INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I
The distinction between Mind and Body be it in any form, goes back to ancient times, and perhaps to the beginning of human self-consciousness. When we ask ourselves: What is a human being? Our answer is usually 'a human being consists of a body and a soul'. The soul is conceived as the essence of the body. In other words, the relationship between a human being and his soul or mind is the relationship between substance and essence and it was stressed that this essence, that is soul, or mind can exist separated from the body. The essence (soul/mind) is part and parcel of the substance and it determines the inner structure of the substance.

Modern philosophy took a completely new turn through Rene Descartes. Descartes' philosophy has one foot in tradition and the other in the new era of philosophy. He never questions the distinction between substance, essence and accidents. And he feels that the towering edifice of scholastic philosophy needed slight adjustment. According to Descartes, as I state in chapter II, mind or soul is conceived not as the essence of body but as the substance in its own right. And consequently he opines that a human being is a combination
of two individual substances namely a body and a mind. The relationship between the two is not the relationship of substance and essence, rather it is the relationship between two substances and therefore, each of these two substances must have its own essence. And as a result, we find that Descartes' innovation consists in his claim that minds are individual things (substances) and not essences of individual things.

Further, according to Descartes, God is the absolute substance and that whatever that has existential independence from any other substance, except the absolute, is a secondary substance. The absolute substance cannot be defined in terms of one exclusive property (attribute) whereas the secondary substances can be defined in terms of one exclusive attribute. Mind can be defined in terms of one exclusive attribute 'thinking' or 'consciousness' and the body or matter can be defined in terms of one exclusive attribute in terms of 'extension'. Both mind and body possess two different and mutually exclusive properties. Body is in space, and is public. It is extended and its behaviour can be mechanically explained. Mind, on the other hand, is not in space, but in time. It is private and has consciousness
as its attribute. It is not extended and therefore, cannot be inspected. However, Descartes maintains that there is some connection between the two which is, according to him, intuitively known, and that on the occasion of something happening in the mind a relevant happening takes place in the body. Descartes asserts that there is a pineal gland inside the nervous system where the body and the mind interact with each other and an impression is produced on the occasion of which a conscious act occurs.

Descartes gives a machanistic explanation of the body which is different from scholystic machanism where soul or the mind is conceived as the essence of the body. Descartes, on the contrary, conceived mind not as the essence of the body but as a substance in its own right. Thus, we see Cartesian Dualism is the dualism of substances where substance is the basic notion. And because of the due consideration of this basic notion we find that this dualism of substances, i.e. of the mind and the body is not acceptable. Not because we have improved or refined our objections clearly but because we want to understand mind at least as well as we understand the world around ourselves.
To understand the Cartesian notion of mind I have examined the concepts which emerge as central to his distinction between 'mind and body', in the second chapter titled 'Descartes Conception of Mind'. These concepts can be treated as the criteria for establishing the distinctness of the mind. In this connection, we find two key claims, two main candidates of the criteria of the mental which have received considerable attention today, they are 'privacy' and 'intentionality'. Both these criteria reflect the aspects of consciousness.

'Privacy', as suggested by Descartes is considered to be the most striking criterion of the mental. Privacy as one of the criteria of the mental, claims that one has 'direct' access to the modifications of one's own consciousness. No one else can know what conscious states I have or I am in. One has direct or immediate (without any inference or mediation) access to one's consciousness which leads us to the belief that consciousness is the private domain of mental states, processes and events which are fundamentally different from any feature of material things conceived in terms of extension¹. For Descartes mind is inner, immaterial,

private, has no window etc. None of the modifications of one’s own consciousness will deceive him leaving him in doubt that he has this state of consciousness that he has as well as what its contents are. Consciousness has two aspects, awareness and self-awareness and i.e. first it is aware of an object in a straight forward manner, as for example, I see this tree then I am also aware that I am aware of the tree. It is that mental state which is necessarily owned by and ascribed to only one owner, namely the one whose states they are \(^2\). This unique relationship between the owner and the owned is that what gives an owner direct access to what he owns and which in turn gives sense to his ‘privacy’.

Intentionality, the other candidate for the criterion of the mental or consciousness, is presented by Franz Brentano. Brentano believes that the feature of ‘intentionality’ differentiates the mental from the physical. ‘Intentionality’, which is said to be a reliable mark of the mental, is meant as (i) direction upon an object i.e. consciousness is always directed towards an object or is necessarily of something, and (ii)

reference to a content, i.e. consciousness always makes reference to a content or all mental acts, states and events do necessarily have some kind of content.

The claim here is that consciousness is always and necessarily of something, for instance, while perceiving a tree in the garden, our seeing-consciousness is directed towards the tree out there. In having pain, although, our consciousness is not directed towards any object yet it is a mental activity. Some psychological phenomena such as depression do not find any object. Brentano holds the thesis that the object must exist in order to involve consciousness, or at least be able to be conceived independently of the act which involves its consciousness.

At the same time, 'reference to a content' maintains that all our mental acts, states and events do necessarily have some kind of content. But it can also be seen that there is no content of those conscious states, processes and events which, do not have objects at all. And thus 'reference to a content' cannot be considered to be a necessary condition of the presence of consciousness.
And consequently, we find that 'intentionality', though it underlines some 'characteristic feature of the mental*8, is proved unsatisfactory to serve as the criterion of consciousness (mental)8.

Now the question arises: Should we infer from the failure of these two criteria of the mental that there is no such thing as mental? Can Cartesian Dualism of mind and body as two independent substances be defended? We have seen even after the three hundred years of debate the philosophers have not been able to bury the Cartesian theory known as Dualism or interactionism in the form presented by Descartes.

The thrust of my thesis has been towards the conclusion that though the mind-body theory considered as the theory of the relationship between two completely different substances as conceived by Descartes is

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* By the characteristic feature of the mental we understand something generally present in the mental. And its presence makes it sure that it is mental. It means that intentionality is sufficient condition of the mental but not a necessary condition.

* By the criterion of the mental we mean it is indespensable, always present in the mental and only in the mental.
unacceptable, yet it does not imply the death of dualism as such. Dualism of mind-body in some form remains conceptually alive.

After having discussed the Cartesian dualism emphasizing the novelty of Descartes conception of mind signifying the total break from the past, I have discussed and tried to justify this conception in the same Chapter. However, Cartesian Dualism stands thoroughly discredited in present century with the coming of the behaviourists. Philosophers have advanced various forms of materialism thereby interpreting the concept of mind in non-Cartesian terms. They have struggled a lot to provide a more acceptable theory of mind-body. Three major attempts stand out in this connection, Logical Behaviourism, Identity theories and Functionalism. Unfortunately, none of these attempts have been successful. In my thesis I have discussed these three types of theories as the central argument against Cartesian dualism.

In this connection, the first very influential treatment of the concept of mind has been forwarded by Gilbert Ryle in his well known book 'The Concept of Mind'. I have
discussed Ryle's position in the IIIrd chapter. Ryle's main contention is that mind is not a substantial entity. He thereby argues by analysis of mental concepts that its (minds) entire expectorants can be classified under three heads namely dispositional, adverbial and achievement. He tries to show that items falling under any of these headings do not refer to either a substantial entity or to a process or events other than physical ones. Ryle gives a dispositional analysis of mind by holding that mind is simply the disposition of the body and thereby a person is not composed of two independent individual substances, i.e. body and mind.

There are many thinkers who do not have any difficulty with the concept of the physical body, but their difficulty lies in the mental term of the alleged relation. The main theory to consider here is that of philosophical or analytical or logical behaviourism as a philosophy of mind developed as a consequence of the rejection of Descartes' 'Mental substance theory'. The core problem here in fact is that expressions referring to mental and physical have different meanings. This notion has been simply assumed to be true. This assumption has been powerfully
attacked in recent times by Gilbert Ryle. Philosophical
behaviourism as is advocated by Ryle seems to hold that
the meaning of mental predicates must be explained in
terms of overt behaviours, or that statement about mind
can be completely analysed in terms of statements about
what other people can or could observe him doing.

When we attribute some mental predicates to some one,
we are attributing to him some kinds of behaviours or
a disposition towards some behaviour or both. Now if
we consider Ryle's assimilation of the mental to the
physical as legitimate or valid, then mind and body are
not different in principle. Thus, the conventional dualistic
theories rest upon a confusion. Ryle assimilates all
mental predicates to dispositional terms like intelligent
or obstinate noticing that their ascription to a person
does not imply anything about his "current experiences".
Reacting against Descartes' view that there are actions
like doubting, willing, feeling and so on, which necessarily
require the existence of something, the mind which acts,
Ryle (refer chapter III) sets out to show that there are no
mental acts by examining psychological concepts and that
each falls into one of three broad classes:
(a) Dispositional concepts,
(b) Adverbial concepts, and
(c) Achievement concepts. Inclinations, motives, moods, agitations, etc., are sometimes called mental states but are in fact not really states at all. They are propensities (good disposition).

Going by Ryle’s account, it appears that dispositional properties are non-occurent because when we say that ‘a glass is brittle’, we donot mean that the glass is at a given moment actually being shivered. To say that a glass is brittle is to say that it may be brittle without even being shivered. A thing is said to be brittle if and only if under suitable circumstances it shatters. The behaviourists like Ryle use this feature of dispositional property and define, thoughts, feelings and wishes, etc., not in terms of actual behaviour but of disposition to behave. A man who hides his thoughts, feeling, wishes, etc., could still have a disposition to behave in certain ways. And therefore, to attribute consciousness or any particular state of consciousness to a person is to attribute a disposition to behave in certain ways. For Ryle to talk
of person's mind is to talk of person's abilities, inclinations, capacities, liabilities etc. For instance, to be angry is to behave in an angry way: to be flushed, abusive, banging the table, trembling etc. Hence we cannot say that to be angry is to have a mental state. There is nothing private. We should note that mental states are names of a particular pattern of behaviour and thereby attribution of intention, desire, intelligence, excitement, fear, and so on are to be understood as attribution of a disposition to behave in a characteristic manner under suitable circumstances.

But we see that the Rylean behaviouristic account of mental states suffers from some difficulties. In Chapter III, I conclude that the logical behaviourist fails to show how one can account for the way one uses one's mental states to explain behaviour. The obvious difficulty, as far as our common experience is concerned, is that there can be mental processes going on although there may be no behaviour at all. A man may be angry & yet give no bodily sign. A man who is angry may think but may do nothing. Ryle argues here that though a man who is angry may not do or say anything but he has the
disposition to behave in some relevant ways. A glass does not shatter but is brittle. Therefore, it can be said that to be angry does not mean to be in a state of anger.

But behaviourism is considered to be profoundly an unnatural account of mental processes. It is not natural at all to speak of one’s speech or action as identical with one’s thought. The thought is distinct from speech and action. Under suitable circumstances, it is thought which brings about action. Mental processes can occur even in the absence of behaviour. Logical behaviourism involves many difficulties as it leaves out the essential feature of consciousness. Further, the feeling of pain in one’s own mind may produce disposition in certain ways but this particular behaviour or disposition to behave is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for sensation. Feeling of pain and behaviour are not identical. It is wrong to analyse mental predicates behaviouristically.

Ryle commits a mistake by denying not only the mental substances but also mental events and occurrences. One may indulge in thinking without showing any outward sign for it. The dispositional account of mind presented
by logical behaviourists is that mind is reducible to behaviour. Physical description for each and every mental act is not possible. For Ryle to be intelligent is to behave intelligently, to be angry is to behave angrily, and so on. These mental events or processes do not require dispositional analysis. And to describe that one is intelligent because one is behaving intelligently, etc., is to commit the fallacy of Petitio Principii, i.e. 'begging the question'. Chapter two of my thesis deals with Ryle's attack on dualism.

Ryle's own theory is also largely discredited, yet the anti-Cartesian movement goes on. The other major attack on Descartes has come from those who propound the so called Identity Theory sometimes called Reductive Materialism, which I have analysed in the IVth chapter. Though this theory is practised in many ways but all versions of the theory deny the existence of mind as a separate substance claiming that mental processes, events, etc. are strictly identical with brain processes and events. The idea in this theory of mind is that each type of mental state or process is numerically identical with sometype of physical state or process in the brain or inside our central nervous
system. In short, mental states and processes are nothing more than very complicated states and processes in the brain. Mental processes and brain processes are not two different kinds of events but are identical. Now the question arises: Is consciousness, or more simply awareness, a brain process? UT Place says yes to this question.

"Consciousness is a process in the brain in my view is neither self-contradictory, nor self-evident; it is a reasonable scientific hypothesis, in the way that the statement 'Lightening is a notion of electric charges' is a reasonable scientific hypothesis"\(^3\).

At the same time, Place in his article 'Is consciousness a brain process?', admits that there remains a number of our mental concepts, of consciousness, of sensations, and mental imagery where a dispositional analysis fails and an acceptance of inner process becomes unavoidable but still it does not entail dualism.

Smart's article 'Sensations and brain processes' has put the Identity Theory firmly on the current philosophical

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map. Smart, influenced by Place states that each and every process reported in sensation statements are in fact processes in the brain. A sensation statement is a report of brain process. Smart writes:

"When I say that a sensation is a brain process or that lightning is an electric discharge I do not mean just that the sensation is somehow spatially or temporarily continuous with the brain process or that the lightning is just spatially or temporarily continuous with the discharge".

Sometimes due to lack of knowledge about neurophysiology we talk about our after-images, aches, pains, etc. as these sensations cannot be processes in the brain just as an illiterate peasant knows nothing of electricity but can talk about lightning. He further argues, 'experience' and 'brain process' donot have the same meaning. He is not arguing that the after-image is a brain process but that the experience of having an after-image is a brain process. Experience is the introspective report of a sensation which is nothing over and above brain process.

Smart does not make clear whether 'sensation' means 'brain process' or is synonymous with 'brain processes' or something else. 'Sensation is a brain process' cannot be a case of pure identity as maintained by Smart. Moreover, to say mind is identified with the stimulus aspect of the brain just as in the sense 'lightning is an electrical discharge' leads Smart to materialism. This materialistic Identity Theory of Smart fails completely to deny dualism.

D M Armstrong propounds a slightly different form of Identity Theory from that of Smart's. He tries to solve the puzzle with established scientific doctrine that a nature of man, or what a man is, can be best understood in physio-chemical terms. Mental processes or thoughts cannot be identified with behaviour. It is possible that there is no behaviour but there are mental states. Mind can be defined as the inner cause of our behaviour and it can be surely identified, with the states of the central nervous system. It can be possibly assumed that there must be something 'going on' behind each and every sort of behaviour. According to Armstrong, this inner principle (mental states/mind), which is behind every behaviour,
is a purely physical account of man and hence can be identified with purely physical states of the central nervous system. Mind is a sort of inner state that produces in man a capacity to bring about such and such behavioural expressions.

Now we see that the stand of Identity Theory in general is that mental states are identical to the brain process. Jerome Shaffer points out that if it is so that two conceptually different processes are identical then empirically it must be possible to show this identity by certain evidence. The problem of location is a genuine problem which must be solved before the Identity Theory can be regarded as a satisfactory theory of mind. It has been seen that Identity theorists are certain in describing mental states than in describing the corresponding physical states as it lays too much emphasis on future findings.

Besides all these what I want to make clear is that mental phenomena cannot be given a physical being. The ontological status of mental phenomena is not clear. All that we can say is that mental phenomena are attributed to the self in a way which is different from the
attribution of the physical phenomena to the self. So the question of the relationship of the mental and physical still remains.

The discussion of the arguments against dualism continues here with the Philosophy of Functionalism.

Functionalism is the main focus of my IVth chapter. Functionalism, the heir to behaviourism, differs both from behaviourism and the traditional mind-body identity theory. It differs from behaviourism on the ground that the behaviourist's account of mental states solely in terms of environmental input and behavioural output is not adequate. A reductive definition solely in terms of publicly observable inputs and outputs is not an adequate characterization of mental states. Identity Theory is also not adequate on the ground that the physiological constitution of each and every being is based on different chemical elements. Thus, there are different kinds of physical systems or physical constitutions and this raises a problem for the Identity Theory. How will it be possibly right to find out one-to-one correspondence between mental and the physical when there are different
kinds of physical systems.

Functionalism, a different approach to the mind-body problem, concentrates much on the functional role of the mental states mediating between a specified input and output. Functionalism studies mental states in terms of their normal causal role, as well as their normal behavioural effects. The concentration is made on input (injury), output (pain behaviour) and the relation between inner states (or with private states). It is to be understood that "the normal function of pain is to be the causal intermediary between a specified bodily cause and a specified sort of behavioural effect". Here it can rightly be said that manifestation of any behavioural effect involves factors like physical events in terms of bodily movement and characteristic cause of it involves the mental states such as thoughts and desires. Functionalism admits mental activity usually linked with behavioural disposition but also that mental states are, in fact, causes of behaviour.

Functionalism, provides a satisfying solution to the problem

of other minds as through the knowledge of correct input and output. We have been able to suppose that there really exists causal intermediary (causal link) between the input - injury, and output - pain. Though functionalism has succeeded somehow to make us understand the functional role of mental states it has failed to deal with the phenomenon of consciousness, like what is it like to be happy, what is it like to be in pain, etc. A highly sophisticated computer can play the functional roles of pain, pleasure or sensation-of-colour but it remains certainly doubtful that it would have intrinsic qualia as ours. A machine or computer can have internal states with functional properties but it can never be said to be conscious or having consciousness as we human beings do have.

Moreover, the various form of functionalism suggest reductions of mental states to physical states. The definition of mental states purely in terms of causal relations which cannot account for qualitative feel of mental states is the central problem with functionalism. This doctrine, therefore, fails to adequately deal with the mental states.
None of the attempts have been successful in rejecting completely Dualism as such. There is, something which still lingers on. I agree that Cartesian Dualism does not take ground in the sense that several standard arguments raised against it have not been answered by the defenders of Descartes. But this, does not amount to the rejection of dualism as such. The dualism of mental and physical states remains as it is.

In my thesis I try and see if some form of dualism is inevitable in trying to make sense of the human reality. And if it is so, what accounts for its inevitability? Is it some feature of the mental itself or is it a feature of our conceptual framework as a whole?

Answer to these questions necessitate some clarifications regarding the most valuable attribute of a person. Hence in Chapter V, I try and analyse the concept of a person/self. According to Descartes a person is his mind, essence of which is consciousness. In order to give a clear picture of the concept of a person Strawson asks two fundamental questions: (i) why one's states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all? And (ii) Why are they ascribed to the
very samething as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation, etc.

Strawson believes that though mental and physical processes are exclusively different from one another but these two diverse kinds of predicates are, in fact, attributes of the 'samething'. Or are ascribed to or belong to one and the samething. A person is not only mind, or body but both. A person is a compound of two diverse kinds of subjects: a subject of experience, for instance, pure ego, and subject of corporeal characteristics, for instance body. In order to avoid further difficulty, we should rather say, according to Strawson, a person consists of a 'subject' and a 'non-subject', and therefore, this primitive concept of a person frees us from the difficulties of both Cartesian dualism and the no-ownership theory.

Strawson makes a distinction between 'm-properties and p-properties' which he thinks are equally applicable to a person because person is a primitive concept. And thus a person is a unitary concept, or unitary entity
having two different kinds of attributes . A person is a combination or is constituted with two diverse kinds of attributes and this concept of a person does not make a dual sense.

But this view of Strawson is somehow not acceptable to us. Strawson admits in his book 'Individuals: An essay' that a disembodied person can exist and so dualism is there. Both conceptual and ontological dualism remains. And thus, Strawson theory does not destroy dualism.

Dualism emerges from the understanding of the concept of person. Dualism of person and body remains 7, and of course dualism of mind and body through the understanding of the concept of person. Though this is not the Cartesian form of dualism, i.e. not the dualism of substances. The debate on mind-body relationship and on persons, conceived as selves, goes on.

In fact, a dualism of or a dualism between self and mind

can also be conceived. Some philosophers, for example, recently McGinn, in his book 'The Character of Mind' points out that self is a simple, mental substance and at the same time, he denied substantiality to mental phenomena (thought, emotion, volitions etc.). This raises a question of the relationship between the self and the mental phenomena since mental phenomena are ascribed to selves and they cannot be explained in physicalistic terms. In other words, the ontological status of mental phenomena is neither mental nor physical. Yet, it is attributed to the self which is a mental substance. So there is a dualism between self and the mental phenomena. However, I have not pursued this line of thought. I mention this only to point out that in the broader perspective of mind-body problem other versions of dualism are possible even after rejecting Cartesian dualism.

Conceptually the distinction remains. By conceptual distinction we mean the fact that in our language mental concepts and physical concepts are incommensurate. At the sometime, it does not imply that both mental and physical

have two distinct kinds of being. That is, their ontological status remains uncertain. But whether a parallel ontological distinction can also be made is a question which remains largely unsettled.

Concept does not pick out anything. A concept is satisfied when it picks out an object of reality as for example, trees, chairs, etc. Contrary to these there are concepts like the concept of pure spontaneity or absolute freedom. Now, is there any spontaneous action to satisfy this concept?

Mental concepts cannot be reduced to non-mental concepts. But the question that mental concepts pick out something in reality is a separate question. It is an empirical or let us say a factual question.

I have not discussed two contemporary theories, namely Meta Linguistic Dualism, advocated by Richard Rorty (Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature), and Complimentarity Theory advocated by N. Bohr 9. However, I would like to

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simply state that these two theories also fail to solve the mind-body problem. Meta Linguistic Dualism is not the dualism between mind and body but dualism between ‘Mental Events’ and ‘Physical Events’, that is, the dualism between ‘Incorrigibility’ and ‘Corrigibility’ between the said events. Moreover, Rorty’s solution is merely a linguistic solution. Bohr’s theory of Complimentarity also cannot be accepted. The principle which he applies in order to solve mind-body problem is actually a principle that he applies in physics. Mental states and mental processes, and bodily states and bodily processes are different from that of physical things in kind. Therefore, the principle which is applicable to physical things cannot be applied to human beings.

I would agree with Richard Rorty when he says that mind-body problem has not been antiquated \( ^10 \), i.e. it has not been hitherto replaced by any newer or better theories. I am convinced that mind-body problem is modern, and not ancient.