CHAPTER - IV

THE MIND THEORY
The second theory that I am going to discuss with regard to the problem of personal identity is the Mind Theory. This theory tries to give us a mentalistic criterion of personal identity. According to this theory, A is identical with B if and only if A's mental states hold identity conferring relation to the mental states of B. In other words, a person's mental states is the determining factor of his identity. This theory however does not assert a single mental state as the determining feature of a person's identity. This is so because a single mental state lasts only for a moment and in the psychological life of a person we can hardly find two mental states which are identical with each other. Moreover, in one's lifetime one undergoes various psychological changes inspite of which a person remains the same person. The Mind Theory thus does not consider a single mental state as the retainer of identity but regards a mental series or a mental construct construed from the mental states by a connecting medium as the determining factor of a person's identity. According to this theory a person is a distinct person by virtue of possessing a distinct mental series; a person retains his identity by continuing as the same mental series.
All the advocates of this theory agree that it is a mental series whose identity confers personal identity, but they differ with regard to the connecting medium that binds the mental states together to constitute a mental series and provide it with its distinctive character.

The most preferred type of connectedness which comes to the mind is the *causal* connectedness between different mental states as the criterion of personal identity. The most popular view holds memory as the connecting factor that binds the mental states to make it a single whole. According to this view A is identical with B if A remembers witnessing all events and performing all actions that B witnessed and performed. This view holds that a particular person knows himself to be the same person now as he was before in spite of certain bodily and psychological changes because his memory connects the past person with the present person and asserts their identity. In other words, it is memory which binds the mental states together to constitute one mental construct. Memory connects two different experiences separated by time and makes them members of the same mental series, that is, experiences of the same person. Memory as a
criterion of personal identity was first invoked by John Locke. He called this memory as 'consciousness' and said that the very concept of person makes it impossible for a person's identity to be retained by anything else then 'consciousness'. He said that a person

'......... is a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking . . . .' 18

According to Locke, it is 'consciousness' which makes a person a person and it is by virtue of this that a person retains his identity over time. A person when remembers witnessing an event or performing an action he realizes at that instant that the person who witnessed the event or performed that action is nobody else but the one who is doing the remembering. It is so because his remembering also involves the memory of him as the witness of or performer of those events or actions. It is memory which enables him to connect the past person

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who performed the action with the present person who is remembering performing it and identify them as one and the same person.

According to Locke, the identity of a person is very much different from the identity of a man or identity of a soul. He says that a person's identity can neither be maintained by physical identity nor it can be maintained by being the same soul. If it was the soul-substance which determined the identity of a person then two persons separated by reincarnation would have been called the same person as their soul is the same. But they are not the same person as the reincarnated individual has lost his memory of his previous life, their 'consciousness' being distinct from each other. It is memory alone which confers identity to persons and it is by virtue of memory that a person is himself. As Locke puts it,

\[ \ldots \text{as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action, so far it is the same personal life.} \]

It is consciousness which binds together separate experiences into a single series and thus makes them experiences of the same person. A person extends his identity till that past of which he is conscious of and extends it to that future of which he is conscious of and therefore concerned about. A person is concerned about his body because he is conscious of it. Locke says that once some part of my body is separated from me, I am no more concerned about that separated part because I am no more conscious of it. Separation of my body limbs do not affect my identity because a person is not a body but he is a person only by virtue of his consciousness. Body is neither the necessary nor the sufficient condition of person's identity. To prove this point Locke has given an example: If two persons, namely, a prince and a cobbler exchange their souls along with their consciousness, the resultant persons would be such that we will call the cobbler's body with the prince's soul and consciousness as the prince and the prince's body with the cobbler's soul and consciousness as the cobbler. This shows that body is not necessary for personal identity as even without his body the prince has managed to retain his identity. And it is not a sufficient condition because,
even though the body of the prince was there yet we cannot call the soul and the consciousness of the cobbler in that body as the prince.

A person retains his identity over time by consciousness, extends his identity to past and future by consciousness. A person gets concerned about his past and future because he is conscious of the fact that it is himself who was involved in the past action and is going to be involved in certain future activities. The pain, pleasure, reward or punishment that are going to come his way will be the result of his own actions and this realisation makes him concerned about his future. But this realisation comes because of his consciousness of the past, present and future. Locke's says,

Self is that conscious thinking thing which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends. 20

A person's identity extends over time by virtue of consciousness. It is the consciousness of a person of being

himself who performed an action in the past and as the one who is going to reap the fruits of his actions in the future which decides the course of his actions. A person's decision of right and wrong thus is based on consciousness. He performs right actions because he is conscious that in the future it will be himself and not somebody else who will enjoy the fruit of the actions performed now. As it is the consciousness of the past and the future that makes a man decide his course of action he should, says John Locke, also receive reward or punishment for those actions alone of which he is still conscious. A person is responsible for those actions alone which he remembers or is concerned about because he is himself only for that time of which he is conscious.

Thus, we can see that, for Locke, personal identity depends on 'consciousness'. But here arises the necessity to understand what Locke meant by 'consciousness'. 'Consciousness' may be understood as the consciousness of doing or experiencing something or it may be the consciousness of some material things, external things or of what someone else is doing. Locke can be assumed to have talked about the former kind of consciousness. For
a person's identity cannot be said to rest on the latter type of consciousness. If Locke by 'consciousness' meant the second type of consciousness then it would mean that a person's identity depends on something which is not a part of that person. But such a relation cannot be considered as essential for personal identity. Therefore, we must take Locke's 'consciousness' to mean the consciousness of doing or experiencing something. This consciousness involved the notion of memory as memory also involves a consciousness of doing something in the past. Memory is the faint copy of consciousness of what a person felt at the time of actually doing or experiencing something. However, J.L. Mackie\textsuperscript{21} says that this is not the only sense in which Locke understood consciousness. If by 'consciousness' Locke meant only 'being conscious of' then he would not have talked about two 'incommunicable consciousness'. Such use of the term consciousness implies that there is an entity which has certain consciousness at one time, then another at another time and thus come to have many such consciousness. Of these consciousness some are from the past and some are

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from the present and they are linked together to form a series by 'consciousness' or memory. This whole series makes up the history of that entity to whom the consciousness belongs.

If we make consciousness as understood by Locke, the criterion of personal identity then we are faced with many serious problems. Locke's view is also criticised by Reid in his "Essay on the "Intellectual Powers of Man". Reid says that if we accept Lockes view then, "a man may be and at the same time not be, the person that did a particular thing."22 Reid gave an example in connection with his comment. In the example there is a boy who was flogged in school for stealing apple and this boy later becomes an officer who takes standard from enemy. This officer again become a General. Now the General remembers taking the standard but he does not remember the flogging. But the officer who took the standard from enemy remembered being flogged. If Locke was correct then we must conclude that the General is the same person as the officer because he remembers his

experiences as an officer but he is not the same person as the boy for he does not remember the experiences of the boy. On the other hand, the officer is the same person as the boy as the officer remembers the flogging he got as a boy. Thus, the General and the officer are the same person and the officer and the boy are the same person but, the General and the boy are not the same person. This is an absurd conclusion. This shows that memory as invoked by Locke cannot be considered as the criterion of personal identity. Locke, however, did bring in concern for oneself along with memory to constitute the criterion of personal identity but memory and concern always do not go together. It may so happen that I remember a particular phase of my life but in that phase I do not find myself to be concerned about this present me. A middle aged man may remember his past as a child but he may not find that child concerned about this present middle aged man. Again, if somebody tells me that I will be tortured tomorrow but along with this information I am also given the additional information that before the torture takes place I will get amnesia, I will not become less concerned about myself who is going to be tortured. It is because, I believe that I will remain the same person in spite of not having memory of my present state. Thus we see
that concern and memory always donot go together and even if they did, they could not have constituted the criterion of personal identity for they presuppose the very thing they are trying to prove. Memory involves the necessary truth that one remembers only one's own experiences and to be concerned about himself implies that he has assumed the fact that he is going to remain the same person.

Locke's view on personal identity also gets reflected in his theory of responsibility. According to him a person is responsible only for those actions which he can remember. This is so because a certain mental history is mine by virtue of it being constructed from mental states connected by my consciousness. So a certain action is mine because I am conscious of it and as only that action of which I am conscious of is my action, I should be held responsible for that action alone. Locke's this view of responsibility is not easily acceptable to us. If his view is considered as correct then we cannot hold a person responsible for the actions he performed during his drunken state for now when he is sober he cannot remember performing them. Similarly, a man will
not be responsible for those actions which he performs during his sleep-walks. Locke foresaw the reluctance of law courts to accept such a view of responsibility. Therefore, he suggested that human judicature is to punish these people as it can never be certain of these people speaking the truth of not remembering performing those actions. But if methods to learn about their truth were available then people should be punished or pardoned according to their memory of performing their actions. This improvement does not change our reaction to Locke's view on responsibility. We are ready to accept Locke's view so far as sleep-walking is concerned and we may compromise in case of a drunk person by saying that though he is not responsible for his actions during his drunken state he certainly is responsible for his action of getting drunk as he started drinking when he was sober. But Locke's view is not acceptable at all so far one's ordinary, normal actions are concerned. I might have performed certain actions, good or bad, under normal conditions which I no longer remember. If Locke is right then I cannot be held responsible for those actions. But this is very hard to accept. Cannot an artist, who painted a picture and now has forgotten about it, claim his work as his?
Though Locke insisted upon the fact that consciousness is the sole bearer of personal identity, there are times when he showed inconsistency regarding his theory. Locke said that though human judicature cannot pardon a person for his actions simply on his claim of having forgotten it, he says that on the 'final day' God will punish or pardon according to the person's consciousness of his actions as God will know for certain the truth of their claims. So far Locke did not contradict himself. But God's intervention with regard to transfer of consciousness goes against his own view. We can well imagine a situation where consciousness between two persons have been interchanged. In such a situation, if Locke's view was right, there is no doubt as to who will be responsible for which actions. Each person is responsible for those actions whose consciousness he is having now. But Locke did not accept this view which legitimately follows from his theory. Locke instead said that as God will know who is the actual bearer of the original consciousness he will punish or reward according to the original ownership of consciousness. Such divine intervention imples that there is something besides consciousness which constitutes a person's identity and which is the actual
bearer of responsibility. And it is this entity which must be protected from being punished for a consciousness which is actually not his. If consciousness was the sole bearer of personal identity then Locke should not have tried to protect the person who now is having somebody else's consciousness. If consciousness alone determined a person's identity then a person should be treated as the one whose consciousness he or she is having now without taking into consideration to whom the consciousness originally belonged. Again, Locke's example of interchange of consciousness between the prince and the cobbler shows signs that he himself was not confident that the soul has nothing to do with a person's identity. In his story of the cobbler and the prince Locke argued that if the prince's consciousness along with his soul get into cobbler's body and the cobbler's soul and consciousness were to enter the prince's body then it is natural for us to call the prince's body with cobbler's soul and consciousness as the cobbler and the cobbler's body with prince's soul and consciousness as the prince. Here we might ask the question as to why Locke included the soul transference along with transfer of consciousness to assert personal identity. Would he have called the
prince's body with the cobbler's consciousness as the cobbler if there was no transference of the soul? He did not test his argument this way. The importance of the role of soul in a person's identity remains unanswered in Locke's theory.

Locke's theory of personal identity, as pointed out by J.L. Mackie, when analysed seems to destroy its own ground,

"Since a man at \( t_2 \) commonly remembers only some of his experiences and actions at \( t_1 \), whereas what constituted a person at \( t_1 \) was all the experiences and actions that were then co-conscious, Locke's view fails to equate a person identified at \( t_2 \) with any person identifiable at \( t_1 \). It is only a theory of how some items which belonged to a person identifiable at \( t_1 \) are appropriated by a person who can be identified as such only at \( t_2 \). It is therefore hardly a theory of personal identity at all, but might be better described as a theory of action appropriation. Locke seems to be forgetting that 'person' is not only 'a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit', but also the noun corresponding to all the personal pronouns'.\(^{23}\)

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Besides such particular criticisms against Locke there is a general criticism put forward by Butler against him. According to Butler Locke's theory confuses the evidence of personal identity, as constituting factor of personal identity. As Butler puts it:

"And one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity; anymore than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes."  

But J.L. Mackie questions the applicability this criticism against Locke's theory. He says that when Locke said that consciousness constitutes personal identity he did not mean to say that consciousness of personal identity constitutes personal identity. Locke's theory does not say that when a person becomes conscious of his past actions this consciousness is the consciousness of himself as the performer of the action. It simply states that the moment a person remembers something he knows that the action he is remembewring now was performed by him.

24. J. Butler Dissertation 1, Of Personal Identity, Published with the Analogy of Religion.  
If Locke's 'consciousness' involved the consciousness of the person himself as the performer of the past action then his theory would certainly have been involved in circularity. However, the consciousness of 'I' as the doer of the past action is so intimately connected with the consciousness of the past action that they seem inseparable. The truth is that these two consciousness are separable though the inference that it was I who did the action from the 'consciousness' of an action is so automatic that we think of them as one and the same thing. Locke's theory simply put says that, if I remember some action from inside then the person who is remembering now and the one who performed it must be one and the same person. Locke's theory if is understood this way, avoids circularity.

Though Butler's criticism may not have affected Locke's theory yet we cannot altogether deny an element of truth in what Butler says. It is true that 'consciousness' which Locke claims to constitute personal identity does not presuppose personal identity but, still it is difficult to accept such 'consciousness' as the bearer of personal identity. Our general inclination is to accept
this 'consciousness' as an evidence of personal identity and not as a constituting feature of personal identity, as Butler so rightly pointed out. Memory is the evidence of that personal identity which has already been constituted by something else. Butler may not have been successful in showing that Locke's theory is involved in circularity but he did succeed in proving that Locke's theory goes against the natural and firm belief of personal identity.

Thus, consciousness as understood by Locke does not seem to provide us with an adequate criterion of personal identity. Memory, as asserted by Hume does not singly constitute personal identity, but is one of the factors responsible for personal identity.

Hume starts his own search for the reason of the idea of personal identity with his discussion of the self. Hume says that the supposition that there must be a self besides and distinct from the body comes from the realisation that human beings have feelings, thoughts, images etc. which though can be talked about by others cannot be seen or had by them, though their resulting
movements can be observed. So we conclude that these things must belong to something and the thing to which they belong cannot be the body. It is believed that it is the self to which these things belong and it is by virtue of this self which remains unchanged in the midst of change, that a person retains his identity over time. Hume did not believe that there is really a substantial self which is enduring and unchangable. According to Hume, there is no permanent self and as such the question of its identity does not arise. He rejected the views of those philosophers who claimed that 'we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence'. Hume says that if this was the case then we would have got the idea of the self directly from the senses. But this is not the case. To get the idea of x directly from the senses we would have to get an impression of x. It is claimed that each one of us get the idea of self as an enduring entity which remains identical throughout our life time. If we have such an idea then we must have had also the impression of such an idea and this impression must remain constant throughout our

life to give us such an idea. But there can be no such impression which remains constant for more than a moment. Even if one of these impressions was an impression of the self at a particular time and some of the others were impressions of the self at different times still the idea of the self as something that endures for a lifetime without interruption would not be a mere copy or correlate of any one impression. So the idea of the self is not derived directly from the senses. According to Hume there is no enduring self to which all perceptions must belong in order to constitute a single whole. He says,

'For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception.'

All we can observe is nothing but a sequence of perception. There is nothing else going on. To think, see, love or hate, is nothing but the occurrence of certain perceptions. There is nothing constant or invariable

or uninterrupted entity according to Hume, which is called the self or mind. According to Hume,

'The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is compos'd....'28

A supposition of the constant enduring self as the thing having mental states is not necessary for explaining how we come to attribute identity to persons. According to Hume, questions about personal identity are actually questions about the bonds of perceptions and ideas. We think that the different perceptions which we have are bound together in a chain, and it is this idea of a chain of perceptions which by virtue of being

continuous gives us our idea of a constant self. If we can prove that there is no such chain of perceptions then we also prove that there is also no one continuous self or person.

For Hume, the identity that we confer upon individuals cannot unite the perceptions. The perceptions never lose their distinctive characters but we are inclined to think that they are united to constitute one continuous train of mental states and it is this concept of continuous train which is responsible for our thinking that the self remains identical over time. If we can find out what binds the perceptions together we will also be able to find out what retains our identity. But Hume says that there is no real connection among the perceptions and as such there is no mental construct which retains the identity of a person. According to Hume, the perceptions affect the mind in such a manner that it starts thinking of these perceptions as connected to constitute a whole, namely, the mind. As the mind is thought to be an entity which persists through time and as the identical entity through time possessing various perceptions, there arises the notion of identity of mind or
the self. Perceptions are bound together only in our thought but are not really connected. This 'union of imagination' is brought about by the three relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation. It is because of these three relations that we have the notion of a connected chain of perceptions which otherwise are distinct and separated. Every idea gets connected with each other because of these three relations and there arises the notion of one constructed whole of perceptions with whose identity we become concerned. Our attribution of identity is a result of mind's easy transition from one perception to another and this is made possible by the relation of resemblance and causation. So it is causation and resemblance which give us our idea of personal identity.

Hume says that memory is also partly responsible for our idea of an enduring self. Memory gives us such an idea of self with its access to our past lives. It not only gives us the notion of an enduring self but also partly constitutes it. To remember is nothing but certain kinds of perceptions occurring in the mind. These perceptions thus become member of the 'bundle of
perceptions' which then comes to facilitate the transition of the imagination along the series making up the bundle. To remember is to have some perceptions which represent and therefore resemble the past perception whose memory it is. Therefore, remembering results in a greater degree of resemblance among those perceptions that constitute our minds. The relation of resemblance leads the imagination to slide more easily from one member to another member of the series and thus leads us to think of it as 'continued view of the same object'.

But memory does not extend to all our past experiences and yet we think that we existed in those moments of experiences which we have forgotten now. This implies that there is something else besides memory which makes us think of ourselves as a continuous self inspite of the break in the memory chain. It is causality, according to Hume which makes the forgotten perceptions belong to the same self. He says,

'the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and
modify each other. Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; and these ideas in their turn produce other impressions. One thought chances another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expell'd in its turn.  

We bring in the causal chain into the gaps which cannot be reached by memory and with its help we get the concept of one enduring self. Causation suppliments resemblance and helps in giving us the concept of ourselves as continuous through time. These relations make the mind slide easily along a series of perceptions that form one single causal chain and make us suppose that the intervening members in the chain which we no longer remember existed in the forgotten intervals. Thus we come to think of ourselves as a single, identical continuous entity.

It is true that memory is important for our notion of selves and that it is because of memory we attribute certain experiences to a person but we cannot appeal to a 'single person's' memory to explain the origin of the idea of 'single person'. Hume here brings in resemblance to explain the notion of personal identity. But

even resemblance cannot be considered as enough for giving us the notion of a mind. This insufficiency of resemblance can be shown with the help of the following example given by Barry Stroud.³⁰ Let us say that there is a bundle of perceptions composed of all and only all those actual perceptions that are perceptions of Eiffel Tower from a particular angle. They being perceptions of the same object resemble each other. But just because the members of the bundle resemble each other they certainly cannot be thought as constituting one mind. We cannot take mind to be simply a construct of perceptions which resemble each other. Moreover, even if we take resemblance as having its effect on us, we might take perceptions as resembling one another because they all occur in one person's memory rather than taking them as constituting one mind. In that case it is memory and not resemblance which is actually doing the work. But memory cannot explain the notion of a single person without using the notion of a single person's memory.

So Hume brings in causality to explain self. According to him each member of a bundle is a cause of

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succeeding member and this in turn is the cause of the next. It is this reason which enables the mind to 'slide easily' along the causal chain and makes us think of it as one mind. But causality as understood in Humean account is nothing but a 'customary association of ideas' and as such it is not enough to give us the notion of a causal chain as constituting one mind. Moreover, our perceptions lack uniformity. Our perception may belong to different classes. One particular moment I may be having the perception of a tree and in the next moment I may turn my head and have the perception of a house. In such a situation I cannot consider my latter perception as the effect of former. New experiences flood into our consciousness independently of what has just been going on there. We cannot accept that each of our perception is caused by our preceding perception. Had our experiences been more regular and uniform, we could have thought that each of our perception is the effect of our previous perception. But it is not the case. If all our perceptions were exactly alike then probably resemblance would have been enough for our idea of a continuing individual self. Our perceptions are not exactly alike and as such it is difficult on our part to accept
resemblance and causality as responsible for our idea of 'the self'. As Barry Stroud puts it:

The novelty and lack of uniformity that we find in our inner life make it difficult to see how Hume's appeal to resemblance and causality could possibly be enough to explain why we come to have an idea of an individual mind or self that endures through time.\[31\]

For Hume there is no uninterrupted entity that continues as one identical thing through our course of life. The mind or imagination is said to be mistakenly led to think that there is such an enduring entity. In other words, for Hume mind is an 'illusion'. Now if mind is an illusion then how is it led to think of an enduring self? Hume has not explained what is that which ascribes identity or fails to observe a real bond among perceptions or reflects on certain ideas. Hume's theory cannot explain why there are separate bundles of perceptions each of which starts considering itself as a separate and distinct entity. According to Hume, all perceptions are distinct existences and thus could exist independently of each other and independently of everything.

else in the universe. There is nothing intrinsic to a perception that connects it with one particular series and not another. If this is so then why perceptions present themselves in separate and discrete bundles? Thus, even if we accept that the self is nothing but a 'bundle of perception', even then Hume has not managed to explain how this bundle comes into being if there is nothing real connecting the perceptions to constitute this bundle.

Hume said that the idea of personal identity is nothing but an idea that we come to have because of the way perceptions occur and get connected in our mind. Then he went on to find out what it is that actually connects the perceptions together to give us such an idea. In other words, Hume's question of personal identity is a question of unity of the mind. But can they really be considered as the same? Hume did not try to explain the concept of person and started with the assumption that questions of identity of person are questions about the bonds of perceptions. Thus Hume seems to have bypassed the question of identity, conflated it with the question of unity of consciousness. For Hume the problem of personal identity has changed its meaning and has
become the problem of unity of mind. And this problem of unity of mind means to him how distinct perceptions are united in a single mind. But for the latter as we have seen, he has no clear answer. In fact he cannot explain the unity of mind in terms of his psychology where each perception is treated as a distinct entity. In the traditional view, as we have seen, the self is introduced precisely to explain the unity of mind. It is suggested that the unity of mind is dependent upon the fact that it is one and the same entity, the self, which have all the perceptions through time. But since Hume has denied the existence of such an entity he has left himself with no other explanation for this. Hume as a true empiricist, settles the question of identity by declaring that he does not discover in introspection any entity which he can call the self. But even if such an entity, namely, the self existed, Hume would not have found it in introspection. What he would have met with in introspection would, according to his own theory, be another perception whose unity with the rest of the mind would have to be explained. Since the self is what is presupposed in the perception of the mind, it cannot be discussed as yet another perception even though it
may be the perception of the self. Moreover, the fact that we may not find any entity answering to the concept of self does not illumine the nature of the concept. We are concerned with understanding the concept self which we actually possess and whether or not the concept picks out anything in reality is a further question.

So far we have not succeeded in finding the criterion of personal identity by treating mental connectedness either in terms of memory or in terms of some other kind of bond such as Hume was looking for. Now I wish to consider whether the general notion of mental (causal) connectedness can yield a criterion of personal identity at all.

The Mind Theorist, as we have seen, regard causal connectedness as the criterion of identity. But it can be shown that it is not causal connectedness of psychological states that asserts identity. In fact Robert Elliot in his article 'Personal Identity and the Causal Continuity Requirement',\(^\text{32}\) shows that even in the absence

of causal connectedness we are inclined to assert identity simply on psychological connectedness.

Elliot argues that if we assert identity on the basis of causal connectedness of mental states then we are equally entitled to accept identity even when causal connectedness is not available. One of the arguments put forward by Elliot where he asserts that identity should be accepted without causal connectedness if we accept identity on the availability of causal connectedness is as follows:

The argument consists of two members of which the first one involves causal connectedness while the second does not. But, it will seem improper not to accept identity in the case which does not involve causal connectedness if we accept identity in the case where causal connectedness is available.

Case Aa: (i) That a person X has died at $t_1$; (ii) Y comes into existence at a later time $t_2$; (iii) that X and Y are psychologically very similar; (iv) that some super-being has created Y because it wanted to recreate X and the creation of Y is causally guided by the being's
knowledge of X; (v) that X and Y believe (i)-(iv), and (vi) that the super-being has ensured that there is no third-person who stands in the same relation to X as does Y.

In this above case the identity of X is ensured by psychological continuity including causal continuity. Here X's anticipation of survival as Y and Y's belief that he or she is the same person as X seems to be quite reasonable. Identity assertion in this case is based on the fact that there is psychologically very little to tell X and Y apart and their similarity is explained by causal continuity. Elliot says that causal continuity is regarded as facilitating the claim that X and Y are identical because it entails that particular psychological states which constitute a particular person in the past give rise to (some of) the particular psychological states which constitute the particular future person with whom, putatively, the earlier person is identical. The psychological continuity of X is ensured by the causal connectedness.

Elliot then gives us a second case where there is no causal connectedness:
Case Ab: This is similar to Aa except that for (iv) substitute (iv !) that there is no causal connectedness, between X's ceasing to exist and Y's coming to existence, and for (v) substitute (v !) that X and Y believe (i), (iii), (ii) and (iv !).

In this case there is no causal connectedness. But Y believes that he stands in survival relation to X. Elliot questions whether it is really unreasonable on Y's part to believe so. Does this absence of causal connectedness render X's anticipating survival as Y irrational? This absence of causal connectedness does not make one deny survival. In the former case Aa the causal chain explains why the resulting person stands in the survival relation to the original person. The presence of causal connectedness may be regarded as the evidence for the survival relation and its availability may make it easier to accumulate other evidences to assert survival of X as Y. But certainly evidence of survival relation cannot be regarded as constituting the survival relation or even that it is essential evidence for the survival relation.
In the second case, causal connectedness is not available between X and Y. In this case X knows that Y will come to existence who will be strongly psychologically connected with X, except that X's final stage do not constitute the causal basis for Y's initial states. In such a situation it is not unreasonable for X to anticipate his survival as Y simply because there is no causal connectedness. In other words, X's anticipation of surviving as Y in Ab seems to be as reasonable as it was in case Aa.

Now, if in fact what X thinks will happen does happen, then Y will be in a position to say that what X expected to happen did happen. Y will notice that it is as if Y is psychologically connected with X. And if X did anticipate surviving as Y then Y will believe that the things have turned out just the way X believed would constitute X's surviving. Here we are inclined to believe X's surviving inspite of not having a causal connectedness to facilitate the survival of X as Y. Survival should be asserted in Ab also if we accept survival in Aa.33

The above argument put forward by Elliot shows that it is not causal connectedness of psychological states that determines a person's survival. However, Elliot did not try to prove that psychological continuity without causal continuity should be regarded as the determining factor of identity. He rather wanted to prove that causal connectedness as advocated by supporters of the causal connectedness theory cannot be regarded as the deciding feature of a person's identity.

This fact that we are equally inclined to assert identity even when causal connectedness is not available goes to show that causal connectedness cannot be regarded as the determining factor of personal identity.

To further test the validity of mental connectedness as the criterion of personal identity we will employ the survival test. In other words, we will try to find out whether a person survives or not in the absence of a particular mental series which does not remain the same by virtue of not being causally connected.

Let us take an imaginary example where a person's
mental states have been taken away from him and they are replaced by some other mental states. After such a replacement all the memories and character traits of the person whose mental states are replaced will be extirpated and in the place of those memories and character traits some other memories and character traits come into being. In other words, the replacing mental series is not causally dependent on the replaced mental series and as such they are two different mental series. Now the question that arises is, 'Is the person after the replacement of the mental states survives inspite of discontinuity of the original series?' If mental connectedness determined the identity of a person then the answer to the above question would have been in negative. We would have said that the person after the replacement of the mental states does not remain the same person with the one who went in for the replacement. But an appeal to intuition does not let us accept that the person has not survived the replacement of the mental states. Even though the two series are not causally connected we are inclined to assert the identity of the person. This gives rise to doubt regarding the validity of mental connectedness as the criterion of personal identity.
However, such a replacement may result in two different situations and it is essential that we distinguish between them. In one situation the replacing mental states are qualitatively similar to the original mental states and in the other situation the replacing mental states are totally different in their quality from the replaced mental states. Let us take up each case separately and see whether in either of these situations mental connectedness can be considered as the necessary condition of personal identity.

In the first case as we have said, the two different sets of mental states are qualitatively similar. Here, a person is subjected to replacement of mental states and this replacement takes place in the split of a second. We know that the replacement has taken place though the quality of the pre-replacement mental states is similar to post-replacement mental states. After such a replacement we are inclined to say that the person who has emerged after the replacement is the same with the person who was subjected to replacement. But it is a fact that the post-replacement mental states are not causally dependent on the pre-replacement mental states.
This shows that a person survives inspite of not having a causally connected mental series. In other words, causal connectedness of the mental states does not determine the identity of a person. Had it been the determining factor, the person who was subjected to the replacement would not have survived after the replacement. But we do claim survival even after replacement of mental states of the above kind, as we cannot accept such a replacement as tantamount to death. And to accept survival of the person after such a replacement makes it evident that mental connectedness is not a necessary condition of personal identity.

We have seen that replacement of mental states by qualitatively similar mental states proves mental connectedness as falling short of being necessary condition for personal identity. Now, let us take another case where the replacing mental states are dissimilar to the replaced mental states and see whether a person ceases to be the same person after such a replacement. In such a situation the person goes in for the replacement with certain mental states and comes out with different mental states which are qualitatively different.
from the original mental states. During the replacement the person remains conscious. After the replacement the person claims himself to be the person which his new mental states tell him. In such a situation we have an inclination to say that the original person has ceased to exist after the replacement and in his place has come into being a new person. This inclination arises because we conflate the two ways of understanding the notion of person. In our ordinary way of understanding the concept of person we take that sameness of a person depends to a certain degree on the sameness of personality of that man. A radical change in personality often makes us say that he is not the same person as he used to be. We often utter sentences like, 'He is not the same person anymore', 'I was a different person then', etc. But this way of understanding 'person' is not relevant to our discussion of personal identity. The concept of person as understood in the problem of personal identity is to be distinguished from our ordinary way of understanding the concept. In the discussion of the problem of personal identity the concept of person is to be understood as the subject of consciousness - the self. It is this concept of person which is referred to in the replacement case. Here we are not concerned with the concept of
person in the sense of person having a personality. We are concerned with the question whether the same subject of consciousness continues or not after the replacement, that is, whether after such a replacement a new self comes into being or not. As long as we understand person in the sense of being the subject of consciousness we are inclined to say that the post-replacement and the pre-replacement persons are not two but one person or one identical self. The person concerned also after the replacement may claim to be the person which the new set of mental states tells him but as he was conscious during the replacement he will also claim that he is the continuation of the original person as there was no break in the consciousness. Therefore, we can say that the person in the sense of being the subject of consciousness has retained his identity though as a person defined by his personality has changed. The person thus has not changed in the essential sense but has changed only in terms of his personality. The ordinary notion of sameness of a person thus seems to comprise of two conditions:

(1) A is the same self or subject as B, and
(2) A is sufficiently psychologically similar to B. In the case under consideration where one mental series is replaced by a qualitatively dissimilar mental series, the first condition is fulfilled but not the second. It is because the second condition is not fulfilled that we feel inclined to say that the pre-replacement and post-replacement persons are not one and the same person. We hesitate to ascribe identity to the person after the replacement of the mental series by a qualitatively different mental series because in such a case the second condition has not been fulfilled. But this condition has little relevance to the discussion of personal identity. In fact this is not an identity question but rather a question of personality. In the discussion of the problem of personal identity it is the notion of person as a self that has actual bearing. The notion of person as a self corresponds more exactly to the subject of mental attributes but does not include the attribute themselves in the way it would have done if it was understood in the other sense. If we understand the notion of person as a self then it is very plausible for us to say that the person who is subjected to the replacement will survive the replacement. The self will survive
inspite of the changes of the psychological states. Dissimilarity of mental states brings about changes in personality but the reference of 'I' remains the same. This proves that mental connectedness is not necessary condition of personal identity.

The above discussion shows that mental connectedness cannot be considered as a necessary condition for personal identity. Now, can it be considered as the sufficient condition of personal identity? To be a sufficient condition of personal identity mental connectedness should be such that whenever a particular mentally connected series is available we say that it must be the same person. So first we must be able to distinguish one particular series from another, that is, we must be able to say which mental states are connected in a special way to constitute one whole which in its turn determines the identity of a person. In other words, mental connectedness needs to be restricted if it is to serve as a sufficient condition of personal identity. Mental connectedness in general means that mental states of a particular mental series depend on preceding mental states for their occurrence while they in their turn give rise to
the succeeding mental states. This understanding of mental connectedness involves the possibility of connecting the mental states of two numerically different persons. My mental states might have been caused by somebody else's behaviour which is an external expression of his mental states and thus my mental states can be said to be dependent on the other person's mental states. Causal dependence of mental states without restriction may well be considered to include the mental states of many numerically distinct persons. My mental states are caused not only by my preceding mental states but by others' as well. I have a certain mental state because I have been affected in some ways by the behaviour of someone else which is caused by his mental state. If causal connectedness without restriction is considered as the sufficient condition of personal identity then one's identity will include other numerically distinct persons. We cannot accept this absurd position and so arises the necessity of putting some restrictions on the causal connectedness of mental states if it is ever to serve as the sufficient condition for personal identity. However, difficulties arise when we try to put this restriction, resulting in circularity. One way of restricting the connectedness
is by saying that a particular mental series is distinct because it belongs to a distinct person or self. In other words, we are assuming that there is a distinct person and the mental states by virtue of being his mental states make up a distinct mental construct which in turn determines that person's identity. If we want to avoid this circularity, the other way open to us is to bring in the body and say that only those mental states can be said to be connected in the special way to constitute a series which belong to a particular body. If we do this, it no more remains a mentalistic criterion for it asserts that body is necessary for personal identity. And this is what, as we have seen in the earlier chapter, the Body Theory asserts. Thus we see that mental connectedness if ever is to become a sufficient condition of personal identity needs to be restricted which cannot be done either without involving circularity or without taking recourse to the Body Theory. In other words, mental connectedness cannot be considered as a sufficient condition either for personal identity.

Thus, the Mind Theory as discussed above failed to give us a satisfactory criterion of personal identity.
In the next two sections of this chapter I am going to discuss Parfit's theory of 'Survival Without Identity' and 'Brain Identity Theory' as specialized versions of Mind Theory and examine whether they can overcome the difficulties faced by the Mind Theory so far in giving us a mentalistic criterion of personal identity.

Parfit's Theory of Survival Without Identity:

Theories of self try to reveal the nature of self by giving us the criterion of personal identity. And to find out the criterion we employ survival test. But Parfit attacks our very belief in personal identity. According to him, there is no such thing as personal identity and that which matters in a person's continued existence is his survival. And this survival does not prove the existence of a permanent underlying subject, i.e., a self. For Parfit personal identity is nothing but a belief which has borrowed its importance from its association with some important philosophical matter, and as such we can do away with it.

According to Parfit, the problem of personal identity
can be divided into two beliefs:

1. The first belief is with regard to the nature of personal identity, and
2. The second belief is with regard to the importance of the concept of personal identity.

Our belief in the nature of personal identity can be expressed as: "whatever happens between now and any future time, either I shall exist or I shall not. Any future experience will either be my experience or it will not be." We will see that this belief results in certain absurdities. To show the absurdities Parfit takes up Wiggins's example of divided brain.

In this example a person undergoes a brain operation where his brain is divided into its two hemispheres. Then, each hemisphere is planted in a new body. So when the operation is completed there are two bodies each having one half of the brain of the person who went in for operation. Each one of the resultant persons exhibit the characteristic of the original person and has his apparent memories. Such a situation presents us with three possible reactions:
1. I donot survive.
2. I survive as one of the two people.
3. I survive as both.

Let us now see what happens if we accept the first position.

A person may have a brain operation where one half of his brain is damaged but the other half is working like before. In such a case we will say that he has survived. Now in Wiggins's example each of the resultant persons have half of the original brain. So in them also the original person should be said to have survived if survival is accepted in the other case where the person survived with one half of his brain damaged. If a person can be said to have survived when only one half of his brain is working, then how can we say that he is dead when both halves of his brain, that is, the whole brain is functioning fine? If we claim a single successful operation as survival, how can a double success be called death? Parfit says that this is absurd and therefore we cannot accept the first of the three alternatives.

The second position also leads to some sort of
contradiction. Parfit says that if we accept this position then it will mean that after the operation where each half of my brain is put in two different bodies, I say that, I survive as one of the resulting person. But there is no proper ground on which I can claim that I am one of them and not the other. Both the resultant individuals are equally eligible to be me and there is no reason for me to prefer one as myself and the other as not me.

Thus it seems that we are left with the third alternative - I survive as both. This position cannot be accepted if we believe that survival like identity is one-one relation. But if we are ready to give up this believe then we find that there is no absurdity in accepting this position. We have seen that we cannot talk of death after the operation takes place nor can we say that I survive as only one of them. So we must admit that I survive as both but then there is no identity either of me with both of them or identity of each with the other. This shows that survival and identity are not one and the same thing. And we certainly cannot give up our claim of survival in this case simply because there is no identity. To admit survival in this case is
not absurd and this can be shown with the following imaginary example.

Let us suppose that a person can disconnect and unite the two hemispheres of his brain at his will. In such a case a person can disconnect the two hemispheres of his brain for each hemisphere to think out its own way of solving a problem. When each half comes to a solution the person decides to unite the two hemispheres. Then after the union, the person will simply feel that he has thought out two ways of solving the problem. This is not absurd. And his divided brain does not mean that he was dead during the division nor does it mean that he is just one of the divided brain after the union. The person thus has survived the division.

Wiggins's example is similar to the above cited case with only one difference, the difference being that in Wiggins's example the two halves of a brain do not get united again. In the example where the two hemispheres got united it was not difficult to assert survival. But in Wiggins's example where the two persons continue to live in two different bodies and start growing different
habits, characteristics and start living in two different parts of the world, it is not easy to claim survival of the original person as now there are two persons instead of one. Parfit says that in such a situation we can say that I do survive the operation as both the persons. They can be different people and yet be me, in just the way in which Pope's three crowns are one crown. In this answer survival does imply identity but in that case the concept of person will have to be changed. But we are dealing here with the generally accepted concept of a person and his survival and identity. If we say that the resulting people are different and yet in a way are me then it gives rise to certain problems. Let us take a situation where the resulting people are fighting a duel. Now, are there three people fighting, one on each side and one on both? And if one of the resulting person dies by a bullet do we say it was a suicide or a murder? How many persons survive after this? One? Two? Or is it one and a half? which of course is absurd. To maintain a situation which is not absurd it would be better to suppose that there are two resulting persons after Wiggins's operation takes place and these two persons hold a special kind of relation to the original person.
Thus we accept that the original person survives as two different and distinct individuals but as this situation does not give us a one-one relationship we cannot talk of identity here. An objection may arise here that such a proposition leaves out identity and thus should be rejected as we are concerned about identity of a person. But there is no reason, according to Parfit, to hold on to the belief of identity when, as we have seen, it leads to absurdity or self contradiction. In Wiggins's example of brain division we have seen that we cannot admit identity and yet we find it almost impossible to deny survival. Certainly we should not reject survival simply because there is no identity here. In the example of divided brain the relation between the resultant persons and the original person is the sort of relation which is all that matters in survival. So we must hold on to survival without identity. All we need for this is a sense in which one person can survive as two. In other words, Parfit suggests that we give up our belief in the special nature of identity. He says that it is actually survival which matters and survival may not be always one-one relationship. We cannot simply deny survival because there is no identity. Identity
may not be available in all cases of survival but survival when one-one can be talked in terms of identity. We have started giving importance to identity relation because what actually matters in our life is one-one relation. However, this should not lead us astray to say that survival if not one-one must not be considered as survival as it does not imply identity. The fact remains that it is survival which actually matters and when is not one-one relation we should give up talking about identity.

According to Parfit the concept of personal identity is used to imply psychological continuity. In other words, when we say that there is personal identity we actually mean that there is psychological continuity. And it is this psychological continuity (including causal continuity) that determines our survival, that is, it is the criterion of survival. But that does not make psychological continuity the criterion of identity because, psychological continuity is not always one-one. Psychological continuity can serve as the criterion of identity when it is one-one but, it in all its form, that is, whether it is one-one or takes a branching form, it is the determining factor of survival for survival also need
not be one-one. We cannot reject psychological continuity as the ground for survival simply because it is not the ground for identity. It is so because it is survival, says Parfit, which really matters in the continued existence of a person.

Bernard Williams's rejection of psychological continuity as the ground of survival is based on the mistaken belief that it is identity which matters and not survival. He argued that psychological continuity may not be always one-one and thus cannot be a criterion of identity. But Parfit argues back by saying that psychological continuity may not serve as a criterion of identity but it can still be the ground for claiming survival. Parfit uses Williams's own principle that an important judgement should be asserted and denied only on importantly different grounds, to show that psychological continuity is the ground for claiming survival.

"Williams applied this principle to a case in which one man is psychologically continuous with the dead Guy Fawkes, and a case in which two men are. His argument was this. If we treat psychological continuity as a sufficient ground for speaking of identity, we shall
say that the one man is Guy Fawkes. But we could not say that the two men are, although we should have the same ground. This disobeys the principle. The remedy is to deny that the one man is Guy Fawkes, to insist that sameness of the body is necessary for identity."34

Williams's principle can yield a different answer altogether. Parfit says that this principle instead of proving psychological continuity as not being important for personal identity can be used to prove that psychological continuity is the ground on which we claim survival. Williams used the principle to prove that it is bodily identity which gives a person his identity over time. Parfit says that Williams interpreted his principle keeping in mind that bodily identity is more important then psychological continuity. But it can yield a different conclusion altogether if we regard psychological continuity as more important than sameness of the body in the continued existence of a person. If a person is really psychologically continuous with Guy Fawkes it would disobey Williams's principle if we deny that the person is Guy Fawkes because, we have the same important ground

to assert the person's survival as in a normal case of identity. Therefore, we ought to assert survival if we are to obey the principle. In order to assert survival we must take the importance from the judgement of identity and attach this importance directly to the ground, that is, psychological continuity. If we accept it then in Wiggins's example of divided brain in each resultant person the original can be said to have survived as the psychological continuity is available; each limb of the branching relation is as good as survival. Accepting this position does go along with Williams's principle, that is, this obeys the principle.

The above argument goes to show that psychological continuity can give us survival irrespective of the fact that it may take a branching form. We cannot deny the validity of psychological continuity as the determining factor of survival simply because it always cannot serve as the criterion of identity. The psychological continuity becomes the criterion of identity when is one-one.

Parfit after showing that psychological continuity
cannot be discarded simply on the ground of being responsible for two different conclusion, namely, similarity and identity, as the criterion for survival discusses the second belief involved in personal identity, that is, the importance of the concept of personal identity. According to him the concept of personal identity has come to occupy a special place in philosophy because it is considered to be a presupposition of some relations which are important in philosophy. But if we can show that it is not a necessary presupposition it will no more retain its importance. One such relation which is said to presuppose personal identity is memory relation. Parfit tries to show that identity is not necessary presupposition of memory.

Memory is taken to involve the logical truth that one remembers only one's own experiences. Now for the sake of argument Parfit uses the concept of 'q-memory' which does not necessarily involve the logical truth that one remembers only one's own experiences. This q-memory may be defined as follows:

I am q-remembering an experience if
(1) I have a belief about a past-experience
which seems itself like a memory belief. (2) Some one did have such an experience, and (3) my belief is dependent upon this experience in the same way (whatever that is) in which memory of an experience is dependent upon it.

In case of memory, when I seem to remember something, I also take it that it is I who had the experience which now I seem to remember. In other words, when I seem to remember an experience I automatically assume that it was me who had the experience. But when we think about it we do not find in our apparent memory that part which suggests that I, the one who is having the apparent memory is the same one who had the experience. We assume it without questioning because memory involves the logical truth that I remember only my own experiences. In a q-memory it is this very fact which we cannot take for granted, that is, if I q-remember having an experience then it does not follow that I must be the one who had the experience. If q-memory was the rule then in having a q-memory all that we would have assumed is that someone did have an experience which now I q-remember. Q-memory thus does not presuppose identity. The concept of q-memory is wider than memory and as such Parfit says that we
should drop the concept of memory altogether and in its place we can use the concept of q-memory.

Parfit says that just as memory can be shown as not necessarily involving the presupposition of identity there are some other concepts which also can be shown as not necessarily involving the presupposition of personal identity. The concept of intention is such a concept where identity is presupposed. This concept involves the logical truth that we can have intentions to perform our own actions alone. Parfit formulates a new concept of q-intention where it is not the logical truth. The concept of q-intention can be brought in Wiggins's case of divided brain where two persons result from one original brain. Here it is plausible to suppose that the original person may q-intend to perform certain actions as one of them. Such a supposition does not presuppose identity. Certain other concepts can also be formulated in the model of such concepts of q-memory and q-intention. A man who can q-remember can q-recognise and be a q-witness of what he has never seen; and a man who can q-intend can have q-ambitions, make q-promises and be q-responsible for.
Relations as those mentioned above come under psychological continuity and the fact that they do not presuppose identity go to suggest that a person can survive through psychological continuity without presupposing identity. This goes to show that it is survival and not personal identity which is important in the continued existence of a man. If this is so then personal identity no more occupies an important place in philosophy.

Psychological continuity thus, says Parfit, neither presupposes identity nor always implies identity but it is the ground on the basis of which we assert survival. All cases of psychological continuity are cases of survival but all cases of survival are not cases of identity. We assert survival in all cases of psychological continuity because survival is not a all-or-nothing matter, it may have degrees. Identity relation on the other hand cannot have degrees; it is an all-or-nothing relation and as such cannot be asserted when psychological continuity takes a branching form.

Parfit to show that survival is a matter of degree
uses certain imaginary examples. In one example there are two persons who merge and become one while unconscious. This is a case of fusion as opposed to Wiggins's example of divided brain which is a case of fission. In a case of fusion we have one resulting person coming out from two different persons. Now the question that arises is whether the original two persons survive or not. It may be argued that they do not survive. The new person may retain all the q-memories of the original persons but he may not retain all their desires, characteristics and psychological properties. Some of them still may be available but all cannot be there. In case where properties are compatible they will continue with each other; in cases where they are incompatible, if they are of equal strength they will cancel out or the stronger can be made weaker and so on. So on the ground that these properties get changed it can be argued that the original persons do not survive. But this is a weak ground, according to Parfit, to deny survival. Every one of us in our lifetime undergo certain psychological changes. We certainly do not consider such changes as death. If in such a case psychological changes are not considered sufficient for claiming death then in the case of fusion
also we have no right to consider certain psychological changes as death. Even though we do not consider fusion as tantamount to death we also find it hard to attribute survival in the complete sense of the term to the original individuals. Originally there were two persons and now there is only one. The question always remains as to what happened to one of the individuals. There were two distinct individuals and in their place there is only one now. In such a situation neither can we say that the original two persons have died the moment fusion took place nor can we say that they have survived in the complete sense of survival. Here we accept survival but in some degree only. This shows that survival is a matter of degree.

Parfit gives another example to show that survival has degree. Let us imagine that there are certain beings who reproduce through divisions. In such a situation one person becomes two and those two persons become four. This is not very different from Wiggins's case except that division keeps on happening to result in many limbs. Here we will not find it difficult to attribute survival to a person if the individual person is the product of
an immediate division of the original individual. But can we attribute survival with an equal easiness to a person who has come into being after many such divisions that started with an early individual? It is true that we cannot deny psychological continuity of the original person even after many divisions. But it is hard to admit survival inspite of the availability of psychological continuity. So it seems that it is not psychological continuity in all its forms which determines survival. Parfit says that psychological continuity determines survival only when individuals are related by a direct psychological relation. By a direct psychological relation Parfit means that sort of relation which holds between a q-memory and a q-remembered action. Without such a direct psychological relation survival is not possible. If X q-remembers most of Y's life and Y q-remembers most of Z's life it does not follow that X q-remembers most of Z's life. In other words, direct psychological relation which is phrased by Parfit as psychological connectedness is non-transitive. As long as this direct, a non-transitive relation holds survival is available, otherwise not. But this psychological connectedness cannot hold indefinitely. It becomes weaker gradually till it vanishes
one day. "Q-memories will weaken with passage of time, and then fade away. Q-ambitions, once fulfilled, will be replaced by others. Q-characteristics will gradually change." And ultimately there will be no psychological states which can be said to be directly related to some individual's psychological states who is related to him by many divisions existing between them.

The relation that holds between individuals separated by an immediate division is very strong and clear. Such a relation is like the relation that holds between today's me and myself tomorrow. Phrases like 'my past self', 'my future self' can be used to imply psychological connectedness depending on the factor of whether one was earlier in time or later in time. Likewise phrases like 'my ancestral self' or 'my descendent self' can be used to imply psychological continuity.

But whatever phrases we use, on whichever factor we give importance to, be it psychological continuity or psychological connectedness to claim survival, the fact that one of these two relations, namely, psychological

connectedness that is involved in survival of a person is a relation of degree is sufficient to show, according to Parfit, that survival is a matter of degree.

What actually matters in the continued existence of a person is survival and it is a matter of degree. Survival need not be always an one-one relationship but when it is one-one it serves as the criterion of identity. So according to Parfit it is psychological continuity which determines a person's identity provided it is one-one relationship and not some permanent entity which remains unchanged in the midst of changes that determines our identity. There is no such thing as 'me' or 'my self' that gives a person his identity over time. These are nothing but terms that are used to indicate the continued existence of a person as determined by survival. According to Parfit we should therefore stop looking for a permanent self which in reality does not exist. What exist is a psychological continuity determining a person's survival and that is what matters in the continued existence of a man.

Thus according to Parfit what matters in the
continued existence of a man is survival and this survival is maintained by psychological continuity which serves as the criterion of survival. Now, psychological continuity as held by Perfit can be maintained by quasi states, namely, quasi memory which he says do not presuppose personal identity. But Marya Schechtman argues that quasi states cannot be considered as the criterion of survival. Accepting quasi states as possible implies that our relation to the experiences we remember is separable from their content. If Perfit is right in holding that psychological continuity is possible through quasi states then it would imply that we can have someone else's memory and there would be nothing abnormal about it. But it is not possible to understand memory and other psychological states without presupposing identity of some sort. Without taking identity of some sort for granted we cannot talk about memory because then, they will rather become delusions which cannot be considered seriously as a criterion of survival.

In the following argument Marya Schechtman shows that it is not possible to have quasi memory. But by

proving the absurdity of quasi memory she is also trying to prove the absurdity of all quasi states.

Generally, one's memories (are memories which) involve personal details like the familiarity of the place where one lives, the objects and people whom one sees everyday, one's relationship to the people around him and his responses to their behaviours etc.. It is difficult to imagine how one can receive the quasi memory of such experiences which includes so many personal details. It may be possible to imagine to have quasi memory of an instantaneous experience like q-remembering an experience of seeing lightening and the feeling that accompanied one's seeing. But the memories that we generally have every day are not such memories but are memories which involve a good many number of personal details of one's life. Personal details of one person are foreign to another person who may be psychologically and historically a totally different person. It is difficult to imagine how a woman who is single can have memories of a man who has a wife and children and lives in a place which she has never even visited. We cannot imagine the woman experiencing the feelings along with the q-memory
that accompanied the experiences of the experiencer. The man might have been proud of his wife, embarrassed by his children's behaviour and concerned about all of them. These feelings accompanying the memory will be out of place for the woman remembering them. It is really not easy to imagine having quasi memories.

There may be two ways of possessing quasi memories. First, in having quasi memories we will reproduce all the visual content of the memory without interpreting it the way the experiencer does, that is, one will reproduce only the things that happened without the feelings that accompanied the experiences. The second alternative is that one will reproduce the memory exactly as it occurs in the experiencer with all the personal elements and associations. It can be shown that neither of these alternatives will allow quasi memory to serve as a criterion of survival and identity without presupposing identity.

It is not very clear that the first alternative is actually possible. Our memories may not be strictly visual as this alternative suggests. Remembering does
not mean simply to have visual images of things or places alone which one is able to recognise. We can have non-visual memories of persons who were around us, the things that occurred and the feelings we had at the time of experiencing them. If the personal details which constitute a large part of memory is missing in quasi memory then the question arises whether such a memory can really be called as the memory of the experiencer. There is good reason to question whether one's quasi memory so understood is qualitatively like a memory at all. Phenomenologically it will be drastically different from the experiencer's memory, appearing not as a coherent memory of the experiencer's experience and in fact will be unlike any memory at all. If quasi memory is different from genuine memory in such a fundamental way then we seem to have no good reason to call it a quasi memory of the experiencer's experience. This in turn makes it quite unreasonable to say that the quasi memory captures what is relevant in the connection between genuine memory and the experience remembered.

The second possible way to imagine this case is to imagine the experiencer's memory being reproduced
in another person as quasi memory with all the personal details of the genuine memory. In such a case of quasi memory the one who is having it will feel that the experiencer's relations are now his relations, the things which were familiar to the other person are also familiar to him and the original person's emotional responses will seem like his own responses. If this is what happens in a quasi memory then it is difficult to do away with the belief that an experience I remember is my experience is separable from the memory itself. If quasi memory involves the sense that they are memories of my experience then it is undeniable that mineness of the experience is inseparable from the content of memory. Parfit might respond to this objection by saying that though it is true to a point, the belief is separable at a later stage. He says that the apparent memory itself may carry the belief that the memory is the memory of one's own experience but on reflection one would be able to separate the belief from the content. This would involve one having a memory qualitatively just like the experiencer's but reflecting on it one will be able to say that the personal details which are included in the memory are somebody else's whose memory he is having now.
There are problems to this solution too. Such a quasi memory contains all the elements of the experiencer's memory but there is an additional element of one's confusion in remembering things which are not familiar to him. The person who is q-remembering has a feeling that these memories are foreign, anomalous, and as if cannot be right but must be some sort of delusions or fantasies. Such memories cannot be part of a coherent life history of a person who is having the quasi memories if the experiencer and the rememberer are very much different from each other psychologically, physically, and historically. A memory which has been familiar to the experiencer will be foreign to the rememberer and this will create a sense of confusion in the rememberer. It seems quite plausible to say therefore that the element of strangeness available in quasi memory makes it qualitatively different from the genuine memory of the experiencer. If, therefore, we really want to reproduce in somebody else the qualitative content of the experiencer's memory we will not only have to recreate a great many of the experiencer's psychological states in the rememberer but suppress a great many of the rememberer's as well. If this is necessary for a quasi memory then to have a quasi
memory one will have to undergo almost complete psycholog­
ical change. It would almost seem that the rememberer's psy­
chology is replaced by the experiencer's psychology. In other words, quasi states fail to serve as the crite­
rion of survival and identity because either they leave out the vital thing which can be said to retain a person's identity (when survival is one-one) or it becomes delu­
sional. In Marya Schechtman own words:

quasi states fail to do the work they are supposed to because they include either too little or too much of the state they reproduce. If they include too little, they donot capture what is relevant to personal identity, and if they include too much, then unless sameness of person is assumed, they are delusional.37

Thus, we have seen that quasi states as advocated by Parfit cannot be really accepted. But equally unacce­
ptable are the fusion and fission cases on which Parfit mainly bases his argument that, it is survival which really matters in a person's continued existence, that survival of a person does not consist in his identity. Fusion and fission cases as discussed by Parfit are from

the third-person perspective and considered from that perspective they seem quite valid. But they are not easily acceptable when considered from first-person perspective. J.R. Lucas has maintained in his article 'A Mind of One's Own' that we need to ask how the story is to be told from inside before attempting to say how we, on the outside would respond.

Lucas first dealt with fusion case and regarded our response to it from first-person perspective.

In the hypothetical experiment involving the fusion of two personalities there will be first the difficulty of integrating two disperate memories into one coherent and plausible history of the putative person. I can imagine that somebody else's memories are implanted in me so that I continue not only with my memory but also with another person's memory. But certainly I will find difficulty in accepting the other person's memory as real memory. Apparent memory cannot be always accepted without question. We generally accept only those memories as correct which do go along with the rest of our remembered experiences. Even if certain memories appear to
be vivid we donot accept them as correct unless and until they do not go against what I know to be true. It is true that memory generally is reliable but it is not infallible by nature and only those memories are accepted which do not run counter to what we know and understand to be true. Each man's autobiography rejects those matters which cannot be accommodated within what is already known and understood. If these putative memories are to be accepted as correct then the person who is having them must suppress certain other critical faculties which reject these memories as correct memory claims. The required suppression of the critical faculties may be so great that the person in whom the memories are implanted may become a totally irrational and barely self-conscious being. Thus fusion cases do not appear to be coherent when considered from inside, from first-person perspective. In Lucas's words -

'although I may by my own free decision share the rest of my life with another, merging my individual will in our joint choices, and coming to know all her memories as she recounts them, neither of us can know the other's early memories first-hand, and our sharing could never conceivably become a complete coalescence.'

Fission cases can also be shown to be incoherent from first-person perspective like fusion, though not so absolutely. A person needs to be able to make sense of his future as well as his past. As Glover emphasizes our identities are very largely what we ourselves create. Unless and until there is a coherent view of my future, I shall not have a coherent concept of myself. It may not be very difficult to imagine oneself in future where one is bilocated but it is difficult to make sense of the prospect of one's being to mes different in mind from each other. In the future when I will be divided into two selves the situation should not be such that my one self is ready to slain the other self. I may decide before fission takes place that such a thing will not happen, that both my selves will stay in harmony with each other. But decision may change. And in such a case I would not know what to think - will I survive even after killing one of my selves? Let us say that such a situation will not arise as I will not change my decision. But what happens when I am unaware of a division that is going to take place? In such a case I as the original

self will not make any decisions regarding my future selves. So the future selves will not know how to react when they meet each other - whether each should consider the other as an imposter to be killed or an alter ego to be cherished. Such problems remain in fission cases when considered from inside. And certainly in case of personal identity first-person perspective cannot be given up as our first awareness of 'self' is in our self-awareness.

Colin McGinn also has questioned the validity of Parfit's argument as based on fission and fusion. McGinn has compared cases of personal fusion and fission with that of other entities such as plants and then he questioned the correctness of claiming survival in personal cases.

McGinn takes a case of fission of a plant where the plant is separated into two halves and are grown separately so that they result in two different plants. In such a case we do not claim identity of the original plant and yet we do not say that the original plant is not

available in any form at all. In other words, we are saying that the original plant is still existing in some form. Now in another case it can be imagined that two plants are being halved and then one half of each plant is joined together to produce another plant. In this case also the original plants are not identical with this new plant, but they are still 'around' in some way in this new plant. Our hesitancy to assert the absence of the original plants in the fusion case as well as in the fission case can be diagnosed as our instinctive desire to claim the survival of the original plants in both the cases. In the fission case we say that the original plant has survived as parts of the resultant plant and in the fusion case the originals survive as parts of them constitute the new plant. In other words in cases of plant fission and fusion we seem to be admitting survival without identity. Here our claims for survival are based on the relation of part and whole. We say that an object survives when whole of it survives and it survives also when part of it survives. Our claim of survival in personal fission and fusion also seem to be based on this part-whole relationship. Parfit, as we have seen, bases his argument of survival without
identity mainly on brain dissection and unification. He argues that a person survives a fission because in it each part of his brain lives on in each resultant individual. And in a fusion case the original persons survive because one half of each of their brain lives on in the resultant individual. Thus, Parfit's claim of survival without identity in fission and fusion cases is similar to survival claim of plants in their fission and fusion. McGinn here asked the question whether it is really proper to treat cases of personal identity as similar to identity questions of other entities. McGinn has argued against such treatment of personal identity. In his own words:

'In agreeing that a person may survive in cases of fission and fusion are we tacitly conceiving the person strictly on the model of his brain - and if we are, is this legitimate? That is, are we regarding the self as subject to the same principles, with respect to the connection between survival and the part-whole relation, as these other non-personal entities? If we are, then we are presupposing a certain conception of the constitution of the self, and the question must arise whether this conception is really acceptable. It is important, in considering this question, to appreciate that the intuition of personal
survival is not satisfactorily explained in terms of psychological similarity and causal connectedness: if this were the sort of fact upon which the claim of survival rested, then the claim would be vulnerable to the criticism of such accounts of personal identity. Short of a convincing defence of mental connectedness theories of the self, we cannot accept this account of what survival amounts to in the fission and fusion cases; indeed such an account of survival in the personal case is even less plausible than for the analogous fission and fusion cases involving material objects. The relation of being a part of an earlier object is a far stronger relation than that of having states which are causally connected with states of some earlier object. It seems, then, that the claim of survival in cases of personal fission and fusion must depend upon presuppositions concerning part and whole: the resulting persons in a fission case are being conceived as literally parts of the original, and a fused person is being taken to have earlier persons as parts. That is to say, we must be conceiving persons in the image of their brains when we agree that there is survival in these cases: we are supposing that selves may, quite literally, be divided into parts, as brains and plants may be so divided; and this is to suppose that
To believe in survival after fission and fusion like Parfit is to give up the intuitive concept of self. Parfit seems to be considering self as a composite entity capable of division on the model of divisibility of non-personal things like plants. His thesis of divisibility of self is mainly based on the divisibility of the brain. Division of self through the division of brain when considered from third-person perspective does not seem very difficult to accept. But it is hard to accept the moment we apply this concept of a divisible self to ourselves. If I accept fission case to be true then I believe that my self is divisible, that is, my consciousness can be curved into two separate halves, and each half is the original self for they both are the parts of the original. If my consciousness can be divided then my point of view can also be divided into two different points of view which are distinct and independent and still are my points of view. Such a consideration does not let us accept self as a composite entity. But we do believe that when

brain is divided into two parts and planted in two different bodies, there are two resultant persons, and if this is so they must also have two different selves. Such considerations do not allow us to reject fission and fusion cases as meaningless and yet self can hardly be considered as divisible if considered from first-person perspective. Moreover, divisibility of self along with the brain leads to a possibility where a brain is divided into many parts and planted in different bodies and thus many selves will emerge from one single self. These new selves are independent and yet are same with the original being as they are parts of it. These selves will have their own points of view and will conceive themselves as possessing unitary and non-composite inner consciousness.

We have seen that divisibility of the self is not acceptable when considered from the first-person perspective. I cannot imagine myself to be divided into parts which will be me by virtue of being my parts. It is impossible for me to accept these selves as me for they are independent and distinct selves, different from me as well as from each other. Divisibility of self goes against our natural belief about the self. We believe it
to be simple and find it hard to accept any theory that attacks this very instinctive belief. We are more comfortable in accepting a concept that goes along with our natural belief. It is this reason which makes us accept more easily a case where only one half of the brain survives as survival than a case where both halves survive resulting in two different persons. So some philosophers who are advocates of the naive notion of the self hold that in case of fission two new selves come into being rather than the original self continuing. When two persons come to exist as a result of fission the original self should be considered as no more existing but if only one half of the brain survives then the original self should be thought as continuing. Survival is possible in case of a person only through identity because without identity if self is thought to continue then it becomes divisible like a plant and this is not acceptable. Self does not have any parts and therefore cannot survive by virtue of division - identity is the only mode of survival for a simple substance like self.

The discussion of fission and fusion fail to prove what it set out to prove, that is, there can be survival
without identity. It is because we find it unacceptable to accept self as divisible. In the word of McGinn,

'The conception of the self that has seemed to elude explanation in other terms was the naive notion we are naturally prone to operate with. It may be that this notion is not, after all, coherent; but it is the notion we have, and any philosophical account of the self has as its first duty the elucidation of that notion. The onus is then on an opponent of the naive notion to show it to be unacceptable. The ordinary conception of the self seems to credit it with the following (inter-related) properties: that it is a simple indivisible substance; that it is not ontologically reducible to other sorts of entities and their relations; that its presence is all-or-nothing; that its survival can consists in nothing other than its identity over time; that its survival is not a matter of degree (since it is simple in nature); that it is a mental concept whose essence is best revealed from the first-person perspective (it is to be seen first and foremost as the reference of 'I'); that its identity over time cannot be given non-trivial criteria. These properties are connected in various ways; but the fundamental property of the self, which underlies and explains the others, is the property of
being a simple substance apprehended as such in self-consciousness. This explains why the self is irreducible and why we cannot give informative criteria of identity for it, and also why it seems that any future person is either definitely you or definitely not - why there cannot really be partial survival of a self. 42

Brain Identity Theory

We have seen that, the mental correctedness (causal connectedness) cannot provide us with a satisfactory criterion of personal identity and as such not acceptable. Equally unacceptable is the no-self theory of Parfit. Both these theories are different from each other but they have one feature in common. That is, both theories consider psychological continuity playing the crucial role in the continued existence of a person. For one theory psychological continuity (including causal continuity) provided criterion for identity while for the other it provided the criterion for survival. Now a third theory emerges as a result of considering psychological continuity as important for personal identity. It is

called Brain Identity Theory. Parfit as we saw, claimed survival where psychological continuity was available. Brain Identity Theory claims survival not on the availability of the psychological continuity but on the availability of the same brain which carries these psychological states. This theory claims brain identity as the criterion of personal identity. We say that the same person has continued over a period of time when we find that he has the same brain.

This Brain Identity Theory has one inherent problem, the problem of circularity. It is possible to conceive a situation where there is a causal connection among the brains of different individuals. Now, in such a situation we can say that there is only one brain whose different parts are situated in different bodies. These parts can be thought to constitute only one brain as it is possible to imagine a connection among the brains of different individuals. If this is accepted, then according to the Brain Identity Theory all these numerically distinct persons would be possessing one self, as sameness of self consist in sameness of the brain. In such a situation we will not be able to talk about
individual identity or individual self as we do not know what can be called as one distinct brain. This is an unacceptable position. We cannot accept such a position because we believe that numerically distinct persons possess distinct selves. Rather we can say that there is only one brain subserving numerically distinct selves. But Brain Identity Theory will collapse on the face of such a principle as it would imply that sameness of brain does not always mean sameness of the self. So the other alternative that is open to the advocates of this theory is that we consider each brain situated in different bodies as one distinct individual brain. That is, every individual possesses an individual brain. But saying this implies that first we assert that there is a distinct person who can be distinguished from others and then say that there is also a distinct brain situated in the individual and then we claim that the identity of the person is determined by this brain. In other words, the brain is rendered its distinctive character by the distinctive character a person which in turn asserts identity of that person. This is circularity. Brain Identity Theory does not tell us how to react to a case of fission where one brain is separated into two halves and planted in two
different bodies. As a result of fission there are two persons now and as such there are two selves. Now do we say that there is only one brain subserving two individuals as the brains of the resultant individuals are functionally identical halves of the original brain? Or do we say that there are two brains as there are two distinct individuals? An affirmative answer to the first question makes Brain Identity Theory invalid as in this case sameness of the brain does not imply sameness of the self. And the second alternative cannot be accepted as it involves circularity. Here we admit that there are two distinct brains because there are two resultant people possessing distinct selves. Thus the distinctive character of the brain is determined by the distinct selves and to make that brain responsible for that person's identity is to argue in a circle.

This view of brain being the criterion of personal identity also ignores one obvious feature. It ignores the fact that our knowledge of a person and our knowledge of his brain are independent from each other. We know that a person is a person even if we may not have any idea about what the brain is like. My understanding of
the concept of person does not necessarily involve my understanding of the concept of the brain. In ancient Greece people did not know about the function of the brain but, that did not stop them from having the concept of a person. A person who has acquired mastery over the concept of person need not be a brain specialist. Our formation of the concept of person can be without any knowledge about the brain, "It therefore seems, very implausible to suppose that our judgements about the identity of selves are based upon judgements of brain identity."^43

Brain and person are two independent concepts and redefining one does not necessarily indicate the necessity to redefine the other. If our concept of brain today is changed it does not mean we also will have to redefine our concept of self. Let us take a case where a person's brain is getting damaged and as such needs to be replaced by another new brain. While the replacement of the brain is going on the psychological states of the person are preserved in some other physiological

process. And when the replacement is over the psychological states again are put in the new brain. Now we certainly do not redefine the self as we should have done if sameness of the brain implied the sameness of the self. If the sameness of the self consisted in the sameness of the brain then a new self should have come into being when the original brain was replaced by a new one. But this has not happened. This implies that a person survives inspite of not having the same brain.

The self is different from the brain. We take the self as the subject who has the mental states but we do not claim the brain to be the subject of our mental states in the same way. It may be argued by the advocates of Brain Identity Theory that corresponding to every mental state there is a physical change in the brain. But certainly the mental states as we have them are not the same thing as having certain physical changes in the brain as a result of these mental states. We may have a new experience which does not necessarily add a new sort of state to the brain. Moreover, having a mental state and something that corresponds to the mental state cannot be one and the same thing. One cannot say
exactly what another person is experiencing by looking at the brain process which should have been the case if the Brain Identity Theorists were correct. The states the self has and the states a brain has are different from each other as well as their way of possessing them; the brain processes cannot constitute the mental state nor the brain can constitute the self.

The self realises its existence through consciousness. Thus, if the sameness of the brain implied the sameness of the self then we should have been able to say that I realise the existence of my brain through self-consciousness. This is absurd. The ontological status of the brain is in no way connected with the persistence of the self. Moreover, continuity of the brain does not always imply continuity of the self. In death of a person we call it death because his self by virtue of which he was what he was is not available any more. But the brain is certainly there even after the death of the person. If we consider brain identity as conferring self identity then we would not know how to explain the relation between a self and a 'person' where a person is dead but his brain is still available. This
shows that brain continuity is not sufficient for the continuity of the self. Again, in modern surgery a person declared as 'brain-dead' may suddenly come alive showing that he has probably continued as the same self during the period of 'brain-death'. Such a situation implies that there is no real connection between brain continuity and continuity of the self.

The self is always understood as the referent of 'I'. And when I utter the word 'I' certainly I do not use this word to refer to my brain. When I talk about brain I say my brain, that is, it is one of the thing that 'I' has but is not the 'I'. Our first realisation of the self is in the first-person perspective and we are always aware of it. There is no particular moment of time when I become aware of my self but in case of brain this need not be the case. Understanding of the idea of brain need not be in the first-person perspective. The brain is a physical thing, a part of a person's body, but the self is the whole being of a person by virtue of which a person is what he is. The brain may be said to carry our distinctive personality and thus is naturally seen as the criterion of our identity. But other parts
of a person's physiological make-up may be considered
to be distinctive in its own way and this does not let us consider these parts as our self. Similarly, my brain being the carrier of my distinct mental states does not become my self. Moreover, the psychological states which give brain its distinctive quality are necessary for the self-identity as we have already seen. Now if that is the case, brain being no more than a physical part of a person's body should not be important enough to be considered as the criterion of personal identity. Moreover, brain is a physical organ but in our effort to define 'I' we use qualities which are of 'mental in particular'.

The above discussion of the Brain Identity Theory goes to show that the theory is unacceptable as a theory of explaining the nature of self. The theory borrowed its basic idea from the causal connectedness of mental states as constituting the criterion of personal identity but brought in a physical aspect in the form of brain and made it the criterion of the personal identity. This physicalistic criterion rather than improving on the theory of causal connectedness as a criterion of personal
identity created some new problems of its own and in the end could not give us a satisfactory criterion of personal identity.