CHAPTER VI

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
The 'Naga issue' is not a new phenomenon, rather 'Naga resistance' has confronted the Government of India more or less since the dawn of Indian independence. It was here in Nagaland that the Indian army learnt its first lesson of low intensity conflict and the Government of India experimented with all the available strategies without evolving any consistent policy. Much later the Government of India faced several problems like that of the Mizos following the footsteps of the Nagas and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagham (DMK) adopting separatist slogan. All this compelled the evolution of a policy on secessionist movements whose central tenet was: Never give in.¹

The Government of India's policy towards the Naga problem can be characterized as 'inconsistent and muddled. Sanjoy Hazarika a writer from the North-East region observed saying, "the intractability of the problems of the North-East and Delhi's piecemeal, adhoc policies toward its people have complicated an already difficult situation."² This writer broadly outlined three methods in dealing with problem like that of the Nagas. He writes:

Policies toward the Nagas and other pro-independence groups seemed to revolve around three factors: brute force to crush the physical capacity to resist, a flood of funds to soften the resolve of indigenous groups and a fierce campaign to portray them as renegades 'misguided' elements who would see sense if only they were given a chance.³

1. Phadnis, Aditi., The third solution (In) Sunday (Calcutta) 7-13 November 1993, p. 35.
3. Idem.
It was a ‘trial and error’ period when military excesses were committed and political blunders were made. M.J. Akbar writes: "Delhi engaged in a carrot-and-stick approach the civilian commissioner set about winning hearts, while the armed forces concentrated on breaking heads. It was a messy deadlock."  

Initially, the policy planners in India sought a political solution as an option. The ‘Nine Point Agreement’ was the outgrowth of such political processes which recognized the ‘right of the Nagas to develop themselves according to their freely expressed wishes’. Unfortunately, the Government of India unilaterally withdrew herself from this commitment for reasons best known to her. 

Subsequently, military option had replaced political approach. Thus, the then Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru decided that it would have to be dealt with a military rather than a political approach. The same line of thinking was shared by the then President Rajendra Prasad. The latter in a note to the Government of India recommended:

>The problem is formidable even now, but then it will become more or less beyond our capacity to control unless we are prepared to be ruthless, and it is doubtful if even then we could suppress them. 

Thus, emphasis on military option was implicit from the above statements of Jawaharlal Nehru and of Rajendra Prasad who rationalized it on prestige issue and for halting the growing strength of the Naga movement. Hence, Jawaharlal Nehru amply made it clear that "there can be no doubt that armed revolt has to be met by force and suppression... We shall set about it as efficiently as effectively as possible." However, there was much apprehension in the minds of the leadership which is quite glaringly revealed in Nehru's letter to Assam Chief Minister B.R. Medhi. He writes:

We know that the Nagas are tough people and are very disciplined. It is therefore conceivable that even when we have succeeded completely in a military sense, small scale guerrilla tactics may continue giving us continuous headache,... affecting our reputation both in India and abroad. How then are we to face this situation?

A. MILITARY OPTION

The military campaign against the Naga nationalists commenced when "troops moved into Tuensang by October 1955 and the war with Nagas started from then." No doubt full scale military offensive and official pronouncement to this effect came only by 1955, but it would be wholly a mistake to conclude that there was no military operation before. As a matter of fact, in 1953, the Government of India had already launched security raids against the NNC and its alleged sympathizers soon after the joint visit of Nehru and U Nu to Naga areas both in India and

10. Idem.
Myanmar. It was at Kohima that the Naga public numbering 10,000 boycotted Nehru's speech and this insult the latter never forgot. By the middle of 1954, security forces raided and bombarded Chingmei, Chemong, villages committing wanton destruction and causing unknown number of deaths. Then on November 15, 1954 security forces raided on the village of Yengpang and killed 60 (sixty) men, women and children as alleged by the Naga nationalists. This operation was a response to the rapid development of unfavorable events in the central Naga Hills so as to restore Government's authority. Unfortunately, because of inability to arrest the situation, the Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru took the fateful decision to send in full-scale military operation in order to check-mate Naga nationalists.

This political decision was rebuffed by the Chief of Army Staff, General L.S. Thimayya and the latter's meeting with the Prime Minister was a heated one because of differences in approach. The General seemed to have candidly told Nehru that it required political wisdom rather than military might to solve the Naga issue. However, the General did what he was expected to do. According to B.N. Mullik, the intelligence officer "nearly two Divisions of the Army and thirty five battalions of Assam

Vide A brief political account (published by GPRN, Oaking May 7, 1992).
15. Idem.
Vide Submission of the NPMHR at the 12th Session of UNWGIP, (Geneva, July 25-29, 1994).
Rifles and Assam Police were in operation in the Naga Hills. Thus, in the words of Nari Rustomji, an administrator who understood the heart of the Naga problem, "The military applied themselves with full-blooded vigour to the business of 'softening up' the recalcitrant Naga." Indeed, the Army built up was enormous that B.N. Mullik noted: "There was nearly one security troop for every adult male in the Naga Hills... but there was never a time when it could be claimed that the Naga guerrillas had been broken into submission." Inspite of this large increase in the security forces, the Naga nationalists fought on with determination. There were many ugly incidents; serious casualties were inflicted on both the sides; no quarter was given or asked for. The security forces exerted the maximum of pressure, but this was not enough to force the Naga nationalists to surrender. It was a matter of doubt as to who was softening up whom'. Frustrated by elusive Naga nationalists, the army more than once clamped down hard on innocent villages. Admittedly, Mhiesizokho Zinyu, an acquaintance of A.Z. Phizo writes:

The Indian armed forces on their part always retaliated by burning houses in the villages, clamping round-the-clock curfew, imposing fines and arresting all suspects. Many Nagas irrespect of underground or overground were taken to concentration camps and tortured in diverse manners.... the Indian armed forces went to the extent of taking revenge on the innocent villagers for the hardships and sufferings they always received from the

underground guerrillas. They often blindly fired automatic rifles, machine guns and sten guns upon villages at night and many were killed in such incidents.22

Indeed, the Naga civilians suffered terribly under the Indian military campaign. But still the Government of India took decision to apply the strategy of 'grouping the villages' - a technique pioneered by the Japanese in Manchuria in the 1930s and later tried by the British Army in their campaign against the communist guerrillas in Malaya.23 For the Government of India 'village grouping' or 'grouping of villages' was an attempt of severing the contact between the Naga nationalists and the Naga civilians and thereby isolate the former and deny their sources of sustenance. Consequently, village after village were uprooted and shifted to new locations - called 'village grouping area'.24

Murkot Ramunny a responsible man in the echelon of power during that period confessed later the suffering and misery the Naga public had to undergo because of 'village grouping system'.25 Side by side, the army was freely operating in the jungle in full-scale. The Indian Air Force was brought into action in a tactical role, bombing and strafing rebel positions.26

Another important strategy applied by the Government of India was the raising of force of Naga militia - `Village Volunteer Force' and `Village Guards' trained and armed by the government to take on Naga nationalists. For the Government of India considered that raising a local militia was essential because regular army suffered from structural and attitudinal inhibitions when fighting irregular wars and local militia (Village Volunteer Force and Village Guards) were able to collect information and intelligence. However, the overall scorched-earth policies had a telling effect and the irony was the terrible suffering, hardship and human misery the Naga civilian underwent. It was not simply that the Naga civilians were caught in the cross-fire between the Naga resistance and the Indian Army but more so because of the army getting frustrated by elusive Naga nationalists the civilians became the target. Even Jayaprakash Narayan who personally studied the ground reality in Nagaland admitted saying: "Many atrocities were perpetrated by the Indian security forces, of which every decent Indian I am sure is ashamed." The Naga nationalists vindicatingly points out and writes:

Life was indeed precarious; it was completely at the mercy of the ruthless invaders. Side by side thousands of villages were incinerated across the country. Some villages were burnt

29. Ibid., p. 227.
down more than twenty times even. Besides, a large number of villages were uprooted from one place to another causing suffering beyond words. Granaries burnt to ashes without exception. Standing crops were destroyed. Schools and churches were raged to the ground. 32

As a matter of fact, the war caused severe economic crisis as all their crops were destroyed in the operations. Admittedly, Udayon Misra noted:

Even a rather cursory study of the role of the Indian Army in Nagaland would reveal that, under cover of fighting the insurgents, the entire economic pattern of the Naga people has been attempted to be disrupted...to have far-reaching consequences. 33

All the officials however did not support the massive military campaign launched against the Nagas. People like Nari Rustomji or General L.S. Thimayya rather advocated more human approach to solve the Naga tangle. Subsequently, by the early 1960s, the Government of India also realized that ultimate solution had to be found through political processes. This view was also shared by the Intelligence Bureau (IB). 34

B. POLITICAL OPTION

The change of mind in the decision-making body opting for political settlement did not imply that military offensive was entirely to be replaced by political process, rather it meant that side by side with military pressure, political process too was to be kept open whenever opportunity arose.

32. A brief political account, op. cit., p. 20.
34. Mullik, op. cit., p. 314.
Significantly, according to the former Director of Intelligence Bureau (IB) B.N. Mullik's own admission, the Nagas were solidly behind the Federal Government of Nagaland.\(^{35}\) The Government had therefore, to give some political concession to a section of the Nagas to break the Naga solidarity.\(^{36}\) In other words to be more precise, plans were drawn up 'to divide and delude' the Nagas. The enactment of Naga Hills and Tuensang Area (NHTA) as autonomous district and the signing of the 16 Point Agreement and the creation of the state of Nagaland are cases in point. However, explicit confirmation that the Intelligence Bureau (IB) was behind the Autonomous District and statehood movements are to be found in the memoirs of B.N. Mullik. This startling revelation displays the important role the intelligence wing played and continues to play in Nagaland as well as the entire North-East.

It is an irony that the Government of India while sponsoring Naga People's Convention (NPC) under intelligence patronage was attempting to settle the issue without taking into consideration the Naga nationalist view point. In fact, the NPC was nothing but a conglomeration of Naga civil servants, pro-government elements and those who opted for peaceful means to the solution of the problem and were also called the moderates. Therefore, leaders like A.Z. Phizo considered granting of autonomous district a political 'manoeuvre' of India\(^{37}\) and the nationalists generally described the new unit as a 'bribe to the moderates'.\(^{38}\) Thus, in

\(^{35}\) Mullik, loc. cit.
\(^{36}\) Luithui, \textit{et al.}, \textit{of. cit.}, p. 2
\(^{37}\) Phizo's memorandum to UNO (In) A brief historical background of Naga Independence, \textit{of. cit.}, p. 36.
these circumstances, it was bound to be a failure since substantial number of Nagas were in support of the 'Naga cause' i.e., to be a free nation.

Meanwhile, the idea of granting a statehood was first mooted when confronted with Phizo's escape to London and attempt to internationalize the Naga cause. Earlier it was the IB who originated the idea of autonomous district. This time, it was the Prime Minister who first mooted and saw that the "solution lay in recognizing Nagaland as a separate state, Jawaharlal Nehru realised that there was no other way out..."\textsuperscript{39} Thus, when the third Naga People's Convention passed a sixteen-point resolution the main thrust was to have a separate statehood for the Nagas and the same when forwarded to the Prime Minister was readily accepted.\textsuperscript{40} Eventually, the Parliament of India passed a bill and the state of Nagaland was formally inaugurated on 1st December, 1963.\textsuperscript{41}

The creation of Nagaland state was significant for it brought about certain advantages to the Government of India in dealing with the Naga nationalists. For the first time, a severe crack developed in the Naga movement and the grant of statehood resulted in pronounced difference between the hard-core and the moderate nationalists.\textsuperscript{42} Thus, if the Government of India attempted to divide the Nagas, she certainly achieved what she

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} Yonuo, Asoso, \textit{The Rising Nagas}, (Vivek Publishing House, Delhi, 1974), p. 228.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Mullik, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 330.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Ramunny, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 140.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p. 160.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Horam, M., \textit{Naga Insurgency}, (Cosmo publication, New Delhi, 1988), p. 90.
\end{itemize}
had sought. However, if the government had planned it to be the final seal to the Naga political problem, it was awfully wrong because the hardcore nationalists did have serious differences with the moderates and the pro-government faction. But still the worse was that the granting of statehood was basically limited to the Nagas residing in west of greater Nagaland (Naga Hills District). Hence, the Nagas of Arunachal Pradesh (Tirap District), Manipur, Assam, were kept out of this arrangement.

Meanwhile, the government had enacted several draconian laws as part of its campaign to contain the Naga movement. Already, between 1953 and 1955 Assam government had enacted two special Acts, namely the Assam Maintenance of Public Order (Autonomous District) Act 1953 and the Assam Disturbed Areas Act 1955. This was followed by the promulgation of (a) The Armed Forces (special powers) Regulations 1958; (b) The Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) special powers ordinance 1958 later converted into an act, and (c) the Nagaland Security Regulation Act of 1962. The special powers Ordinance of 1958 was converted into an act in September, as the Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Act 1958, later amended as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1972 to make it applicable to all the states and union territories in the North-East. In addition, another act, meant specially for Nagaland, came into force in 1962. It was called "The Nagaland Security Regulation Act of 1962". In addition to these draconian laws, the Government of India has in the recent

times, imposed the Punjab Security of State Act, 1953 in the state of Manipur and Nagaland. Besides, other general laws like the National Security Act (NSA) and Terrorist and Disruptive (prevention) Act (TADA) are too in operation.

According to the Human Rights activists, "the singular purpose of introducing the special laws is to equip the government and its armed forces with extensive power, putting themselves beyond the limits set by the Constitution" of India.

Indeed, all these special acts operating in Nagaland, Manipur and also in the rest of the North-Eastern states was first purported to crush the Naga political movement and subsequently extended to deal with other movements in the region. Thus, the enactment of the special Armed Forces (special powers) Act was justified by the Government of India on the ground of extraordinary political situation in the North-East region. In fact, the Armed Forces (special powers) Act is outstanding because of the extensive powers given to the armed forces. For instance, clause 4 (a) of this act provided that the army personnel down to the rank of a non-commissioned officer had the power to shoot and kill, to enter and search and arrest without warrant any person against whom reasonable suspicion existed that he had committed or was likely to commit a cognizable offence.


46. Ibid.

47. Statement of Mr. Ramaswamy, Attorney General of India at UN Human Rights Committee meeting held on March 1991, New York (in) NPMHR goes to UN (published by NPMHR (Manipur Sector) 1991), pp. 6-7.

48. Ibid., p. 23.
The Regulation gave the Armed Forces legal immunity to commit any crime against the people. It is no wonder that the Nagas and other tribes and communities in the North-East have vehemently opposed and demanded the withdrawal of so called 'black laws'.

It is worth noting that the Manipur Human Rights Forum and the Naga People's Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) filed a petition in the Supreme Court giving details of atrocities committed by the armed forces in Manipur and Nagaland. It challenged the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act. The petition is pending before the Constitutional bench. In the words of V.K. Krishna Iyer former judge of the Supreme Court:

The stark and tragic fact remains that Army excesses under the guise of Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act are taking place, the military stationed in that area is menacing the common people's life and liberty...it becomes the compelling duty of every Indian to protest against such gross violence. Even judicial remedies are becoming futile on account of Army indifference to court orders.

It is an irony that the armed forces sent to Nagaland and the North-east Region to contain Naga movement or `insurgency' has been accused of committing excesses and severe violation of human rights. Admittedly, Luithui and Haksar writes:

With almost indefinite freedom in their hands the heavily armed Indian personnel went around devastating life and property of the Nagas.

There was no law at all. The only law that was followed was the whims and fancies of these strangers in Indian army uniform with guns.\[^{52}\]

The Amnesty International pointed out:

The broad provisions of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act not only facilitate human rights violation but can also encourage violations because those responsible need not fear they will be held accountable for any action taken under its provisions. The security forces operating in the North East appear to be aware that they will enjoy such immunity from prosecution.\[^{53}\]

It was therefore, the singular purpose of the Naga People's Movement for Human Rights to go to the United Nations Human Rights Committee\(^*\) to pressurise the Government of India to bring about a changed attitude vis-a-vis the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. This move was significant because for the first time, the plight of the Naga people, various violations of human rights and arbitrariness of Armed Forces Special Powers Act were heard by the UN Human Rights Committee.\[^{54}\] A general observation one can make out from the UN Human Rights Committee proceedings is that

\[^{52}\] Luithui, \textit{et al.}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 32.
\(^*\) United Nation Human Rights Committee - This is the most prestigious human rights forum consisting of 18 experts from all over the world, chosen for their commitment to the cause of human rights, their legal expertise and high moral character. The UN Human Rights Committee has been constituted to monitor the implementation of the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This covenant was passed by the UN and it came into force on 23rd of March 1976. Every country which ratifies it or accedes to it is bound to follow the provisions of the covenant under International Law. India acceded to the covenant on the 10th of April, 1979.
\[^{54}\] NPMHR \textit{goes to United Nations} (published by NPMHR, Imphal: November 1991) p. 2. (the whole proceedings of the UN Human Rights Committee is also published by NPMHR).
the Committee expressed their deep concern about the Government of India's refusal to recognise the right to self-determination. The members also expressed their concern about the violation of human rights of the people of North East by the Indian Security Force operation under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act.\textsuperscript{55}

Historically speaking, the formation of the 'Peace Mission' and appointment of Rev. Michael Scott (a foreigner) as one of the members was outstanding and it is to the credit of the Government of India that this time they were serious about rightly solving the Naga issue. Unfortunately, the 'Peace Mission Commission' could bring about no settlement, as the premises from which the principal parties (i.e. the Federal Government of Nagaland and the Government of India) set out were at diametrically opposite extremes.\textsuperscript{56} Even the much publicized 'peace talks' arranged by the Peace Mission Commissioners between the Prime Minister late Indira Gandhi and the delegation from FGN could not yield any positive result. Thus, it is in this deadlock situation, R. Suisa, a prominent leader of the NNC and FGN brought out his proposal for solving the 'Indo-Naga political conflict' which stressed on permanent link between India and Nagaland after allowing the latter to be sovereign on all account.\textsuperscript{57} R. Suisa's proposal was indeed a workable formula which could satisfy the aspirations of the Naga people while at the same time

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
  \bibitem{55} Passim. PNMHR goes to UN.
  \bibitem{57} Ngareophung, NG., (Compiled) \textit{Legacy of R. Suisa} (Published by NG. Ngareophung, Ukhru, 1979) pp. 54-55.
\end{thebibliography}
(R. Suisa was an MP at one time, later he joined the Naga political movement and served as an advisor to the NNC/FGN until his last).

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it took note of the defence needs of India. Certainly it would have been a splendid catch for the Nagas had it not been the short sightedness of the NNC leadership. According to R. Suisa's own admission, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and U.N. Debar, the then Congress President, took three months to come to an understanding concerning his proposal. When the matter was put forward to A.Z. Phizo, the President of the NNC by R. Suisa (himself) and Vizol in London, the former was bluntly reminded "Do you know the fate of T. Sakhrie." No wonder coming back home, Vizol and his Democratic Party stated: "they doubted the sincerity of both the groups, the Government of India as well as the Federal Government in their attempt to find a solution to the festering problem of the Nagas."60

It is true that the Peace Mission failed in solving the principal issue but it did achieve something hitherto found missing. For the first time, the Naga issue was studied in the right perspective with due weightage to the arguments from the Government of India and Federal Government of Nagaland. Significantly, for the first time, the Peace Mission succeeded in bringing the two-warring groups to a negotiating table and initiated real peace process which culminated with the signing of the 'cease-fire'. Thus, Jaya Prakash Narayan, a member of the

58. Ibid., p. 68.
* T. Sakhrie - He served as the General Secretary of the NNC but was brutally assassinated by the NNC because he seems to have deviated from the NNC political stand and for other differences with the NNC leadership.
59. Written interview of 'Brig.' V.S. Wungmatem, Chief of the Naga Army, NSCN (conducted by the scholar), P. 15. Vide Night of the Guerrillas, pp. 171-172.
60. Nibedon, op. cit., p. 171.
Peace Mission stated that a notable achievement of the Peace Mission was the ability to help realize both the parties "to renounce the use of armed forces for the solution of the political conflict between them, and instead shall pursue the means of reason and peaceful political action." 61

It is a fact that the Government of India and the Naga nationalists got the opportunity of settling the issue when the Peace talk was raised to the Prime Ministerial level. Unfortunately, because of rigid stand from both sides there was no breakthrough from the deadlock. 62

The course of events in Nagaland in the following years was such that the cease-fire remained operative only on paper and there were serious allegations and counter-allegations of violations from both the parties. 63 Meanwhile, on August 8, 1972, the Chief Minister, Hokishe Sema was ambushed which killed two jawans and his driver. 64 There was immediate reaction. The Government of India banned NNC, FGN and FA 65 and the 'cease-fire' agreement was terminated since then. 66

Thereafter, the Indian army unleashed full thrust to render a final blow to the defiant Nagas. The major offensive against the Naga nationalists came at a time when the NNC, FGN and Federal Army were thoroughly disorganized. The NNC was marred by 61. Narayan, Jaya Prakash., Nation Building in India (Edited by Bramanand), published by Brahmanand, Navachetna, Prakashan Varanasi, n. d. p. 325
64. Horam, op. cit., p. 161
65. Idem.
infighting and internal dissensions. As a matter of fact, there was a complete breakdown of the chain of command affecting the rank and file of the NNC coupled with complete absence of leadership guideline at that crucial moment. Over and above, the political environment was totally against them. For instance, state emergency was proclaimed and the security forces were given a free hand; the Naga nationalists lost their important base and supply line when East Pakistan was liberated with help from the Indian Army; the Indian Army was reinforced and reorganized having a 'unified command'; and finally, the ruling party in Nagaland state persistently worked for Nagas' integration into the mainstream of India. Thus, it was glaringly visible that the Naga nationalists were in a precarious condition. Subsequently, when the military offensive commenced the Nagas could not withstand and consequently capitulated with the signing of the Shillong Accord.

The signing of the Accord was indeed an absolute gain for India and the worst debacle for the Naga nationalists. Through 'arm twisting' and diplomatic manoeuvering, the Government was able to obtain their commitment to the Constitution of India and arms surrender from the NNC. Moreover, the effects of the accord was equally advantageous for India. The accord virtually divided the Naga nationalists as pro-accord group and anti-accord group.

67. Singh, op. cit., p. 139.
69. See Clause 1 and 11 of Shillong Accord, 1975.
Later when all the desperate attempts to reorganize the NNC failed there was no other option for the anti-Accord group except to form a new organization to salvage the cause. Hence, the leadership of Th. Muviah and Isak Swu formed the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland in 1980 (five years after signing the accord). An intelligence officer rightly seemed to have said: "Mother of the North eastern insurgencies had been born." It was the regrouping of the hardcore Naga nationalists under the leadership of Th. Muviah and Isak Swu. But it is also true the Naga resistant forces were battered by the attempts to decimate them in the post accord period. Thus, when the NSCN was formed, they had to literally start from a zero-point with so many odds against them. The most formidable of which were the Indo-Myanmar joint offensive and the efforts of the accord group to push it through.

C. GOVERNMENT POLICY AND STRATEGY VIS-A-VIS THE NSCN

The change in the security environment in Nagaland after the signing of the Shillong Accord and the emergence of the NSCN as a distinct force resulted in governmental formulation of new policy and strategy, the nature which was considerably different from one in the pre-accord period (within Nagaland). With the NSCN coming to the forefront of the Naga movement the Government of India was confronted with new dimensions like ideological factor, centralized administration, forging of united front, new tactic 70. Hazarika, op. cit., p. 110.
of challenging India and Myanmar in several fronts, rendering assistance to other ethnic nationalities in the North East as well as beyond India.

However, it must be noted that the fundamental policy i.e. military offensive and political initiative remained intact if not intensified. The change in perception leading to new policy and strategy can be better understood when we discuss them one after another. They are as follows:

(1) Military Offensive

The emergence of the NSCN came to replace the NNC virtually in espousing the cause of Naga nationalism and it did cause the Government of India to evolve a military strategy to decimate and a political process as well to isolate the vocal section of the Naga nationalists. It was in this context, the Nagaland state Commissioner admitted that it was not to take any rest until the anti-accord group was checkmated. Indeed, the Naga nationalist group under Th. Muivah and Isak Swu which survived the onslaught of the Government forces hitherto was bitterly battling for life against the collective forces—the Indian security forces, Myanmarese troops and the pro-accord NNC group. Precisely six months after the formation of the NSCN, a joint force of the aforesaid launched an attack on the NSCN operational Headquarters at Langnuk (Naga territory in Upper Myanmar) on 27th September 1980 which killed about seventy of its cadres. Since then


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series of military campaigns by the Myanmarese troops were launched and at times joint operations (India and Myanmar) carried out.

Meanwhile the accord group of the NNC formed a local militia (most probably with full knowledge and consent of the Government of India) calling themselves as 'Peoples' Militia of Nagaland' (PMN). The same strategy as carried out by the Government of India in the 1960s by forming 'village guards' in Nagaland state and 'village volunteer force' in Manipur state to checkmate the NNC was now repeated to stall the NSCN in the 1980s. The tacit understanding between the PMN and security forces was quite visible to every common man. The PMN were paid, armed and sheltered in the army camps in all their operations against the NSCN.73 But despite all these, over the course of time, the NSCN prevailed and edged out all their opponents and the notorious PMN was marginalised permanently. Indeed, the NSCN leadership was consistently calling upon their comrades and the Nagas in general to face the challenges boldly. Thus to inspire the Nagas, it stated:

The time has come for you and for us either to shrink back or prove through. God wants us

73. Raising, Rh., A letter to Naga public, Oking, 21 April, 1989. The cooperation between the security forces and PMN was an open affair and every common man particularly in Manipur hill districts knew about it. Even after the PMN was mauled by the NSCN, one of its main leaders Mr. Phantiphang is being looked after and lodged in at Leimakhong a Divisional Headquarters of the Indian Army Manipur sector.

* Notorious (PMN) - The Naga villagers suffered immensely at the hands of the PMN men. They were exorbitantly taxed and inflicted physical torture suspecting them to be NSCN sympathisers. It was in fact, a 'reign of terror' although for a short time.
right now to stand for him. Now is the time to hold firm our ground with Christ and face the stick and carrot policy and persecutions of all Indian type.\textsuperscript{74}

This strategy of using militants against nationalists is not an isolated issue. Just as in Nagaland, the Government of India had been extensively utilising "cat system" during the post 1991 anti-terrorism drive in Punjab. It is said that these "cats" are actually militants turned undercover police or army agents.\textsuperscript{75} They are called "cats" because of the stealthy existence; renegade terrorists help the security forces in undercover operations against terrorists. "Cats" are used for varying tasks. One is to use them as spotters. Another is to make them infiltrate the insurgent group and provide information about their strength, hide-outs and modus operandi. Yet another and deadly category of "cats" who are armed and operate independently in the guise of insurgents, tracking down wanted persons and knocking them off.\textsuperscript{76}

The NSCN ambush at Namthilok (Ukhrul region) in 1982 killing all the 21 men traveling in three trucks belonging to 21 Sikh Regiment which had undergone vigorous 'low intensity conflict' training at Va Irene ngte in Mizoram,\textsuperscript{77} marked the beginning of the NSCN expansion. The problem with the Indian security forces was whenever any ambush occurred it was generally reciprocated by torturing innocent civilians and this created instead a

\textsuperscript{75} Vinayak, Ramesh., Prowling for the living, India Today, December 15, 1995, p. 100.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 101.
\textsuperscript{77} Kalbag, Chaitanya., Death's wing, India Today October 31, 1992, p. 82.
favourable ground for Naga nationalists. Corroboratingly, Gautam Dasgupta writes, "Revenge-hungry securitymen, torturing villagers, have given Muivah a steady stream of recruits from the Naga village youth. It has been the same vicious circle again and again." Thus, the army sent to Nagaland and Manipur to contain the Naga movement are ironically driving many youth to join the movement because of the ongoing atrocities on Naga families. According to Wasbir Hussain, the chronic problem with the Indian Army is "the serious failure to educate the soldiers on demands made by the region's ground realities." Hence, he suggested that in order to stop villagers from supporting the Naga nationalist cause, "security forces must be made to be seen as protectors and not aggressors."80

(2) Intelligence Network and Propaganda

Like many other governments facing 'ethnic nationalist movements', the Government of India have elaborately if not meticulously worked out intelligence network and propaganda machinery. As a matter of fact, the then Commissioner of Nagaland state admitted that no political movement like that of the Nagas can be suppressed without a good intelligence network and propaganda machinery.81 Admittedly, Shekhar Gupta writes, "sound intelligence and clever propaganda was vital tools of the counterinsurgency." However, this particular investigation is

80. Idem.
82. Gupta, Shekhar., Guarding the North-east - 11, C0ordination is the casualty, Indian Express, 14 December, 1982.
obviously handicapped by complete sealing of information relating to the subject. Therefore, the analysis of this role relies on secondary sources.

The magnitude of the Naga problem is manifested by the sheer presence of all the intelligence agencies in the region. At present, the Government of India is deploying the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau (SBI), Central Intelligence Department (CID), Military Intelligence (MI), etc. Recently, the Army has set up what is known as Internal Security Group (ISG) and their task is to keep the army ready for any eventuality. This is besides, Liaison Units (LU) and Intelligence and Field Security Units (AFSU) which are responsible for counter-intelligence and gathering external intelligence on behalf of the army. Moreover, the BSF, CRPF, the Assam Rifles all have their respective intelligence set up.

All these different intelligence agencies were operating independently and quite apparently it was one of the reasons why none of them could be decisive. Admittedly, pointing out the crux of the problem in the intelligence department, Shekhar Gupta writes: "with no agency knowing where its jurisdiction begins or ends there is total confusion which benefits the insurgents...."

The intelligence agencies are all the time busy ensuring that

Vide Strangers of the Mist, p. 191.
85. Ibid., p. 89.
86. Chibber, loc. cit.
they are the first to report to Delhi any news happening." 87

Currently, there is serious effort to integrate intelligence network in the North East region and place them under an unified command. 88 Already, the intelligence agencies are having frequent high level consultation in order to upgrade intelligence network in the region. Such meetings have been held in Shillong, Gauhati, Agartala etc. 89 It is true that the nature and strategy of the NSCN operation spreading out in almost all the seven states in the North-East is causing equally hectic intelligence activities in the region. The situation is further aggravated now because of the alleged Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) infiltration in the region and the agency's growing involvement in aiding ethnic nationalist movements in the region including the Nagas. 90

Although at present, one cannot be precise about the success or failure of the intelligence operation, the same agencies have been very successful in Nagaland in putting forth their plans effectively in the past. But for obvious reason, their work achievements are to remain shunted from public preview. 91

One of the notable achievements of the intelligence agencies was to bring a split within the NSCN organisation. This happened in 1988 as stated earlier in Chapter IV. The IB using SS Khaplang and others, attempted to do away with leaders like Th. Muviah and

87: Gupta, loc. cit.
Isak Chishi Swu to enable the former to come to the forefront. As a result, SS Khaplang and his group killed more than two hundred cadres of the NSCN. Although, the plan failed to topple the leadership, it brought about a division in the NSCN organisation. Thereafter, the Khaplang group came to be known more as a force to counter the NSCN under Isak Chishi Swu and Th. Muivah. Their tacit understanding with the Government of India through the IB and the State Government of Nagaland state became a knowledgeable fact. It is important to note that the Government of India meticulously utilized the services of the Khaplang group in checkmating the NSCN and in adopting measures to counter Naga political aspiration.

Another common tactic the intelligence agencies adopt against the NSCN is resorting to disinformation as part of their propaganda campaign. The common method is to plant propaganda stories to the press of both local and national through the Press Information Bureau (defence wing) issued by the Public Relation Officer (PRO), who is generally an Intelligence Officer. It is because of this, that a number of times prolific journalists were put in embarrassing position. In this context, Deepak Dewan, Chief of Bureau (NE.SUN) clarify says: "Now the army PRO has

93. Passim, Newspaper reportings, interviews, statements from the group. Kindly refer to Chapter IV for detail.
Vide CPI(M-L), Nationalities on War Path, A Selection of Vanguard essays, (Vanguard Publications, India, 1996), p. 15. Writes: "Since the late 1980's the Indian Government had tried to use the Naga group of S.S. Khaplang to launch attacks against the entire fighting forces led by NSCN."
94. Gupta, Shekhar., loc. cit.
been sending directly to the editors of regional and national papers. In most cases, the editors show their immaturity and irresponsibility by not disclosing the source of the news item."\textsuperscript{95} This sort of game is so frequently used in the conflict torn region perhaps with a dual objectives: to shun people's support to the cause and secondly to create instability within the nationalist organisation (as it was successfully done in the past). This has worked well in a few cases but had failed in most cases by becoming counter-productive. We can examine a few cases with special reference to the NSCN.

It was the \textit{Alee} (foreign) Command under Th. Muivah and Isak Chishi Swu who outrightly denounced the Shillong Accord as 'total capitulation' and earned the wrath of both the pro-accord NNC and the Government of India who considered Th. Muivah and others as a disturbing force to the peace process.\textsuperscript{96} In the given circumstances, the intelligence wing found 'Communism' to be the best bait to convince the Naga Christian population against them. Thus, a massive programme was undertaken for getting the support of the Church body in this campaign. It was too glaring that the Government of India and its intelligence agencies were taking advantages of the Nagas being Christians. Evidently, in this context, General Rawat, GOC of the Eastern Command cautioned the Naga congregation in Phek district asking: "How Nagaland, where the majority were Christians, could seek help from an atheistic

\textsuperscript{95} Dewan, Deepak., \textit{Army handout creates furore (In) NE SUN} December 1, 1990.
\textsuperscript{96} Sumi, Huska., \textit{What is the future of the Shillong Accord?} Press handout, p. 4.

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country like China?" The Government of India's strategy was to let the Naga population correlate military aid from China with importing communism to Nagaland along with the propaganda that accepting communism will destroy their religion (Animism or Christianity). It is in this context that they accused Th. Muivah and others as hardcore communists. As indicated in Chapter III and IV, branding them 'communists' was far from the truth and was even misleading. Both Th. Muivah and Isak Chishi Swu are ardent evangelical Christians and what they advocated was some form of socialism which was never akin to communism as propagated.

The second case is the common phrase that is usually resorted to by military and political leaders alike, viz., 'Insurgency under control. It is because they assess things only from statistical point of view and not from the ground reality. Here lies the serious error in correctly assessing the situation in Nagaland. It is believed that both military and political leaders are advised not to report Nagaland situation as threatening the security of India. 'Insurgency under control' is a common phrase frequently used in projecting the situation in Nagaland. For instance, in reply to a question, the Minister of state for Home assured members of the Lower House that situation in the entire North-East was under control. Opinion from the defence wing is no different. Lt. General J.K. Puri, GOC in-chief, Eastern Commander said: "security forces had brought the

98. Dev, op. cit., p. 140.
insurgency under reasonable control in the last 30 years, particularly in Nagaland."100 In a similar tone, Lt. Gen. V. Madan, GOC Nagaland stated: "NSCN was at a low intensity in Nagaland."101 The reports from the Home Ministry, particularly of the North-East is quite misleading when they say 'everything is under control'.102 Major. General Ashok K. Mehta being critical of army style of projecting the situation in Nagaland also quoted General Roy Choudhary's (Chief of the Army) statement "The situation has been conveyed wrongly to the rest of the country even by the media."103 As a matter of fact, Lt. General O.P. Kaushik, Chief of the Staff, Eastern Command admits that situation in the North-East is worst than Jammu and Kashmir.104 Thus, it is only now that military perception of the region has changed. It must be noted that conveying a wrong picture than the one dictated by the actual ground reality is a dangerous trend, in that it would seriously effect policy making or planning and result.

Another brutal disinformation from the intelligence was the story about Angelus Shimrah, the 'Foreign Secretary' of the NSCN. In a newspaper it was reported that Angelus Shimrah had broken away from the NSCN and formed Government of the People's Republic of Nagaland.105 The former immediately issued a clarification

100. Insurgency under control in NE (In) Times of India, June 10, 1986.
104. Idem.

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terming the story as "baseless propaganda...and coming forth from the traitors and the adversary." 106 In this case, even though, the intelligence might have had an intention, it was rather poorly planted and too cheap to be taken seriously because Angelus Shimrah is a well educated leader and an ardent nationalist forming the core of the NSCN organisation.

Then certain misinformation about Th. Muivah was also spread around the early part of 1987 by the intelligence agency. They put a story through a national wire service that Th. Muivah, the General Secretary of the NSCN was missing since February with possibilities of his having been drowned in Chindwin river, or immobilised after the accident in Chindwin river having been under treatment in Assam. 107 To this, Subir Bhaumik sharply reacted and said: "I can vouch they are all cock-and bull stories, as I met him much after February." 108

Another possibility discussed in the wire service story was just ludicrous. It reported that Muivah was under 'house arrest' in Kachin Independent Army Headquarters after he tried to use the Burmese Communist Party to contact China. According to Subir Bhaumik:

> The intelligence is lending Muivah an aura of mystery by spreading such stories about him. These stories will certainly not confuse the underground, if they are so intended, because the rebels know what is happening in their organisation. 109

108. Idem.
But soon again, the intelligence Information planted another fabricated story through the Press Information Bureau (PIB) Defence Wing and the same was published in national papers under the caption "Secret talks with NSCN in Delhi". According to the news report, Th. Muivah, Angelus Shimrah and Rh. Raising of NSCN were flown to Delhi for a few rounds of discussions with senior Home Ministry officials. In Nagaland, this was SS Khaplang's Primary accusation against Th. Muivah, Isak Swu and others that they were preparing to surrender to India and this report in the national paper was explicitly intended to corroborate Khaplang's allegation. The report was sensational and skilfully framed so as to make the readers believe in it, specially in Nagaland. Evidently in this context, Captain W. Shimray, Liaison Officer, GPRN disclosed that Khaplang's men were going around in the villages and military camps displaying the very report (secret talks with NSCN in Delhi) as confirmation of their allegation and found many taking their story. Thus, it was a successful operation subtly carried out. Nevertheless, despite having suffered serious damage within the organisation, the NSCN leadership remained committed to the cause of the Nagas and thus Isak Swu and Th. Muivah reiterated their stand stating: "every Naga must know that our policy is to fight eternally if India and Burma (Myanmar) do not keep their hands off Nagaland.

111. Idem.
112. Written interview with Captain W. Shimray, Liaison Officer GPRN, conducted by the scholar, 17 August, 1993.
We shall be all out in our support to all the revolutionaries in Burma and India."\textsuperscript{113}

In 1990, the intelligence planted another serious damaging story through the PIB defence wing (Imphal) as part of their disinformation and propaganda under the headline "NSCN callously exploiting Non-Tangkhuls"\textsuperscript{114} The army handout which was published by the Assam Tribune dated October 13, 1990 conspicuously intended to divide the Nagas on tribal line and drive a wedge between the Naga nationalists.

(3) Neutralising NSCN

Despite all out military offensive against the NSCN, both the political and military leaders do not rule out talk with the NSCN for final settlement.\textsuperscript{115} Even the military (Defence) whose main thrust was military solution for long time have now realized the necessity of holding talk with the NSCN.\textsuperscript{116} Thus, an apparent willingness to settle the Naga issue through dialogue and negotiation is explicit in both the political leadership and Defence Ministry.

However, the Government of India is determined to hold the negotiation only after neutralising the NSCN. This is evident from the several action plans it had effected. The strategy of

\textsuperscript{113} The Joint Statement, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{114} \textit{The Assam Tribune}, October 13, 1990.
\textsuperscript{117} Ramunnya, Marcot., \textit{Lessons from dealing with rebels \textit{The Hindu}}, January 25, 1992.
neutralising the NSCN stems from the reasoning that one should never negotiate from a position of weakness but of strength.\textsuperscript{117}

It is in the light of this that the government of India took recourse to neutralising all the forces or ethnic nationalist groups aligning with the NSCN although without any success. Thus, the spate of signing accord with several aforesaid groups such as the Tripura National Volunteer (TNV), Hmar People's Convention (HPC), Bodo Peoples' Action Committee (BPAC), Dimasa National Security Force (DNSF), Achik Liberation Matgrik Army (ALMA) can be understood in the light of this strategy. This strategy of neutralising all the groups close to the NSCN and finally isolating it tactically sounds quite brilliant and convincing. However, such a strategy requires a long period to take effect and it is doubtful whether one could really achieve the scheme because the settlement with one group could lead to emergence of another group and this is exactly happening in the North-East today. For instance, the Government of India with much publicity signed accord with TNV, Bodos or even DNSF and ALMA but within no time, National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) was formed in Tripura, Bodo Security Force (BSF) was strengthened and DNSF regrouped with the help of the NSCN.\textsuperscript{118}

The Government of India's policy or strategy sprang directly as a counterpoise against the NSCN's military strategy of expanding their area of influence and dispersal of their forces and thus effectively expanding the striking radius in the entire


North East region. Thus, one of the primary military objectives of 'united front' is, according to Th. Muivah to "make the mighty Indian armed forces run back and forth." The NSCN strategy is essentially to face the mighty Indian army on several fronts not just confining to Nagaland alone. It is, on the other hand, the assessment of the Government of India to confront the Naga nationalists on a single front and hence the strategy of neutralising the forces friendly to the NSCN. Unfortunately, for the Government of India, this strategy has not worked so well as indicated aforesaid.

(4) Sponsoring forces to checkmate the NSCN

Though for obvious reasons, the Government of India outrightly denied having sponsored forces like the Kuki National Army (KNA)* or Khaplang-Dally group to checkmate the NSCN, the allegations are quite strong and the modus operandi of these two organisations seriously question the denial of the government of India.

Not very long ago, the Government of India was found hobnobbing with the LTTE and imparting training which of course the Government of India was vehemently denying until its role was unveiled. The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) received

* KNA - One must not confuse with Kuki National Assembly. Kuki National Army is not a legal political organisation under the constitution of India and is a militant group.
121. Subramaniam, T.S., A role unveiled, Frontline, January 17, 1992, p. 84.
the green signal from Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India to recruit as many Sri Lankan Tamil youths as possible and give them training in arms.¹²²

Later the LTTE loosened from the grip of the RAW and even refused to surrender its arms after the Indo-Sri Lankan accord in 1987; the Government of India deliberately encouraged the Eelam Peoples' Revolutionary Liberation Front in order to neutralise the LTTE. However, history is a proof as to how miserably the strategy failed.¹²³

Today, the same Intelligence Services are alleged to have sponsored Ikhwan-Ul-Muslimoon (a militant group in Kashmir) and this group is known to be playing a central role for the Government of India by taking on the pro-Pakistan outfits.¹²⁴ Thus, one senior official in Srinagar admittedly believed to have stated "Irrespective of which agency is using him (Koka Parray, chief of the group), he is playing a very useful role by taking on the pro-Pakistan outfits."¹²⁵

It is in the same way that the Government of India is seen purposely inciting the Kuki National Army (KNA) as a counterweight against the NSCN.¹²⁶ Several Non-Governmental Organisations like the Manipur Naga Baptist Church Leaders Forum; All Naga Students' Association, Manipur; Naga Peoples' Movement for Human Rights; and Naga Students' Federation have come out

¹²². Idem.
¹²⁵. Idem.
openly accusing the Government of India for purposely fanning the ethnic clash between the Nagas and the Kukis and subtly sponsoring the Kuki militia with cash and weapon to fight the NSCN.\textsuperscript{127} Evidently in this context, the NPMHR sees the Naga-Kuki clash as nothing but Government of India's 'divide and Rule' policy. Thus, it writes:

\begin{quote}
The issue today is a synchronized act of the national oppressions and the few opportunistic elements. The Indian Government has failed to meet the challenge of self-determination for the Indigenous people, which is clearly a political question. The opportunistic elements among the Kukis have resorted to historical back-projection whereby sanction is sought from the past to justify the present.... The turmoil today is the root of national oppression through the policy of divide and rule by the Indian state and the few opportunists for the perpetuation of dominance and misrule. The Question of nationalism cannot be solved by instigating narrow tribal conflicts and militarising the region.\textsuperscript{128}
\end{quote}

Similarly, the NSCN leadership has consistently maintain the stand that the Naga-Kuki conflict represented a 'new phase of Indian State terrorism' and accused the Government of India of training, arming, sheltering and financing the Kukis to fight a 'proxy-war' for India against the 'stubborn freedom loving Nagas' in general and the NSCN in particular on a 'secret promise' in return to create a 'homeland for the Kukis' in the territory of the Nagas.\textsuperscript{129}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{127} Passim Moreh National Oppression by NPMHR, Imphal, August, 1992.
\textsuperscript{128} Vide Memorandum to Prime Minister submitted by Manipur Naga Baptist Church Leader's Forum, 1993.
\textsuperscript{129} Muivah, Th., A rejoinder to the Indian propaganda stunt, \textsl{op. cit.}, p. 9.
\end{flushleft}
Several national papers do admit that the Government of India is sponsoring the Kukis for their interest. As a matter of fact, The Telegraph writes, "In the present conflict, the centre is trying to use the Kuki National Army (KNA) to check the National Socialist Council of Nagaland. The government is trying to take advantage of a traditional enmity that existed between the two tribes." On the other hand, The Times of India published a report supporting government policy of helping the Kukis. Thus, it writes, "The Indian Defence Forces were not adept at counter-insurgency and would need the help of outfits like KNA, who know every inch of the territory and could tackle NSCN far more effectively with the full backing and logistic support of the army, RAW and other intelligence agencies." Here it is observed that the 'tactical design of the central government is to antagonise KNA against NSCN in order to offset and divert the latter's striking power.

Going by the reports of the Kuki militia, it is not surprising that the former is working in tandem with the Indian Security Force. Though one cannot rule out the possibility of discord between the two (just like the LTTE and RAW) in the future, at present there seems to be good understanding. As a matter of fact, the President of the Kuki National Army (KNA), Hanglen openly admitted that he had met the then Army Chief Gen. S.F. Rodrigues in Delhi on December 24, 1992 and also confided

that they were in touch with Army cantonments at Leimakhong (Manipur Sector) and Jakhama (Nagaland Sector). According to the news story published in Hindustan Times, the Kuki National Army (KNA) is supposed to have asked for about Rs. 7 crores as financial assistance from the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the counter espionage organisation of the Government of India. Moreover, the KNA asked for the arms and material support from Indian Army to undertake a 'fight to the finish war with the NSCN'.

Besides, a damaging nexus between the Kukis and the Government of Manipur is strongly alleged with well documented facts. Evidently in this context, the Manipur Naga Baptist Church leader's Forum, Naga People's Movement for Human Rights and All Naga Student's Association, Manipur etc. accused the Manipur Government of being partisan to the Kukis and neglecting the Nagas. The previous two ministries in Manipur headed by R.K. Ranbir Singh in general and that of R.K. Dorendra Singh in particular conspicuously displayed their bias and prejudices against the Nagas. For instance, the Nagas alleged that "Mr. R. K. Dorendra Singh is openly siding and encouraging Kukis..."

134. Hanglen, President KNO interview with Pradip Phanjoubam (In) The Naga Banner, April 16, 1993. Hanglen alias Sokhatinmang Haokip was later killed by his men in 1995 because of the disclosures he made, (Indian Recorder, April 23-29, 1995), p. 1102. Leimakhong and Jakhama are both Indian Army Divisional Headquaters coordinating 'Low Intensity Conflict'.


atrocities on the Nagas.137 As it was alleged, the then Government of R.K. Dorendra Singh did precious little to safeguard the Naga victims. Even the church body points out the evil intent of the state government and recounts: "the Kuki villagers are given shelter by the security forces but not the Nagas, and while the Kuki victims were given compensation and immediate attention and Naga plights are not sympathetically considered.138 The Nagas in general and all the Non-governmental organisations were of the view that the Manipur government under R.K. Dorendra Singh in collusion with the Kuki ministers and the security forces were carrying out a well calculated game of suppressing the Naga movement.139

The nexus between the Kuki militia and some ministers of Manipur Government was unearthed from documents seized from the Kuki militia leaders. The documents explicitly disclosed that R.K. Dorendra Singh, the then Chief Minister of Manipur donated Rs. 1,00,000, while the Finance Minister, C. Doungel Kuki also donated Rs. 2,00,000 to the Kuki militia organisation.140

According to one NGO source, further updating the allegation:

R.K. Dorendra Singh's right hand man, Mr. C. Doungel Kuki...alleged to have given not only Rs. 2 lakhs mentioned above, but according to the letter of T. Thanglem Kuki Chief Commander, Chin-Kuki Revolutionary Front, dated 30.5-1991 Mr. C. Doungel had paid Rs. 2 lakhs on 27.5 1991. Again, he paid another instalment of Rs. 3 lakhs (as per Mr. D. Nethang, President, Kuki Federal Council, dated 30. 9. 1990). According to the letter of

137. Memorandum to Prime Minister, loc. cit.
140. Ibid., p. 16.

Vide The Telegraph, October 27, 1992.
Mr. K. Athnang Kuki (chief) ... C. Doungel promised to contribute Rs. 25 lakhs by instal­ment for the formation of his underground outfit. 141

Besides the confirmation of some ministers aiding and abetting the Kuki militia to take on the NSCN, the partisan attitude of Dorendra Singh' ministry is also quite evident from the notification of August 1993 to confiscate licensed arms from Ukhrul district (predominantly inhabited by the Tangkhul Nagas) and the Kukis were spared from it. 142

But still the more serious allegations pertaining to the nexus between the Kuki militia and the Indian security forces are corroborated by the following incidents. The following evidences speak eloquently of the collusion of the two forces vis-a-vis the NSCN.

On 21.4. 1993 Noon Assam Regiment and Kuki National Army set ablaze all the houses of Kamhang Khullen village of Chandel district numbering 25 and same number of granary.

On 22.4. 1993 at around 11 A.M. the combined forces of 15 Assam Regiment and KNA rounded up Leibi village and burnt down 64 houses.

On 15.5. 1993 15 Assam Regiment in collusion with Kuki volunteers set ablaze 24 houses and granaries of Laipham village (Maring).

On May 10, 1993 at around 12 Noon the KNA with 24 Assam Rifles of New Cannan Post attacked Thawai and Riha villages. 143

It is in this context that the NSCN termed the whole development as "Indian state terrorism"\textsuperscript{144} and "national oppression"\textsuperscript{145} by NPMHR. According to the NSCN leadership, using third party such as the Kukis against the NSCN has twofold objectives:

First, to justify the induction of two fresh Divisions of troops into Nagaland which is already saturated with military presence.
Second, to put the blame of all the excesses committed in these communal clashes squarely on the NSCN with a view to project them as terrorists in the eye of the world.\textsuperscript{146}

\textit{As a matter of fact, the Government of India's representation to the Secretary General, Unrepresented Nations and People's Organisation (UNPO) squarely blamed the NSCN for the Naga-Kuki clash and for all the killing that had taken place. Thus, it termed the NSCN as a terrorist organisation and demanded NSCN dismemberrship from UNPO which is committed to peaceful approach.\textsuperscript{147} The same tone was also used by Indian Government's mission to the UN office in 1993 and 1994 in their protest against the NSCN delegation participating in the Working Group on Indigenous Population in Geneva.\textsuperscript{148} Therefore, the NSCN

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\textsuperscript{144} The New phase of Indian state terrorism in Nagaland Statement of the NSCN, 18 September, 1993, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{145} Moreh, National Oppression NPMHR, loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{146} The new phase of Indian state terrorism, loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{147} Passim Government of India's representation to the Secretary General, UNPO, 1994.
allegation that the Government of India desires to project them as a terrorist group appears true as indicated aforesaid.

Coming back to the allegations of the existence of tacit understanding between the Kukis and Indian security forces, the latter has refuted it. For instance, both Maj. Gen. Sen Gupta and Maj. Gen Satish Chander Chopra has said that the security forces adopted a non-partisan attitude in tackling the ethnic problems and in fighting insurgency and of course they admitted that they have been confronting the NSCN more than KNA because of the former's area of operation. However, the allegation concerning the Government of India fanning the ethnic clash and patronising the Kukis or Kuki militia to checkmate the NSCN are too well founded to be easily dismissed. The self confession of the key KNA leadership and documents seized from the KNA members, the strong charges made by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the operation of the Indian security forces in collusion with KNA substantiate the allegations. In this case, the appeal by a neutral group such as the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (a militant organisation comprising Kanglepak Communist Party, United Liberation Front and PREPAK of Manipur) to Kukis is quite revealing. It cautioned the Kukis against becoming pawns "of imperialist India and her lackey" and to 'erase' the suspicion that Kuki leaders are being used by India to work against revolutionaries of the region.


The other group involved in the game-plan of the Government of India to counter the NSCN is the Khaplang group (the press called it the NSCN -K) as indicated earlier. Now it is clear that both these groups were covertly utilised, one from the North and the other from the South to decimate the NSCN and strategically it is sound indeed.

By now, it is also glaringly evident that several Kuki militia men were trained by the Khaplang group in the North-West of upper Myanmar and this fact has amply substantiated the alleged nexus of Khaplang group with the Indian security forces. Otherwise, there is no logic why Khaplang group should cooperate with the Kuki militia when the latter is in conflict with the Nagas. Thus, the primary objective is precisely to counter the NSCN.

The point is this, that the strategy of patronising groups like the Kukis or Khaplang group comes in handy only for a short term as tactical gain but certainly not the solution of the key issue. Ironically, so far, the Naga nationalists are engaged in one of the longest bush-wars in Asia and is yet to show any sign of weakening, both in morale and armed strength.

D. DEFENCE COORDINATION

Since the time of NSCN securing international recognition by becoming member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) in January 1993, and the alleged

151. Passim Interview of C. Alemla.  
Confession of Longna Chishuhu.  
Open Letter to SC Jamir by 'Brig.' V.S. Atem.

152. Nayar, loc. cit.
involvement of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in aiding the Naga nationalists and other North East insurgents, the Government of India has no reason but to feel perturbed. Thus, for the first time defence coordination among different defence related agencies of the state was given prominent emphasis. This new defence coordination was evolved significantly because of the Naga political movement assuming a new dimension.

Lately, there had been a flurry of seemingly purposeful activity on the turbulent North-East region as well as at the international diplomatic level. For the first time, the Government of India conspicuously has shown some seriousness in dealing with the problem. Evidently in this context, the Prime minister of India, Narasimha Rao has constituted a special Committee under the Chairmanship of S.B. Chavan, the Home Minister with other members of the Committee such as Margaret Alva, Santosh Mohan Dev and P.A. Sangma. The Committee is to monitor the political movement or insurgency scenario and advise the Prime Minister for taking effective steps. Thus, in the words of Santosh Mohan Dev: "The centre in close coordination with the North Eastern states and is committed to end insurgency."}

It is against this backdrop that the Union Home Minister S.B. Chavan called for integrated, comprehensive plan involving the North-Eastern states to tackle the political problem of the

155. Idem.
156. Idem.
Hence, the intention is to tackle the ethnic nationalist movement on a war-footing which now appears to be sitting on the edge of a volcano.

With directive from the Union Home Ministry, North-East Regional Security Coordination Cell has been set up. The members comprise of Chief Ministers of the region, Chief Secretaries, DGPs and high Army officers. The whole thrust is for total coordination among the seven states and facilitate a cohesive approach to the political problems in the region. Such security coordination is dictated by the proliferation of NSCN operation covering all the North-East region. Thus, the Government have chalked out a multi-pronged strategy essentially for containing the NSCN activities. The strategy involves coordination among intelligence agencies operating in the region, setting up of a unified command of all the security forces under operation; setting up of a common intelligence data bank in Shillong and a 'hot line' with all the state capitals from Shillong for better sharing of information and coordination of low intensity conflict. Then inter alia, the strategy include the declaration of the most seriously affected areas as 'disturbed areas', notification of certain militant groups as 'unlawful associations'; deployment of additional units

159. Centre open to talks with NE insurgents The Eastern Clarion (Jorhat) May 1, 1995.
of the Army and the central para military forces, financial assistance to the North-Eastern states for modernization and upgradation of state police forces, raising of Indian reserve battalions. But still one of the most important decisions is to set up a special standing monitoring mechanism comprising representatives of the Ministry of Finance, the Planning Commission and the Ministry of Home Affairs. They will monitor how the funds are being utilised by the various state government in the North-East. This is a significant step indeed in a region infested with corruption and other ills.

Thus, it is a massive and comprehensive plan chalked out by the Government of India covering the entire region of the North-East. The objective of such plan is quite conceivable i.e. on the one hand to commit an all out offensive against the NSCN under Isak Swu and Th. Muivah's leadership and bring the Naga movement to a considerably low level if not 'totally decimate them'. On the other hand, the Government is resolute to woo the general civilians and moderates by adopting appeasement programme such as steps for economic development, particularly with a view to improving the basic infrastructure and employment opportunities. The Government of India also removed the 'bamboo curtain' by lifting 'Restricted Area Permits' for foreigners visiting the area from three states i.e. Assam,

163. Idem.
165. Idem.

Vide Union Ministers moot steps to woo NE tribals The Eastern Clarion, May 4, 1995.
Meghalaya and Tripura. Another significant step was the government's decision to revert back to the pre-1989 policy wherein non-plan expenses were borne by the Central Government. In other words, it seeks to place Nagaland state and other North-Eastern states under 'Special category states'. This is besides full reimbursement of expenditure incurred on deployment of central para-military forces by the Central Government. Over and above, the government is keeping the door open for political dialogue with the NSCN.

Another notable decision is that the various agencies like the state's bureaucracy, district civil administration, police, para-military forces and the Army would give a special attention to social welfare activities, especially in rural areas, to ensure greater interaction with the common people and earn their goodwill. Admittedly, Maj. Gen. B.S. Randhawa, Commandant of the counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) at Vairengte stated that "getting the people on our side is an important part of all counter insurgency operations." Major Gautam Deb, an intelligence officer of the CIJWS offers more detail about the social welfare activities and said: "We...slowly try to win them over by providing them with medical aid, subsidised rations, education and other social services."

172. Idem.
is true that winning over the hearts and minds of the local people is an integral part of low intensity conflict operations or in containing political movement such as that of the Nagas.

E. CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Hitherto, the policy (if at all there was a policy) on Nagaland or on the Naga political issue, has been predominantly to contain it rather than rightly solving the issue. Admittedly Nirmal Nibedon, points out correctly some years back that the centre generally deploy armed forces 'in order to checkmate the Naga nationalists but by itself, it has not solved the problem rather compounded it'.¹⁷³ Thus, it is in this perception that the scholar observed some flaw in the Government policy vis-a-vis the Naga issue, particularly against the NSCN. They are:

(1) Policy lacked consistency

Government of India's policy against the Nagas and their problem for the last forty years or so can be considered as inconsistent and lacking genuine commitment. This is borne out of the many experiences and observations made on her policy and mode of operation.

One such discrepancy is the abrupt unilateral withdrawal of the Nine-Point Agreement by the Government of India.¹⁷⁴ Such was literally termed as 'betrayal of the Agreement by India' by the nationalist leadership in Nagaland.¹⁷⁵ Another case of almost

¹⁷³ Nibedon, op. cit., p. XIV (preface).
¹⁷⁴ A brief political account, op. cit., p. 9 (for detail refer Chapter II).
¹⁷⁵ Idem.
similar nature was the unilateral abrogation of 'Cease-fire Agreement' in 1972.\footnote{176}

This inconsistency was also observed by the members of the 'Peace Mission'. Thus, Jaya Prakash Narayan made this observation that Gundevia (who headed the delegation of the Government of India in the talk with the Nagas) made blatantly contradictory statements on India's stand concerning the Peace Mission proposal. For instance, Gundevia's letter of January 21 and statement of April 4 and 5 contradict each other.\footnote{177} According to Narayan, this 'deepened the suspicious of FGN about Government of India's motive and was believed to be the main reason of FGN's refusal to accept the Peace Mission's proposals.\footnote{178}

The element of inconsistency is also seen in the manner in which arrangements arrived at, are not being observed or executed. Evidently in this context, several points of 'Sixteen Point Agreement' signed with the Naga People's Convention in 1960 is yet to be fulfilled. In fact, "Nehru had assured the Nagas in 1960 that the question of Naga boundaries and forests would be examined and settled."\footnote{179} The same is true of the controversial Shillong Accord. Although as guiding principle for the solution of the Naga problem, both the parties i.e., the Government of India and the FGN and NNC representatives agreed that (1) solution should be honourable to all concerned and (2) solution should be acceptable to both sides,\footnote{180} the end result (Shillong

\footnote{176. Ibid., p. 18.}
\footnote{177. Narayan, op. cit., p. 345.}
\footnote{178. Idem.}
\footnote{179. Rustomji, Nari., Imperilled Frontiers India's North-Eastern Borderlands (Oxford University Press, Delhi 1983), p. 70.}
\footnote{180. Ramunny, loc. cit.}
Accord) was the Government's complete domination resulting in an imposed Agreement.\textsuperscript{181} As a matter of fact clause III of the Shillong Accord explicitly provided room for further negotiation for final settlement but when the government realised that the Naga nationalists were neutralised (according to their assessment) any follow-up talk was shelved. For instance, according to the NSCN sources, because of the repeated approaches of the Government of India as many as seven times to `hold talks without any precondition', the NSCN agreed and the proposed talk was fixed on 15th July, 1985 at Tuensang town. The government delegation failed to turn up and the talk was postponed indefinitely\textsuperscript{182} which of course never took place.

Thus, lack of consistency in the Government of India's approach and policy and secondly, lack of genuine commitment to find a rightful settlement are quite glaring. The Government of India seem to have a piecemeal approach of the issue. The government seems to be satisfied with their situational approach of keeping the situation under acceptable level which does not pose a serious threat to the security of India. Hence, the problem with the policy of Indian Government is not seeking a permanent solution but containment of the movement which she thinks she had achieved it.\textsuperscript{183}

\textsuperscript{181} Luithui, et al., op.cit., p.37 (see Chapter III for details).
\textsuperscript{182} Interview of Bertil Lintner with Th. Muivah, (published by the GPRN December 1985), p. 18.
\textsuperscript{183} It is truism of all the ruling political leaders and Army officers that `everything is under control' is the accepted conventional statement.
(2) Political Process Outweighted by Military Approach

Another disturbing trend in the Government of India's policy is the pre-eminence of the military option in handling the delicate Naga issue. Since the time, the Government of India took the onus of handling the Naga issue from the British Government, military approach had remained a predominantly accepted measure to the solution of the problem. The reasons behind such move are as follows:

Firstly, the strategical placement of Nagaland at the trijuncture of India, China and Myanmar is an important factor. The region is strategically vital for India's defence. Thus, Ramaswamy, Attorney General of India argued at the International Human Rights Committee, New York by amply reflecting this point. The latter justified giving extraordinary power to the Army in the North-East region because of being 'border areas' and live with political movements.

Secondly, the administration (decision makers) has a peculiar reading of the Naga problem. Nari Rustomji (a distinguished administrator) rightly observed:

It was generally assumed, during the earlier years of Independence that the British technique (using brute military force) of dealing with a situation was necessarily the correct technique, forgetting that the circumstances of the situation might be entirely different and necessitate a totally different approach.

186. Rustomji, op. cit., p. 32.
This perception conspicuously unchallenged, resulted to unprecedented human tragedy and played a considerable part in sharpening and aggravating discontentment.

Thus, the whole perception was security oriented. Moreover, the Government's policy is seen from the manner of sending mostly retired Army Officers as Governors of the state. Both Gen. K.V. Krishna Rao and Lt. Gen. V.K. Nayar are retired army officers and O.N. Srivastava came from the police service. This practice was severely opposed by the Chief Minister of Manipur, Rishang Keishing.

INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

As a matter of fact, Naga territory is almost equally divided between India and Myanmar. This peculiar geographical setting of Naga inhabited areas by itself could not have confined the 'Naga political movement' just within India. Right from the 1950s onwards, the Nagas inhabiting North-West of myanmar (Naga nationalists refer to as 'Eastern Nagaland') have substantially contributed manpower to the cause of the Nagas. However, right now, we are specifically concerned with the NSCN leadership seeking to internationalise Naga case and thereby attempt to put pressure on the Government of India. Thus, as of now, the Naga political movement has given entirely a new international dimension.

187. Ibid., p. 7.
188. Ibid., p. 33.
189. Seram, Kishore., Governor is playing politics NR SUN April 9-15, 1994, p. 16.

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Thus, it is quite conceivable that the NSCN has embarked upon a two prolonged strategy of confronting the Government of India and Myanmar. One is to continue the armed resistance with the Indian troops and to a lesser extent with Myanmar, while the other and more important task is to internationalise Naga case in a big way.

The study of international dimension with reference to the NSCN will be of two-fold. Firstly, the study will highlight the Naga nationalists' international campaign with special reference to Nagaland securing membership to Unpresented Nations and People's Organisation (UNPO), the NSCN work at UNO, NSCN garnering support of several Non-Governmental Organisations and finally the NSCN Alee Command forging friendship with other foreign 'Revolutionary Groups' or ethnic nationalist organisations. Secondly, the study will involve India's relationship with her neighbouring states vis-a-vis the Naga issue and examine the strong allegation of foreign powers assisting and supporting the Naga nationalists.

A. NAGALAND's MEMBERSHIP OF UNPO

The abortive attempt of SS Khaplang in 1988 to dislodge Muivah and a subsequent holding of a National Assembly at 'Jordan Camp' on 7th November 1989 marked a turning point in the history of the Naga movement. The National Assembly condemned SS Khaplang as 'national criminal' and expelled him from the organisation
once and for all. The HQhQ (Assembly) on the other hand, reaffirmed the leadership of Isak Swu and Th. Muivah. 191

Thereafter, following the National, HQhQ Isak Swu and Th. Muivah went out for foreign mission to internationalise Naga case and garner international support.

Meanwhile, the NSCN military wing significantly achieved a success when its Alee Command under the leadership of 'Maj.' Ningkhan Shimray and his associates had successfully carried out two seaborne military operations under the code name 'Operation Red Sea' followed by 'Operation Jordan' bringing in sophisticated arms from friendly countries after crossing the Indian ocean. It was significant because for the first time in the history of the Naga struggle for freedom that the importance of sea-route was felt. 192 Moreover, the NSCN cadres were able to successfully maneuver from Chittagong Hill tracts to Nagaland without being seen and ambushed by the Indian security forces. 193 As a matter of fact, this marked the crescendo of NSCN military strength.

On the diplomatic front Th. Muivah and Isak Swu worked hard to enlist Nagaland as a member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) and significantly within a short-span of time. 194 It is a global forum of nations and peoples not

adequately represented in the international community. Thus, the NSCN succinctly declared:

The Third general Assembly of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) admitted the Naga nation into its membership on January 23, 1993. This is a historic achievement of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland towards safeguarding their free existence against the invasion of their country by India and Burma (Myanmar).

The acceptance of Nagaland's membership in the UNPO was announced by Enkin Alptekin, the Chairman of the UNPO at the Hague UNPO Third General Assembly, following which the national flag of free Nagaland was hoisted among the flags of other nations for the first time in the history of the Nagas. In response, Isak Chishi Swu thanked the UNPO and presented "Nagaland for Christ" banner to the Chairman, UNPO. According to NSCN, the banner bears three meaning: the free existence of Nagaland, the expression of Naga national faith in Christ and the symbol of hope to use Nagaland for World peace Centre. Isak Chishi Swu, Chairman of the NSCN addressed the Assembly and made serious charges against India and Myanmar. Thus, Isak Swu complained of the "untold sufferings and the bitter state of affairs Naga people have been subjected to in the past forty years on account of the preposterous occupation of their homeland

198. Idem.
by the Indian and Burmese (Myanmarese) armed forces." Isak Swu also reiterated the Naga nationalist stand saying:

Nagas have their history and it does not admit of any attempts at distortion. Nagas as a distinct nation remains unconquered, unadministered and independent from time immemorial.

Swu also made serious charges of human rights violation by India and Myanmar. Thus he stated:

Destruction and suffering inflicted upon the Nagas in the past forty years are beyond description. Losses in terms of life and property are immeasurable - thousands were indiscriminately killed, thousands tortured to death, thousands died of starvation and diseases in concentration camps and jails. Raping of women were daily phenomenon. Burning down of villages, destruction of crops were time and again carried out-of all which outside world knows virtually nothing.

The NSCN leadership explicitly considered Nagaland as a free nation but sandwiched between two other nations-India in the West and Myanmar in the East and cautioned the UNPO Assembly that "there is limit to tolerance and it is simply no good to wait for reappraisals for forty years of patience is enough."

The meeting in the Hague was graced and addressed by the following outstanding dignitaries: Lord Amnals, member of the British House of Lords and former British Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence; H. S. H. Prince Adam II of Liechtenstein;

199. The Speech of Isak Swu, Chairman, NSCN (at the General Assembly of UNPO, 30th January, 1993).
201. Idem.

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Ireland's Nobel Prize Laureate MS.M. Carrigem Magnire, President of the Peace People, Belfast and many others.203

There is no doubt that the Naga nationalists pulled off a major diplomatic victory inspite of the opposition from the External Affairs Ministry of the Government of India. For the NSCN, becoming a member of the UNPO conspicuously opened a number of excellent avenues for internationalising its cause and struggle for sovereignty. Evidently, the UNPO provides a range of services for its members. For instances, its mission is to provide inter-alia unique international forum for nations and people whose voices are not being heard at the United Nations and other international organisations. It also provides services and trainings for representatives of the UNPO members to enhance their effectiveness in pursuing diplomatic and other non-violent strategies and conflict resolution.204

In Nagaland, the declaration of Nagaland becoming a full-fledged member of the UNPO was well received. According to a handout issued by the GPRN 25th March 1993 was declared as 'Thanks Giving Day'.205 Among the jubilant group included the NNC (K) who in a press statement lauded the NSCN for its great achievement. The release was signed by 'Gen'. Merentoba, M. Chumbemo Murry, Kolhule Nagi, Samphu Yimchunger, all members of the NNC Executive Council on behalf of the NNC. Thus, it stated that they:

203. NSCN Press Statement, loc. cit. 204. UNPO, op. cit., p. 4.
expressed heartful gratitude and support to
the achievements of NSCN leaders Isak Chishi
Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah at the
international arena for the cause of Naga
sovereignty and urge upon all people to unite
immediately in order to strengthen the mission
of both these leaders for fulfilling the long
felt aspirations of the Nagas as a distinct
people. 206

On the part of the Government of India, its effort to block
the NSCN moves to join UNPO on the plea that Nagaland state has
been a legitimate and adequately represented state for almost 30
years was an argument that found few takers. 207 Moreover India's
effort to send a Naga politician to the Hague to counter the NSCN
stand also did not materialise, instead it created a controversy
in Nagaland state. It all started with an alleged interview of
Shikiho Sema with a Delhi based paper (Eastern Recorder) and
republished in 'Nagaland Observer' wherein Shikiho, Minister for
Higher and Technical Education was alleged to have attended the
UNPO General Assembly to counter the NSCN propaganda. 208

Shikiho immediately called a press conference and denied
that he had ever gone to the Hague to attend the UNPO Assembly or
given any press interview. 209 However, he admitted that he was
hand-picked by the centre to attend the Hague Conference but
owing to certain technical difficulties, the trip could not
materialise. 210 An Editor of a local newspaper observed:

206. NNC lauds Isak and Muivah The Nagaland Post (Dimapur)
October 1, 1993.
207. Modak, loc. cit.
208. Shikiho Denies UNPO issue Nagaland observer (Kohima) April
17, 1993.

Vide The Telegraph 26 April, 1995.
The reaction of the South Block over the matter of UNPO is not a new phenomenon as it had done the same thing with the Naga issue in UN by sending some Naga VIP than as the head of the delegation.211

Significantly, the Former Chief Minister of the Nagaland state, Hokishe Sema was a member of the Indian delegation to the 27th UN General Assembly212 primarily to convince the western press and UN delegations about the 'baseless claims' of the Naga nationalists.

There is no doubt that for the Government of India Nagaland's membership of the UNPO is a serious matter. In the same year (1993), the Government of India despite of the fact that the UNPO is not officially recognised by her till date, submitted a representation addressed to the Secretary General of the UNPO demanding suspension of the NSCN from UNPO membership as it did not meet any of UNPO conditions but openly and flagrantly violated all the objectives.213 The main thrust of the Government of India's argument was that the NSCN being an outrightly armed military organisation believed in armed struggle alone and hence did not match with the UNPO's non-violence principles. However, one does not know how the UNPO office responded but this much is clear that Government's effort had failed since the NSCN continued to retain her membership. Moreover, the NSCN General Secretary sharply countered the Government of India's represen-

211. The visit that never was (An editorial column) Nagaland Post May 1, 1995.
tation by submitting a rejoinder to the same which totally negated India's allegation and rather accused the Government of India of initiating 'bloodshed in Nagaland'. Thus, Th. Muivah writes:

We are urged to speak out what we are and UNPO will do well if we are understood once again in our reality. We believe in peaceful political solution. Let no one drive us away from it. But India does not. Indians count on military solutions and this is the crux of the problem. 214

Th. Muivah also charged the Government of India of taking "advantage of Naga's sincerity and sustained tolerance." 215 Pointing how war and conflict started and why Nagas had to pick up arms, Th. Muivah writes:

When Nagas refused to accept the Indian Constitution Nehru's government despatched thousands of Indian armed forces into Nagaland.... The horror of hell started with no one to stop it. Thousands were massacred, thousands imprisoned and tortured beyond description, hundreds of villages burnt down, crops destroyed, women raped without number...should they (Nagas) not defend themselves and their national rights? They had to because they did not believe in passivity and capitulation. 216

The General Secretary of the NSCN believed that to India Nagaland's membership in the UNPO was like a bolt from the blue. It is clear that the Government of India's effort to dislodge the NSCN from UNPO membership has failed if not abandoned. Thus, in this matter, the NSCN has edged out the Government of India and the latter's utter diplomatic failure was quite explicit.

215. Ibid., p. 3.
216. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
Nagaland's admission into UNPO as a full-fledged member significantly created a deep impact in Nagaland and helped the NSCN immensely in consolidating their strength. In course of time, there has been unabated desertion from other camps to the NSCN under Isak Chishi Swu and Th. Muivah's leadership. In this context, the joining of the entire group of the NNC (K) in Yimchunger region can be cited. They declared, 'NSCN is the only authentic organisation for the Nagas'.\textsuperscript{217} It is worthy to mention here that even Khodao Yanthan, the then President of the NNC (K) himself had joined NSCN recently. In the press statement issued from the Hague, he stated thus:

They (Isak Chishi Swu and Th. Muivah) thus waved the nation from the tragedy thereof and from the dead-end of the NNC's leadership, ushering thereby in the hope and certainty of the National destiny. Had it not been for the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, the history of the Nagas would have been one of the humiliation. It is the NSCN, with the unflinching support of the people, that has safeguard the sovereignty of Nagaland from the unprecedented challenge of the peril since 1975.\textsuperscript{218}

The NSCN expansion and consolidation can be seen not only in the home front but also in the international front. Admission into UNPO has helped the NSCN forge friendship and linkages with the number of non-governmental organisations. Thus, a journalist reportedly writes: "Using his contacts in the UNPO - like Michael Van Walt, its Secretary General, and Mr. Lody Gyari, a Tibetan leader in exile - Muivah established link with the Asian

\textsuperscript{217} NSCN gains support, \textit{Nagaland Post}, October 13, 1993.
\textsuperscript{218} Open statement of Mr. Khodao Yanthan former President of the Naga National Council, 23rd January, 1995. The Hague (The Netherlands).
Asian Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP) and the Belgium based Flemish support for Indigenous people." The AIPP sympathising is quite conspicuous from its declaration on Nagaland:

We...take serious note of the ongoing large-scale atrocities committed by the Indian Army on the Naga people and demand an immediate withdrawal of the military from the area, and the fulfilment of the legitimate aspiration of the Naga people for genuine self-government.

Another notable link the Naga nationalists established is with the KWIA a powerful Non-Governmental Organisation in Belgium which is held much in great esteem by both the governments and the NGO groups in Europe. It is the only support group in Belgium for the Indigenous Peoples all over the world. It is quite conceivable that the NSCN is working closely with the KWIA and is being supported by this group in their international campaign. Significantly, KWIA have made a declaration on Nagaland strongly demanding restoration of Naga national rights by India and Myanmar. Thus, it declares:

KWIA, the Flemish support inherent group for Indigenous Peoples, commends itself to support the right of the Naga people to self-determination and Independence....We appeal to the Indian Government to stop the atrocities towards the Naga people, to stop the killing of innocent Naga citizens, and to stop the strategies set up to divide the Naga communities and organizations....We respect and support the Naga resistance by all legal means, including armed resistance, as authorized by international law.

221. KWIA declaration on Nagaland (Geneva, July 30, 1993).
Other NGO groups supporting the Naga cause and the NSCN organisation include the Justice and Peace Centre, South Boston, International Human Rights Association of American Minorities (IHRAAM), World Baptist Alliance, Asian Cultural Forum on Development (ACFOD), Minority Right Group (MRG), Naga Vigil Group (London), International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), Society for Threatened Peoples etc.²²² This developments taking place certainly reflects the proliferation of the NSCN international network. These link-ups and friendship have placed the NSCN on a higher pedestal in their campaign for international support.

Thus, it can be noted that the NSCN have been receiving a lot of international publicity and exposure in furthering their political struggle. The Swiss state national TV made 'coverage on the history of the Nagas, their resistance to the forcible military occupation of their land by India and Myanmar'.²²³ Then De Standaart (a Belgian newspaper) in Brussels on July 8, 1993 carried a picture of Isak Swu and Th. Muivah and published the latter's full statement of their cause.²²⁴ A Swiss magazine 'Monde' of 19th July, 1993 carried a full story 'Forgotten Peoples' as narrated by Isak Swu and Th. Muivah²²⁵.

It is observed that one of the reasons of the NSCN gaining more publicity is the UN General Assembly's declaration of 1993 as the 'International year of the Indigenous Peoples'. This generated a lot of activities globally and even in Nagaland NGO

²²². Passim From different sources (printed matter).
²²³. Information from AIPP Secretariat, (Bangkok, 1993).
²²⁴. De Standaart July 8, 1993 (Reproduced by AIPP Secretariat).
groups such as the Naga Peoples' Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) and Naga Students Federation (NSF) took the leading role in organising consultation meetings and drafting of the proposed UN declaration on the rights of Indigenous people. The NSF and NPMHR jointly organised the celebration of 'NAGA WEEK' in commemoration of the UN declaration of International Year of the World's Indigenous Peoples.226

Thus fortunately for the NSCN, their international campaign to garner friendly support from world community started in accordance with the UN declaration. Remarkably, the NSCN has been actively participating in the International affairs, particularly with the UN Working Group on Indigenous people. For instance, the NSCN sent its representatives Zingmi Shimray alias 'Maj'. Ningkhan Shimray to the second Summit of the Indigenous Peoples at Mexico held on October 4-8, 1993.227 Then the NSCN made a breakthrough when Isak Swu and Th. Muivah went to participate in the UN Conference of the Working Group on the Draft Declaration on the rights of the Indigenous Peoples at Geneva from July 19th to 30th 1993. Significantly, Isak Chishi Swu, Chairman, NSCN also delivered a speech at the Conference attended by more than 500 delegates.228 Isak Chishi Swu speaking on behalf of the Nagas said:

226. **Naga Week** December 1-5, 1993 Towards our rightful place through the healing our spirit (Published by the publicity Committee Naga Week, Naga Club Building, Kohima, 1993).


Nagas have been invariably confronted with the real war of massive military operations, massive political suppressions, massive economic exploitation and endless assimilation processes. Ceaseless influx of alien people has reached alarming proportions. Our land is grabbed from all the sides, mineral resources exploited. Forests are cut down solely for selfish ends. Most of the countryside are left barren; ruthless exploitation in the past decades by the colonial agents has dangerously tilted the ecological balance of our beautiful richly gifted land.  

The Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations Office, Geneva strongly protested against the participation of the NSCN delegation. Thus, Debashish Chakravarti on behalf of the Indian Delegation to the Working group stated:

We object to the appearance in this forum of persons heading armed groups that spread terror. We are astonished that the so-called National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) has spoken at this forum. This illegal armed group is openly secessionist.

However, the fact that Isak Swu and Th. Muivah attended the UN Conference on Indigenous Peoples the following year again i.e. 25-29 July, 1994 at Geneva and the Chairman of the NSCN speaking at the Conference explicitly outweighted diplomatically their opponent. Even in the UN Conference the NSCN leadership did not spare India and Myanmar. Thus, Isak Swu empathetically stated:

Nagas are all for peace and non-violence, but sadly enough we see nothing of non-violence and peace in the Indian and Burmese


231. The Telegraph, loc. cit.
(Myanmarese) leadership. Our effort for peaceful solution since 1947 was brushed aside. Therefore, let it be known to the world that the crux of the problem is the military solution which both India and Burma have been speaking relentlessly over the Nagas over the decades.232

Thus, the NSCN leadership have used such international forums meticulously exploiting the opportune time in publicizing the plight of the Naga people as a persecuted nationality and garner international support for its cause.

The NSCN leadership have also engaged themselves in pressurizing India and Myanmar on Human Rights Issue. It is on this issue that the role played by Naga People's Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR), Naga Student's Federation (NSF) and other non-governmental organisations in Nagaland in voicing against human rights violations by the Indian security forces comes quite handy. In a way, indirectly, they are corroborating the NSCN international campaign on gross human rights violations in Nagaland.

Here, it is important to note the major role played by the NPMHR in this field. This is the only human rights group of the Naga people established in 1978233 and has carried out consistent struggle of protecting human rights and voicing against human rights violation in Nagaland. Since its inception, the NPMHR has taken up several 'public interest litigation' in the Supreme Court of India.234 In 1982, the NPMHR successfully organised a women fact finding team from New Delhi to go to Ukhrul District

232. The speech of Mr. Isak Chishi Swu, loc. cit.
234. NPMHR (Brochure) New Delhi.
in Manipur state and investigate into the reported cases of army atrocities on the civilian Nagas.\textsuperscript{235} The Amnesty International special reporting (86 pages book) on torture and extrajudicial executions in Senapati district, Manipur is essentially the work of the NPMHR.\textsuperscript{236} In 1991, NPMHR made a breakthrough, when they went to UN Human Rights Committee and gave a first hand report to army atrocities.\textsuperscript{237}


Democratic and peaceful means of struggle to regain our freedom, and liberty was ignored by India, a country that has just attained her independence through \textit{Ahimsa} and democratic means. India responded by sending in her army.... It is now over forty years and more that the Nagas have been resisting the Indian occupational forces, who have been responsible for committing every offence listed in the Indian Penal Code. Yet they go unpunished because the Indian Parliament has given them extra-constitutional powers to crush the Naga national movement. Under the Armed Forces (special powers) Act of 1958, amended in 1972, the Indian powerful instrument of immunity, the Indian security forces have been unleashing a reign of terror in the Naga areas.\textsuperscript{238}

It is against such background that the NSCN literature highly praised the NPMHR. Thus writes, "The Nagas are greatly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{235} \textit{Report of Women's fact finding team}, Delhi, October 1982, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{238} Chara, Shelley (NPMHR)., \textit{Speech at UN Conference on Indigenous Peoples} (Geneva, July 27, 1994).
\end{itemize}
indebted to the human rights organisation for the unique service they rendered in this part of the world."\(^{239}\)

It is clear that the main focus of the NSCN international lobby is on the issue of human rights violations in Nagaland by the Indian security forces. Thus, when the NSCN delegation Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah attended the 51st Session of the United Nations Commission on the Human Rights, the former spoke about the flagrant human rights violation in Nagaland and their unreserved faith in the Universal Declaration.\(^{239}\) The Naga leaders' main demand in that session was to press for a fact finding mission to Nagaland to review the seriousness of the issue at the earliest time possible.

The issue of sending an international fact finding team to Nagaland was equally emphasised by the UNPO. The latter demanded of both the Government of India and Myanmar to allow international observers, the international human rights community and media to investigate the situation in Nagaland. Significantly, the General Assembly at UNPO also agreed to send a fact-finding human rights mission to Nagaland vowed to support Nagaland and its people.\(^{240}\) To this end, it is worth noting that at its Fourth UNPO General Assembly's second session held in the Hague from 20th-26th January, 1995, it was resolved to:

recognise the historical sovereignty of the Naga people over their territory to determine their own government and the illegality of the invasion and continued occupation by the Indian and Myanmarese armed forces.\(^{241}\)


\(^{240}\) UNPO's support for Nagaland, Nagaland Post, February 1, 1995.
Thus, it is against such a background that the Naga nationalist leaders have within a short span of time achieved significant diplomatic victory by propagating their cause in various forums.

B. POLITICAL NEXUS WITH OTHER REVOLUTIONARY GROUP

The immediate impact of Nagaland obtaining membership in the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) and thereby receiving international recognition was of forging link with Council of Khalistan.\textsuperscript{242} No wonder, Gurmit Singh Aulakh, President of Council of Khalistan issued an appeal to Sikh soldiers and officers in Nagaland which calls for cessation of oppression of the Nagas. Thus, he writes:

\begin{quote}
I therefore, strongly urge all Sikh soldiers in the Indian Army serving in Nagaland to cease oppression of the Nagas and support their freedom as you support the freedom of your own people....It is your duty, then, to support the Nagas in their struggle of freedom and not assist in their brutal suppression by the Indian Army.\textsuperscript{243}
\end{quote}

The NSCN leadership have explicitly made clear their policy and strategy of united front which emphasised on winning friends from within and without in confronting a superior force.\textsuperscript{244} The NSCN leadership does have a clear perception on the need of aligning their movement with other like minded revolutionaries.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{241} Idem.
\textsuperscript{242} Khalistanis back Naga rebel group, \textit{The Telegraph} 24 April, 1993.
\textsuperscript{243} \textit{Cease Oppression of Nagas respect all who seek freedom}, 244. Free Nagaland manifesto, \textit{op cit.}, p. 29.
\end{flushright}
Besides forging operational link with the ethnic nationalist groups in the North-East region, the NSCN have successfully established rapport with a number of revolutionary groups in South East Asia. This has immensely helped the NSCN Alee Command in procuring and transporting the military hardware to their destination. This is evident from the 'Command reports' of Alee Command. 245

By now, one can clearly perceive the two-prolong strategy. The first group headed by Swu and Muivah took the onus of international campaign in Europe with special reference to the UNPO. It is worth noting that Isak and Muivah's work was reinforced by two other top ranking officers of the NSCN Viz., Angelus Shimrah and Rh. Raising in the United States as part of their international campaign. 246 The third group conspicuously under 'Major' Ningkhan Shimray of the Alee Command engaged itself in procuring military related hardware from international market as well as from friendly states. However, 'Major' Ningkhan Shimray, Co-ordinator Foreign Affairs, NSCN is not simply confined to arms procurement; his assignment also includes diplomatic task specially with the various revolutionary groups in South East Asia. 247 It was this officer of the NSCN who did most of the groundwork in forging link with a number of revolutionary groups. The Ministry of Home Affairs, GPRN in a progress report writes that 'Major' Ningkhan


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was sent abroad to contact with progressive revolutionary parties in South East Asia and explore venues for purchase of military wares. Through sheer will power and selfless dedication to the cause, he ploughed a lonely furrow for a number of years. It was in 1990 that he got a glimmer of hope when he managed to procure an outlet into the international political arena.248

The first contact was made with the Karen National Union (KNU). In the words of 'Major' Ningkhan Shimray "following my first diplomatic contact with Karen National Union's President Gen. Bo Mya and Botho Ba Thein Prime Minister, KNU a friendly bilateral relation was established."249 Here, it is important to note that KNU is the strongest in terms of manpower and military strength among the nationalist movements in Myanmar.

Thereafter, the Naga nationalists forged operational link with Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), New Mon State Party (NMSP), National United Front of Arakan (NUFA), Wa National Party (WNP), National Democratic Front (NDF), and Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB).250 Besides, the NSCN also established cooperation with Chin Liberation Front (CLF).251 The report of the Alee Command indicated well how the various organisation assisted them in making 'operation Red sea' and 'operation Jordan' a complete success story.252 It even noted that about 200 Mon Army and some 50 porters were contributed for the operation and thus, actually

248. progress Reports Ministry of Home Affairs GPRN 1988-1993
250. Ibid, p. 3.
251. Written interview with John, president, Chin Liberation Front (conducted by the scholar, 1993).
252. Command report, op. cit., p. 5
a combined force of Mon, Arakan and the NSCN participated in 'operation Jordan'.

Thus, the NSCN's friendship with the aforesaid groups comes quite useful and remunerative. This network of alliances among the various ethnic nationalist groups in South East Asia is aimed at boosting the NSCN operation.

Then it brings us to the much publicised subject and the ignorance of journalists on the matter-link with the Kachin Independent Organisation (KIO) and Kachin Independent Army (KIA). The story that all the insurgency groups including the NSCN are receiving arms and training from the KIA all along, ostensibly seems to maintain that once these aids and training cease, insurgents or nationalist groups will wither away seems to be quite prominent opinion among the press in India. But this is far from the truth as far as the NSCN is concerned.

Nonetheless, it must be admitted that the first ethnic nationalist group the Nagas contacted was the Kachins. As, Nirmal Nibedon writes: "Muivah pulled off an agreement with the leaders of the Naga tribesmen of Burma." This took place when Th. Muivah with a strong contingent of Naga Army marched out to China in 1966. However, the Naga nationalist leaders sufficiently made it clear that Nagas never received aids nor training from the Kachins. This fact is stated by no other than Th. Muivah. In a response to a query he replied: "We didn't take training from

253. Idem.
255. Dasgupta, loc. cit.
256. Nibedon, op. cit, p. 51.
Kachins. We Nagas were much ahead of them before also. Rather, the NSCN leadership is quite critical of the Kachins. Th. Muivah thus stated: "The Kachins were not happy with us because we did not like their involvement in the drug business. So they shifted their policy and aligned with the Shillong Accord group...How can we be happy with the Kachins?" Isak Swu corroborated Th. Muivah's statement when he said:

They (Kachins) had understanding with Accord makers and started drug business with them through Indian Military officers. Then they entered into close relationship with the Government of India at our expense.

It is true that other ethnic nationalist groups like the ULFA, PLA etc. received arms and training from the KIO and KIA, But the Naga nationalists since the NNC time till the NSCN, have not received any arms or ammunitions or training. Rather the Naga nationalists are of the view that Kachins have been quite obstructive at times. Evidently in this context, from every shipment of arms and ammunitions from China, considerable commissions were taken out by them. For instance, 'Major' A. S. Ayo Shimray, an important member of the China bound team of 1973 testified that KIO authorities insisted on sharing half-half of every military materials brought from China for the service rendered to the Nagas (free passage, food, shelter etc.). Thus, in 1973 the Kachins took away 1,20,000 rounds of ammunitions, a

257. Interview with Th. Muivah gen. Secy, NSCN by Deepak Dewan, loc. cit.
259. Written interview with Isak (conducted by the scholar) p. 4.
260. Written interview with Major A.S. Ayo Shimray (conducted by the scholar, 4th June, 1995).
few numbers of rocket shells, hand grenades, including some explosive materials.\(^\text{261}\) 'Major' Shimray also confided that the Chinese authorities were not happy with the Kachins because of this and cautioned them not to deduct commissions from the Nagas.\(^\text{262}\) A functionary of the NSCN also alleged that a sizeable amount of arms and ammunition belonging to the NSCN (shipment from China) is still held up by the Kachins and yet to be returned to the Nagas.\(^\text{263}\)

Thus, the aforesaid points glaringly exposed the myth of Kachins arming and training the Nagas. Outside this frame the Naga relationship with the Kachins was generally cordial.

C. FOREIGN POWERS ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN AIDING AND SUPPORTING NAGA MOVEMENT

1. MYANMAR

Geographically, Myanmar is India's immediate neighbour in South East Asia. Historically too, these two countries had a very long period of mutual contact with each other in the realm of trade, commerce, religion, law and culture.\(^\text{264}\) Moreover, in the modern period too Myanmar (formerly Burma) is important to India for more established reasons. For a long time, India had no strategic problem on her eastern flank. However, Japanese blitzkrieg sweeping through Burma (now Myanmar) in 1942 posed a direct threat to India. This reminded the Government of India

\(^{261}\) Idem.
\(^{262}\) Idem.
\(^{263}\) Written interview with Major Ningkhan Shimray _loc. cit._
that a hostile power in control of Myanmar could threaten India's security from land, sea and the air.\textsuperscript{265} Secondly, from the strategic point, Myanmar controls one of the most important land routes from China Southwards. In case of Sino-Indian conflict, an invasion of Myanmar would be prelude to the invasion to India.\textsuperscript{266} Thirdly, the border area of India and Myanmar is inhabited by Nagas, Mizos, Meiteis etc. who have been a source of troubles to the Indian Government. Hence, specifically for the suppression of the Naga nationalists (whose movement has been the strongest), the cooperation, or at least the neutrality of the Government of Myanmar, was necessary. A Myanmarese Government hostile to India would be the most damaging for India's interest.

Two other factors further contributed to augment India's perception. On the one hand, there is Pakistan, a state whose hostility towards India posed an important security problem on India's western borders. Hence, the existence of a friendly state on her eastern borders to counterbalance this threat perception or to avoid being flanked by two hostile states, could not be neglected by India. Finally, the emergence of a powerful nuclear state neighbour in the North transformed India's North Eastern borders from a 'forgotten' into a live frontier.

It is against such backdrop that the Government of India has consistently maintained a policy of restraint if not appeasement against Myanmar. Friendship with Myanmar is vital for India and

\textsuperscript{265} Thien, Ton Tack., \textit{India and the South East Asia 1947-1960} A study of India's policy towards the South East Asian countries (Libraririe Droz, Geneva, 1963), p. 151.

\textsuperscript{266} Idem.
hence good relationship with Myanmar at all cost seems to be the 
officially accepted dictum of India.

In the case of Myanmar, there is no hard evidences to 
suggest that she supported or assisted the Naga nationalists in 
their struggle against the Government of India. However, it must 
be admitted that Myanmar Government's policy against the Nagas, 
was of 'non-interference' initially. Admittedly, on July 25, 
1957, The Nation (editorial) stated that "the Burmese relation 
with the unadministered Naga tribesmen remained perfectly correct 
and based on the policy of leaving them very much alone."267 This 
policy was indeed the official policy of the Myanmarese 
Government for quite some time. The reason behind such policy was 
because Myanmar was heavily engaged with the civil war and 
secondly, there was practically no administration in the area 
inhabited by the Nagas.268 No wonder, even the declaration of 
Hongkin Government as sovereign People's Republic of free 
Nagaland in 1954 went unnoticed.269

Therefore, in such a situation, the Nagas have utilised 
Myanmar territory as part of their operational area. Of course, 
as indicated in the Chapter II, the Nagas of both sides of the 
border shared the same political aspiration and their ultimate 
political goal is the merger of all Naga areas into one singe 
political entity.270 It is learnt that until 1961 the Nagas were 
freely utilising Myanmar territory in their military manouevering

267. Pakem, _op. cit._, p. 121.
268. _Ibid._, p. 120.
269. Pakem, _loc. cit._
270. Misra, Udayon., _North-East India_ Quest for Identity (Osmons 
and as a passage to East Pakistan (Bangladesh). This is evident from the statement of the Prime Minister U Nu and a communique issued by the Foreign Affairs in Rangoon. When asked by the newsman in Calcutta, if the Naga nationalists were maintaining contact with the outside world through Myanmar, the Prime Minister replied: "I do not think it is possible. Being friendly with India we will not allow such activities."\(^{271}\) Earlier to this, a communique was issued by the Foreign Office in Rangoon (Yangoon) on 16th May, 1961 which said that Myanmar government would take "every measure open to them to deal with the hostile Nagas from India reported to be operating from Burmese territory."\(^{272}\) In both these statement, the phrase 'we will not' and 'would take any measure' explicitly referred to future course of action and not ongoing measures. Admittedly, Asoso Yonuo writes thus, "The Burmese government, till early 1960's did not intercept the Nagas moving through the Burmese territory on the understanding that they should not disturb the Burmese law and order situation by their traffic."\(^{273}\)

Thus, the Naga nationalists had taken advantage of the security lull in North West of Myanmar precisely because of Myanmar's policy of 'non-interference in Naga Affairs'. This however, does not imply that Myanmar supported or assisted the Naga cause. To the Naga nationalists, Myanmar was important for two reasons : Firstly, there are large parts of Naga territory (Eastern Nagaland) and the active participation of the Nagas from

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that region was also needed in the movement. Secondly, it is impossible not to use Myanmar territory because of their operational convenience. Its territory is used for passage to China and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Thus, Myanmar factor is vital for the Nagas even today.

However, if the Myammarese Government had maintained neutrality against the Naga political affair, it was only till 1961. Myanmar under Gen. Ne Win brought about a change in the policy in dealing with the nationalist forces including the Nagas. Though General Ne Win took over the power in a bloodless coup in 1962, the changed perception in the Government's approach was glaringly evident by 1961 when the Myanmar Government had instructed officials in the Naga areas concerned to take strict measures against the Naga nationalists.274 Thus at that time official indications were that Myammarese Government was determined to take every possible action against the Naga nationalists.

This changed perception emanated not entirely from Myanmar Government but mostly because of severe pressure from the Government of India who by then was facing hostility from the Naga nationalists.275 However, India's proposed joint Military offensive against the Naga276 could not materialise because of uncertain political situation.

275. Idem.
Thus, the feasibility of joint operations against the Naga nationalists could reopen only during Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's three day visit to Myanmar from 2 September 1964. This was reciprocated with the visit of General Ne Win's week-long from 5 September 1965. The Joint Communique issued on 12 February was particularly noteworthy. This communique was issued keeping the rising Naga nationalist activities in the backdrop which needed to be tackled realistically. Moreover, the growing deterioration of relations between Myanmar and China, particularly the latter's support of the White Flag movement may have placed new pressures on Myanmar. In fact, relation between India and Myanmar seemed to be shifting from that of cooperation influenced by 'sentiment' to that of cooperation arising from mutual necessity.

On 21 February, 1966, the Indian Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan informed the Lok Sabha that the Burmese Government had responded favourably to the proposed for joint patrolling of the Indo-Myanmar border to control Naga and Mizo nationalist activities and prevent their transit through Myanmarese territory to, or from China or the then East Pakistan.

Joint Military Operation

Joint effort to curb the activities of the Naga nationalist on a major scale was arrived at when the Prime Minister of India

278. Ibid., p. 186.
Indira Gandhi paid a visit to Myanmar between 27-30 March, 1969.\textsuperscript{281} However, by then, both the Governments were continuing with joint patrolling of the border and sharing of intelligence information on Naga nationalist movement on either side of the border.\textsuperscript{282} Admittedly Nibedon writes thus:

New Delhi and Rangoon had been freely exchanging notes on the fiery situation prevailing in their common frontiers. Tremendous pressure was being exerted on Rangoon, for the Naga guerrillas were using Burmese territory for launching operations against India. Troops of both had coordinated operations against the elusive guerrillas. India had helped the Burmese in setting up frontier out-posts all along the border... In fact, many of these military posts had been built by the Indian and literally gifted to the Burmese.\textsuperscript{283}

It is observed that the first result of their joint effort was, when Dusoi Chakhesang together with seventy six Naga army were apprehended by the Myanmarese troops on April 11, 1969 and were immediately handed over to the Indian Army authorities at Moreh.\textsuperscript{284}

By late 1968, the two countries contemplated launching massive joint operations against the Naga nationalists but this could materialize only by late 1970s in the post Shillong Accord scenario. Since much secrecy is maintained relating to joint military operation by both the two governments, the only way out is to know when the actual operation was carried into effect.

\textsuperscript{281} Ibid., p. 187.
\textsuperscript{283} Idem.
\textsuperscript{284} Singh, Prakash., Nagaland (National Book Trust, New Delhi, 1972), p. 133.
Thus the NSCN recounted that they fought a big battle in the month of March 1976 at Langnok village in which two Majors and one Lieutenant with 56 other were wiped out with all the arms captured by Federal Army.\(^{285}\) When the formulation of the NSCN was declared both the troops belonging to Myanmar and India carried out massive army joint operation side by side, one after another in their attempt to nip the NSCN in the bud.\(^{286}\) The operations was of no avail. The official note concerning the joint military operations were made known only when the then Foreign Minister of Myanmar paid a visit to New Delhi in the mid 1984. R. Venkataraman, the then Defence Minister whole heartedly approved of the deal (for the joint military operation).\(^{287}\) Thus, once again, in Upper Myanmar (Naga territory), major Military operation was launched by the Myanmarese 5th Regiment on NSCN General Headquarters, reportedly using jet fighters and helicopters and gunship causing heavy casualty on the NSCN side.\(^{288}\)

Then in 1985 to strengthen bilateral relation between the two countries and update and joint military operations, the then External Affairs Ministers Khurshid Alam Khan visited Myanmar.\(^{289}\) The leadership in New Delhi were by now convinced of Chinese severance of relation with the Naga nationalists and felt that this was the right moment to launch an Indo-Myanmar military

\(^{285}\) A brief political account, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 25.  
\(^{286}\) \textit{Idem}.  
\(^{288}\) Summer Offensive against NSCN \textit{Nagaland Times} July 11, 1984.  
\(^{289}\) \textit{Idem}.
offensive. Evidently, on 19th December 1985 General Headquarters of the NSCN was attacked by the crack 52 Battalion based at Singkhaling Hkamti. This attack came at the time when Bertil Lintner a free lance writer based in Hong Kong was a guest of the NSCN with his wife and child. The battle went on for twelve days, a fiercely-fought encounter in which the possession of the camp changed hands four times. The Myanmarese finally retreated after their commander Lieutenant Colonel Tankhaling died with a bullet in his head. An NSCN 'Colonel' Thanmi also felt.

Then another, perhaps, the biggest joint military operation was launched on 26th April, 1986 when they attacked the NSCN General Headquarters. The fierce fighting continued till first week of June 1986. During this operation, the Indian Chief of the Army, Gen. Krishnaswamy Sundarji made a flying visit to Rangoon on 27th May 1986 to monitor the ongoing campaign. General Sunderji happened to be the first Indian Army Chief who visited Myanmar after Myanmar's independence. Unfortunately, for Myanmar and India, they suffered heavy casualties and ultimately had to withdraw. The NSCN believed that the whole operation in terms of funds and materials were financed by the Government of

290. Idem.
292. Dasgupta, loc. cit.
293. Burma-India Joint Operation (Published by GPRN Oking, 3 May 1986).
294. Ibid., p. 2.
India. It was reported that in this campaign Myanmar side lost forty personnel including two Majors and more than thirty were injured. On the NSCN side six were killed, two wounded and two captured. The casualty on the Indian side was not known.

It was followed by the Indian External Affairs Minister N.D. Tiwari on a goodwill visit to Myanmar on December 23, 1986. A joint statement was issued in Yangoon and New Delhi which did mention that "India and Burma have been co-operating over the years in dealing with problems in insurgency in border areas on both sides. The Burmese Army has been exchanging information with the Indian Defence forces about the movement of extremists through Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram, which have been very valuable in intercepting them."

Next, in the sequel, the biggest ever offensive was launched in May, 1987, when nearly 10,000 Myanmar troops were involved in an operation to flush out the Kachin Independent Army (KIA). The two week-long operation had the KIA fighters on the run, as the troops took control of four of its strongholds in Kachinland bordering China. Simultaneously, the Indian Army trekked 24 Km inside Myanmar territory and attacked one of the NSCN bases near Thalie village. The casualty was not known.

It is conspicuous that the Government of India was constantly pressing Yangoon government to initiate joint operations against the NSCN bases as New Delhi realise that this

295. Idem.
296. Idem.
299. Idem.
Headquarters are becoming a rallying ground of other insurgent groups. This is also evident from the frequency of visit to Myanmar by Indian political leaders. The Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, visited Myanmar on December 15, 1987 on a two day visit. The outcome of the visit was a Maritime Boundary Agreement between India and Myanmar. Besides other things, significantly, the two governments agreed to intensify cooperation in fighting trans-border insurgency, a problem which is being tackled jointly.

However, despite persistent effort particularly from the Government of India's side, relationship between the two countries was not always cordial and this time the relationship deteriorated with the rise of 'Democratic Movement in Myanmar' led by Aung Sang Suu Kyi.

The worst was the Myanmarese government suspicion that the Indian government was involved in certain action which is directly against her interest. Evidently in this context, the disclosure made by Captain German, the Secretary (finance) of the Revolutionary Peoples' Front (RPF) to the state police of Manipur unfolded the attitude of the Myanmarese Governments. It was reported that the Myanmarese government had agreed to patronize their revolutionary front with all the forces under their command to revolt against the Indian government. The same sources also hinted that the Myanmarese authorities thought that

300. Dasgupta, loc. cit.
302. Idem.
303. Idem.
the Indian government had circulated fake currency note inside
the territory of Myanmar in large scale as a result of which the
economy of the Myanmarese government was adversely affected.305
Secondly, Indian government was also accused of patronizing the
ZORO (Zomi Reunification Organisation) within the territory of
Myanmar to revolt against the Myanmar government.306

This alleged confession of a RPF member holds some weight.
Admittedly, the statement made by Tint Swe, who was elected from
the Pale II Constituency on a National League for Democracy (NLD)
corroborated the former disclosure. Tint Swe stated that the
Myanmarese armymen deployed near the international border were
providing shelter and imparting arms training to insurgent groups
such as ULFA, PLA and NSCN.307 Tint Swe also said: "Probably,
the Burmese government is sheltering and training Indian
insurgents as a retaliation to India providing refuge to several
prodemocracy activities and MPs."308 Although one cannot
precisely indicate the whole detail of it, this much is clear
that suspicion had developed between the government of Myanmar
and India for quite some time.

Unfortunately, many unexpected developments were taking
place in South East Asia political theatre bringing far reaching
consequences. Around the same time, the Kachin Independent
Organisation (KIO) which had been a host to several ethnic
nationalists groups in the North-East in India for long, decided

305. Idem.
306. Idem.
308. Idem.
to turn to India for help.\textsuperscript{309} The KIO Chairman Brangsein wrote to the Indian Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, asking for support to "fight the war for survival" against the "blood thirsty rulers of Myanmar."\textsuperscript{310} Thus, KIO turning its back on the insurgents in India is quite significant in view of being a prominent constituent member of the Democratic Alliance of Burma. Writing on this development, Stanley Ongching observed: "It is true that the KIO had already struck a deal with the Government of India. The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) office has already established at the General Headquarters of the KIA. The Government of India is believed to have promised to provide political support and also supply arms, ammunitions and even hard currency in their struggle against the military junta of Myanmar ... on the condition that the Kachin Independents organisation on its part draw its sword against all the nationalists groups to leave Kachinland."\textsuperscript{311} In one way, this may ostensibly be seen as a positive development for India. Yet on the other hand, it is a germ which could worsen the already saturated situation.

Meanwhile, Myanmar was getting closer to China. In fact, Myanmar's position is quite sensitive. She being a small power had to maintain good relationship with both India and China. As a matter of fact, Myanmar's close relationship with China is essentially in her interest to survive as a small nation.\textsuperscript{309, 310, 311}

\textsuperscript{310} Idem.
\textsuperscript{311} Ongching, Stanley., Nagaland war theatre \textit{Hill Express} (Kohima) March 10, 1992. \textit{Vide} Myanmar Army build up, \textit{The Times of India} Feb. 21, 1992.

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has however, a big stake in Myanmar in view of the NSCN's ever expanding area of operation and its policy of 'United Front' with several ethnic political armed groups in the North East of India and South East Asia.

2. CHINA

The Chinese government supporting the Naga nationalist cause openly and extending help by imparting training, arming etc. is a well established fact. In fact the Chinese government's involvement in the Naga case is not a secret one. Besides training and supplying arms, the Chinese government helped the Nagas in publicity and garnering international support by using its state machinery (e.g., Radio services) for espousing the Naga cause.

The Naga nationalists' connection with the Chinese Government date back to the 1960s. It was precisely on 5 May, 1966, the Federal Government of Nagaland sent a powerful team, the Alee Command (Foreign Mission) led by NNC General Secretary, Thuingaleng Muivah, and 'Brig.' Thinoselie M. Keyho (from the army) with 300 men. They carried a letter from the Kedhage (President) of the FGN to the President of the Peoples Republic of China which says:

I am sending a few persons with Th. Muivah, Plenipotentiairy and Brigadier M. Keyho...from our Government to your Excellency with the hope that your Excellency will seriously look into our present difficulties. That as a small nation it was never our intention to do anything which will offend our great.

neighbour. That is why inspite of being suppressed to the extreme we have been trying to persuade the Government of India to recognise our right to regain our sovereignty after the British left us; yet the Government of India till today have not given place to reason; and as it has become impossible for us to resist unaided the military might of Indian armed forces, we have to look to your government and your people for any possible assistance in any form so that we may properly safeguard our sovereignty through the liberal hand of your people.\footnote{13}

Thus, the practical execution of the mission to establish relation with the Chinese government was left in the hands of Th. Muivah, the General Secretary of the NNC and his associates. Fortunately enough, the FGN had chosen the right man for the right mission. Th. Muivah a post graduate from Gauhati University was not only bright in studies but also skilled in the art of diplomacy and negotiation.\footnote{14} Above all, he was an ardent nationalist, committed and honest.\footnote{15}

The Chinese connection, at first intended only as a diversion and auxiliary source of training and arms, became the 'lifeline' after the loss of the 'Pakistan connection' following the conversion of East Pakistan into Bangladesh in 1972.\footnote{16}

It came to be known that, Th. Muivah's Alee Command on reaching China "were received with a red carpet welcome and placed in the military training camps, particularly at Eu-Kung about 10 miles of Teng Chung."\footnote{17} Later Th. Muivah went to North Korea and North Vietnam where he met leaders of the respective

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{13}{Nibedon, op. cit., p. 149.}
\footnote{14}{Hazarika, op. cit., p. 105.}
\footnote{15}{Nibedon, op. cit., p. 382.}
\footnote{16}{Idem.}
\footnote{17}{Yonuo, op. cit., p. 347.}
\end{footnotes}
Communist parties and watched their training programmes in sabotage, infiltration, local intelligence and guerrilla wars.\textsuperscript{318} The Chinese government had reportedly assured the Naga nationalists of its support, asking them to send in thousands of young and educated persons having unshaken conviction in the ideal of Nagaland's sovereignty for training, arms and ammunition and to coordinate their activities with the Meiteis in Manipur, Mizo in Assam and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and Shans, Kachins and Karens in Burma.\textsuperscript{319} Thus China's policy of supporting the Naga political aspiration was significant because for the first time a big power in Asia had understood the Nagas and that was a significant achievement. It was the Moscow radio which first broadcast that Chinese personnel were taking part in Naga guerrilla movement.\textsuperscript{320}

Another significant achievement of the \textit{Alee Command} under Thuingaleng Muivah was forging of link with the Kachin Independent Organisation (KIO). The latter with its armed wing-Kachin Independent Army (KIA) had already been fighting for freedom from Myanmar's yoke for more than twenty years.\textsuperscript{321} That early contact between Th. Muivah and the Kachins held good for many years and especially for Manipuri and Assamese groups in the 1970s and 1980s.\textsuperscript{322}

\textsuperscript{318} Hazarika, \textit{loc. cit.}
\textsuperscript{319} Patterson, G. N., Delhi and the Nagas \textit{Far Eastern Economic Review}, Hong Kong, October 31, 1968, p. 240.
\textsuperscript{320} \textit{Moscow Radio}, July 21, 1961 (In) Yonuo, Asoso., \textit{The rising Nagas loc. cit.}
\textsuperscript{321} Hazarika, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 103.
\textsuperscript{322} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 104.
Meanwhile in China, the Nagas were undergoing intensive training programme and China because of its strained relation with India embarked on helping the Naga nationalists on a bigger scale. In fact, the Chinese government visualized the following arrangement:

1. The government in exile would be based at a suitable point in China territory contiguous to the Indian border;
2. The Chinese would openly support the Naga cause on the pattern of their support to the other governments in exile;
3. The Chinese would guide the foreign relations of the Naga government in exile;
4. The Chinese would help in other ways, such as setting up a radio station and permitting use of their propaganda machinery. 323

This was a scheme specially negotiated by the Alee Command but the FGN authorities did not give consent and the NSCN President A.Z. Phizo failed to approve it either. 324 Perhaps, the FGN and the NNC leadership were pinning their hope more on the Western powers as their campaign was generally restricted to the west.

Meanwhile, the first batch of Chinese trained Naga were sent home under 'Brigadier' Thinusillie and a small contingent had been held back under Th. Muivah for a special assignment. 325 The Chinese authorities had also instructed the Kachins not to come between them and the Nagas. The Nagas were to be given a free

324. Idem.
passage. 326 But it was reported that the Kachins (KIA) usually demanded huge commission from the Nagas and wanted to share with them whatever arms and ammunitions they brought from China. 327 Later, the Kachins were told bluntly by the Chinese authorities in Yunnan Province not to obstruct the Nagas with an assurance that whatever commission they ought to get their services rendered to the Nagas would be realised from the Chinese. 328

Then in the month of December, 1967 when the sixth and the last round of talk with the Indian Prime Minister broke down, the second batch under 'General' Mowu and Isak Chishi Swu, the Foreign Minister of the FGN was flagged off in China. 329 The second batch did not face much problem on the way because Th. Muivah had already laid the ground work so well, particularly with the KIO. 330 In a way, the Kachins under the leadership of Zawtu and Zasein helped the Nagas immensely, they usually escorted the Naga army till the Chinese territory and also the team coming from China upto Hukwang valley. 331

However, the route to Yunnan was not an easy one. It generally takes three months from Nagaland to reach China. Thus all of them were not lucky, some of them got through; others were ambushed and lost their heads to their 'eastern cousins' (Nagas in Myanmar), who had no ideas what these Nagas from the West were upto, but saw them as intruders. Still some were trapped by

326. Ibid., p. 186.
327. Written interview of 'Major' A.S. Ayo Shimray conducted by the scholar, 1995.
328. Idem.
330. Ibid., p. 185.
331. Ibid., p. 186.
Myanmarese troops, arrested and put in jail in Mandalay before being extradited to India. Nonetheless, once they reached China, they were practically accorded the status of a foreign delegation. Besides, military training, they were taken for sightseeing tour. Th. Muivah narrated that the Nagas also participated in mass rallies during the cultural revolution. Remarkably, the Chinese also constructed a Church for the Christian Nagas. Thus, the Chinese government in no way attempted to impose their ideology (as alleged) but gave complete freedom concerning their faith.

The Federal Government was getting disorganised and a major crack was developing. 'General'. Kaito with Kughato and Scato Swu had walked out of the movement and were operating under the aegis of New Delhi. Now from their strongholds in Satakha in the heart of Sema region, they were making it clear that they had not only quit the movement but were against link with Peking itself. This was a great blow to the Naga movement.

Meanwhile on June 7, 1968 the Indian security forces discovered a Naga encampment at Jotsoma, only a mile away from its Divisional headquarters. The security forces bombarded for three hours and attacked the well laid up camp of China-returned Naga nationalists. This was undoubtedly the biggest ever battle (another was where about 800 Indian security lost their lives).

332. Lintner, op. cit., pp. 82-83.
334. Lintner, loc. cit.
335. Gwizan, loc. cit.
337. Ibid., p. 199.
live in a severe battle at Paosaidruing in Ukhurul region) fought between the Indian security forces and the Naga nationalists. The latter claimed that 1000 Indian soldiers were killed but government sources put the figure at 90. In that battle, the Nagas used all the weapons brought from China including AK 47 automatic rifles, Soviet made 7.62 SKS carbines, US made carbines, medium machine guns, 60 mm mortors and grenades.

That year, (1968), 'General' Mowu and Isak Chishi Swu arrived in Nagaland from China. 'Gen.' Mowu's group was dramatically intercepted by 'Gen.' Kaito's men and handed them over to Indian security force. Isak Chishi Swu's group too was intercepted and 90 of them were captured and three killed. However, Swu managed to escape. A statement placed in the Lok Sabha on the arms and ammunition captured from 'Gen.' Mowu included 4 60 mm mortors, 1 rocket launcher, 11 7.62 light machine guns, 89 semi-automatic rifles, 42 sub-machine guns and 6 pistols. The haul from Isak's group was sixty weapons. In April 1968 Dusoi Chakhesang led another batch to China. However, he lost his tract and was arrested by the Myanmarese troops. Later on April 11, 1969 Dusoi together with 76 Nagas was handed over by the Myanmarese government to the India army authorities at Moreh. Thus, the capture of 'General' Mowu's group and the dissipation and dispersal of Isak Chishi Swu and the arrest of

341. Idem.
344. Idem.
345. Ibid., p. 133.

Vide Nibedon, op. cit., p. 196.
Dusoi Chakhesang's group greatly demoralised the nationalist Nagas. Besides, the Semas had formed 'Revolutionary Government' on their own seriously affecting the movement.

Swaran Singh, Defence Minister of India, claimed in the Lok Sabha on April 1, 1969 that the Government had been able to "break the backbone" of the Nagas.346

Nonetheless, the Naga nationalists determined with their conviction continued their journey to China one after another. In China, some of the Nagas were sent to North Vietnam to study for themselves on the spot as to how the brave Vietcongs were fighting the Americans. In Hanoi, the North Vietnamese government committed itself to support the cause of the Naga people and "extend whatever possible help within their ability for the liberation of the Nagas from the reactionary Indian government."347 Thus, a pamphlet captioned 'The US Imperialist propaganda' brought out by the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hanoi in 1967 said:

The Naga peoples have benefited from the teachings of the Kao Dong Party and learnt from the experience of the Vietnamese struggle for independence. They have received instruction in the techniques of the sabotage, ambush, assassination and lightning raid. Naga leaders, during recent fraternal discussions in Hanoi, have expressed their thanks for the technical advice and guidance given to them in their fight against the reactionary Indian government by the heroes of the People's Army of North Vietnam.348

346. Nibedon, loc. cit.
Meanwhile Chinese aid to the Nagas was brought up in the UN General Assembly by Taiwan's Foreign Minister Wei Tao-Ming on October 22, 1968 stating that People's Republic of China was training thousands of Naga nationalists in Yunnan and sending them back to India to fight against the Government of India.349 On the similar line, severe criticism came from Soviet Union against the Chinese Government for its alleged divide and rule policy in South Asia. Evidently in this context, the Soviet Journal (Asia and Africa Today), Far-East Analyst S. Leonidov, accused China of having colonial designs in Asia, especially in the Indian sub-continent. He further pointed out that within India "the Naga uprising and Naxalbari armed revolt were aided and abetted by the Chinese clandestinely."350 Again the capture of Chinese made weapons by the Indian Government troops from the Naga fighters were widely reported in Moscow, supporting the Soviet charges against China of crude interference in the affairs of neighbouring countries.351 Besides, on earlier occasion, Moscow radio in March 1969 ridiculed Peking's support to the Nagas by imparting Mao guerrilla training in China and providing arms and ammunition, even to the extent of monetary help.352

By the end of 1970, Th. Muivah, the 'Plenipotentiary' and the General Secretary of the NNC returned home after completing four years mission in China.353

349. Singh., op. cit., p. 133.
In the years that followed two developments became very evident. On the one hand, the Indian security forces acquired ascendancy in Nagaland, on the other hand, the leadership spearheading the movement was drifting in the absence of what Th. Muivah called ‘correct tactics and strategy. As a result, the spirit of resistance showed signs of evaporation. At this stage, Th. Muivah, the General Secretary of the NNC was asked for the second time to go on a ‘goodwill mission’ to China.354 Before leaving Muivah convened the National Assembly in the absence of A.Z. Phizo (away in London) and Imkong Meren, bed ridden in the jungle due to ill health, on 4th of September 1974 at Un Sethy (a place between Touphima [Northern Angami] and Lazami and Iganumi of Poghobuto). There was the general apprehension that the then leadership could enter into a deal with the Government of India. This led the National Assembly to resolve that "every patriotic Naga will have the right to condemn any accord/agreement entered into that entails loss of sovereign right of Nagaland,"355 and "that Nagas would fight to the last drop of their blood if India refuses to leave Nagaland."356

It came to be known that Th. Muivah's group on hearing the news of the accord rushed homeward from China. After reaching Naga territory in upper Myanmar, the Alee Command sent its condemnation of the Shillong Accord as 'total capitulation'.357

Hearing the news of the Shillong Accord, the Chinese authorities were certainly hurt. A broadcast from Peking radio

354. Written interview of Th. Muivah, loc. cit.
356. Ibid., p. 8.
said: "neither armed suppression nor political deception can curb the development of the armed struggle of the Nagas." And further it added that "their cause is just one..."  

Th. Muivah having re-organised the NNC in Upper Myanmar, marched off to China again (his third trip) at the end of the year in 1976 along with 400 Naga fighters with an intention to contact Phizo as well as procure more arms. After reaching China, several letters were despatched to Phizo with the help of the Chinese. Receiving no response from the NNC President, the Foreign delegation came back home (upper Myanmar). Perhaps, this was the last trip to China by the Naga nationalists. Even if they carried out further trip to China, it was not known to the public.

The question, 'when did the Chinese exactly stop helping the Nagas?' is hard to know. Th. Muivah in an interview with Bertil Lintner responded saying: "Our relationship with China is as before; It has not changed except that we give more attention to the practice of self-reliance as declared in our manifesto." Indeed, according to NSCN sources, a few trips were attempted to procure arms from China but the result of such trip are not known. But one thing is clear that the Shillong Accord and the arms surrender of Chinese arms to India were not taken lightly by the Chinese but the change of leadership in China ultimately sealed the China trail. As a matter of fact, even the former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi expressed his confidence that

359. Written interview of Brig. V.S. Wungmatem, loc. cit.
360. Interview of Bertil Lintner with Th. Muivah, op. cit., p.22.
"China is no longer helping anti-Indian element in the North-East... We do not have any complaints now in the North-East."362 This was the statement made following his visit to China in December, 1988. Recently, the Chief of Army Staff, Gen. S. Roy Chowdhary, also affirmingly stated that the NSCN were no longer getting support from China.363 Thus, this much is clear that the China-Naga connection stands disconnected at present. However, in view of an apparent move from China to strengthen its naval power in the Bay of Bengal and its open arms sale to Pakistan and Myanmar directly hurting the vital security interest of India and at a time when the NSCN is making attempts both national and international to strengthen its power, it will not be a surprise if the NSCN re-establish China connection.

3. PAKISTAN

The Government of Pakistan's decision to train arm and support the Nagas came as no surprise when the relationship between India and Pakistan was at a low ebb. The main issue of contention between the two powers is the 'Kashmir' imbroglio. Already two successive wars have been fought between them first in 1948 followed by 1965 on the issue of 'Kashmir'. Since then, relationship between the two has never been a smooth one.

The Naga contact with the Pakistani authority started with A.Z. Phizo's arrival in Dhaka on December 6, 1956 on his way to London.364 Phizo's object of going via East Pakistan was to seek assistance.

364. Nibedon, op. cit., p. 84.
arms aid from that country and to mobilise support for raising
the Naga issue in various international forums. For Pakistan,
they were much willing to support the Nagas. Thus, an
understanding was arrived at whereby Pakistan agreed to supply
arms and ammunition to the Nagas. A.Z. Phizo's visit paved the
way for others to follow suit. Zhekuto Sema, Director of
Intelligence of the FGN, Thungti Chang ex-chief of Naga Home
Guards, and Mowu then a Naga Youth leader went to Pakistan in
1957. Mowu was arrested on August 10, 1957 at Damchua (North
Cachar) while returning. On October 20, 1957 he was released on
the declaration of amnesty. Zhekuto Sema was actually killed in
an encounter and Thungti Chang was arrested.

On the part of the Government of Pakistan, the Naga issue
was treated as of paramount importance along with the Mizo
problem. Consequently, a special liaison cell was set up by the
Government of Pakistan for contact and giving encouragement to
the Naga and Mizo nationalists. Apart from training imparted,
political briefing was also given to the Naga nationalists by
Pakistani Ministers and high officials.

The first group for advanced training and bringing arms was
flagged off in April 1962. This group was led by Gen. Kaito and
Mowu, Khodao Yanthan and Yankong. They reached Pakistan (now
Bangladesh) safely. From there the four leaders proceeded to
London to meet the President of the NNC, A.Z. Phizo. All of them

366. Idem.
367. Singh, op. cit., p. 117.
368. Ibid., pp. 116-117.
went on Pakistani paper.\textsuperscript{370} Gen. Mowu Gwizan recounted that the "Indian government tried its best and strongly requested the British Government to arrest us and surrender to its (India) government. But the British government refused to do so on the ground that we (Nagas) are not Indians."\textsuperscript{371} Afterwards which Gen. Kaito and Gen. Mowu returned to East Pakistan. Then along with the trained Naga army they marched back to Nagaland with full arms and ammunitions. They reached Nagaland safely in March, 1963.\textsuperscript{372}

The Pakistan authorities set up training camps at Rangamati, Ruma, Bandarban, Rankhiang forest area, Slikadam and other places in the Chittagong Hill tracts. The emphasis was on training in handling of bombs, firing 2" mortars, handling explosives for sabotage, jungle warfare and night operation.\textsuperscript{373} The whole operation was a meticulous planning of a high level. The Pakistani radio broadcasts and its press propaganda also played an equally active role.

Meanwhile a few months after the arrival of Gen. Kaito's group, another formidable group of about 500 Naga army escaped to Pakistan in October 1963 under the leadership of Dusoi Chakhesang. This group was given, apart from military hardware, Rs. 30,000 in Indian currency by Pakistan. They returned in May 1964.\textsuperscript{374} While the group was still on its way back, another contingent, about 300 strong, led by Yeveto Sema reached

\textsuperscript{370} Idem.
\textsuperscript{371} Idem.
\textsuperscript{372} Singh, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 118.
\textsuperscript{373} Ibid., p. 115.
\textsuperscript{374} Yonuo, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 118.
Pakistan. But the biggest and the most successful expedition to Pakistan was led by Zuheto Sema. He took with him about 1000 men. It received training on the modern line in Pakistan and returned to Nagaland in 1965. Thus, the trip to Pakistan went on unabated. However all were not lucky. For instance, Gen. Mowu Gwizan mission failed. He took 400 men to East Pakistan in November 1965. Unfortunately, the group was intercepted and forced to re-enter India in Manipur sector. Prakash Singh thus writes: "It was an ignominious failure for Mowu Angami who had otherwise a towering stature in the Naga Army." 376

Attempts were maid again in December 1965 by the Nagas to send another batch to Pakistan through the Churachandpur area of Manipur, but the expedition failed. In June 1966 Nedelie Angami was able to conduct a group of 200 Nagas to Pakistan and the same returned in November 1966 via Churachandpur and Tamenglong Subdivisions of Manipur. 377

Though Pakistan's help to the Mizo National Front (MNF) was at a bigger scale because of geographical contiguity, the former's aid to the Naga too was formidable. Perhaps, the Nagas received more compact assistance than the Mizos in one sense. They not only received training and arms but also financial assistance to the tune of Rs. 5 lakhs. 379 They used East Pakistan as a spring board to go to foreign countries. 380

375. Ibid., p. 119.
376. Idem.
378. Idem.
Pakistan Government's strategy in extending assistance to the Nagas and Mizos in the North East probably would appear to have three objectives:

(1) to disintegrate the unity of the country.

(2) to strain the country's economy; and

(3) to tie down a number of Mountain Divisions, of the Indian Army in these areas.

Unfortunately, the war between India and Pakistan in 1971 for the liberation of Bangladesh brought an abrupt end to the Naga's connection with East Pakistan. An important gain incident following the liberation of Bangladesh was the rounding up of the Naga Army top brass at Dhaka. 'Commander-in-Chief' Thinuselie Angami and 'Brigadier' Nedelie Angami were taken into custody by the Indian Army on December 22, 1971.381 Thus, the Naga nationalists suffered a severe setback with the loss of the sanctuary it had enjoyed in East Pakistan. Hence, Naga-Pakistan connection was kept dormant for a long time.

The Naga-Pakistan relationship was re-established only in the 1990s after a gap of twenty years. However, this time, the modus operandi of its relationship will be through the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan equivalent of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Indian's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).382 Thus, the operation is now in a subtle form and it is difficult to accurately pin-point the nature of this tacit understanding.

381. Singh, op. cit., p. 123.
Most probably, the alleged NSCN link with Pakistan's ISI commenced from 1990 when NSCN Alee Command made contact with the ISI officials in Dhaka.\textsuperscript{383} It was of the same time that the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) was also active. The alleged ISI and other foreign powers aiding the North-East ethnic armed groups came to light when the confession of one Captain German (belonging to the Revolutionary People's Front (RPF)) to the Manipur police was published. The RPF cadre reportedly confessed that Pakistan Government have already agreed to extend all kinds of support to the NE ethnic armed groups.\textsuperscript{384}

In this context, the Director General of Border Security Force (BSF), T. Arantachari in a press conference in Agartala said:

Pakistan was out to foment destabilisation, communal riots and violence through extremists in the North Eastern region, while in some cases they were aiding and abetting the extremists through the neighbouring Bangladesh, in other cases they were helping them directly.\textsuperscript{385}

The Assam Chief Minister, Hiteswar Saikia, and many other leaders of the North-Eastern region had made similar allegations against Pakistan. Most prominently, the 44-page General Secretary's report of the North Eastern Congress (I) Coordination Committee special Conference held at Dispur on June 22, 1993 alerted the nation against the nexus between Bangladesh and

\textsuperscript{383} Confession of Khayao, Hurey Finance Secretary, GPRN \textit{The Hindustan Times}, June 13, 1994.
\textsuperscript{384} Conspiracy to destabilize country (in) \textit{The Sentinel} January 13, 1991.
\textsuperscript{385} Pakistan involved in insurgency in NE \textit{Economic Times}, 12 August, 1992.
Pakistan on one hand and forces within the region on the other to destabilise the North-Eastern region.\textsuperscript{386}

A confirmation of these allegations came following the arrest of Khayao Hurey, the then Finance Secretary of the NSCN and his sensational confession running into 126 pages. He categorically admitted that Pakistan, particularly the ISI had been direct involved in assisting the Nagas. He confessed that Pakistan authorities had made available to the NSCN a sum of 1.7 million US dollars in three instalments to enable the NSCN to procure arms from South East Asia.\textsuperscript{387} Further he confessed that apart from the Pakistan Embassy in Dhaka, the Pakistan Embassy in Kathmandu also had begun to play a major role in aiding NSCN.\textsuperscript{388} This startling revealation had provided immense help to the Government of India, particularly the policy planners of the region. One can also affirmingly state that until the Naga issue and other problems in the entire North-East region are settled rightly, the involvement of foreign powers or agencies cannot be contained, for the simple reason that this region is strategically located.

4. BANGLADESH

It was a historical event in 1971 that the Government of India sent in its defence forces to liberate Bangladesh from the yoke of Pakistan. It was also a fact that the Government of India did render a number of humanitarian services to the new nation-

\textsuperscript{386} Pak-Bangladesh nexus to destabilize North East. Eastern Panorama, August, 1993, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{387} The Hindustan Times, loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{388} Idem.
state of Bangladesh. Yet today, the relationship between the two neighbouring countries can never be said to be cordial and stable.

A study of the Indo-Bangladesh relations indicates that the problems between the two countries are largely geo-political in character. Some of these problems are the influx of illegal immigrants, boundary dispute, New Moore island controversy and above all the issue of use and distribution of Ganga waters at Farakha. Of all these problems, it is certainly the question of the sharing of the river waters which has acquired the most serious proportion. Indeed it has become the measure of the relationship existing between the two. In the midst of these problems, the anti-India campaign is very strong in Bangladesh.

Thus, keeping this in the backdrop, the Bangladeshi helped to the NSCN to set up training camps in Chittagong Hill tract and NSCN leaders allegedly operating in Dhaka comes not to so much of a surprise.

In fact, the NSCN establishing a base area in Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill tract and the news of its cadres operating from Cox Bazar is now confirmed. It is now clear that this tract is vital for the NSCN to act as a transit base. Both the shipment from 'operation red sea' and 'operation Jordan' landed in this area and subsequently flagged off to Nagaland from there.

389. Singh, Kuldeep., India and Bangladesh (Published by Anmol publications, New Layalpur, Ext.Delhi, 1987), Forward XII.

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As reported, the top brass of the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) have been personally supervising the training and other aspects of some insurgent' camps, which are being run in consultation with the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). Dhaka has also been directly encouraging the China-trained Th. Muivah and Isak Chishi Swu of the NSCN to form an umbrella body with the active participation of the other insurgent groups. Th. Muivah's group of NSCN, is reliably learnt, has been able to establish contact with almost all the militant groups operating in the North-East. It is believed to be running the largest training camp in the Chittagong Hill tracts of Bangladesh.391 No wonder, the Home Minister S.B. Chavan explicitly maintained that the involvement of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan with the help of Bangladesh in the insurgency of North Eastern region, was a fact and cautioned that this would only embitter he good neighbourly relations. Chavan made it clear that his Ministry was in possession of full details of ISI operations in the North-East including training, funding and sheltering of the militants by Pakistan elements with the base in Bangladesh.392

Though Bangladesh had often denied such report on ISI, the Home Minister is believed to have got enough evidence to substantiate its charges. Bangladesh had also been provided with such evidence by India.393 It is in this context that the Chief of Staff, Eastern Command Lieutenant General, O.P. Kaushik said

393. Idem.
that the situation in the North-East insurgency is worse than Jammu and Kashmir.394

It is possible that the Bangladesh government could be using insurgency or the NSCN as a bargaining factor vis-a-vis the Government of India in order to secure as much concession (in matters related to Tin Bigha, Farakha barrage etc.) as possible from India. Thus, the arrest and handing over of People's Liberation Army (PLA) members of Manipur by the Bangladesh government to the Government of India395 can be understood in the aforesaid context. This happened after India's decision to hand over 'Tin Bigha' to Bangladesh.396 Though it may ostensibly appear coincidental, the timing was too close to be ignored.

Again when the government of Bangladesh was fully informed by the Government of India about the various insurgent groups including the NSCN, she remained unmoved. There may be one good explanation that the Government of Bangladesh could use the NSCN to counter balance the Shanti Bahini militants allegedly receiving help from India.

Finally, if Pakistan and Bangladesh have shared similar perception on aiding the NSCN there is no reason why they will not cooperate even in this line. Both are Muslim countries and there are still a significant section of Bangladeshi population who nurture pro-Pakistan feeling. Thus, in this environment, the

This change in the security environment in the North East region has demanded of governmental activities at the highest level leading to the formulation of steps to contain and counter what they called 'ISI menace'.


ISI could easily carry out its plan without much hindrances even from within Bangladesh.

In conclusion it can be stated that the involvement of Pakistan or Bangladesh in aiding and patronizing the NSCN or the insurgent groups in the North East will continue until the neighbourly relationship among them is favourably re-established in the future.