INTRODUCTION
Verbal language, is undoubtedly, man's most important and characteristic means of communication, but it is not the only one, nor necessarily, the most expressive one. My endeavour in this work has been to explore the immense expressive potentialities of music, and in that light bring out the significance of music and musical experience.

1. But before going on to say what I have done, I must, first of all, clarify what I have not done, and this I believe is necessary, because the title of my dissertation is somewhat misleading. The title "Language of Music", could roughly raise two kinds of expectations. One would be, to expect a discussion of the general problems of philosophy of language; and the other, taking music to be a kind of language, a discussion of the structure of music, of meaning in music in musical terms, the possibility of a vocabulary of music and so on. Although I do touch on some of these problems in the course of my discussion, I have not discussed any of them at length. This is so, because my intention has not been to analyze the concept of language, and see whether music can properly be called a language or not. My primary concern has been to understand expression in music, and the significance of musical expression, and the relationship between musical expression and life in general.
2. In the first chapter, I take up the general philosophical problem of the identity of a work of music. It may be said that, of the identity of a work of art, two kinds of questions may be asked — one metaphysical, and the other logical. My concern has really been with the logical question, which may be of the form; "What in actual fact, are the criteria of identity of a particular work of art?" I have shown that a work of music is a generic entity, and a particular performance of it, is an element that comes under the generic entity. I have come to this conclusion after having made a distinction between three different kinds of generic entities namely, a type, a class and a universal, with tokens, members and instances as their elements respectively, and seeing that, a musical work could be said to be closest to the generic entity called type. An important characteristic of the type/token relationship is that, a type and its tokens may not only share properties, but properties are also transmitted from one to the other. However, although all properties of a token may be transmitted to the type, it is not necessary that they will do so. In fact, it is necessary, that not all properties should pass from type to token, although any single property might do so. This point is of great importance in music, for it brings out a salient feature of music; that of the possibility of any number of
new interpretations of a given work of music. In fact, it may be said that the very nature of music as a creative art would be distorted if there were no such possibilities.

To emphasize this point, I have briefly discussed Susanne Langer's contention that a musical composition is essentially incomplete, i.e., it needs completion through its tokens. I find the Langerian view unacceptable, for, to suppose that something is incomplete, necessarily implies that it is, in principle, capable of being completed. But any attempt to complete a musical work will have the unbearable consequence of introducing a degree of mechanicality to a musical performance, which in fact is alien to it. This is all the more evident in the Indian Classical Tradition, for here any attempt to introduce "completeness" to a musical work will reflect a total misunderstanding of the very tradition. Hence it may be said that interpretation in music is open ended, and for music to be music, it must be impossible to delimit the possibilities of new interpretations.

3. In the second chapter, I take up the more specific problem of emotions and the expression of emotions in general and in music. I have said that though language is the most characteristic means of expressions, it is somewhat
inadequate in expressing that which contains too many minute, yet closely related parts. There are certain emotions and delicate nuances of emotions which cannot be projected into discursive forms, and it is music, which shares the same properties of dynamism as emotions, which is better equipped to do this. In this connection I have briefly discussed the concept of emotion and expression and have attempted to draw up a distinction between an emotion and a feeling or a sensation, and also between natural or conventional expression from expression in music.

The expression of an emotion forms part of our understanding of the emotion. An emotion may thus be said to be an organic unity or what might be called a "hermeneutic mesh" of the feeling, the expression of this feeling, and the object of the feeling. In bringing out the differences between a feeling and an emotion, I have shown that it is essential for an emotion to have an object of reference. But in bringing this idea to bear on music, there appears to be a difficulty, for in music especially instrumental music, there is nothing which might be said to be the object. It is seen however, that in art the expression of emotions is different from that in real life and the
depiction or presentation of an emotion is possible without bringing in all the elements of meaning of an emotion. The creative potential of music is such, that while primarily presenting the feeling or bhāva associated with a particular emotion, it points inevitably to a completeness of the hermeneutic circle. Further, it may be said that the absence of an object does not detract anything from the musical expression of emotions, for music expresses not the facticity of an emotion, but rather, it captures, or tries to capture the prāṇa or essence of an emotion.

Towards the end of the chapter, I take up the discussion of whether the emotions expressed in a piece of music are those of the performer's or the composer's. My contention has been that it is not. Besides raising the rather usual objections, I have also shown that perhaps one main reason why emotions are attributed to the composer or the performer, is that it is thought that an emotion expressed must have an object, but I have already shown that it is possible to have an objectless expression of emotions. Another objection that I have raised, and one that has been variously emphasized by different philosophers is to do with music's expressiveness. I have shown that to attribute expressiveness of a musical piece to the self expression of the artist is to make musical expressiveness an extrinsic
feature of a piece of music, when in fact it is built into the music itself.

4. In the third chapter, I take up the discussion of two related questions raised in the previous chapter. They are: (i) Can specific expressive properties be attributed to a piece of music? and (ii) Is the specific property so attributed, dependent on any particular or specific aspect of the musical work? My intention has been to show that it is the sthāyibhāva, which determines the expressive character of a musical work. The sthāyibhāva is the basic persisting emotion which binds together, the total aesthetic situation of a musical composition and which guides the entire structure and form of a musical work. The sthāyibhāva could thus be likened to Langer's "commanding idea", for in its expression the entire structure as also the emotive character of a musical composition is created.

After having discussed sthāyibhāva, I have made an attempt to specify the musical elements in a raga through which the sthāyibhāva or the permanent mood could be sought to be embodied. Though the most obvious choice here seem to be the vādi and samvādi notes of a raga, I have shown that it is the pakad or the catch phrase of a raga in which the sthāyibhāva could be said to be embodied. The reason for
my choice is that in Indian music the unity of the entire rendering of a raga is a flowing unity, and it is the śrutis which give this flowing quality to a raga. Moreover it is the subtle intricacies of expression of the different śrutis, which give each raga an individual character, and help to present and accentuate the mood of the particular emotion being presented. In musical terms, the pakad because it shows the characteristic use of śrutis of a particular raga, is better suited to suggest and bring out the emotive flavour of a particular raga. But though I say that it is the pakad through which, the sthāvibhāva could be said to be presented, my intention is not to suggest that these musical elements can be separated from the whole. A raga is an organic unity, and the pakad enhances and accentuates the sthāvibhāva, but the sthāvibhāva is not confined to particular aspects only, but permeates the entire musical work. While discussing sthāvibhāva, I have drawn up a distinction between sthāvibhāva of a musical work and the rasa of the work. It may be said that, while the sthāvibhāva is that which determines the basic form, structure and mood of a musical work, rasa is the resulting relish which the said mood brings about. Rasa is the resultant of an aesthetic configuration, hence it is not an emotion, not even a primary emotion, but that which vitalizes an emotion.
5. In the fourth chapter I take up for discussion a somewhat different but important topic, that of evaluation in music.

When a piece of music is appreciated or evaluated, it appears to be done so in reference to some valued characteristics. My endeavour has been to discover whether there are in fact such characteristics or properties of music which are considered to have intrinsic value. Having been arguing for the stand that music expresses emotions the question posed has been of the form, whether any emotion or emotions can be said to have intrinsic value?

Before attempting an answer to this question, I have dwelt on the general problem of aesthetic evaluation. I have maintained, that though the critic or would-be critic does not evaluate a work of art by applying a set of fully articulated, readily available set of principles or standards, yet comparative evaluation is possible, and general claims about norms do get made. One such claim has been to show that art of any kind must present "truth". In literature the truth could be said to be insights into human nature, in the visual arts "essences" and so on.
Music has frequently been thought to be connected with the spiritual and thence with the moral. The claim would then be to show that the "truth" of music is the moral and spiritual message that it conveys and the effect that it is meant to have on the listener. It may be said that while the moral and the spiritual go together, they are not logically connected with one another. However, though the spiritual and the moral are distinguishable, the only available criterion of authenticity of the spiritual is the moral. It is easy enough to see how spirituality comes into music, in fact, it may be said that, the spirituality of a piece of music is something which cannot be separated from the piece of music itself. The problem is to show how morality is connected with music, such that the aesthetic appeal or aesthetic merits of a musical work is not lessened.

I have attempted to show that morality which can be shown to be welded with the aesthetic, consists in the individual's progressively altering one's consciousness towards "unselfishness" or towards what I call "unselfing". In music, the meditative prayerful beginning of a khayal and the final letting go of the conclusion are symbolic of this "unselfing", of the banishment of the ego and
self deceiving fantasies. One way in which art and music is able to progressively alter one's consciousness towards unselfishness is by virtue of something it shares with nature — a perfection of form which invites unpossessive contemplation and resists absorption into the selfish fantasy life of the consciousness. Thus it is said that great music transcends selfish and obsessive limitations of personality and can frequently enlarge the sensibility of the hearer.

6. An interesting question that arises in connection with problems relating to evaluation of music, is that of sentimentality in music. I take up a brief discussion of this question in an Appendix to Chapter Four of the dissertation. I endeavour to show that sentimentality results not so much due to the over indulgence of emotions, as due to misinterpretation of reality. Another way of putting it would be to show that sentimentality results from over stating or over-attending to the dramatic quality of experience and neglecting the mundane aspects, when rightly life consists of both types of experiences. Over-attending to a certain aspect and neglecting others results in making that particular aspect static, and this is what happens in music.
Langer has said that music is an "unconsummated symbol". Unconsummated could be taken to apply to music whose potentiality for expression has not been exhausted, or has not become supersaturated, and when music's potentiality for expression is not exhausted, its dynamic flow is also not arrested. Sentimentality in music is to arrest music's dynamic flow, which is again the result of exhausting all potentialities of expression.

It is then not the feelings and emotions which make a musical work sentimental but how they have been presented, and how they have been presented is again dependent on how one understands them. To avoid sentimentality in music, an emotion must be seen in its proper perspective and in entirety, for only when an emotion is taken in isolation that its flow is restricted and in music, creativity is arrested.

7. In the concluding sixth chapter, I make further remarks about the connection of music as a form of art and morality and spirituality. These remarks are made against the background of the Theory of Rasas, and the scheme of purusharthas in Indian Philosophy. In this connection I reiterate my stand that music is an autonomous form of art.
There could be said to be two senses of the idea of autonomy: (i) That music is not connected with anything extra-musical; (ii) that music does not need the help of anything else in its expressive function. It is obvious that I do not accept the alleged autonomy of music in the first sense of the term but rather uphold music's autonomy in the second sense. The second sense implies that music is complete in itself, in the sense that in its expressive function it does not need the help of anything that is essentially non-musical. I have pointed out that it is perhaps an overemphasis on the causal powers of music that has led many to reject autonomy of music in the second sense. It is important to note that music is not a mere instrument of causal manipulation, although attempts can be made and are made to do this.

Another way of rejecting the autonomy of music would be to show that music cannot be an autonomous form of art because it is incapable of presenting all the rásas independently. In a way this may be true for rásas like vibhātsa and adbhuta to be properly presented in music would require the help of non-musical contexts like dance or drama. But there are other rásas, the chief ones being śringāra and karuna, which are capable of purely musical
presentation. I have attempted to bring out the significance of this by showing that a possible, what might be called "interactive" hierarchy of the rasas, could perhaps be worked out on the basis of how any rasa informs the others, so that they become appropriate objects of aesthetic presentation. I have shown that it is śṛṅgāra rasa, which could be said to perform this supremely unifying and vitalizing role. Hence the fact that there may be some rasas which may not be amenable to purely musical presentation, is not something that can affect the wholeness of music, for such rasas in any case cannot be proper subjects of aesthetic treatment in isolation, but need to be unified by śṛṅgāra, and śṛṅgāra is an indisputable subject of total musical treatment.

Lastly, I have tried to bring out the significance of the rasas, more precisely śṛṅgāra rasa, by making an attempt to connect the rasas with the scheme of purusharthas. The purusharthas could be said to be an attempt at a philosophical definition of the concept of man. The significance of the purusharthas lie in that it is logically impossible to conceive of a state of human existence, or to conceive of a man who is not involved in some way with the pursuit of the purusharthas. While maintaining that the
purusharthas, like the rasas and the virtues seek, by their very nature, unity and completeness in a mutual, life-enhancing, "interactive" inter-relationship, I have shown that aesthetic pursuit is principally pursuit of kama. I obviously do not take the narrow view of kama but kama as tempered by dharma, and in that light kama as, love of others, of natural objects, of objects of art and of God. And I have shown that the rasa connected with the experience of such love is śringāra. Hence it may be said that while aesthetic pursuit is a truly human pursuit, its product—the aesthetic object as well as its enjoyment, is the embodiment of the rasa of that, which holds human life together. And as this rasa finds its purest expression in music, music affords us more than all the other arts, intimations of moksha and ananda.