CONCLUSION

This problem of the Naga insurgency has been approached judicially. The analytical challenge lay in the central theme of the thesis, *Nature and pattern of Insurgency: A geographical analysis*, that has been viewed in the contemporary conditions. In the process, it was evident that the insurgent leaders have inadvertently became the victims of their own lack of comprehension in the rapidly changing politico-geographic environment (which was caused by the British withdrawal from the subcontinent in 1947, emergence of communist China in 1949 and Bangladesh in 1971) of the region.

From the analysis so far, it is very clear that history, geography, economic development and socio-political aspects have significant impact on the insurgency in Nagaland. There has been no doubt that the physical milieu had played a significant role in the development of Naga insurgent movement. Inaccessibility and the rugged topography of the state has proved itself, in time, conducive as well as bane to the insurgent movement in Nagaland. Thus along with thick vegetation and low visibility among others, had complicated the movement. Thus it can be seen that, whenever such movements do not consider the hard physical
fact of the area concerned (despite) its initial success, the movement is found to fail (unless the area is richly endowed with resources).

Although entire Nagaland (Naga hill district) had come under the British influence and administration (excluding the unadministrative area of Tuensang district) there were few sections of populace who were politically active and who remained as spokesman of the movement. Their efforts to identify and distinguish themselves from the rest of the country was encouraged by the colonial rulers. Ethnicity and distrust became the focal point. This suggested that the spatial arrangement must be such that minimum distortion (psychological) may have either retarded or inhibited the development of the tribes and the unsurgent movement. Political domination, better communication facilities etc., were indirectly suggested by the colonial rulers as instruments which encouraged the tribal fear of absorption and loss of identity after independence.

It can thus be said that the analysis of the Naga underground movement and the interest of their leaders clearly illustrates:

(1) That extremist leaders resorted to the use of force to decide the issue. It then suggested that the
insurgency formed a continuum by which the insurgent pursued their interests. However, the choice of means under the circumstances was not only their own but also was the function of certain environmental conditions over which they had no control.

(2) The alliances and unity between various tribes in the early stages of insurgency suggested that it was a means to explicate and precise the existence of commonality of interest among them (either through ignorance or by force) and transform it into a legal obligation of the populace.

It follows that among the Naga tribes, that there is no such large scale community of interest-common, or complimentary- either the unity between them will break as was proved later (see chapter V and VI) or display their traditional aggressiveness which never provided a firm foundation. The Naga situation clearly demonstrates that the unity between the diverse tribes depended upon the duration and success of the struggle through which the movement was able to achieve and retained the advantages so derived (as in the early stages).
The Naga ambivalence towards space complicated a balanced investigation. They (extremist leaders) sought a definite space but their political background only indicated its relative weaknesses. It remains that had it only been peace, distance and stability that was needed, Nagaland would have never been faced behavioural complexities. One can add that inherent political antagonism and insurgency would never be solved or achieve their purpose. If one does not turn away from the reality of the situation, the solution to the problem has to be sought within the context of innate needs of the people environment and integration with Indian Union. Abundance of study clearly illustrate, the consequence of violence which the Naga tribes experienced. There actively defended territories and unchanging tribal boundaries came under new pressures in which their intransigency was no help at all.

Inherent in their environment, was the fact that the diverse areas of Naga hills had the capacity to sustain the population in varying degrees. Neither was any damage inflicted by the inter-tribal conflict. The onset of administration and subsequent policies united the various Naga tribes who began to voice their political viewpoint in concert (missionaries actively became one of the rallying points) which tempered that traditional aggressiveness
to an establish but alien administrative mores and values). Their political beliefs and explanation gradually intruded their domestic arrangements as well as other aspects. In short, as far as the Nagas were concerned (to a large extent by extremist leaders as well) the phenomena of space greatly impinged upon their behaviour.

The Naga insurgent elements, it seems, considered the extension of authority as intrusion of their personal space without considering the fact that political environment in the world in general and the sub-continent in particular had undergone drastic changes. They persisted upon their traditional interpretation of space and district identity from the rest. They lacked comprehension about the offer of autonomy in the early phase of their struggle. Their insistence on reverting to situation that existed prior to British annexation and independence only makes it obvious that their conceptual bases of geographical location and political environment was weak and tenuous.

But any consideration to the problem of insurgency in Nagaland, should necessarily consider the territorial propensities. Their territorial principle have remained effective. The territorial pattern provided a premise to investigate, although since late 1960's and early 1970's
the insurgent movement has spread to Manipur, Mizoram and Tripura (it was present in Upper Burma which was contiguous to these states). The stepped up counter-insurgency operations resulted in de-territorialisation of the movement. From the insurgent's point of view this was not followed by the conceptual substitutes that could have kept the intensity of movement alive. What their strategy and ideological stand failed to realise was that territorial manifestations and personal space offers adequate accommodation in Nagaland and within the framework of Indian constitution.

Viewing the distribution pattern of tribes in the insurgents context, one can clearly state that social distance was expressed by its scattered dispersion that constantly discouraged the influence of alien elements, social space and distance in Nagaland context can be summed up to include an area of permanent location and with definite boundaries (that which is recognised by other Naga tribes). Their territorial behaviour was inherent in their environment though certain distinct disparities exists.

Again apart from the proposition of common political forum (?) the Naga tribal groups were separated from each other. The separation have been through
acceptance of territorial rights (this has also brought about significant problems to the Naga insurgents band in the Upper Burma), and group antagonism. A closer analysis clearly reveals a mosaic of territories that were discrete and their impact in the distribution of social order. The consequence of which was in the form of integration. It was only a (common) suspicion that aided and abetted by the concerned parties that resulted in joining of forces by various Naga tribal communities against the Central Government in 1950.

The fears of dominance as advocated by extremist leaders may at one end of a continuum in the early faces of insurgency in Nagaland. The psychological consequences of the inhabitants of Nagaland was dictated by both the insurgents and Government. Though dominance was expressed by in terms of space, restricted environment thwarted any definite territorial spacing between them. Intensity of the movement did not bring about any organised principle but parallel government of the insurgents - the Naga federal government (NFG).

The formation of NFG was preceded by gradual emergence of an elite who through their political power contemplated on the controlling the social space - Nagaland
—without sharing it. However, in this, the extremist leaders grossly miscalculated and came in confrontation with central government for a relation of dominance in space. As a result, in the initial phases, the insurgency remained non-territorial while it continued to be dominant over the tribal population (this has despite any territorial success which the insurgent would have had).

This then leads us to presume that the Naga insurgent movement desperately needed a territory which in turn was a consequence of a space. The need for territory became imperative. However, this failure manifested itself as a political issue and insurgent elements strove for recognition and equality.

Theoretically or practically such a stands did not help in territorial arrangements. The exposure of deterritorialisation resulted in the establishment of sanctuaries across the international frontiers in Burma (this was again at the goodwill of insurgents elements of upper Burma). Passing through the continuum resulted in the increasing conflicts within the Naga insurgents movement. Insurgents environment therefore imposed serious limitation, failure to tackle effectively. Immensity of
organisation resulted in either the surrender to the security forces or elimination.

This then suggests that the Naga insurgency is fundamentally a consequence of Naga perception of state that clashed with reality. The political boundaries which they inherited bore little relationship to the traditional tribal areas. Nonetheless the Naga irredentism has played a relatively small part as destabilising factor in the region. Certainly disruptive possibilities and separatism are evident but the Naga insurgency has indicated that until the pre-requisites are fully filled such movements can hardly succeed.

The problem of insurgents physical environment should not normally be beyond solution. Neither should incidence of insurgency place beyond the powers of solution. But in any event the basic essence in the Naga insurgency dilemma reflected not the continuation of the struggle but concentration of powers and decision making apparatus in the state.