CHAPTER - II

REFERENCE AND CRITERIA OF 'THE SELF'
In this chapter my aim is to arrive at a general understanding of the concept of self. We will begin with some general observation concerning how the word 'self' and its cognates are actually used in day to day life. We will examine what implication it has for a general theory of the self.

It is a common fact of life that we think dualistically about human being, that we ascribe two, what appears to be radically different kinds of states, namely, mental states and physical states, to a human being. With physical states there seems to be no problem in determining the entity to which it belongs. We generally agree that physical states manifest in the body of the human being and so we can readily accept that the states of the body belong to the human being by virtue of the fact that the body itself belongs to the human being. But now we are using the term 'human being' to signify a person. A person is not just a body in the sense that we ascribe mental states to human being considered as person. But now just as the physical states were ascribed to a person by virtue of his possessing a body, we want to know what is that entity by virtue of possessing which we ascribed
mental states to a person. It may be suggested that this question is based on a misunderstanding of the function of 'I' in language. Generally we take 'I' to be a referential notion. If we can prove that 'I' actually does not refer to anything, then the search for that entity to which 'I' refers to could have been abandoned. But we will see that 'I' is a referential expression and thus the search for its referent continues. Our search for the referent of 'I' goes on because we believe that this referent is the 'self', that is, the subject of the mental states. That is the reason why we try to understand the nature of the self by trying to find out the referent of 'I'.

Now let us see whether the Philosophers who claim 'I' to be a non-referential expression succeed in proving it.

According to these philosophers it is a mistake to consider 'I' as referring to an entity. It is nothing but a necessity of language. They claim that 'I' is used as a kind of 'dummy grammatical subject' as McGinn puts it. They argue that 'I' serves the same purpose as 'it' serves in the statement, 'It is raining'. 'I' is used
by a person to draw attention to himself. But this is a wrong argument. The first-person pronoun 'I' is referential. When one says 'I am in pain' there must be an entity to which the pain belongs. We cannot simply say that 'there is pain' which should have been the case if 'I' was not a referential expression. If 'I' does not refer to anything then all that we would have understood from the utterence 'I am in pain' is that somewhere there is pain. But when somebody utters this sentence he does not mean to say that somewhere pain is available. What he wants to say is that there is a particular entity who is suffering from pain and that particular entity is no other thing or being but himself who is uttering this sentence. Moreover, the concept of pain without somebody having it is inconceivable. The concept of 'pain' can be understood only as somebody having it. We cannot have the concept of 'floating pain' without belonging to someone. Moreover, even the philosophers who claim that 'I' is non-referential have to admit that the third person pronoun 'he' etc. are referential. The sentence, 'He is an Indian citizen' does refer to an individual. Now if that individual who is referred to by 'he' utters a sentence to imply that truth will have to say 'I am an Indian citizen'. If the philosophers were to be believed...
that 'I' does not refer to anything we will have to say that in the former sentence there was a referent but in the latter sentence there is no referent though they are supposed to say the same thing. The truth is that 'I' or 'he' refers to the same individual if used to indicate one particular individual. When a person makes a statement about himself he uses the pronoun 'I' and when others want to make a statement to imply the same truth, they use third-person pronoun or noun. If we admit that third-person pronouns have reference then we also have to admit that first-person pronoun 'I' also has a referent, because both refer to the same entity, when are used about the same individual. But 'I' is not merely an extension of third-person pronouns, because it is 'I' or the first-person perspective in the understanding of self that renders it its special character. The distinctive character of the self can be understood only from the first-person perspective. It is true that when we use 'he' or any third-person pronoun we refer to the same kind of thing that we refer to when we use 'I'. But our understanding of the nature of that entity to whom we ascribe these pronouns has to be always in first-person perspective first. After understanding it in the first-person perspective only we can proceed to ascribe it
to others. In other words, we first understand what is 'I' and then ascribe it to other persons through third-person pronouns. Our understanding of the nature of the referent of 'I' is necessarily in the first-person perspective but to prove that it has a referent we have to start with third-person perspective. But even if the philosophers proved that 'I' is not a referential concept it does not necessarily imply that there is no 'self'. There may not be any referent of 'I', which as we have seen is not the case, but still can we deny that there is an entity who has the mental states? We must admit that the mental states just do not float around but belong to something and that entity to which they belong is the 'self'. Now, if we have a self we must also have an expression to refer to that self. This word which is taken to refer to this self may be the first-person pronoun 'I' or any other word which may be more applicable. All that is necessary is a word which can bring about the distinctive character of the self and as we already have the word 'I' there is no need to go searching for another word.

Our aim is to understand the nature of that entity by virtue of which we possess mental states or by virtue
of which a person is called a person. This entity as we have already said is called traditionally 'the self'. This self is defined as the subject of mental states. But our ascriptions of mental states to self is different from our ascriptions of physical states to the body. That is, mental states belong to the self in the sense of being 'owned' by the self in self-consciousness. Though we could say that conscious states manifest in the self just as physical states manifest in the body and both kinds of states are ascribed to a person since a person owns a body as well as a self, there is difference in owning a body and owning a self. The difference in the sense of ownership is important since it seems that we can talk of mental states of a self primarily because a self is conscious of possessing it. In other words the self is conscious of its consciousness. This extra aspect of self-consciousness with respect to the conscious states of a self is what gives meaning to the idea of ownership of states of consciousness.

There are some philosophers (as probably Wittgenstein and earlier Hume) who have put forward, what Strawson has called the 'No Ownership Theory' of the self. If this theory were true we could imagine unowned states
of consciousness to exist. But this is hard to imagine because whenever we think of states of consciousness we always seem to think of them as someone's states of consciousness.

According to Strawson the No-ownership Theory holds that experiences need not be owned by a subject, which is identified with the self. According to the advocates of this theory the only sense in which experiences can meaningfully be assigned to an owner is that they are causally dependent upon the state of some particular body. Strawson rejects this theory on the ground that in that case the experiences of a person would not necessarily be his and only his since the experiences in question could have been caused by another body. In other words, causal dependence of experience upon the body stipulates only a contingent connection between the experiences and the body while the experiences belonging to a self are necessarily so. As Strawson puts it: "The no-ownership theorist fails to take account of all the facts. He takes account of some of them. He implies, correctly, that the unique position or role of a single body in one's experience is not a sufficient explanation of the fact that one's experiences, or states of
consciousness, are ascribed to something which has them, with that peculiar non transferable kind of possession which is here in question. It may be a necessary part of the explanation, but it is not, by itself, a sufficient explanation. The theorist, as we have seen, goes on to suggest that it is perhaps a sufficient explanation of something else: viz., of our confusedly and mistakenly thinking that states of consciousness are to be ascribed to something in this special way. And this suggestion, as we have seen, is incoherent: for it involves the denial that someone's states of consciousness are anyone's. We avoid the incoherence of this denial, while agreeing that the special role of a single body in someone's experience does not suffice to explain why that experience should be ascribed to anybody. The fact that there is this special role does not, by itself, give a sufficient reason why what we think of as a subject of experience should have any use for the conception of himself as such a subject."^2 Strawson's criticism of the No-ownership theory seems to be valid in so far as human selves are concerned. For human selves are just those entities which

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in self-consciousness claim their experiences to be intrinsic to their self-consciousness. But this is a special sense of 'ownership' which is not indicated simply by saying that certain mental states belong to an entity because they are causally related to that entity. The ownership of states of consciousness signifies a 'primitive' and irreducible relationship between the self and its mental states which is adequately grasped only in the first-person perspective. From this, however, we cannot conclude that there can be no unowned mental states. Clearly we do not believe that animals own their mental states in the same sense in which human beings do. But in the third-person perspective the case is similar with the case of attributing physical states to a body. Whenever we talk of a state or property we talk of it in relation to a subject or an entity to which it is attributed. This much is a necessity of language. In this way we can attribute mental states to animals. But it is doubtful whether the animals possess a first-person perspective, that is, the animal is not in a position to know and claim to possess whatever mental state it is in. In this sense, that is, in the first-person perspective we cannot say that the animal owns
the mental states which (we can legitimately say) it possesses. For this reason we hesitate to address animals as selves.

Above observation leads to the conclusion that possession of self-consciousness is not only characteristic of self but is a necessary feature of the self. A self thus is not only a subject of consciousness but is also a subject who is conscious of being so, i.e., self-conscious. This point is important since a self represents a unitary centre of awareness and it is difficult to attribute this to animals. The kind of unity of mind exhibited by human being seems to require the integrating power of self-awareness which can comprehend the past, present and future experiences belonging to one and the same individual, namely, one and the same self. This kind of unity can properly be understood only in self-consciousness. This special kind of unity thus can be found only in those entity which have selves. Any entity thus to be called a self must possess the unity of mind. It is in self-consciousness alone that a self is able to put a mere succession of mental events into a meaningful whole apprehended as mental states
or experiences of oneself. We are aware of ourselves in our self-consciousness. In other words, we know that we are selves because we are self-conscious. There is not a particular moment of realization that 'I am a self'. I know it because without this knowledge I would not have been a self.. Thus our knowledge of self is necessarily a matter of first-person perspective and we use the first-person pronoun to refer to this self. Other personal pronouns that we use can meaningfully refer to selves only by virtue of their connection with the expression 'I'.

Some further observations about the concept of self can be made as follows:

Colin McGinn, in his book 'The Character of Mind' argues that the possession of a self is not a "matter of degree". This means that there are no "borderline cases" in which we cannot decide whether a self is to be ascribed to a creature or not. In McGinn's own word,:

"The existence of the self is an all-or-nothing matter - you either have one or you don't. This seems to derive from
the special kind of unity in a creature's mental life which the self confers: we feel, from the inside, that mental states either belong to a unitary thing or they don't - they could not fall between being unified and being fragmented. The unity of the self is the unity conferred by self-consciousness, and this unity cannot come in grades".

We have discussed earlier that self in order to be a self must be self-conscious. Thus arises the necessity to distinguish it from any biological concept. For an entity to belong to a biological class it does not have to be self-conscious. The concept 'human being', in so far as it refers to a biological entity does not include the notion of self-consciousness. Human being depends on empirical enquiry to acquire the knowledge of what constitutes him. Any biological classification must go through experiments to know that it fulfills the criterion for being so. It simply does not come to know that it is so, for it does not have knowledge that it will fulfill the criterion to be that biological class.

Human being as a biological entity does not necessarily know that he is so unless empirical science discloses to him that he fulfills the criteria of being a human. Self, on the other hand, carries the knowledge of itself as being so. Without it, self would not be a self. It knows that it is a self before anything can reveal the knowledge of its possession to it. Knowledge of the self is primarily in the first-person perspective while the knowledge of belonging to a biological class need not be from a first-person perspective. The criterion of belonging to a biological class is external and thus, whether one belongs to a particular class or not can be judged by others. Self necessarily involves first-person perspective while biological concept is a third-person discovery.

McGinn says that, "selves necessarily know that they are selves."\(^4\) A self knows that the knowledge of its existence is true. The knowledge of being a self has certainty for without it one cannot claim to be a self. The proof of being a self is the knowledge of it being a self.

Traditionally the nature of the self is tried to be understood by answering the question about personal identity. It is a problem in which we try to understand the circumstances, the situations and the conditions under which we claim a person to be the same person over time. When we claim the sameness of a person we base our assertion on certain conditions, that is, we put down certain conditions which a person has to fulfill if he is to be asserted as the same person. Thus the problem of personal identity is actually a search for the conditions or the criteria of personal identity. Our knowledge about what constitutes the sameness of a person over a period of time will throw light on the nature of the self by virtue of which we call a person 'a person'.

However, the notion of criterion as used in case of personal identity needs to be distinguished from similar notions as symptoms and evidences.

Symptom as commonly understood is that which indicates the existence of something. It is generally a physiological process. Our experience teaches us to associate certain indications with the existence of
certain things. They can be said to be effects of some-
thing. Symptoms are bound to appear if its cause is
present. But criterion is not simply an indication which
implies the existence of a particular thing. Criterion
is rather a constituent factor of that particular thing
whose criterion it is. Symptoms are not the constituent
factors but simply appear when the thing of whose sympoms
they are is available. They indicate the existence of
something but are not a part of that thing. Criterion
on the other hand, does not depend on the existence of
something else but a thing would not have been that
particular thing if it did not have those elements which
constitute its criterion. Criterion is that by virtue
of which we judge something or someone as the same thing
or same person over a period of time. If a thing fulfills
a certain criterion then it definitely is the thing which
is associated with that criterion. A criterion is exclu-
sively the criterion of one particular thing alone. There
cannot be one criterion for two things. But a symptom
does not necessarily be the symptom of one particular
thing. The manifestations which count as symptoms, for
example, of a particular disease may also be present
in case of another quite different kind of disease. In
other words symptoms do not uniquely pick out what they are symptoms of. In more philosophical language we can say that the relationship between symptom and what it is symptom of is purely contingent while the relation between the criterion and what it is criterion of is logical. In other words x is x because it fulfills a particular criteria and by virtue of being x it exhibits certain symptoms. The satisfaction of criterion for x establishes that the thing is x with certainty. It is actually defining x in some other terms. It is true that the presence of a particular symptom also establishes the existence of x but not with certainty because, their relation is not a logical relation.

Like symptoms, evidence also is not a constituent factor of a particular thing though it also proves the existence of a thing. If, for example, we take the statement, "John is in pain", then we will regard his pain-behaviour as the evidence of his feeling pain. But this pain-behaviour certainly does not constitute 'the pain'. It is so, because firstly, we do not identify 'pain' with 'pain-behaviour' as we believe 'pain' to be something more than pain-behaviour and secondly because we do not
know for certain that the evidence we are using to assert the existence of 'pain' is exclusively the evidence for that particular feeling of pain. Evidence can be said to be used generally in epistemological context while criterion can be said to be used in metaphysical sense as well. Evidence is that which we use to know the existence of a certain thing while criterion is used to know whether a certain thing is that thing or not. Evidence is outward expression for existence of a certain thing but it need not be the distinctive feature which distinguishes that thing from others. Criterion being the constituent factor is also the distinctive feature of that thing which distinguishes it from any other thing. In other words, criterion constitutes unique feature of a thing by virtue of which a thing is what it is. The logical relation existing between a criterion and the thing of whose criterion it is makes it logically impossible for us to imagine that thing as divorced from its criterion, but we can very well accept the relation of evidence with that whose evidence it is as a contingent one. Criterion infact, constitutes the very nature of a thing and as such must be there to make a thing what it is. But evidences do not constitute the nature of
a particular thing. Criteria and evidences are different concepts though they are used interchangably in our day to day life. We can bring in the concept of 'evidence' under the concept of 'criteria' but then we will have to widen the concept of 'criteria'. In other words, we can call a certain evidence as the criteria but in that case we will use the concept of 'criteria' in a very loose sense.

Wittgenstein's notion of criteria:

Norman Malcom tries to elucidate Wittgenstein's notion of criteria by trying to bring out its connection in our learning and teaching. When two persons are using a concept in their minds, to know with certainty that they are talking about the same thing, an experience, we may have to observe the necessary physiological process that accompanies it. But the persons who are using the notion certainly did not learn about this notion by first observing that physiological process. It implies that our learning of concepts does not need to be based on our learning of associated physiological process. In other words, physiological process is not the criteria for saying a certain thing silently to oneself. To teach
to say silently certain things to oneself actually involves the effort of bringing to one's mind the meaning of that thing. If one is able to bring the meaning of a word or term to another's mind then it means that he showed the use of the word and thus taught the criterion for the use of that word. While teaching, one always points out those features which are important to understand the use of the word and these features constitute the 'criterion'. It is these features on the basis of which someone's knowledge of a thing is judged. Thus the presence of the criterion indicates the presence of the phenomenon. The satisfaction of the criterion establishes the existence of the thing whose criterion it is beyond question. If the criterion for pain is available in a person then we must assert that 'He is in pain'. Wittgenstein however, does not assert that proposition that describes the criterion of pain logically implies the proposition 'He is in pain'. A criterion is satisfied only in certain circumstances. One may, for example be exhibiting pain—behaviour while acting but that certainly does not imply that he is in pain. The expressions of pain are thus the criterion of pain only in certain 'surroundings' and not in others. But
if describing factors of the criterion, for example, the pain-behaviour does not always indicate the truth of someone being in pain, then how will we ever become certain of the existence or presence of a certain thing? But we donot doubt the presence of a certain thing in all occasions. There are situations where doubt does not arise. In certain surroundings and situations it is the doubt which will be rejected as absurd. Even in such situations one can still doubt. But "Doubting has an end" — Perhaps we can imagine a doubt but we no more take this doubt seriously. The doubt that appears after a certain stage is not regarded as serious doubt. After seeing certain behaviour and observing certain circumstances, no further information or circumstance is regarded as relevant to decide whether something really exists or not. The doubts which are raised after this stage are considered as unimportant. It is true that these are not illogical doubts but they are abnormal. In a situation where my friend is struck down by a car and is exhibiting behaviour of extreme pain I certainly do not doubt about his pain. My behaviour or thought would be abnormal if I start doubting though this doubt

may not be illogical. Such abnormalities must be treated as exceptions and not as the rule. If one makes 'doubting' the rule with regard to another person's pain, then it would be senseless to suppose that he has this concept of 'another person's pain'. If he knows what this concept means then it automatically implies that he used some criterion to learn this concept and the criterion he used to learn the concept is the criterion he should use to know any further occurrence of that event or existence of that thing. Continuous 'doubt' implies that a person infact is not using any 'criterion' at all for he does not take any 'expression' to be the expression of pain. So criterion thus understood is that which indicates the presence of a thing with certainty.

The above interpretation of Wittgenstein's concept of criterion by Malcom makes the features constituting the criterion the 'necessary conditions' of a certain thing but they are not the 'sufficient conditions'. These features can imply the presence of the thing only when certain other conditions are fulfilled. But according to Rogers Albritton for something to be called a criterion of something, it not only has to be the necessary condition
but also must be sufficient by itself. This term 'necessary and sufficient conditions' is introduced specially by Albritton to explain the notion of 'criterion' as he sees it in Wittgenstein's writing. For, according to him the notion of criterion as a 'necessary and sufficient condition' is very much available in Wittgenstein's own definition of 'criterion' as in the following passage:

"Let us introduce two antithetical terms in order to avoid certain elementary confusions: To the question "How do you know that so and so is the case?", we sometimes answer by giving 'criteria' and sometimes by giving 'symptoms'. If medical science calls angina an inflammation caused by a particular bacillus, and we ask in a particular case "Why do you say this man has got angina?" then the answer "I have found the bacillus so-and-so in his blood" gives us the criterion, or what we may call the defining criterion of angina. If on the other hand the answer was, "His throat is inflamed," this might give us a symptom of angina. I call "symptom" a phenomenon of which experience has taught us that it coincided, in some way or other, with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion. Then to say "A man has angina if
this bacillus is found in him" is a tautology or it is a loose way of stating the definition of "angina". But to say, "A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed throat" is to make a hypothesis.  

The above passages is claimed to make criterion the sufficient condition for the existence of something. This is so because, to know the existence of angina the presence of a particular bacillus is sufficient. If that bacillus is present then there is no doubt that there must be angina. The presence of the bacillus is sufficient and does not require any other condition to prove the existence of angina. Thus, 'the presence of bacillus' is the sufficient condition for the presence of angina and it is the criterion of angina. But criterion is not identical with the thing of whose criterion it is. The criterion holds a special relation with a particular thing but is not that thing. Criterion is a part of the thing whose criterion it is and thus logically implies the thing's presence. In the example of angina and bacillus, the bacillus is not the angina but its presence logically implies the presence of angina. This notion

of criterion is the notion of 'defining criterion' as distinguished from 'criterion among others':

"If a phenomenon is a criterion among others for a thing's being so, then first, certainly, it is one among other phenomena that can show the thing to be so, as the criterion for its being so might do if there were one. (Wittgenstein says, for example: "whenever these first criteria told me a person had toothache."). But it can be "used as a criterion," or "is a criterion", "only under certain circumstances: "Many different criteria distinguish, under different circumstances, cases of believing what you say from those of not believing what you say." Or suppose, as Wittgenstein does (though he may not think that this one phenomenon is ever really enough by itself), that holding one's cheek, in a certain kind of way is a criterion of (another person's) having a toothache. Still, there are circumstances under which a man's holding his cheek, no matter how, won't show that he has a toothache." 7

This criterion among others is neither the necessary nor the sufficient condition for a thing being that

thing but for Wittgenstein to be a criterion it should hold a relation of entailment with the thing whose criterion it is.

The dominant conception of Wittgenstein's criterion as found in 'Remarks on The Foundation of Mathematics', and "Philosophical Investigations" has been put down by Rogers Albritton in the following passages:

A criterion for a given thing's being so is something that can show the thing to be so and show by its absence that the thing is not so; it is something by which one may be justified in saying that the thing is so and by whose absence one may be justified in saying that the thing is not so. And a criterion for a thing's being so has this relation to the Thing's being so not as a matter of fact, like what Wittgenstein calls a "symptom" of its being so, but as a matter of "logical" necessity. That is, on Wittgenstein's account of such necessity, its relation to the thing's being so is "founded on a definition" or "founded on convention" or is a matter of "grammar". 8

Thus it appears that to be a Wittgensteinian Criterion it must have such a relation with that whose

criterion it is, that its presence indicates without a doubt the presence of the thing whose criterion it is. To be a criterion is to be a part of the "use", the "grammar" of the word.

If we take Albritton's interpretation of Wittgenstein's concept of criterion as correct then we are to consider criterion as the necessary and sufficient condition for a thing being so. This concept of criterion would have been applicable in the discussion of problem of personal identity except for the fact that Wittgenstein had his own concept of relation of necessity such as the one that can be found between a criterion and the thing whose criterion it is. According to Wittgenstein the relation of necessity is founded on 'definition' or on 'convention' (I will not go into what he really meant by relation of necessity as founded on definition or convention). But the criterion that is needed for personal identity certainly needs to be the necessary and sufficient condition for a thing being so but the relation of necessity is not be understood in Wittgenstein's sense. The criterion of personal identity should be such that it reveals those features of a person without which the person would not
have been that person and by virtue of which the person remains the same person over a period of time.

We treat the problem of Personal identity as special and therefore use only that criterion to understand that problem which is the necessary and sufficient condition. The sort of criterion that we use for ascribing identity to something largely depends upon the type of identity we are judging. By identity we generally mean the persistence of a thing over a period of time. Question about identity is a question about sameness. And our ascription of identity or sameness is dependent on certain factors. The identity judgement, 'This is the same thing which I saw yesterday', is made on the basis of presence of certain features which were there in the thing when I saw it yesterday and are also present in the thing when I am seeing it now. And features which make me assert the identity of the thing is the criterion of its identity. However, the nature of criterion for determining identity depends on the nature of the thing whose identity is in question. Thus, the nature of the criterion of personal identity depends on the nature of person or self. If by person we understand simply
a body which is like other material bodies then the criterion of personal identity would have been the same as a criterion for the identity of material objects. But, the truth is that we do not consider a person to be a body only. A person is also regarded as a subject of perceptions, sensations and experiences. If a person was only a body then the criterion of personal identity would have been spatio-temporal continuity which is the criterion of identity of material things. There is no doubt that persons do have bodies but they are not bodies alone. A person is a person not only by virtue of having a body but also by virtue of having a mind as well. A person not only has a physical history but also has a mental history and it is this mental factor which distinguishes a person from those objects which donot have mind. Therefore, the criterion of personal identity must be different from the criterion of identity of material objects.

But if a person is only a combination of body and mind then it will follow that the criterion we use to determine the identity of animals can also serve as the criterion of personal identity. But a person is not
only a combination of body and mind but is something more than their combination. We are not puzzled by identity problem of animals because we do not consider them as something more than a combination of body and mind. Persons are also necessarily selves. And we have already discussed earlier in this chapter why we cannot treat animals as selves. This absence of selves in animals makes the criterion of their identity non-applicable to persons. Every person is a self by virtue of being self-conscious which makes him aware of himself as a unitary centre of consciousness. The presence of this unique feature in a person makes him distinct from animals and also it requires that our treatment of personal identity is different from our treatment of identity problem of other living creatures.

The problem of personal identity however, gets different treatments in philosophy and in our everyday life. Our reference to 'identity' of a person in day to day life is mainly based on physical traits. It is true that this reference also involves mental traits but they are evidences rather then criteria. Our assertion of identity of a person in every day life is not actually an assertion of 'identity' as discussed in
philosophy. In philosophy when we talk about the problem of identity we are actually looking for the features by virtue of which a person remains the same over time inspite of going through certain mental and physical changes. In philosophy we are looking for the criterion of personal identity but in our everyday life our search for the criterion of identity is not actually a search for the criterion of identity but for the identification mark of that individual. If the problem of personal identity were a problem which could have been answered by evidences or identification marks then it would not have needed any special treatment. But the problem of personal identity cannot be solved by evidences or symptoms or any identification mark for a person is a unique entity, unique by virtue of having a mind and a body and by virtue of being a self.

So, in order to understand the nature of a person we will have to find out the features which make a person a person and retain his identity over time. In other words, we have to find out the criterion of personal identity. In the recent philosophy, in order to find out the criterion of personal identity the philosophers
have employed what is known as 'survival test'. All the three theories of the nature of self try to find out the criterion of personal identity by employing this 'Survival test'.