CHAPTER - IV

THE EVALUATION OF MUSIC
1. When any object or situation is appreciated or valued it is done so in reference to certain valued characteristics which the said object or situation may or may not possess. Similarly, when a piece of music is appreciated or evaluated it appears to be done so in reference to some valued characteristics. The problem would then seem to be to discover what are these valued characteristics and whether these valued characteristics are common to all musical compositions and performances. Having been arguing for the view that music expresses emotions, the obvious stand to be taken, would be, to show that musical appraisal is also in some way connected to the expression of emotions in music, — either a piece of music is to be valued because it adequately expresses a particular emotion (the stress being on the expression), or a piece of music, say X, is to be rated more valuable than another piece of music Y, because X expresses P, where P is a specific emotion, — here the stress is not on the expression but rather on the kind of emotion being expressed. Hence emotion P appears to have intrinsic value, for X is considered to be more valuable than Y, simply because it expresses P.
Before embarking on the task of finding out which of the two alternatives actually hold good in musical appreciation and whether any emotion can be said to be intrinsically valuable, I would like to briefly consider some problems of aesthetic evaluations. These pertain primarily to literature and painting, but may be extended to music as well.

2. The questions which have been asked and which have been variously answered are: is the critic, in making evaluations of works of art and literature, committed to a set of principles; and if so, what are the justification and the nature of the justifications of such principles? The important point to be noted is that, unlike many other things, works of art are unique and, in Strawson's words, there can be no general descriptive criteria for aesthetic assessment. The uniqueness of art is all the more pronounced in music, where every performance is itself a unique phenomenon. The individual and specific features of a work of art, or a piece of music, are thus what is to be considered, for in appreciating a piece of music, say Raga Mian Malhar, we concern ourselves not with its general features but with its individual and specific gestures. We say the raga is poignant not merely because
of the use of the two nishads, but because of the particular kind of way of using the nishads, in the form of a long circular meend. And in individual performances it is not merely because of this characteristic way of presenting the nishads, but because of the particular way the individual performer presents it.

Having appreciated Raga Mian Malhar for its particular kind of poignancy is however, not to be committed to the view that poignancy is always a virtue in a musical exposition. There is a view of criticism according to which, whatever is relevant to any evaluation is relevant to every other evaluation. This view is clearly an attempt to contain critical evaluation within certain prescribed or recognized formula or norms, or at least to assign value on the basis of certain "essential" features.

This supposed need for fixed standards and essential features is what F. R. Leavis refutes in his reply to Wellek; and I reproduce here part of Leavis' reply, which, while being explicitly concerned with one's critical response to poetry, does also throw some light on the process of assessment in the other arts too. Leavis says "...The critic —the reader of poetry— is indeed concerned with evaluation, but to figure him as measuring with a
norm which he brings up to the object and applies from the outside is to misrepresent the process."¹ What is required is a heightened awareness on the part of the critic of the art object, both of the parts and their unity, and this is precisely what Leavis' means for he adds:

... the critics aim is, first to realise as sensitively and as completely as possible this or that which claims his attention; and a certain valuing is implicit in the realizing. As he matures in experience of the new thing he asks, explicitly and implicitly: 'Where does this come? How does it stand in relation to...? How relatively important does it seem?' And the organization into which it settles as a constituent in becoming 'placed' is an organization of similarly 'placed' things, things that have found their bearings with regard to one another, and not a theoretical system or a system determined by abstract consideration.²

And again he says:

Of course, the process of 'making fully conscious and articulate' is a process of relating and organizing, and the 'immediate sense of value' should, as the critic matures with experience, represent a growing stability of organization (the problem is to combine stability with growth). What, on testing and retesting and wider experience, turn out to be my more constant preferences, what is the relative permanencies, in my response, and what structure begins to
assert itself in the field of poetry with which I am familiar? What map or chart of English poetry as a whole represents my utmost consistency and most inclusive coherence of response?

F.R. Leavis' views on the critical assessment of poetry sound equally convincing and revealing when extended to painting and music as well. It is indeed true that the first step in a critical appreciation is an intelligent "wide-eyed" exposure to a number of instances of genuinely creative art. By repeatedly listening to music of the great masters — listening with discriminating attention not with "one ear on the standard" approach, but taking in all that the medium has to offer, one gradually begins to notice different features of the medium and as one gains in experience, these features which are at first not clearly perceived become distinct and characteristic and one begins to apprehend the "character" of the object of art. Earlier, speaking on the expressiveness of music, I had made a similar observation because expressiveness being an immediate experience cannot be known through second person descriptions. To determine the identity of the expressiveness of a piece of music, what is required is not an external standard or principle, but frequent exposure to the medium, accompanied by acute awareness on the part of the audience.
It is through such a patient and persistent process of exposure and discovery, that one comes to acquire a conception of a tradition of music, and a critical vocabulary in terms of which to find one's way about in that tradition. There would be loose ends in this conception, and the critical vocabulary would not be a hierarchical system with every element in its logically assigned place. But this is no hindrance either to the legitimacy of a particular evaluation or to the sharpness of a specific vision.

3. It is interesting in this connection to compare the way in which one is educated in moral principles and the way in which one acquires a more or less systematic critical self-awareness in the arts. One may be told "It's wrong to do that", and have it made clear to one that it is not only this particular action, but this kind of action, that is wrong: notoriously one is given rules of thumb as a child, without their point being made clear to one. That one does learn moral values in this way is because, it is vitally important that people should behave in certain ways, before they are able to appreciate the justification of the injunction. In art, the situation is a different one: one's taste develops through encounter with
a number of individual works, from which something like a scheme of values gradually emerges, if it does; one is educated in art not by being told to admire certain things and disapprove of others, in the hope that one will understand the point of these admirations and disapprovals later — such a procedure would be evidently absurd. Speaking very broadly, one might say that both in morality and in art, there is, ultimately a tie-up between likings, desires etc., on the one hand, and "values" on the other, or between expressions of one's feelings about things and one's evaluative judgements. In morality, if we bring these together, it is first of all by learning that values may not be related to one's likings: in fact, this is the inevitable way we learn the moral language. We might say that we learn the language of wanting etc. and the language of goodness, to a large extent, in separation; and some people never succeed in bringing them into a satisfactory relationship. But in our training in art the procedure is more of the following kind: we read stories and poems or listen to this piece of music and that, and find ourselves getting certain sorts of pleasure from them; and at this stage there is little use for an evaluative vocabulary which serves a separate purpose from the expression of
liking etc. It is only after a very considerable amount of reading or hearing, when we find that the pleasure we get from some works is much more intense than others, that some works are moving while others are merely exciting, that in some we get new things every time we go back to them, while others wear thin, and so on, that we begin to have a serious use for an evaluative vocabulary. And just as some people never succeed in relating moral language to the language of wants etc. so many people never manage to tie up the language of liking, enjoying etc. with the language of aesthetic value.

4. So far we have been considering how it in that we develop a critical frame of mind with regard to works of art, but the question still remains: when we do evaluate or assess a work of art why is it that from amongst a number of characteristics we select certain characteristics as valuable and leave out others, or again why do we assess certain works of art to have greater value than others? Can we give any justification or justifications for our selection and if so, what is, or are, the justifications we give for our choices.

We might, then, ask here, are we to accept after all, the legitimacy of the demand for a clearly articulatable
standard or principle of criticism? The point which, I hope, has emerged from the discussion of how a critical self-awareness develops, is that the critic or the would-be critic does not begin with a set of fully articulated, readily available set of principles or standards of criticism. And, if we are to believe Leavis', he need not, even after his critical awareness has achieved a degree of coherence and completeness, embark upon what may be called a philosophical justification of "standards of criticism". The coherence and completeness of his "system", together with its "justification", is embodied in his work as a critic. There is no question of any justification in abstraction from this work.

Leavis may well be right about the extent of the philosophical commitment of a critic. Nevertheless, whatever the critic might think about his philosophical responsibilities, general claims about norms do get made, and one doesn't see how a philosophical consideration of such claims can be thought entirely futile.

One such claim is that art of any kind must present "truth", and the reason why we judge some works to be greater than others, or within the same work, some aspect
to be more significant than another, is by virtue of the fact that it contains greater "truth" than another or in a particular case, certain aspects are valued because they accentuate or help to accentuate the "truth" presented. "Truth" is a very ambiguous term implying several things; we have truth equivalent to sincerity, to acceptability, then we have truth as value for mankind, truth to stand for coherence of parts, truth as consistency and so on. The problem would be to decide which among these several meanings of truth is implied in the arts, and whether there is a common notion of "truth", in all the arts or whether "truth" varies from art to art or within the same art form, from work to work.

There is a view according to which, the presentation of "truth", is connected with one's ability to make true or false statements. But since statements rightly are made only in literature, we must restrict our examination only to literature. Literature, it is seen, can make true or false statements about historical facts or scientific discoveries. But then the functions of art and history are quite different, for although historical or scientific truths may occur in works of art and often do occur, this does not make them art. Great works of
literature may present historical facts accurately, and may enlighten us about many historical truths, but these are presented only incidentally. It is not by virtue of the fact that they contribute something to historical or sociological knowledge that they are valued as great works. If they are valued for the facts or information they contain then they are not genuinely valued. And this is so because, as has been often pointed out, nothing in a work of art has a real aesthetic value unless it can reach the consciousness of the spectator or listener through the evidence of the art alone.

This idea has, of course, been frequently exaggerated. One form that this exaggeration has taken is in the insistence, by some, that any reference beyond the work of art itself to, say, historical circumstances of the artist, commits the so called "intentional fallacy". My view is that the "intentional fallacy" is not a fallacy at all. One cannot, by a logical fiat, rule out the possibility of some kinds of considerations, including those of the artist's psychological and sociological circumstances, and of the actual course of history, being relevant to the understanding of or to gaining clarity about a particular work of art. Having said this, however,
I would like to insist that while many kinds of consideration can be brought to bear upon one's understanding of a work of art, the "truth" of a work of art is different from historical truth, or psychological truth about the artist, or the correct application of a technique. The truth of a work of art is rather the valid universal insight that it conveys in and through its very particularity or uniqueness.

"Poetry", says Aristotle, is a more serious thing than history, for poetry is chiefly conversant about universal truth, history about particular, ... in what manner for e.g. any person of a certain character would speak or act, probably or necessarily — this is universal and this is the object of poetry. But what Alcibiades did, or what happened to him — this is particular truth.

To express universal truths then, art must not only be "true about" something, but it must give us "insights" into human nature, into life and into oneself, and all great literature gives us this profound human insight. Shakespeare's genius lies in his presentation of a wide range of characters, and the tremendous "insight" he has in each. The greatness of any novelist lies precisely in his ability to select and present a character and having
presented him, probe inwards into the human heart and mind and accentuate the human truths, as well as to have a near-clairvoyant understand of a wide range of types and of social milieu.

An important point to be noted here, is that the career of any single individual is filled with all sorts of conflicting cross currents of actions and events. But a novelist cannot put into his novel every aspect of a person's life and personality. Therefore he chooses only such incidents and events which help to accentuate his particular "insight" of the particular character, and does not clutter up his novel with all kinds of factual truths, but otherwise irrelevant details. Thus, one causal chain of events may be pursued, and in a great work everything is precise and relevant to the presentation of the artist's "insights". In fact relevancy is important not only in literature but in all the other forms of art too; nothing in a raga, or a symphony or a concerto, is ever redundant. The use of vivadi notes in the exposition of a raga, does not detract but rather adds to or helps to accentuate the particular mood of the raga by offering contrasts, of course the consummate skill of the musician is an important contributing factor.
Thus although, literature does not present us with propositions which are empirically verifiable like those of science and factual like those of history, it gives an unlimited perspective of human life, and profound "insights" into human nature.

Similarly in the visual arts, the painter or the sculptor presents not merely what he sees, but tries to get to the "essence" of things. And although some artists are capable of presenting powerful and continuing characterization, this getting to the "essence" of things seem to be the kind of truth the artist aims, and one reason why the same theme may be variously presented is because different artists capture different essences. An appropriate example would be Rembrandt's celebrated "Susanna and the Elders". The outstanding quality of this painting, the theme of which has been dealt with by earlier painters, has been dealt with by Rembrandt, imparting to it a novel and sensitive dimension. Lastman and Rubens before him had conceived of the scene as a contrast between the sensuous vulnerability of the nude Susanna and the pawing lechery of the old men around her. In Rembrandt's portrayal, the artist has veered away from the standpoint of viewing Susanna as a sexual object,
and instead, he has portrayed her in such a way so as
to evoke compassion and a sense of the poignant. Her
posture expresses the tautness of an animal trapped, and
in her eyes we see the voice of mute appeal. Juxtaposed
to the Baroque which laid great stress on dramatic signifi-
cance with the use of devices such as striking colour,
female voluptuousness, all conceived in composition
with a sense of the grandiose, — Rembrandt's paintings
evoke freshness in the quality of a dialogue and in the
attempt to reveal the intrinsic essence of his subjects.
The painting that comes to my mind here is Rembrandt's
"Aristotle contemplating the bust of Homer". While the
master conveys the meditative mood of the philosopher
with powerful use of colours and chiaroscuro, the famous
Rembrandtian technique — that of light and shadow
reveals to the viewer the inner recesses of the philoso-
pher's mind, as does the golden chain emblazoned around
the neck against the opulent black velvet robe.

Thus whether it is the Rembrandtian characteristics given
above, or the three dimensional solidity of Cezzane or
the two dimensional decorative character of perceptual
objects of Matisse, it is the 'essence' of things that
an artist tries to portray in his art and this is the
'truth' of the visual arts. The presentation can differ depending on the type of "essence" being captured, which only goes to further emphasise the earlier point, that in aesthetic evaluation, each work being unique, must be seen in its own perspective.

We come then to music. Can there be said to be "truth" in a musical piece, and if so, then what kind of "truth" is presented and how is it presented?

5. Music has frequently been thought to be connected with the spiritual and, thence with the moral. (It is sometimes claimed that the moral and the spiritual, while they may go together, are really not logically connected with one another. I do not, here, wish to enter into a detailed argument against this claim. I shall be content with merely saying this: while the spiritual and the moral are certainly distinguishable, the only available criterion of authenticity of the spiritual is the moral. The spiritual cannot at the same time be immoral. Immorality empties spirituality of its very core). One obvious way in which the connection can be made is by bringing to the centre of one's consideration the kind of music known as devotional music. (It might even be said that this kind of music is at the centre already,
whether one takes the Western or the Indian tradition. And the claim, then, would be that the "truth" of music is the moral and spiritual message that it conveys and the effect that it is meant to have on the listener. But the question is, does the moral message necessarily increase the aesthetic value of the music? This view has been vehemently opposed and criticized, and I quote here Tovey's remarks in his book on Beethoven, to show the nature of the criticism that this view has been subjected to. Tovey says:

... we have always to remember that the business of the work of art is to be itself, whereas neither the science of ethics nor the structure of society can thrive for long on that denial that it is the duty of man to improve himself. A sense of duty imposed upon a work of art from without is artistic insincerity. Whatever goes into the work of art must belong to it. We must not impute it as a defect in Wagner's aesthetic system that his music dramas tend to glorify irresponsibility, or at all events to remove from his heroes and heroines even by means as crude as magis potions — every hindrance to the attainments of their desires.

The gist then is that a musical piece can have real aesthetic value only if it reaches out to the audience through the intricacies of music alone, and without the help of moral values and messages. According to Tovey's
view then, a raga is not a vehicle for moral truth but a thing which explains itself.

Is Tovey justified in making these divisions between the aesthetic objective and the moral objective? One agrees with Tovey that didactic art, as such, may have very little aesthetic merit, but morality does not necessarily have to be didactic; a moral objective need not be expressed or conveyed in the form of an overt message. This imbalance between aesthetic value and moral or spiritual value arises because a division has been made between what is music, and what music is for. But to separate what music is, from what music is for, is to attempt to break up the organic unity of a piece of music. Musically speaking, the "truth" of a piece of music is the "truth" of the sthāvībhāva, hence the "truth" of a piece of music is inextricably bound up with the musical work as a whole, for it is the sthāvībhāva that determines as well as embodies the "truth".

To put the point in another way, although a piece of music may become defective, qua a piece of music, by too explicit an attempt at spiritualizing" (e.g. Raga Priyadarshini composed and played by Amjad Ali Khan,
in spite of his obvious skill), it will be erroneous to infer from this that the spirituality of a piece of music is something which can be separated from the piece of music itself. It can be shown, I think, that there are possibilities of spiritual enlightenment which can be achieved only through music; and indeed, the realization of such possibilities has, especially in our own tradition, been regarded as the supreme task of music.* (See footnote). The ideal is to weld together the aesthetic and the spiritual so that one cannot have the one without the other.

*In Indian music, a distinction is drawn between marga (highway) and desi (by way) music. Marga music is defined as that which was followed after by Siva (drubinena) and practised (prayuktam) by Bharata, while desi, as that which serves for worldly entertainment (lokanuranjakam), in accordance with customs. Nowadays it is common to classify all forms of classical music as marga, and folk music as desi. But to classify thus, is to miss the implication of the terms marga and desi. Marga derived from root mrg, means to chase or hunt especially by tracking and in the Rgveda, it is connected with the idea of tracking the hidden light – the occulted Agni or Sun. Marga music then, implicitly conveys the idea of vimuktada or liberation, for it is by finding the hidden light that moksha is attained. Desi on the other hand derived from dis is taken to indicate and imply local or regional or pertaining to a limited or contained area. From the celestial or solar point of view desi is mundane and limited, while marga is sacred and limitless. The distinction of marga from desi is then not necessarily a distinction of aristocratic and cultivated from folk and primitive music, but rather a distinction between
This point may be granted, but one may still have a doubt about morality, being connected with music, springing from the idea, mentioned above, of the separability of spirituality from morality. There is, however, another, to my mind, more effective way of showing how the moral does essentially enter into the aesthetic generally, and into the aesthetics of music, in particular.

6. The central concern of morality, to my mind, is, "how can I make myself a better person — better in my ordinary, day to day, self-awareness as well as in my actions?"

The simple answer to this question, given, say, by religion is that I can become better by ever altering my consciousness in the direction of unselfishness and by turning this altered consciousness into a source of energy for my action. The religious person feels that sacred and traditional from profane and sentimental music. A piece of classical music could be desi, if it were used just as a vehicle of self expression of the musician, or if all that the musician was concerned about was to give a "brilliant performance", with the display of virtuosity and technique, and with no attempt to capture the spirit of the music, and transcend mundane limitations. A good example would be Ustad Amir Khan's renderings of Raga Marwa and Raga Lalit. The first rendering of Raga Marwa is marga in the true sense of the term, and it can truly be said that the Ustad's rendering of Marwa has established a norm which is difficult to transcend. Whereas, in his rendering of Raga Lalit, he seems to be more concerned with fanciful and mundane techniques, and his use of badhat only divides the raga into "atomistic blocks", and does not present a picture of completeness.
he needs help for such alteration of consciousness, and that, frequently, he does also receive help. "Not I, but Krishna". The real existence of such help is often used as an argument for the truth of religious doctrines. Of course, prayer and sacrament may be "misused" by the believer as mere instruments of consolation. But whatever one thinks of its theological contexts, it does seem that prayer can actually induce a better quality of consciousness and provide an energy for good action which would not otherwise be available.

It is precisely this role of progressively altering our consciousness towards unselfishness that art — or at least great art — also performs. Following a hint in Plato (Phaedrus 250), I shall start by speaking of what is perhaps the most obvious thing in our surroundings which is an occasion for "unselfing", and that is what is popularly called beauty. Beauty is the convenient and traditional name of something which art and nature share, and which gives a fairly clear sense to the idea of change of consciousness that I have talked about. I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, oblivious of my surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage done to my ego. Then suddenly I observe the
jacaranda tree in full bloom at a distance. In a moment everything is altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. There is nothing but the mauve grandeur of the jacaranda. And when I return to thinking of the other matter it seems less important. And, of course, this is also something which we may do deliberately: give attention to nature in order to clear our minds of selfish care.

I have started by talking about beauty in nature not because I think it is the most important place of moral change, but because I think it is the most accessible one. It is so patently a good thing to take delight in trees and animals that people who plant trees in their homes and watch animals in their natural habitat, might be surprised at the notion that these things have anything to do with virtue. The surprise is a product of the fact that, as Plato pointed out, beauty is the only spiritual thing we love by instinct.

There is continuity between beauty in nature and beauty in art, but the latter introduces us to a more difficult region. The experience of art is more easily degraded than the experience of nature. A great deal of art is actually self-consoling fantasy, and even great art cannot
guarantee the quality of its audience's consciousness. However, great art exists and is sometimes properly experienced, and even a shallow experience of what is great can have its effects. Art — that is great art, not fantasy art — affords us a pure delight in the independent existence of what is excellent. Both in its genesis and its enjoyment, it is a thing totally opposed to selfish obsession. It invigorates our best faculties, and, to use Platonic language, inspires love in the highest part of the soul. It is able to do this partly by virtue of something which it shares with nature: a perfection of form which invites unpossessive contemplation and resists absorption into the selfish fantasy-life of the consciousness.

Art, however, considered as a sacrament or a source of good energy, possesses an extra dimension. Art is less accessible than nature; but also more edifying since it is actually a human product. Art is a human product and virtues as well as talents are required of the artist. The good artist, in relation to his art, is brave, truthful, patient and humble. And not merely in representational arts, but in music especially, we receive intuitions of these qualities. The discipline that is required of the
shishva is not just a means towards the acquisition of the necessary skill by him, it is also, what I have called, the "unselfing", the necessary training in humility which must inform his art. The meditative, prayerful, beginning of a khayal and the final letting go of the conclusion are also symbolic of this unselfing — of the banishment of the ego and self deceiving fantasy from great music. In great music we are presented with a truthful image of the human condition — of the structure of our emotional life in a form which can be steadily contemplated. Great music transcends selfish and obsessive limitations of personality and can frequently enlarge the sensibility of the hearer. Most of all, it exhibits to us the connection, in human beings, of clear vision with compassion and love. The clarity of vision, of, say, a Ravi Shankar, is not a mirror-like representation of the form of our life of emotions, it is essentially compassion and justice, in musical terms, born of close intimations of the truth of the spirit.
REFERENCES


2. Ibid., p. 213.

3. Ibid., p. 214.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER - IV

A NOTE ON SENTIMENTALITY IN MUSIC
1. The problem of sentimentality is a subject in itself, and needs greater and more detailed analysis than I propose to do, but as the title of the work suggests, by endeavour here would be to understand only a part of the problem as related to music.

Earlier in discussing emotions and expression of emotions, I had remarked that in music or in any other art form, as in real life, more of a certain characteristic which is said to be expressive, or contribute towards the expression of a certain emotion, does not necessarily increase the intensity of expression of the emotion but projects something else. Too "sad" a rendering of a raga makes the performance affected and sentimental rather than poignant. From this it appears that overmuch of an emotion or indulgence in an emotion is what leads to sentimentality. But then not all kinds of emotional indulgence can be called sentimental. There seems to be some kind of connection between the emotion itself and sentimentality. Suspense thrillers, where the author indulges, and sometimes even wallows in suspenses and thrills, cannot be called sentimental. An emotional indulgence in Raga Malkaus which expresses utsaha would not be called sentimental but pompous. It has been said that some emotions
are intrinsically sentimental. Michael Tanner in his article on Sentimentality,\(^1\) says that some emotions are of a kind which inhibit action because they themselves are enjoyable to have, but if acted upon one would cease to have them and one does not want to stop having them. The range of feelings which help to increase one's own superiority, so long as no activity is required e.g. righteous indignation, is according to Tanner, intrinsically sentimental. I believe that certain emotions, perhaps the three Spinozian primary emotions of desire, joy and sorrow could perhaps be said to be intrinsically sentimental; sentimental, not in the sense that where they occur they have to be sentimental, but in the sense that, they have propensity towards sentimentality.

2. Besides the view that to be sentimental is to indulge in feelings, and one can indulge in feelings only when one has had them on the cheap, or without any effort, to be sentimental is also said to be shallow. This may perhaps throw more light on the problem of sentimentality. In our normal understanding of the term "shallow", means to have merely a superficial knowledge or understanding of any problem or situation. Thus when sentimentality is likened to being shallow, what is implied is that in
a given situation just the periphery of an emotion is grasped, and not only that, but the periphery so grasped, is taken to be the core and only essential feature of the emotion or emotive situation. Sentimentality is then not just "morbid sensibility composed of gross multitude", but is due also to "emotional failure and dissemblance", and the morbid sensibility results from this failure. It is not as though the individual misrepresents the world solely to indulge his feelings, but that having grasped only a peripheral knowledge of any truth, lays emphasis on the wrong features.

3. Again it has been said that a response is sentimental, if it is too great for a particular occasion, or when because of the interaction of sentiments, it is inappropriate to the situation which calls it forth. It becomes inapt, either by restricting itself to one feature of the many that a particular situation presents, or by substituting for it an illusory situation, that may sometimes have hardly anything in common with it.

4. In all these accounts of sentimentality the main feature that stands out, is that; there is a reference to a situation or an object. The question would now arise,
that if an object or situation plays such a crucial role in sentimentality, then how does one account for sentimentality in music? This problem is all the more pronounced in pure instrumental music, for here there appears to be no reference to any object or situation, and yet some musical compositions are unmistakably sentimental. As I have already discussed earlier, musical expression is unmediated or objectless, and in music it is not on account of a situation or an object that a piece of music is judged to be sentimental; even in works of programme music like Berlioz's or Liszt's where there is an evoked or implied situation, it is not on account of that evoked or implied situation that the music is characterized as sentimental but the music is in itself sentimental. Similarly Tchaikovsky is incessantly berated for the sentimentality of his symphonies without a clear suggestion that they are exaggerated responses to some programmatic situation, and in the Indian context, Ustad Vilayat Khan is sometimes exceedingly sentimental, but in the rendering of a raga there is definitely no reference to any situation or object.

It is seen then that just as music is expressive without being about anything, it can also be sentimental without
there being any reference to any object or situation. Hence Tanner seems to be right when he concludes that sentimentality is not about, the aboutness of an emotion.

5. Man's sentient life is a dynamic flow, consisting of pits and peaks. No emotion remains static either at the peak or the pit. Sentimentality is the attempt to make an emotion remain static at one point, when the natural life of the emotion is that, there should be ebb and flow. When an emotion is made to remain at one point, it becomes super-saturated and becoming supersaturated looses its character and relevance. An appropriate and vivid example of this would be Miss Havisham in Dicken's *Great Expectations*, who is jilted on her wedding day, and who, makes life come to a standstill, clock on the mantelpiece, clothes, drapery, dress, emotions, precisely at the moment she is jilted. Miss Havisham is of course, eccentricity personified but normally the persons involved in great tragedies gradually get out of the pit if they let life take its normal course. It is not that the grief is forgotten but for a person directly and greatly involved in a tragedy, the grief is not a part of a fragment of one's existence, but envelops one's whole being and entire life; the grief flows on and becomes poignant.
Whereas for the person not directly involved in a tragedy, the grief is fragmented i.e. the grief and sense of loss affects only a certain part of the person's existence and thus it is made to remain static. Remaining static, the situation becomes supersaturated with grief and hence sentimentality comes in.

Sentimentality is thus overstating or overattending to the dramatic quality of experience and neglecting the mundanity. Everything in life has more than one side to it and if the essence of any particular situation is not grasped then only one aspect is emphasized. Wordsworth's poems could serve as a good example of sentimentality, where Wordsworth being exposed to the benign influence of nature of the Lake Districts, emphasizes only the tranquility and the curative touch of nature. Aldous Huxley is right when he states that perhaps Wordsworth's view of nature would have been different had he visited the tropics.²

Coming to music and having said that music is sentimental without being about anything, the problem arises, on what basis is music to be characterized as sentimental or unsentimental. If there is no referential point, how is a piece of music said to be sentimental.
6. Susanne Langer has said that music is an "unconsummated symbol", and this could perhaps give us an insight into the way sentimentality comes into the expression of emotions in music. By "unconsummated symbol", I understand music, as that whose potentiality for expression has not been exhausted, or applying the term I had used earlier, music that has not become supersaturated.

Sentimentality by being static exhausts all potentialities. Music as "unconsummated symbol", of man's sentient life, is ever flowing and dynamic with endless possibilities; creating new dimensions and revealing strange depths of emotions or any particular emotion. In Indian music the śrūtis take on this important role of keeping this flow on. Śrūtis increase the expressive quality of a raga but at the same time do not exhaust creativity. Similarly in the Indian Theory of Dhvani, the expressive quality of poetry is said to be increased by the power of suggestions rather than direct expression; suggestions do not exhaust creativity. Sometimes in the rendering of a raga the flow is internalized. This is especially so in the Indian classical dance forms of the south. There are certain points in the course of the dance when the music flows on and the dancer becomes seemingly static—
but in actuality the dancer does not become static but rather the movements go inwards. There has been an attempt to fill in these static moments with actual movements by the famous ballet dancer Rudolph Nuriyev, in his dance composition entitled "Bhakti", where against typical Carnatak music, he presents a new dance form by filling in all the places of potentiality i.e. corresponding to all movements in the music there is a body movement. Though very creative and innovative as a synthetic dance form of the east and the west, I do not think this kind of dance form would have enduring appeal and this is so because of the attempt, as it were, to exhaust all potentialities.

7. It is then not the feelings and emotions which make a piece of music sentimental but how they have been presented, and how they have been presented is again dependent on how one understands them. The ideal state is then neither to do away with emotions altogether and concentrate only on the formal aspects of music nor to go about expressing emotions without understanding them at all. The idea is neither to shirk or avoid, nor to indulge—the ideal condition of man being one in which, he has no fear of his emotions however powerful and
voluminous, because of his confidence in their vitality which results from one's grasping of the essence of an emotion. It is true that a man who is emotionally educated is as rare as a phoenix, but that does not mean that one need to do away with emotions altogether. As Tanner put it, "... it is the recalcitrance of the world in refusing to suffer one's emotional expressions that leads to so many of them remaining wholly within and either dying of in activation or burgeoning without point, thus leading one nilly willy to sentimentality."

To avoid sentimentality in music one must see an emotion in its proper perspective. Only when an emotion is taken in isolation that it restricts flow and becomes static and allows no creativity. An emotion expressed in a piece of music, must be presented as it would really be in life and for this a greater insight into emotions is required.
REFERENCES

1. "Sentimentality"
2. "Wordsworth in the Tropics"
4. "Sentimentality"