§ 1. COHERENCE & LOGICAL EMPIRICISM

So far we have been maintaining that the principle of coherence is the principle of both truth and beauty. This implies that truth in the scientific sense consists not in mere particular brute facts but in the general principles that include and explain these facts. The particular facts owe their truth to the general whole of which they are parts. But in the case of beauty, we have been maintaining, that though every work of art is profoundly individual and hence defies our attempt to classify it into a general type, all works of art are governed by one basic principle expressed in different forms. Hence in determining the quality of a work of art, the critic should see whether this basic principle is successfully realized.

This position is clearly opposed to the modern revival of empiricism known as logical empiricism. The logical empiricists, in spite of some differences among the several advocates of this movement with regard to the details, are pointedly unanimous in attacking the universal principle claimed either in theory of knowledge or aesthetics or ethics or in theory of reality. In this respect, they are the revivers of Hume in modern dress. They condemn the general principle of any form as "essentialistic", which expression for them stands for a fallacy. The general essence or any kind of thought category that
represents the universal is simply false. The denial of the essence is common to two schools in the modern times: logical empiricism and existentialism. For the latter, the essence should be dismissed or "bracketed" in order to grasp the existence or the true unadulterated (by thought) reality. For the former, the essence is false (or nonsense as it says), because it cannot be verified by sense experience.

A proposition, according to the logical empiricist, has sense only when it can be verified with sense experience. His position is different from that of the epistemological realist in that for him a proposition is true in virtue of its correspondence with the reality existing outside. Another very important feature is: a realist can be a rationalist recognising the validity of universal proposition and he also tries to prove the independent existence of the objects by means of inference—which involves some universal connection. The logical empiricist denies a permanent object of knowledge, which the realist recognises and he reduces all our knowledge into mere sense experience. He tries to distinguish himself from the traditional British empiricism by saying that his is the logical method in empiricism while the traditional empiricistic method was psychological. Ayer makes this point clear when he says: "......in calling ourselves empiricists, we are not avowing a belief in any of the psychological doctrines which are commonly associated with empiricism."
For, even if these doctrines were valid, their validity would be independent of the validity of any philosophical thesis. It could be established only by observation, and not by the purely logical considerations upon which our empiricism rests.1

As empiricists, for them, a proposition which does not refer to "any state of affairs" or any fact of experience is no proposition at all. Or, as Wittgenstein says, the statement "This proposition has such and such a sense" = "This proposition represents such and such a state of affairs."2 But not being ordinary empiricists, they try to establish their theory with logical arguments. Though in essence there is not much difference between the arguments of Hume and those of logical empiricists, the latter make certain convenient and arbitrary logical rules and with the help of these rules they attack any assertion of the other schools of philosophy and try to show its falsity, thus favouring their own position. The logical empiricists, accordingly, recognise only two kinds of propositions: Synthetic propositions and analytic propositions. They define an analytic proposition as one in which a man has determined to use a certain term in a certain way. ".....although they (analytic propositions) give us no information about any empirical situation, they enlighten us by illustrating the way in which we use certain symbols," and that is all their importance. And the real

propositions are synthetic propositions. Now, Kant also had recognised the synthetic propositions—i.e., propositions based on our empirical experience as "this book is red". But what occupied the attention of Kant was not these synthetic a posteriori propositions but the synthetic a priori ones and how they are possible. But the logical empiricists reject even at the outset all a priori propositions and the synthetic a priori ones too. So, for them only synthetic a posteriori propositions are valid.

Being suspicious of any kind of generality, the logical empiricist tries to reduce even the experience which, according to him, is the basis of all valid propositions to purely independent bits. For him, there is nothing like an Experience with a capital E. Even "an atomic fact is a combination of objects". When I experience the book as red, it is not the Red, a general quality which is inhered in the book that I experience in it, but it is only the book as red; and to suppose any general quality of redness is not warranted by experience.

The logical empiricists rather rewrite the Humean arguments against the necessary nature of inductive generalizations. Ayer dismisses the very problem as "fictitious" and says that the progress of science is never impaired if philosophers do not justify the rationality of inductive assumptions. Nor does our belief in sciences cease if the basis of inductive generalizations are proved to be experientially unverifiable. "..... the only

3. Tractatus, Quoted from Ibid. p.478.
test to which a form of scientific procedure which satisfies the necessary condition of self-consistency is subject, is the test of its success in practice. Here, we can observe, logical empiricism recognises at least partially the instrumental theory of truth, "When we come to 'rationality', we shall find that for us 'being rational' entails being guided in a particular fashion by past experience."

Our purpose in this chapter is neither to give a complete account of all the features of the logical empiricist movement, nor to offer an exhaustive criticism of it, but only to consider the tenability of its objection to the validity of the universal nature of truth and beauty. In the previous chapter we explained in what sense beauty is also universal. We shall presently state the logical empiricist's objections to our view of beauty and we shall proceed to consider the real consistency of his objections.

§ 2. THE "AESTHETICS" OF LOGICAL        
            
EMPIRICISM:

In the volume titled "Aesthetics and Language" (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1954.) an attempt has been made to put together the different streams of logical empiricist views on aesthetics in one volume. While the contributors to this volume hold different views with regard to certain details and minor problems, all of them agree about the central position: Criticism of a work of art

5. Ibid. p.48.
does not require any general principle.

Prof. W. B. Gallie in his essay on "The Function of philosophical Aesthetics" holds that all the rationalistic aesthetic theories are "vitiated through and through by the 'essentialist' fallacy"—i.e., these theories presuppose that "whenever we are in a position to define a substance or activity we must know its essence or ultimate nature." Gallie states the important features of Idealistic Aesthetics in the following manner, before he tries to criticise them. They are, as he states: (A) There is one way of reading a particular poem, and this gives us that poem's individual meaning and value. (For poem one could substitute painting, musical composition or what not). (B) There is (or was) one act of Imagination which also makes (or made) that poem's individual meaning and value. (C) The 'reading' referred to in (A) and the 'act' referred to in (B) are, despite historical and psychological differences (accidents), 'ideally identical': they are equivalent conditions of the existence, meaning, and value of the poem. (D) The material embodiment of any poem, painting or what not is aesthetically irrelevant: the poem exists, as a poem, in the imaginative 'act' of 'reading'.

Having stated these basic tenets of idealistic aesthetics as objectively as he can, Gallie proceeds to

6. All the other quotations from Prof. Gallie refer to this essay, unless mentioned otherwise.

7. Prof. Gallie states six points out of which we have reproduced only four, since the other two are not directly important from the point of view of the slope of our discussion.
criticise them one after another. Following the linguistic analytical method of the fellow-men of his school, his first criticism is: the work 'Art' does not mean the same thing in different contexts. Just as the word King means different things at different occasions, now a priest, now the supreme military commander, another time the highest head of the judiciary and in a different situation the supreme executive or the constitutional servant; so also the word 'Art' is an abstract thing which does not give identical meaning in all the circumstances. Further, "there are such things as revolutions in artistic taste and inspiration, and after such a revolution certain things are classified as Art which were not before, while other things are no longer classified as Art." (our italics). Thus the statement (C) that the ideal content of art is identical is rejected.

Then Prof. Gallie proceeds to criticise the second statement that there is (or was) one act of imagination which also makes (or made) that poem's individual meaning and value. He argues that no poem or novel or play was written in one act of imagination and no painting was ever started and completed in one single stretch of work by the painter. On the contrary, we find the artist working on the same thing at different periods or even for several years. Further, after a work is completed in the first instance, the artist retouches it several times till he feels satisfied of its finishing delicacies. He gives all these later touches at different times and being promp-
ted by different motives or points of view. When the work of art comes to us, we without the real knowledge of what the artist himself does, say that it was done in one act of imagination. But the real process of creation will undergo the following marked steps: To start with, there will be the initial inspiration of a poem (which can be traced back to the past experience of the poet) which brings in the mind of the poet certain striking feature, which may form the opening line or some significant part of the whole theme. But the "extension or development of the poem can hardly be attributed to these same features, however; on the contrary, it will almost certainly be due to either (a) certain other features of the initial line or stanza.... or (b) some further, relative independent 'inspiration', i.e., a line or stanza which was not in the poet's mind when he selected, or recognised the value of the 'initial inspiration' of his poem."

In the same way, holds Prof. Gallie, the further "organic" development of the poem should be explained on similar lines: i.e., the different lines at the different stages suggest different new developments which are included. In this way, "the poem's unity will not depend on some single, all-embracing act of the poet's imagination, but rather on the palpable incompleteness of the work at every stage—an incompleteness that keeps him at work until he has made of the poem as real a unity as his poetic capacity, his initial inspiration, the conventions of his
literary form, and the genius of the language he uses, will allow."

After having criticised the idealistic theory in this way, Prof. Gallie puts forward what he calls the "alternative methods in aesthetics". This position, he says, should always be careful from being led to draw any general principles in art criticism. He calls this position the "attitude of informed scepticism". "The informed sceptic will deny that the word 'Art', as commonly used, stands for any one thing, and will deny that for every given work of art there is one way of 'reading' that gives us its meaning and value." His function is only to check up different arts from being thought of as related with one another by the usage on the part of art critics of such meaningless phrases as "the music of poetry", "the logic of music", "the poetry of colour", etc. Because, when we speak of a "musical flow of line" what the word "musical" stands for is quite different from what it means in the art of music proper. Apart from this help of linguistic analysis, the aesthetcian (if at all he is necessary) has no other aid to offer to the critics of particular arts.

Here also, we may observe, the role of the informed sceptic is the same as what he does in the case of the analysis of scientific terminologies. The logical empiricist, after having rejected all metaphysics, holds that a science by the name of philosophy may continue with a useful service. But its job is only to analyse and fix
up the correct meaning of the various terminologies of the different sciences. It is in the same way that it can assist the practical art criticism.

The main tenet of the logical empiricist’s attitude towards art is stated when he holds that art criticism does not involve any general principle of criticism. The position that we have maintained throughout our work rests on the view that criticism presupposes some aesthetic theory. Not merely in imagination, but in thought also, we have been maintaining, every activity presupposes a general standard. Criticism is essentially an intellectual activity and it cannot take place without any basis of a general principle. The logical empiricist denies this. In thought, his avowed aim is to smash all types of general propositions; and pursuing the same standpoint in imagination, he holds that such a general principle is not only unnecessary but it weilds a misleading influence on the art critics. W. E. Kennick clearly states it:

"put it in the form of our assumption: Criticism presupposes Aesthetic Theory. This assumption contains the ... mistake on which traditional aesthetics rests, namely, the view that responsible criticism is impossible without standards or criteria universally applicable to all works of art." But, on the contrary, according to him, "the bases of responsible criticism are indeed to be found in the work of art and nowhere else, but this in no way implies that critical judgments presuppose any canons, rules,

standards, or criteria applicable to all works of art." He argues that the insistence by the idealistic aestheticians on a general principle is due to the confusion between the nature of moral appraisal and art criticism. In appraising any act from the moral point of view, we usually tend to appeal to certain general rules because moral appraisal "expresses a desire for uniformity." The idealistic aestheticians, according to Kennick, first mistake that because Beauty and Goodness are two species of the same genus, namely value, and then they think that what holds good in the case of one should equally hold good in the case of the other. But since moral appraisal itself does not presuppose any general theory, but it is conditioned by certain habit and socio-cultural factors, its claim for a general principle is also baseless. And its analogue—art criticism—also loses the force of its argument which it claimed on analogy. As a matter of fact, the basis of the criticism of every work of art should be found in the work itself.

§ 3. CRITICISM OF THE LOGICAL EMPIRICIST'S NOTION OF VALIDITY:

Herbert Feigl begins his chapter on Logical Empiricism in the "Twentieth Century Philosophy" with the observation that the difference in philosophical outlooks "goes deeper than disagreement in doctrine; at bottom it is a difference in basic aim and interest." When Philo-

9. Ibid. p.327.
sophical doctrines come into irreconcilable clash, we will notice the observation of Feigl but we cannot stop with this observation. On the contrary we have to go further and decide the issue with the help of reason. Logical empiricism like its ancestral empiricistic theories is not merely a matter of "temperament", but it is the outcome of certain conviction. Because of its empirical presupposition, it does not pay any recognition to the claim of reason and in this way it is anti-intellectualism. In order to escape the charge of anti-intellectualism, the logical empiricist adds an adjective to his nomenclature and prefers to be called Logical empiricist instead of mere empiricist. Some other followers of this movement dislike the designation 'logical empiricism' and prefer to be called logical positivists, because the term positivist or positivism gives the meaning of a person or theory which believes only in what actually is and rejects what is spurious. But is he logically justified in calling himself "logical" or in exalting his claim under the term positivism?

The logical empiricist's definition and the classification of the propositions are so arbitrarily devised that one could easily discern that they are made so in order to make them suit his empirical preconceptions. Though he recognises two kinds of propositions, analytic and synthetic, he dismisses the former with the definition that it stands only for how one has determined to use a term. When several persons use terms in an analytical
proposition in the same sense, it only means that all of them have determined to use them in the same sense; just as, though the rules of the game are arbitrarily fixed, the participants readily abide by them. Even "the theorems or laws of logic are analytic sentences—true by virtue of presupposed agreements concerning the meaning of the terms employed." Mathematical and geometrical propositions are also of the same nature. We may note that nothing is so arbitrary than the logical empiricist's definition of the laws of thought or the proposition of mathematics. If they are based on mere mutual agreement or convention, why should the scientist believe in the mathe­matist scientist believe in the mathematical system and base his science on it? We have already discussed this problem under the caption "Empiricism and Necessity" in an earlier chapter (Ch. V, § 3). Hence we may take up the other type which he speaks of: Synthetic proposition.

According to Kantian logic, an analytic proposition is one in which the predicate explicitly states some quality or property which is derived from the analysis of the subject. And though the predicate does not add anything entirely new to our knowledge of the subject, it helps us to understand the deeper and varied implications of the subject. Hence the element of novelty from the point of view of the development of our knowledge is there in all analytic propositions. And since the predicate is derived from the subject, there is necessity or universal con-
-274-

-nection between the two. The logical empiricist also recognises this universal connection, but holds that it is worthless because such a universality has no other basis than the convention or the agreement of those who use it. The logical empiricist tries to strengthen his position in denying the universality of thought by denying the validity of the universality of even the analytic proposition.

The Kantian logic recognises the empirical synthetic proposition also. But its main aim is to show how synthetic non-empirical (a priori) propositions are possible. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason takes it (but not for granted) that the synthetic nonempirical propositions are possible and then it tries to explain how they are so. Kant refers to the achievements and the nature of the sciences to show that they are possible. Whether one agrees with all the details of Kant's scheme to show how they are possible or not, one cannot reject that they are possible. Again, the existence of science demonstrate to us even to-day that synthetic non-empirical propositions are possible. But the logical empiricist holds that the sciences can do away with any type of general principles or any assumption of the uniformity of nature. In this connection, one can observe that this argument is bluntly arbitrary. First he assumes that there are no non-empirical and universal synthetic propositions and when the example of the sciences are given, he says that sciences not only can do without such propositions but they should.
confine only to what is observed. The scientist observes certain sequences in the behaviour of nature and he has to state his findings in a positivistic way without any kind of generalization. But what is the value of scientific knowledge if we cannot move any more beyond our direct observation? The logical empiricist's answer is: Scientific knowledge should be taken only as probable but never as certain which characteristic is based on the rationalistic conception of universal connection. But we should mark that probability is a relative concept which always implies as its norm certainty. But the logical positivist frowns at the concept of certainty. It is here that he is most dogmatic when he refuses to recognize the validity of implication without giving any valid reason than his argument that direct experience alone gives us valid knowledge. But that direct acquaintance gives us valid knowledge does not mean the invalidity of implication.

To come to the positive side of his thesis: For him a proposition is genuine only when it can be verified in terms of sensory experience. But on the fact of a proposition we can make out whether it is an analytic or a synthetic one and if it is the former we can simply dismiss it. But when we know that a proposition is empirical, it means that we know the meaning of the proposition. To verify the meaning of a proposition and thus to see whether it is valid should mean that we can have access to see the claim of the proposition in the indirect way than the one through which we obtained that proposition.
But the logical empiricist does not allow any indirect way of verification. Thus, we obtain a proposition by sensory experience and when we want, we can verify it with the same sensory experience. Thus the sensory experience will be the whole and sole of the validity of all our knowledge. But what is the proof for this? No proof is necessary according to his logic.

§ 4. THE ERRORS OF LOGICAL EMPIRICIST VIEW OF ART CRITICISM:

The attempt of the logical empiricist to reduce all our sense experience into certain extremely particular bits is reflected in his view on aesthetics also. He is so much suspicious of any kind of generality that he does not admit, e.g., the blue in the sky and the blue in the book is the same colour. The blue in the first example is "the sky as blue" and in the second, "the book as blue". And hence the colour of the one has nothing to do with that of the other. It is this attitude for extreme pluralism that works in his attitude to aesthetic theories. The characteristics of the idealistic aesthetics are, therefore, not palatable to him. We shall now examine, as the aesthetic counterpart of the logical position which we considered in the preceding section, how far the criticisms of Prof. Gallie are sound.

The first characteristic that he states—there is one way of reading a particular poem and this gives us that poem's individual meaning and value—is absolutely correct. But his criticism of the characteristic is
based on the failure to recognise the difference between aesthetic point of view and certain non-aesthetic points of view. He takes the help of the facts that there are certain so called revolutions in the concept of artistic creation and the appreciation of art, to come to the conclusion that therefore there are more ways of reading (or seeing) a work of art or creating it. It is true that in the history of criticisms—of literature, painting, music or for that matter any branch of art—there are different theories of criticism and certain theories will be prevalent during certain periods. Thus each new theory considers itself a revolution (an extreme and unduly glorified term), with the claim of completely rooting out the previous theory. But any 'revolutionary' theory in art criticism should be looked at with suspicion because of its very nature of revolution. The fact that a particular theory served for some time to explain us the point of view from which we should see works of art testifies that it was not completely faulty. When a new theory gains the vogue, it is not so much the indication of the defect of the earlier theory as the other aspect of the works of art which the new theory emphasises and which the earlier one has either completely neglected or had given upon only a faint emphasis. Such changes in emphasis are natural. But it does not mean, as Prof. Gallie thinks, total change in the very taste and definition of art; on the contrary it only indicates the profundity of art and the relative onesidedness of the "theories". A theory after all is an intellectual attempt to give us a point
of view to look at art and because of this intellectual nature, it cannot give us the complete and integral point of view. Many times different theories are complementary to one another. In the history of Indian Poetics we find different theories such as the alamkāra theory, the rasa theory, the dhvani theory and the auśitya theory, being considered most important. But we also find that when a poetician upholds one theory, he does not totally denounce and do away with the others; but he only claims a greater importance to his theory and gives a relatively less importance to others. The rasa cannot be evoked without dhvani and the evoked rasa cannot be maintained without auśitya. Thus the so called revolution in the taste and definition of art, if it is genuine, cannot afford to neglect the merits of the earlier theories. Prof. Gallie's argument first assumes that the different theories in the criticism of art are mutually exclusive and then it tries to reach the convenient conclusion that therefore there is no one way of looking at art. On this basis he concludes that there is no universality in the aesthetic experience.

We shall reaffirm our view that there is only one way of judging a work of art and that is the aesthetic way which does not exclude the merits emphasised in the other so called revolutionary theories.

Coming to the second characteristic which is the subject of Prof. Gallie's criticism—there is (or was)
one act of imagination which also makes (or made) that poem's individual meaning and value—we should point out that his criticism fails to distinguish between the physical act and what is meant by the act of one imaginative movement. He gives the example that all parts of a poem or novel cannot be written at a stretch of time and that many a time the development of a work of art takes such form and magnitude that the artist himself did not know it previously. Moreover, each stage of the development might be suggested to him by the earlier stage or by a certain new meaning which he sees in the context which he had not imagined before he started writing it. On this basis Prof. Gallie arrives at the conclusion that a work of art is not a result of one act of imagination.

When we say that every work of art is the result of one act of imagination, we should distinguish between the one stretch of actual temporal duration at which an artist works and the one continuous imaginative action which will be the whole determining principle in the creation of a particular work of art. The writing of a novel may be started today and the author may take about seven years as Romain Rolland did to complete it. It depends upon the canvas and the dimension of the work. A small lyric or a sonnet can be completed in one sitting. The big novel is described to be the result of one imaginative act in the sense, whenever the author resumes his work from where he left it last, he continues from where he left it. As an analogue we may imagine a big mathematical
problem to solve which a mathematician takes one month. Everyday he works some steps and takes rest and in the middle he may make a holiday trip to the countryside. But when he completes it after a month we say that the conclusion is the result of one intellectual act. When the mathematician comes back from his holiday trip, he resumes his intellectual work and starts with the threads he had just left over two days before. This mental frame we should call the intellectual—something impersonal—function of his mind. The logical empiricist ignores this distinction, because he is dogmatic even from the starting point to consider anything beyond the sense experience. For him there is no difference between the eating and drinking acts of the mathematician and his mathematical problem-solving act. It is with the same kind of dogmatic presupposition that he refuses to understand in which sense the work of art is described as the creation of one act.

Further as regards his description of the development of a work of art: The artist need not know before hand all the details, because it is not rigidly preplanned intellectual activity. As the artist moves with the development of his imagination, new meaning can be seen and the possibilities of new situations can be discovered and the artist may make use of them or modify them in the way they suit the central principle of the work of art. In fact, many a time the guiding principle of the work of art imagination itself becomes clearly defined as it passes
through the new situations that develop. But this is not the argument to conclude from, that the work of art is a collection of different unrelated acts of imagination.

We hold that when we read a poem or experience any work of art, despite other psychological or historical differences, ideally speaking, we will have the same experience as the artist had when he created it. There are various accidental conditions and limitations which prevent us from rising ourselves to such a state of experience. It may be our insufficient mastery over the language when we read an epic in a classical language or lack of training to appreciate the various subtleties in a work of art of another tradition. But if all these conditions are fulfilled and the experient overcomes the various other psychological limitations, he will have the same experience as the artist had. To put it in another way, the aesthetic experience of both the artist and the experient is "ideally identical". But Prof. Gallie disbelieves in this view. Since for his empiricistic mind, the individual is nothing but a composite of his particular situations and experiences, it is impossible for him to raise himself above what he empirically is.

The fourth characteristic which Prof. Gallie criticises—the material embodiment of any poem, painting, or what not is aesthetically irrelevant: the poem exists, as a poem, in the imaginative 'act' or 'reading'—is the view of Croce. We agree with the criticism of Prof. Gallie because we cannot confine artistic creation only to the
'internal state' excluding the material. Gallie is right when he writes that "the history of art contains countless instances of how new materials, media, instruments, etc., have determined both the direction and the vitality of artistic inspiration."\(^\text{12}\) We also maintain that we cannot create a division between the matter and the form either in artistic creation or in intellectual operation, though we can view for the purpose of analysis as though the form can be studied in a relative isolation.

The central point maintained by all the logical empiricists with regard to the criticism of art is: "The bases of responsible criticism are indeed to be found in the work of art and nowhere else, but this in no way implies that critical judgments presuppose any canons, rules, standards, or criteria applicable to all works of art." (W. E. Kennick. Quoted above by us in the second section of this chapter). This attitude is also the part of the general attitude of the logical empiricist towards the general principle of any kind. Just as he denies the necessity, or even the implicit reference to it, of any universal principle in our thinking; so also he denies the necessity of any general canon in the criticism of a work of art. "The bases of responsible criticism are indeed to be found in the work of art and nowhere else". But can there be criticism without evaluation and evaluation without a norm or a standard? Each type of work (or work of art) has its own standard and the particular work under

that type should fulfil the standard of that type. The standard is necessitated by both the special advantages and the limitations of the particular medium of the type of the art under consideration. E.g., Music should be judged by a certain form of harmony and painting by another form of harmony and so on. Each particular composition of music or piece of painting should come up to the standard of its type. But this does not mean that every work of art has the same prototype, an unchanging pattern of harmony. We have to remember that the way in which form or harmony is manifested in a work of art is unique to it. So our approach to every work of art must be determined by the work itself; but this is not equivalent to saying that our criticism does not imply or appeal to any general canon.

Prof. Gallie allows to make "a certain amount of comparison between different works of art" which "will help a critic in discussing their individual merits or failures." But "such comparisons must be of minor importance in as much as the critic's main concern is with the uniqueness, not the similarities, of different works of art." But our question is: Can there be any comparison between different things if they did not have a certain common feature or factor? It is evident from what we quoted from Gallie that the logical empiricist feels the awkwardness of his own position and hence he makes a gesture of recognising the merits of the idealistic position. But his empiricistic bias prevents him from accepting completely the positive principle suggested by his own queer
We may conclude this section with the observation that the logical empiricist's conceptions of truth and beauty are characterised by a physicalist bias. Though he does not explicitly say that he is philosophically a materialist, his general predisposition and the conclusion it brings about are materialistic and it is this bias which prevents him from recognising any kind of general principle either in logic or in aesthetics or in morals.

§ 5. THE EMOTIONALIST THEORY OF VALUES

All the errors of the logical empiricist with regard to aesthetics that we found in the previous section are due to his refusal to give any rational justification for the values like goodness, beauty etc. For him, the terms in all value judgments are employed "not to make statements of fact, but simply to express certain feelings and evoke a certain response." It follows, as in ethics, that there is no sense in attributing objective validity to aesthetic judgments, and no possibility of arguing about questions of fact." ".....there is nothing in aesthetics .....that........embodies a unique type of knowledge." 14

With his bias against the universal nature of thought, the logical empiricist rejects the universal nature of art also. But when the question, if there is nothing general in aesthetic experience, what is it that makes it

objective? is asked, he denies the status of objectivity to art and holds that such a question does not arise at all, since, according to him, all values are merely emotional. Here we may observe that in arguing for his emotionalist theory of values, he relapses into the old fallacy of treating emotion as in no way connected with our thinking. But emotion, though a great part of it cannot be expressed in verbal and discursive language, can be expressed in such a way that the others may also experience the same degree of its intensity. When it is expressed in this way, it requires specially suitable symbols such as the language of poems and the lines and colours of painting. In this way, emotion also becomes universal in the sense, several persons can have the same emotion. It should be pointed out, however, that the emotion which we speak of in this sense is not the personal emotions of particular individuals. The logical empiricist's contention that emotions are purely subjective rightly applies to our personal emotions. But when the personal emotions undergo a self-transcending transformation, they become aesthetic emotions; which are objective and universal in the sense they can be communicated so as others also can experience them. Like our thought, this transformed emotion also has objective validity and hence it admits a certain test or criterion of evaluation. Though this criterion is based on aesthetic experience, it is intellectual in character; for, aesthetic evaluation is an act of comparing an aesthetic experience with the criterion it aims to fulfil.
But the logical empiricist disbelieves in all these facts and claims his view on the presupposition that the aesthetic emotion is not different from personal emotions. Then art experience becomes no different from indulging in personal and sentimental fancies. Moreover, if art is concerned with "simply to express certain feelings and evoke a certain response," what are these certain feelings and certain response that Ayer speaks of? Here the logical empiricist has left the problem unanswered. The truth of the matter is: even the logical empiricist cannot help passing at least some value judgments like "this novel is good", "that picture is bad", "this drama is better than that," etc. Even granting his emotional presupposition for the sake of the argument, why should one work of art be better than the other? Because it evokes in us more emotion. And does it not follow from this that "a work of art should evoke more emotion in order that it can be a better work of the kind"? But this is a value judgment, a universal proposition.

C. E. M. Joad points out another grave fallacy of the emotionalist theory of values. If all values are merely matters of emotions, what is the difference between an ethical judgment and an aesthetic judgment? Is there no difference between the two judgments "that is a cruel act" and "it is a bad picture"? We pointed out in our chapter on truth and beauty as instruments (Ch.II. § 6) that, since the instrumentalist defines both these values in terms of one and the same criterion (utility) without...15. Op. Cit., p.130.
recognising the distinctions between the two, he confounds the one for the other. The logical empiricist also commits the same error when he thrusts all value judgments into one class, namely emotion.

§ 6. AESTHETIC HARMONY & SOME CONTEMPORARY TRENDS IN ART:

It is relevant if we briefly consider in this connection how we can maintain our harmony theory of beauty amidst the different modern movements in art. Specially from the latter part of the nineteenth century, the world of European Art is undergoing a continuous vicissitude and "revolutions" not only in the technique and the method of the artists but in the very aim of art. Just as after industrial revolution, the European society and consequently the individual life have been in a changing pattern, the concept of art also is in the process of a continuous modification. The discoveries in sciences—physics, biology, psychology etc.—have modified both human life and our concepts of values. As a result we find in the field of art several movements, to name but a few major ones: impressionism, cubism, constructivism and surrealism. We shall not consider these movements in detail, because these are not theories aesthetically systematised and explained bringing out their philosophical implications. They are only certain movements or tendencies in the world of art. It should be remembered that every style of art need not have or produce an aesthetic theory of its own. There can be several shades or styles in the
aesthetic outlook of a certain movement, which, when re-
duced to systematic aesthetic theory, may mean basically
one single theory. Before commenting upon these trends
in relation to the harmony theory of beauty, it is better
if we explain a few of them very briefly.

(1) IMPRESSIONISM: Impressionistic art arose as a revolt
against the old studio rules and it is an attempt to cap-
ture in paint the first, unintellectualised, movement of
our impression of a thing. In this direction the artist
should analyse our perception or experience and express
with all its original freshness. "The impressionists vi-
dualized and caught the moment in time. 16 "And for this
purpose he showed the forms as they are "dislodged from
their surrounding atmosphere and established them firmly
in space. The results were an articulated pictorial ar-
chitecture, classical in its order, coherence and clarity,
and an entirely more stylized form of description." 17

There are several shades or stages of impressionism
like the neo-impressionism, post-impressionism etc., which
it is not necessary for us to enter into in detail.

(2) CUBISM: Cubism was influenced by the modern develop-
ments in physical sciences. Experimental physics rejec-
ted the Newtonian space and time and in their place it
postulated its conception of matter and energy, which are
conceived as charges of force. Being influenced by this
conception of reality of the physical sciences, the cubists

16. Charles McCurdy: Modern Art: A Pictorial Anthology,
p.19. (Macmillan, New York.)
17. Ibid. p.19.
revolutionised their conception of forms, space, time and relation. Picasso, the great name of the school, "broke up his forms to analyze spatial movements and their organization as elements in themselves. Subject matter was used as a means to understand the relation of three-dimensional space and perceptual form to the two dimensional flat surface. In seeking the roots of creative experience in painting, Picasso began to eliminate realistic space and rejected preconceived systems of design." 18

(3) CONSTRUCTIVISM: Constructivism sets forth the ideal of constructing newer and newer forms out of the materials that we come across in our everyday contemporary life. A very important artist of this school, Naum Gabo writes that such natural scenes as a torn piece of s loud carried away by the wind or the green thicket of leaves and trees or a streamy trail of smoke from a passing train which are "the wells from which I draw the crude content of my forms. Of course, I don't take them as they come; the image of my perception needs an order and this order is my construction...... It is mankind alone which is shaping it in certain order out of a mass of incoherent and inimical realities. This is what it means to me to be constructive." 19

In a manifesto, Gabo and Pevsner declared four cardinal points of constructivism: "(1) To communicate the reality of life, art should be based on the two fundamental elements: space and time. (2) Volume is not the only sp-

tial concept. (3) Kinetic and dynamic elements must be used to express the real nature of time: static rhythms are not sufficient. (4) Art should stop being imitative and try instead to discover new forms.

The constructivist aims to shape his work as the engineer his bridge, and the mathematician his formula of a planetary orbit.

(4) SURREALISM: When the freedom of the individual is becoming more and more restricted in the deterministic circumstances of modern industrial society, surrealism attempts to affirm the individual freedom. But in doing so it gives singular prominence to the subconscious activities of the mind. "The dream alone leaves man his rights to liberty," one surrealist spoke. It was Andre Breton, a poet and former doctor, who first issued the surrealist manifesto in 1924: "A psychic automatism by which we proposed to express the real functioning of thought... a dictation of thought without any control by reason, outside all aesthetic or moral preoccupation." The surrealist puts greater emphasis on the difference between the inner world of imagery and the outer world of perception. And he turns his eye towards the inner world and tries to depict it. Usually his subjects are such as the dissociation of mind from body, the experiences of the early days, the crises and the conflicts in the subconscious, the frustrated wishes and repressed sex impulses etc.,

In this respect he is tremendously influenced by the

20. Ibid. p.231.
psycho-analytic school of psychology. In order to accomplish this task, it tries to invent new symbols—symbols which are natural to the operation of the subconscious. Usually these symbols are in line with those that Freud has explained in his account of the dream phenomenon. Because of the mysterious nature of the world that the surrealist creates, the spectator feels that he is seeing a strange and mysterious world.

Now we may conclude this section by asking our principal question: Can we say that our harmony theory of beauty succeeds in explaining these modern movements in European art? We have to make certain observations before we can give a bald answer to this question. Owing to the expansion of human knowledge in different directions, the modern man's attitude towards life and value is changing and the artist is very much influenced by the sciences of physics, biology, psychology and even economics. Man's conception of material nature also has changed. Material aspect of reality is ultimately composed of energy charges. The artist tries to depict his vision which is very much influenced by all these sciences and social changes. But one point remains the same: though the scientific theories change, the basic nature of man's thinking and imagination has not and cannot change. Whatever be the subject matter and the style of these modern tendencies in art, the artist is trying to express new forms of harmony in the new aspects of life which he is exploring. The constructivist's using of steel and iron, his construction of big bridges and aeroplanes also exhibit
certain architectural harmony and even in the mysterious expressions of the surrealist, we find here and there, the harmony of colours and masses etc.

The tendency of modern art—specially surrealism—is to consider the canons of beauty like harmony, proportion, etc., as at best incidental features and not essential rules in the creation of a work of art. The artist fulfils his function if he successfully expresses the subconscious forces like despair, thwarted wishes, frustrated emotions and the tensions of the inner life of man; which are more often the results of unconscious strife and contradiction. Thus the surrealist argues that the function of art is not to please our eyes and ears with the harmonious forms but to show the deeper truths of ourselves.

We must understand that this revolt against the principles of harmony is in fact not against these principles themselves but against the dry conventions of academic art. An academician is an artist (strictly speaking he, should be called a craftsman) who tries to produce something by strictly conforming himself to the classical rules and regulations; but who lacks the life force of creation. It is the other extremity of the pendulum when the surrealist defies the universal forms of art while strictly speaking he is right in defying the dryness of the academic art. Further, whatever be the moving force that leads the surrealist to express, unless his expression is in accordance with the forms necessitated by the eye and the ear etc., it fails to sustain the interest of the beholder. And the tension and strife which he emphasises in
expression can be expressed only against a background which balances the antagonistic forces. Thus without knowing what exactly he does even the surrealist expresses in some form of harmony if not in the form of harmony followed by the artist of older days. After the first few years of its youthful movement surrealism also is tending towards a certain form.

We have to observe another general fact. Modern art is experimental in its attitude. Even before a style can realize its definite form and its consequent advantages, a new trend sets in violently defying the earlier one. Hence much of modern art has become confusing to the ordinary spectator. After all, the symbols that the artist uses must be deeply rooted in the cultural soil of the people and the new symbols that an artist creates must be intelligible in terms of the existing ones. But many modern artists invent and use symbols which they and a few members of their coterie can understand. But the general spectator is simply bewildered at them. Thus the harmonies that the artists and the specialists find in many of the works of modern art are not recognised by the general public. The point is, not that modern art is totally against the aesthetic principle of harmony, but the harmony it aims to realise is too strange to the spectator. Since by the influence of the sciences the artist himself is carried away too far from the concreteness of life, the harmony that he tries to realise cannot evoke our emotional response and set our imagination in motion.
§ 7. A NOTE ON EXISTENTIALISM:

We may close this chapter with a very brief reference to another modern school both in philosophy and in art: existentialism. In a sense our problem is not directly related with this school. Existentialism is the school that upholds the priority of existence over essence. Kierkegaard, the first markedly defined existentialist, holds that the intellectualist way of understanding does not give us any knowledge of the real. Any attempt to explain existence leads us to the paradoxical position of defining it in terms of essence. Hence existentialism advocates a trans-intellectual realization of existence. What is the nature of this realization or comprehension of existence? In answering this question, the followers of this school divide among themselves into two general types of answer: one school holding that "Existence is met with through crisis or despair" and the other "It is met with through communion."

We need not enter into the details of these problems, our question being: What is the attitude of existentialism towards the coherent theory of truth and beauty? It is already evident that since the existentialist denies the validity of intellectual comprehension of the real, it denies the conception of truth as coherence. But we also do not claim that the coherence of thought enables us to comprehend the real in its original purity. We recognise the levels of knowing and as such we hold that coherence is what gives us truth (or what is truth) at the
level of the understanding. The existentialist is one-sided and extreme in that he altogether denies the essence in preference to the existence. Moreover, his conception of realizing or comprehending the existence through despair or through communion is so much mixed with pessimism that it can hardly be described as a healthy philosophy.

Coming to the aesthetic side of the school: Existentialist writers and artists are becoming more popular and appealing, in contemporary Europe, specially in the continent. Writers like Albert Camus and Jean Paul Sartre have produced some significant literary works also. But what is considered to be existentialist writing is distinguished more by the philosophy or the point of view with which the artist sees his theme than by any new theory of art. We find all the characteristics of literary harmony—the plot, characters etc.,—in the novels and the stories of the existentialist writers. We may disagree with the approach to life which they present in their works, but in so far as they do not reject the form of writing and the underlying principle of that form, we are not directly interested in them.