CHAPTER IV

PROBLEM IN SOUTH LUSHAI HILLS

After its attachment to Bengal South Lushai hills was under administrative control of the Deputy Commissioner Chittagong Hill Tracts. C.S. Murray of the Bengal Police and Captain John Shakespear of the First Leinster Regiment, both of whom had distinguished themselves in the Chin-Lushai Expedition, looked after its affairs as Assistant Political Officers. While McCabe was involved in crushing resistance in the north, Shakespear and Murray were engaged in the pacification of the south. The impetus to the annexation of these hills came from raids that the tribes in the Lushai hills made on British or protected villages. But within the hills the situation was extremely complicated. Inter village feuds had been rampant and pacification involved putting an end to this and enforcing Pax-Brittanica.

* In November 1890 Bengal decided upon a Superintendent and had actually removed Murray to the billet. It was however, not before April 1891 that the South Lushai Hills was constituted separate district that a Superintendent could take charge.
During January and February 1891 Captain Shakespear from his base at Fort Tregear moved eastward visiting village after village imposing fines and releasing captives. Every village was made to provide supplies and coolies for transport of baggage. By early February he reached Saiha after a strenuous march. Here he found that the “language of these people is quite different to that of the Lushais or eastern Pois.” Saiha was in fact a Mara village, a tribe known to the Lushai and the British as Lakher and to the Arakanis and others as Shendus. So too was Ramri village which he next visited. The state of affairs in the Lakher country in the south east of these hills can be seen from the nature of Ramri defences described by Shakespear:

The defences have been very elaborate. The approach from this side is along narrow ridge. At the end of this ridge the naturally steep hills has been scraped away and at the top is the gateway, the only approach to which is up a single log notched to form a rough ladder. There have been two “keeps,” one having a stone wall four feet thick surmounted by a palisade, but both are in a very bad state of repair. The chief came to greet us, and conducted us to two nice houses at the top of the village.

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1 FEBP. May 1891; Nos. 56-61, Diary of Shakespear, 5 February 1891.
By the middle of February Shakespear reached Serkawr one of the last of this Lakher villages towards Burma. Compensation was assessed and imposed on Serkawr as was done in the case of Saiha, for raids which were guilty of. From Ramri captives taken from northern Arakan villages were recovered. It was while in these parts that Shakespear learned of Murray’s difficulties in Zakapa’s village.

SUBJUGATION OF THE PAWIS

C.S.Murray, along with S.V.Tayler, had moved out of Lunglei on 1 February 1891 with fifty Frontier Police on an extensive tour.¹ On the 8th he reached Zakapa’s village where he halted the night.² Zakapa was apparently friendly and promised Murray cooly transport for him to proceed to Lalbuta’s village some miles to the north. The following day Zakapa was sent for along with Lalchhuma, a neighbouring chief whose village was only two hundred yards distant. Both of them, as Murray noted in his diary, “refused to come” on the ground that they were busy organising the coolies.³ On the 10th they were again summoned but with the same result. Thereupon the Assistant Political Officer marched to Lalchhuma’s village to find them in the

¹ FEAP. July 1896; Nos. 71-115, Diaries of C.S.Murray, from 1 to 18 February 1891.
² Ibid., C.S.Murray to Commissioner of Chittagong Division, 12 February 1891.
³ Ibid.
chief’s house with a large number of men around them. Murray ordered the men out and asked the chiefs to tell him once for all whether they would obey his order or not. He threatened to punish them severely unless they followed him to Zakapa’s village. But once outside the house they were prevailed upon by their men not to proceed. Before leaving Lalchhuma’s village Murray turned and told the chiefs: “this is the last time I give you the order; if you refuse to obey, you must take the consequences.”

From Zakapa’s village Murray leaving twenty men behind moved out with the remainder of his escort to destroy thirteen grain silos some two and half miles from the village. While these were being fired the Lushais turned on the small guard in the village and looted the government chest of nearly Rs. 2000. After this they ambushed Murray on his return:

We hurried on as hard as we could, (Murray wrote) and when about three-fourth of a mile from the village, where the path was narrow with thick jungle on both sides, a volley was fired into us. I had told off an advance guard of five sepoys and one havildar, who were about five paces ahead of me. The two leading men were shot dead; the third man had his Frontier Police badge shot off his cap; the fourth man

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1 Ibid., Diaries of C.S.Murray, From 1-8 February 1891.
2 FEAP, July 1896; Nos. 71-115, Diaries of C.S.Murray, from 1 to 18 February 1891.
was untouched; the fifth man, the havildar, had his cap shot off; the sixth man in front of me had a bullet pass through his belt and clothes behind, just grazing his back, two bullets hit the muzzle of his rifle about three inches and twelve inches from the muzzle of his rifle being on the slope.¹

Both Murray and his assistant Tayler were singled out for attack.

As Murray continues:

A second later several guns were pushed out of the jungle, and deliberate shots taken at Tayler and myself. I do not know how we escaped, as the guns were not three feet off us. A volley was at once fired by our side, and I gave the order for all of men to lie down in the jungle which we did. I had heard shots continually from the village up to the attack on us, when they had ceased. I ordered the bugler now to sound the “fall in,” to try and let the police in the village know where we were. The result of this was to bring a volley in the direction of the bugler. I now held a consultation with Tayler and my native Officers, and we came to the conclusion it would be madness to try and advance. The Lushais were evidently in large numbers. They had plenty of guns, absolutely commanded the position in every way, and we could not see one of them.²

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¹ Ibid.
² Ibid.
Murray and his men managed to retreat and made their way to Chhimtuipui river and reached the camp on the following day at about four in the evening.

The incident brought a sharp reaction from David Robert Lyall, who as Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, was Murray's immediate superior. He at once asked Murray to explain the entire episode, particularly on the alleged refusal of the chiefs to provide coolies. It appeared strange to him that Zakapa, who had earlier sworn friendship with Captain Shakespear and was apparently friendly towards Murray at first should suddenly and for no apparent reason attack him in strength. That Lyall's suspicions were not without foundation was soon established when it transpired that it was not the demand for coolies or supplies that was at the root of the disturbance upon Murray. In the enquiry conducted subsequently Murray's interpreter deposed as follows:

Jacopa sent 50 coolies to carry the baggage. Mr. Murray had asked for 100. On the arrival of Mr. Murray to Jacopa's village, Jacopa met the Saheb with welcome. Mr. Murray told me to get two girls for himself and the Chota Saheb (Mr. Tayler). I said, where shall I get them from. Mr. Murray said, tell the chief to get them. I did so. Then I and Vaitlaia and Jacopa searched for these girls, and could not get them any. Then we went to Mr. Murray and told him
and he said 'Why cannot you get them; go and make a 'Banda bust'. Afterward we persuaded two girls to come but when I told them that they would sleep with the Saheb, they said "No, we won't" and run away.¹

The interpreter returned to report their desperate search for girls and asked Murray that they will catch them if he agreed. This was not agree to as Murray clarified his position:

No do not catch them, the Sepoy will see, but if you cannot bring me two women, I will have the wives of Jacopa and Pajika. Jacopa was present and Mr. Murray said it in Lushai, and at once Jacopa's family began to leave the village...²

In all probability all this happened on the first night itself. This explains why Zakapa and his family moved out to Lalchhuma's village that very night. Murray himself noted in his diary that Zakapa "did not sleep in the village this night." The demand for girls was again made to Zakapa in Lalchhuma's village according to the interpreter. Further he asked the chief to collect the village girls to dance before him to which Zakapa replied that according to their custom this could be done only on traditional festive occasions. Zakapa instead offered him goats as

¹ Ibid. Statement of Panjiham, Tipperah, Son of Chandra Singh, an Interpreter.
² Ibid.
a gift, but when these were supplied Murray had found fault with them. Incidentally, Murray in his diary refers to the refusal of the chiefs to his demands, but cleverly does not state what these demands were. The Government of Bengal accepted the enquiry report and recognised that Murray's "disgraceful conduct was the principal cause of the outbreak." He was immediately removed.

News of the outbreak and particularly the reason behind it soon spread to other neighbouring villages.¹ Fifty nine men from Dokapa’s village who acted as Murray’s carriers up to Zakapa’s village and were on the way to Lalbuta’s village threw down their loads when they learnt of the incident and joined in the attack.² From Dokapa’s village as well as from Kapchhunga’s and Lalchhuma’s quickly joined in.

On the 22 February Captain Hutchinson with 150 men advanced from Fort Tregear to Zakapa’s village.³ By the time he reached the village, Zakapa had already moved out and remained moving from place to place to avoid an encounter with the force. All military and police post in the hills up to Fort White was telegraphed to obtain intelligence on Zakapa’s movements.⁴

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¹ Ibid.
² FEAP. July 1896; Nos. 71-115, (No. 83) Dairies of C.S.Murray Esq. C.I.E. Assistant Political Officer, Lushai Hills, From the 1st to 18th February 1891.
³ Ibid., No. 72. Confidential from Sir John Edgar to The Commissioner of Chittagong Division. McCabe also moved towards the South from the North Lushai Hills.
⁴ Ibid., Report from C.S.Murray to the Commissioner of Chittagong Division. 8th March 1891.
Meanwhile flying columns under Colonel Evans, Lieutenant Cole, and Captain Hutchinson scoured the hills hunting the chiefs and their mantris involved in the late rising. By early March three chiefs, Dokapa, Lalchhuma, Kapchhunga, and their mantris were apprehended. Zakapa still eluded the British forces and remained a fugitive. It was not before another four years that Zakapa could finally be brought in.\(^1\) After Captain Shakespear took charge as Superintendent on 16 April,\(^2\) he announced rewards of 500/-, Rs.200/-, Rs.100/-, for the capture of Zakapa, his brother Pazika, and the mantri respectively.\(^3\)

The subjugation of Dokhama, Lalchhuma, and Kapchhunga brought peace to the southern hills for the remaining months of the year. On 4 January 1892, Shakespear held a durbar of chiefs near Lunglei which was attended by representatives from every tribes.\(^4\) The Superintendent told them that British occupation was permanent and that feuds unless stopped would involve serious punishment. They were made to swear friendship with one another or at least peace with one another. Tribute would have to be paid, and Shakespear accepted the principle that this could be done in

\(^{1}\) Ibid.
\(^{2}\) Ibid.
\(^{3}\) FEBP. August 1891; Nos. 88-97, (No. 93) Dairy of Captain Shakespear from 23rd to 29th May 1891.
\(^{4}\) Sir Robert Reid, *History of the Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam*, (Shillong, 1942). p. 45. Five clans represented this darbar, "Howlong, Thangloa, Mollienpui, Lakher or Longsen, and Pol."
the form of rice. He also told them labour supplies would be paid for, the amount later being fixed at four annas a day.

At the end of the month Shakespear met McCabe at Kairuma's village and settled the boundary between the North and the South Lushai hills. From here he proceeded south again to enquire into a murder committed by the Pawi chief Dokulha, a brother of Hausata involved in a killing of Lieutenant Stewart that had occasioned the Lushai Expedition of 1889. Dokulha's statement which he made two days after his capture illustrated the nature of the feud in these hills:

Thongliena's men shot my brother Vantura. If I did not kill some men my brother's spirit would have no slave in the "Head men's village, therefore I went to shot two men of Thongliena's village. We met some men of Boite Thilkara's village and mistook them for Thongliena's men and so shot at them.

On 17 February Shakespear sent his assistant Robert Sneyd Hutchinson with thirty-six men under a Subedar against Dokulha's village. Hutchinson started at 3 a.m., and in about an hour time reached the jhum fields of the village. While near the village on top of the summit of a hill the alarm was given. Hutchinson thus described what followed:

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1 Quoted in Ibid., There is a misprint; it should have been "Dead men's village" instead of Head men's village. "Dead men's village or Mitthi Khud" is the place where the soul of the dead went.
I charged into the village with some fifteen men who were near me; men with guns came tumbling out of the houses and I heard shot fired. I had ordered my men not to fire but to follow me in a rush on the chief's house, the situation of which I knew. Unfortunately a man with a gun took deliberate point blank aim at me and I fired at him with my pistol. He lurched forward dropping the guns but was seized and carried off by some other men near him, the gun remaining with me. The delay of a minute or so just stopped me from getting Dokola who made away as I entered the house in company with some other men.¹

The man who disappeared before Hutchinson was none other than that Dokulha himself. The next day, 18 February, Dokulha gave himself up. This was just as well for disturbances had now broken out to the north.

THE HAULAWNGS

In February 1892, it will be recalled, began Lalburha's resistance against McCabe. Shakespear received a message from Aizawl that McCabe was closely invested by large number of Lushai warriors at Lalburha's stockade. Shakespear at once decided to proceed to McCabe's assistance. The latter however, when asked reported that assistance from Lunglei was not

¹ Quoted in Ibid., p.33.
required but that if Shakespeare could move around the Haulawng group of villages it would prevent them from joining the eastern Lushais. The villages of these chiefs lay between the north and south Lushai hills. The Haulawng chiefs as Shakespeare knew were a branch of the Sailos and therefore connected with Lalburha and the eastern chiefs. The most important of them were Dokhama, Dophunga, Lallauva, Seipuia, Vansanga, Lalhrima, Lalthawma, Rochungnunga, Tlungbuta and Lalburha. Lalthuama whose village was situated nearer Lunglei was in fact under the influence of Ropuiliani. She was the wife of Vandula and daughter of the great chief Lalsavunga. Of her Shakespeare had written:

Her influence is directly hostile to us, as is only natural when it is considered that she is the daughter of one great chief who always opposed us, and the widow of another. Since her husband’s death she has seen his brother becoming more and more friendly with us, and increasing their prestige by virtue of this alliance. So much so that I overlooked her entirely and attributed Lalthuama’s frequent faults to his own youthful folly. All the villages belonging to this

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1 Of them Shakespeare had thus recorded in his diary for the week ending 8 August 1891, the entry being for 6 August: “Apparently the people known to us as Howlong are really a branch of the Sylos clan and are called Howlong after the hill of that name on which the village of Rollura was the same stock as the chief shown in the pedigree tables as Sailos. The whole of the tribes known to us as Sylos and Howlong are spoken of the common term Thang-ur.”

Others were: Kamlova, Lalkanglova, Zaduna, Kaphleia, Kalkhama, Lalmaia, Laltawna, Liankhara, Lianpuiluti (mother of Laltawna), Sailoliana, Vanthanga and Thangliana. Lalburha who was involved in this rising was not the same man with that of the Eastern chief. He was, however, usually referred to as South Lalburha.
group have been more or less troublesome, not actively hostile but passively obstructive. It has always been difficult to get tribute or labour from them.¹

Ropuiliani had tremendous influence among the Lushai chiefs, who were by connection sympathetic with the Eastern Lushais. Lalluauva and Seipuia were however friendly towards the British.

Shakespear’s objective in advancing into the Haulawng region was to ensure the neutrality of these villages. It was also to prevent Kairuma from making common cause with Lalburha. On 13 March Shakespear reached the friendly village of Lalluauva. Here he discovered that at all the villages decided against supplying coolies. He was further told that the Lushais were prepared to resist his advance. The first indication of this was the killing of Shakespear’s interpreter Satinkhara, at the village of Dokhama, the grand son of Ropuiliani. On 16 March Shakespear was himself attacked near Vansanga’s village of Chhipphir. This was repulsed. But Shakespear now realised his difficulties. The terrain and the dense grass jungle along this route made it difficult even to see the attacking Lushais. An attempt at negotiations failed and Shakespear had to push on. Every inch on his passage was contested and it was after great

¹ FEBP. March 1894; Nos.152-159, Shakespear’s report concerning Ropui Lieni, widow of Vandula, and her son, Lalthuama.
difficulty that Vansanga’s village was reached and carried. It was now fortified but remained virtually under siege by the Lushai.

Vansanga’s mother who ruled Zote village called Shakespear to her village so that talks could begin with her son. But on his way there Shakespear was attacked,1 and had to return. After collecting supplies he moved out against Zote village on 18 March with hundred rifles and 190 coolies, a guard of fifty rifles being left to protect his base at Vansanga. As he neared Zote village Shakespear found it was strongly defended. Not less than four stockades blocked the path to the village and were defended by fifty to sixty armed men. It was clear that the Lushais were determined to block the movement of the force beyond Zote.

I found Zaute strongly stockaded and full of men, I stormed the stockades, losing one sepoy. The rebels holding the stockades till we were within a few yards of them. It was now evident that 150 rifles could not quell the rebellion. I therefore returned to Vansanga’s and stockaded my force...

1 Intelligence of Lushai plan and movements were given by Dara Shakespear’s friend and interpreter. For a photograph of his, in old age, see, A.G.McCall, Lushai Chrysalis (London, 1949), facing p. 64. The success of the forces however, rested on Dara, interpreter, and a loyal Lushai friend, who explained the Lushai mode of warfare and their strategy.

The incident at Zote was the result of a confederation comprising men from Thangliana, Kamlova and Lalhrima and some other village.\(^1\) Shakespear now realised that he could not occupy Zote with a small force. There was constant sniping from the jungles and as he was short of supplies, not having even the unhusked grain. The village was accordingly fired after which Shakespear returned to Vansanga.\(^2\) From here he sent small flying column by night to nearby villages.\(^3\)

Shakespear could neither move forward nor control the developing resistance. The Lushais cut the telegraph line, as a result of which no communication to any other place was possible.\(^4\) Meanwhile simultaneous attacks were made by the Lushais on the Vansanga position. Shakespear had no choice but to seek reinforcement from Chittagong. He sent Lalluauva’s men thither with the following message:

I am sure from the determined resistance made today that the rising is a big one. At present our position is

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\(^1\) Ibid
\(^2\) Ibid
\(^3\) As this village stood on the top of the cliff it was convenient for the Lushais to take defensive position and they stockaded the village, properly placed the fully armed sentries.\(^5\) Lieutenant Boileau and his party made a flanking attack, fired a volley and then charged up the hill towards the small gate, which was fortunately opened. At the same time the main body tried to divert the attention of the Lushais which enabled the flanking party to get into the gate, one sepoy killed and one Lushai from Lalluauva’s men wounded. The Lungrang sentries were taken by surprise from the rear and they abandoned their position and frittered away to all directions. The village was then destroyed. On their way back to Vansanga’s stockade the Lushais continued to fire from the jungle, in spite of which they managed to reach the village stockades, where the force was better protected from the Lushai continuous attack.

\(^4\) MSR. CB-1, Pol-3, Shakespear’s report about the Note on the Lushai Hills, its inhabitants and its administration since 1888.

\(^5\) MSR. CB-1, Pol-3, Shakespear’s report about the Note on the Lushai Hills, its inhabitants and its administration since 1888.
most precarious, and any hesitation now would be fatal. It is only by holding on here and putting a bold face on the matter that we can succeed; but full and complete punishment must at once be meted out, and a complete submission obtained. I cannot do this without more men.¹

On 21 March, Hutchinson arrived at Vansanga's village with 58 rifles from Lunglei. Though this strengthened his position somewhat, Shakespear believed that it was still not possible to attempt punishing the hostile chiefs whose villages, about 20 in number, were scattered over several square miles of the territory.² Shakespear accordingly returned to Lunglei leaving a guard in Vansanga's stockade under a European Officer.³ News immediately spread that he had retired and "immediately the Lushais swarmed round the post and the lines of communication, cutting the line, firing on all parties and cutting up stragglers or the unwary who strayed even a few yards outside the posts."⁴

It was now that the Government of Bengal informed Burma of the serious state of affairs in the Lushai hills and applied for assistance. At this time a column called the Nwengal Column under Bertram S. Cary was conducting operations against the

² M SR, CB-1, G-9, J.Shakespear's report. 29th June 1892.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Bertram S.Cary and H.N.Tuck, Op.cit., p. 70
Chins immediately east of the Lushai hills. When he received direction from his government that he should proceed to assist the beleaguered Shakespear, Cary was on his return to Fort Falam. His transport was worn out and rations all but exhausted, and the food supply taken from Nikuala village, his objective in his last expedition partially consumed. He therefore decided to return to Falam and with fresh and replenish then go to the assistance of Shakespear. After overcoming problems of moving in equally difficult terrain and under incessant rain the Burma column reached Dokhama village on 3 May. On the news of its arrival the Lushais ceased firing into the post, deserted their villages and began hiding their grain and property in the jungle. Cary discussed the situation with Captain Rose who commanded the column and with Captain Shakespear. Since the column had rations for five days operations it was, "decided to punish a few villages, but to punish them thoroughly" and a campaign against the leading village was arranged. What the Burma or Nwengal Column did is described in Cary's own words:

every nullah was searched and tons of grains burnt,
whilst herds of cattle were shot and finally the village burnt...The Burma Column marched to Rochungnunga, shelled the village of Lalkanlova en route, and also destroyed granaries. The Frontier Police marched to Rochungnunga by a different route, and on arriving at the village were fired on by a few Lushais and a few shots were exchanged...The Lalrhema party slipped through it just before daylight, but the place was deserted except for a small guard with whom shots were exchanged for some minute: the party then rushed the village. The Lalkamlova party rushed the village as daylight was appearing, killed one man, wounded another, and captured a third, seized four guns, and, after burning the village to the ground, returned to Rochungnunga. The next day the Lalkanlova party remainder of the Column at Lalrhema after burning Rochungnunga.¹

So it went on all altogether 1500 houses were burnt. Thereafter the column moved on to Lunglei and thence to Chittagong and Rangoon.

RESULTS REVIEWED: OPERATIONS PROPOSED

After the subjugation of the Haulawngs and the punishment of a number of chiefs, Captain Shakespear reviewed the whole rising in detail. "The cause of the rising," Shakespear noted, "was the determination of certain powerful chiefs near Aizawl not

¹ Ibid.
to supply labour."¹ This he had experienced himself when in early January 1892, he sent out orders to the chiefs north of Lunglei and south of Aizawl, to send in coolies to work at the ordinary rate of pay. "They all made excuses," the Superintendent said and:

I visited some of them, fined them for their disobedience, and by the middle of February had 300 men working at Lunglei. These men all ran away, being summoned by Vansanga and Lalthova. By comparing dates, it will be seen that just at that time, 19th February, Mr. McCabe was sending to demand coolies from Lalbura and was contemplating a refusal of that chief to comply with his demand.²

Shakespear firmly believed that this disobedience in recalling their men from their work at Lunglei was on the advice of the northern chiefs, who were subject to McCabe.

Captain Shakespear had further suspicion about this recall of labour. The nature of work was such that the hardship was slight. He knew that coolies were never called for except in the season of the year when there were no work to be done in the jhums. Besides, the men were paid for their labour at a fair rate. Furthermore, the work they were employed on was mostly house

¹ FEAP. February 1893; Nos. 45-105, Shakespears' note on the rising among the Haulawngs. 5 September 1892.
² Ibid.
building, which the Lushais were accustomed to. On top of this
the workers were found cheerful and willing. But some chiefs
seemed to have been unhappy, Shakespear affirmed, “several
chiefs asked last year why they alone were asked for coolies and
not the more distant chiefs as well.”\(^1\) In spite of that, the
Superintendent knew well, that the only way to reduce the cost of
the British occupation of the hills was to obtain as much labour
as possible locally.

Of the twenty one villages comprising some 3000 houses,
concerned in the uprising, only nine villages had been punished;
viz: the villages of Dokhama, Vansanga, Laltawna’s mother,
Laltawna, Rochungnonga, Lalkanglova, Lalhrima, Tlungbuta and
Sailoliana. Even these villages were not sufficiently dealt with as
burning a village is but was only a “small punishment.”\(^2\)
Shakespear therefore considered it absolutely necessary to send
punitive expeditions against these chiefs. The mere sending in a
military force was, of course, not sufficient to subjugate the
Lushais. He explained what was needed:

It has been over and over again conclusively proved
that there is only one way to really punish these
people, and that is to establish oneself in a village in

\(^1\) Ibid.
\(^2\) Ibid.
sufficient force and with ample supplies, and regularly hunt them down until the terms offered were agreed to, and then repeat the operation at the next village.¹

That burning of villages was not a sufficient deterrence was further elaborated upon:

To burn the village is no punishment, as the best village in the hills can be rebuilt in three months. They will certainly bury their crops, so that a force having only time to march through the country will be able to do them little or no harm. In such a country there is no chance of bringing the enemy to bay and inflicting severe losses on them, and all Officers who have experience of the north-east frontier are agreed that the above is the only satisfactory method of obtaining a real submission.²

“I consider it absolutely necessary that a punitive column should be sent against the rebels this cold weather,” he told J.A. Crowfort, Foreign Deputy Secretary, in a demi-official letter on 5 September 1892, and:

It required all my influence to keep the remainder of my district quite during the rising last spring, and if I

¹ Ibid.
² Ibid.
am not placed in a position to coerce the rebels this cold weather, our prestige will suffer, so that most of the work of the last years will be thrown away and have to be re-done at an increased cost later on.¹

He considered that the whole operations would probably take about three months. Accordingly, he proposed to form a depot at Lallauva's village, three days march from Lunglei, and collect two months' provision. The column would when near other posts be able to draw on the godowns there. He further planned to attack Vansanga's village and occupy it, collect as much rice as required and destroy the remainder, bring in all livestock they would find, and hunt down any of the enemy whom they might come across. After establishing itself at Vansanga's village, the expedition would proceed on to other villages and apply the same method. No offer of any terms or any overtures to the Lushais would be made unless it was in a position to take action should these be rejected. Shakespeare had in mind what the terms and conditions would be:

1. The surrender of the chiefs, to stand his trail.
2. The surrender of their guns.

¹ *Ibid.*, see note by Captain Shakespeare, on the recent rising in the Lushai hills, and suggestions as to the operations necessary during the ensuing cold weather to complete the pacification of the District. 5 September 1892.
3. Immediate compliance with all orders regarding supply of labour.\(^1\)

If he was to achieve his objectives, Shakespear made the need for reinforcement clear. The punitive column would not be less than 350 rifles, a sufficient force would be required to guard the posts and to secure the Lunglei-Demagri line of communications. The total force required and their disposition was estimated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Rifles</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fort Tregear</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lalthuama</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunglei</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demagri</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six camp guards on</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demagri - Lunglei road</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The force available at his disposal was, 200 from 17\(^{th}\) Bengal Infantry and 320 Military Police and Shakespear proposed another 400 men or a wing of regiment to be sent.

As the villages to be punished were so scattered even though small in number, the Superintendent thought the work would be simplified if a force from Aizawl could operate against the most northerly villages, viz., Lalburha, Thangliana, Tlungbuta and Liankhara. The Lunglei column would simultaneously operate

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\(^1\) Ibid.  
\(^2\) Ibid.
from the south. The other arrangements such as signalling, road-
making, transport and supplies were also detailed. The date of
commencement of operations, would depend on the collection of
sufficient supplies at Lunglei, but Shakespear hoped it would in
the early part of December 1892, the best season for military
operations in the North East Frontier hills.

Captain Shakespear had the full support of his Government.
The Lieutenant Governor Sir Charles Elliot, however, considered
it “absolutely necessary” for combine operations from Aizawl and
Lunglei.¹ In Shillong Sir William Ward who discussed Bengal’s
proposals with McCabe agreed. The Political Officer of the North
Lushai Hills reminded the Chief Commissioner that the Haulawng
villages of south Lalburha, south Lalhrima, Tlungbuta,
Thangliana, Kamlova, Liankhara, Kanglova, Rochungnunga and
Zaduna which Shakespear had previously transferred to him all
rose during the late uprising.² McCabe, further said that: “South
Lalrharma, Kanglova, Tlongbut and Rochungnunga were destroyed
by the Lungleh and Burma columns and were not likely to offer
any organised resistance in the future. The establishment of an
outpost at South Lalrharma, and a combined promenade through

¹ Ibid., Demi official, Elliot to Lansdowne, 11 September 1892.
² Ibid.
the northern Howlong country would undoubtedly effect a thorough settlement of this tract. He therefore suggested that:

1) The two columns should start simultaneously.
2) Vansanga should be the advanced base of the Lungleh column, and Leinpunga or Jarak of the Aijal column.
3) The Aijal force would proceed first to Lalbura, only two very easy marches from Leinpunga, thence to South Laihima.
4) The Lungleh force should visit Rochungnunga, Kanglova, Leinkhara and possibly Tlongbuta.¹

By this plan, McCabe concluded, the country would be thoroughly patrolled, and all possibility of a combine movement on the part of the enemy would be frustrated.²

These recommendations were further elaborated by Bengal. Co-operation from Fort White or Falam was mooted, not so much to strengthen the punitive forces as much to block the escape of the recalcitrant Lushais from this area eastwards.³ Columns from Fort White, Aizawl, and Lunglei should make a combined move from their respective position not later than 15 December 1892

¹ FEAP, February 1893; Nos. 45-105, F.C.Dukes, Chief Commissioner of Assam to the Chief Secretary, Government of Bengal. Dated 30 September 1893.
² Ibid.
³ M SR, CB-2, G-25, H.J.S.Cotton, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. 6 October, 1892.
towards the Haulawng country. These three columns should established heliographic communications with each other in stead through telegraph lines of which were liable to disruption and so simplify the problem of information. They should arrange their own commissariat and supplies. The column from the Fort White should cover the villages of Liankhama in the north through Nikuala’s village, then Kairuma, Zaduna and Lalbuta in the south. The object of the operation would be to give protection to the friendly Lushai chiefs and consolidate the British power among the hostile. It was essential, in Bengal’s view, that a sufficient force was established in the hostile villages and remained there until the terms were complied with.

Regarding the strength of each column, Bengal proposed that the Aizawl column should consist of 300 Military Police, and a column of not less than 300 from Fort White with two Mountain guns, and three to four hundred men of Military Police stationed at Lungleh and Fort Tregear would be sufficient. In addition to these Gurkhas were asked for. They were considered experts in hill and jungle warfare and able to withstand the climate of the hills. One other advantage of Gurkhas was that they were rice
eaters like the Lushais and hence there would be no difficulty in finding supplies for them.\(^1\)

The Government of India was reluctant to sanction the proposed extensive operation; Lansdowne's own view was that "considering the operations which we are carrying out elsewhere and the state of our finances, I should deprecate anything like unnecessary activity with Lushai Hills this winter."\(^2\) Captain Shakespear who was in Calcutta tried to argue his case with the Military Member, Sir Henry Brakenbury. He explained to General Brakenbury the policy followed of compelling the Lushais to supply force labour and a certain quantity of supplies. Unless the policy was applied to the distant villages or abandon their present homes and move further away. Brakenbury's views summed up the current thinking on the subject:

I am not at present convinced that the policy of letting them all alone, and neither requiring force labour, nor tributes in supplies, might not be tried. I take it that these demands are the causes of the existing hostility to us on their part; and it might be possible to try the policy here of giving small subsidies for local levies and keeping open lines of

\(^1\) *Ibid*

\(^2\) *Ibid.*, see KWs, note by Lord Lansdowne, 25 September 1892.
communication, which would probably be for cheaper on the long run than these continued expeditions.¹

It was however on the insistences of Sir Charles Elliott² on punitive measures that the Government of India finally relented.³

COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS

In December 1892 combined movements of Military and Military Police of the strength already decided began against the Haulawngs. A.W.Davis, who had in the meanwhile succeeded McCabe as Political Officer of the North Lushai Hills with a force of Military and Military Police had already advanced in November 1892 as far as the village of south Lalburha, situated on the Darlung peak and containing 300 houses, and lying in his North Lushai Hills District. Lalburha surprisingly offered no opposition. He received Davis in a friendly manners, provided coolies for the transport of their baggage and whatever supplies he required. Still, Davis fined him 20 guns for his delay in providing the coolies.⁴ This was promptly paid. Evidently

¹ Ibid., Note by Sir Henry Brakenbury, 29 September 1892.
² Ibid., see note by Lord Lansdowne, 26 October 1892. The Foreign Department also noted that the “Lieutenant Governor’s meaning seems to be that, if the villages are left alone now, they are certain to give trouble which will force us to punish them within a short time...” and that, “the credit of the British name is doubtless at the button of the Lieutenant Governor’s strong recommendation...”, 6 November 1892.
Lalburha had no wish to fight the British though he was slow in obeying orders. From Lalburha's village Davis moved to Serchhip, Lalhrima's village. On the way he visited Samlukhai, the village of the Haulawng chief Thangliana, where he was well received. He reached Serchhip on 5 January 1893 and established an advanced post. Buildings for its permanent occupation by the Military Police, were constructed. Besides with his base at Serchhip, the Assistant Commandant of the Military Police, Lieutenant Tytler attained the submission of a number of chiefs.

Captain Shakespear marched from Lunglei, commanding the combined forces from Chittagong and the force already at his disposal at Lunglei Fort. He covered the whole Haulawng villages towards Serchhip through Vansanga's village. He encountered no opposition from the Haulawngs and made his way through to Serchhip village.

Shakespear met Davis at Serchhip on the same day and the two Officers decided to impose a fine of 200 guns on the villages of Lalhrima, Rochungnanga, Liankhara, Tlungbuta, Lalkanglova, and Kamlova, for their part in the rising of April-May last. This decision was announced on 8 January before an assembly of

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid. See also Reid, History, op.cit., pp. 48-49.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
chiefs. Among them Rochungnunga, Lalkanglova, Lalhrima, and Tlungbuta had already been punished by the burning of their villages and destruction of their grain. So were the chiefs of the Southern Lushai District such as Dokhama, Vansanga, Laltawna’s mother, Laltawna, and Sailoliana. Their villages too had been destroyed along with their grain while some of them were inflicted a fine of guns. However, Shakespear considered these as rather mild and so the impositions of further fines. After this, on 9 January Captain Shakespear left Serchhip. On the way he visited the villages west of Tlawng river, met their chiefs, and being satisfied with their conduct returned to Fort Lunglei. Davis remained in Serchhip till 23 January visiting with a small escort the remaining Haulaewng villages lying within his charge and assessing them to revenue. “everywhere I was well received” said his annual report of the North Lushai Hills for the year 1892-93, “and found no difficulty in getting coolies and supplies.”

But this was by no means the end of the Haulawng problem. While Shakespear was on his tour to the Northern Haulawng chiefs, Ropuiliani widow of Vandula, the chieftainess of Denlung, was directly hostile to the British. Although her late

1 Ibid.
2 FEAP. February 1893; Nos. 45-105.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
husband's brothers Lalluaua, Seipuia and Lalthangvunga were all loyal to the British, she held herself steadily aloof. All the villages under her influence were troublesome not actively but passively obstructive. Shakespear always found difficulty to get tribute and labour from them.¹

In July 1892 Shakespear received the information that Ropuiliani, her son Lalthuama, Dokhara and other chiefs of this group planned to attack him. He therefore arrested Ropuiliani and Lalthuama.² With the approval of W.J. Cunningham, Secretary to the Government of India, they were deported to the Chittagong jail where the chieftainess died. With the capture of the obstinate chieftainess and her son, the southern Haulawng problem practically relieved. Shakespear reviewed the whole operations in his report:

The general condition of the country now, and the success we have attained in the payment of revenue and fines, seems to point to the fact that the Lushais have abandoned all ideas of combine resistance, although it is quite possible that isolated outbreaks, such as that at Jacopa, may, under similar circumstances occur for several years to come, but the force of the police on the spot, if maintain as its

¹ FEBP, March 1894; Nos. 152-159, Shakespear’s report concerning Ropuiliani widow of Vandula, and her son Lalthuama.
² Ibid.
present strength, should be sufficient for the suppression of such disturbances.¹

¹ Reid, Op. cit., p. 34