CHAPTER - III

PLAY OF PRESENCE AND ABSENCE: DERRIDA’S PROJECT OF DECONSTRUCTION

I

Knowledge as Presence

Derrida conceives knowledge within the metaphysics of presence, which means, a reduction to an essence, being or concept. Derrida locates construction of such notions like ‘essence’, ‘being’, ‘concept’ and the truth - values assigned to them as an affirmation of the presence of something in it, which confirms the relationship between the subject and the object. Derrida further locates the specific way in which such a relationship is instituted within the discourse of philosophy. Derrida locates such an institution as an inevitable consequence of philosophy in search for origin of a concept or an object which brings in a reference relation and a statement of fact to which the subject and the object stand in a stable relationship. A philosophical discourse construes a set of such relationship, which aims at exhausting possible modes of knowing the world and
accommodates them by a thread of reason that explains the mutual relationship between the subject and the object. Derrida terms such self-explanatory reason that justifies and explains the presence of something to itself as a 'closure', which assumes a metaphysical form by establishing a regular law of relationship between the subject and the object. Derrida explains the character of 'closure' by its character of 'invagination' of the relationship between the subject and the object within the discourse, which he further explained in terms of an auto-affection of knowledge taking place within the law of essence or truth. An auto-affection is the possibility of repetition of the capacity to represent something as always present to itself, a repetition of the same from the same, self-sameness, which can take place within philosophical discourse. Representation of facts through a stable relationship produces a determined space of presence bound by a flawless repetition of the same that fixes the limits of 'knowing' within the discourse. Derrida highlights this circle of auto-affection as the key to understand the metaphysical construction of reality as the repetition of the self-
sameness, which is broached in phenomenology in its search for first principles and give an ultimate foundational status to the 'Being' of all forms of existence. Such a circle of auto-affection limits the possibility of knowing and only in the case of belonging to the circle the conditions of knowing is satisfied. The most suitable candidate of such circle, for Derrida is Metaphysics, within which the founding oppositions of philosophy, the form and the world, the sensible and the intelligible are instituted.2 Even phenomenology in its double movement of returning to the concrete and discovering the first principles of knowing the concrete, gives rise to a double metaphysics of 'essence' and 'phenomenon'.3 Ontology's presupposition of being, further inscribes the metaphysical necessity of first principle within the discourse of philosophy. In recapitulating all these, Derrida captures the tendency of attaining an unitary closure within Metaphysics by various forms of philosophical inquiry which inscribes and re-inscribes itself within the discourse of metaphysics. Derrida unveils 'two' distinct historical 'moment' in such repeated inscriptions: one, a Nietzschean moment of active
forgetting of the origin and the other, a Heideggerian nostalgia for the forgotten origin and its recalling. Further, Derrida diagnoses a constant play between these two moments in discursive Metaphysics in the form of a binary mutuality. But the complementarity of these two moments marks a perpetual absence, which each taken singly tries to meet, while both of them fall in to an invaginated abyss of a stable origin as conceived by metaphysics. This leads to a simultaneous phenomenon of belonging and non-belonging to the unitary origin of Metaphysics. Such simultaneous belonging and non-belonging guard the non-present origin, which transcends the current determination of Being and which is transgressed in the determination of present.

These moments of forgetting and recalling of the origin gives rise to a double movement of attempting a breakthrough towards what is beyond it and at the same time trying to remain within the discourse. A breakthrough is obviously an undoing of the conditions of possibility, while remaining within the discourse shall mean a re-inscription of the impossibility of the conditions of possibility, that is, the
presence of the origin within the discourse. It would mean a displacement of the conditions of possibility into something radically different as well as impossibility of replacement of such conditions of possibility corresponding to the double movement. Displacement of the conditions of possibility signifies a certain opening towards something other, while the impossibility of its replacement implies a certain closure. As far as the impossibility of replacement is concerned, Derrida conceived it as a consequence of reduction of general context into a particular representation, metaphorically called a moment of blindness of the conditions of possibility. The metaphysical notion of 'presence', for example, gives rise to such a moment of blindness when the 'being' of 'presence' must be precomprehended in making it self-present. So, in answering any question like 'what is something X?' The being of 'X' is precomprehended in the very question 'what is?' which calls for a radically different character of X with which X is identical. The being of X acting as the condition of possibility for asking the question displaces the condition of possibility to something else, while at the
same time irreplacebility of the being of X forbids any movement towards anything else. The double movement within the question, therefore, puts the very condition of possibility of being under question, which can in no way be answered within the possibilities of alternation and sameness. One can infer that asking such a question 'what is', is a suspension of being as a condition of possibility into a permanently awaited moment of its realization that calls for its present displacement, while it is present as a fixed moment calls for asking a question about its' present only, which is a suspension of 'present' itself. This mode of differential structuring of concepts into 'being' and then its dismantling to construct further concepts is not given within metaphysics, even though both are grounded as origin and relation, unveiled through dismantling and construction indicates an essential conditioning of concepts through destruction of its origin and its relationship with other concepts. But what this destruction should accomplish is a dual differential structure of destruction-reduction and destruction-construction, the former culling together origin and concept and the latter culling together old
concept and new formation. Between these two structures there is a moment of rupture that breaks the link between the ground and the concept by presenting a simultaneous act of grounding and ungrounding that go together mutually interrupting and intervening into each other's stability. In the move destruction-construction, the outside of a metaphysical determination interrupts into the coherence of conceptual chain and breaks out into a vast and sweeping emergence of 'new', the wholly other. The movement destruction-reduction in which concepts are reduced to origin through dismantling is an emergence of an origin, ever negated in the act of destruction, supposedly an act to recover itself. The recovery of an origin is therefore, a negation of it in the structure of the discourse. Between these two movements of recovery and constitution there is a permanent breach, a breach between the origin and its annulment in the chain of conceptual relationship. Derrida insists that philosophy in its relative autonomy would like to maintain a kind of balance between forces that generate these two movements: one, Derrida raises a deeper methodological question, could there be a destruction of the
metaphysical discourse that suspends 'being' into something present such that being could be recovered as an origin? Or, could there be a certain exteriority to metaphysics with respect to the presence of 'being', an exteriority in general in which both the origin as the ground and what is grounded could be expressed?

II

A Discursive Characterisation of 'Presence'

Derrida answers this question from his generalized notion of 'exteriority', which is not a passage from an 'interior' to 'exterior', it can only mean a displacement of the limits and closure of the discourse of metaphysics. What it displaces is the complicity of metaphysics in self-sufficiency of concepts and their self-relation to themselves which produce the determination of limits of a discourse. Concepts attributed with such characteristics demonstrate the grounding of concepts into themselves, which can act as the 'ground' from which metaphysics obtains and retains its origin. In the reflexive movement of the
concepts back to their ground, there is a destructive conceptual machinery, while grounding different moves to break through a radically different ground. If these two movements are possible, the 'ground' as origin grounds concepts while ground as relation ungrounds concepts into newer concepts. Derrida explains this process in terms of 'constituting' and 'dislocating' the concepts, both of which occur simultaneously. What Derrida points out is that the self grounding of the concepts cannot account for its ungrounding, while its ungrounding calls for a different concept altogether. What this process produces is a difference or a differentia structure in which concepts designate presence. But ground as origin marks an original or fundamental presence, while ground as relation marks an infinite deferring of the presence into something other, another that marks an absence, interrupting the other by trying to speak of contradiction without any contradiction, that is, by way of a self-transposition of one movement into another, that is, the move of destruction-reduction turning into its opposite of 'construction' and then the movement of destruction-construction turning into its opposite of
'destruction'. This is the process of reflexive determination of the negative unity of the contradiction within the realm of knowledge, as if knowledge is constituted by such a unity. Derrida characterizes this unity as a metaphysical neutralization of a contradiction through a logic of constitution, which is trapped into a kind of 'circle' that describes 'the form of the relation between the history of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of metaphysics'. Yet this 'circle' does not signify a limit bordering a homogenous field, but a more twisted structure, that is constituted by a break between the grounds of its possibility and alienation of the ground into a discourse.

This breached structure of discourse gives rise to a notion of 'constitution' that generates a 'speculation', a speculation that engenders concepts of production, synthesis, unity by a threatening gesture of 'incision'. But this 'incision' parts away the difference only in order to 'circumcise' them into the possibility of a self-consistent discourse, which can act as 'the self-giving
evidence of the present or presence of sense to a full and primordial intuition. But the breach shows that there is irreducible abyss or non-presence constitutive of 'presence' kept repressed under the 'ethico-theoretical act that revives the decision that founded philosophy in its platonic from and further reduced to an 'exterior' in the form of a conceptual opposition between 'evidence and non-evidence.' This is what Derrida locates as a metaphysical and as an 'obstinate desire to save presence and repetition'. But circumscribing 'presence' within the discourse also implies a power to exclude and circumcise and a killing power. But the ethico-theoretical act of circumcision simultaneously guards itself from a metaphysical commitment to circumcise presence from its exterior, and rather circumcises with this caution,

There must be circumcision, circumcision of the word, and it must take place once, precisely, each time one time, the one time only.

Through this act of circumcision of exteriority a total blurring between representation and reality takes place.
What Derrida discloses from such an act of blurring is that the possibility of breach, acting as a primordial mark or an originary possibility of repetition and the 'dissymmetric, hierarchically ordered space' of discourse constituted by certain conceptual dyads signifies 'presence' and an exterior of 'non-presence' producing a non-homogenous oppositional space. Such a space flowing from primordial possibility of repetition is filled with 'marks' of 'breach'. The ethico-theoretical privileging of 'presence' has to therefore figure such marks within its conceptual arrangement in such a manner that it can provide a self-sufficient explanation for institution of presence. The figurative discourse of philosophy must, therefore, yield to provide a field for such marks to be inscribed on its body, which is an ethical 'must', a 'must' that follows from its decision of not losing the 'presence'. This primordial originary mark of breach and its circumscription into a discourse must be traversed by a number of forces that incise its internal space into a differentiated space.
III

*Sign, Structure and Presence*

The differentiated space is a 'space' for governing the discourse within which the circumcision of the presence produces an 'exterior', which is a structural possibility of being weaned from the 'concrete' in general falling in the 'exterior'. Derrida further strengthens the notion of circumcision by way of relating it to the condition of possibility of the discourse of knowledge. What such a discourse excludes is, that precisely, for Derrida, the condition of possibility of knowledge. Though the question about 'condition of possibility' is a transcendental question, but it interrupts the discourse by way of marks of difference invaginated within and yet generating a 'play' that can extend structurally to the infinite possibility of a polysemy. This transcendental conditions of possibility produces an immanent asemantic in-exhaustibility' that acts as a 'structural necessity' \(^{14}\) marked in the 'space' of difference. Derrida describes such a structural necessity,
in the recoiling of the blank upon blank, the blank colours itself (...) affecting itself ad infinitum - its own colourless, even more invisible, ground (...) in the act of inscribing itself on itself indefinitely, mark upon mark, it multiplies and complicates (...). 

Such a structurally infinite production of blanks to marks upon marks, is indefinitely repeated within the other, which is a primordial structure of repetition, that makes possible a mark to repeat infinitely. This infinite repetition takes place within the possibility of reference to other marks, which necessarily dispossess itself away from itself, toward the other infinitely. The perpetual repetition of marks to the point of referring the other produces a structure of generalized indication, which constantly puts the minimal identity of signs into question. This putting of sign into question through constant reference to other signs itself constitutes the force of an abyssal structure. Derrida construes such an abyssal structure in terms of remark, a repetition of marks within difference as inscription in general, which determines positions and relations between
the marks without governing the configuration within which a mark is just inscribed. In recovering the origin, reduction of the discourse leads to such inscriptions in general, which is not the annulment of the origin. The possibility of inscription in general represents an irreducible plurality in contrast with the unique origin, the origin that is simultaneously made possible and impossible within the plurality of inscriptions and therefore origin and its constitutive operation go through such a plurality which only has an abyss. Derrida describes such an abyssal structure:

In such a structure, which is a non-fundamental one, at once superficial and bottomless (...) It passes into the other.  

This passage into the other is passage into a mark which marks the absence of itself into the presence of an other which itself is again an absence towards the other. Derrida construes this notion of absent-present in positive sense of the notion of 'sign' that 'represents' presence in absence in its 'graphics'. Therefore the structure of
inscription is a structure of grapheme in general. But such graphics as marks and re-marks loses its heterogeneity the moment they begin signifying, that is, getting marked in in-between spaces. Because of re-marks produced as a marked mark, each mark in its reference to the other and deportation to the other must get re-marked in the fold of its disappearance or effacement. In other words, it is effacement of marks that acts as the transcendental condition of possibility in an abyssal plurality making the mark incapable of retaining its identity, but getting folded into the remark, which designates it now. Derrida locates the fold or the angle of the remark as the undecidable play between the 're'-of the repetitions of mark and the 're'-of the remarked double of the 'mark', within which the discourse of metaphysics situates its notion of knowledge and truth. But such situation presupposes the ideal and recuperable repetition of concepts that constitute the discourse and this acts the condition of possibility of the discourse. This condition of possibility of an ideal and recuperable repetition of concepts stands for an oppositional relationship with the primordial repetition of
difference in the infinite field of inscription /graphemes in general. Rather the condition of possibility of an ideal repetition reduces the difference into sameness. The permanently repeatable meaning of signs is expressed in the elimination of difference in repetitions of the signs of the permanent meaning. The possibility of repetition simultaneously constitutes the permanence and negates the permanence into difference produced through repetition. Such permanently constituted meaning of a sign eliminates the originary structure of repetition of the sign, which is the primordial condition of possibility of permanent meaning,

(...)

there are two way of eliminating the primordiality of the sign (...)

philosophy eliminates signs by making them derivative; it annuls reproduction and representation by making signs a modification of simple presence. But because it is just such a philosophy—which is, in fact, the philosophy and history of the West—which has so constituted and established the very concept of signs, the sign is from its very origin and to the core of its sense
marked by this will to derivation or effacement. Thus to restore the original and nonderivative character of signs in opposition to classical metaphysics, is, by an apparent paradox, at the same time to eliminate a concept of signs whose whole history and meaning belong to the adventure of the metaphysics of presence.  

This adventure of the metaphysics of presence leads to a distinction between signs which have no permanent signified and signs which permanently identify a specific signified. The signs which do not have signified, which are called as 'merely indicative' is experienced as 'presence' by knowing subject. The signs which have fixed meaning act as the possibility of repetition. These signs are called expressive signs. It is quite paradoxical that the indicative signs do not have the possibility of repetition without expression and therefore whenever indicative signs are repeated it assumes the possibility of bearing certain fixed meaning just as the expressive signs. Expressive 'signs' are non-derivative, and it gives rise to a fixed meaning that cannot retain its nonderivational character without being repeated,
while every repetition assumes an indicative function. Derrida further carries forwards this blurring of distinction between indication and expression in the process of repetition and points out that,

Husserl himself gives us the means to think this against what he says (...). A sign is never an event, if by an event we mean an irreplaceable and irreversible empirical particular(...) this identity is necessarily ideal. If this necessarily implies a representation: as Vorstellung, the locus of ideality in general, as vergegenwartigung, the possibility of reproduction in general, and as representation, in so far as each signifying event is a substitute (...). Since this representative structure is signification itself, I cannot enter into an effective discourse without being from the start involved in unlimited representation.18

Therefore elimination of the concept of indicative signs as presence into expression and the concept of expressive signs into representation leads us to the position that expression
as signification embeds representations and this leads to the elimination of the distinction between 'representation' and 'reality'. Derrida takes the process of elimination of primordiality of signs to such a logical end in order to show that founding conceptual oppositions between 'real' and 'representation' 'effective' and 'fictitious' do not stand in the case of signs bearing the function of 'representation'. This further incorporates 'representation' as a function of a primordial structure of 'repetition' available in the discursive space constituted by perpetual remarking of the graphics. This incorporation of 'representation' into the structure of repetition makes it a structure of signs, marked by difference between them. This structure of signs henceforth would always displace presence into representation which is further displaced into the difference present in between signs, themselves markers of absence of something present within such structure of signs. Whether signs would function to present objects or it would represent them is undecidable and this undecidability would destabilize signs from bearing a fixed meaning relationship between them.
Presence, Representation and Difference

Once again starting from the project of elimination of difference between presence and representation, origin and marks one can go into the science of Linguistics and Semiology, both of which adduced a secondary and derivative status to signs. In Saussarian Linguistics, sign is given its position within a chain of signifiers, which in totality determines its meaning and position. Both the meaning and position are fixed by the totality of signification, that is, by the 'exchange' and combination between them. But such exchange and combination are treated as 'two sides of the one and the same production'. This notion of unity produced through a chain of signifiers is the crux of Saussarian Linguistics, in which a signifier acquires a fixed signified through its presence in the totality. Derrida shows that the totality of signification is constituted by the difference between arbitrary signs which affect the totality and totality in itself is never present in and of itself without this difference. Derrida gives a special
sense to the notion of 'difference' as there is only
difference in language and no totality of signification can
be conceived without this difference. Derrida re-describes
the 'difference', differently from the conventional notion
of difference between two positive terms, as the positivity
of such terms. For Derrida, it is a reduction of
representation into an ideality or an identity. Therefore,
Derrida refuses to construe a notion of positive terms out
of signs and instead affirms only of difference available
between such terms. Such terms in themselves are mere marks
or signs of that which represent a thing in its absence.
Such difference constituting a language acts as the very
condition of possibility of its function of signification.
Prior to this difference, there can't be any preexistent
idea or phonic sound in language. This difference is,
therefore, not produced from any preexistent source of truth
and knowledge, but from the arbitrary representational
relationship between sign and object, which itself marks a
difference. So, there is no cause of such a difference, it
is a mere effect of the production of signs, which does not
have any content in themselves except that the mark produces
this effect of difference, which further produces a representation without any pre-given relationship of knowledge. This representation further effects a causality. All these series of effects are differential in character in such a manner that retracting its precedent cause only produces a difference between the representation and what is represented which are hierarchically arranged in the functioning of ordinary language.

This shows the idealizing and relevant negativity which works within the sign to unsettle the sensory receptions. An idealization that follows is the concept of a Physical ideality which is displacement of reality or spatial criterion into certain hierarchies. This movement of idealization summarizes the entire metaphysics of presence, a certain organization of functions that philosophy has called 'meaning'. Further this idealizing move prescribes certain metaphysical way of thinking the Being. One example of this is Humanism that re-appropriates being 'in the thinking of the truth of man' to ensure a transition between
metaphysics and humanism via a universal following of various moves of idealization. In Derrida's words,

"Being" and language - the group of languages - that the we governs or opens: such is the name of that which assures the transition between metaphysics and humanism via the we.

The question that should be asked is this point is, how can construction of a metadiscourse of humanism and metaphysics undermines the primordial structure of repetition of marks that signify nothing? One obvious Derridean answer is, by privileging concepts the negative image of a differentiated space of mark and inscribing it in the concept itself, as concepts are conditioned upon such a field of heterogeneous marks. So, the concepts that represent a unified presence to itself are interrupted by the non-presence produced by those marks. This interruption constitutes the present and 'divide the present in and of itself' and thereby dividing the concepts into presentation to itself and presentation to the other. Such a division extract a reduced predicative trait held in reserve by the
concept in presenting its content to itself. This regulated extraction of predicate enables the concept to represent and this is a sort of displacement of the limits and closure of the concept within the discourse that gives rise to it. This acts as a lever of intervention, such interventions produce another structure of a derivative discourse that borrows its artifacts from the previous one and yet makes a difference.

This marking a difference always shall bear the trace of the previous predicates which are newly predicated in the discourse derived from any pre-given conceptual structure. The two discourses grow in an interlaced manner such that neither of them neutralizes the force of concepts contained in them, but chooses to interlace use-able parts of the concepts. By doing so, the two discourses thwart out the illusionary possibility of moving out of their field of concepts, rather they engrave concepts in a newer mix. Structuring two fields of discourses in such a manner that one always bears the trace of the other in a constitutive sense to mark a rupture in the conceptual interior of
discourses. Such a rupture lays open the closure of discourses into a structure of differences.

This structure of difference display two characteristics: one, regulation of conceptual predicates refer back to the apriori difference that mark a space of inscription. Such a space of inscription further exhibits a double movement: a movement of designation or position by which the field of their production gets blended with the space unfolding between marks of the series; and a movement of re-mark that marks the space between repeated marks and marks that are already there. Such a movement represents marks in a certain series and marking of the space between marks in that series is coloured by the recoiling of the mark on to itself and onto some other marks. Such a remarking of the space in between in the act of recoiling and passing on to other marks the space of inscription unstoppable. What one has to understand is that remark is not simply a recoiling repetition but a structure of self-reference as well as reference to the other. Therefore, in the process of re-marking, the marks represent themselves
and this representing them withdraws them towards other unmarked marks to make them represent, which further marks then withdraw ceaselessly.

Such a structure of representation function as a structure of signs which functions like linguistic signs, but it is more primordial than the linguistic signs. This primordiality makes representation possible, which merely strives for an identity of signs, which is merely derived from this basic structure of difference. But the primordial structure of signs derive the ideality from repetition and so there is an apriori effacement of the sign in order to emerge into remark, a doubling of the mark that supplements the already effaced mark. The effacement makes possible the supplementing function of a remark. This is like a structure that marks presence between possible and impossible, a structure that is without a non-self-identity, in which identity is always effaced onto its re-marking. The supplementary addition of the mark to its other un-marked correlates is a simultaneous production of 'blank', an effacement and a delayed restitution of one effaced sign on
another, to be effaced to a different one. This structure of supplement is a structure of reappropriation of the withdrawn signs in an outside of remark that points to an infinite substitution, 'in-the-place of-itself', an auto-affection that is delayed infinitely. Thus the presence achieved through such supplements is an auto-affection that structurally haunts the absence of a stable presence, the mode in which the self affects itself. Such an auto-affection is unmediated except by its own act of designation that endlessly subverts recoiling into one's own self by an openness towards an unmarked exteriority in general. Derrida considers this primordial structure of repetition as a fecund source of episteme, the source of non-identity, the trace of erasure of the identity which takes place in the form of 'protowriting (...) at the origin of sense'.^22 This protowriting takes place in the traces of erasure of signs into a ideality producing remark, a non-sense, an impossibility to coincide with itself. This draws a reference to Derrida's famous allusion to Freud's idea of deferment of pleasure in which pleasure is delayed by postponement of satisfaction manifested in traces that are
neither pleasure nor displeasure but just unconscious traces on psyche that cannot be named within presence or absence. Such a process of perpetual deferment of the final satisfaction or acquiring of the signified bring in a structure of folds. Derrida asks this question, what is the effect of such a structure on subjectivity or rather the effect of subjectivity as it is produced in the structure?

Derrida answers the question in two ways: one, the idea of supplementing, that is adding and substituting that go on at the protowriting follows a mode of marking every position and two, such marks play the role of re-inscribing any discourse/signification into a more flexible and non-present exteriority of something absolute other of the discourse. The first move signifies an originary conditions of possibility of repetition. For example, the way phone or verbal signs are produced repetitively marks a fixed relationship between voice and phone. The second move marks the production of an experience by an absolute differentiability of signs. An example of this could be the way voice or phone is being written down as an 'outside' or
dead marks of living voice/phone, as the self-presence of the voice to itself is dirempted and displaced into marks that have no organic link with voice. So, the case of writing produces double deal: in its 'literal' sense it makes the living 'phone' dead and in its 'figurative' sense it retains an originary self-presence that the voice contains to itself.

This double sense of 'literal' and 'figurative' constitute the movement of difference in the structure of repetition. The 'literal' determines the totality of signification in language, while the 'figurative' determines the possible extension of the field of difference beyond the limits of language. The primordial form of meaning of place and position, where there are neither presence nor sense, but only forms of syntax that intuitively postpones the coming of sense by first bearing a trace of mutual contamination of signs and then extending it beyond the limits of structure to constitute an 'absolute over board' that produces the same when it divides it through multiple iteration and repetition. Therefore the answer that Derrida gives to the
question of effect on the subject or on effect of reproduction of subjectivity turns into (i) an absolute suspension of possibility of objectivity within the self-presence of the subject, and (ii) Subjectivity falling back upon its ground of difference shall constitute itself as an ideal object in itself. The first one shows an originary lack in the constitution of objectivity, while the second one shows that the plenitude or full presence of subject is dependent on an absence of the other.

This simultaneous affectation of a lack and a plenitude produce a double bottom of heterogeneity: (i) doubling of the mark inhibiting a total reflective adequation and (ii) a deferral of the mark that prevents the subject for ever. Such a double bottom coincides with the double deal of signs in which one cannot choose between living repetition of life and truth and the dead repetition of death and non-truth, because the structure of difference would continually erase the stable position of signs into a reference to the other. The discursive relationship of a fixed determination of the other produces a law of repetition between the signifier and
the signified only to repeat and relate them together, because iterability of signifier and signified in the discourse shall depend upon identification of self-identical marks. Such identification follows an 'interiorizing' of identity inscribed upon a stable 'mark' not subjected to the discursive deferral. One can object here and raise the issue that,

This interiority belongs to the phenomenological and ideal aspect of every signifier. The ideal form of the written signifier, for example, is not in the world, and the distinction between the grapheme and the empirical body of the corresponding graphic sign separates an inside from outside, phenomenological consciousness from the world.\(^6\)

Derrida would reply to the objection by pointing out that phenomenological spatial reference lies in the world and this sense of being 'outside' of the 'world' constitute the phenomenon. But by a strange paradox, meaning is identified through suspension of relation to outside, while
expression of meaning in language produces a distance from 'outside' in order to hold meaning in ideal objectivity. Derrida considers such distance from outside as just a representation of function of language through which representations are validated. This is simultaneously a 'figurative' function of language which successfully maintains the relationship between the verbal phone and the written sign and by the same forbids the written sign or grapheme in general as an image of the former.\textsuperscript{27} It forbids because the written sign links the verbal phone to an exterior, which it delinks in order to retain an ideal objectivity. This blurs the distinction between speech and writing and also the natural relationship between them, Derrida re-produces another account of this relationship,

Now we must think that writing is at the same time more exterior to speech, not being its 'image' or 'symbol', and more interior to speech, which is already in itself a writing.\textsuperscript{28}
Writing as a Generalised Structure of Knowledge

Derrida privileges 'writing' over 'speech' here by upturning the conventional priority of 'speech' over 'writing'. In doing so, he is performing two acts: one a systemic notion of writing that represents the phone and the other how representation of phone in writing divides the writing into two contradictory conventions: (i) phone undermining the authenticity of writing, and (ii) writing holding an undecidability between phone and writing. Further, in writing every 'signifier' comes to be treated as a representation or as a metaphor for the signified, assuming that phone produces graphemes. While every graphic in its act of signification can only refer to another standing for a signified. In other words, there is a referral of one signified to another, a displacement of one signified into another through a displacement of one signifier into another. The vertical relationship between signifiers and signified is ungrounded in a plain relationship between signifier and signified. Drawing a parallel again with interiority of phones, Derrida gives
another argument. The interiorization of writing is a movement from 'indication' to expression' and 'writing' becomes 'a body, that expresses something only if we promote the verbal expression that animates it, if its space is temporalized'. The temporalized interiority of expression establishes the exteriority of indication so that indication remains outside of expressivity and objectivity. This 'outside' is then expressed and it is further purged into another 'outside', but expression of all such 'inside' takes place within 'consciousness', that is, into the temporalized space of voice. In this shelter, temporalized and interiorized space of voice, expression has reduced 'outside' by bracketing it within. Therefore the expression is a two-fold "going forth" of the sense,

The going forth beyond - itself of an act, then of sense, which can remain in itself, and only in the voice.  

The first going forth is the 'sense' through which 'indication' and 'temporalization' of indication reaches in the interior of voice. This gives a further
'interiorization' to a space interior to sense in which the sense takes the form of an 'object'. But this interiorization of sense into an object opens up the object to an exterior of sense, further opened up to an exterior of expression, later opened up to an exterior of indication. Derrida shows that such simultaneous reversal of 'exterior' into 'interior' and 'vice versa' opens up the possibility of indefinite repetition, the dissimulation of objectivity, sense, meaning and indication as such. But the irreducibility of the absence of all these 'as such' is an interior repetition which is a re-call of a 'sense' across a 'space', simultaneously 'interior' and 'exterior' to itself. Such a 're-calling' produces an 'inter-subjectivity' within the 'subject' even though simultaneous 'interior' and 'exterior' movement of subjectivity produces 'subject' as just an effect of it. But when such a simultaneity is thought of something that really does this two fold going forth and it is in this that a 'subject' is instituted. Derrida formulates it in these terms,

The general structure of the unmotivated trace connects within the same
possibility and they cannot be separated except by abstraction, the structure of relationship with the other, the movement of temporalization and language as writing.\(^3\)

So, the insertion of the subject is an institution, which could be viewed as an active synthesis, through the absence of the other which constitutes the presence, the temporalized exteriority of sense in which it appears as such. The intrusion of an 'outside', an 'other' into presence produces a dialectic between 'outside' and 'inside', 'identity' and 'difference' and what the dialectic opens up is an absolute outside in the movement of interiorization. But the possibility of reduction of one side of the dialectic to the other lies in the immediate non-self presence of both the sides.\(^4\) The immediate non-self presence is the becoming-space of time in which the exteriority could be interiorized. But the becoming space of time establishes an interweaving of inside and outside, in which it privileges 'space' as an irreducible outside. Spacing is this interweaving of the relationship between inside and outside, which is neither inside nor outside. If
Being is presence, if things deserve the application of 'is' in so far as they are present, the spacing is never present, but it is a process of constituting the 'present' which 'is not' in space, in the becoming space of time. Therefore, spacing is the name for turning inside out of all interiority just as it is a privileging of the outside over inside. The outside, which presents the absence of other into the exterior of the expression and the non-presence of what lies at the exterior in the expression marks a non-present presence within sense or object in general. Derrida conceptualizes it by giving it a new name, differance, which is neither a thing nor a concept, but signifies a movement from 'outside' to 'inside' and vice versa within the space of an irreducible difference between signs. This outside of difference names a radical alterity, which is unnameable, yet a possibility of attaining meaning. Derrida describes it in structural terms,

We could take up all the coupled oppositions on which philosophy is constructed, and from which our language lives, not in order to see opposition
vanish but to see the emergence of a necessity such that one of the terms appear as the difference of the other, the other differed within the systematic ordering of the same (e.g., the intelligible as differing from the sensible, as sensible differed, the concept as differed - differing intuition, life as differed - differing matters, mind as differed - differing life; culture as differed - differing nature...). 16

This differed - deffering constitutes an interweaving of an 'inside' and 'outside' in the exterior in general represented in the irreducible structure of difference of signs. The simultaneity of differed and differing is temporalized in the form of an ever present difference in 'space' and ever present deferral in time, both figuratively signifying a permanent non-presence, an impossibility of reduction of primordial difference. It is not a simple inversion of 'inside' into an 'outside' of difference, as such an outside is never available. What is available is a circular and entangled bond between 'inside' and 'outside'
through differences. This irreducibility of the structure of
difference is conceptualized as the condition of possibility
of all significations within language. Differing shall only
mean something is different from something else, while
deferring shall mean postponement of the completion of an
act. The first would signify an ever extending structure in
which one sign shall differ spatially from the other and the
second would signify that the becoming space of time within
expression defers the reference of the sign into something
absent, which leads to further deferral into something
'past' or 'future'. This is how the sign as a non-present
'remainder' is cut off from what it stands for and its terms
of production. Derrida combines this non-present remainder
with what it is cut off from in both spatial and 'temporal'
mode and gives rise to the neologism differance. The two
senses of term 'difference' and 'deferment' combines in the
portmanteau 'differance'. The term 'differance' signifies
present in absence, while the term 'deferrel' signifies a
suspension of the 'living present' which is never 'present'.
The first one marks the Saussurian implication that signs
occupy a place only within a chain of differences, which act
as the condition of possibility of signs in general, while deferring is a temporalization of the exteriority of signs into interior of expression, sense or speech and the two movements occur simultaneously resisting the possibility of an unitary signification of expression in a unified subject'. Derrida conceptualizes this 'difference', the double movement of 'difference' and 'deferral' an intervention into figuration of difference in space and time and it is this intervention that separates the signifier and the signified in their spatial and temporal presentation. This separation indicates that each differential element in a linguistic system signifies in so far as it refers to another element and deferring its presence to another element and producing a difference with it. Such a character of signs makes it symptomatically related to 'mark' or 'trace' in general which are reinscribed. What such marks imply is that the 'present' or 'experience' in general must refer to something radically other than itself, which is not present and the presence of which is infinitely deferred. Therefore any attempt of signification would generate such a
structure of differential traces which is constitutive of meaning and meaning in such difference itself,

It is because of differance that the movement of signification is possible. ⁴²

This constitutive difference makes possible the play of meaning as it is the force behind reference of one signifier to another. The aspect of defference produces interval between elements and the temporal relation between elements is 'deferrel' and the two together produces a structure which is named as achi-writing by Derrida. The production of arche writing is within presence, a writing that produces the structure of difference within presence produces an irreducible archi-syntheses in one and the same possibility of difference producing temporalization and relationship between signs within language. ⁴³ This relationship assumes the form of a matrix of irreducible oppositions that are produced as an interior and exterior simultaneously. The archi-synthesis always produces a simultaneous 'difference' and 'deferral'. At the level of difference, archi-trace acts
as the condition of possibility of metaphysical dyads like presence/absence, time/space and phone/grapheme, displacing and interlacing each other. At the level of deferral, the play of opposition between metaphysical dyads produces the becoming spaces of such opposition. For example, the opposition between speech and writing in the moment of deferral shall get transformed into the absence of presence. In the moment of difference, speech assumes an interior of writing; which further interiorizes speech. But the archi-synthesis unmakes all the metaphysical opposition into a suspened figure of time or space. What is achieved by archi-synthesis is a positive destruction of 'presence' instituted by philosophy’s ethico-theoretic decision to trace its origin as archi-truces or archi-writing provides a field of non-synonymical substitution. Derrida conceptualizes it as, 'suspended remains',

The structural possibility of being weaned from the referent or from the signified seems to me to make every mark, (...) a grapheme in general; (...) the non-present remainder (resistance) of a differential mark cut off from its
positive production or 'origin'. And I shall even extend this law to all 'experience' in general if it is conceded that there is no experience consisting of pure presence but only of chains of differential marks.\[^{38}\]

This extended concept of differential marks constitutes the new science of writing 'grammatology', which does not determine the history of Being within the horizon of presence, rather in terms of a determined signifying 'trace'. This field of trace which implies an originary protowriting from which discourse and language draws its syntax, which contains heterogeneous statements, not contradictory ones, but of a singular heterogeneity, a field of difference, a negativity homogeneous to all other negatives to resist the general heterogeneity of the whole set of the ontological system. Rather it establishes an exteriority to the 'heterogeneity' by the singularity of difference that resists admission of multiplicity within difference. This makes Derrida wonder what cannot be assimilated in this play of differences, in the space of its possibility. Derrida only prognosticates that what
cannot be assimilated into the system of difference that supports it from outside and exposes the annulling of the condition that gives rise to the system. This leads to in-assimilable remainders of the system which can not be inferred into the 'singular' heterogeneity of the system, which cannot further be interned into general heterogeneity. This binds the statements or concepts which are able to produce the bond in the system of differences only to bring the decidable statements to undecidable statements in a system of differences. The system of difference, therefore, constricts the movement of traces to 'closing up, squeezing, containing, suppressing, subjecting, compressing, redressing, subduing, reducing, forcing, subjugating, enslaving, hemming in,' an ideality that owes itself to 'its own inner limits,' to this contraction, or this structuration it gives 'itself'. This is the double negation of the negative of difference, first negated into a stable set of rules, further negated into an 'inhibitive construction recalls both its 'lack' and 'plenitude' in 'avoiding to lose itself in abstract indetermination', this is a 'displacement', 'counterforce of displacement' or
Derrida understands here the relationship between force of displacement that commits ‘violence’ to the singularity of difference and cautions against ‘strict-ure against stricture’ and writes,

There is no choosing here each time a discourse contra the transcendental is held, a matrix-the (con)striction itself-constrains the discourse to place the non-transcendental, the outside of transcendental field, the excluded in the structuring position. The matrix in question constitutes the excluded as transcendental of the transcendental (...) transcendental contraband. The contra-band is not yet dialectical contradiction. The contra-band remains something other than what necessarily it is to become. Such would be the (non-dialectical) law of the (dialectical) stricture, of the bond(...).
VI

Mapping the Text and the World

What it wants to is that a differentially ordered signs not preceded by any meaning, structure or idea constitutes itself into an idea which acts as a general text to hold the possibility of irreducibility of structure of difference into textuality. Such a generalized structure of text representing the condition of possibility of textuality in general remains extra-textual. It can enforce a stricture and at the same time open the text to the heterogeneity in general. But a 'text' in its relationship with such heterogeneity acquires a definite context on its giving itself to the world. Therefore 'text' interlaces reference to history, world, reality, Being and especially to the other, all those that are not immediately experienced, but experienced as a differentiability. Derrida considers such an experience as 'textual' in the sense that it serves as a framework of accounting all the 'structures 'as 'real':

What I call 'text' implies all the structures called 'real', economic', 'historical', socio-institutional, in
short: all possible referents. Another way of recalling once again that there is nothing outside the text'. This does not mean that all referents are suspended, denied... But it does not mean that every referent and all reality has the structure of a differantial trace (...). and that one cannot refer to this 'real' except in an interpretive experience. The latter neither yields meaning nor assumes it except in a movement of differential referring. 42

What it means is that the textual representation assumes a differential structure, which means that the reality is never constituted except reciprocally by representation. Within the textual structure of difference, the condition of possibility of representation in the originary absence of what is represented, which is otherwise presented as an empirical mark. Therefore, Derrida contends,

One must indeed speak of an originary trace or arche-trace. Yet we know that the concept destroys its name and that
all begins with trace. There is above
all no originary trace.\textsuperscript{43}

It is the space of arche-traces brought inside the
horizon of presence that deconstruction takes place in the
form of taking into account the limitless context. It is
here upon the surface of a context that deconstruction takes
place in the form of textualization, an affirmative move and
simultaneously it proceeds through the text to uncover the
lines of forces that orders the trace structure within the
text. Within the text, spacing of the traces is the
'becoming-absent' and 'becoming-unconscious' of the subject.
The signification formed within this hollow of difference
between what is appearing in the text and the appearance.
Derrida characterises this difference as a 'non-fundamental
structure',

In, such a structure (...) at once
superficial and bottomless (...) the
property is literally sunk (...) It
passes into the other. \textsuperscript{44}
This non-fundamental structure of text transforms the hierarchical structure\textsuperscript{45} between reality and representation and reverses it into its opposites. Production of such a structure of reversal is meant for instituting the difference into the text. By institution of such difference the text draws its closure around it in its relationship with what it means to say. Difference is thereby subsumed under meaning. This subsumption of meaning under difference does not enable a text to construct a meaning wholly but constructs it partially by taking resort to an ideality that marks a transition from phenomenon to its condition of possibility. But this resorting to transcendental conditions of possibility is the return of a moment of unconditionality actively forgotten in the construction of a text. Remembering the unconditionality is an irreducible opening of the text beyond its 'closure' but this in itself does not free the text of its subsumption under laws of production to which it shows its never inextinguishable fidelity. Derrida contends that structure of difference also accounts for this fidelity by giving it an ontological status in terms of belonging to the law. What Derrida
intends is to remove the fidelity of the structure of difference to the law of abstraction of the text by was it referring to the unconditional as well as to the conditions of possibility none of which are present within the text. The double reference to 'unconditional' (difference) and the condition of possibility (of knowledge) that only issue out from a 'text', instead of themselves constructing the text. Derrida argues that context articulates the conditions of possibility for experience in general and the context itself is conditioned by the unconditioned, by that which is independent of 'a context in general'. Derrida argues that such an 'unconditioned' arises as the interruption, non-closure of any determined context, it is an injunction that transcends all contexts. Such an unconditioned paradoxically acts as the condition of possibility of texts in general and conditions it through difference that point to a differential matrix of generation of names and concepts produced as its effects:

The unnameable is not an ineffable Being which no name could approach: God, for example. This unnameable is the play
which makes possible nominal effects, the relatively unitary and atomic structures that are called names, the chains of substitutions of names in which, for example, the nominal effect difference is itself enmeshed.  

The eruption of the unconditional within the conditioned is an unnameable through difference signifying only a dynamic which can neither be re-called as a nostalgia nor be prognosticated as the ultimate, which is 'never be' or 'never is', but an absolute alterity which is never present but just an 'indication',

It governs nothing, reigns over nothing, and nowhere exercises any authority. It is not announced by any capital letter. Not only is there no kingdom of difference, but difference instigates the subversion of every kingdom. Which makes it obviously threatening and infallibly dreaded by everything within us that desires a kingdom, the past or future presence of a kingdom.  

46
Such an absolute 'alterity' which marks the possibility of the exit of alterity outside of itself and of signification in so far as it is constituted by reduction of difference into a fixed meaning of the entity. Such a fixed meaning of the entity in hierarchical or differential terms ground their iterability in the outside of itself. Construction of unconditional as space, which is again the context in general makes possible the illegibility of the concept by giving it an exit. Such an exit is described by Derrida as an 'we must affirm this', and say 'yes' to the unnameable that acts as the 'injunction' to affirm the 'unconditoned' and it produces deconstruction:

The yes, which says nothing, describes nothing but itself, the performance of its own event of affirmation repeats itself, quotes, cites itself, says yes-to itself as (to an) other in accordance with the ring (...).47

Deconstruction here produces two steps: the step beyond the presence, the irrevocable being or non-being of something finished, and across inert event. This exposes
present to what is coming, a displacement that indicates an irreducible alterity; and the not beyond, no going beyond, to make possible the coming of the other. This means deconstruction is not wholly transgressive of what is conditioned as a text, but it repeats the possibility of the text by taking a step beyond. Derrida expresses such a state of being within and without as a horizon of waiting which acts as phase of 'stepping beyond' and a phase of displacement or re-citation of what is already there. Derrida calls it a 'double gesture',

We must proceed using a double gesture, according to a unity that is both systematic and in and of itself divided (...).

The phase of stepping beyond indicates the irreducible alterity within the system and re-citation is constituted by this alterity, an invention of the same in a newer-form. Deconstruction is inventive, or it does not exist, when the first gesture takes place it is entirely within the unity of the system, 'across or inert event' constitutes the step beyond, that is, a more away from the gross; and the second
gesture breaks through the unity and re-inscribes what is invested by taking the step beyond. Deconstruction is engaged in and by the incoming, the arrival of what is coming, and it makes possible what to come in and by the future and the adventure of the future, \(^{50}\) the advent of future from the abyss that stems out of the unity of the system or the conventions. Deconstruction, therefore, produces a trespassable margin between what exists and what is to come, an unnameable mark separating the presence and the future. It produces an invisibility between the two phases turned onto one another, a simulacrum of the present and the future in the invisibility between the two phases. Being within the present, the visibility of the present depends upon a certain bind of the present manifested in a specularity conditioned by differential in - appearance of the present as trace is something like 'X without the X', 'the unknown without itself. This is what Derrida also characterized as 'conjuration', which leads one drawing an apparition of a line between 'what is there' and what is 'there to come' and hit upon the 'specular' or the
"apparition," a bodyless body, a kind of 'body without property'. Derrida says,

The constative form tends to reassure. The certification is effective(...). It is effectively performative.  

Derrida considers this reassurance of the 'performative' as ensuring that philosophy is a 'philosophy of ontology', where the alterity of the other assumes a specular form or gives a certitude to the visible interior of the text. Within this certitude, there is no question of opposing the invention of same to the invention of other, which is different differently,

its difference beckons towards another coming about, toward this other invention of which we dream, the invention of the wholly other, the one that allows the coming of a still unanticipatable alterity, and for which no horizon of waiting as yet seems ready, in place, available.  

VII

Deconstruction as Critique and Critique as Deconstruction

Divested of even a 'horizon of waiting' within textuality of the constative, one must still prepone for it. Like heroic subjective agent we must prepare ourselves to invent the wholly other. "To prepare oneself for this coming (venue) of the other is what can be called deconstruction". One can say that deconstruction directs itself towards the wholly other, the impossible, the dream of what is not and never will be present and which does not belong within the horizon of what presently prevails. Once again a 'double gesture', a crisscrossing between what is there and what is yet to come, this experience is characterized by Derrida,

To invent would then be to "know" how to say "come" and to answer the "come" of the other. Does that ever come about? Of this event one is never sure.

But this saying 'come' signifies a state of knowledge which does not follow the already existing discourse but treats through it, it is constituted and dislocated at the same time. Therefore,
(...) the question "what is" belongs to a space (ontology and from it the knowledge of grammar, linguistics, semantics and so on) opened by a "come" come from the other. 55

This sense of 'come' could not become an object, theme or representation, but an opening which could only be demonstrated in language such that it remains as the other of language that comes in the 'step' beyond' and 'not beyond' language This 'other' manifests in the irreducible structure of difference that language houses in, constituting and dislocating it at the same time, writing is other than the subject, in whatever sense the latter is understood. writing can never be thought under the category of the subject, however it is modified, however it is endowed with consciousness or unconsciousness, it will refer by the entire thread of its history, to a substantiality of a presence unperturbed by accidents, or to the identity of the
selfsame proper in the presence of self relationship.56

Manifestation of 'other' in writing continuously dislocates any reference to the self and hence any movement of idealization is the text shall inherently be fractured between 'self' and the 'other' in a perpetual absence of the both. Such a fracture appears as a kind of 'fork', one of the side extended further then the other in such a way that when the 'self' posits an 'other', the 'other' never comes and the self remains in a perpetual state of waiting, preparing itself for the other. This keeps the discourse open-ended,

Would it not at once cease to be the other? Would the event have arrived yet? Would it not be struck by its interdiction (...) by its very arrival?57

This question puts the 'other' under 'erasure'. In the textual structuring of the conceptual oppositions, no concept can in itself remain metaphysical, it has to efface itself in order to refer to the other. This erasure is the
possibility of becoming of concepts within a frame of convention and rules. Therefore deconstruction invents the permissible and the possible, which is the inventiveness of a 'human subject', invention in conformity with already established conventions. Two consequences shall follows from these; one, bending such conventions in order to allow the other to come in the opening of such conventions and secondly, invention invents nothing new. Both these consequences follow because,

nothing comes to the other or from the other. For the other is not the possible. So it would be necessary to say that the only possible invention is the invention of the impossible(...).\(^5^9\)

This is how deconstruction gets embroiled into a paradox of the impossible which sets it in motion, by means of which deconstruction can let the he come,

I am careful to say "let it come" because if the other is precisely what is not inverted, the initiative or deconstructive inventiveness can consist
only in the opening, in unclosetting, destabilising foreclusionary structures so far as to allow for the passage toward the other. But one does not make the other come, one lets it come by preparing for its coming. 60

VIII

Play of Presence and Absence

This perpetual non-presence of the other in the inventiveness of the other takes it outside the textual fabric within which deconstruction operates. The name or concept of something disappear in the shrouds of other ness which permanently delay the wholly other. Derrida says,

There is no such thing as a 'metaphysical concept'. There is no such thing as a 'metaphysical name'. The metaphysical is a certain determination or direction taken by a chain, one cannot oppose it to a concept, but to a process of textual labour and another enchaining. 61
The concept tends to disappear to efface itself, to make itself meaningless in the process of enchaining. It becomes a name sans name. It does so precisely to point to the possibility of wholly other which never falls into presence. Deconstruction obeys strange syntax of the sans:

The same word and the same thing appear removed from themselves, substracted from their reference and from their identity, fully continuous with letting themselves be traversed, in their old body, towards a 'wholly other' dissimulated in them. But no more than in pas does this consist in a simple privation or negation, far from it (...). It forms the trace or the step (pas) of the tout autre that is at issue in it, the re-treat of the pas, and of the pas sans pas.62

Such a re-inscription is an act of circumscribing and circumventing the invention of something within the discourse, which carries the tradition or convention. Derrida puts it under the erasure of promise.
I will speak of a promise, then, but also within the promise. 63

The point here is to remain active in placing oneself within the commitment of meaning and being but as soon as one re-inscribes such a commitment within promise, there is never present commitment arising prior to commitment', the promise already is stripped away. But such stripping away is the source of the injunction that produces an unconditional moment of affirmation. This stripping away is simultaneously a 'sending' and a 'returning' which is beyond the closure of representation. Both 'sending' and 'returning' is 'unconditioned', as it lies beyond every determinate context or beyond determination of context in general, that is, it marks an absence of an addressee to whom 'promise' of sending is made to whom returns the promise. So, Derrida writes,

Following this, what remains is to articulate this unconditionality with the determinate conditions of this or that context(...). The structure thus described supposes that there are only contexts, that nothing exists outside context (...), the limit of the frame or
the border of the context always entails as clause of non-closure ... The outside penetrates and thus determines the inside. 64

IX

Deconstructing Reason

Therefore, thinking of an exteriority as the other of the discourse problematizes the exteriority as well as the boundary of the discourse. An analogous case of experience is the self-identical identification of the subject as the centre of reason or knowledge. Identification of such a subject involves identification of how it is constituted, the basis of its presence which lies in its self-identical action, role and continuity. Derrida, by questioning the notion of a proper other, questions the representation of such an other as subject or as subject's-relation-to-its-other because such a subject always remains an other to itself by erasing itself in any act of signification. The history of the subject as construed in Western metaphysics accords it a place only through an 'effect of anterior absence and temporalization'. Prior to all cognition and
memory the subject is a 'trace', wandering through its presence, which is never self-present. After the acts of cognition and memory this wandering trace gets engaged in a network of consciousness filled up with a system of signifiers that constantly defects to various fields of signification. In this kind of situation of difference, Subject appears only as an effect of centring or closure of the discourse, which cannot be conceptualized on the basis of presence. But it remains as a discourse instituted as an exchange with an exterior, a trace,

Prior to every proposition and even before all discourse in general(...) preserves a trace of the other. A trace of an event older than it or of a 'taking place' to come, both of them: here there is neither an alternative nor a contradiction.65

This trace enter into a relation of erasing one other, which are a series of interruptions, which leave its traces of erasure as an encounter with the other. But this entails a moment of affirmation of the 'other' through which the
subject could be constituted and therefore deconstruction or erasure becomes a positive response to an alterity which necessity calls, summons or motivates it; such is an 'alterity' that institutes an other to precede philosophy to give rise to a rapport, through which the subject can express itself. Again such a rapport is answering to the call of other which opens up the limits of signification that acts as a 'transcendental contract' that 'renders possible every 'contract'. Such a possibility makes a text able to answer to what Derrida calls answering to the call of reason. The principle of Reason always demands an answer by rendering these principles on their 'grounds' which are conserved in a discourse of reason. Derrida says,

To respond to the call of reason is to "render reason", to explain effects through their causes, rationally; it is also to ground, to justify, to account for on the basis of principle of roots.66

But answering for the call of reason is to question the grounds of reason and to ask question like, 'Are we to use reason to account for the principle of reason? Is the reason
for reason rational?' The questions imply certain annihilation of reason by asking ground for reason, if there are grounds at all. But the question of ground of reason 'annihilates' annihilation of reason, as reason is already formed without a ground, without a self sufficient principle and so asking a question about ground of reason demarcates 'the reason for asking the question' and 'what is asked for' only to show up a deeper abyss. Such an 'abyss' strangely enough opens up our questioning of grounds of reason and our acts of giving reasons. Deconstruction, therefore, opens up a dialogue between abyssal structure and what the structure represents. Derrida characterized it,

Are we obeying the principle of reason when we ask what grounds this principle which is itself a principle of grounding? We are—not which does not mean that we are disobeying it, either. Are we dealing here with a circle or with an abyss? The circle would consist in seeking to account for reason by reason, to render reason to the principle of reason, in appealing to the principle in order to make it speak of itself at the
very point where (...). The principle of reason says nothing about itself. The abyss (...) would be the impossibility for a principle of grounding to ground itself (...). Who is more faithful to reason's call, who hears it with a keener ear who better sees the difference, the one who offers questions in return and tries to think through the possibility of that summons, or the one who does not want to hear about the reason of reason?\(^\text{67}\)

The double bottomlessness of having no ground to ground the principle of reason as well as ungrounding reason by questioning its grounds produces a breach between principle and discourse and discourse and its ground realized in the methodological operation of deconstruction. It recognizes an irreducible non-presence, recognized as a constitutive value, which brings in 'an ineradicable non-originarity' to any act of self-reflexivity or claim of subjecthood.

These deconstructed interior of the field of difference acts as a condition of possibility for a simultaneous
reinscription of the components of a discourse, which is 'derivable' from the destructuring of a field of discourse. At this level, the de-structured elements of a hierarchy assume a singularity as a primal affirmation which is also absolutely divisible. Such a singularity within a deconstructed discourse requires repetition with alteration and the alteration produces citation. This citation is an affirmation of itself, which would be deciphered. But the citation is expressed and the moment it is expressed, it is a response to solicitation of the other, beyond-being. This logic of citation is not governed here by any appropriation, but it is just a giving itself to the other. But this giving itself becomes another appropriation if it is determined, already by an interpretative discourse. Still, it is a drift headed to the wholly other 'underivable from the identity of a determination'. It is just this undeterminable drift through which the giving can prolong in addresses without message and without destination, without sender or decidable addresses. This produces a strange syntax of de-construction in which the citation is "X sans X", it is not a simple negation, multiplication or destruction, but a certain
reinscription of X, a certain reversal of the movement of X that still communicates with X. This communication is something like disruption of all symmetry between the conscious 'self' and its portrait, a non-identity with itself. This non-identity 'folds' into a 'double bind' between non-self identical and self in which self resembles the non-self identity by becoming non-self and self'. This is how a fold produces a response to the non-self-identical which is a deconstructive 'yes', a certain trembling that comes back to itself with trace of the other, which remains as an outside to the 'yes'. But what yes is this? This yes refers back to itself, comes back to itself, 'a reference of itself to itself which at the same time never leaves itself and never happens to arrive'. This is where we have finally abandoned the play of reference.⁶⁸

X

In Lieu Of Conclusion

To sum up, the very activity of thinking, which too happens on the basis of epistemological, ontological and
veridical comprehension, is the reduction of plurality into unity and alterity into sameness. Philosophy in the western tradition has been aiming at most, to grasp and to domesticate the other and so the goal of Derrida’s deconstruction is not simply to recover the unthought of tradition but to understand that-which-cannot be-thought, it is to point towards that which philosophy is unable to say. Deconstruction attempts to locate ‘a non-site, or a non-philosophical site, from which to question philosophy’. But to reach such a site, paradoxically deconstruction has to draw its resources from within the tradition of philosophy or logocentrism. Deconstruction assumes a ‘double bind’ of both belonging to a philosophical system, which at the same time is not capable of belonging to the system. This becomes possible because deconstruction unravels the condition of possibility of a text by belonging to it and at the same time opens the text up to the unconditional exterior by interrogating/defying those conditions of possibility.

The irreducible opening of a text to the unconditional text lies beyond every determinate context, even of the
determination of context in general. The unconditional not only announces its presence in the opening of the text, it intervenes in the construction of a text from its very opening and forms a law that transcends the very determination of this context and context in general. The unconditionality needs to be articulated by way of opening the conditioned context to the indeterminable context of responsibility and this is how opening it to the conditioned indetermination. The conditioned context is deferred in the moment of opening up the unconditioned and the unconditioned context condition it in different ways producing difference in the determined context. The unconditioned context affirms with a determination and the moment of affirmation bears an injunction that entails a non-closure in the text.

Such an unconditioned context is opened up in the very idea of sign that represents the present in its absence. The sign institutes an auto-affection linked up with an irreducible non-presence that has a contributive role. The contribution of the sign is marked by the effacement of voice and by its difference from other elements in language.
This negative non-presence in sign links it up with a science of writing that deals with the auto-affection among signs in a chain.

That knowledge ideally requires unconditioned justification can only be mediated through the auto-affection of signs that generates concepts or ideas, reinscribed back in the non-reflexive and non present exteriority of absolute other.

Derrida's reading of Marx's *Capital* in terms of an already inscribed *time* that terminates circulation in order to produce value that assumes the 'form' of human relationship, the 'form' which gives rise to specular entity, a phenomenon marked 'X' for any phenomeno-logical perception. Similarly, Derrida's affirmation that by thinking other as the proper margin, Philosophy, is never surprised by its outside, in the extreme 'elitism' of subject-centred reason.
NOTES


9. SP, p. 5.
10. SP, p. 53.
11. SP, p. 62.
12. WT, p. 68.
13. SP, p. 57.
15. D, p. 256.
18. SP, p. 50.
19. MP, p. 121.
22. SP, pp. 85-86.
23. MP, p. 21.

25. OG, p. 154.

26. SP, p. 85/86.

27. OG, p. 45.

28. OG, p. 46.

29. MP, pp. 260-1.

30. MP, p. 91.

31. SP, p. 35.

32. OG, p. 47.

33. OG, p. 47.

34. SP, p. 40.

35. SP, p. 40.

36. MP, pp. 18-19.

37. MP, p. 13.


41. G, p. 244.

42. LI, p. 148.

43. OG, p. 61.

44. S, p. 117.

45. S, p. 81.

46. MP, p. 22.


52. *RDR*, p. 55.


54. *RDR*, p. 56.


58. *RDR*, p. 60.

59. *RDR*, p. 60.

60. *RDR*, p. 60.


64. *LJ*, pp. 152-3.


