§ 1. INTRODUCTORY:

In the preceding two chapters we observed that both truth and beauty are of the nature of a coherent whole and in that whole every part should be subordinating to the purpose of the whole; or the whole should manifest its nature in every part, each part necessarily following from the whole. Or the truth or beauty of each part stands in a necessary relation with all the other parts. We also noted that the difference between the aesthetic and the logical wholes consists in that, while the former is self-complete in every act of the play of imagination, the latter cannot be self-complete till it includes within itself or is itself included in all the other parts so that there can be only one all-inclusive whole. Hence while each separate aesthetic whole can be beautiful on its own account, the case is quite the reverse with the logical whole.

In this chapter we may consider the meaning and the nature of necessity and relation, a clear knowledge of which makes our understanding of the nature of both logical and aesthetic whole better. As we proceed with the discussions, wherever we find the occasion, we shall point out the difference between the two kinds of the whole; which form the central problem of our study.

First we shall give a summary exposition of the meaning and nature of necessity in the context of the logi-
cal whole and then we shall compare its meaning and na-
ture with those of the aesthetic whole.

§ 2. THE MEDIATE NATURE OF

In epistemology, necessity may be described in terms
of the law of sufficient reason; which means that for a
thing to be what it is and not otherwise, there must be a
reason or a ground. We may add here that if the ground
is there, it's consequent should inevitably follow. Since
coherence is a system of reciprocally determining parts,
every part of feature of it may be regarded as a consequ-
ent to which some other part or parts are antecedents;
and ultimately the whole stands as the ground. As Bosan-
quet says, "in plain english, the law of sufficient reason
represents the demand of intelligence for the explanation
of something else". Bosanquet adds further: "In the case
of anything but the absolute whole this demand must go on
to infinity, for outside any given content there is always
something which can be regarded relatively to that content
as something else." That is to say, necessity means the
nature of inevitably following from the ground. Now we
should ask: Does this necessity refer to the ground or
to the part? Is it the consequent that depends upon a ne-
cessity or is it the ground? According to coherence theory
only the absolute whole can be the ground. To have nece-
sity is to follow from a ground and so, for the absolute

2. Ibid. p.213.
whole the question of necessity does not arise at all. Absolute necessity is in fact, as Schopenhauer says, *Contradictio in adiecto*, for ex hypothesi, all necessity is conditional. Necessity means to refer oneself to a higher point of view, to show its place in a wider scheme in which it is a part. Hence the notion of necessity should be understood only in the relation between the various judgments that constitute the truth.

Because we have explained necessity in terms of the principle of sufficient reason, and since the latter is somehow associated with formal logic, we should not think that the notion of necessity is merely formal, or that its governance is merely within the intellectual sphere without any reference to material world. But in fact, as we are maintaining throughout, our thought is the thought of something and if the basic principle of the object of thought is different from the basic principle of thought, there is no justification in entertaining such a thought. The fundamental assumption of epistemology, of whatever school it be, is that we think in accordance with the nature of the objective world. The notion of necessity can be seen in its full force in the principles of sciences. Necessity is not a principle apart from experience. Science itself is nothing but our experience rationally systematised in such a way that the interpretations or the necessary connections between the various parts can be as such understood. Bosanquet quotes a sentence from Prof. Huxley as saying that we can imagine man and his works and all the higher
forms of animal life being utterly destroyed and the earth
becoming a scene of horror and mountain ranges being sub-
merged into the ocean. All this may appear to us as dis-
order, but "to the eye of science, there would be no more
disorder here than in the Subbatical peace of a summer sea?\(^3\)

This means, in any event of nature the principle of nece-
ssity reigns supreme and there can neither be any suspen-
sion of the laws of nature nor any supernatural interpo-
sition.

All necessity is mediate necessity in the sense that
whenever we speak of any conclusion, the conclusion should
follow from the ground, because of some factor like the
middle term. (From this point of view, is the so called im-
mediate inference really different in essence from medi-
ate inference?). All thinking is a mediational activity and
as such all our thought and hence necessity is because of
something; i.e., it is mediate. But here a question ari-
ses: What is the nature of a priori necessity? For the
concept "a priori" means that a truth is presupposed in
every bit of experience and that this truth is necessarily
presupposed. If necessity is mediational and if a priori
is also a form of necessity without being mediated by any-
thing, how can we reconcile these two views?

It was Aristotle who for the first time used the
word a priori. The problem for Aristotle was: Since each
preceding member of a series presupposes its preceding

\(^3\) Huxley: Contemporary Review, for February 1887. Quoted
from Ibid. p.214.
member and this in turn its predecessor and so on ad infinitum, it is only by making the series ultimately return to itself that we can escape this fallacy. And this is described as a priori. All necessity involves a "why" which bears the mark "because of"; i.e., it is mediate. And if a priori is really a necessary truth, it cannot cease to be mediate and if it is not mediate, it is not necessary in the sense in which we mean it. In fact a priori instead of being a form of necessity is something which is a ground of necessity.

IN WHAT SENSE CAN WE SPEAK OF AESTHETIC NECESSITY?

We noted above that all necessity is mediate, it is because-of-face. In this sense we cannot speak of an aesthetic necessity. For, mediation is a character of only discursive intellect; it is the characteristic of the reasoning process, which always depends for its proof on some other term. But it is the same condition which as such should exactly be absent in aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experience is essentially emotional or of the nature of immediate feeling. We do not maintain that there will not be any kind of awareness in art experience but we only assert that aesthetic experience excludes any kind of mediated proof. A landscape or a tune is beautiful and we experience it not because of any other second factor, but because it is beautiful and we experience its beauty immediately. It is true that this experience is of the nature of a whole, but in the experience of the whole
what takes place is uniquely different from what it is in
the case of understanding the whole with the rational in-
tellect. The whole of the logical understanding is an
inferred construct of the mind while in aesthetic experi-
ence the whole is something which is a direct experience.

Despite these differences we may point out an impor-
tant fact from the point of view of the teleology of nece-
sity. The purpose of necessity is to connect and to con-
nect implies some disjointed elements to be connected.
It is because of the disjoining process which has already
set in and the catastrophe of it is felt by the intellect,
the intellect itself devices a plan to connect the disjoin-
ted even as they arise. Hence the purpose of necessity
is to restore the unity. But in the case of aesthetic
whole, since the intellect has not become discursive, there
is neither the process of disjoining nor the necessity of
connecting. But do we not speak of an aesthetic whole
and its parts? Do we not say that a particular \textit{Than} has
wonderfully added to the beauty of the song or a particu-
lar line is indispensably necessary for the unity of the
picture? Are not these statements based on analysis, what-
ever the degree of analysis be? In doing so, no doubt,
we are aware of the fact that the line is of the picture
and the \textit{Than} of the song. But the same is true in the
case of the analysis of discursive intellect. There can-
not be anything like a literal disjoining. There is ana-
lysis — which means differentiation which by implication
is always on the basis of a unifying principle. One may
say that in appreciating art, taking it part by part is a
matter of reflection on a work of art and it does not belong to art experience proper. But this view limits the scope, width and depth of art experience. In any kind of art experience, we first have the impression of the whole and we go on indefinitely taking every part one after another and enjoying it.

So what this goes to point out is this: that both in epistemology and in aesthetic the concept of necessity is there. But in epistemology as we are at the discursive intellectual level, necessity is explicitly conceptual. But at the aesthetic level, the whole presents itself immediately before us and so necessity in the mediate and conceptual sense does not arise. But to the extent we are able to analyse each part and enjoy it, some kind of connecting link should be there and that is necessity which has not yet become completely conceptualised in the discursive sense.

Since the epistemic coherence is a whole the limit of which is impossible for us as human beings to mark out, the necessity of epistemology is not fully known; for till we know the entire whole, we cannot claim to know exhaustively the necessity of any one part. But since aesthetic coherence is a whole which has a natural limit of its own in the case of every work of art, we may in a sense claim to "know" (not in the discursive sense) the necessity of a part completely. So in this sense the nature of necessity is better illustrated in the aesthetic whole than in the logical whole.
§ 3. **EMPIRICISM AND NECESSITY:**

We may very briefly note the two opposite and extreme positions with regard to their attitude towards the concept of necessity: Empiricism and Formalism.

By now it is clear that the notion of necessity arises only on the basis of a whole and in a logical whole necessity is the basis of universality and it is always a mediate truth; and though in this sense we cannot speak of necessity in the aesthetic whole, in so far as we speak of the unity of the parts in an aesthetic whole, we should recognise some implicit notion of necessity. In both the cases, the meaning of necessity is just "that which cannot be otherwise".

But, for empiricism necessity is nothing more than a matter of habituation. The empiricist tries to justify his position by pointing to the degree of necessity that we entertain between different facts. Are all leaves necessarily green? Is all snow necessarily white? Our habit of seeing the second in affirmative is uncontradicted while that of the first is contradicted many times. The second we call a necessary proposition while we do not label the first with this exalted title. But both are contingent since our uncontradicted habit of seeing the two together is not the proof of its universal necessity. Some stream of empiricism ascribes the reason for the strong persistence of such habit in us which it calls "radical memory". Even the so called laws of logic, which
are held by rationalism to be the most universal necessary principles, are the products of the experience of the entire race, the habit of which is transmitted into our belief and imagination. "The universal law that, other things equal, the cohesion of psychical states is proportionate to the frequency with which they have followed one another in experience, supplies an explanation for the so-called forms of thought, as soon as it is supplemented by the law that habitual psychical successions entail some hereditary tendency to such successions, which under persistent conditions, will become cumulative in generation after generation." 4

This explanation is simply a case like saying that the burnt child dreads the fire because of habit. While accepting the example that because of the habit the child dreads the fire, if we further ask why the fire should burn the child whenever the latter touches it? Spencer's psychology cannot give any satisfactory answer. To be consistent with its original position, it should only say that we do not know whether the fire really has the capacity to burn or not, but it is in the child's (and of the race) habit to have that experience. This position, while calling itself advocating the claim of sense experience, ignores the immediate truth of sense experience itself.

Just as the empirical conception of logical necessity destroys the very faith of the sciences from under the em-
-pirical conception of aesthetic necessity destroys any kind of definiteness in a work of art. The aesthetic counterpart of empiricism in epistemology may hold that our notions of unity etc., in art are just matters of habit and in a picture there can be mere opposition without any kind of unity; and the end of a tragedy may be a comedy even though all the preceding portions are kept intact, only if the audience are accustomed to see such a view. A modern writer expresses himself: "... relationships within particular works of art are experienced and described as consistent when they satisfy a certain set of expectations of a percipient who has become familiar with certain kinds of relationships. Such sets of expectation, in turn, are the result of a percipient's habituation to and familiarity with certain kinds of relationships." 5

It is true that certain familiarity and habit are necessary for us to appreciate the necessity or the necessary relation in any work of art. But this is equally true in the case of sciences also, if by familiarity and habit we mean a certain degree of training or knowledge about what we are observing or appreciating. But it is quite untenable to conclude on this basis that all necessity is a matter of mere habit. This position raises another question: Is art appreciation governed merely by the psychological conditions which are limited by one's socio-cultural traditions? If it were the truth, the art of one 5. Helmut Hungerland: Consistency as a criterion in Art Criticism. Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism. Vol.VII. NL. Dec. 1948. Italics ours.
tradition should be totally unintelligible for another tradition. But this is not the fact. If a man with just an "ear for music" attends a musical concert of another tradition, he will definitely appreciate it and if he has further sympathy, he will find out how coherence is exhibited in the music of that tradition. It is true that the way in which coherence or necessity exhibits itself is different from one artistic tradition to another, but to say that therefore it is a matter of mere habit is to be blind to the empirical evidence itself. The differences in the forms of coherence only show the myriad ways of its applicability and therefore its universality.

The attempt to answer the empiricist's position is continuing in one form or another from the time of Kant, but since it is not our purpose here to enter into the details of all the arguments of the rationalists, we may just pass on by referring to the nature of geometrical thinking in which even without empirical experience the conclusions necessarily follows. It may be a red triangle or a green triangle, or it may be one of any size or made of any material, the fresh student can lop off all these unnecessary accidental features and think the essential nature of geometrical necessity. It is true, that we get the necessary propositions through experiences, but to say that we get it always from experience is a serious error.

NECESSITY AND FORMALISM: EPISTEMIC & AESTHETIC: While the empiricist's position asserts that necessity is only a matter of habituation, the formalist holds that all our
experience takes place in a certain fixed non-sensible relational pattern; and we may single out this pattern from the assemblies of experiential masses and study them in their pure formal relations. There is necessity in this structure or pattern and since it constitutes the bony structure of all our experience, there is necessity in concrete experience.

In the sphere of art and art criticism a similar view had been gaining popularity. This view holds that beauty consists not in the subject matter but in the form and therefore the necessity or otherwise in the work of art is purely a question of the form. To quote one of the leading advocates of formalism in art: "What quality is shared by all objects that provoke our aesthetic emotions? What quality is common to Sta. Sophia and the windows at Charters, Mexican sculpture, a Persian bowl, Chinese carpets, Giotto's frescoes at Padua, and the masterpieces of Poussin, Piero della Francesca, and Cézanne?—only one answer seems possible—significant form. In each, lines and colours combined in a particular way, certain forms and relations of forms, stir our aesthetic emotions. These relations and combinations of lines and colours, these aesthetically moving forms, I call "Significant form"; and "Significant form" is the one quality common to all works of visual art". 6 Olive Bell continues and says: "For a discussion of aesthetics, it need be agreed only that forms arranged and combined

according to certain unknown and mysterious laws do move us in a particular way, and that it is the business of an artist so to combine and arrange them that they shall move us ....... my term 'Significant Form' included combinations of lines and colours. The distinction between form and colour is an unreal one.

Before we examine the position of Olive Bell we will do well to state the view of necessity of the epistemological formalist. According to him, since necessity is in the form of thought, what matters to us in our pursuit of truth is merely the form of the argument and when once the form is scrupulously observed, the content which is relatively less important gets itself into the governing rules of these forms. To take an example: I am elder than X and X is elder than Y and hence I am elder than Y. Here we may substitute any other terms; but in so far as the same structure of the argument is maintained, the necessity of the conclusion cannot be doubted.

While the formalist holds that necessity consists in the form of the argument, he does not hold that all the forms exhibit the same degree of necessity. Though Kant held that the various categories are equally necessary in the sense they are indispensable to experience, he did not maintain that we possess the same insight into all the categories, like, e.g., between the sequences of axioms and the theorem of geometry. "It is thus evident that while for the formalist necessity must reside if anywhere in

7. Ibid. p.11-12.
logical forms, logical forms do not always convey necessity.\(^8\)

It is necessary for our purpose to have a clear idea of the meaning of form—i.e., logical form. We may note a few descriptions of logical form by some noted thinkers.

"The form of a proposition is that, in it, that remains unchanged when every constituent of the proposition is replaced by another."\(^9\)

"The form of a proposition is what remains unchanged although all the constituents of the proposition are altered. The form is the way in which the constituents are put together."\(^10\)

"When there is complete abstraction from all material constituents the proposition is completely formal."\(^11\)

"Logical implication is formal in the sense that it holds between all propositions, no matter how diverse, provided they stand to each other in certain relations."\(^12\)

"If, in the apprehension of a fact, everything is disregarded excepting the numerical identity and diversity of its elements, and their grouping into wholes, what remains will be the logical form."\(^13\)

Logical form is the least common factor of all objects."\(^14\)

---

14. Eaton: Ibid. p.43. (Quoted from Ibid.)
Now, we may ignore the differences of opinion among these thinkers with regard to the various other characteristics of form, and observe one common characteristic: the form of the proposition can be studied independently of the content. The formalist can claim, and rightly, that the most formal proposition is the most universal one and so it is most necessary. But here a question faces us: Is it really possible for us to study the form independently of the content? The formalist may give an affirmative answer and give the example of arithmetic in which we can study the various numbers without having the corresponding number of material things. But we should note that this example itself is not true; for what we really imply by any mathematical number, say, 3 is, if there are three pencils or books or rivers etc., this number would describe their numerical differences. So by implication, even numbers are not formal, but material.

We may now take up the parallel problem that has most influentially crept into aesthetics: Whether the beauty of a work of art consists exclusively of its form or content? We have already quoted two passages from Clive Bell who holds that beauty or aesthetic necessity consists in the formal arrangement of lines, colours etc. To reproduce the quotation: "... forms arranged and combined according to certain unknown and mysterious laws do move us in a particular way and it is the business of the artist so to combine and arrange them that they shall move
us." Now, the question arises: Is beauty a by-product of or another name for these formal arrangements? If it is so, why should they move us? Here the formalist becomes silent. The answer of Mr. Bell is, it is "mysterious". It is mysterious because of the formalist's error of abstracting the form from the content of the work of art.

If form is the sole factor that matters, then any form can be given to any subject and there is no subject that is artistically either more suited or less suited. But as A. O. Bradley points out, the Fall of Man is really a more unfavourable subject than a pin's head—though it is possible to write a good poem on a pin's head. The point to be noted is, either in logic or in art, there is nothing like any definite set of forms. To assume that form alone settles truth or beauty is to suppose by implication that we are in possession of all the forms both in logic and in art.

Necessity that we entertain in the context of the coherence theory of truth is not that of the abstract universal. We concede that form can be viewed for a time as though it is independent. But this does not mean that it is actually so and we can study it as such. Formalism is an answer to empiricism, but it commits the fallacy of taking the other extreme. Even the representative example of formal necessity exemplified in syllogism cannot be purely formal and this is made clear when we are asked not to commit the fallacy of ambiguous terms. If necessity or truth lies in mere form, why should we look into
the concrete meaning of the terms? What is the plain meaning of meaning but its reference to its content? So the necessity which we insist is the concrete, the "material", which is urged by the actual circumstances.

The fallacy of separating the form from the content and entertaining that the one is more important than the other arises perhaps due to our mistaken of the "type" or the "general shape" for the form. In the same way the error arises when we mistake the "subject" of a work of art for its content. This is an error that occurs both in epistemology and in aesthetics. When, for example, a certain astronomical problem is reasoned out by the scientist, what is the content of his reasoning? Astronomy. What is the form of the reasoning? Say, a certain mathematical method. But here "Astronomy" is a very vague word. The content is exactly what he reasoned and the conclusion he reached; and the form is how the conclusion naturally forced itself out of the data. There may be similarity between the how of the coming out of one conclusion from its data and the how of the coming out of another conclusion from its data. If we recognise this similarity there is no harm and in a way it is practically serviceable. But our thought has a tendency to abstract the similarities and view them as though they can be studied separately. So far so good. But owing to a confusion of thinking or by what is called in poetry the perso-

15. "The controversy over form starts when a question is raised about whether the 'natural beauty' of the material is given its just due." — James L. Jarret: The Quest for Beauty. p.201.
-nifying process (in philosophy "entifying") we make a transition from this legitimate activity of thought to treat these similar hows as though they are one set, ready patterns like the block of the printer. It is true, there is a type called negative judgment. But are any two negative judgments exactly identical in their implications and applicability? If not, can there be form stripped off of its implication and applicability?

The mistaking of the subject for the content and the form for the general type can be obviously found in the field of art. Two persons may write dramas on the same subject—say, the battle of Kurukṣetra. But in their content (assume that both of them are genuine artists with originality of insight and creative power) the two dramas essentially differ from each other. For, one dramatist conceives the whole war, say as a Dharmayuddha, the war of righteousness. And to bring out the ends of justice whatever Kṛṣṇa does is right and the whole war is nothing but a series of the material consequences of the law of justice, unviolable and irrevocable. In this light, what are the characters? And to whom should the credit of winning the war go? etc., etc., the whole substance of the story and the interpretation of the characters undergo a transformation. Now, for the second dramatist, the war is nothing but a great feat of diplomacy and strategy. Whatever Kṛṣṇa does, he does it because he is an ingenious diplomat, cunning and skilled. In this light what will
be the interpretation of the characters and thereby the whole story of the battle?

Here the subject of both the dramatists may be the same but the substance of each is different and because the substance is different the form in which it expresses itself is also different. Just as the substance is different from subject, so also the form is different from the "type". In the statement "on the same subject of Kurukṣetra battle two dramas are written" the battle of Kurukṣetra is the subject and dramas the type. But this is simply a descriptive statement which comprises neither the substance nor the form. The substance is what the work is and the form how it is. In a logical judgment the that is the subject and what the predicate. Just as we cannot separate the two in a logical judgment, but we can only view them distinctly, so also the what and the how within of a poem are essentially one. If the what is affected, the how definitely changes and we cannot modify the how without changing the what. The work of art is one in which both the how and the what are inseparable. Says one of the most influential English Literary critics: "Substance is within the poem, and its opposite, form, is also within the poem." Then where is the superiority of the one to the other? Prof. Bradley continues and says: "It (the value of the poem) lies neither in the one (form) nor in the other (substance), nor in any addition of them, 16.

but in the poem, where they are not." That is, in the state of the aesthetic enjoyment the distinction between form and content never arises. Is it not the case in logic too that when we actually think, we do not distinguish between the content and the form of our thinking?

§ 4. THE MEANING OF RELATION:

We may now turn to the usage of the other word we have added in the title of this chapter, namely relation. In the context in which we use the word relation, how far its meaning is different from that of necessity is a matter of interpretation. But when we explained the meaning of necessity, we said that it stands for the relation which inevitably a consequent is ground or a part to its whole; and that necessity is a notion that can be applied not to the whole but to the judgments or parts in relation to the other parts belonging to the same whole. We also pointed out the difference between a logical whole and an aesthetic whole and how in the latter the term necessity cannot be applied in the mediate sense of discursive intellect; still in so far as we speak of an aesthetic whole and its parts, necessity means the uniting principle.

Now, without giving rise to objections, can we not substitute the word relation in the place of necessity? Instead of saying that necessity binds the consequent to its ground or the parts to its whole, can we not say that there is a relation between the two? We can say so provided by the word relation we mean neither more nor less
than, nor anything different from, what we meant by the
term necessity. We may abide by this strict condition
and use the word relation.

The word relation when applied to the judgments
between which there is concrete necessity, means that one
judgment is related with the other in such a way that the
judgments are what they are because they are related with
each other in the way they are now; and in a work of art
too each part is related with the others in such a way
that the parts are what they are because they are related
with the others in such a way that the parts are what they
are because they are related with each other in the way
they are now. That is to say, the relation is inevitable
for the parts to be what they are. This description of
the relation concurs itself with what is known as the in-
ternal view of relation; which may be described briefly
(tautologously too) as the relation which is intimately
connected with the terms or parts.

Now already we are in the arena of epistemology on
which great fights were fought and are being fought bet-
ween the two views of relation: the one holding that the
relation in which the terms are placed does not affect
the terms intrinsically. A term may change its relation
without either affecting or being affected by other terms
just as if I take one book from one shelf and keep it in
the box the book will not be affected in any way, nor will
the other books in any way be changed. This theory is
known as the external view of relation; relations are
external to the terms of change of relation does not intrinsically affect the terms related. Conversely it means that the terms may change without changing the relations. This view holds that what we should see in inference is just a relation between a term and another and without causing any change in the other terms we may change the mode of our inference. In the proposition "If a donkey is Plato, it is a great philosopher," the external view holds that the consequent follows from the antecedent and so the proposition is true. For the (relation of) implication correctly holds between "Donkey is Plato" and "it is a great philosopher", on the basis of "if". We saw the relation and there we should end and stop. But here the internal view of relation disagrees and says that we cannot stop here; for if a donkey becomes Plato various other consequences should follow—like, the laws of physiology should change and all that. Statements of implications are not simply connectives of bare abstractions. They have a reference to further conditions which together will form a system. So relations can not be other than internal in the sense described above.

Though we may not find any external aesthetic relation being systematically developed and defended, we find in the history of Western Literary Criticism positions which imply the external view and relations. Being influenced by Hobbes and Hume, Gerard, a literary critic belonging to the age of Hume, describes imaginative
combination of elements as due to mechanical laws of combination. In his own words: "When Homer formed the idea of Chimera, he only joined into one animal, parts which belonged to different animals; the head of a lion, the body of a goat, and the tail of a serpent." The tendency towards the incoherent and indeterminate organization (whether they are really incoherent forms another question) in some shades of modern art is due to an unconscious leaning on the part of the artists towards what may be called an external view of relations in a work of art. But treating it hypothetically just as a position—the aesthetic counterpart of what we are considering in epistemology—we may try to explain it thus: in a work of art there is nothing that intrinsically necessitates any part to be what it is because of its relation with the other parts; and the other parts also can be arranged in any other way without changing the significance of the former part.

This position cannot even be explained any further without making an account of nonsense and hence we need not spend any time in criticising it. But this much we shall note that in epistemology the problem of internal and external views of relation can be at least discussed because in our thought we can abstract just for the sake

of study a term from another. The two terms in a judgment are different at least as terms. If not, what is the point of speaking that they are two terms? Now, because we can treat them as two different terms, we can (by confusing distinctness for separateness) speak of them as not internally connected. But in the case of aesthetic experience, we are at the emotional level, the level of feeling where the discursive intellect cannot enter to create acute distinctness. To put the matter in a slightly different way: unity and distinctness are relative concepts, we cannot speak of the one without implying the other. Yet when we are at the level of discursive intellect, we deal with the latter while implying the former; and when we are at the level of aesthetic experience, we are in the state of the former in which though distinction is there, the sense of unity is so predominate (otherwise it ceases to be aesthetic experience) that we are not clearly aware of the aspect of the distinctness. Not merely that, we are not consciously aware of even the unity which is understood always in the background, however faint it may be, of distinctness. Hence as we can do in epistemology, we cannot even speak of an "external relation" among the parts of the aesthetic whole and yet be true to what we actually experience.

If we hold that relations are external to things or terms, we are confronted with another difficulty. Then it follows that anything can be related with any other thing, because relation does not make an intrinsic diffe-
-235-

rence to the terms. But in actuality we find that things can be related only with certain other things and not with all. Thus a pitch in music has a relation with a lower or a higher pitch and it has no relation in so far as it is musical pitch with old potato. Because the former is also a term of sound, it can relate itself with other pitches as both intrinsically share the same nature. In this way we cannot relate a spatial term like a right angle with an ethical term like gratitude. That is, only those terms which have something common in nature can be related with each other and so the basis of the relation should lie in the nature of the terms.

Before entering into examining whether the external view of relation satisfies the requirements of logic, we shall state what exactly it means. The theory is stated as follows by one of its defenders: *(1) That if two terms are related, neither term influences the other, (2) That the absence of either term would be without effect on the other, (3) That either term may come into being and into relation with the other term without affecting it, (4) That, accordingly, no term is complex by virtue of being related, and (5) That no term, underlying A R B ..., is necessary. Briefly, the theory of external relations is that relatedness and independence are quite compatible.*

Let us try to understand the meaning of these propositions by questioning each. The first proposition

18. This statement should be understood with a qualification. No doubt everything in the world is related with everything else but not in the same degree of directness.

states that if two terms are related, neither term influences the other. But if that is the nature of relation, what is the good of calling it a relation and what should be the nature of the terms that stand uninfluenced when they are related with other terms? A thorough-going pluralism, where particular facts are stubbornly independent, refusing to come together. If a man defines philosophy as an attempt at systematic and unified explanation of experience, in the face of this relation he should either change the definition of philosophy or reject this description of relations. The second statement says that "the absence of either term would be without effect on the other!". In this connection we should keep in view that we cannot take relation as an abstract entity. Relation is the relation of something. It may be a relation between a quality and its substance, between some temporal events or spatial existents. Let us take the relation between a quality and a substance. Say substance sugar S is related with the quality sweetness Q. If the absence of either term is without effect on the other, can we say that sweetness Q can be absent from sugar S and yet sugar will not be affected? We should remember that we are not talking about the terms in abstraction. For us a term is a symbol that stands for a thing or some part or aspect of existence. If there can be sugar without sweetness, to us only the defender of this doctrine should explain what it is.

The third proposition says that "either term may come into being and into relation with the other terms without affecting it". But our question is, into what kind of relation? Is it spatial or temporal or of what kind? We cannot keep satisfied with an example that a brick may be placed ten yards away from another brick and then taken still farther away without affecting the former brick. But relation, to speak with seriousness, should be in all its genuineness. Can we say that fire can come into relation with an explosive without affecting it? Or Oxygen and Hydrogen can come into contact with each other without affecting either the other or itself?

The fourth is: "No term is complex by virtue of being related". This is another form of stubbornly maintaining its pluralism. As a criticism of this statement we may refer back to our criticism of the first statement and pass on to the last that "no term, is underlying A R B... is necessary".

This statement is put forward only as an answer to Bradley's criticism of external relations (Appearance Reality Ch.III.) in which he argues that if relation is external to the term how can it relate itself with the term at all? In order to get itself related with the term, it requires another relation, which also according to this theory must be external. And again the same problem arises and hence it causes an infinite regress. Bradley's criticism is still unanswered. The external theory of relation, in order to escape this criticism, should modify
its definition, but in its modified form whether it can be really called external in the original sense of the term is a matter which only the defender of the theory should explain.

§ 5. RELATION IMPLIES A "WHY":

PURPOSE OF THOUGHT AND IMAGINATION:

Now, we may ask a fundamental question with regard to the necessity of any relation whether aesthetic or epistemie. Why should a term be related or get itself related with other term or terms, a part in a work of art with other parts? We shall take the view of relation not only in its epistemological or aesthetic or ontological sense but in all its aspects including the axiological. Whether in a work of art or in actual life or in any scientific field, the fact that a thing is related with some other thing implies that there is an inner necessity, inherent in its nature, for that thing to be related. Whatever the other descriptions of that inner necessity be, one thing is sure: the thing relates itself because of its certain deficiency. To put the same thing in another way: the thing feels certain incompleteness with itself and it is as a movement towards the fulfilment of this incompleteness.

---

20. In a sense we cannot make a demarcation between the so-called axiological sciences and the non-axiological ones. Is metaphysics the discipline that describes the nature of reality as it is? Are truth and beauty facts or values or facts transformed into values? Apart from any sense of value can our notions of epistemology, aesthetics, etc., be satisfactory? The so-called fact is a fiction even according to the empiricist Lake and we may say that truth is a value. See, Dr. A.G. Javadekar: Approach to Reality, where he tries to present a point of view towards Reality from an integrated point of view of the fundamental values of life.
that the relation takes place. Can we not say that be-
cause man in himself feels incomplete that he enters into
conjugal relationship with a woman and vice versa? Can we
not say that friendship is the same kind of relationship
that takes place because of the fact necessity of man for
certain fulfilment? In the same way the relationship bet-
ween the teacher and the taught, mother and the child?
These examples based on human emotions may not be accepted
by the advocates of the external theory of relations. But
let us remember that we cannot ignore the emotional side
of our experience. Still we may give similar examples
from the scientific field. Is it not in the nature of
oxygen to combine itself with hydrogen whenever suitable
conditions are provided? In this example, it may be said
that after the relation takes place oxygen cannot retain
its identity, for it results into quite another thing.
But what we should note here is, after the relationship
takes place, the previous terms in no case retain their
original identity in the strict sense of the term, and to
the extent they are modified by the new relations, they
are numerically different; and in the case of oxygen and
hydrogen the modification may be comparatively more.

The question is just this: If we accept teleology,
in some sense or other, in the course of the working of
physical matter, change cannot be mechanical change, but
it should be a transformation. Transformation towards
whatever be the direction, of certain things when they get
together in a certain way; i.e., when they are related.
The nature of this getting related or transformation must be within the previous states of things. But we cannot say this on an external view of relation.

That relation arises because of certain felt deficiency can be more markedly observed in a purposive activity like the development of our thought and imagination. When we have the first moment of any experience, we have pure undifferentiated feeling which may be described as the total experience. Then, out of this experience itself awareness begins to dawn which develops itself into discursive thought. And when we come to the level of thought, the undifferentiated experience becomes differentiated into various notions of things and qualities etc. It is at this time that we have the notion of a relation. A term, when it is there with its differentiated stage—i.e., as a quality or a thing divorced by thought from other things, is an abstraction and so it feels shaky. It is an abstraction because it is pointed to in isolation. It cannot be in that stage, for the concepts of thought are just tools made by thought itself for its own development. Each term, in order to fulfil its purposive development, i.e., to overcome its isolation and abstraction, wants to develop itself. And it is exactly that terms become related to one another. It is this felt necessity of development which is the basis of all relation. When two terms get related, it means that the necessity of development was felt by both the terms and each gains as it needs and gives as it can; and in this way relation
develops in the process or realising certain equilibrium of thought without reaching which thought cannot rest satisfied.

A similar process can be observed in the purposive (but not practical) development of imagination. We must remember that imagination cannot take place in vacum, but it works only through some medium like paint, sound, words etc. Hence we may speak of different kinds of imagination based on the medium in which it takes place—like tonal imagination, visual or colour imagination etc. Now, wherever imagination develops in the way of its realisation, a process sets in within itself. In this process the developed stage should get itself related with the previous stage or point; without this process of getting related the imagination cannot become one integrated whole. It is in this process of developing or multiplying in the quality of its own medium, yet retaining its unity, that the need for relation arises. But since this relation and development go together, or since both of them are two aspects of one and the same process, we cannot so acutely distinguish in a work of art which is relation and which the related. For, in the aesthetic experience, the relation is also a matter of feeling even as the related. In the previous chapter we defined concepts like harmony, balance contrast etc., in terms of relation. But we should note in this context that relation is how the things are in the unity. The point we have to note here is this: just as in the case of thinking,
relation develops in the process of realising certain equilibrium without reaching which thought can not rest satisfied; so also relation is generated in the developing process of imagination in realizing its equilibrium or harmony without reaching which imagination cannot achieve its satisfactory fulfilment. Since in thought the term can be viewed and spoken of with clear distinction, relation can also be viewed with a greater degree of distinctness; but in imagination, as we are governed more by feeling, the nature of which does not admit the predominance of discursiveness, the parts cannot be viewed with the same degree of distinctness with which we can view the terms; nor can the relation be viewed as clearly as it can be in thought.

Apart from this distinction between the relation of thought and that of imagination, this suggests that relation aims at a common end, which is consciously seen or dimly felt. What is this end? The answer lies in what we described in our previous chapter, namely the development of thought and imagination into a coherent whole. In fact both terms and relations are instruments in the purposive development of thought and to treat either as external to the other or as independent in itself is to be blind to the very nature of the development of thought. And the same is true in the case of parts and relations in a work of art. So all relations are relations in a whole. The whole pervades all the parts maintaining the unity and it does it in the form of the relations. In this sense relations are neither external in the sense described by Prof. Spaulding nor is it blindly and upurposively internal as one can suppose, but it is there to fulfil a purpose.
§ 6. RELATION & THE LAW OF IDENTITY

But this account of the development of thought is not acceptable to the external view of relations. For a while to confine ourselves to epistemology alone, we may ask: In the development of thought does the term retain its identity or not? The answer is demanded in the strict sense of the principle of contradiction. If the term maintains its identity there is no question of either its change or its internal relation with other terms; and if it does not maintain, the result will be an utter chaos, for without a strong pillar on what can our thought rest? Here the example of the syllogism may be given, which insists that the terms of the syllogism should remain the same in both the places--i.e., in the premise and the conclusion--lest they should become ambiguous. In the same way the middle term should remain unchanged in both the propositions. But it does relate the extreme terms and the inference does follow. So, the conclusion that the advocates of the external view of relations draw is: not only inference can take place with external relation, but if there is no external relation, genuine inference is not possible; for the terms themselves will not remain what they should, if the relation is not external.

This is an old objection based on a very old fallacy and its origin is as old as Socrates. Aristotle implicitly accepted the practice of Socrates that before one started any discussion, one should have defined the terms
And on this basis Aristotle held that terms are prior to propositions; which meant that terms can be conceived apart from the proposition in which they occur. Further he said that in a proposition one term was either affirmed or denied of the other. Now, syllogism of formal logic contains propositions, conceived in this sense. But from the time of the birth of the idealistic logic this theory of proposition is rejected. In fact, judgment is the unit of thought and a term has its meaning only in the judgment in which it is referred to. If a thought does not give full sense it is not a judgment, nay it is not thought. Every judgment consists of terms, at least two. Now, these two terms are, called terms in virtue of the fact that they are of the judgment and apart from it we cannot speak of any term.

But the syllogism of formal logic erroneously gives priority to terms, which implies that two independent terms are brought to relation. On this basis, the external view of relation claims that since two independent terms are related (with a further presumption that even after they are related their previous independence is maintained), independence and relation are compatible; i.e., external relation is tenable.

Secondly, syllogism of formal logic is based on the theory of abstract universals, which is rejected by the coherence theory of truth. Syllogism holds that the major premise is a universal proposition. Now, does it

22. See, Ibid, from Ch.1 to VII for a detailed discussion of this point.
contain Socrates or does it not? The middle term says it
does contain. If the minor term is already within the
universal class, how can it be "external" to the latter?
In the same way, what is the relation between man and mor­tal? Is it within the nature of all men to die or is it
not within their nature? If it is not within their nature,
how can we say that all men are mortal?

In this way, if syllogism is interpreted according
to the abstract universal theory, it should crumble down
against a number of difficulties. In syllogism the terms
are taken in abstraction as though Socrates is an entity
which is quite freshly joined with mortality. We believe
not in the abstract universal but in concrete universal
or in the unity which includes the particulars.

So the argument that terms should retain their st­
right identity in thought does not stand any serious criti­
cism. After all, thought develops through the terms and
it does not jump from one independent pillar-like term to
another. Terms are just certain distinguished aspects
of reality. They stand for the differentiated aspects
which differentiation is made by thought itself. But the
same thought further relates the differentiated aspects.
And to say that terms should keep up their absolute iden­
tity (in the sense of their isolation) is to relapse into
the pre-Kantian theory of propositions.

§ 7. THE ELEMENT OF INEXPLICABILITY
IN INTERNAL RELATION:

So far, we have seen that external view of relation
cannot explain the nature of inference or existence. We
also defended a view of relation which is commonly described as internal theory of relation. We shall not commit ourselves to the position of any particular philosopher who upholds the internal theory, but we shall only try to show in what sense and how far our test of truth—coherence—is based on this view. Before that we shall briefly describe this view in the words of some of its supporters. G.E. Moore quotes some important descriptions like: "A relation must at both ends affect, and pass into, the being of its terms." "Every relation essentially penetrates the being of its terms, and is, in this sense intrinsic." "To stand in a relation and not to be relative, to support it and yet not to be infected and undermined by it, seems out of the question."

Other phrases which describe the internal view of relation are: "No relations are purely external". "All relations qualify or modify or make a difference to the terms between which they hold." "No terms are independent of any of the relations in which they stand to other terms."

These phrases are so self-explanatory that they hardly require any comment for being made more clear. Yet we may try to explain the nature of relation in the following way:

---

23. Of course Moore quotes them only to criticise, but they are representative quotations. See his Philosophical studies. p.266 ff.
25. Ibid. p.392.
26. Ibid. p.142.
Prof. Moore himself says that corresponding to every relation there must be a "relational property" in the terms; such as if $A$ is the father of $B$, $A$ possesses the relational property of fatherhood. Now, without changing this relational property we cannot change the relation of $A$ to $B$. Is this property an essential nature of the personality of $A$ as it is? It may be argued that $A$ could continue to exist even without this relational property. But the question is, in the absence of this property, could $A$ continue as he is—as $A$ the father of $B$, which property is also an intrinsic phase of what we call the personality of $A$? Clearly not.

But we need not accept the view of Prof. Moore that corresponding to each relation there must be a "relational property" in the term. We cannot reduce relation to qualities. If relations are reduced to qualities, then what are qualities? Can the qualities be qualities and at the same time relate themselves with other qualities? That is, relations cannot be reduced to qualities. Mc Taggart writes: 27 "There are three facts..... In the first place, a relation may no doubt be based on a quality in each of its terms. But this does not mean that it can be reduced to those qualities..... In the second place..... the existence of a quality in any relation between two substances involves the existence of a quality in each of those substances. "A admires B" is a statement of a relation between $A$ and $B$. But its truth implies

27. Nature of Existence p.82-83. Italics in the original.
the truth of the statements "A is an admirer of B" and "B is an object of admiration to A", which state qualities of A and B. But we cannot state these qualities in terms which omit the conception of relation, since the first is the quality of being a person who admires B, and the second is the quality of being a person who is admired by A, and therefore neither of them can be stated without introducing the conception of admiration which is a relation.

"In the third place a relation determines a quality of any whole which contains all the terms of the relation."

In our conception of relation there is something inexplicable. For, though relation is intrinsic to the terms, it cannot be reduced to mere qualities. In the same way in a work of art, the spatial position of each line, the sequential position of each tone etc., will determine and will be determined by the others. It is in terms of relations that we can explain the concepts of harmony, contrast and balance. Yet, we cannot reduce relations to either the parts that are related or to any other elements. For without relation there is neither multiplicity nor movement. Hence the difficulty that arises is: how can relation be both in a part and out of that part to go and relate with other parts? This is a question which we shall postpone for a later context, because this question is not a mere question about relation in epistemology and aesthetics, but in its extended form it is a question about our conception of truth and beauty themselves; nay, even more, it is a question about the
validity or otherwise of our concepts of truth and beauty from the point of view of a possible higher non-relational experience. Hence for the present we shall merely concentrate on explaining in what sense we believe that all relations are intrinsic.

§ 8. INTERNAL RELATION & THE MEANING OF ACCIDENT:

The problem is this: In the opinion of great critics, specially in literature, every consequent development of the action should necessarily follow from the starting; or from the "world of the literary creation". If this principle is not clearly observed in the development of a literary work, it is the implicit exhibition of the failure of that work. To take examples: A very poor worker X of a factory is almost dying as he cannot sufficiently feed himself and the members of his family. He is one among the thousands of the fellow workers. But this X, our hero, has organised a strike of all the workers to demand better wages. But there is no fund for the purpose. When the movement of the strike is in a critical condition, the hero finds bars of gold under the ground when his wife was digging the kitchen garden to sow vegetable seeds. By selling that gold, the requirement of the strike is fulfilled and the strike is a success.

Or another story: A poor young man and the only daughter of a rich widower, are in love with each other. The father of the girl refuses to give his daughter in marriage to this poor man. The lovers are on the point of death out of frustration. The spectators (if it is a
drama, or readers if it is a novel) are very anxious. Then all of a sudden there comes an old man who tells the father of the girl that the lover of his daughter is no other than the son of his own sister who dies as soon as she gave him birth and that he was left in the child-welfare centre because her husband also died of heart failure on hearing the tragic news; and the child was somehow brought up in the child-welfare centre. Then the lovers are allowed to marry and the spectators heave a sigh of relief.

Instances the type of which can be shown in hundreds from the books of immature writers, are cases of accidental solutions of complications. A novel built purely on events and accidents, has a very loose type of structure and organization. What this shows is, in a work of art if the unity is not clearly achieved, or if the imagination of the artist himself is not fully realized, he tries to patch up the work with some deliberate solutions. This attempt on the part of the artist may be fully conscious or not. This kind of accident appears in the works (which are always aesthetic failures) of the forms of art like music, painting, etc. When imagination is on with its creative activity, if its development is stopped before it finds its own natural conclusion, some non-imaginative help which are quite foreign to the tone of the basic imaginative principles, may be sought and taken to give the finishing shape to the work of art. And "accident" is the result of such attempt. Accident is that which is not satisfactorily integrated by the imagina-
Now let us turn to consider what does accident mean in logic. The problem in logic is this. We consider that the entire universe is a system in which everything is in some way related with everything else and this relation is internal. But, it may be asked, what is the internal relation between a boy who usually puts on a blue shirt and his failure in the examination and another boy's wearing a green shirt and his success? What internal relation is there between the falling of an old tree in Ceylon in the year 1960 and Santayana writing his "Sense of Beauty" in a particular year in America? Questions as these must be dealt with under two distinct but mutually inter-related discussions: (1) What is the meaning of accidents? and; (2) In what way our conception of causation supports our notion of relation?

We may deal first with the meaning of accidents. What is the relation between the boy's wearing the blue shirt and his failure in the examination? Traditional logic classified all predicates under five groups and defined predicables as the name of the relation in which a predicate stands to its subject. Thus the predicables of genus and species are internal in our sense; for in the case of the genus, it shows that the subject is a part of the predicate and the species says that the predicate is the part of the subject. The differentiae is an analytical proposition and proprium also is intrinsic to the subject as it depends upon its differentia. Only the last--
which is further subdivided into two—accident is described as that which is neither a part of the subject nor does it follow from the differentia, but it is there, only as an accident. The meaning of accident is "that the reasoning of which I know not". The accidents are further subdivided into separable and inseparable on the basis, whether they are invariably observed with the subject or not. Now, we should remember that in the development of our knowledge invariable association is the stepping stone further leading to the knowledge of the intrinsic connection. The fact that inseparable accident is distinguished from the separable ones dimly anticipates or implies that the accidents are accidents to us, to our knowledge. In this sense, we may hold, that the five predicables indicate in a broad manner the degree of our knowledge of the relation between the predicate and the subject.

Every subject, i.e., every individual fact is a subject of innumerable predicates. We know the intrinsic relation between some predicates and the subject. Thus we know the relation between the boy of low I.Q. and his failure in the examination and the boy with inadequate teaching and library facilities and his failure in the examination. But we do not know the relationship between the blue shirt and the failure. In all these three examples we should note that low I.Q. is a predicate of the boy and his failure is also a predicate; and in the same way lack of adequate facilities is also a predicate. We know the relation between one predicate and another. But
when we come to the question of the blue shirt, it is also a predicate; but we do not know the relation between this predicate and another predicate, namely failure in the examination. But here, and exactly here, we should raise one basic question: Is our knowledge of the subject— the boy— complete in all the respects? If we had complete knowledge, we would know the inner relation between the blue shirt and the failure. But our knowledge is limited. So we are not prepared to accept that there is any intrinsic relation. Here, can we say that it is an external relation between the two in the sense, the predicate is only an accident of the subject? If we want to call accident as a relation let us call it so; but it only means that it is a relation which we call external because we do not know any internal relation there. So the argument is simply negative.

Let us imagine it is possible to extend our subject and have one all inclusive proposition with the whole of existence as the subject and all events and qualities as the predicates. Both the falling of the old tree in Ceylon and the writing of a book by a philosopher in America are predicates of the same subject and here we do not know how the one necessitates the other or both are necessitated by some other common predicate. Nor do we know those complex chains which are at the back of these two events and where the other ends of both the chains meet.

All this simply means that we do not know; and that is the limitation of our knowledge. But, it may be asked,
how can we draw the conclusion that all these are inter-

nally related, when we confess that we do not know? Here

we should remember what we noted in our previous chapter

about the nature of coherence. We noted that coherence

is the nature and the test of truth. But this does not

mean that we are in possession of complete truth; for

complete coherence means the all-inclusive system; but

our knowledge at the present state is not all-inclusive.

But we are not divested of any knowledge. The knowledge

that we are having indicates the nature of the all inclu-

sive system. In the same way, we may hold, our lacking

of complete knowledge of all the relations of all things

does not prevent us from speaking about the nature of the

relations in which all things are connected with each

other. We do not claim absolute knowledge and this is

due to our freedom from any dogmatic assertion. In fact

to obtain the knowledge of every detail is not the business

of philosophy. It is science which should discover, as

it is doing, the relation between the various events in
detail and philosophy studies only the general nature of

such relations. In the same way how coherence is exhi-

bited in the details of particular pieces of knowledge is

the business of science.

"If you could have a perfect rational knowledge of

the world, you could go from the nature of red-hairedness
to these other characters which qualify it, and you could

from the nature of red-hairedness reconstruct all the red-

haired men. In such perfect knowledge you could start
internally from any one character in the universe, and you could pass from that pass to the rest. You would go in each case more or less directly or indirectly, and with unimportant characters the amount of indirectness would be enormous, but no passage would be external. Such knowledge is out of the reach of any mind that has to think rationally. But if in the Absolute, knowledge is perfected, as we conclude it is, then in a higher form the end of such knowledge is actually realized and with ignorance and chance the last show of externality has vanished.  

When we say that all things are internally related with each other we do not mean that all are related in the same way. There are various aspects of existence—the spatial, the temporal, of the logical, of the ethical, of the material etc. A spatial thing may not have direct internal relation with a value-fact and it need not have. We are not aiming at reducing everything in the world to a dull monotony or a unity divested of any difference. What we mean is this: one spatial event is internally related with another spatial event and one ethical fact is internally related with another ethical fact and in the same way since a science is a systematised unit of knowledge, all the facts that come within that science are internally related. When we come to the level of finding the unity of the underlying principles of the several sciences, we find that the bases of all these internal

relations are different aspects of one reality which includes all these. The synthesis of the basic principles of all sciences, positive or normative (which division is also in a way arbitrary) biological or physical etc., is the function of philosophy.

§ 9. **AN ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION:**

We may here add an argument which has a direct bearing on the logical coherence, but it throws some light indirectly in support of the aesthetic coherence also. That is the argument from causation.

We shall not enter into the discussion on the acceptability or otherwise of causation as a necessary principle or to answer the doubts of Hume. That is a problem too divergent from our main line of thought. We shall continue ourselves only to the question: Does the principle of causation support our view of internal relations or our view of necessity in reasoning? In fact causation itself rests on the concept of necessity. Therefore we shall ask the following questions and try to answer them in the order in which they are asked: (1) Is there any difference between the necessity in reasoning and that in causation? and (2) Are all cases of reasoning cases of causation? and (3) How far the necessity in causation substantiates our view of intrinsic relation?

The answer to the first question—Is there any difference between the necessity in reasoning and that in causation?—is, No. For, causation itself is a principle or relation which is reached after a high degree of intellectual exercise. The facts that are given to us directly
from nature or the natural phenomena themselves do not give us anything more than certain successive events and these are miserably inadequate from the point of view of a system. Further, the phenomena of nature are always so complex that we have to make a great deal of mental abstraction and construction before we can reach through them a necessary relation between the relevant C and E. That is, causation is always a hypothetical argument in which the ground and the consequent are necessarily connected. So, there is no difference between the necessity that we find in causation and in reasoning.

But this does not mean, coming to the second question, that all cases of reasoning are cases of causation. Here is a difference: causation is something which has a reference to the temporal "before" and "after"; because cause and effect are temporally successive. But we do not find this element in a reasoning as we have in geometry. Whether the properties follow temporally after the definition of the triangle is a meaningless question; for it is a system of reasoning which has no reference to time in this sense. Here the point is this: Necessity is exhibited in all the spheres and aspects of existence, but the necessity which is exhibited in one particular aspect cannot as such be found in another aspect. Each aspect has its own special condition which makes the necessity to operate in a particular way. Yet we may observe one similar point between the two spheres. In reasoning we speak of a consequent and a ground and in causation
we speak of an effect and an antecedent. Now, in many
cases of our reasoning, actually our ground will be the
antecedent and the consequent will be the effect. In
such cases where "the premises represent a reality in ti-
me, which actually and by its own necessity, goes into a
construction— whenever that construction itself is real,
and the quality of relation, that appears in the conclu-
sion, is its immediate result— in these cases and in
these cases alone, the because and the cause must be id-
ential", and "wherever on the other hand there is no ques-
tion of a temporal process of events" "the reason for kn-
owing and the reason for being fall hopelessly asunder."

Now we shall come to our third question: How far
the necessity in causation substantiates our view of in-
trinsic relation? After all, what is causality itself?
It is a principle which is based on the theory that events
of nature are internally related with an abiding principle.
The law of causation is "the application to events of the
principle of coherence or system, which is a cardinal as-
sumption of thought." It is held by scientists of first
eminence that all the events in the whole of the univers-
are so intimately connected with each other that we cannot
see the lily in the crannied wall as an isolated phenome-
non. "Everybody pulls every other to-wards it, no matter
how distant it may be. Newton's apple not only exerted
its pull on the earth, but on every star in the sky, and

29. Bradley: Logic. Vol.II. p.545. The quotation of
the phrase "wherever on the other hand....." is in-
serted from the correction the author has suggested
in the Additional Notes.

the motion of every star was affected by its fall. We cannot move a finger without disturbing all the stars." It is this—the anxious of the scientist that the whole universe is a system—which is the basis of causation.

In this system every thing must be connected (needless to add 'internally') with everything else either directly or indirectly. There is no meaning in saying that all the members are the members of a genuine system and yet they are "externally related."

Though this argument does not directly add to the aesthetic coherency, it has an indirect bearing. Our conception of causation is determined by our world-view; or our world-view is implied in our conception of causation. Further, whether it is epistemology or ethics or aesthetics, the standard of the normative science has its basis in our world-view. Our conception of causation is a necessary part or the basis of our view that the world is a coherent system and it is this view that forces itself on the ideal of our thought; and it is the same view that determines our aesthetic standard.

§ 10. CONCLUSION:

A relation presupposes a whole and it determines terms or parts, as the relation itself is determined by its terms. We cannot either reduce the relations into terms or terms into relations. The necessity in our thought and imagination is expressed through these relations. We may further add that our notions of terms and parts and

relations between them only mark the development of the inner purpose of our thought and imagination, the developed form of which is coherence, epistemic or aesthetic. The test of truth and beauty is within the very nature of thought and imagination respectively and the nature of thought expresses itself through terms and necessary relations forming a systematic whole, in which the parts are kept distinct but necessarily related with each other; and the same description is true in the case of imagination if we remember the difference that we noted between two throughout the preceding chapters.