' voters are utility maximizing and forward looking (that is, 'prospective optimizers'), they are backward looking and adaptive in the learning model (that is, 'adaptive satisficers') (Fowler, 2006).

The resource theory of political participation predicts that access to socio-economic resources will explain variations in political participation among various groups. By contrast, social learning theory predicts that variations in political participation will result from the value and beliefs about politics gained from childhood and adolescent socialization. Early socialization studies by Easton and Dennis (1967), and others have argued that this pre-adult socialization has important consequences for adult political values and may offset negative political experience in later life. From the perspective of the political system, the diffuse regime support that flows from this socialization acts as "a reservoir upon which the system typically draws in times of crises, such as depressions, wars, and internecine conflicts, when perceived benefits may recede to their lowest ebb."
Sniderman (1975) examines the role of personality and motivational factors in shaping political beliefs and, more specifically, democratic commitment. His theory rests on two main propositions. First, since support for the democratic ideal involves a complex array of beliefs and values, its most common source within a society will be the political culture. Second, the extent to which individuals acquire this commitment from the political culture will depend, at least in part, on their personality, and those with high self-esteem will be “more likely to have internalized the modal values of the political culture.” Socialization, personality and the motivation to learn thus interact in a complex way to determine to what extent individuals support democratic values. Social learning is a variable that links personality and democratic commitment. As Sniderman (1975) puts it, “democratic values for a variety of reasons are not easy learn, and whatever affects an individual’s capacity for social learning also affects his chances of learning those values.” His model therefore implies a causal sequence, with personality as a prior independent variable, social learning as an intermediate variable, and democratic values as the dependent variable. We can measure learning by measuring two sets of variables; first, values and beliefs held by individuals and second by the period of time individual has been exposed to the political system. In measuring values, three variables are used: Political efficacy, Political trust (Dalton, 1988; Ronald, James, Stevens and Barry 1986) and Authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950; Berry, et al. 1977).

Political Efficacy refers to the belief that an individual’s action can influence the operation of the political process, that the system within which they live is democratic, and that the government is responsive to popular demands. Political Trust refers to the belief that the politicians
and officials who run the political system can be trusted to look after community needs and not to pursue their own individual goals. Both efficacy and trust represent important indicators of political culture, and among citizens they represent mediating influences between political socialization and political participation. Authoritarianism reflects personality attributes such as dogmatism and rigidity, which have been shown to be important in shaping prejudice and ethnocentrism. (Adorno et al., 1950, McAllister and Makkai, 1992)
References:


5. Rush and Althoff, *An Introduction to Political Sociology*, p. 76.


34. Ibid., p. 62-78 quoted by authors, Benny Geys, op. cit., p. 22.


60. Lapp, M. op.cit., pp. 171-185.


105. Hritzuk, Natasha and Park, David K. The question of Latino participation: from an SES to a social structural explanation. *Social Science Quarterly* 81, 2000, pp. 151-166.


112. Hritzuk, Natasha and Park, David K. The question of Latino participation: from an SES to a social structural explanation. Social Science Quarterly 81, 2000, pp. 151-166.


151. Ibid., p-254.
156. Ibid., 1950.