We can now trace, in detail, the social, political, economic and religious milieu in England in the Victorian era which ultimately led to the composition of 'Culture and Anarchy' by Matthew Arnold. An account of some of the important movements that characterized the age like Utilitarianism, Logical Positivism, Oxford Movement and the various democratic experiments and the reaction to these movements on the part of the intellectuals of the age like Cardinal Newman, Ruskin, Carlyle, Thomas Arnold, Charles Dickens and J.S. Mill may be relevant.

The Victorian period in the history of England evokes contradictory reactions and conflicting emotions. Extreme positions are adopted while speaking of the period. Macaulay speaks of the scientific and industrial progress that took place in the period. He is often acclaimed as the great trumpeter of Victorian Progress. He claimed that, during the age, there was 'a higher standard of living'. At the other extreme, we find Lytton Strachey ridiculing the various revered personages of the period in his work 'The Eminent Victorians'. Lytton Strachey's debunking, of course, can be understood as a manifestation of the general disenchantment of the post First World War generation with the previous age. Scapegoats had to be found and the result was the ironical view of the prophets of the Victorian era.
But it cannot be denied that some sort of progress took place in the industrial and scientific fields during the age. There seems to be a deep-seated spiritual vulgarity at the heart of the civilization. The opposition from the intellectuals can be summed up in the inescapable word 'Materialism'. The domination of material ends and of un-enlightened self-interest appears to have resulted in the loss of sensitiveness and the death of spirit. At the beginning of the 19th century, Wordsworth lamented the 'savage torpor' to which the discriminating powers of the mind had been reduced owing to a multitude of causes. At the other end of the century, D.H.Lawrence attacked the ugliness behind every facet of human activity, resulting in a loss of capacity of the human soul to appreciate beauty. The diminishing stature of man, in comparison with impersonal processes over which he had little control, was a moral as well as an economic problem faced by the intellectuals of the day. Thus, the Victorian age was a complex period wherein many currents of thought crossed each other, resulting in a confused picture.

The phenomenon of 'Utilitarianism' is taken up at first. Bentham, in his 'Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation' (1789) says: "Nature has placed man under the governance of two sovereign masters, PAIN and PLEASURE. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as determine what we shall do. On the
one hand, the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we say, in all we think: every effort we make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. The PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY recognizes this subjection and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason. By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question; or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose happiness. I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual but of every measure of government.

An unpleasant picture of the human mind and a negative view of society as an aggregate of individuals, held together by selfishness, is given by this type of rationalism. Bentham imagined that pain and pleasure are quantitatively measurable and the problem of right and wrong might be resolved by the weight of the quantities of pleasure and pain resulting from an act or omission. On this basis, utilitarianism claimed to be scientific.
Utilitarians were committed to the extension of education and of franchise. But their educational aims seemed designed to create a population entirely submissive to factories and machines. Bentham attempted, in the empirical tradition, to supply comprehensive explanations of human nature and experience. The vaguely democratic principle of 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' was supported by a whole structure of assumptions about the human mind and human nature.

The theory of 'Laissez-Faire' comes into conflict with the state. The doctrine of economic 'Laissez-Faire' made a natural law of the manufacturers' unchecked pursuit of profit. It also recommended, on scientific grounds, abstention from all attempts to improve the lot of workers. Their lot could only be improved by the restriction of their numbers, thus preventing too great a drain on the wages fund.

Utilitarianism was adopted primarily by the rising middle class. The landed gentry found that it had little to offer to them. The artisans also found that it offered only Malthusian negatives to them without any prospect of extension of parliamentary franchise. But the slow growth of trade unions itself tended to soften the latent animosities and tended to create an awareness of responsibilities. The rising middle class found the doctrine satisfactory as it confirmed its growing power through reforms directed against the privileges
of the aristocracy. The doctrine had been coloured by values appropriate to the new methods of production. Political and social institutions, corresponding to the earlier stages of Industrial Revolution, were served by the earlier phase of the doctrine. The climax of this effort was the Reform Bill of 1832. The doctrine was the inspiration of the most important parliamentary reforms. Though it theoretically favoured LAISSEZ-FAIRE, it came to stand for efficient centralised administration and a strong civil service. Though in such matters as the agitation for cheap bread, the utilitarians were friends of the working man, in others, such as the regulation of conditions in factories, they were his enemies. Thus utilitarianism could be described to be full of paradoxes. On the one hand, the Benthamites artificially harmonize interests in order to ensure the greatest happiness of the greatest number. On the other, economic interests would seem to be, as Adam Smith believed, self-harmonizing, and to require as little intervention from the State as possible.

Carlyle criticises the imperfect statistics and rightly demands for rational enquiry, so that the Legislature will not go on 'legislating in the dark'. Carlyle's essay on 'Chartism' (1839) is a full-scale attack on the Laissez-Faire idea: 'That self-cancelling Donothingism and Laissez-Faire should have got so ingrained into our practice, is the
source of all these miseries'. But Carlyle recognizes part of this movement as the struggle for democracy. Carlyle thus bestows partial praise only on this doctrine.

Even more than the danger of majority tyranny, Mill saw the danger resulting from the success of the first period of the Industrial Revolution. He saw also the danger consequent on the national life being dominated by LAISSEZ-FAIRE commercialism. He thought that Bentham's idea of the world was that of a collection of persons each pursuing his separate interest and pleasure. This was freedom or individual liberty as the rising industrial class had defined it, with the shadow of Bentham to support them, in terms of the freedom 'to do as they willed with their own.' This was not freedom of thought, as Mill, the intellectual, had defined it. Faced with this, Mill had to reconsider his opinion of utilitarian thought: 'A philosophy like Bentham's..... can teach the means of organizing and regulating the merely BUSINESS part of the social arrangements.... It will do nothing (except some times as an instrument in the hands of a higher doctrine) for the spiritual interests of society; nor does it suffice of itself even for the material interests.... All he can do is but to indicate means by which, in any given state of the national mind, the material interests of society can be protected; saving the question, of which others must judge, whether the use of these means would have on the national character, any injurious influence.'

Mill was convinced that the newly reformed industrial civilization was narrow and inadequate. The emphasis on culture, Mill decided, was the way to enlarge the utilitarian tradition. As a result of the changes brought about in society by the Industrial Revolution, he wanted that cultivation had to be stated as an absolute. Cultivation offered a superior social idea contrasted with the proposition of utility as the source of value and the amassing of fortunes on account of mechanism. The social idea of culture, now introduced into English thinking, meant that an idea had been formulated which expressed value in terms independent of 'civilization'. The standard of perfection, of 'the harmonious development of those qualities and faculties that characterise our humanity', was now available, not merely to influence society, but to judge it.

Mill's aim in his essay on 'Utilitarianism' was to show that utilitarianism would yield a morality as lofty as any religious system. The view that 'actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness' is bound to create intense dislike in those who think that life has a 'nobler' end than pleasure. Mill is deflected by the Carlylean objection that happiness is unattainable and that we must learn renunciation.

The field of religion also presents a dismal picture with clashing interests. The 'Logical Positivism'
or 'The Philosophic Positive' of Auguste Comte (1798-1857) greatly influenced the intellectuals of the day. Comte is a figure of salient and symbolic interest. He saw clearly that the New World must have a religion and set himself to found a new one since the old one was dead. His prestige was ruined by this attempt as the materialists thought him crazy and the orthodox a blasphemous impostor. He can be regarded as the central figure of his century whose special problem was reconciling destruction with reconstruction, science with religion, the past with the present and order with progress.

Comte's system is based on dogmatic science and not on dogmatic theology. He aimed at a systematic unification of all known truths on the basis of scientific methods. Comte is a reformer of thought for the sake of action. His problem is to find for the new order a positive base that shall be indestructible by criticism because it is perfectly rational. Comte sees in the contemporary situation an intellectual and moral anarchy caused by the destruction of the 'theological' by the 'metaphysical'. This can be avoided only by the emergence of Positivism. The positive philosophy will go beyond the old antithesis. It will unite the past and the present into a harmonious whole, recognizing the fundamental law of continuous human development. Comte can be categorised as an anti-liberal as he desired to terminate anarchy and build a new order. But his utopia has a semblance
of the mediaeval order. There is an authoritative tone in his desire for the giving up of the 'vagabond liberty of individual minds'. This desire is for a meeting of the best minds which is not possible without their surrender of their right of free enquiry. Mill respected Comte's passion for unity and system and his desire to direct all social forces to one end. England remained outside the continental system, as classified by Comte and this was not to the liking of Comte. England has never shown the correct anti-thesis between the theological and metaphysical stages. He attacks, in a scathing manner, the British constitution which he considered to be only an accidental product of peculiar protestant conditions. He hated protestantism as much as England as both stood for a compromise. He thought it indisputable that 'the gradual development of humanity favours a growing preponderance of the noblest tendencies of our nature.'

Comte's religion has been described as 'Catholicism minus christianity', or alternatively 'Catholicism plus science'. Most impressive was the synthetic and unifying power of Comte's mind, whereby he was able to reconcile the conflicting forces of his century, blending progress with order, science with religion and the march of the mind with the spirit of Middle Ages. It appeared to him that the Middle Ages had the right structure and aims, but false beliefs. The modern world has
the right beliefs but no structure. The solution, as it appeared to him, was to unite the new truth with the old order. This is what Comte attempted to do in the 'Politique' and in the foundation of the Religion of Humanity.

Comte acknowledges the supremacy of the affections over the head. He declares that 'the affective element predominates in our nature.' Positivism now turns to the task of devising 'a system which regulates the whole course of our private and public existence, by bringing Feeling, Reason and Activity into permanent harmony.' In future, the grand principle will be the subordination of all thought, all intellect to moral principle; men of science will become philosophers and philosophers priests. Life thus becomes 'a continuous and intense act of worship.' The grand aim, to which all effort is to be directed, is the betterment of the Order of Nature which is imperfect, namely, human society. Altruism must triumph over selflove. 'Live for others' becomes the only great human maxim. In the Middle Ages, Christianity and chivalry attempted these tasks. Moral progress was then the aim and politics were subordinate to morals. Positive religion, superseding Christianity, comprises all that was wise and true in other religions which were imperfect. It recognizes the fact that natural laws are modifiable by man. Man is the product of his environment and he can also change it. As per the Catechism, the positive Religion appeals through its great conception of Humanity. By this grand idea,
the conception of God will be entirely superseded. Positivism offers a new Divinity which is alive, present and dynamic. It depends upon the love of its worshippers for its very existence. In the Positive Religion alone, 'the object of worship is a Being whose nature is relative, modifiable, and perfectible.' This new worship produces progress, which is 'the development of order under the influence of Love.' Comte claims that Positivism is superior to all former religions as it unifies the life of action with the life of faith. Unlike Catholicism, it admits the existence of disinterested affection as a genuine fact of human nature. Altruism will triumph over egoism when positive education becomes effective and when industry has been disciplined. Subordinating all things to morality, Positive religion will embrace the Arts, as well as philosophy and politics. Free from its theological restraints, Art will be able to follow spontaneously its natural vocation of 'idealising real life', and poetry will become the soul of worship.

Comte is anxious to show that Positivism is the true successor of Catholicism. His admiration for mediaevalism is profound. Positivism overcomes the disharmony between the intellect and the heart by its new priesthood, who are to be the intellectual leaders as well as the moral guides of the new order and by the consecration of science 'as the source
from which the universal religion receives its very principles.' Positivism accepts the mediaeval distinction between Temporal and Spiritual power and the new spiritual power, the scientific priesthood will be kept distinct from all political powers. It will exercise its influence over society mainly through the systematic control of education, as well as by the organization and maintenance of public worship and festivals. Its authority and prestige will be upheld by the influence of women. This is a highly characteristic part of Comte's teaching. Comte believes that throughout the period of modern anarchy, women have unconsciously preserved the best mediaeval tradition, and so have helped to save moral culture. Women will assume their rightful place of honour, lending their incomparable influence over private life to the support of the priestly educators. Humanity itself, on the new symbolic flag of Positivism, will be depicted as a young mother, carrying her infant son; the worship of Virgin Mary may thus prove another connecting link between Catholicism and Positivism - the virgin being regarded as the personification of Humanity.

In Positivism, human effort replaces Providence. The new human providence has four main subsections: Women are the moral providence, the priesthood, the intellectual providence, the patriciate (Capitalists) the Material, and the proletariat the General. 'The people represent the activity of the Supreme Being, as women represent its sympathy and philosophers its intellect.' In an ideal
order, the spiritual power would suffice, and rank would correspond to merit; this ideal must ever be kept in view. But at present, the social functions of rank and wealth must be recognized. That function has to be improved and regulated. Education will develop the realization that property involves social obligations not to be rejected, and that labour is service, not to be dismissed with money payments and without gratitude. The philosopher-priests, like the workers are to have 'as little to do with wealth as with government.' They will form a married but propertyless caste, though they will receive sufficient remuneration on a fixed scale.

All these arrangements presuppose realization of a vast confederation of small republics with no political unity. This proliferation of small states will restore true patriotism by linking the family sentiment with love of country. It is the home affections which most effectively temper the pride of intellect. The positive polity and worship aim to develop these feelings. The spiritual centre will be Paris and will spread from there. The cult of 'Sociolatry' (Comte's own term) is expressed and symbolized by the private and public worship of the Religion of Humanity. Private worship, the foundation of Sociolatry, is based 'on the adoration of the best types we can find to personify Humanity', that is, on the worship of women as the domestic goddess; the 'Guardian Angels' being mother (veneration), wife (attachment) and Daughter (kindness). Prayer, an invocation of the angels, should not be 'asking for
things'; (in prayer we identify ourselves more and more with the Being we adore'; in praying, we should be loving, thinking and active all at once. Judicious choice of passages from the best poets may aid our prayer at midday.

By all these and many other means of grace, the grand conception of solidarity (living for others) and continuity (living in the past and in the future) are kept ever present before all minds, and the victory of the sympathetic seeking is assured. 'Humanity definitively occupies the place of God', but Comte graciously adds 'she does not forget the services which the idea of God provisionally rendered.' He was a joyless, self-intoxicated doctrinaire who could not deviate enough from his own groove to ask the fundamental question whether science can ever be itself a philosophy. Yet the scope and nobility of his system, the profundity of his historical generalizations, and the wisdom of many of his doctrines are undeniable. Some of the causes for the early eclipse of Comte may be due to the tiresome redundancy of his works, his conceit and his excessive love of systematization. Above all, he was eclipsed by Marx, who spoke with greater authority and whose doctrines could immediately serve as the platform of a political party. But Matthew Arnold was very much attracted towards Comte's Religion of Humanity which appeared to be the best one as a synthesis of religion and science.
Cardinal Newman always remembered and kept July 14, the day of Keble's Assize Sermon of 1833, as the starting point of the Tractarian Movement. That sermon was a protest against interference by a secularized parliament in matters spiritual, and the movement has accordingly been regarded as political in its origin. Tractarianism followed the revolutionary and romantic upheavals and hence was scholastic, dogmatic and ecclesiastical, in a word, 'Catholic'. It had to unprotestantize the English Church. The significant thing about the period is that it began to be possible to listen to popish arguments in a country where popery had so long been abhorred and tabooed.

The Reform Bill and the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts changed the whole situation. The true situation of the church became apparent. Its liturgy, its articles and its status could be altered, as its Bishops would be appointed at the will of a parliamentary majority which might be non-Anglican. The movement was only political and anti-liberal because it was primarily spiritual. Its object was to withstand the liberalism of the day. Newman habitually speaks of the movement as spontaneous in origin and not contrived. It was 'a spiritual awakening of spiritual wants'. 'There has been for some years', he wrote in 1839, 'a growing tendency towards the character of mind and feeling of which Catholic doctrines are the just expression.'
Opinions long obscured begin to be revived, and captivate by their seeming novelty, but still more by the 'touching beauty, loftiness of idea, and earnestness of character which they evidence or require'. The state of protestantism must have been worse for a catholic movement started by a few academic clergymen to have gained so much momentum. So, Newman could say, with firm conviction, in one of his first sermons: 'I do not shrink from uttering my firm conviction that it would be a gain to the country were it vastly more superstitious, more bigoted, more gloomy, more fierce in its religion than at present it shows itself to be'. The two real spiritual antagonists are Catholicism and Rationalism. Newman was opposed to Liberalism as it destroyed the dogmatic foundation of spiritual life. Liberalism, in his opinion, was the offspring of Rationalism. He names as the party's great and deadly foe 'that imbecile, inconsistent thing called Protestantism, which had subjected the Church to the State by rejecting papal authority'. In his opinion, it was protestantism which had opened the way to schism and sect and finally to infidelity by exalting Scripture and Private judgement. Protestantism had minimized the authority of the priesthood by turning the Bishops into civil servants and had rejected so much of the ritual, symbolism and practice that Catholicism had held conducive to holiness. The result was that Christianity was unprotected against the strength of the forces of unbelief of the 19th century.

century. The strength of Tractarianism lay in its diagnosis of the age blighted by worldliness and of contemporary protestantism as incapable of rescuing it from spiritual decay and death.

As long as Newman retained his Englishman's suspicion of Rome as corrupt, crafty and idolatrous, he continued to believe in the possibility of a 'Via Media' - an English Catholic Church like that of Laud, apostolic, yet free from 'the practical abuses and excesses of Rome.' Speaking later, from his post-conversion vantage point, he could show how impossible it was for the Anglican church to be wound up to the catholic level without denying its own nature and ceasing to be itself. The very first principle of the Movement was ecclesiastical liberty - antagonism against the Royal Supremacy, to the Establishment as such. The preservation of Dogma, of the Sacraments, ceremonial observances, practical duty, counsels of perfection depended on this principle for the Tractarians. According to them, the Establishment principles destroyed the super-natural altogether by making emphatically Christ's Kingdom a Kingdom of this world.

The materials for a real understanding of a Divine sovereign and judge are supplied not by brittle reasoning but by our yearning after deliverance and a holier life. Our awareness of right and wrong, of good
and bad, in our sense of sin and failure and in our sense of obligation lie the materials for an awareness of religion. This apprehension is independent of Revelation or Dogma or theological formulations. Theology is the notional formulation of what the experience seems to mean. It is here that Newman makes the transition from natural to revealed religion, a transition rendered imperative for him by his wider vision of human nature in its fallen state and by his tragic view of our weakness and sinfulness. Belief in God is the starting point from which we arrive at a dim conception of Himself afforded by Nature. 'Sacrifice of Wealth, name or position, faith and hope, self-conquest, communion with the spiritual world, presupposes a real hold and habitual intuition of the objects of Revelation, which is certitude under another name'.

Newman carried on the vital task of the 19th century by the rejection of flimsy evidences and by the disclosure of a deeper and firmer foundation for religious faith. Critics of Oxford Movement exclusively attended to its 'Romanizing' manifestations. They failed to appreciate that the catholicity of Newman was an organic outgrowth of the deep criticism of religious foundations. Newman, led by a profound spiritual instinct, placed religion on a surer basis than any afforded by scriptural fundamentalism or evangelical assurance.

Newman's mysterious but charming personality evoked sharp reactions from the intellectuals of the day. One such

intellectual was Thomas Arnold, the famous head master of Rugby. Newman and Thomas Arnold can be considered to symbolize the two conflicting trends in the 19th Century religious thought. Arnold was an ethical and liberal gentleman, who aimed at the promotion of goodness. Newman was mystical and dogmatic and aimed at the production of saints by an infallible church. Arnold condemned the exaltation of sacerdotal caste and rejected as trivial all that seemed vital to Newman. Arnold accused the Tractarians, of teaching old error instead of new truth and of raising the church and sacrament above Christ himself. Newman's reply would be that error is always renewing itself while truth is ever the same. No dishonour is done to Christ by believing that He can be known fully through the church and the ordinances which He instituted and through which His spirit is mediated. Arnold accepted the spirit of the age and believed it could be christianized as search for truth was going on. Newman was afraid of this search as he feared that the spirit of enquiry was in its very nature destructive of faith in the Unseen. Atheism would be the result, he believed, if this spirit of enquiry of the age was not checked.

Tractarians were accused of being reactionary dreamers, caring little about the 'condition of England' question, ignoring modern science by substituting unrealities for realities. Newman's concern was for the Invisible and
Truth which was divinely communicated and hence remained the same for ever. The specific challenges of his own century were considered by him merely as reincarnation of early heresies, long back resolved by the Catholic church.

From some points of view, especially in contrast with the 18th century, the Victorian age might be regarded as an age of religion. Evangelicalism was the creed of the Middle Class and it set the tone of manners, dress and taste which the lower orders imitated as they wished to achieve respectability. The age is also considered as an age of religious decay and uncontrolled sectarianism. Non-conformity had always had a class basis. It was so partly because religious association was one of the few means of showing group solidarity open to the non-enfranchized. The interest of social classes became more and more reflected by religion. Methodism also was a kind of non-conformity but at the bottom of the structure of Dissent. Many of the religious difficulties of the period were only expressions of pain as men outgrew their habitat and origin. They felt ill at ease in their old chapels. Religious vagrancy has remained a distressing feature of English life. It was for such vagrants that various substitute religions of science such as scientific Paternalism or Positivism and Spencerian Evolutionism had their attraction. Science thus provided outlets for religious zeal and a new path to respectability. Biblical
criticism directed its attack against protestantism which based its justification as the infallible scripture. Protestantism lost the spirit of Christianity even with its insistence on the word of God. The Oxford Movement may be considered as an attempt at reformation of the Anglican protestantism's relation to the rest of Christendom. It thus tried to counteract the liberalism of the day in matters of religion.

Liberalism took in the field of religion other forms during the Victorian age. Agnosticism was one such form which helped certain individuals to lead orderly lives. Agnosticism appeared to be the product of only one side of human nature, the purely rational. 'Agnostic' does not mean a person whose mind is oppressed by a negative response to christianity. But Victorian agnosticism developed some of the narrowness and rigidity connected with protestantism. It was in this late Victorian ethos that Hinduism, and other cults found adherents amongst those who found the increasing commercialization of English life stifling. There was also developing amongst the increasingly large member of literate men and women a humanist attitude to life which was not a matter of creeds and dogmas. It was a recognition of the human conditions of life. Humanism helps maintenance of standards of sincerity, delicacy and intellectual honesty. It works for intelligibility and fairness and may be considered as an essential contributing factor in culture.
The Victorian period was indeed one of upheaval and individualism, of nationalism and liberalism, of the growth of population and the need for control or for emigration. Education became a general concern and the place of religious teaching in a national system of education was bitterly debated. The literature of the period naturally reflected all these phenomena of the age and society. The dominant temper of the early and middle Victorian period was intensely moralistic and was heavy with a sense of responsibility. The comparatively peaceful evolution of democratic forms of government could be ascribed, among the numerous explanations offered, to the non-fulfilment of the prophecy of Marx that the contagion of revolution might spread from the continent and also to the sheer momentum of social change. The tradesman like quality of the rising middle class was also partly responsible for the peacefulness of social evolution.

Agriculture itself had become thoroughly dominated by a business spirit. The Trade Unions, throughout the century, had to struggle for a tolerable bargaining relationship with money. In their turn, they were subject to the risk of being static and illiberal. The possibility was foreseen by De Tocqueville, by Mill and by all those constitutionally minded men who, accepting the need for democratic development, were deeply concerned about the ancient risk of tyranny latent in the word 'democracy'. The ascendant middle class attempted to shape the unruly lower class in its own image
by preaching and by propaganda. This explains the moralizing tone of much of the Victorian writing. Mixing business with moralism, the literature appears to be hypocritical. In their own separate and individual ways, Charles Dickens, Carlyle, Ruskin and Arnold attempted to lessen, through description and irony, the self-righteousness of the period. The period made these writers unhappy, discontented as it was becoming hard, gross and impervious to criticism.

The critics were all concerned with keeping the age sensitive and preventing the surrender to commercial success and mechanical processes. Carlyle wrote forebodingly in SIGNS OF THE TIMES (1829): 'were we required to characterize this age of ours by any single epithet, we should be tempted to call it, not an Heroical, Devotional, Philosophical or Moral Age, but, above all others, the Mechanical Age. It is the Age of Machinery, in every outward and inward sense of that word; the age, which, with its whole undivided might, forwards, teaches, and practises the great art of adapting means to ends. Nothing is now done directly or by hand; all is by rule and calculated contrivance.... On every hand, the living artisan is driven from his workshop, to make room for a speedier inanimate one.... What wonderful accessions have thus been made, and are still making, to the physical power of mankind; how much better fed, clothed, lodged and, in all outward respects, accommodated men now are, or might be, by a given quantity of labour, is a grateful reflection which
forces itself on every one. But leaving these matters for the present, let us observe how the mechanical genius of our time has diffused itself into quite other provinces. Not the external and physical alone is managed by machinery, but the spiritual also. ..... These things, which we state lightly enough here, are yet of deep import, and indicate a mighty change in our whole manner of existence. For the same habit regulates not our modes of action alone, but our modes of thought, and feeling. Men are grown mechanical in head and heart, as well as in hand.\textsuperscript{5} The Industrial Society runs the risk of its way of life being imposed by machines and the human beings of becoming semi-militarized mechanics.

The expansion of the British Empire had its own consequences. The country became more and more urbanized, and the lower classes began to imitate the habits of the upper classes as they had their own small share of their prosperity. The tone of self-righteousness at home developed into one of imperialism abroad. The extraordinary growth in population was a world-wide phenomenon, tentatively explained as the result of improved medical knowledge and hygiene. Most people survived infancy and people lived longer. In itself, this natural phenomenon goes some way towards explaining the squalor in housing and in factories described by the novelists of the age. Humanitarian sentiment

had first to bring 'the Condition of England' question to public notice and initiate reforms; once the first crisis had been met, writers could face the permanent and irremediable consequences both of the conditions and its cure. 'Cheap and Nasty', Carlyle was obliged to comment as he surveyed the London scene at the time of the Second Reform Bill: 'For there lies in it not the Physical mischief only, but the Moral too which is far more.' I have often sadly thought of this. That a fresh human soul should be born in such a place; born in the midst of concrete mendacity'.

The Industrial Revolution created opportunities for and released energies in the middle and artisan class which turned to the diligent prosecution of trade and industry. Multiplicity of talents found their occasion and opportunity. The struggle for literacy as a way for betterment, in the form of colleges for workmen, often took an embittered form.

In the late Victorian period, questions of education, the debate about the content of English culture and resistance to the standardizing effect of machines predominate over all other considerations. The Second Reform Bill of 1867 enfranchised the working classes in the town, thus, shifting the centre of political power. The Trade Union Act of 1871 gave recognition to the unions as part of the mechanism of modern life. The result was that the workmen no longer depended merely on humanitarian sentiment. They were the masters.

now. Gradually, the working classes and the former chartists developed their own kind of socialist idealism. An awareness of Marxist 'labour theory of value', the theory that 'labour is the source of wealth' can be discerned.

The theme of Mill's 'Liberty' (1859) was essentially the theme of Arnold's 'Culture and Anarchy' (1869), which is, in some ways, an answer to Mill's reasoning. Mill was more like Arnold than he was like Bright or Frederick Harrison, and he would have echoed Arnold's words: 'I am a Liberal, yet I am a Liberal tempered by experience, reflection, and renouncement....' He might have as well gone on to the end of Arnold's sentence: 'and I am, above all, a believer in Culture.' It is in this context that Arnold's work, his emphasis on 'Sweetness and Light', on standards to which all men would respond and on which they could agree whatever their ideological differences, has its permanent importance. Such a conception of culture has no necessary connection with the theory of the State which occur in Arnold as in Carlyle.

No account of the Victorian age would be complete without a description of the intellectuals of the day and their impact on the society of the day. They have permanently left their foot prints on the sands of time. The sort of assessment which Matthew Arnold made of the Victorian period in 'the Function of Criticism at the Present Time'

(1865) seems to be appropriate. He distinguished in it between 'epochs of concentration' such as the age of Burke and 'epochs of expansion'. 'Epochs of concentration cannot well endure for ever; epochs of expansion, in the due course of things, follow them. Such an epoch of expansion seems to be opening in this country. In the first place, all danger of a hostile forcible pressure of foreign ideas upon our practice has long disappeared; like the traveller in the fable, therefore, we begin to wear our cloak a little more loosely. Then, with a long peace, the ideas of Europe steal gradually and amicably in, and mingle, though in infinitesimally small quantities at a time, with our notions. Then, too, in spite of all that is said about the absorbing and brutalizing influence of our passionate material progress, it seems to me indisputable that this progress is likely, though not certain, to lead in the end to an apparition of intellectual life; .........
I grant it is mainly the privilege of faith, at present, to discern this end to our railways, our business, and our fortune-making; but we shall see if, here as elsewhere, faith is not in the end the true prophet. 8 It is this predominant impression of 'expansion' which accounts for much of the loose talk of 'greatness'. The early Victorians derived, especially the intellectuals, a sense of purpose from their combined attempt to improve 'the condition of England' or to face the challenge posed by science, or to mitigate fanaticism. By the end of the century, writers felt that the
middle class values which they had helped to establish were intolerably 'philistine', complacent and inimical to Art. Arnold depicts the effect of modern life on the Scholar Gipsy in these lines:

But fly our paths, our feverish contact fly!
For strong the infection of our mental strife,
Which, though it gives no bliss, yet spoils for rest;
And we should win thee from thy own fair life,
Like us distracted, and like us unblest.
Soon, soon thy cheer would die,
Thy hopes grow timorous, and unfix'd thy powers,
And thy clear aims be cross and shifting made;
And then thy glad perennial youth would fade,
Fade, and grow old at last, and die like ours.  

Even when they analysed mind and thoughts fairly thoroughly, as Tennyson, Arnold and Clough appear to have done, the result was the same—the feeling of discomfort of ideas and general opinions. The Victorian writers win respect by their conscientiousness, industry and willingness to engage in a moral and intellectual debate about the deleterious effects of their age.

Carlyle published, in 1829, his important essay 'Signs of the Times' in the 'Edinburgh Review'. The essay

was his first main contribution to the social thought of his time. The influence of German thinkers in the preceding 40 years, namely Goethe, Schiller, Jean Paul and Novalis, is clearly manifest. The influence of Coleridge also is easily discernible. Even then, the originality of Carlyle's thought is not affected. Carlyle, in this essay, is stating a direct response to Industrialism, the feel, the quality of men's general reactions to England of his time. He was the first to name industrialism as such. This reaction is illustrated, first, by reference to the changes in methods of production. Then, there are the consequent social changes: 'what changes, too, this addition of power is introducing into the social system; how wealth has more and more increased, and at the same time gathered itself more and more into masses, strangely altering the old relations, and increasing the distance between the rich and the poor, will be question for political Economists, and a much more complex and important one than any that they have yet engaged with.  

Carlyle continued his analysis in another direction, which Matthew Arnold, writing 'Culture and Anarchy' could have acknowledged: 'Not the external and physical alone is now managed by machinery, but the internal and spiritual also..... The same habit regulates not our modes of action alone, but our modes of thought and feeling. Men are grown mechanical in head and heart, as

well as in hand. They have lost faith in individual endea-
vour, and in natural force, of any kind. Not for internal
perfection, but for external combinations and arrangements,
for institutions, constitutions - for mechanism of one sort
or other, do they hope and struggle. Their whole efforts,
attachments, opinions, turn on mechanism, and are of a
mechanical character.' ...... 'Religion is now..... for the
most part, a wise prudential feeling grounded on mere calcu-
lation...... whereby some smaller quantum of earthly enjoy-
ment may be exchanged for a far larger quantum of celestial
enjoyment. Thus Religion too is a profit, a working for
wages'.

Carlyle's criticism of the characteristics of the
age is fundamental. He wants to see a restoration of balance.
'Doubtless, this age also is advancing. Its very unrest, its
ceaseless activity, its discontent contains matter of promise.
Knowledge, education are opening the eyes of the humblest;
are increasing the number of thinking minds without limit.
This is as it should be; for not in turning back, not in
resisting, but only in resolutely struggling forward does our
life consist....... There is a deep-lying struggle in the whole
fabric of society; a boundless grinding collision of the New
with the old..... Political freedom is hitherto the object of
these efforts; but they will not and cannot stop there. It
is towards a higher freedom than mere freedom from oppression

11. Carlyle, Signs of the Times, (London: J.M.Dent and
by his fellow-mortal, that man dimly aims. Of this higher, heavenly freedom, which is "man's reasonable service", all his noble institutions, his faithful endeavours and loftiest attainments, are but the body, and more and more approximated emblem. As an important social thinker, he pointed out the marks of sickness of his age throughout his works. The spiritual emptiness of the characteristic social relationships of his day 'with cash payment as the sole nexus' was pointed out by him with a terrible clarity in all his works. His more relevant writings are the essay on 'Chartism', the lectures on 'Heroes and Hero-worship', the 'Latter Day Pamphlets', 'Past and present' and 'Shooting Niagara'. Whatever he wrote dealt with the main social problems of his day and this lent a unity to his work.

The essay on 'Chartism', published in 1839, begins with a characteristic insight: 'Chartism means the bitter discontent grown fierce and mad, the wrong condition therefore or the wrong disposition, of the working classes of England.... The matter of chartism is weighty, deep-rooted, far-extending, did not begin yesterday; will by no means end this day or tomorrow.' After this recognition, and the parallel recognition that it is no answer to call the discontent 'mad, incendiary, nefarious', Carlyle proposes the famous 'condition of England' question: 'Is the condition of the

English working people wrong; so wrong that rational working-
men cannot, will not, and even should not rest quiet under
it? Carlyle has his own specific solution in 'Chartism'. He was opposed, not only to the general spirit of 'Laissez-
Faire', but to what he called Paralytic Radicalism. In
practical effect - as in the proposals for popular education
and planned emigration - it is not really very different from
Utilitarianism. In its call for more governmental control,
it is a move in the same direction as that which the second
phase of radical Utilitarianism was to take. The emphasis is
on the transformation of social and human relationships based
on the laws of political economy. This emphasis, human and
general, was more influential than Carlyle's call for heroic
leadership and reverent obedience.

Carlyle's call is for more government and more
order, which is represented by him as the demand of the English
working people. Carlyle, however, interprets this demand
in his own way. His call is to the classes with power to
equip themselves for the right exercise of power. They have
to make themselves an active and responsible governing class,
and purge themselves of 'donothingism'. Carlyle's attitude
towards the masses is a blend of compassion for human misery
with scorn for the nostrums of 'democracy'. It is in the

name of the toiling millions that he denounces laissez-
faire and the cash-nexus, but the remedy is not to be
found in mere political enfranchisement. The Reform Bill
has extended franchise, but there remains as before hunger,
misery and sense of injustice. What is needed is a True
Aristocracy, an Aristocracy of the wise, and a true
priesthood. The only right of man is the right to be wisely
governed. The hard working millions, he declares, are in
dire need of proper guidance and not votes. England will
learn either how to find its heroes or cease to exist among
nations. Carlyle correctly diagnosed the weaknesses and
exposed the cant of Victorian democracy; its reliance upon
laissez-faire economics, its superficial conception of free-
dom, its belief in the political enfranchisement and its
deficiency in purpose, idea or meaning. He believed that
democracy must unlearn its economic idolatries, cease to be
self-seeking and mechanical in order to survive.

Carlyle's analysis of modern society resembles
that of Arnold but with a change of nomenclature; the 'Barba-
rians' become the exponents of dilettantism or Donothingism
and the 'Philistines' of Mammonism. The latter have this
superiority over the aristocracy that their Mammonism makes
them work. Later, in his life, he learned to respect & what
was distinguished in the tone and morale of high society.
Carlyle's position, as regards religion, resembles that of Arnold in 'Literature and Dogma'. It is a position common to liberal Victorians with a religious temper. The idea of culture as the whole way of living of a people receives a new emphasis in Carlyle. It becomes the ground of his attack on Industrialism. He disagrees with the view that a society, popularly so called, is composed of mere economic relationships, with 'cash payments as the sole nexus'. In 'Shooting Niagara', he declares emphatically that there are demands that cannot be supplied by shops alone. Such demands are related to the characteristic conception of the 'genius', the Hero as man of letters. The main symptom of the disorganisation of the society is the neglect of such a genius. The characteristic, modern idea of the artist is also partly due to Carlyle. It is here that the idea of culture as a body of values superior to the ordinary progress of society and the idea of culture as the body of arts and learning meet and combine. Carlyle, even when he appealed to the leadership of the aristocracy and captains of industry, never failed to emphasize this other conception of a 'spiritual aristocracy', a highly cultivated and responsible minority, concerned to define and emphasize the highest values at which society must aim. The central emphasis, in the general anger of 'Shooting Niagara', is on the need for a class of such men - 'writing and Teaching Heroes' - Whose concern is with the 'quality' of the national life. This has been Coleridge's
idea of the national church, the clerisy. Carlyle, in different terms, makes the same proposal, for an 'organic Literary class'. He is not sure of the best arrangements for such a class. The idea of such an 'elite', for the common good of society, has not been lost sight of. All that now needs emphasis, with Carlyle as with Coleridge, and as with Matthew Arnold after them, is that the then existing organisation of society, as they understood it, offered no actual basis for the maintenance of such a class. The separation of the activities grouped as 'culture' from the main purposes of the new kind of society was the ground of complaint. It is in these terms, reinforced by more general conclusions, that culture came to be defined as a separate entity and as a critical idea.

Charles Dickens was a novelist of the Victorian era who gave a realistic portrayal of the variety and pathos of common experience. He had great opportunities for real experience at a lower social level and hence his pragmatism. Dickens's criticism of his world is casual and incidental in the sense that he chooses the treatment of a particular abuse. 'Hard Times' is an examination of the dominant philosophy of Industrialism, Utilitarianism which is aggressive moneymaking and power-seeking ideal. Aggressive economic individualism is also attacked.

Reform and exploitation, for Dickens, are the two sides of the same coin, Industrialism. Elements of human
nature, like personal kindness, sympathy and forbearance count for him much. There is a contrast between the practical and inarticulate education, which is gained by living and doing, and highly articulated education, which is gained by systematisation and abstraction. He recognizes the industrial working class as an object of pity and admires their personal devotion in suffering. He vividly portrays their attempts to better their living conditions. The Trade Unions are dismissed with a stock Victorian reaction. He depends on Carlyle for his criticism of the political economy.

Dickens's popularity can be accounted for as he was a typical Victorian. Hardship, squalor, despair and drudgery of Industrial England quickened his genius. The social upheaval brought in to existence of a body of middle class readers who became the judges of literary taste. They enjoyed power on account of their success and prosperity in industry and commerce. The Reform Act of 1832 gave them political importance also. Thus it was a self-satisfied but ignorant public for which Dickens wrote. The public was indifferent to the claims of Art and Imagination, was sentimental and inclined to moral didactism.

Ruskin was a writer who, like Carlyle, attempted a reformation of society by weeding it of all the evils and wickedness that made it ugly. He clearly saw the dangers of
materialism with no concurrence of the soul. It was the shocking inability of his contemporaries to appreciate beauty in art and the higher values of life that made him study the causes of materialism. Thus the inspiration for Ruskin's social criticism was moral in nature. But the basis of his proposals for social reform is a reaction of his artistic nature. The poisoning of social and individual conduct is traced by him to spiritual causes. Art meant for Ruskin all sound work. Hence he preached in all his work the gospel of good work, which will be valued for its own sake and also for its beneficial results. Good work, for him, is no mere moral platitude. It was a definite protest against divorcing work from life owing to excessive specialization of industry in modern life. Ruskin clearly saw the elements of decay in the civilization of his day. He felt the bane of the age was its impatience of simplicity, its admiration of success, its preference for enjoyment and its wrong notion regarding pleasure. He is never tired of repeatedly indicating these defects in a society which desired only the satisfaction of degraded tastes by acquisition of wealth by whatever means. It is this problem of bad wealth and consequent poverty and misery among the working classes that Ruskin attempts to solve. He criticises three aspects of modern industrial society in a severe manner. The first evil is mechanisation of work and life. He attempts to prove that all bargaining in modern commercial transactions is unjust and that the competitive system in trade and industry
involved definite injury to work and human character. In his lecture on 'Works', he says that it is quite proper that a man should be paid the fair value for his work. But wealth is ill-used when it goes to those who are already wealthy and used it for exploiting the poor workers. Hence Ruskin condemns the power of capital as unjust. Ruskin felt that English men were poisoned by their intense passion to 'get on in life'. The ruling goddess of the Britisher, he says, is the Goddess of Getting-on. According to him, catastrophe or something worse than that would be the result of such a course of action.

The mercantile economy of his day is attacked by Ruskin on the basis that 'there is no wealth but life'. Money-making activities and motives should not be divorced from the wider and more significant problems concerning human nature and life. He repeats that the best work cannot be had from a workman by treating his labour as a merely marketable commodity. He felt also that over-specialization in industry leads gradually to a deadening of the productive faculties and to the narrowing of the power of enjoyment. Liberal concession in wage is not a compensation for the de-humanizing toil. Ruskin's ideal worker is cheerful with thought only of the day's work and with no thought of the morrow. In his lecture on 'Traffic', he talks of the duty of capitalists towards workers as consisting in payment of just wages for honest work, fair wages for fair work. The
work should be got done under good 'lieutenants of labour' with 'appointed times of rest'. Ruskin was not a socialist. The moral or ethical issues overshadow his writings. He treated capital as the root, the fruit of which is to be consumed in life.

Ruskin's work, as a political economist, was to turn from a quantitative to a qualitative economy. According to him, the social economic system was rotten to its core with the cancer of a wrong motive. Complete transformation of its structure with a new spirit alone would restore it to its normal health. His remedy for the social evils is proper education of the working classes. He does not aim at an education which is either purely intellectual or too mechanical in its methods. He realises that for the mass of children in the country, the moral and material basis of a true home is miserably defective. That is why he insists on a scheme for the best possible education for the children of the nation. He has no belief in the mere teaching of the three R's as he believes that no good can be derived therefrom. He believed that the poorer classes should not be blamed for their loose ways of living by fine gentlemen of the society. He repeatedly turns from the sordid commercial transactions of the modern day to show in some good carving or painting how all the ideals of the noblest minds in all ages have been associated with the vision of life as a conflict. In his opinion, the greatest disease of his
contemporaries was the unrighteousness of their sensations. Money alone and not art or literature was the adored centre of all their affections and aspirations.

Matthew Arnold's father, Dr. Thomas Arnold, the famous Headmaster of Rugby, made a deep and lasting impression on the mental makeup of his son. Dr. Thomas Arnold was one who believed that man had a destiny and a duty, whose fulfilment, whether as an obligation to God or to one's fellow creatures, would alone make life significant and satisfying. The depth and intensity of his religious convictions has to be recognized. His life was in deed, 'rooted in God'. Earnestness, zest and moral thoughtfulness were the leading traits of his character and he had an extraordinary power of communicating these qualities to others. He regarded Christianity as the sovereign science of life in all its branches. He had dedicated his life to the idea of constructing 'a truly national and Christian church and a truly national and Christian system of education.' He was deeply influenced by Coleridge, above all by his 'Constitution of Church and State'. In him, the Coleridgean ideas became a programme of action. The leading principle of his whole life's effort was to realize the idea of a Christian society, in microcosm at Rugby and at large in the nation. According to him, the source of all woes was the separation of things secular from things spiritual. According to him, the end of the church is the putting down of all
moral evil; its nature a living society of all Christians. He was equally opposed to the Evangelical view of the state as existing only for physical ends and to the priestly view of the church as a separate society governed by a divinely appointed hierarchy. In his view, the nation was the true sphere for the realization of Christianity. As such, he thought that great areas of human activity like war, economics and education cannot be considered as secular and exempted from spiritual criticism.

It is in his 'Essay on the Right Interpretation of the Scriptures' ('Sermons', Vol. ii, 1832) that Arnold most clearly exhibited that quality designated by his son as 'wonderfully European'. Arnold was aware of German Criticism and its meaning for the future of protestantism. He rises to the best level of insight when he tries to distinguish between 'questions of criticism' and 'questions of religion'. His deeply felt conviction that the true basis of religion was moral and spiritual served him well here. He says that Christian faith does not concern itself with the solutions to the historical, critical and scientific objections to the Bible. Religion need not be afraid of critical enquiry, according to him. What is revealed in Scripture is the will of God and the duty of man and religion is only concerned with these. Faith wins, for it is a necessary condition of health of the soul. Faith makes one to embrace that side which leads to moral and practical perfection.
But the weakness of the church has been due to disunity and especially to the existence of one 'established church' and a number of 'dissenting' churches. The true aim of the State is identical with that of the church. It is the highest well-being of society, moral and spiritual as well as physical. In a Christian country, he firmly asserted, the State cannot but be the church. Arnold would, therefore include the Dissenters within the idea of the national church. Arnold realized how uncongenial were secular politics and social order. He wanted to christianize the whole social, political and economic organism and rally all Christians into one great national society for Christians. All the disturbances that followed the Reform Bill, all the prevalent miseries, inequalities and injustices seemed to him to be due to the failure of the national church to check the national sins. He was very certain and clear about the Christian view of the true end of man influencing ideas regarding national wealth and political economy. The practical side of Christianity is, for Arnold, its very essence.

Arnold was bitterly opposed to the Oxford Movement. Oxford men, in his opinion, were idolaters, because they placed church and Sacrament above Christ himself. It was Arnold's conviction that is for religion to teach us wherein good consists and how to realize it in our
individual lives and in society. Mere diffusion of useful knowledge, in his opinion, is not genuine adult education. Only moral and religious knowledge can instruct the judgement and not science or literature. Christianity is precisely a system for propagating a certain given set of moral standards. In a Christian country, therefore, a knowledge of Christianity is essential even to intellectual education.

Arnold was quite sure that the tenets of utilitarianism were quite irreconcilable with Christianity. As for church government, Arnold held that the scriptures are the sole authority for Christian truth, but not for the constitution and rules of the church. The original idea of the Christian church was that the whole body of Christians should share in its concerns, the notion of a 'human priesthood' being excluded by the primary recognition of Christ as the sole priest and intercessor. The present church organisation is not democratic enough and he wants to remedy this by abolishing the distinction between spiritual and secular.

John Stuart Mill also influenced the way of thinking of the intellectuals of his age to a great extent. Mill himself was influenced by Coleridge, Bentham, Carlyle, Comte and the contemporary Zeitgeist in general. The main
direction of his effort was predetermined by the previous revolutionary age. It was towards the improvement of the human lot by the removal of ancient prejudice and established dogmatism. Like Comte and Marx, he was a reformer of thought for the sake of action. But he thought of action always as lying within the framework of parliamentary democracy. He learnt that social evolution has certain necessary stages which follow each other in a fixed order. With Comte, he believed that the 'positive' stage had produced in the modern world a distinctive intellectual anarchy. Old received opinions had lost prestige and no new ones had yet gained authority. He tells us that the governing classes influence through a combination of various factors like wisdom, wealth, virtue, rank and sacerdotal power. Mill remarks that Christianity has been the only natural religion compatible with progress while other religions like Hinduism and Islam have remained stationary. But, in 1831, the natural order had collapsed. Wealth and influence were no longer synonymous with wisdom and leadership. Power must now be lodged with the able and the energetic and such men exist only outside the ruling class. Mill believed in the possibility of indefinite progress and perfectability, but assumed that the masses would never be able to do better than choose the best leaders.

Mill's first major work 'The System of Logic', appeared in 1843 and immediately became a sacred scripture.
for Liberal Intellectuals. Mill applies his principles to ethics, politics and history. Mill argues here that our volitions and actions are the invariable effects of causes. Mill asserts here that volitions are originally determined by desire of pleasure. Man comes to will the means by habit without thinking of the end. Keeping clear of metaphysics, Mill thinks of the science of the formation of human character as of supreme importance. He coins for it the name of 'ethology'. All men have not one character. But there exist universal, causal laws of the formation of character. For Mill, the individual is always the final end. In Mill’s view, the character itself should be, to the individual, of paramount importance. The ideal nobleness of character would make life happy and would highly develop all faculties of man.

In his famous work, 'The Principles of Political Economy' (1848), Mill is trying to reconcile incompatibilities. How are the best ends of socialism to be gained without abandoning the values of individualism and laissez-faire? Mill, as a practical economist, believed neither in the providence of God nor in the beneficence of nature. He had no great faith in the average humanity too. Man was improvident and nature niggardly. Progress does not mean accumulation of wealth, expanding trade and increasing population. This classic work on political economy is written on the assumption
that men should not be interfered with in their desire to become richer and richer. He believes that in the stationary state, free from material struggle, there will be more room for improving the art of living. The true purpose of mechanical inventions will be to abridge labour and not to increase wealth. They will also create the necessary leisure for cultivating the graces of life. He says that, for mankind to enjoy the benefits of progress, there should be a check on the increase in population. The existing habits of mankind can be improved by education which would lead to an enhanced standard of living. They can also be improved by state intervention. Here, by a typical paradox, the arch-individualist comes in sight of socialism. He proceeds, in patient dejection, to examine how much state action can be allowed without giving up the individualist essentials.

Production of wealth must not be tampered with but the state may do much to ensure its better distribution, one means of which is a stricter restraint on population. Levelling institutions, either of a just or an unjust kind, cannot alone accomplish it. He expected that the stricter restraint would spontaneously be applied by the people as education enriched their lives and as improved conditions enhanced their self-respect. So, there must above all be national education, enforced and financed, by the state.
There must also be laws favouring equality of fortunes consistent with the just claim of the individual to the fruits of his industry. There should be a limit to what can be acquired by gift or inheritance. There should be emigration to relieve the existing pressure of population. There should be laws providing alleviation for displaced workers. The government may even nationalize land. He recommended the protection of child labourers. All these measures of state socialism, he maintained, would be realizable in the stationary state.

'The grand, leading principle, towards which every argument in these pages directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest variety.' In taking this motto from Wilhelm Von Humboldt for his most famous essay, Mill is defining the sense in which he proposes to discuss liberty. He discusses, in this essay 'On Liberty' (1859), with more philosophical breadth, 'the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual.' He was discovering that out of the very liberty for which he had striven had proceeded a new sort of tyranny. He was wrestling with paradoxes once again, and trying to defend his principles against their own consequences. The old laissez-faire liberty had produced an order in which only the privileged few were really free. The rest of mankind was free only to sell their labour or starve. To
remedy this situation, the principle of equality had been invoked and franchise has been widely extended. Mill was prepared to admit a considerable measure of state socialism even to counteract the remaining evils of free competition. But all this meant only a greater measure of interference with the individual through more and more legislation. The question that arose was whether liberty and equality were incompatible. It is remarkable to find him, even in 1859, aware of the impending tyranny of 'collective mediocrity'. He felt that the tendency of all the changes taking place in the world was to strengthen society and diminish the power of the individual. He was greatly disturbed by this tendency for he firmly believed that the 'natural' was always better than the 'contrived'. To him, man was a 'natural' unit and society was 'artificial'. The mid-victorian England appeared to him a place not congenial for mental freedom. Mill felt himself attacking two kinds of tyranny, namely, intellectual torpor and intolerance and the monstrous offspring of the democratic Frankenstein.

The first section of the book comprises Liberty of thought and discussion. For Mill, discussion was the breath of life as he earnestly desired the free play of mind upon all subjects. Absence of discussion weakens belief. He felt that the modern christian paid his real allegiance to worldly interests only. He felt that onesidedness is an inherent defect of the human mind itself. In the great
practical concerns of life, above all in politics, 'truth
is a reconciling and combining of opposites'. An interes-
ting part of this discussion occurs where Mill considers
Christian ethics, which are reputed to contain no half
truth but the whole truth, in matters of conduct. He wants
a moral regeneration of mankind produced by combining pagan
virtues and their modern counter parts as represented in
the ideals of chivalry and such like gentlemanly standards
with those of christianity.

The argument of the second section is that given
intellectual liberty, men must also be free to plan their
own lives as they think fit. Liberty in living must go
with liberty in thinking, provided that the individual
does not make himself a nuisance to other people. Mill
examines here the limits of the power of the state over
the individual, the ruling principle here being the charac-
teristic one that 'leaving people to themselves is better
than controlling them'. Mill draws the boundary line by
distinguishing between self-regarding and public actions.
The individuals must be unhampered in all that affects
themselves only, but the state must intervene to prevent
anti-social behaviour. He feels that democracy or the rule
of the average mediocre man has now triumphed and a new bond-
dage is proceeding from this very tyranny. He is firmly
convinced the genius and originality of thought or conduct
can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom. This
freedom is vanishing from the modern mass-civilization. The evil of standardization is brought out by him very clearly.

His religious views are expressed in three essays on religion. They are 'Nature' (1850), the 'Utility of Religion' (1858) and 'Theism' (1870). They were all posthumously published in 1874. Here, in culminating frustration, he tries to draw faith out of reason. St. Paul's proposition that no man finds God by wisdom (reasoning) is proved here. Orthodox and organized religion is here rejected, partly for moral reasons, but chiefly because it is not intellectually demonstrable. He considers the church also to be the home of social privilege and mental darkness.

He is of the conviction that only through cultivation that virtue becomes a second nature. Hence he believes that man must tame his nature as firmly as he must amend outward circumstances. In the second essay, 'the Utility of Religion', Mill considers the usefulness of religion in his age of weak beliefs. He admits that religion may be morally useful without being intellectually sustainable. But the question is whether its moral usefulness can be made available without its dogmas. Morality has been, he urges, traditionally taught as part of religion. So, he poses the question whether mankind can give up these most undoubted moral truths, the products of noble human hearts.
He firmly declares that man, being in the 'positive' stage of development, shall not give up Christian doctrine, the moral precepts of Jesus Christ, which holds up a noble and lofty ideal. Religion is the result of man's craving for certain knowledge of what he can never certainly know. But he can attempt to idealise and perfect this earthly life through elevated sentiments. Mill believes also that man is capable of indefinite improvement. He feels that the Religion of Humanity is a better religion than all others, for first, it is disinterested, namely, it does not depend upon future rewards. Secondly, it is free from the main intellectual difficulty of orthodoxy, that of ascribing perfection to God. Thirdly, it is free from the moral difficulties of the faith like salvation depending upon moral goodness and creation of Hell by God. Mill believes that mankind will come to care less and less for religion's promise of future life as it will grow unselfish. It is but pertinent to point at this juncture that Matthew Arnold was gradually moving towards this Religion of Humanity.

In 'Theism', the last and most important of these essays, Mill asks what foundation there may be for the doctrines of religion. Can the canons of historical and scientific explanation be applied to religious beliefs? Mill's scientific approach vitiates his argument from the outset. Scientific understanding cannot analyse religious experience upon which faith is founded. He refutes theism.
Mill has read Darwin since he wrote 'Nature'. He now finds a large balance of probability in favour of creation by intelligence on the basis of adaptations in nature. He regards as plausible recent speculations on Darwin's theories of 'Natural Selection', and the 'Survival of the Fittest'. At the end of his long career, Mill gives us a much reduced vestige of religious hope. As long as we recognise the power of the creator to be limited, we may legitimately believe that His goodness is complete.

The Victorian age and the various beliefs, thoughts and systems that prevailed in the age in the various fields of human activity have been considered. This was the background against which the composition of 'Culture and Anarchy' by Matthew Arnold should be viewed. The liberalism that prevailed during the age is best summed up by J.Dover Wilson in his introduction to his edition of Matthew Arnold's 'Culture and Anarchy'.

'His work took him all over the country, and made him intimately acquainted with every class of society. Above all it threw him into close contact with what used at that period to be called "the lower middle class", the small shop keepers and petty employers, for the most part nonconformist in persuasion, who were managers of the schools he inspected, and often parents of the children attending them. .....

Thus Arnold's whole official career
was spent in that atmosphere of "disputes, tea-meetings, openings of chapels, sermons" which made up "the dismal and illiberal life" of the non-conformist in the 'Sixties, "a life so unlovely, so unattractive, so incomplete, so narrow, so far removed from a true and satisfying ideal of human perfection," that he found himself compelled to write "Culture and Anarchy" for its sweetening and enlightening'...... 'After the rise of Methodism in the 18th century, nonconformists formed the majority of the English people; and after the second Reform Bill of 1867 they came to form the majority of the English electorate. The future of the country, as Arnold very well knew, was in their hands. Were they not indeed already remaking and rebuilding the country according to their "dismal and illiberal" vision, in as much as the bulk of the new industrial magnates were drawn from their ranks?"  

'With the Populace, for him as for most other thinking men in 1868 an unknown quantity, he could do little directly. But he saw their filthy and ragged children daily in the schools - "children eaten up with disease, half-sized, half-fed, half clothed, neglected by their parents, without health, without home, without hope" - he had to thread his way through their squalid streets and past their unsanitary hovels as he went to his work, and he knew all too well what a foul canker of poverty lay

beneath the smiling prosperity of the middle classes'.

"He defined literature as "a criticism of life," and much of his own is criticism both of life and letters. Above all it expresses better than any other poetry of the age the strange malaise which beneath all the glitter and pretentiousness of industrial success afflicted the heart of the country. In 1851, the year Arnold became an inspector, the new industrial order, with the "hungry forties" now behind it and a vista of unlimited progress before it, had celebrated high festival in the Great Exhibition; and the next quarter of a century was a period of immense commercial prosperity and immense self-complacency. Science was at the same time opening up new and unexpected horizons; the ORIGIN OF SPECIES appeared in 1859, and Huxley the champion of Evolution had met and routed the magnificent but specious Bishop Wilberforce in an open debate at Oxford. Everywhere the forces of materialism seemed triumphant, everywhere the old creeds, the old institutions, the old traditions with all their beauty and historical associations were in retreat. Arnold was no blind opponent of change; in many ways he welcomed the new tendencies. Yet at the same time he shuddered as he noted how uncivilised the English were, how lacking in the foundations of culture, how self-satisfied and provincial, how utterly unprepared for the readjustment which the time demanded. "I see a wave", he writes in 1848 in a letter

"of more than American vulgarity, moral, intellectual and social, preparing to break over us"; and in the concluding lines of DOVER BEACH this constantly recurring thought finds other expression ..... 'It is not to be supposed that Arnold really thought, with Carlyle, that England in 1869 was about to plunge in to a whirlpool of anarchy. What he did was to use certain anarchical tendencies and lawless incidents of his own day, due to a temporary phase of intense political excitement, as illustrations of the deep-seated SPIRITUAL anarchy of the English people, an anarchy which expressed itself in its hideous sprawling industrial cities, its loud-voiced assertion of personal liberty, its dismal, stuffy, and cantankerous forms of Christianity, its worship of size and numbers and wealth and machinery generally, its state-blindness, and its belief in collision (collision of parties, of sects, of firms) as the only way of salvation'.