CHAPTER - III

THE BODY THEORY
According to the Body Theory, the sameness of self consists in the sameness of the body. It asserts that personal identity necessarily involves the identity of the body. In our everyday life we identify and individuate persons by reference to their body. When I say to my friend about another individual, 'This person is so and so', I refer to 'this person'. My reference to 'this person' individuates one single person and my friend must regard personal identity as involving bodily identity at least long enough for a name or uniquely identifying description, to acquire a reference. But my identifying myself does not involve my saying, 'I must be so and so for I remember being called thus'. I do not individuate myself by my body in order to know who I am. But I know myself to be 'myself' and this involves individuation of myself as distinguished from others. I know myself to be a distinct individual distinguished from all other individuals. But this distinguishing oneself from others involves reference to body.

Thus it can be seen that personal identity cannot do without bodily identity and it presupposes the existence of other people. If other people did not exist then
I would be left with a situation where there would be nobody for me not to be and if they exist then there are ways to know their existence. Our knowledge of other people is based on our knowledge of their bodily existence. This fact that reference to body is necessary for our knowledge of other people is a human predicament. And this predicament makes it essential that any philosophical theory of personal identity must be based on our physical existence of space and time.

The assertion that bodily identity is necessary for personal identity rules out any possibility of disembodied state of existence. The argument for disembodied state of existence of person can be put down briefly in the following manner: We have experiences in our embodied state and we can well imagine to continue having these experiences even when we no more have a body. The only difference between these two sets of experience is that one is had while being embodied and the other while being disembodied. Now if we can imagine to continue having experiences after forsaking the body then we can also imagine having experiences always as disembodied person, that is, we can imagine ourselves as
always without a body.

But this argument, as A.J. Ayer9 has pointed out, makes indivisuation impossible. Moreover such a view does not make clear the difference between the two sets of experiences. We can imagine ourselves in a disembodied state only when we think of ourselves as retaining the psychological states, in the disembodied state, of the embodied person. Body is necessary for having experiences and these experiences are rendered their special characteristic by virtue of being a distinct body's experiences. The indivisuation of mental states depends on the body. There cannot be distinct experiences without a distinct body. This inability to indivisuate persons except by a distinct body implies the necessity of body for a person's identity. Indivisuation of a particular individual at a particular time implies the necessity of body for a person and indivisuating that individual as the same individual over time by reference to the same body implies that a person retains his identity only by virtue of bodily identity. The possibility of retaining identity over time without a body has been invoked by Strawson too.

But he gives such identity a 'secondary status' which he thinks is legitimate for the disembodied person can retain his identity of his embodied state by retaining memories of the prior embodied existence. But here he forgets that memory is not a sufficient condition for personal identity for memory can be wrong and sometimes may totally be washed out in certain circumstances. Again memory is not even necessary for personal identity as we do assert personal identity in such situations. To assert personal identity we must assert bodily identity. A person is that person by virtue of possessing a distinct body. This assertion of necessity of the body has been tried to be proved wrong by putting forward certain imaginary examples. One such example is that of switching bodies. In this situation of switching bodies two persons start exhibiting the other's psychological traits. On the ground of such exhibition we are inclined to say that each has become the other. But are we really driven to such a position? It would be easier to accept if we rather say that each of the original person has remained the same but only mysteriously acquired other's mental states and character traits. A similar answer can be given to a situation where a person is said to ostensibly remember
the experiences of a dead person and this may be accompa­nied by an apparent continuity of character. In this situation it is more natural to say that this person who is remembering the experiences of the dead person and exhibiting characteristics similar to that of the dead man's has actually somehow picked them up rather then saying that he is the dead person in a new body. The continuity of a person inspite of spatial and temporal discontinuity is not very acceptable. However, a person who is physically identified now if is ostensibly remem­bering experiences and exhibiting certain characteristics which were actually of a person physically identified earlier then he can be said to be the same with the one whose experiences he is remembering and whose characters he is exhibiting. But such a criterion of identity is parasitical upon the 'primary' physical criterion. It is true that in some cases we can identify a person as the same person by using a psychological criterion but this psychological criterion could acquire the status of being a criterion only by virtue of being connected with a distinct body. In other words, the distinctive characte­ristic of the psychological traits which gives it the status of criterion can be given only by a distinct body.
Thus we see that personal identity involves the necessary condition of bodily identity.

In the recent times, it is Bernard Williams who has proved to be an ardent advocate of an extreme version of this theory. He has come to represent all those who support the Body Theory of the self. Now I am going to discuss Williams's version of this theory according to which a person cannot retain his identity without bodily identity.

Williams's Theory of Personal Identity

Williams rejects any view which does not regard bodily identity as necessary for personal identity. However, he admits that questions of personal identity cannot be answered simply by the identity of the body. For Williams bodily identity is necessary for personal identity but not a sufficient condition as other considerations of personal characteristics and memory must be taken into consideration.

The thesis that bodily identity is not a necessary
condition of personal identity can be interpreted in two ways: firstly, it can be interpreted as the thesis which holds that there is at least one case in which bodily identity fails consistently and other conditions thus are sufficient for the assertion of personal identity, but in some other imaginable cases where other conditions fail bodily identity is the necessary condition for asserting personal identity. The second interpretation of the thesis can be put thus, in no conceivable case of personal identity bodily identity is a necessary condition there always being some other conditions serving as necessary and sufficient condition of personal identity. The former interpretation is called by Williams as the weaker thesis and the latter is called the stronger thesis. But according to Williams neither of the above interpretation of the thesis that bodily identity is not necessary for personal identity is correct. He rejects both the theses, for according to him bodily identity is necessary for personal identity. To prove the necessity of bodily identity, Williams uses the weaker thesis and ultimately proves that both the weaker and the stronger theses are incorrect. In his discussion of personal identity, bodily identity is the criterion of personal
identity and it is spatio-temporal continuity which gives us bodily identity.

Williams starts with an imaginary situation where a person wakes up one morning and is found to have undergone violent changes of character which casts doubt regarding his identity. The question that arises in such a situation regarding the person's identity can be formulated in the following manner:

(a) Is he the same person as he used to be? which in order to avoid ambiguity may be formulated as
(b) Is this the same person who went to sleep last night?

Now, the question is whether such an identity question can be answered without taking into consideration bodily identity. Can memory explain identity question? Let us see now whether memory can really answer this identity question. That is, let us see whether identity question can be answered or not without bodily identity. Before employing memory to explain identity we must keep the following features of memory in our mind,
(i) To say 'A remember x' without irony or inverted commas, is to imply that x really happened; in this respect remember is parallel to know.

(ii) It does not follow from this, nor is it true that all claims to remember, as veridical; or not everything one seems to remember is something one really remembers.

Now let us see how far memory is successful in explaining identity of the person who, as mentioned earlier, wakes up in the morning to exhibit violent changes in his personality.

A particular person, namely, Charles after waking up one morning claims to remember certain events and performing certain tasks which he so long never claimed to have witnessed or performed, and he does not remember certain events and actions which he so long claimed to have witnessed and performed. In other words, Charles has undergone changes where his memories and dispositions are not the same as before. So here memory being the supposed criterion should explain Charles's identity and the explanation should assert that the person who went to sleep last night and the one who has woken up in the
morning are not one and the same person but are two different persons. But we are not driven to accept this explanation. It is because, there is no reason to believe without proof that Charles after waking up in the morning is making true memory claims. In order to find out whether the claims are true or not we can check out whether Charles was really present in the situations which he now claims to have witnessed. If Charles was present in those situations then it would imply that he is remembering it in the ordinary manner and if he was not present there then there is nothing to confirm that his claims are true claims. In other words, memory claims cannot be verified without reference to body. It is not possible to separate the 'mental' from the 'bodily' criterion.

However, it is possible that Charles's memory claims are so detailed that they can be derived only from performing an action. But such a supposition does not help us as it does not rule out the possibility of clairvoyance. Moreover, what makes an action different from an event is the intention of the agent involved in the action. But it is something no one knows except the person whose
action it is. So the intention which now Charles claims to have had at the time of his performing that action cannot be confirmed. Thus, there is nothing and no one that can confirm the memory claim to be correct and true except Charles himself. And, criterion which cannot be verified cannot serve the purpose of explaining something, namely, in this case the identity of Charles.

In the above example, Charles's memory claims were that of an unknown person, but if his memory claims pointed to the life history of a particular person, say, Guy Fawkes, then would we have said that this changed Charles with his new memory claims is actually Guy Fawkes? Charles's memory claims may be such that they fit with Guy Fawkes's life and explain many things which so long remained unexplained as it could not have been explained by anybody else than Guy Fawkes. But this supposition also cannot rule out clairvoyance or some mysterious way of acquiring other person's memory and character. Memory cannot be sufficient for personal identity even if it is backed by similarity of character, dispositions and personality traits. We cannot rule out the possibility that what Charles is claiming to remember are memory claims
which are to be distinguished from the memory of Guy Fawkes.

That memory is not a sufficient condition of personal identity can be proved by another imaginary example. In this example there are two persons who are exhibiting the character of a third person and are claiming to remember this person's experiences. This is a case of reduplication. In a case of reduplication it is not only Charles who has acquired the memories and characters of Guy Fawkes but Charles's brother Roberts too has acquired them. In such a situation, if memory is the criterion of personal identity then we should be able to say that both Charles and Roberts are Guy Fawkes. We cannot say that Charles is Guy Fawkes and Roberts is not, for both of them are equally eligible to be Guy Fawkes. Now, if we admit that both of them are Guy Fawkes then we also must say that each one of them is also the other. But this is an absurd claim. The only way to avoid this situation is to say that while one of them is a case of genuine memory the other is only a case of memory claim. It is true that this would have solved our problem. But we cannot assert it as there is no ground on the
basis of which we can make this assertion. Both Charles and Robert have the same ground to assert their identity with Guy Fawkes, and yet we cannot accept it as it leads to the absurd conclusion of both being identical with each other. This conclusion is unacceptable because identity in this case does not remain one-to-one relation. Therefore, as in this case of reduplication we cannot assert identity we will have to assert similarity. That is, both Charles and Roberts are similar to Guy Fawkes on the basis of having similar memories and character. But if we accept in this case of reduplication that on psychological ground we can assert only similarity, we can easily say in the other case also, where Charles is the only candidate for identity with Guy Fawkes that Charles is only similar and not identical with Guy Fawkes.

Williams, however, points out that what is applicable in a case of reduplication is not necessarily applicable in the case where the candidate for identity is only one. This may be taken to imply that memory can be sufficient condition of personal identity if it is one person claiming to remember another person's experiences. But this is a wrong assumption as other difficulties
arise if we base personal identity on psychological features such as memory. The distinction between same and similar does not hold good in case of memories. We can use the terms 'similar' and 'same' only with respect to material objects. In case of material objects if two things look alike we say that they are similar but they are not the same as they are occupying different space. But such a criterion cannot be applied in case of memory or any other psychological features. To say that two persons have same character is to say that they have similar character. And in case of memories the distinction between 'similar' and 'same' is still more unclear. We really cannot understand what is really meant by similar memories as distinguished from same memories without any reference to the body. When we assert the identity of one person with another on the basis of same memories we are asserting the very thing which we want to prove, because same memories cannot belong to two different persons. And we cannot assert identity on the basis of exact similarity of memories as similar memory claims can be made by different persons. In the example of Charles claiming to remember Guy Fawkes's experiences we cannot employ sameness of memory to assert identity as it asserts the very thing it went out to prove and
similar memory claims, as we have seen, cannot serve as the sufficient condition of personal identity. Moreover, Williams says that different assertions can be made on the same psychological ground if it does not involve reference to body. For example, in the reduplication case, where Charles and Roberts both are candidates for identity, we say that they are not identical with Guy Fawkes but are similar. On the other hand, we assert identity of Charles with Guy Fawkes where he was the lone candidate for identity on the same psychological ground. Thus, we see that two different conclusions follow from the same ground. And Williams argues that psychological factors thus cannot be considered as the sufficient condition of identity it being the ground of both similarity and identity.

According to Williams bodily identity must be referred to at some point or other in our understanding of personal identity. In the example where Charles woke up with different character and claiming to have different memories, even if we accept that the person who woke up is no more Charles but Guy Fawkes whose experiences he seems to remember and whose character he is exhibiting
now, we will find that we will have to refer to the physical criterion. When we are saying that this new person is actually Guy Fawkes we would like to check whether Charles claims really fit those of Guy Fawkes's or not. In order to do that we first have to check the life history of Guy Fawkes, and we do check the life history of Guy Fawkes by checking Guy Fawkes's physical body witnessing and performing certain actions. This reference to body makes it clear that without bodily identity personal identity is not possible. Even if we accept that memory is sufficient condition of personal identity, bodily identity is necessary to prove the correctness of this sufficient condition. If bodily identity is not regarded as necessary then we will not be able to answer any question of personal identity. If there is a constant change of bodies then it will be impossible to have any knowledge of the life history of an individual and if we cannot have any knowledge about the life history of an individual we will not be able to make out as to whose identity it is we are talking about. Personal identity cannot be determined without reference to body.

The above discussion proves that bodily identity is
unavoidable in any case of personal identity taken in third-person perspective. But Williams shows that it is equally unavoidable in cases of personal identity taken in first-person perspective.

Let us imagine a situation where a person has two sets of memories. Previously he had S and now he has S₁. In the present state he goes back to S and finds that he remembers S as well as S₁ and knows that both the sets are his because he remembers them. Thus he comes to the conclusion that the person who had S is the same person who has S₁. But in reality S and S₁ are not two different sets of memories but one continued series where S is included in S₁ and as such it does not prove anything. Again let us consider another situation where a person has S₁ which includes the general memory to the effect that he used to remember things which now he no longer remembers. But such a situation does not pose identity problem as every individual knows himself to be the same person inspite of it, for it is the case with almost all of us. So a situation which involves identity problem could be one in which S₁ involves the general notion of memory to the effect that he used to remember certain
things which now do not seem to be compatible with $S_1$. And so he asks the question, "Am I the same person who had this set of memories which now seem to be incompatible with $S_1$, as the one who has $S_1"? If identity question such as this arises in such a situation then there is nothing much that can be done by the person who is raising the question except going to others who can tell him whether he is the same person or not. And the others will use the third-person perspective in determining his identity which necessarily involves reference to bodily identity.

A criterion, says Williams, by virtue of being a criterion can be used only by others. In response to this view of Williams philosophers who maintain that memory explains personal identity, hold that fulfilment of such a condition by memory is not essential because memory is not a criterion but the very essence of personal identity. Being the essence of personal identity it asserts to a person that he is the same person over time with certainty. Such a view, however, takes for granted that memory claim of the person concerned is correct. But Williams argues that memory claim, as we have seen,
need not be always correct. Moreover, the view that memory is the essence of personal identity ignores third-person perspective. It does not take into account what others think of such a situation. Memory needs some other criterion to judge its correctness. Such a situation can also be described as a misremembered case by the person concerned. Moreover, a person cannot remember everything that has happened in his life. So there is every chance that the person who is claiming that the body which now belongs to him is different from the one which belonged to him earlier is not remembering correctly what his body was like earlier. Taken into account such shortcomings of memory, it can neither be considered as essence nor as criterion of personal identity.

For Williams, certain conditions must be fulfilled for something to be called a criterion:

"identity is a one-one relation, and that no principle can be a criterion of identity for things of type T if it relies only on what is logically a one - many or many-many relation between things of type T. What is wrong with the supposed criterion of identity for persons which relies only on memory claims - is just that '....being disposed to make sincere
memory claims which exactly fit the life of...'
is not a one-one, but a many-one, relation,and hence cannot possibly be adequate in logic
to constitute a criterion of identity.10

The above passage makes it clear that if anything is
to serve as a criterion of something then it must be
a necessary condition for that thing being so. This
principle does not state a sufficient condition for
identity. But Williams in the very beginning pointed
out that his aim is to prove that bodily identity is
a necessary condition and not a sufficient condition
of personal identity. In other words, his theory tries
to prove that in the absence of bodily identity we cannot
talk about personal identity. And according to Williams
it is bodily identity alone which can serve as a satis-
factory criterion of personal identity because it never
admits of many-one or one-many relation. Any other princi-
ple which is likely to admit such relation cannot be
regarded as the criterion of personal identity. Williams
says:

10. B.A.O. Williams, Problems of the Self, (Cambridge:
'no principle $P$ will be a philosophically satisfactory criterion of identity for Ts if the only thing that saves $P$ from admitting many one relations among Ts is a quite arbitrary provision',\textsuperscript{11}

Such a concept of criterion is formulated to guard against reduplication. Now, it is to be seen whether bodily identity based on spatio-temporal continuity comes up to meet this notion of criterion or not.

Let us take an imaginary case where a person splits into two parts like an amoeba. According to Williams the two resultant persons donot hold identity relation with the original person. Each one of them is not identical with the original and as such are not identical with each other. The question may arise here that inspite of spatio-temporal continuity why the resultant persons are not identical with the original. Williams argues that there is in fact no spatio-temporal continuity in this case of splitting. He says that application of spatio-temporal criterion involves historical enquiry of the

subject concerned. In an historical enquiry we start at a particular given point of time from where we proceed course by course where one situation leads to another till we come to the present situation. In such a journey we will come across the moment of reduplication. The application of spatio-temporal continuity thus reveals to us the presence of reduplication in the continued history of a person. The continuity of the original person stops the moment reduplication occurs and two different histories start from that moment onwards. Thus we come to the conclusion that the resultant persons are not identical with the original person as there is a break in the spatio-temporal continuity. So we see that spatio-temporal continuity admits only one-one relation. Therefore, it is bodily identity alone which can satisfy the conditions required by 'criterion'.

There are philosophers who however, say that bodily identity is not necessary for personal identity in any situation, some other factors always being necessary and sufficient. But this view always does not seem to be logically conceivable. Williams says that accepting the thesis will open the way for us to accept bodily
interchange as possible. In a case of bodily interchange, a particular person acquires another person's personality and the other person acquires his personality. If we imagine that between these two persons one of them is an emperor and the other is a peasant then after the bodily interchange the emperor's body will exhibit the peasant's personality and peasant's body will exhibit the emperor's personality. But Williams says that it is difficult to comprehend how the emperor's personality can be exhibited by the peasant's body and vice-versa. It is inconceivable how the emperor's fastidious arrogance is expressed in the peasant's face and how the peasant's personality gets expressed through emperor's cultured tones. Such consideration of bodily interchange makes us reconsider our easy acceptance of bodily interchange. It may however be argued that it is not possible to tell in advance how far a certain feature may suddenly express something quite unexpected. But we cannot ignore the limitation of a feature in expressing something. And it is this limit which makes bodily interchange unacceptable. The peasant may remember the past history of emperor quite correctly and he may also be exhibiting the character traits of the emperor but he does not become the emperor unless
and until he becomes at least the same sort of person as the emperor. And given the limitation of physical features it is not possible.

The forgoing discussion shows that the concept of bodily interchange is not conceivable. But it should have been conceivable if bodily identity was not necessary for personal identity. Moreover, in any case of personal identity when we are asked to distinguish the personality from one's body we donot know what to distinguish from what.

A more detailed account of body exchange also ends with a similar conclusion, that is, memory and other psychological traits are not sufficient to prove personal identity. Williams proves this with the help of an imaginary example. In this example A and B are two persons who are going to have a process carried out on them which will result in a situation where A's psychological states are put in B's brain and B's psychological states are put in A's brain. The person with A's body and B's psychological states is called A-body person and the person with B's body and A's psychological states is called
B-body person. If both A and B are asked before the process is carried out to make a choice of pain and pleasure after the process is completed, they are most likely to choose what they regard as best for them. The choice normally in such a situation is such that A would want pleasure for B-body person and B will choose pleasure for A-body person. Such choices seem to imply that personal identity can be there without bodily continuity. But does it really? Williams gives a counter example which leads to a different conclusion altogether. If I am informed today that I will be tortured tomorrow then my natural reaction will be that of fear. This fear cannot be reduced by the information that just before being tortured I will lose the memory of the previous information. The thought that ultimately it is going to be me who is going to be tortured will not leave me. The situation does not change much if I am told that along with my memory my character and dispositions are also going to change. The information that a psychologically altered person is going to get tortured does not help me to overcome my fear. Again the further information that during the time of torture I am going to consider myself as another person also does not lessen my fear.
But if psychological states were sufficient for personal identity then my fear should not have continued after I received my information. But it continues. Again, it is an appalling thought for most of us to lead a life of a mad person even though we know that when we will become mad we will not have any realization of being mad. If bodily identity did not give me the personal identity then the thought of how another person constituted by different psychological states leads his life should not have bothered me. The truth is that I get concerned about that mad person or to be tortured person for I believe that I will continue to retain my identity in both cases by virtue of my bodily identity. Here one might argue that reference to the person who is going to be tortured as 'you' influences my reaction. But we cannot accept it as I am perfectly capable of deducing for myself what he means and in fact I would not have been affected by the reference 'you' if I thought that the situation were different from what it is.

William consider certain cases where A is informed about different situations he is going to be in where he is going to be tortured and analyses A's reaction with
regard to the torture:

(i) A is subjected to an operation which produces total amnesia;

(ii) amnesia is produced in A, and other interference leads to certain changes in his character;

(iii) changes in his character are produced, and, at the same time certain illusory 'primary' beliefs are induced in him, they are of quite fictitious type and do not fit the life of any actual person;

(iv) the same as (iii) except that both the character traits and memory impressions are designed to be appropriate to another actual person B;

(v) the same as (iv) except that the result is produced by putting the information into A from the brain of B, by a method which leaves B as same as he was before;

(vi) the same happens to A as in (v), but B is not left the same, since a similar operation is conducted in the reverse direction.

In situation (i) A's fear is quite understandable. He has reason to fear torture that is going to happen to him. The possible amnesia of the information does not take away the fear of torture. The knowledge remains
with A that it is going to be him who will suffer. The position is no different in (ii) and A's fear continues inspite of the extra information that he is going to have different psychological states at the time of torture. And in situation (iii) also we can easily accept A's fear as legitimate. In situation (iv) also A's fear is understandable though he has the information that the psychological states he is going to have at the time of torture appropriate to another person B. The knowledge of another person having similar psychological states does not reduce A's fear. In situation (v) also A's fear for torture does not lessen even though A comes to know that those psychological states he is going to have will come from B's brain. In this situation A knows that after the operation there are going to be two persons, namely, B and A - body person. If psychological states were sufficient to retain a person's identity then A should not have continued to be afraid of the torture as he will not continue any more after the operation. But A's fear continues because A regards A-body person as himself. Now if body exchange is valid then A in situation (vi) should start considering himself as B-body person. But this situation (vi) is not very much different from
situation (v) except that (vi) has the extra information of what is going to happen to B who also is going to undergo a similar operation. In other words, A is getting concerned in (vi) about what is going to happen to another person. There is in fact no valid ground on which A now in situation (vi) can claim himself to be the B-body person for the ground on which A claimed in situation (v) to be A-body person is still available and as such he should continue considering himself as A-body person. An argument can be put forward against it by saying that though it was reasonable for A to be A-body person in situation (v), in situation (vi) he becomes B-body person because, in situation (v) there was no better candidate than A-body person for A to be himself. But this argument does not have any argumentative force according to Williams. He says that if A's fear in situation (v) is regarded as justified then it can also be extended to situation (vi) which is not different from (v) except having the extra information of what is going to happen to another person.

This argument shows that psychological factors without reference to body donot suffice to determine
personal identity. But the other argument of 'exchanging bodies' leads to a different conclusion altogether. Both the conclusions seem equally convincing and there is no ground for preferring one to the other. The latter argument shows that bodily identity is necessary for personal identity while in the former situation we have an inclination to say that bodily identity is not necessary for personal identity. It is difficult to decide which option is to be preferred at the cost of the other. However, according to Williams, the conclusion of 'exchanging bodies' that bodily identity is not necessary for personal identity is only an apparent one. A proper look at this situation proves otherwise. Williams says that the situation where A and B are informed of a process they are to go through resulting in each receiving the other's psychological states is a situation which 'is the product of the will' of the experimenter. It is true that in this situation A would like that pleasure should be given to B-body person and B would want that pleasure should be given to A-body person. But an opposite reaction would have emerged from A if the experimenter stopped in situation (v) or would have continued beyond situation (vi) where there are many persons with A-like
characteristics and many others with B-like characteristics. In all these situations there is no inclination to say that, if I were A, that all the cases of psychological continuity are cases of my continuity. The experimenter seems to have picked up, particularly that situation where we are least hesitant to assert personal identity without bodily identity. If our concept of person, says Williams, was formed in the model of some ghostly being in bodies which can move around by certain procedure, can change places without being destroyed or dispersed, then we could have admitted of the idea of personal identity without bodily identity. But neither we form our concept of person in this model nor the experimenter of 'exchanging bodies' had this concept of person. The situation which the experimenter picked up in 'exchanging bodies' is a situation where we are inclined to assert personal identity without bodily identity. But all the other situations from (i) to (v) and others which may arise after situation (vi) make it evident that we cannot talk of personal identity without reference to bodily identity. The principle that one's fear can extend to future pain no matter what psychological changes precede it, is a principle we accept and as such
In the example of 'exchanging bodies' A will want that the experimenter should pass the pain to B-body person. In other words, for Williams, A will consider himself as identical with A-body person and not with B-body person because, in this situation also personal identity continues with bodily identity.

Williams has tried hard in the above discussion to prove that without bodily identity we cannot talk about personal identity. But he has not really convinced us of this fact. He has said that in the example of 'exchanging bodies' A continues as A-body person. This however is not an easy conclusion to accept. Williams, as an argument against this example said that the critics of the thesis that bodily identity is necessary for personal identity would pick up that situation in which we are most inclined to assert that bodily identity is not necessary for personal identity. Even if we accept that the 'experimenter' was being partial or biased, still Williams should have been able to prove that we cannot talk about personal identity in this situation as there is no bodily identity. Rather than proving the necessity of bodily identity in this situation Williams
said that as bodily identity is necessary for personal identity in other situations of his counter example, it should also be considered as necessary in this situation as well. This cannot be accepted or a valid argument. The other situations where we are inclined to assert identity on the basis of bodily identity may have some likeness to this situation of 'exchanging bodies' but they are not identical situations. As such, we cannot say that what was applicable in other situations is also applicable in this situation. Williams's conclusion that in the example of 'exchanging bodies' we should say that one does not continue without bodily identity overrides our natural instinct. Our hesitation for saying that one cannot continue without bodily identity arises because the psychological series carries with it the person's point of view whose psychological series it is. Though there is no bodily identity of A with B-body person after the process is carried out on both A and B, B-body person has now acquired A's point of view of himself and the world along with the psychological states. This point of view of a person is vital to that person's identity and it is this very factor which has been ignored by Williams in his eagerness to prove the necessity of bodily
identity for personal identity. Moreover, Williams himself does not escape from his own criticism directed against the 'experimenter' of picking up that situation which suits his purpose best. The 'experimenter', according to Williams, picked up the situation where we are most inclined to assert personal identity without bodily identity. But Williams avoided this very situation where A acquires B's psychological states and B acquires A's psychological states because this endangered his theory. He picked up those situations which best support his theory of necessity of bodily identity for personal identity. Williams should have been able to show that it is not possible to talk of personal identity in this situation as there is no bodily identity. Again, his principle that important principles should be asserted and denied only on importantly different grounds is capable of being interpreted in two days. Williams interpreted it to suit his purpose of showing that psychological ground may lead to two different conclusions and as such cannot be regarded as sufficient condition of personal identity. But this very principle can be interpreted in a totally different way as shown by Parfit,12

(discussed in detail in chapter IV).

The Body theory as discussed by Williams is mainly concerned with proving that bodily identity is necessary for personal identity. He did not try to prove the sufficiency of bodily identity as other consideration of personal characteristics and memory must be taken into consideration. But given Williams's view of necessity of bodily identity we should also have been able to assert the sufficiency of bodily identity for personal identity. If we donot consider bodily identity as sufficient condition of personal identity, we are faced with certain situations which would not have been acceptable to Williams. If body is not sufficient for personal identity then we can imagine situations where one body is occupied by different persons at different times. Williams certainly would not have accepted such possibility. Probably, as Hamlyn pointed out, Williams's view of bodily identity not being sufficient condition of personal identity was to guard against such situations where a person cannot be called a person inspite of having a body, namely, a dead person. In other words, a dead person cannot be

called the person he was before his death inspite of
having the same body. Williams did not want to identify
person with bodies but maintained that without body a
person cannot be that person. In the words of Hamlyn:

What Williams may have in mind is that the
concept of a person does not amount merely
to that of a body, but to that plus the other
things that he mentions. ¹⁴

Given Williams's own concept of criterion of personal
identity, it is true that bodily identity serves as the
criterion of personal identity. But criterion of personal
identity, as we have mentioned in chapter II, should
not only be the necessary but also sufficient condition
of personal identity. But does Williams really succeed
even in proving that bodily identity is necessary for
personal identity?

Williams in order to prove the necessity of bodily
identity for personal identity employed a case of redupli-
cation. It is true that he succeeded in proving in the
reduplicated case that psychological ground by itself
leads to the absurdity of making identity one-to-many

relation. But, he himself said that this argument does not hold good when only one person, namely, Charles is involved in the problem of identity. Williams in order to prove the insufficiency of memory and other psychological factors in this case brought out a distinction between 'same' and 'similarity'. He argues that we cannot talk about sameness of psychological states as the determining factor of one's identity as it assumes the very thing it wants to prove because, same psychological states cannot be owned by two different persons. And similar psychological states is not sufficient to prove personal identity as similar psychological states can be owned by different individuals at the same time. Even if we consider Williams as successful in proving the insufficiency of psychological states for personal identity, he cannot assert the necessity of bodily identity on this ground alone. He should have been able to show that in the case of Charles being the lone candidate for identity with Guy Fawkes, it is not possible to talk of identity at all as there is no bodily identity. But Williams did not try to prove this very point.

Thus we have seen that Williams has not really
been successful in proving the necessity of bodily identity for personal identity. Another example of a simple brain transplantation can be shown to supply a decisive argument against the bodily identity as a necessary condition of personal identity. When we imagine A's brain transferred to B's brainless body we are also to imagine A's personality as a whole transferred to B's body. This is so because we know from science that a person's brain is the physical basis of his personality. But then if A's personality is present in B's body in such a way as to make it one composite whole then it follows that the new composite whole will be addressed as A possessing a new body, i.e., the body formerly belonging to B. This is so because, personality by definition denotes the person whose personality we are talking about. And this in turn shows that the body is not necessary for personal identity. Of course we are still retaining a part of the body, namely, the brain, but we are treating it only as empirically necessary for personality and not as logically so. In any case brain is not the body whatever significance it may have for personal identity. I will

discuss the relation of brain to personal identity in the next chapter fully.

Williams's claim of bodily identity as the criterion of personal identity is based on spatio-temporal continuity. But spatio-temporal continuity does not hold very strong even in identity questions regarding material objects. In this connection Hamlyn has brought in the example of Hobbes's 'Ship of Athens'. In this example the citizens took away the wooden parts of the original ship and replaced them with new wooden parts. Now with the timbers which have been replaced they built a new ship. In such a situation the question that arises is, 'which one of these two is the original ship?'. The answer that the spatio-temporally continuous one is the original ship does not give us a clear answer. We are faced with a similar problem where object involved is not more than one. It is possible for a manufactured article to be taken into bits and pieces and to make a new article with these pieces. Now a reverse process can be done where the new article is disintegrated and from the bits

and pieces of this disintegrated article we make the original article. In such a circumstance we say that the original article and the new one are identical. But, if this is the case then we are admitting identity despite the fact that the article did not exist in the interval.

Another example that asserts that spatio-temporal continuity cannot assert personal identity is put forward by J.M. Shorter\(^{17}\). Shorter takes a fictional example which he says is meant to be taken not only as logically possible but as having implications which are even plausible in certain respect. The story as told by Shorter goes on to say that there is a planet Juno in which bodies grow into maturity which are counterparts of bodies of people on Earth. The difference between the one on Earth and the one on Juno is that while the former is living the latter has no life. But the moment the one on Earth dies the counterpart on Juno comes to life with the same personal characteristics as those which so long were the characteristics of the one who was living on Earth. Here, Shorter appeals to morality to decide on their identity. He says that if connection

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between the two planets is established the relatives of the original Earth person should consider this Junonian as their original relative. Shorter in this example emphasizes that personal identity also involves issues like personal relation, and some of these are moral.

This argument of Shorter against Spatio-temporal continuity as the criterion of personal identity is not very successful. For, though he proves that identity can be asserted without spatial continuity he has not proved temporal discontinuity. Shorter replies to this objection by saying that temporal discontinuity like spatial discontinuity will not be very hard to prove and this lack of temporal discontinuity is not sufficient to disprove his thesis. Even if we accept that Shorter was not successful in proving his thesis, he has at least managed to make us rethink about the easy acceptance of spatio-temporal continuity as the criterion of identity. We cannot reject such possibility, as Shorter has mentioned, outright. There is, however, another argument against Shorter's story. According to this argument the story makes sense only against the normal situation where identity presupposes spatio-temporal continuity. This
is a valid argument against Shorter and we cannot deny the possibility that the situation in Juno is not going to remain the same always. There may come a time when Junonians come to life even when their counterparts are still alive on Earth. But, still we cannot reject outright the suggestion that spatio-temporal continuity may not be necessary for personal identity. It is a fact that spatio-temporal continuity is the norm against which deviations may occur and it is these deviations which question the ready acceptance of the correctness of spatio-temporal continuity as the criterion of personal identity.