CHAPTER II

EMOTIONS, THE EXPRESSION OF EMOTIONS, AND MUSIC
1. Verbal language is undoubtedly man's paradigmatic means of communication, performing a great variety of communicating functions like stating, describing, asking, expressing feelings and emotions, eliciting them, prescribing, ordering etc., but it is not the only one, nor necessarily the most expressive means of communication. Although words are our most important instruments of expression, in the world of emotions there are experiences which do not fit the grammatical scheme of expression, and then, it is apparent that our confidence in language as a means of expression is perhaps overstressed for it is somewhat limited in expressing that which contains too many minute yet closely related parts and too many "relations within relations", and certain emotions and delicate nuances of emotions which cannot be projected into discursive forms. As Susanne Langer puts it, "Ordinary language does not have enough names for the infinite number of subjective states that a man experiences."\(^1\) She maintains that ordinary language is a poor medium for expressing our emotional nature adequately, for language

... merely names certain vaguely and crudely conceived states but fails miserably in any attempt to convey the ever moving patterns, the ambivalences and intricacies of inner experience, the interplay of feelings with thoughts
and impressions, memories, transient fantasy or its more runic traces all turned into nameless emotional stuff.  \(^2\) (See footnote)*

Thus when we say that we understand what some other person is feeling or experiencing, what we mean is that we understand why the person must be sad or happy or excited i.e. we can comprehend the cause of his attitude. We do not mean that we have an insight into the actual flow and balance of his feelings, into what might be considered to be "an index of the mind's grasp of its object". It is art, and more specifically music, which alone can adequately articulate such a conception.

2. A prerequisite in understanding how music expresses and articulates emotions is having a clear conception of the ideas of "emotion" and "expression". Etymologically the word emotion is derived from the Latin word "emovere" which means to 'stir up', 'to agitate' or 'to excite'. The common idea of emotions is also similar, for our idea of having an emotion or of being in an emotional

*It may, on the face of it, look as though this claim might have to contend with the Wittgensteinian thesis about the impossibility of a private language. But this is not really so, because all that it requires is a distinction between verbal language and language, which although public, is not verbal; and this is a distinction which, to my mind cannot be denied.
state, is the idea of being 'stirred up', agitated or excited. Clearly then, when one is in an emotional state one is in a state of tension which varies in intensity according to the type of emotion concerned and which, frequently, is resolved by the expression of the said emotion.

Taking their cue from the etymological meaning of the term, various thinkers define "an emotional state" variously. Some call it a moved or stirred up state of an organism, others, "an affective experience that shows itself in overt behaviour", and yet others speak of it as "the feeling tone of a particular quality", the affective colouring of experience that one finds by introspection. But 'emotion' is a highly complex concept and mere definitions cannot really bring out all the intricacies of this protean concept. Besides other aspects, one difficulty in attempting to define emotion arises due to its close association with "feeling" which itself is a difficult term. (An essential step in clarifying the concept of an emotion would be to ascertain whether an emotion is a kind of feeling or sensation, or a cognition or psychological condition, or just a behaviour pattern).
A sensation is a mental occurrence which is immediately and surely felt by the person having the sensation. Sensations like an itch or a tickle or pain, may also be publicly displayed by means of more or less typical behaviour, like scratching, giggling etc., i.e. some sensations may be associated with distinctive behavioural patterns or at least tendencies to distinctive physical activities. An emotion on the other hand, cannot be identified with either a particular behaviour pattern or a tendency thereto; of course some emotions are or may be associated with distinctive behaviour. For example, a man who has the emotion of fear will normally try to run away from the thing which is the object or the cause of the fear, either physically, or else mentally by refusing to think of the problem, or even if he does not do either and deliberately refuses to run away he will at least have the tendency to do so. But most emotions are not associated with any distinctive behavioural patterns. A person who is overjoyed or embarrassed does not perform any typical activities. Squirming and broad expansive movements which may be associated with these emotions do not pinpoint the emotion. A point to be noted here however, is that although emotions are not necessarily connected with overt behaviour, for one can have an
emotion without acting in characteristic ways x, y, z, a person's behaviour, verbal or non-verbal, does provide evidence of a certain emotion and in fact, in some circumstances, a person's behaviour provides the sole evidence for saying that a person has emotion x, because no other criterion is available, so much so, that it has been pointed out by Kenny, that if there were no characteristic expression of emotions the meaning of emotion words could not be learnt and third person ascription of emotions impossible. This does not however, show that there is a non-contingent connection between an emotion and behaviour for the connection may sometimes be conventional. That is to say, it may indeed be the case that it may be impossible to learn the meanings of certain words except on the basis of conventional rules, but the meanings themselves need not be exhausted by these rules. I will be referring to this point again.

A sensation or a feeling is a very private phenomenon, the person having the sensation being the best judge of the sensation, and leaving aside controversies like pretenses etc., when a person claims that he is having sensation 3 he cannot be contradicted. But on the other hand, though emotions cannot be associated with typical
physical activities or behavioural patterns, another person may know that person X is having such and such an emotion without verbally being told by the first person. In fact, very often a second person is a better judge of another's emotional state than the person himself, so much so, that when a person asserts that he is having emotion E, he can be contradicted. It may be said then, that an emotion can be shared in a way a sensation cannot. One cannot experience another's pain, nor can one feel another's grief, but one can understand another's grief and in understanding, feel the form of the grief. This is so because an emotion touches one's very being, and is thus contagious from one person to another, because one's being, in this sense, is necessarily situated in a community of beings.

A sensation is localised in the sense that, it occurs here and now, and is limited in its occurrence to the time and place where it is experienced. When one says "My head is aching" or "My throat is tickling", or "that flower is red", he refers to a specific area and says it at a specific time, or even if a sensation like, e.g., coldness is not limited or confined to a specific point like the hand or the leg, still there is a specific area
of reference. Moreover the sensation coldness, can be got rid of or contained if the area of reference is taken care of i.e. if the person clads himself in warm clothes, sits by the fire etc. But on the other hand, no spatio temporal limitations can be put on an emotion. "My grief", as it were, envelops my whole being, and the reasons and causes may be so multifarious and deep rooted that they cannot be summarily removed as in the case of sensations. My grief may be accompanied by sensations like heaviness of limbs or heart etc., but it cannot be said that the heaviness of my limbs is my grief. A person may cry when he is in pain as well as when he is grief stricken, but there is a definite difference between the two kinds of crying. Initially only the sensations of physical discomfort make a child cry, and only as he grows in maturity does he begin to associate crying with feeling sad.

Coming to expression, we find that there is a crucial difference between expression of a sensation and the expression of an emotion. A wince may be an expression of pain but it cannot normally be said that a person expresses his pain by wincing. There is a difference between expressing feelings and evincing feelings by groaning, crying etc., and this is so because in emotions, feelings play
a very crucial role, which has led many thinkers like Kant, Hume, William James etc., to equate emotions with feelings. These thinkers maintain that what makes a condition an emotion and what makes it the particular emotion it is, is the presence in consciousness of a certain felt quality, which like sensory qualities is completely accessible to introspection and accessible in no other way. These theorists thus give a central place to determinate feelings, showing that, emotion words are nothing but the labels of these feelings. The current opinion however is to deny giving such a prominent place to feelings, some theorists even denying the existence of feelings altogether and instead giving their analysis in terms of "situation appraisals plus an undifferentiated general excitation". Emotion terms are indeed very complex for when we say that "A feels remorse", "B is indignant" or "C feels bitter", we do something much more complex than claim that A, B, C, behave in certain identifiable ways and experience types of inner turmoil. "C feels bitter", about the way he was treated carries as part of its meaning, C believes he ought not to have been so treated, or C believes he was treated badly, i.e. being bitter involves making certain evaluations, not simply having a feeling or acting in particular ways.
There is a certain amount of deliberation or evaluation involved, though of course, the evaluation is not made in the purposeful manner of a person making a moral judgement. The person evaluating the emotional situation does not ponder on the situation and then react, rather, the person has some kind of a general "apprehension" or "misapprehension" of the various aspects of his emotion.

This then brings us to the essential difference between a feeling and an emotion. The crucial point of difference is that it is essential for an emotion to have an object (e.g. we feel love or anger towards or because of x); when a person experiences the emotion 'remorse' his feeling of this emotion is dependent on an object. He is remorseful of past deeds and the true meaning of remorse must have the idea of a past object in it. However, the object towards which an emotion is directed does not necessarily have to be some individual thing or person, rather, there is a reference to something beyond the person experiencing the particular emotion, a reference beyond the emotion itself. There is what has been called "intentionality." In the traditional Indian way of thinking also, which I shall discuss later, this aspect of an emotion plays a crucial role in that it is taken to form part of the meaning of an emotion.
While on emotions and feelings it may be further added that, if only feelings are given a prominent place in the concept of emotions it would be impossible to distinguish between emotions solely on the basis of the feelings involved. For instance, annoyance does not seem to feel any different from indignance but what distinguishes the two is the way the person apprehends the situation. He feels indignation when he thinks some rightful expectation has been violated, whereas annoyance is what he feels at something having gone wrong.

3. Not all emotions are the same type. There are emotions which are immediately felt and expressed and there are abiding or persisting emotions. The first, sometimes termed occurrent emotion, is the emotion a person experiences at a particular instance. A person has an occurrent emotion when he gets angry, feels sad or is indignant, whereas the love a person feels for his loved ones is an abiding emotion in the sense that it is ever present and occasionally overtly expressed. The sensational element is undoubtedly there in both occurrent and abiding emotions, but there are what Pitcher calls "calm passions" which do not include any such sensational element, as for instance, hope, and sometimes even those emotions which
do have characteristic sensations like fear and anger, sometimes exist without the sensational element.

Whether the expression is overtly or subtly done, the important point is that, expression of an emotion forms part of our understanding of an emotion. In fact there are those like Collingwood, who maintain that an emotion is known or identified only through its expression. Expression gives an emotion its distinctive character. Prior to expression an emotion exists as a vague unconscious perturbation, and the person experiencing it is not aware of anything else but this perturbation or excitement. Collingwood is right in a way when he says that an emotion gets its distinctive character by its expression, but the whole process is not quite the way he puts it. His idea of a "helpless oppressed condition," from which a man extricates himself by expressing himself implies a sense of deliberation on the part of the person and gives the idea of breaking up the whole process of emotion and its expression into clearly defined steps. As stated earlier, the whole process is not a case of definite apprehension and deliberation. It is not possible to break up into bits the various components of an emotion, for an emotion is an organic unity. It is what may be called a
"hermeneutic mesh" of the "feeling", the expression of this feeling, and the object of the feeling. For instance, the characteristic feeling of anger can be meaningfully articulated only by reference to its expression; the going red in the face, the facial distortions and so on. But both the feeling and the expression get their meaning by being hermeneutically placed in relation to the object of the emotion.

5. Whichever way it is put, the idea of an emotion is that it involves tension, agitation or pressure which is relieved or reduced by the expression of the particular emotion; in some emotions the expressions are very obvious, whereas in others the expression is hardly perceptible. This is due to the fact that the tension accompanying emotions vary in intensity, thus the tension in a grief stricken person, or a person in a fury would be considerable, whereas the person in a state of depression would be sunk in apathy and passivity, his emotion would be dull and undifferentiated. Thus if a man's emotive life were to be projected on a graph, it would not always consist of peaks and pits, sometimes the graph, like the wave of the sea, would rise to sublime heights and then subside the serene cadences, sometimes there would be a
gentle ripples and its resolution and sometimes there would be the merest hint of a rise.

6. There are different kinds of expression of emotions and accordingly they have been classed as natural and conventional, rule governed or not rule governed, verbal or non-verbal. Natural expressions are involuntary expressions e.g. blushing, change of colour, horripilation etc. They are unlearned and universal. In Indian aesthetics they are said to be eight in number and are called Sattvikabhāvas. They are considered to be the infallible signs of emotions for they can take place only when the emotion of which they are recognised to be the effects is actually experienced by the person concerned. The wilful expression of emotions such as the movement of eyes, eyebrows, gesticulations etc., are called amabhāvas and are voluntary in nature. They are not considered to be infallible signs of any particular emotion, for they can be enacted even when the said emotion is not experienced by the person. Conventional expressions of emotions are learned and subject to cultural variations and necessarily rule governed, but not necessarily voluntary e.g. in India the conventional expression of welcome is by folding the hands, this is initially learnt by convention and later on becomes an involuntary expression
of welcome. O. H. Green in his article on the "Expression of emotion," \(^5\) defines conventional and natural expression as, "Expressions of emotions which cannot be referred to in giving a partial definition of the relevant emotion words and which do not constitute a form of behaviour characteristic of the emotion in question except in virtue of being defined as expression of the emotion are conventional expressions of emotions," \(^6\) and expression of emotions, "which can be referred to in giving a partial definition of the relevant emotion term and which constitute a form of behaviour characteristic of the emotion in question without being defined as expressions of that emotion are natural expressions of emotions...." \(^7\)

Having discussed the general notion of emotions, I would now like to consider emotions and expression of emotions in art, particularly in music, and see whether the same principles of expression are applicable here too.

It is seen that in art, the expression of emotion is different from that in real life, for the depiction or presentation of an emotion is possible without bringing in all the elements of meaning of an emotion. In music the situation is even further removed from real life, for in music neither object nor feeling is present, and expres-
sion is also not related in any ordinary way to the natural and conventional modes of expression of emotions; yet, musical expression of emotions, is of all emotional expression, the most immediate, inward and intimate. One may say that this is possible because music makes, so to speak, straight for the inner life, the präna of an emotion, and this it is peculiarly suited to do, for music shares with emotions its characteristic properties of dynamism and flow. As has been pointed out by Susanne Langer.

Music bears a close logical similarity to the forms of human feeling forms of growth and of attenuation, flowing and stowing, conflict and resolution, speed, arrest, terrific excitement, calm or subtle activation and dreamy lapses — not joy and sorrow perhaps but the poignancy of either and both — the greatness and brevity and eternal passing of everything vitally felt. Such is the pattern or logical form of sentience; and the pattern of music is that same form worked out in pure measured sound and silence.8

One way of putting the matter might be to say that music expresses not the emotions proper, but the "forms of emotions". It reveals as it were, the rationale of feelings, and the rhythm and pattern of their rise. And music is expressively unique in that music gives expression to objectless emotions. It is seen that in music, especially
instrumental music or even khayals, there is nothing which may be said to be the object of the emotion presented. But in spite of this, nothing is detracted from the musical expression of emotions, for music expresses, not the facticity of an emotion, but rather captures, or tries to capture the prana or essence of an emotion. The absence of an object or an objective situation is never felt because of the tremendous expressive quality of the medium itself. The creative potential of the medium is such that while primarily presenting the feeling or bhāya, associated with a particular emotion, it points inevitably to a completeness of the hermeneutic circle.

8. Langer shows not only that music is a tonal analogue of our emotive life, but also that music represents time, not measured time but lived or experienced time.

Musical duration is an image of what might be termed 'live' or 'experienced' time — the passage of life that we feel as expectations becomes 'now', and 'now', turns into unalterable fact. Such passage is measurable only in terms of sensibilities, tensions and emotions, and it is not merely a different measure but an altogether different structure from practical or scientific time.

In fact Langer seems to imply that the primary function of music is to represent time, for she says that, the
semblance of this vital, experiential time is the primary illusion of music, and it is in music that we have its image.

... completely articulated and pure; every kind of tension transformed into musical tension, every qualitative content into musical quality, every extraneous factor replaced by musical elements. The primary illusion of music is the sonorous image of passage, abstracted from actuality to become free and plastic and entirely perceptible.10

Although Langer is right in emphasising the relationship between music and temporality, as passage or flow is an essential feature of music, her views on this matter seem to suggest that emotions in music only have an instrumental function i.e. emotions have to be used because it is through the tension and resolution of emotions one perceives the 'subjective' or 'real life'. But progression in music consists in building up of musical tensions and their resolutions and a particular musical work or passage presents the life of a feeling in musical terms, and the tensions which are inevitably there are the tensions of this feeling. And it is really the other way round, that although music is an image of time, what is important is what fills this time — the
feeling, its 'breaking' or diminishing or merging into other feelings.

9. The important point is then that, while it is undeniable that music presents emotions and that it is possible for us to recognize them not merely as feelings but as emotions, the musical presentation of emotions is what it is, and not another thing in a different guise, i.e. musical expression of an emotion is not translatable or reducible into some other non-musical expression. Only when we try to present musical expressions of emotions in some other medium do we feel that an objectless expression of emotions is impossible. But in music itself, the absence of an object or objective situation or reference is quite irrelevant in determining its expressiveness, for as said earlier, music, because of its tremendous creative potential is in itself complete. Of course other things may be added to music (e.g. operas) but this is not done because music is in itself wanting in expressing any desired emotion, but because, the composer tries to achieve a new medium of artistic expression or tries to express in a different way. A Wagner opera does not achieve something more complete than a Beethoven's symphony, but something different. Similarly in Indian music,
simply by enunciating the words of a *khayal* clearly does
not make a rendering of a *raga* more expressive than one
where the artist chooses to employ words like *Re Tum Ni*
etc. What is required then to complete the hermeneutic
circle is the internal, purely musical coherence, fitting­ness and aptness of a musical work, which is possible
because of the unmediated expressive power of music. This
then brings us to another important aspect of musical
expression, that of "expressiveness".

10. Analyzing the term expression in his article, "Expression
and Emotion",\(^\text{11}\) John Nolt points out that it is seen
that there are some senses of the term which do not fol­
low the general analysis where, "a expresses p" means
"a is p", Nolt explains this point with the help of an
illustration.... "A political cartoon expresses Theodore
Roosevelt's patriotic fervour in a lighthearted and
satirical way. The cartoon expresses fervour but is not
fervent".\(^\text{12}\) The cartoon also expresses lightheartedness
and that is obviously the intended expression. A distinc­
tion between the two expressions is made by showing that
whereas, the cartoon expresses fervour, fervour is not
the *expressive quality* of the work itself, but rather the
work depicts or represents fervour. Lightheartedness on
the other hand, is an **expressive quality** of the work itself; that is to say, it is a quality of the work as a whole and is not necessarily connected to its representational function. It is to be remembered that the aesthetic concept of expression cannot be identified with the non-aesthetic concept of natural expression, for natural expression need not be expressive but in art and, especially so in music, it can be said that there is no expression without expressiveness. A work of art is an expression of love or grief, only if it is expressive of love and grief, and the eloquence of art in expressing the inexpressible is due precisely to the expressiveness of art. In a way language is also expressive, but language is expressive through the conventions that give it reference, whereas the expressiveness of art, moreso music, cannot be pinpointed or cannot be determined by other references. And as expressiveness has to do with impact, expressiveness of a piece of music cannot be grasped by second person descriptions — the experience must be immediate and personally felt.

There has been an attempt to pin down expressiveness in art to external factors. A work of art is said to be expressive if it expresses emotions, and a work of art
can be said to express emotions or a mood, if and only if, it exhibits qualities identical with, or at least, similar to those used as criteria for ascribing emotion or moods to people's behaviour and this is especially true in music. This is the view held by Hosper's who says:

... let us remind ourselves of the most basic sense of the term expression, namely, that of outer behaviour manifesting or reflecting inner states. When people feel sad they tend to exhibit certain types of behaviour: they move slowly, they walk softly, they talk in hushed tones, their movements are not jerky and abrupt, nor are their tones strident and piercing and so on. Now music can truly be said to exhibit at least some of these same qualities. Music that we immediately identify as sad, is normally slow, the interval between the tones is small, with few large tonal intervals, and the tones are not strident but hushed and soft.13

In general then: a work of music has feeling quality X, when it has features (the more the better) that human beings have when they are in feeling state X². Similarly, Hospers points out that a line in a painting is graceful because it possesses similarities to the contour of the limbs of human and animal bodies when they are said to be graceful. Horizontal lines corresponding to the human position for rest is graceful etc. Hosper's behaviouristic
analysis however, cannot apply to all arts and it fails to account for the expressiveness of colour. Hospers is however aware of this, for he gives an alternative when he says, "Expressiveness is rooted in association". The colour green for instance, acquires its expressiveness through its association with certain other human experiences. Hospers' association theory can be schematized as, where a is an art object and p an affective state, a expresses p, if and only if a has some (or many) qualities commonly associated with p in human experiences.

Although this theory is, to a large extent, true, it is however neither necessary nor sufficient that for an art object to express an affective state it must have properties commonly associated with that affective state. This is particularly true in literature (especially poems) which is expressive of any particular emotion and in whose context there are no words which one commonly associates with that particular emotion. In literature emotions and moods are expressed by means of suggestions, by what in Indian Aesthetics is called Dhvanikavya. In fact here, great emphasis is laid on the expressiveness of poetic language by means of suggestions or Dhvani. It is maintained that the ideal element of poetic visions can only
be expressed by means of suggestions for direct expression in ordinary language would not only fail to bring out the intricacies of the vision, but would also tend to lead to an over exaggerated or affected expression, for the intensity of feelings cannot be expressed without loss of beauty through ordinary language, but only through language which suggestively brings out the rarity of the poetic vision. In a piece of literary work, say a poem, it is then the combination of the meanings in the whole that makes the poem expressive of any particular emotion. And one understands the expression of any emotion when one understands the suggested words and situations. And just as it is not necessary that for an art object to express a certain affective state it must have properties generally associated with that state in human experience, it is not a sufficient condition either. Having qualities associated with an emotion, it is not sufficient for expression of that emotion for example, instances of art objects which have a superabundance of some qualities generally associated with human experience do not express that emotion but something else, maybe even its opposite. A performance which is too sad thus becomes ludicrous, and a piece of music too sweet, becomes nauseating and stagnant.
Whether it is through association or through some other means, the fact is that music is infinitely expressive. One may, at this point, perhaps ask the following set of questions; can one attribute specific expressive properties to a piece of music, and, if so, then, is the specific expressive property dependent on any particular or specific aspect of a piece of music, and can one attribute specific expressive properties just on the basis of what is presented i.e. is the rendering of a particular raga sufficient to determine the expressive property of the raga, or is there need to know something more? I have already briefly touched on these questions and here I repeat, that while one may have no difficulty in recognizing the complex of similarities between a sad scene in a play and an actual sad occurrence in real life, it is much more difficult to point out phenomenal features of a raga that will justify our calling it sad. This is so because musical expressiveness is unmediated or objectless. But in spite of this, it is possible to recognize specific expressive properties of a piece of music, because music is, as it were, inherently expressive. Of course it may not be possible for the inexperienced listener to immediately identify or pinpoint a particular emotion in a raga, but the expressive medium brings in
one a kind of awareness which is immediate and unanalysable, and in that sense intuitive. And gradually, depending on one's experience and exposure, one can give a name to that specific expressive experience. Expressiveness is always an immediate experience and it cannot be known through second person descriptions. Hence the identity of expressiveness is not determined by the application of an external standard, for the identity is the identity of an experience - the experience of recognizing expression and for this no criterion is required.

This brings me to a consideration of some interesting remarks of Gombrich's in his book, *Art and Illusion;* remarks that are relevant to the question posed above. His observations are mainly of the visual arts, but they can be taken to apply to music as well. As opposed to what he calls the Theory of Natural Resonance, according to which certain elements which can occur outside as well as inside art have an intrinsic connection with inner states which they are thereby, able to express as well as to invoke, Gombrich points out that many instances of art testifies that one and the same element or complex of elements can have an entirely different significance in different contexts. He says, "what strikes us as a
dissonance in Haydn might pass unnoticed in a post-Wagnerian context and even the fortissimo of a string quartet may have fewer decibels than the pianissimo of a large symphony orchestra. And hence, Gombrich argues, that a particular element has significance only if it regarded as selection out of a specifiable set of alternatives, i.e. in order for one to see a work as expressive one must know the set of alternatives within which the artist is working, or what might be called his "repertoire"; and it is only by knowing what point in the repertoire the work emerges can one ascribe to the work a particular expressive significance. The Expressionists by talking as if a given shape or colour were inherently 'charged' with an expressive meaning totally ignores this important point. Here I do not intend to go into a detailed discussion of Gombrich's theory, but extending it to music this much is obvious, that though it might provide some important points in the topic of musical appraisal, it cannot be applied in understanding musical expressiveness. By bringing in the concept of 'repertoire', a limit is put on the musician's expressive capabilities, where rightly there should be none. And this is so for it is seen that, just as words describe that which we have not seen before,
similarly, music can present emotions and moods one has not felt before, and passions one has not known before "... the artist need not have experienced in actual life every emotion he can express. It may be through manipulations of his created elements that he discovers new possibilities of feeling, strange moods, perhaps greater concentrations of passion than his own temperament could ever produce..."; and not only that, but it is possible, just as it is possible in language as pointed out by Chomsky, for another person well experienced in musical expression to understand expressively fresh works of music. No limit can be put on a person's capability to understand the expressive qualities of a piece of music, however strange and alien the mood. This is so because, although a piece of music like any other work of art reveals the character of subjectivity, it is itself objective, and its purpose is to objectify the "life of feeling. As an abstracted form, it can be handled quite apart from its sources and yield such dynamic patterns that may even surprise the musician himself.

12. We come then to the debate whether the emotions expressed in a piece of music are those of the composer's or performer's or not. The Expressionists like Collingwood and
Croce point out that a work of art expresses what an artist experiences and undergoes on being stimulated by some external or internal factor. Collingwood points out that the artists only find out what their emotions are in the course of finding out how to express them. They cannot begin the work of expressing by deciding what emotion to express; emotions thus do not exist independent of their expression, and from this he shows that, the aesthetic experience or artistic activity is the experience of expressing one's emotions and that which expresses them is the total imaginative activity called indifferently language of art. Briefly the Expressionists stand can be represented in two different ways. Firstly, works of art are expressive of a certain emotion, say grief, because the composer or artist was in this mental or emotional condition when he produced the particular work of art, or in other words, to call a piece of music sad, is to say that it expresses the sadness of its composer or performer. Secondly, works of art are expressive of grief because they produce or are able to produce a similar emotional state of mind or feeling in the spectator or, in other words, to call a piece of music sad is to say that it causes sadness in the hearer. Some modify the latter by saying that music does not cause sadness
but, rather that were one sad, the music would be a fit object of one's feeling.

Leaving aside philosophical analysis even a simple examination shows that the Expressionist's stand is not acceptable, for it is seen that if one takes musical expression of emotions to be nothing other than the outpouring of the feelings of the musician, then one cannot explain how an artist could perform two different ragas expressing such diverse emotions like Raga Yaman whose dominant mood is that of love's longing and Raga Marwa which expresses renunciation at the same sitting, or if the artist were performing in the Western tradition, would he even be able to perform a complete sonata, for instance, successfully for the allegro, adagio, presto and allegretto would all express different moods. As Langer puts it "... such mercurial passions would be abnormal even in the notoriously capricious race of musicians." The facial expressions and gesticulations of the hands etc. of the musician are not signs indicating the expression of personal emotions, these outward physical expressions are part and parcel of a performance and very often they are learnt conventionally. It is really the flow, tension and resolutions of the music, which the artist
indicates by waving his hands, closing his eyes etc. and not confessing his emotions to the audience. The sentimental lover of music would of course like to think that all the pathos and poignancy expressed in a piece of music is nothing but the expression of the longing or ecstasy or despair of the artist's own 'vie amoureuse', contending that the artist can only express those sentiments which he has experienced sometime in his lifetime. But, as already pointed out, an artist can express feelings which he has not experienced before. Moreover, sheer self expression does not require an artistic form — the proper reaction to extreme grief is loss of speech, palpitation, crying etc., but not music. But the fact that pathos and poignancy is expressed and enjoyed shows that personal emotions are not expressed by the performer, and neither are they subjectively felt by the audience, and the aesthetic appeal of artistic presentation of emotions lies precisely in this fact that there is a distance, between what the artist presents and his subjective self, and the same goes for the audience too. Feelings revealed in music are then not the passion, love, or longing of any particular individual, inviting one to put oneself in that person's place, rather the feelings are presented directly to one's understanding.
such that one may grasp, realize and comprehend these without pretending to have them nor to impute them to another. Thus even though the subject matter of music may be similar to self expression and the symbols might also be borrowed from the realm of expressive symptoms yet the "borrowed suggestive elements are formalized and the subject matter distanced in an artistic perspective."^17

Examining the different versions of the Expressionist Theory, it is seen that the main reason why emotions expressed in a piece of music are attributed to the artist is because it is believed by these theorists in some way or another — that emotions must always have an object or cause, whereas in music, more so in instrumental music and khayals, there is nothing in the music itself, which can be said to be the object or cause of any particular emotion being expressed. Hence the emotion is given an object by saying that the emotion expressed is the self expression of the musician. But as seen earlier, in music, the creative potential of the medium is such that, the absence of a cause or an object does not detract anything from music's primary function of expressing emotions. Even without an object or cause the emotions presented can be identified as a particular emotion. What
is important is to grasp the 'essence of a feeling' and pure experience is possible only if the artist is not weighed down by his personal woes and cares. An artist conveying his personal feelings might perform passionately, but the performance being a symptom of emotion, be contagious only for the moment, it would lack intensity because its expressive forms are inarticulate.

One of the more fundamental objections to the theory of art as self expression and one that is emphasized by recent philosophers is to do with music's expressiveness. Attributing the expressiveness of a musical piece to the self expression of the artist is to make musical expressiveness a separate feature of the musical piece, but expressiveness is built into the music itself and it is something we apprehend directly. The qualities of expressiveness that we attribute to a piece of music is essential to our understanding and appreciating the piece of music. But by attributing the expressiveness of music to the self expression of the artist we make these features extrinsic to the music and make it belong more to the biography of the musician.

13. Music expresses emotions but not the emotions of its composer or performer —the difficulties involved in
understanding this idea is lessened when we understand (as shown by philosophers like Langer) music as expressing emotions symbolically. While a signal merely indicates, a symbol presents ideas i.e. the function of a symbol is expression or presentation of concepts. Music is a symbolic presentation of man's sentient life. Although music does not use fixed symbolic references, yet it logically expresses man's inner life of emotions. Susanne Langer thus calls music a highly articulated symbol which can be analyzed but which cannot, like verbal language, be,

constructed by a process of synthesis of elements, because no such elements exist outside it. They only occur in a total form; as the concave and convex surfaces of a shell may be noted as characterising its form but a shell cannot be synthetically composed of the 'concave' and the 'convex'. There are no such factors before there is a shell. 18

And this highly "articulated sensuous symbol", by virtue of its dynamic structure, can express the forms of vital experience which language is unfit to convey. The function of music is then, not the stimulation of feelings, but the expression of it, and not the "symptomatic expression of feelings that beset the composer but a symbolic expression of the forms of sentience as he understands them". 19
The cognitive value of symbols is such that they can present ideas transcending the individual's realm of subjective experience, and hence there is no limit to what the artist can express. Again the "commanding form", of a piece of music presents the artist with infinite emotive possibilities and expressive value. Thus the musician's greatness in presenting feelings and emotions is not so much because of his own feelings, as because, of his,

Intuitive recognition of forms symbolic of feelings and his tendency to project emotive knowledge into such objective forms. In handling his own creation, composing a symbol of human emotion he learns from the perceptible reality before him possibilities of subjective experience that he has not known in his personal life. His own mental scope and the growth and expansion of his personality are therefore deeply involved with his art.20

What is important, is to remember that man's emotive life is highly complex. It is clear by now that emotions and their expressions do not follow a watertight connection in the sense that Emotion E need not always be followed by expression X, but may be followed by X or Y or Z. Man's sentient life is inseparable from the man himself, man being ever in a state of emotional experience; some emotions he consciously experiences, others he is vaguely
aware of, and yet others he is totally unaware of i.e. there are those he experiences primarily and others he cannot pinpoint. Music being the most abstract and elusive of all the arts is also an adequate and lucid symbol of man's emotive life. Due to its immense potentialities for expression, music is able to present both the conscious and unconscious feelings and emotions of man. And in fact, not only of man, but the inner spirit of whole civilizations may be comprehended through its music, for it is said that music is so intimately interwoven with changes in the shapes of time that it can be of extraordinary historical and psychological interest.

The function of music, however, is not just the expression of emotions but the presentation of emotions such that the "relishability", what in Indian Aesthetics is called Rasa is presented. Rasa literally means "juice" or "extract", but as an aesthetic concept it refers to the essence or basic character of a work of art, and the purpose of all forms of art is the exposition or presentation of the basic rasa. Mere technique may bring out all the forms of a raga, yet fail to present rasa. So although there is distance between the artist and what he presents, yet the artist must not be far removed from the feel (bhēya)
of the raga. The concept of rasa then focusses on the core emotive content of a raga around which revolves its sensuous characteristics, like metre, magnitude, rhythm etc. There are recognized rasas - Nava Rasa, namely, śṛṅgāra, hasya, karuna, raudra, veera, bhavanaka, vibhatsa, adbhuta and Śānta rasa. This list is not arbitrarily made up, but is based on man's emotive life and consists principally of these nine sentiments and other sentiments are nothing but the combination of these in different ways. Each artistic creation is supposed to be dominated by the presentation of any one of these Nava Rasas, although other related rasas may also be presented in a lesser degree.

The artistic warmth and ardour or dard that the artist presents in a performance is thus, not due to a personal passion, but the passion of rasa presentation; the bhāya of presenting, say, śṛṅgāra rasa; and the feelings that the audience experience also depends on how well he apprehends the raga presented. Human experience is such, that it is easier to say something is not, than to confirm something is in clearly articulated terms, and that something is, is sometimes best confirmed intuitively. Rasa-nubbuti is such an experience which is to be experienced immediately and intuitively.
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