CONCLUSION
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We began this work with a discussion of Aristotle. This beginning was prompted by several considerations, the chief among which is the fact that Aristotle was arguably the first philosopher in the western philosophical tradition who expounded a systematic theory of explanation of man and nature. Aristotle believed in the uniqueness of the explanatory system - whatever the object of explanation might be, that is, whether it is a nature that we wish to explain or human action. The central concept of his theory of explanation were those of essence and telos. In other words, what has come to be known as teleological explanation was something which Aristotle thought, must, in the ultimate analysis, override all other varieties of explanation. While the Aristotelian tradition still survives in very significant ways, the Galilean revolution brought about a very important difference for the later development of western thought. Mechanistic explanation, the essence of the Galilean way, came to be increasingly accepted as the only proper way of explaining natural phenomena. And today in spite of the vast complexity of the entire scientific enterprise, the Galilean idea still forms the core of the notion of scientific explanation.

However, the Aristotelian idea of explanation in terms of telos still holds a powerful sway over what is known as the sciences of man. Many philosophers think that the Aristotelian way must be the irreducible way of explaining what is uniquely human and they
gladly accept the consequence that this means that there is an unbridgeable gap between what we call nature and human reality. Sometimes this idea is expressed in terms of the supposed mutually irreducible distinction between the concept of a cause and that of a reason. Although the recent philosophical debate about the distinction between cause and reason has been instructive and insightful in many ways, this debate, like most philosophical debates, has remained inconclusive. What has however interested me is the subtle interplay of the Aristotelean and the Galilean in the thought of three of the great masters of modern western thought (Freud, Marx and Sartre). And the lesson perhaps to be learned from this is that causal explanation and explanation in terms of reason, although there are profound philosophical differences between them, cannot yet be separated from one another in a complete understanding of what is even uniquely human (It is interesting that perhaps none of these great thinkers will count as a philosopher in the paradigm of philosophy in the Anglo-American variety of analytic philosophy).

In my critical exposition of these three thinkers my primary aim has not however been to prove this point, although perhaps indirectly it does give some support to this point. If I were asked why it was these three thinkers that I chose for special consideration, my answer would be that each of them in his own special way is profoundly concerned with the idea of human freedom. And in my work I have tried to seek clarity about the concept in
and through the thinking of these philosophers. I called them philosophers in spite of the Anglo-American reluctance to bestow this accolade on them - and if what I have written throws any indirect light on how to sort out the Aristotle/Galileo divide I must consider myself rather fortunate.

To put the point about the distinction between explanation in terms of reason and in terms of cause somewhat differently, and also to bring the title of my dissertation finally to the picture, the vehicle through which the truth about man and his action is to be understood and explained is meaning and not data which are brute or devoid of meaning. This is the so called hermeneutic approach to human phenomena. Human actions are identified not by some shared physical traits but in terms of what they mean to participants. Sometimes this fact is held wholly or partly to entail the exemption of human or social phenomena either from causation or from external empirical investigation or of course from both. The argument can be put as follows. The nexus which exists between natural phenomena or classes of events are independent of any one society or culture, common to them all, and blind to the meanings prevailing in any one of them. but actions are identified by what they mean to the participants, and the meanings which identify them are drawn from them, as it were, semantic pool of a given culture, which need not be, and perhaps never is, identified with the store of meanings used by another culture. Hence, there cannot be a valid causal
generalization in which one of the links is a class of actions, i.e. events only bound together by the collective meanings which happen to be in use in a given culture for these do not overlap with any so to speak natural kind or category.

The above statement is as extreme a statement as possible about the irreducibility of the distinction between cause and reason between purpose, motive, intention on the one hand, and stimulus, impulse and so on on the other. As I have already made clear although it is correct to say that the truth about human actions and institutions is primarily to be sought in terms of meaning, such understanding cannot exclude causal understanding as well. And it is the peculiar mixture of meaning and cause that is unique to the understanding of man and his action and not just meaning divorced from cause. Again it is in the context of this that my choice of the three philosophers for special study is to be understood.

To return now to the three philosophers and to the theme of freedom that I mentioned, that freedom is possible for human beings is something that I take to be a major fact about man. And the concept of freedom can be understood only in the context of the availability of the network of concepts such as meaning, intention, purpose, ideal, goal, and so on. For Freud and Marx and even for Sartre man can be profoundly unfree and yet the only way of realizing the fact of this unfreedom is through an understanding of it in terms of as it were the causal powers of meanings, ideas, concepts and so on.
Take Freud for instance. The fundamental idea that man's action is controlled by and is at the same time the manifestation of repressed wishes which lie buried in the unconscious is expressed in unmistakable causal terms. Yet these 'causes' are discovered not by an empirical investigation of brute, meaningless data, but through a careful analysis of the meanings that these data have acquired in the individual's experience of himself as a person (a meaning-seeking and meaning-endowing creature) and of his relationship to others and to the world.

These data are essentially carriers of meanings or, in one word, 'symbols'. The repressed wishes have the causal powers that they do only because of the possibility of investing objects of awareness with meaning. Causality operates in the case of man necessarily through a nexus of meanings. The idea that in the Freudian account freedom is possible becomes intelligible only against this background. Man is unfree when meanings acquire a life of their own and are hidden, by whatever mechanism, from his consciousness. Freedom consists in uncovering the meanings of objects in one's consciousness and thereby coming to an understanding of what one's actions are all about. To understand oneself is also at the same time to free oneself from the causal powers of the unconscious. Man is free because he really knows why he is doing what he is doing and has thus a self-conscious grasp of himself.
A similar account can be given of the Marxian idea of alienation and the bondage that this alienation imposes on man. An alienated man is unfree because his labour is enforced labour and its products are devoid of any significance to him in his capacity as a person. The only significance they have is essentially a causal one in that these are objects that he must produce in order that he may keep himself alive; he cannot invests on these objects any other meaning than as the source of his wages in terms of money. Marxian freedom consists in the possibility of de-alienated labour, labour which leads to production of objects on which the worker invests his own meaning independently of the money that it may or may not bring him. A truly free society is a community of people who are engaged in de-alienated labour.

For Sartre man is essentially free but this freedom is as it were nothing to him (Nothingness) unless he is capable of unself-deceivingly and genuinely creating meanings for himself for his actions and the world. The purely causal compulsions (compulsions generated by meanings created by others) on abandoning one's inalienable freedom are so great that most men prefer to live a life under such compulsions than accept the responsibilities of authentic creation of meanings. Such men, although they are free - because for Sartre a man cannot but be free - exercise their freedom in a mechanical causal fashion. Genuine or authentic man is man who is free from such mechanicality of actions.
It is thus clear that for all these thinkers, in spite of their radical differences of views in many ways, man's understanding of himself or of the truth of himself consists in the recognition of the possibility of the exercise of genuine freedom. And this understanding is achieved through an overthrow of the causal powers of meanings and restoring to them the spontaneity which is their natural habitat.