CHAPTER V

NAGA INSURGENCY
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It is understandable that the study of insurgency and insurgents has of prime interest to scholars as well as to politicians and military men. Virtually, every aspect of the insurgency process has been considered. There remains one element, however, that has not received adequate attention. This is the geographical perspective in the evolution and definition of insurgency. There is a definite distinction between secessionist movements, rebellions, revolution and national revolution. Secessionist movement or (insurgency), such as those of the Nagas in 1950's was the attempt of one region of the country to secede. Similar to this was of in America during the Civil War 1861-65 and 1967-69 situation of Nigeria(Biafra).

A rebellion is locally oriented and often of only limited political objective. Overthrow of the entire Government, or secession from the state is not part of its objective. Revolution on the other hand is directed towards the overthrow of the entire national political structure and Government. The distinction between revolution and secessionist is not in their objectives, but in the involvement of nation population. Revolution often
is characterized by political struggles among elites. By contrast, insurgency consciously attempt to involve entire population in their causes. Their objectives are not merely to replace the existing leadership of the state but drastically alter the form of government (and often the structure of the society itself), as in China in 1949 or Cuba in 1959. It is this pattern that is characteristic of today's insurgent era and it is the secessionist movement that is the objective of the present analysis.

No insurgency is identical to another (when one compares such documented revolutions as those in China, Greece, Philippines, Malaya, Indonesia and Cuba), except to capture the centre of a territorial base within the state. They have also demonstrated the critical role of certain pre-requisites like historical background, favourable terrain, sympathetic population, self-sufficient economy, poor communication. Though the individual exploitation and contribution varies from stage to stage and from insurgency to insurgency, the importance of pre-conditions to start a successful insurgency cannot be disputed.

2. Ibid.
Broadly speaking, factors that are necessary for insurgency to develop in a particular area are the geographical conditions i.e. rugged terrain, thick forests, land bound borders with passable obstacles, negotiable internal barrier and a landscape of rural riverine or delta type. Low mountains with temperate climate, flora and fauna springs and streams that provide cover, ford, water and freedom from endemic diseases go a long way in sustaining the insurgent activity. Blessed with these attributes the geography of Nagaland and North Burma has greatly influenced the tribal insurgents groups, like the Nagas, Shans, Kachins, Karens, etc., to survive for well over three decades despite continuous check by respective security forces (India and Burma).

The incompatibilities providing the roots for insurgency always operates in combination of factors. They are so interlocked that it becomes difficult to extract each from the imbroglio for adequate and meaningful analysis. For instance, British influence gave a spurt to group aspiration causing political dissension. Naga inertness, religious fanaticism, linguistic antagonism led to the emergence of strong centrifugal tendencies (see also chapter II).

Not to speak of centrifugal tendencies which has given the idea to the minority for separation from the main land and create a tension within the state. But political and ideological factors also threaten the status quo and initiate geographical change. This change was not understood by the Indian government after the departure of the British, which has generated uncertainties to devalue the authority's representation and enhance the insurgent image.

Whereas the pre-requisites discussed earlier had provided the field conditions that partially determined the state of insurgency in Nagaland, but to constitute a full scale insurgency there were certain other elements. These intangible elements were like charismatic leadership of Japio Phizo, popular cause of freedom, goal of independence, aim of democracy and ideology based on religion, and British moral help and encouragement made the people's involvements in the struggle. The various arms and ammunitions dumps left during the Burma war further enabled this partisan group to take up to the arms (see also chapter II).

Processes and Manifestations:

Insurgency in Nagaland can be divided into three broad phases, that is/Build up phase that led the creation of forum from where such political consciousness resulted in the emergence of leadership,(ii) The commencement of the political phase marked by the transformation of the forum into a political party. Later development saw the formation of several tribal Council such as Lotha Tribal council (1923) and All Tribal Council in 1928. However in 1945 the Naga Hills District Tribal Council was formed. Which was changed to Naga National Council (NNC) in 1946 at the Wokha session. The NNC gave a sense of political unit to Naga tribes and introduced the concept of Naga Nationhood. On the other hand Government policies were formulated and necessary initial measures were taken. The commencement of military phase which was initiated by guerilla actions in 1956 and followed by mobile operations (third phase).

The development of this problem in Nagaland had deep root in itself. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the Naga Hills district had already become an integral part of British India. The Naga people had also
reconciled to this fact. The first World War (1914-18) brought significant changes in the Nagas. The Nagas who went to France brought back horrified accounts as to how the great civilised nation fought for their ends and interests. The intercourse among the different Nagas of different tribes in France, far from their home, fostered mutual love, service and sense of political unity. This manifested itself in their verbal resolution to return to their home land, they would work for friendship and unity among themselves. They had also decided that they would also give up their weakness like head hunting and village feuds. It was this spirit which spearheaded an upsurge of the Naga nationalist movement. But the Naga demand for a separate and distinct status for their hill districts had originated mainly after the second world war, when negotiation were going on for granting independence to India. But the idea of according special status to the Naga hill area was mooted as early as 1929, when the Simon Commission had visited Kohima.


After the end of the second world war in 1945, the Naga leaders again started the movement for a special status for the Naga hills district as distinct from India. In the post war period the labour party headed by Attlee, came to power in Britain. His Government was in favour of granting independence to India. This very fact prompted the educated Nagas, who in February 1946 had developed the Naga club into a social and political organisation known as Naga National Council to put forward the demand for a special status for the Naga hills district. This NHC had been organised primarily to enlist the active support of the British officers for social, economic political and cultural developments of the Nagas. But soon this organisation developed into a political party. This was evident when the cabinet mission came to India to prepare ground for granting independence to India. The Naga National Council submitted a four point memorandum on 19 January, 1946 which was as follows:

a) This Naga National Council stands for the solidarity of Naga tribes, including those in the un-administrated areas.

b) This Council strongly protest against being included in Assam.

c) The Naga hills should be constitutionally included in an autonomous Assam in a free India, with local autonomy and due safeguards for the interests of the Nagas and

d) The Naga tribes should have a separate electorate.

It was thus obvious that the Nagas in the beginning did not wish to form an independent state of their own. They just wanted some autonomy in matters of local administration. This attitude, however, soon changed. As per the four point memorandum submitted by NNC to cabinet mission, it seems (according to author) that the Government of India had always said the same. The stand taken by the Naga extremists, then suggests that they were merely attempting to take maximum advantage of British withdrawal and partition of the sub-continent. The Naga dissidents then, probably were aware of their minority position (politically speaking) and low popularity among the various Naga tribes. The armed struggle, then

only suggests that this minority group was attempting to seize political power through insurgency. So in the beginning of 1947, they started clamouring for an independent status for the Naga hills area.

The Naga National Council submitted a memorandum on 20 February 1947, to the British Government which expressed the misgiving that "a constitution drawn up by the people who have no knowledge of the Naga hills area and the Naga people". It will be quite unsuitable and unacceptable to the Naga people. They also mentioned that their unique system of the life will be wiped out with forty crores of Indians, as their strength is only one crore. The Naga National Council made an appeal to the British Government and the Government of India to set up an Interim Government for the Naga people for a period of ten years. At the end of which the Nagas should be free to choose the form of Government they liked. On 19 May, 1947 the Naga National Council again submitted another memorandum, clarifying that the ten years interim Government might be a government of Naga people with full power over the administration except

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid
its defence. Two days later on 21st May, 1947 they again issued a statement, in which they said "the Nagas who were determined not to allow themselves to be involved in a divided and chaotic India are prepared to declare their own independence and can only think of entering into a ten years treaty with an independent Assam.

The Indian leaders tried to pacify the people. As early as August 1946, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the then President of the Indian National Congress, wrote a long letter to Shakharie, the secretary of the NNC, with a view of removing the doubts and suspicion of some Naga leaders about the status and future of the hill districts in free India. He said, "that the Naga territory is too small to be an independent state. It lies between the two huge countries of India and China. It will not be possible for the British Government to hold on the Naga hills or any part of it. More o over the people of the Naga hills are backward and they need considerable help from the free India for their

13. Assam Tribune(Gauhati), 22 May, 1947.
development. They would be isolated between India and China. Inevitably therefore, Naga Hill must form a part of India and of Assam with which it has developed such close association. At the same it is our policy that tribal areas should have as much freedom and autonomy as possible, so that they can live according their customs and desires."

He also said that a special department will be opened in the state as well as in the centre which, would look after the welfare and interests of the tribal areas.

Pandit Nehru's constructive approach, however could not break the ice and the Nagas continue their agitations for an Interim Government. The British Government was also unable to entertain the demand of the Naga leaders. Though few British officials in the Naga Hills had earlier suggested to convert this area as a crown colony or a Trust territory, but the labour


15. Ibid.

Government in England was not in mood to open this complicated issue at the time of their withdrawal from India. Hence, they (British) simply kept silent on the representation of the Nagas. The efforts of Andrew Clow, the then Governor of Assam, to make them understand the futility of their demand was unsuccessful. He stated that a separate state or even a separate province for them was not a practicable proposition. If they insisted to get it, they would remain poor and backward and would even lose some of the inadequate service they were enjoying at that time. He therefore advised the Nagas to have an understanding with the people of Assam and live with in the Indian Union. The advise of Andrew Clow did not change the Nagas attitude to have interim Government. Even some extremist demanded complete independence.

Sir Akbar Hydari, the then Governor of Assam, was instructed by the Government of India to find out possible solution to conclude an agreement with them.

19. Ibid.
regarding the status of the Naga Hills district. After long discussions with the Naga National Council leaders, Sir Akbar Hydari reached at nine point agreement in June 1947. (see Appendix No.1), which came to be known as the Hydari Agreement. Unanimity over these articles were almost reached, but when the question of interpretation of the ninth point came up, the trouble started. In fact there were two sections among the Nagas, moderates and extremist. The moderate interpreted the agreement in the right form, whereas the extremist were adamant to have assurance from the Indian government for complete independence after the expiry of ten years. The provisions of the agreement was put to vote in the NNC and the majority accepted it. But the extremist under the leadership of Phizo remained dissatisfied. Their dissatisfaction prevented the Nagas from coming to definite understanding with the Indian Government. Naturally, when, there was no meeting point, the Hydari Agreement could not be implemented.

But the Indian leaders were ready to accommodate the demands of the Nagas as far as possible in the

20. Ibid.
constitution. An Advisory committee was set up under the chairmanship of G. Bordoloi the then Chief Minister of Assam, to assess and advise on the future administration of the tribals and excluded areas, inhabited by the hill people. He recommended the middle path, after assessing the situation. All the tribes of the provinces other than Assam, whether living in the plains or in the partially excluded tracts, should as a whole should be treated as minority. These areas must therefore be treated separately from the rest.

On the basis of the recommendation of the Bardoloi Committee, the sixth scheduled of the Indian constitution was made, which partially met the Naga demands to manage those affairs that concerned them. In a way the Naga demand of autonomy in cultural, religious and economic matters were met. The Nagas were given the District Council and regional Council and representation in the Government of Assam. The founding fathers of the Indian constitution had expected that the creation of the District Council and Regional Council would give the

Nagas a sense of participation in the administration and they would gradually come within the main stream of India.

These expectations of the Indian leaders, however, were not based on a realistic assessment of the situation existing in Nagaland at that time. The Nagas, far from being satisfied with the provisions of Indian Constitution, became all the more irritated and dissatisfied. The Nagas had been demanding a Government of their own, of course within the Indian union for the time being but contrary to their expectations they were tagged with Assam, which they had consistently opposed. They felt that they had been betrayed. Indian side, it was such he said as no Naga could have written, "Nehru's views was that the very idea of independence was a piece of mischief planted in the simple Naga soul by some of the British administrator and the missionary, and he apparently suspected that foreign hands were still behind the Naga position. Soon after the attitude was clearly expressed by the Assam Chief Minister who blamed the Baptist missionaries for

abetting "a foreign conspiracy to separate the Naga Hills from India and retain it as an imperialist strongholds".

With the decision of the Indian Government the point of collision became the only alternative. Finding every other way closed, their demands refused and ignored, the Naga National Council took a leaf out of the Congress book and tried civil disobedience. A campaign was launched for non-cooperations with the Government in the development schemes which was just beginning, and for non-payment of taxes, teachers and children withdrawn from schools, village headmen resigned their official responsibilities. The disident and extremist Nagas, therefore succeeded in creating a feeling of subjugation and exploitation. This anti-Indian feeling was deliberately allowed to grow. It ultimately culminated in hostility against India and underground activities were started.

Manifestations:

Phizo operated skillfully that one by one all tribes will be involved in the struggle. They had taken decision that all the tribes should support their leader's decision

unanimously. There were some Nagas who were not accepting the leadership of Phizo (because of violent means) and were bound by their traditions, drowned their dissident's voice.

The extremist in Nagaland twisted every event to propagate their cause for example when the executive Committee got the assurance in February 1963, for the negotiation, the extremist started propagating the people that an agreement had been reached on the dissolution of the Interim body. There was no broadcasting station in Nagaland and hence, rumours had a currency which Government of India did not have, by which the extremist confused the villagers. Even the most distant and primitive Nagas of Tuensang could not escape the spell of the extremists' propaganda. Phizo, it is alleged, visited the Konyaks and other tribesmen along the border of Burma on numerous occasions and succeeded in motivating them. He also enlisted a large number of those, who were prepared to join any fray that promised head hunting to regain the aura of their past.

The most powerful and advanced tribe (Angamis) almost

27. The Times of India (New Delhi) 23 February, 1963.
rallied behind him out of tribal and religious loyalty. The majority of the next progressive Aos, who were also predominantly Christians had no choice but to join the struggle as the religions appeared to be in danger. The Semas also rallied around Phizo to merely satisfy their hunger for violence. The remaining tribes, namely Chakasan, Lotha, Chang, Sangtam, Zeleang, Kenga, Phom and others did not give the second thought and plunged themselves into the struggle. Those who cherished peace had perished.

For the first time, the Nagas who for centuries had no contact with the people of neighbouring village joined hands for the cause of perceived independence. This unanimous development in one of the most inhospitable area of the world was perhaps a most notable achievement of the insurgents. The Naga youth already had all the inherent attributes of a fighter and required no training or experience to learn the hard way. The traditionally blind faith of the Nagas in their top brass resulted in unquestioned acceptance of what they said. While the naked display of their military power instilled confidence in their ultimate victory. The yearning for head hunting helped the junior leaders to enforce their own laws ruthlessly. By presenting a programme and manifesto that tickled every Naga's (aroused) aspiration,
TYPICAL PATTERNS OF INSURGENT EXPANSION

MOBILE WAR

GUERRILLA WAR with fixed bases

AREA OF MOBILITY

GUERRILLA AREA

DIRECTION OF EXPANSION

REGULAR WAR

BASE AREA

LIBERATED AREA

GUERRILLA AREA

SOURCE: R.W. McColl, "The Insurgent State, Territorial Basis of Revolution"

ARAME vol. 59, 1969, p. 619

MAP NO 12
their leadership cashed on their state of mind. Most of the Nagas thus motivated and some compelled to develop faith in the political wing and support to the militant Naga.

The rise of Naga insurgency to military supremacy is a sordid account of ignorance and obstancy of the extremist Naga leaders. On the other hand unrealistic appreciation and inadequate responses on the part of authorities. The anti national activities of Phizo and Naga National Council made the Government of India to think seriously about the problem of Nagas. Consequently the government put a number of restriction on the activities of the extremist. Since Phizo was the ring leader of the antinational activities, the Indian Government issued a warrant against him with the rummours of the imminent arrest of the Naga National Council leader, Almost every one who had some position of responsibility went underground. The arrest of some people only confirmed the fears expressed by the extremists.

The search of village Khonoma in May 1953 scared people still further and more of them found it safer to go underground. Such a development only helped the extremist to prove their forecast and challenge the bonafides
of the non-committed and the moderate section. In order to incapacitate the symbols of authority, many officials were intimidated, kidnapped, taken hostage and even murdered. As a mark of civil disobedience, the lower level functionaries were ordered to disassociate and stop collecting the house tax, the only source of revenue. Irrespective of the merits such a crisis expected every Naga whatever his status and station of posting to support his own people. Many young Nagas volunteered and some were coerced to join the underground with the fear of searches, seizures, arrests and drafting as informers. These things were appearing real to those who had not joined the underground. They started running away to the deep interior of the state for safety from one side to another, after a period of intense political activity that was followed by widespread sabotage and terrorism (in early 1955). The hostile Indian Nagas launched the guerilla warfare in Tuensang, one of the remotest and least administrative area of India. In April, due to the unabated guerilla activities, Tuensang was declared as a disturbed area. But this was no sudden outburst in Tuensang. It was planned and controlled terrorism launched to assess the reaction and response of the authority to a given crisis situation, as it was to compel the Tuensang Nagas to fall in line with the insurgents.
The Central Government reacted over the situation in the same way as at first the British had. Several leaders of Naga National Council were arrested. The sixteen tribal councils, established by the British just before independence (All of them were under the leadership of Naga National Council) were abolished. Reinforcement of security forces were moved into the area to tackle the problem. It was officially stated in Shillong on January 8, 1955 that units of Army and Assam Police had gone into action in the hilly tracts on Assam-Naga Hills border to comb the area for armed Naga hostiles (who had began to harass the plains people on mission of dacoity and loot).

By the beginning of 1955, insurgent activity not only intensified but also enclosed wider territorial parameters. The Indian government declared Mokokchung a disturbed area and security forces were soon employed in wider scale to restore speedily political stability and authority of the central government.

On March 22, 1956 the insurgents (underground Nagas) declared the Naga Hills and Tuensang areas as a united and independent state. They established a Federal government of Nagaland and promulgated a constitution, the preamble of which began Nagaland is a people's sovereign
republic. The following Table will show the Phizo's parallel Federal Government:

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<th>Tatar Boho (Parliament)</th>
<th>Naga National Council (Political wing)</th>
<th>Kadhang (President)</th>
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<td>Naga women society</td>
<td>Naga youth Movement</td>
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<td>Angs (Governors)</td>
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<td>Miden Pioyu</td>
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<td>Kilonsers (Masters)</td>
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<td>Pangtongs (Dy. Commissioner)</td>
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<td>Area Village Council</td>
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16 Major tribes: Rena Peyu (Chairman of each Village)

- Angami
- Sema
- Lotha
- Ao
- Chakasang
- Phom
- Kuki
- Konmak
- Yimchenger Chang
- Renga
- Mung
- Chakru
- Song
- Pochury
- Churu

The insurgency gathered momentum after the establishment of Naga Federal Government. But the villagers began to suffer more even, when not actively engaged. Retaliating against villagers for the actions of the guerillas, the Indian security forces took the strict measures against them. This had general hostility between the suppressor force and the villagers. On the other hand, it was also true that generated bitterness among the villagers dividing those, supported the guerillas and their cause from those who stood by the powers that be. That difference between the two groups may be merely tactical will not necessarily lessen the hostility between them.

The Indian security forces in that great strength had put a road block on the path to real independence, which the Naga National Council by insurgency and guerilla Campaign, were trying to gain. The other Nagas (loyal Nagas), this approach appeared at least adventurous at worst futile. They advocated out flanking or infiltrating the Indian resistance in other words by separating Nagas from Indians by constitutional means. However, in early 1956, difference within the NNC became apparent. It started with the torture and execution of T.N. Lakhire, once a close associate of Phizo, by the extremists elements of the insurgent movement. This incident was
to demonstrate to other elements in the movement not to question Phizo. emphasis on prolonged insurrections (to which Sakhire was opposed).

The central government was quick to take advantage of this insurgent division. They (authority) surfaced the idea in late 1950 that statehood within the Indian Union might provide an answer for the demand of autonomy. This idea was put forth because the underground organization of Nagas known as Naga people convention had put the proposal earlier for the same. From the outset it was suspected by members and supporters of the underground that the idea of statehood been conceived by the Indians to divide and delude the Nagas. Although Pandit Nehru strongly resisted the idea of a new state of Nagaland, which was also shared by most sections of Indian political leaders, they warned that to grant statehood to Nagas would set up a chain reaction of similar demand throughout North-east India (It might be said that exactly that did in fact happen).

At all events the Prime Minister Pandit Nehru suddenly revised his opinion after receiving the Naga delegation under the leadership of Imkongliba Ao and decided awarding statehood demand for Naga Hill district.
Constitutional and administrative procedure took three years and the state of Nagaland was inaugurated on 1963. It was then by far the smallest state in India with an area of about 16483 sq Km and a population of some 3.50 million. Nevertheless the statehood move was quickly denounced as surrender by the federal Nagas, who were fighting for the sovereignty. The Nagas who were co-operating with Indian in establishing a state paid the price with the assassination of first Chief Minister of Nagaland Mr. Shill Ao. The guerilla activity again started in Nagaland. Although the Indian security forces did not slacken their counter operations.

In April 1964 a convention was held in Nagaland which was attended by several thousand people and resolved on an attempt at peace and proposed the three man commission. A cease fire agreement was signed between the Indian Government and Naga Federal Government on 24 May, 1964. Agreement on a cease fire masked for a moment the absolute and disagreement that continued between the two sides. The task of the commission to whom

the cease fire agreement gave a continuing mediatory role to play. It proposed this way out of the dead lock that the Indian Government should give the time and opportunity to the Nagas to participate voluntarily in the Indian Union (that is to accede to it).

Again this proposal was really a non-starter. To the federal Nagas, it meant surrender to the Indian government. It required an act of trust in the other side (for to give the right to accede necessarily entailed the right not to do so) and also would set a precedent immoral as they saw it to the future unity of the country. After a brief series of futile meeting between the delegation of the Naga federal government and Mrs. Indira Gandhi (who had become Prime Minister at the beginning of 1966), the political negotiations broke down. However she made it clear that the solution of the problem had to be found with Nagaland, remaining a part of the Indian Union and there could be no compromise on this issue. The cease fire continued to be extended trimonthly and later monthly intervals by formal, though separate announcements by the two sides.

31. The Statesmen, New Delhi, April 15, 1966
At last the peace mission dissolved in May 1966 because both the sides were at logger heads about the agreement.

The rebel Nagas, no doubts stepped up their hostile activities after the failure of peace talks, but the desired goal was not in sight. This led to not only a sense of despondency among a section of the rebels but also caused a serious rift in their campaign, weakened their capacity to pressurize the government. The harassed and weakened rebels could not withstand the mounting pressure from the nationalist and liberal Nagas, who had all along been working for an end to hostile activities and for the establishment of lasting peace in Nagaland. Their efforts ultimately succeeded in November 1975, with the conclusion of the Shillong accord between the Government of Nagaland and the underground Naga leader. It was a historic event as it opened a new chapter in the history of Nagaland. It ushered an era of understanding, peace and tranquility in this strife-torn state. The constitutional issue of the political problem and insurgency was brought to an end by this agreement. This accord was accepted by the underground Organisation among themselves at their Dehoma meeting on 5 December, 1975.

33. Ibid.
The underground organisations and movements thereafter ceased to exist as a threat as all had agreed to be a peaceful citizens of India and to function in accordance with the constitution as it stands. The people of Nafaland heaved a sigh of relief because of the hostile activities at long last came to an end. The underground Naga got an opportunity to live peacefully and happily in the midst of their family members and friends. They also got an assurance of being rehabilitated by the Government of Nagaland. The Shillong accord also provided an opportunity to those underground Nagas who were across the border to come back to their land and to join the rest of their colleagues in accepting unconditionally the constitution of the country and taking their rightful place in the society.

It has to be admitted that the problem of those hostile Nagas, who had gone outside the country to get training and collect arms remained as it was. The appeal of the Government authorities to those hostile to come back to Nagaland and make their legitimate contribution to the progress peace and normalisation which is well on its way in Nagaland had however, no

35. Ibid. p. 3.
significant impact on those hostile. They did not care to come back to Nagaland under the amnesty announced by the Government with the result that the problem of such rebel Nagas still exist.

Independent Nagaland was merely an idea that was encouraged by the British, who permitted conspicuous decision of the leaders of the movement. They perceived the field of settlement in Nagaland, where they had free independent government activity, (it seems that the Naga insurgent leaders wanted political power desperately which they could not get otherwise). Yet such brevity of the leaders of the movement had completely over simplified the Naga history. If one consider the evolution of Nagaland it is very clear that the history could not be compressed. The present study provides one of the many alternatives between the political and geographical study of insurgency in Nagaland, but not necessarily suggesting a short-cut. It does not reduce the scope of political geography nor permitting the politics on an easy platform. It is an attempt, however to provide some academic clarification and it may provide available media of working back and forth among historical, political and geographical data.
Naga insurgency had in fact occurred in political area - Nagaland - from a series of decisions of the insurgent leaders with little or possibly no intervening movement. These actions and decisions and responses were directly proportionate to that of the Central Government, which took decisions after considering the location and federal character of the country or vice versa. Hence, the field services areas of the insurgents was gradually isolated and in some cases completely eliminated. So much so that the effective field service areas of the insurgents have to be located across the frontier in Burma, where they have to contend with the Burmese insurgents.

The Naga insurgency in both the Geographical and political terms was essentially a situation of conflicts (both within and without). The resolution of conflicts (accompany by violence) are clearly expressive. It clearly indicated, conflicts of ideas that did not amount to much until they began to be embodied in decisions that was primarily to create an independent Nagaland. But it culminated in a movement that abstracted the development (socio-economic of Nagaland and the unity of Indian Union). Insurgents effective field was only in contact, if we consider their movement as merely kinitic. But the early phases, say otherwise for it was at that time dynamic
that gradually disintegrated (showing the inherent tendencies which was centrifugal in character in diverse tribal society).

Although no limit can be introduced the idea of independent Nagaland of insurgents. It can be clearly stated that their decisions, movements, fields and political areas was conditioned by the geography of their environment. This is because there very idea was composite of cultural ideas, and could have succeeded only if their very idea was to be within Indian Union. (In fact the author contents that the creation of Nagaland as a state within Indian Union, like other Indian states, was in itself a recognition of the Nagas as a separate culture).

(Spatial Pattern of Naga Insurgency).

Looking from the point of view of internal political development, the creation of insurgent state had a number of values to a movement. In March 1956, just before the devastating eastern monsoon broke out, the extremist underground Nagas declared the Naga Hills and Tuensang a united and independent state. To demonstrate the establishment of the authority of their
AREA OF HIGH & LOW INTENSITY OF NAGA INSURGENCY

INTENSITY

HIGH
LOW

MAP NO. 13
Naga Federal Government (NFG) they hoisted their own republic flag at Phensinyu village in Kohima area.

It demonstrated the weakness and ineffectiveness of the Government to control and protect its own territory and population. Finally the insurgent state and its political administrative organisation provided at least an aura of legitimacy to the movement. To forge unity in the NFG, terms from various Nagas dialects had been adopted. To establish lineage with the mongols, whose blood still runs in their veins, the term Tartar was borrowed from Aos, the work kilonser was adopted from the Yimchunger Aung was the Konyak contribution. Kedahge came from the Hengmas.

Although their main objective of unity to give a turn to the movement to the military stage, it began by dividing the movement into three stages, the stage of contention, equilibrium and general counter offensive. The Naga insurgents were on the stage of equilibrium after declaring independent state of Nagaland. As they were able to control some part of the state. According McColl, each stage is looked at as part of the progressive

creation of new state within politically hostile territory.

Yet the need for a territorial base becomes apparent the insurgents must choose a specific area for controlling the activity. Ideally a guerilla area should have the following attributes.

(i) If possible an area should be chosen that had previous experience in political opposition to the central government.

(ii) Political stability at both the national and local levels should be weak or actually lacking.

(iii) The location must provide access to important military and political objectives, such as capitals, cities and critical resources of transport service.

(iv) Area of weak or confused political authority such as borders lands or even along international boundaries or ideal location.

(v) Terrain should be favourable for military operations and personal security.

(vi) In so far the area should be economically self sufficient.

In the case of Nagaland, after a period of frantic political activity and widespread sabotage, the hostile Naga launched the guerilla warfare in Tuensang district. Because this place had some of the above stated criteria. This movement compelled the Tuensang Nagas to fall in line with others. The hostile Nagas were quite right in selecting Tuensang as the area of contest. Being furthest away from the seat of central authority and along the international border is most inaccessible area. They had been able to establish their clandestine military cadres secretly and unobtrusively in its remote and inaccessible corner. The means of communication, the thick forests and high mountains were all in their support. But with the counter action of the security forces, Tuensang ceased to be the vast deep remote interior later on. As far as the guerilla experience was concerned the hostile Nagas already had the best which the security forces learned later on (see chapter I).

But over emphasis on their military superiority that was merely inter-tribal made them complacent and distorted the concept of liberated or safe base. Even though Tuensang failed to provide the depth resources and safety required for the developments of troops' expansion, they started planning for the next stage.
They started converting their guerilla into regular units and hill tops village into fortified defensive positions. This led to the formation of what they thought were liberated or safe bases for initiating mobile and entrenched warfare. The main consideration for the guerilla leader during the mobile was to select of an area which can provide adequate room to maneuver and hide from counter-insurgency troops and still remains within the striking distance of a major political targets. To meet these requirements the area must be large in terms of its geometric configuration or it must have terrain suited to the hide and seek character of mobile war.

The Naga insurgents selected the area of Thangkul Nagas in Manipur and Nagaland border, which is having the elements required for the mobile war. After strengthening their bases in the Thangkul Nagas area, they continued their efforts of terrorism. No village was spared from the taxes and every house was obliged to supply either a fighter or a porter. Forcible collection of paddy, eatables, clothing, money and drafting of personal for unspecified mission became a routine. Those who disagreed with their means of violence and goal of independence could at best lay passive.
The policy of wholesale murder in Nagaland was designed to keep the local people terrorised. Through this mean they were able to maintain ruthless control over the people and prevented the local population to support the Government.

In March 1956, the NFG was able to control all the major tribes and compelled them to fight for a single cause that was independence and as stated by Phizo. To eliminate opposition, subvert the administration and ascend militarily the insurgent in Nagaland had raised numerous mass association fronts and cells like in Malaya, Vietnam, Greece and Philippines. But such a resounding development in Nagaland in so short a time with no viable economic base, devoid of communications, common language and media was a fantastic movement.

Like any other military organisation the Naga federal government raised a course party and small intelligence cell of varying strength. They did not face much problem in setting up these units. Born and brought up in the same village and very close to the hands of nature the geographical characteristics were already well embedded in the Naga brain. A common source of their
information was, for example when the agents merged with the numerous road construction repair parties. Their well spread network around defensive positions camps forward the occupants either by speed marches or through relay runners. The Nagas inhabiting the areas around the security posts in their traditional dress were the best bet. With such natural ingenuity and invaluable aids the Naga federal army was able to maintain an efficient system of intelligence communication and security.

Linked with the land mass was the issue of manpower. Because the limited territory denied the Nagas, the ability to develop deep interior, bases for regrouping, training centre. Rest areas and depots beyond the reach of Indian security forces. Assuming the early 1956 population of Nagaland to be around 3 million their ratio to then Indian population of about 400 million comes to averaging 1 to 13 persons. Any complete and prolonged diversion of the Nagas towards insurgency could only cause famines and economic hardship in their area. Because they depend entirely on their agricultural production for survival. The hands that could be spread from the total of 115,574 male workers (working force in 1961) to effectively control a hilly sub-tropical area
with population scattered all over could be very...

It is very difficult to fix their strength at any time. However, of the estimates varying widely from 5,000 to 15,000 was reduced to 300 after the Shillong Accord. The effective number of active insurgents whether equipped with modern arms or primitive daos and spares can be placed at around 9000 i.e. approximately 3% to the total population which was reduced to 2% after the emergence of the loyal Naga section. Though many old Naga faggies and teenagers of either sex performed all sort of jobs, and ran errands (as in other insurgenties in the world), the absence of any reliable data, only leads to an estimation that more than three fourth of the Naga federal army was between the age group of 18 to 35.

The Naga federal governments had all the pre-requisite except the finance for which they had to depend on the local population. There condition was so bad that their civil and military personal were rarely paid adequately and regularly. Because at that

time there were no factory workers or a large labour force whose regular wages could be taxed. Payments and requisitions came to be made against post dated cheques on the assurance that after the Naga currency was printed all arrears would be cleared.

Phizo and his extremists band were able to control over the Naga people without any resistance from the Indian authority. This gave rise to the morale of hostile Nagas. The people of Nagaland had no option other than to support Naga federal government. Obviously this was the time (1956), when the Naga insurgency entered the stabilisation phase. But unfortunately, the phenomenal material and human mobilisation could not be matched by the intellectual competence to comprehend the process (assured supply of materials and finance) and character of insurgency. It was unfortunate for the Naga federal government that neither their leaders nor the youth (which was nursery for the insurgency) were familiar with the arts and skill required to conduct the affairs of sovereign state (not to speak of launching a successful guerrilla warfare as Mao did in China).

Although the Naga insurgents launched the guerrilla warfare in the beginning without any resistance. They were having all the pre-requisites in the Tuensang area and
got the success in the first stage. But on the other hand central authority took strict measures to supress these insurgent movements later on. On January 29, 1956 the whole Naga Hill areas was declared a disturbed area and troops were moved to the Naga Hills to supress the insurgent movements. The insurgents started moving from Tuensang to other parts of the region. The Assam Governor, Gen. S. M. Srinagesh issued a notification in Shillong on December 30, 1959 declaring three sub-divisions as disturbed area. i.e. bordering East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) Jowai sub-division in United Khasi and Jaintia Hills and Silchar and Karimganj sub-divisions in the Cachar district to deal adequately with hostile Naga gang, reported to be moving and about to create disorder. See map No. 1/4.

(A communiqué issued by the foreign office Rangoon on May 16, 1961 that, it was reported by informed sources that the rebel had now established strong forces on Burmese territory between Homalin and Saramati. It was also stated that the Naga hostiles had their strong bases in the Somra that between the Indian border and the Chinwin

42. The Statesman (Calcutta) 1956, Also see the Asian Recorder (1960) between January-March p. 31-21
44. The Nation (Rangoon) May 30, 1931.
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river near the 26th Parallel. This area was almost inaccessible, and there were no Burmese army unit operating. It also informed that another hostile group was moving towards the Naga areas in Burma, probably to re-establish their old headquarter on the south western slopes of (13,700 ft.) Saramati Peak which they had abandoned in 1962. Naga hostile also had their base at an height of 7,600 ft at the Katon Peak in Burma, which had deep gorges west wards. Their area of operation was in the Indian and Burma side at a point between Lenakot and Bongmut. The actual entry of the Naga hostile to Nagaland was near the trijunction of Manipur, Mizo Hill and Burma.

The Governor of Nagaland on November 19, 1963 declared the area between Kohima and international boundary as disturbed. He also asked the Manipur authority to declare the whole area of Ukhrul sub-division three miles from the International border as a disturbed area. The hostiles in Manipur were spread over in Tolloi, Tuenoem, Nambri, Seukhong and Anikathel all in Ukhrul sub-division. They also had their base at Harem in Hao sub-division.

45. Ibid.
46. The Times of India (New Delhi) February 26, 1962.
of Manipur. In the Manipur they were having the support of the volunteer force on the Indian-Burmese border in Tengnaupal sub-division of Manipur.

The above discussion shows that the Naga hostiles were operating in the area, where the terrain afforded natural concealment and obstacles to hinder the military operations (where mountains and swamps hindered the tanks and trucks movements). Wood and thick vegetation provided cover from aerial observation and attacks. (see Map No.-/3).

The Naga insurgents got serious setbacks after the Chinese aggression when the Indian authority diverted its full attention towards the Naga hostiles. On reinduction of the Army units, the intelligence sources dried up. Informers and agents were either terrorised or liquidated. The masses reasserted their loyalty to the NFG (for want of protection). The NFG was strengthened by additional recruits from the Naga village. The Indian security forces had to commence all over again. But soon the NFG found itself hard pressed by the Indian security

forces, who were not new to the game, and started looking for respite which they got when the Naga hostile prayed for the peace. It was continued from September 5, 1964 to 31 August, 1972 which was terminated by the Government of India when the Naga hostile intensified their subversive activities (attack on Hokishe Sema, Chief Minister of Nagaland).

The emergence of Bangladesh in December 1971, resulted in the denial of their safe haven. The Burmese authority's strict measure to eliminate the insurgents from their territory only stupified them. (The government of Burma allocated US $208 million for defence in the new fiscal year to deal with insurgents effectively). In the face of an uncompromising stand taken by the Government of India for the first time in 1972, the bulk of what ever was left of the extremist saw wisdom in closing their unimpressive score books of violence and opening a promising account of peace under formula that could provide them safety without loss of face.

In the beginning the morale of the Naga insurgents were boosted, because large towns were garrisoned but the small villages were not, so they always got concealment in
those village. In April 1956 the solitary brigade supported by the few contingent of Assam Rifles and Assam Police commenced counter insurgency in the Naga Hill. Their strength was less than half of the NFG. It was worse that time to create a small village post, since each individual post was easily overwhelmed, its soldiers captured or killed their arms and ammunitions seized. This was another propaganda victory that was scored by the insurgents. These were some of the reasons due to which the insurgency spread all over the Nagaland in the initial stage, inspite of certain measures taken by the authority. It started dying only when the common mass started understanding the result of the violence. The Government of India took this opportunity quickly by separating this group of Nagas who were against the violence by giving them material help and security. This section was later on known as loyal Nagas section. The Government of India and security forces won the heart of people by showing the sympathy towards them and with development works.

The Naga Federal Army like the guerilla forces inevitably were so weakly developed and badly co-ordinated that they could neither re-organise nor reinforce any other bases after the inevitable clashes with the Indian security forces.