CONCLUSION

Though psychologists have claimed to have understood mind yet a lot needs to be further explored if the mystery of the relations of mind to body has to be fully exposed. As I have shown in the earlier chapters, all the so-called theories of mind namely, Behaviourism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, have ignored the essential feature of consciousness. Undoubtedly the word consciousness with the suffix 'ness' seems to suggest the property 'of being conscious'.

When we go by scientific understanding of this there is a general consensus that there is no intrinsic, conceptual or metaphysical difficulty as to how consciousness depends on the brain. Variations in the physical properties of the brain might correlate with changes in consciousness, yet we are ignorant of the character of the connection between the two. But the problem still remains the same. How are we to understand the correlation where one is purely physical, and the other purely non-physical? In order to meet requisite theoretical understanding to this question even if we grasp atomic and molecular theory, a kind of reductionist approach, we find ourselves unable to precisely spot the point where the answer to this particular problem exists.

Thus, consciousness is considered to be something mysterious, non-existent not because it is invisible but
because we hardly have any trace of it in terms of physical evidence. Today it is a matter of common knowledge that we cannot doubt the invisible parts/waves of electromagnetic spectrum, they are there even though not open to our naked eyes. Similarly, 'cognitive closure' with respect to consciousness does not imply that it does not exist or is unreal.

As McGinn argues:

".... such closure does not reflect adversely on the reality of the properties that lie outside the representational capacities in question; a property is no less real for not being reachable from a certain kind of perceiving and conceiving mind. .... cognitive closure with respect to P does not imply irrealism about P. That P is (as we might say) noumenal for M does not show that P does not occur in some naturalistic scientific theory T -- it shows only that T is not cognitively accessible to M. ......Nothing, at least, in the concept of reality shows that everything real is open to the human concept-forming faculty -- if, that is, we are realists about reality."^1

The reason/idea behind this consideration is that we may remain in complete ignorance of our own mentality yet we

cannot deny the fact that people are linked with at least two different aspects i.e. the mental & the physical. Though these two are not identical yet they have always been with us. The knowledge of consciousness is perceptually closed and because of this cognitive closure no form of inference can enable us to have proper understanding of consciousness.

The situation calls to mind Locke’s view (in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding) that our God-given faculties do not equip us to fathom the deep truth about reality. In fact, Locke held precisely this about the relation between mind and brain: only divine revelation could enable us to understand how ‘perceptions’ are produced in our minds by material objects.

To continue, there seems to be no compelling reason to suppose that the properties needed to explain the mind-body relation should be in principle perceptible. And therefore, perceptual closure does not entail cognitive closure as it is possible to conceptualize unobservables with the help of suppositions, assumptions, etc. Still there may be some problem because consciousness is considered to be something non-physical, immaterial, and therefore, any assumption or supposition based on purely physical data can never take us outside or beyond the realm of the physical. It seems to me if knowledge about consciousness is something noumenal in kind then it becomes evident that knowledge of this
(consciousness) is an impossibility just by the empirical studies of the brain alone. It is difficult because we employ the same methods, different cognitive faculties of perception and introspection, to know our acquaintance with consciousness by which we have our acquaintance with the brain. And thus, we are left with the view that mind-body problem is unsoluble since we are unable to apprehend the nature of the psychophysical nexus so long as the inavailability of an appropriate faculty to account for consciousness is there.

To reiterate, in our language mental concepts and physical concepts are incommensurable. But that does not imply that both mental and physical have two distinct kinds of being. In other words, their ontological status remains uncertain.

The conclusion what I have tried to draw is that though the mind-body theory considered as the theory of the relationship between two completely different substances, as conceived by Descartes is unacceptable, yet it has not been sufficiently refuted. Dualism of mind-body in some form or other remains conceptually alive.

In all the chapters of my thesis, I have tried to findout whether there is any philosophical solution to the mind-body problem. I find no solution to this problem because the solution offered by different theories seem to be rather
inadequate. Therefore, I have come to the conclusion that this problem has not been settled to any philosopher's satisfaction. Mind-body problem is a problem-perennial in philosophy.