CHAPTER I

TRUTH AND BEAUTY AS IMITATION.

§ 1. THE MEANING OF IMITATION:

When we classify the various subtle and divergent philosophical trends into certain broad positions and brand them into certain descriptive names, we can neither claim to do justice nor actually do it to every shade of these positions. Thus, for e.g., when we use the word 'realism' to denote certain philosophical movement, we do not specifically mean either this or that particular mode of that movement. Our designation 'realism' may refer to either naive realism, neo-realism or critical realism or the realistic position taken by any one individual thinker. Thus even in Indian thought there are various realistic schools like the Nyāya, the Jaina, the Mīmāṃsā and even the Rāmānuja. But all of them differ from one another considerably with regard to their explanations of the final problem.

Leaving aside the metaphysical differences that exist between one realist and another, we may define a realist as one who believes in the independent reality of the things and that whatever we know must have an objective basis; in other words, our knowledge, it may be the knowledge derived from perceptual source or by inference, which must have an objective reference which exists "out there" independently of any one's knowing it. And our knowledge is true if it "correctly" represents the objective world, if it conforms to the thing as it is. The test of truth, then, according to this school, is whether our knowledge "reflects" the objective world as it is or whether our mental
picture of the object is a distorted one. Truth is the mental copy of the external object; it is yathārtha jñāna.

The idea that truth consists in copying is suggested by many sources. Language implies that man wants to convey something about something to some other person. If that something does not conform to his ideas, how is speech possible? If the thing is not copied by the mind and if it does not remain the same, practical life becomes impossible. Further, the past cannot be retained in the mind if the mind did not somehow copy the thing with which we deal. When disagreement between two individuals arises about a thing, the fact that both of them agree to appeal to facts implies that the minds of both the individuals copied the fact; hence either both are wrong or one of them is wrong. And when agreement is reached between the two, it means that the copies of the same thing in both the minds are similar.

Beauty as imitation:

We find the same position being completely or partly adopted in the history of European art and art criticism. It is in Plato that we find for the first time a clear statement of the imitation theory of beauty. For Plato all that the artist does is "to take a mirror and turn it round in all directions". But when Plato holds that art has truth thrice removed from reality, we can easily notice that he was very much influenced by his

2. The Republic. Translated by Cornford. p.326.
predecessors and contemporaries in forming his view on art. The Greeks believed that the function of art was to imitate, imitate nature or things. In fact Plato builds up his material sensible world on his doctrine of imitation. The doctrine of imitation has its sway even on Aristotle's thought about art. Thus for him drama is the imitation of action. Aristotle writes: "There seem to be two causes that gave rise to poetry in general, and they are natural. The impulse to imitate is inherent in man from his childhood; he is distinguished from among the animals by being the most imitative of them, and he takes the first steps of his education by imitating. Everyone's enjoyment of imitation is also inborn. What happens with works of art demonstrates this: though a thing itself is disagreeable to look at, we enjoy contemplating the most accurate representations of it—For instance, figures of the most despicable animals, or of human corpses. The reason for this lies in another fact: learning is a great pleasure, not only to philosophers but likewise to everyone else, however limited one's gift for it may be. He enjoys looking at these representations, because in the act of studying them he is learning—identifying the object by an inference (for instance, recognising who is the original of a portrait)."

In the western artistic tradition the notion of imitation persisted in some form or the other and in a greater or lesser degree. The painter, for example, required a model. Even such a master artist as Michael Angelo used models to paint such a divine theme as the life of Christ. The idea behind the using of models

3. Poetics, Ch.4. Translated by L.H. Potts.
was that nature or object of nature was in itself beautiful and
the business of the artist was just to catch that beauty in a
particular medium best suited to his expressive talent.

Though this vague notion can be noticed right from the be­

"art for art's sake" and he desired to make
a 'living' art'. For him "painting should deal only with visual
objects and tangible things...... represent simple people in un­
idealized attitudes, undesirable subjects for painting from the

Academy point of view". " His programme reflected the will of
a generation which was trying in the middle of the nineteenth cen­
tury to formulate the world in which it lived without sublimity,
but with all the more reality. It was the starting point of a
modern school of painting which endeavours to present nature and
the exact image of things and not symbols for them". It was an
age when the artists were labouring under the passion of being
"true to nature" and fidelity of representation. We may note with profit a passage from a famous art critic of the time:" Even
if it may be disputed that they (the trees) think, they certainly
give us food for thought, and in return we owe them not the arro­
gance of the master or the pedantic and classical style, but every

4. The History of western Art, by Erwin O. Christenson, Mentor
Book, p.320.
5. Peter Thoene: Modern German Art (Pelican) p.16.
6. Rousseau (not the Philosopher) Quoted from Ibid p.18.
sincerity in attention in reproducing their beings. In return for all the thought they arouse in us, they only ask not to be disfigured, not to be robbed of that air which they need so much. They also beg to be spared what we, in studio jargon, call modeling them. They do not want any more relief than is natural to them."

The realist stresses also the subject that is selected. Some critics simply denounced Courbet's art as vulgar "on the basis that he delighted in the lowest types of humanity and in the least elevating scenes." But for this charge the painter replied that "if he never painted angels, it was because he had never seen any". The painter (Courbet) "who in order to show his contempt for the Academicians dismissed all his models and let his pupils draw a live cow instead of the conventional nude."

In fact realism aims at representing life as it is; it does not fight shy of exhibiting and pointing at the uglier aspect of life which the academic standard would simply pass over or completely ignore. In matters of technique also the realist would insist on using natural colours, draw on the canvas in its actual appearance and not with a view to simply please the eye. In the philosophy of art, realism is the affirmation of the sensuous, the empirical and the particular as against the symbolical, the spiritual and the universal.

In the year 1856 Flaubert published his famous novel Madame

Bovary. This novel started the realistic current in all its vigour and influence in the French literature. Flaubert's theory of realism was concerned with the professional procedures of a novelist. He conceived a scientific detachment, a coolness and care, in the observation of materials. He made several trips to a village, made detailed notes of its streets, houses etc., just to sketch the village in which the husband of the heroine, Dr. Bovary lives. In the words of a distinguished French critic, Sainte-Beuve, the novelist Flaubert "holds his pen like a scalpel". Another critic of the same time writes: "The painter (or novelist or any artist) of our own time will live our own life, with our own habits and our own ideas. He will take the feelings he gets from the look of things in our society and give them back to us in pictures where we recognise ourselves and our own surroundings. It will not do to lose sight of the fact that we ourselves are both the subject and the object of art: art is the expression of ourselves for our own sake."

This phase of French realism was regarded even by its promoters as a transitional movement. Inherent in its sociological implications, the here and the now, the "democratic truth" which it pursued, was the notion of "the monotonous, the meagre, the drab, the underprivileged, even the seamy." And this realism quickly intensified into the phase called naturalism. The greatest exponent of this phase was Emile Zola, the novelist. In

9. For a detailed understanding of Flaubert's realistic method and aim of writing, see, Francis Steegmuller: Gustave Flaubert and Madame Bovary.
11. Wimsatt and Brooks: op.,lit, p.457
his treatise, *Le Roman Experimental*, which he published in 1880, he has expressed his aim and method of writing the novel. The novelist should get rich knowledge of life, which he aims at painting, in all its practical implications by a long course of patient observation. He should aim at nothing less than a supreme knowledge of the conditions which are the masters of good and evil, of life itself. His business is quite analogous to that of a physician who studies the working of the organism patiently before he tries for its improvement. Zola wrote:° What matters most to me is to be purely naturalistic, purely physiological. Instead of having principles (royalism, catholicism) I shall have laws (heredity, atavism)....... I am satisfied to be a scientist, to talk of that which exists....... A simple expose of a family by showing the interior mechanisms which direct them °.

The nature of Zola's aim can be best noted in the words of Wimsatt and Brooks°° as the "result of the scientific development which has occurred in this (19th) century; it is a continuation and complement to the science of physiology which in turn depends upon chemistry and physics; it substitutes for the study of man as an abstraction, man as a metaphysical entity, the study of the natural man, man as the subject of Physico-chemical laws, a being determined by the influences of his environment".

The obvious reason for the realistic swing that art took in Europe in the latter part of the nineteenth century was the rise and growth of natural sciences. As a protest against the formalism and scholasticism of the Middle ages, scientists preferred the way of experiment and a direct study of nature in all its wildness and nudity. When science was so powerfully influencing every walk of human life in general, and when it gave a tremendous utilitarian scope, it is quite natural for the artist and the philosopher to believe that the method of the sciences should be the method of art and philosophy. This attitude prevailed in Europe till the artist and the philosopher realized the exact scope and limitations of sciences and the distinctive role that art and philosophy should play.

We have here briefly sketched that phase of artistic activity, by two representative artists, one in the field of painting and the other in literature, known as realism, to acquaint ourselves with the underlying idea with which the artist began to look at his aim and business. But our central purpose here is not to study any phase in particular in the history of art or epistemology, but to try to understand whether there is consistency in a particular view of truth and beauty which is generally called realistic; which, to summarise the position succinctly, holds that truth and beauty are imitations, the one by the ideas in the mind and the other by the artist's medium, the object of imitation being the things that actually exist in space and time.

In this section we entered into a rather long account of the realistic view of beauty. But our main purpose is to examine whether the theory that truth and beauty consist in imitating the
objects of nature, life etc., our study does not refer to any one particular thinker or art critic. Our principal interest is only (1) to consider the philosophical tenability of this view of truth and beauty, and (2) to find out whether and how far this position both in epistemology and aesthetics involves similar errors.

§ 2. THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE IMITATION THEORY:

That truth and beauty are imitations is based on a certain view of human mind and nature. It treats human mind as a passive mirror-like thing that does not contribute any thing of its own in the process of the creation or the arising of truth and beauty. And it further assumes that natural facts in the sense of the particular facts of the phenomena themselves constitute solely the nature of truth and beauty: what the mind should imitate is not any underlying principle of the facts of natural phenomena but the brute facts themselves and that is all which is necessary for the attainment of truth. And in the same way a work of art becomes beautiful only and in so far as it reproduces in a particular medium the brute fact of a natural phenomenon, like a tree, a mountain or a cow etc., we may term this view as the camera of the mirror theory of truth and beauty.

This view holds that truth consists in the exact correspondence between the ideas in the head and their objects outside; just as beauty consists, according to it, in the exact copy of the model. Both in its epistemological and aesthetic applications this view has a special appeal to common sense and the common man. When the camera was invented it had a tremendous
influence on art, specially painting. Artists of lesser insight thought that the day had come when painters should become photographers, and that even if one remained a painter his business was to equal, if not emulate, the exact recording made by the camera. But gradually artists and critics of deeper insight discovered the limitations of camera which had till then given the greatest impetus to realistic art.

There is a specific reason why the camera view of truth and beauty is so much appreciated by the common man. The common man, who by definition is one who is not intellectually so much developed as to distinguish truth from beauty, always takes the obvious and the easiest for truth as well as beauty. The lens of the camera is like the lens of the human eye and so the image that the former records is like the image that falls on the retina. And "it was because the camera's records corresponded largely to the purely mechanical part of the average human vision...... that the average human being recognised them as records of his own familiar experience, and called them for that reason 'true'. That is, the average human being identifies his sensations with truth and by confusions or muddled thinking or even lack of higher thinking, further identifies this "truth" with what it considers to be beauty. Realism in aesthetics is the application to beauty of a standard of a false epistemology.

In fact the camera-- both as an instrument of artistic production and like the human mind treated merely as a camera-- knows nothing about the object and it can record only the effects of light. When we recognise an object in the photograph, say a

14. R. H. Wilenski: The Modern Movement in Art (Faber & Faber) p.77-78.
house or a man, it is only because we are habituated to develop
the complete object in our mind when at least a partial repre-
sentation of it is given. The same happens when we perceive the
objects and say what they are. It is always the percipient who
completes and constructs the given sensational effects. We
take certain effects for the complete thing which we do not know
for what. This objection may be raised even against painting.
But what we want to prove by this is, that in painting, the lines,
the play of light and shade are new creations; they are created
in a rhythmic or significant manner so that they by themselves
give us enjoyment. As the forms of light in the photographic
record are only mechanical, we cannot find any rhythm in it.
Further, it is our contention that the thing as it is can never
be recorded even by a camera. Even the most glorified camera
hopelessly fails to record the concrete object and it touches
only upon a minute surface of the object. And it is we who
"make" it a concrete thing when we see it; i.e., even a camera
cannot be fully realistic.

When people were not satisfied with their actual photog-
graphs and the actual natural scenes, the photographers began to
make "artistic photography" by "touching up" the actual impres-
sion and thus make the impression more "beautiful" and attractive.
But what they produce in this way are "hybrid abominations" which
are false both to photography and art proper. Thus the natural
scenes sold in the bazaar or hung on the restaurant walls, are
not the actual photographs of any real scenery. Some actual
scenery is photographed, no doubt, and all sorts of fantastic
colours are added to it just to make it attractive, catchy or exciting. We pay heavily the "artistic photographer" rather than the ordinary one only because the former plays upon our vanity and makes us to appear in the photograph "more beautiful." What we should note here is, every one is dissatisfied with the realism of the camera and hence all these attempts to improve the appearance. We do not refuse to recognise the various useful services camera renders to us. But it can never replace art; nor, as the early realists believed, should painting try to compete with the camera. Since art is entirely different in its function, method and aim, there is no point in mistaking the product of one for that of the other. And the mistake arises because of the wrong premise that "art is imitation."

The truth of the matter is, man is never satisfied, either in thinking or in imagination, with what simply is. In fact if man were to be satisfied with merely what is, there is no need for him either to think or to imagine. The fact that he thinks itself implies that he wants to go beyond the actually presented and that he imagines implies that he wishes to improve upon the actual state of things. Nobody denies the proposition that I stand on the ground and I live by breathing. But this is not the complete truth. The intellect of man demands a deeper explanation of these facts; and this demand is not so much to deny these obvious facts but to improve our knowledge of them. But when we go on improving our notion of truth, we find that the premise "truth is imitation" falls down.
§ 3. IMITATION, BASICALLY AN EPistemological Question

Now we may treat the proposition "Truth and Beauty are imitations" — truth the imitation of the real by the mind and beauty of the same by the artist; the only difference being while in truth the mind itself acts as the canvas, in beauty there will be a physical canvas. We may treat this position from the epistemological point of view. In fact, basically the question is purely epistemological. The proposition "beauty is imitation" need not imply the proposition "truth is imitation". But that beauty is imitation logically presupposes the correct knowledge of the object to be imitated. If for the moment we adopt the imitation theory of truth, we get the correct knowledge of the object only if the mind of the artist first correctly imitates the object, before his mind can imitate the imitation of his mental picture. Otherwise the hand cannot automatically paint the object without the intermediary of the mind. Hence both these propositions are basically epistemological and epistemologically both are one and the same proposition.

From the epistemological point of view the difficulties that arise are: (1) Whether it is really possible for us to know if our knowledge correctly reflects the objective world outside; and (2) Whether we are not entertaining an apparently eloquent test of truth which at its bottom begs the very question which it sets before itself to solve.

Harold Joachim holds 15 that when the question of imitation

arises in epistemology it implies at least three factors: (1) A real object which is the source or the cause of the reflection or which may be called the original; (2) The reflection, like e.g., in the mirror; and (3) A mind or a consciousness that perceives whether the reflection is a correct imitation of the original.

Now we may push the original object and the reflection to a dialectical examination. The original should be either a simple indivisible entity—i.e., an entity which is so simple that it does not admit any distinction within itself, which does not possess any part; it is in other words, a partless, indivisible, indistinguishable minuter-than-a-speck-like-thing or it must be a complex whole. The first supposition is untenable; for a thing which is partless and indistinguishably minute cannot produce a reflection. Neither can it work as the "object" of which our mental image can be the imitation. The term imitation in its undistorted sense always means a thing, a concrete something which is sufficient enough to be imitated. An indistinguishable, partless, ultimately minute entity should be something which is really invisible; a visible thing cannot be absolutely indistinguishable. If we grant that reality, of which our mental image should be an imitation, is absolutely partless etc., then we are attempting to survey a house which is formless, partless etc. Thus the first alternative breaks down and we may take up the second.

If the original is a complex whole, imitation is possible. But in what sense? A complex is something which possesses a magnitude, which is made of some parts and in which the parts
should take their position in a certain way so that the complex can be and continue to be as it is. The complex is not simply an aggregate, a formless medley. The fact that it has a magnitude of a certain form itself implies that it is not a formless aggregate. Now, suppose that the Complex which is made of certain parts or elements like a, b, c, d, is clearly and correctly reflected in the mirror. In order that this reflection should be correct, all the components in the original, a, b, c, d, etc., should be reflected with their full due in the mirror. That is to say, the importance of the position of any part should neither be minimised nor be exaggerated; nor should its position be changed in the duplicate. In other words, there must be one-one relation between the elements in the original and those in the reflection.

But the one-one relation cannot be conceived without a unifying background. The component 'b' in the reflection cannot be the exact reflection of 'b' in the original, if the former does not stand in the same relation to its other fellow-components. It is not merely the components taken in isolation that give a form to the complex whole but the relation in which all of them stand to each other. In other words, there is a "design", a "structure", an "arrangement" or a "plan" in the constitution of the original. And the reflection will be an exact imitation of the original if in the former also the components are related to one another in the same way as they are in the original. Which means, the design or structure of the original and the reflection are the same, or the reflection possesses
the same purpose which is exhibited in the original. Thus a number of copies may be taken of the same metallic plate of the compositor. And each page by itself may be different from the others in point of material existence; but all the pages are the same, and every individual page is nothing but an exhibition of the same order in which the matter was composed on the metallic sheet. From this point of view, when I narrate a story my narration imitates the actual story in the book; if the order of the events and the inner structure of the story—i.e., in mutual tension and relation of the action, description etc.—are exactly or more or less correctly the same as they are in the original book. History is true, not if it simply contains a mass of unrelated events and incidents, but only if it exhibits the order and the relation in which the events and incidents stand to each other.

The same can be illustrated with a work of art. When a portrait is to be painted the artist knows that he cannot paint the exact height, volume etc., of the sitter. He calculates the size of the portrait and the size of the sitter and accordingly reduces every part, the nose, the ear, the eye and every lock of the hair etc., to their proportionate magnitude. But this alone does not make the painting. Each of these elements must be arranged in the same relation in the picture as it was in the original—i.e., the elements in the picture should be governed by the same design or inner relation or they are the duplïcates of the same structure in varying magnitudes.

In this way, imitation means identity of design, or being
governed by the same inner relation or structure. But this is not what the imitation theory of truth holds. Its simple formula is, the reflection is true if it faithfully reproduces the original; and the theory does not intend to imply what we meant by the word "imitation". It is true that our criticism is based on what is known as the internal relation, which the upholders of the imitation theory of truth and beauty do not accept. But since this view of relation forms a distinct problem of its own, we shall postpone it to a later chapter and for the present return to see whether this theory of truth and beauty fulfills the other demands of criticism.

§ 4. VERIFICATION OF IMITATION:

In any act of imitation there must be at least three factors: (1) The object which is imitated, (2) The reflection, and (3) Some person or a mind which would compare the first two factors and say whether the imitation is genuine. These three factors are quite essential in both the application of the theory: to truth and beauty. In the case of beauty the spectator will be the comparer while in the case of truth our mind itself should do the job. First we may consider the second application of the theory: can the mind compare and see whether the ideas have correctly imitated the object?

The question may be asked whether the mind is so much an essential factor. The defenders of the imitation theory may argue whether a mind perceives it or not, the reflection in the mirror is a true reflection if it is correctly reflected. In other words truth does not depend upon any mind; it is indepen-
dent of any knowing consciousness; truth is simply there and we human beings only "discover" it, "find" it and do not "make" it. And hence the third factor namely a knowing mind or a perceiving consciousness is not at all necessary.

But this attitude is like the attempt to see without eyes and hear without ears. Granting that truth does not depend upon your or my mind individually, who should say that there is truth which is the genuine imitation of the original by the ideas? If no human mind had perceived it, it might be truth for itself, but for us who are assuming so much of right to examine it, there would be no right, no ability, not even the least possibility of speaking that there is such a thing as the given original, its reflection and the existing correspondence between the two. It may not be your or my mind individually that perceives it, but some mind, somewhere and sometime must have perceived it if it can be truth at all. We do not confound truth with any one's psychic moment but we should guard ourselves from making the extravagant assumption that it is something nobody need know what.

If we further examine this trio in a clear manner new difficulties will crop up. In order that the mind should see whether the reflection is a real imitation of the original, both the reflection and the original should enter in the consciousness. Thus when I look at both the original and the reflection in the mirror, first I look at, say, the original which enters into my mind either in the form of a retinal image or in
the form of a concept in the mind or in any form as one pleases to call it. And secondly, when I look at the reflection, the same process takes place and another retinal image or concept will be formed. My mind thus retains the first within it and compares it with the second. If there is perfect imitation or correspondence between the two images, then I say that there is imitation of the original object by the reflection. Thus imitation which I now affirm is something which I see between two of my own mental images, which I transfer or refer to some external object. In itself this process may not be harmful. But how can we know whether there is perfect imitation of the original object by its image in my mind and, the reflection in the mirror which acts as an object for its image in my mind? Here we are involved in a hopeless regress, a path of endless backward steps ultimately leading us nowhere, but to itself.

The agreement for which we searched between the two mental images suggests that the criterion of truth rests not with imitation of the original by the reflection but in the agreement between our own ideas or images. When I "see" the table and say that it is square and say that it is so because my mental picture imitates the actual form of the table, I only mean thereby that I am seeing how I am seeing. How can I say that my mental picture actually imitates the real object? By looking at it for the second time, third time with care and in bright light? Here imitation only means clear perception. Thus the criterion of truth is clear perception. This is what it comes to. Suppose I take another track of seeing whether my visual
image imitates the actual object, and I touch all the parts of the table in order to confirm it, even here imitation means the agreement between the visual and the tactual perceptions. If we are so fond of the word "imitation", we may even say that the visual perception imitates the tactual perception and hence I can say that my idea about the table imitates one of the features or characters of it. But this way of employing the word is to violently pulling the meaning of a term beyond its capacity to connote. In this background we may agree with Prof. Joackim when he says¹⁶ that "Correspondence (by which Joackim means imitation), perhaps..... is a symptom of truth..... there may be correspondence without truth, or with truth so trifling that serious falsehood is involved in it. And when there is truth, it is not the correspondence which primarily determines its being, its nature, or its extent. Truth depends primarily on something other than correspondence-- on something which itself conditions the being and the nature of the correspondence ".

Wildon Carr writes:¹⁷ "And the whole notion is seen to be absurd when we consider that, were it a fact that real things produce copies of themselves in our mind; we could never know it was so-- all that we should have any knowledge of would be the copies, and whether these are like or unlike the reality, or indeed whether there was any reality for them to be like

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¹⁶. Ibid. p.17.

¹⁷. The problem of Truth (People's Book) p.22.
would, in the nature of case, be unknowable, and we could never ask the question."

The fact that what we have actually with us are only the ideas or concepts is ignored by the imitation theory. This theory is based upon a dichotomy between the two factors, one "explicitly 'mental' in some sense in which the other is not; and the other factor is explicitly 'real' in some sense in which the first is not. And truth is the correspondence of the 'mental' with the 'real' so that the 'mental' apprehends the 'real'".18

Now, it is always the point with which we make the distinction that the original is always more concrete, more clear and is a fuller expression of the inner principle of the thing; and the reflection is a less full expression, less concrete and comparatively shadowy than the original. From this point of view, the mental image is the less concrete expression of the two. Thus the image in the mirror reflects the face and the narration depicts the event, the portrait portrays the sitter and so on. The object is conceived as 'real', as being objective, something external, foreign to the mental; it is independent of the mental. Now the question that confronts us in this philosophical position is, how can the mental apprehend the real which is external to it and which refuses to become mental? The old dualism enters here and to overcome it we have to take recourse either to any arbitrary duex ex machina as Descartes

did or we should change the meaning of the real and say that it is not completely external. The former course involves logical absurdity while the latter is an indirect way of giving up the very presupposition on which the theory is based.

In other words according to this theory of truth, there are two factors, one pre-eminently mental and the other distinctly 'real'. Inspite of it both are in a sense mental. For, if the latter is not in any sense mental or if it does not come within the purview of mind, we cannot speak of it even. And both are real, for the image of the mind is also a fact, the denial of which results in cutting off one leg of the theory. The theory should modify its definition lest it should suffer this mutilation.

The entire error in this theory is due to its separation of the known from the knowing mind. It treats idea, the real object and the imitation (i.e., truth)--- all the three as separate. " The moment that truth, knowledge and reality are taken as separate, there is no way in which consistently they can come or be forced together."

§ 5. OTHER DIFFICULTIES OF THE POSITION:

In this section we may consider the first application--i.e., the aesthetic application-- which we indicated in the beginning of the previous section. In the previous section we considered the epistemological application of the imitation theory.

Any act of imitation requires at least three factors: (1) the object which is imitated, (2) the reflection, and (3) some one person or a mind which should compare the first two factors with each other and say that the imitation is genuine. We may consider both the epistemological and the aesthetic applications of the imitation theory in the analysis of them into the three factors that we noted. In the case of the epistemological application of the theory, the object will be the same, the mental picture will be its copy and the mind will be the logical judge. And in the case of the aesthetic application of the theory, again the natural object or the sitter whom the artist will use as the model will be the original, the work of art will be the copy and the spectator will be the judge.

Now, it is always the fact that the original will always be more concrete and rich in matter of details than the copy; the copy being comparatively less concrete and more shadowy. It does not mean that the copy can never be as much concrete as the original. But the fact that it is a copy implies that the original is the more concrete object. Now, in order that the copy should be a better and a more satisfactory one there is always scope for it to become more and more concrete. Thus when the mind finds that the mental image is rather faint, the image should aim at becoming more concrete (and who should do it? the process is mechanical on the assumption of the theory) and when the picture is less concrete the spectator wishes it to be more improved; and the artist should try to improve it. We may observe this tendency in the fields of painting and stage production. But here we shall consider in a little detail how this
tendency has expressed itself in the field of stage production and the consequent difficulties that this art had to face.

The modern tendency in the stage is to take as much help of scientific advancement as possible to show on the stage which was not possible in the olden days. For the modern dramatist the purpose of his art is to reflect life truly; and the purpose of the setting is to make a real representation of the background. The modern stage producer is not satisfied with any suggestive or partial representation of the background. If the action takes place in a room, he wants that it must be like a room and if the hero swims in a river under the pouring showers, he aims at exactly showing the waters pouring down and flowing. He hates the obviously painted imitation of the scenery and goes any length in "Solidity of construction and detail" of making the scenery look materially as real as possible. And if he is a well-trained stage technician, he aims also at showing deception—i.e., making things seem real which are just stage setting. His objective is always consistent and complete representative illusion.

Against this objective of absolute realism, art critics, dramatists and aestheticians have advanced various criticisms, all of which have been summarised into three main arguments by Prof. Dolman. The criticisms are: (1) it distracts the attention of the audience from the actor; (2) it weakens the illusionary nature of representation by challenging the comparison; and

20. John Dolman Jr. : The art of play production. See the entire Ch.XVIII.
(3) it tends to destroy aesthetic distance.

(1) When the background is elaborately realistic and the detail is aesthetically unnecessary or unexpected; when the detail is full of unduly conspicuous or striking elements, it distracts the attention of the audience from the action of the play. "Successful imitation of reality when such imitation is seen to be difficult or remarkable is distracting. The very effort to startle or impress out of which realism originally grew had in it the potential sources of distraction, and the most distracting form of realism today is that which is clearly intended to evoke admiration or applause for its cleverness or completeness, or deceptiveness." 21

(2) This attempt met a difficulty which is really a process of endless regress. When the presented thing is too realistic, naturally our sense of comparison is aroused and we begin comparing the real life and real sceneries with the setting on the stage; which is to forget that the stage is a stage. We also fail to distinguish between the illusion of imagination and the illusion of deception. As long as imagination is stimulated so that the elements of reality are symbolically acceptable without any hint of deception, there is no harm; but when the elements become unnecessarily real and numerous as to imply deception, each element of deception arouses unfavourable comparison and then some limitation or defect is observed. Then

further effort should be made for a more perfect imitation. This process results in an endless process, or as Prof. Dolman puts it, "each gain in realism raises the standard of comparison, so that deception becomes more difficult, since no imitation of life can quite equal reality (i.e., real life or nature etc.), the whole process becomes futile and results only in dissatisfaction." We should remember that when a known place is realistically imitated, the audience inevitably begins to compare the picture with the original place.

From the field of painting also the same difficulty can be elaborately explained and illustrated. But since the illustration from stage production has made our point clear, we may just turn to compare this difficulty with the one we find in the epistemological application of the theory of imitation. In the epistemological application also the mind is always dissatisfied with the abstractness of the copy and it wants the latter to be more and more concrete. But there is a limit for the copy in its attempt to become more concrete and the limitation is due to the fact that it is after all a mental copy. And the mind should stop its demand for a better copy at some arbitrary point. Thus while in the aesthetic sphere it results in the dissatisfaction of the spectator, in the epistemological field it results in the dissatisfaction of the mind.

(3) There is another common unfavourable psychological 

22. Ibid. p.387.
condition which will be aroused if the imitation theory of truth and beauty is pursued. First, we may explain the aesthetic side of this psychologically unfavourable condition under the caption "aesthetic distance". Aesthetic distance means, the spectator should not be allowed or made to feel that the presentation directly or personally refers to him. He should never feel involved in the action or be physically affected. He should be only a "spectator" at a distance, and he should feel that he is above the action. In other words it is a sort of impersonal or disinterested emotional experience. But when any part of a play aroused the spectator's sense of reality that he feels himself involved in its implications or is too vividly reminded of his own personal experience, naturally he cannot maintain his sense of detachment. His experience as aesthetic experience will cease and become hopelessly personal or sentimental; which experience is only a lower type of emotional experience.

This condition of aesthetic distance emphasises that the aesthetic experience should never be personal or sentimental. It is an experience in which the individual is not a particular individual but he experiences something that transcends his particularity. This condition is common to experience of truth also. Following our phrase in aesthetics, we may call this condition "Epistemic distance". Though the thinker thinks about an object or the percipient perceives something, we should make a distinction between his pure cognition of the object without the cognition being coloured by
his personal emotions and feelings etc. In order that our knowledge of an object should become true in the scientific sense of the term, we have to withdraw our emotive reactions from the cognition. The proposition "The explosion of an atom is horrible" is not a scientific proposition, while "the explosion of an atom makes a sudden release of $x^0$ of energy" is one. The latter proposition keeps up the epistemic distance while the former does not. But the latter proposition is not one which is either supplied to us or which can be verified by the imitation theory of truth—truth which upholds the object outside and its copy inside the mind. We may remark in this context that just as the imitation view of beauty reduces what it calls the objective character of beauty to mere personal emotions, the imitation view of truth limits conception of truth to our mere sensations coloured with personal emotions. In both the cases it reduces the two values—of truth and beauty—to hopeless personalism.

In order to meet these common criticisms the protagonists of the imitation theory of truth and beauty may modify the thorough-going nature of their view and aim at moderation. We may call this modified theory, "The simplified theory of imitation", which may hold that what the imitation, either in truth or in beauty, aims at is not the exact reproduction of the original but it only aims at imitating the salient features which will give the desired effect of the copy vividly. It does not aim at completeness of imitation and hence it tries to avoid the endless regress that results in the process of
improving the concreteness of the copy—the mental copy in truth and the stage or the canvas copy in beauty.

In fact the early stage of the creed of realism in art was exactly or something like simplified realism. When this creed was started, the stage producer aimed at giving the likeness of the scenery he wanted to represent. But everyday he was finding that the "likeness" he aimed at was still an ideal for which more and more efforts and improvements should be made. Thus completeness of imitation was a defensive mode or a movement towards improvement of the original aim.

In the same way at a comparatively undeveloped stage, the imitation theory of truth aims at something like the simplified imitation. But again when the theory is pressed to offer details, it should logically proceed for complete imitation. But finding its own absurdity, it may revert as a defensive mode to its earlier account of the simple imitation.

We may conclude this section by noting that if the imitation theory is applied rigorously not only to the stage but to any form of art, not only to perception but to any mode of cognition, it results in dulling the constructive powers of the spectator and the thinker. Elizabethan audience were actually "seeing" forests and palaces on the most poorly equipped stage in the daylight. We have lost that power of seeing where there is no detail because mansions and mountains are shown to us ready-made on the stage. Aesthetic experience is an active condition wherein all our imaginative faculty should be at its fullest play in constructing what the artist meant us to construct; it is not a process of passively receiving the sensa-
tions of whatever is given. The elements presented must be symbolic. The Elizabethan could accept the branch of a tree for a forest. The difference between realism and symbolic representation is that while the former "serves chiefly to strengthen the empathic appeal, symbolism to reach the emotion through imagination"; that is to say, once again the imitation theory reduces aesthetic experience to mere excitement, sensational and personal emotions.

So is the constructive powers of scientific thinking. Truth is always something that might be stimulated by perception. But even perception is a construction. And every scientific generalization is a matter of intellectual construction. But the imitation theory does not allow any constructive power to human mind and thus makes human creative ability horribly poor.

§ 6. THE CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF TRUTH AND BEAUTY:

In the preceding section we referred to the constructive intellectual nature of truth and the constructive imaginative nature of beauty. Now, we may study in a little detail this constructive nature of both truth and beauty.

First to take up truth:

In fact the "Solid chunk of fact" which we believed to be existing as the basis of our thought is itself a fiction. The notion of Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is psychologically difficult to understand. To the extent that a perception is Nirvikalpaka or uninterpreted or uncategorised by thought, it is as

23. Ibid. p.395.
good as something we don't know. To recognise a thing as "this is a parrot" is a considerable intellectual achievement. Because even the most ignorant man who recognises a parrot, should know its colour size, the shape of its wings, head, beak etc., and its differentia from other birds resembling the parrot. All these intellectual processes may not take place explicitly in the mind of the perceipient; but they do take place implicitly, and may be, rapidly.

In this way when we approach the problem from the epistemological point of view, the solid reality, pure perception or sensation, simply crumbles down and our continued effort to test the validity of our judgement deals not with the pure fact but with something already categorised. We may catch the bird which we called a parrot and confirm our previous judgement, or touch it, or submit it to dissection by a biologist and try to collect a number of minor and detailed facts about the bird. But in all these cases every new feature that we come to know will be a new judgement, a mentally categorised piece of knowledge. Ultimately what we can do is only to see whether our earlier judgement about the bird agrees with the subsequent ones expressing the other details and characteristics. If there is no opposition or difference between our first judgement and any or all of the later ones, we confirm that it is a parrot. If any one of the later judgments comes in conflict with the first one, we are stopped in the course of arriving at the final confirmation. But this process is not that of imitation in the sense in which the word is meant.
the imitations of some real thing but because they aim at imaginative realization of some mood. It is "imagination"—i.e., the "unreal" that makes a work of art and not the "real".

§ 7. IMITATION OF THE UNIVERSALS?

We noted above that the attempt to imitate the particular thing without any sort of intellectual or imaginative construction is an impossible one. Moreover, this attempt is to a large extent useless. For what is the use of imitating a particular object in the name of beauty when we have the object itself before us? And what special achievement is there in confining ourselves to the bare facts like "before me is a stone" etc., in the name of truth?

In order to avoid the limitations of the theory of imitating the particular facts, the theory of imitation may modify its definition and hold that what it aims at imitating is not the particular facts, but the universal essences of things. Thus the theory may ask us to imitate not the falling of apples but the underlying principle of the falling of all bodies. It is the universal principle which we imitate.

Of the aesthetic aspect of the theory, we find a clear exposition in Aristotle. We noted in the beginning of this chapter that Aristotle is also a supporter of the theory of imitation in art. But what he advocates is not the imitation of particular objects but the universal
Writes Prof. Blanshard: 25 "Indeed that the brute-fact view of perception is untrue is proved by this alone; that perception may be mistaken; I may take the cardinal for the lion. If the object were mere given fact, such a mistake would be impossible. A fact is what it is, and cannot possibly be something else, the seeming must be in our thought, and the perception that involves such seeming has advanced beyond the given, into the region of judgment. What makes the error possible is a theory of ours."

There are some judgments the subjects of which do not lie outside us but in our own physical or mental states. Such judgments as "I am experiencing sorrow" or "I have headache," do not refer to any outside fact but they are our own internal states; and it might be said that they need not go through all the categorising process of thought and hence be bare facts. But even such judgments must pass through all the intellectual process before it can become a judgment. In fact from the point of view of judgment there is no difference between the judgment which we are now considering and the one like "Before me is a table". Even the table which I claim as being outside me (i.e., my body) should be resolved into certain sensations before they can be categorised; and in the present examples also it is the sensations or states of feeling that become categorised. 26 Even such a judgment

25. Ibid. p. 229.
26. We may make the distinction that feeling is different from sensation by saying that the latter has a neutral
as "I am happy" is a complicated structure of thought which contains the "I", the person distinct from others, "happiness" which is a form of experience having its own distinctive nature, which is possessed by the "I", or which is the "I" etc. Further there will be different forms and degrees of happiness of which the present happiness is one in the scale. It refers to a particular moment of time, namely now, which is a member in a series etc.

But it might be objected that the expression may be just an exclamation like "happy!", "pain!" etc. Such exclamations might not be completely expressed in language. The context itself suggests a possible complete meaning. If it so suggests it is a judgment and if it does not suggest any full meaning, it is not a judgment; and with it we are not concerned.

Our standpoint does not mean that every judgment that we make should have sense-data, which the imitation theory implies. However realistic one be in one's epistemological position, one should accept that the course of making a judgment makes a judgment more than bare sense-data. It may be true that in one respect the "reality outside" is more basis and the former hasn't. But for our present purpose, it is sufficient if we note that in the total experience, the distinction between the mental and the physical, the neutral and the feeling, does not go beyond a certain length made for convenience; and any absolute distinction is quite opposite to what we are maintaining, namely, all experience is uniform in its nature in that all becomes categorised in such a way that its "basis is pure" is something which we cannot speak of.
than what we apprehend in our judgment. But at the same
time our judgment also contains more than that particular
aspect, which we apprehend, of the "reality outside";
which implies that the 'more' in our judgment has nothing
with the "reality outside" to correspond. Thus imitation,
even granting the claim of its adherents, may work as far
as it can; but it cannot be applied to all cases of our
mental experience. In higher mathematical concepts there
are no sense-data to correspond to our thinking. There
we appeal to some other criterion of truth. Wildon Carr
asks the question:27 "The more familiar instance of corres­
pondence is the symbolism we use in mathematics. Are our
ideas of this nature? And is their truth their correspon­
dence? Is a perfectly true idea one in which there exists
a point-to-point correspondence to the reality it repre­
sents?"

In such propositions as "A implies B", "To excuse
is a nobler act than to revenge", where can we look for
exact sense-data to correspond? Further, to assert that
all our sense-experience should have an outside entity cor­
responding it is an extravagant claim. Persons in deli­
rious conditions "see" snakes, devils and ghosts as surely
as we see our own hands. And their emotional reactions
to what they see are also undeniable genuine. But there
is nothing outside to correspond to their sensations. But
here the followers of the theory may claim that the expe­
rience of such persons is not true, because there is no

27. The problem of Truth. p.23.
objective basis to counterpart it. But who should say that there is no objective basis? The delirious person does not agree with us when we tell him that what he is seeing are mere fancies. For him who "sees" the ghost even at the second time the ghost is "there". But after his delirious mood is over the ghost will not be there. Now, in which should he believe and on what basis? The answer is so plain that he cannot believe in those experiences because they contradict their earlier and the later experiences. Here he is not appealing to the imitation theory, but is abandoning it in favour of another criterion of truth. If he says that both experiences are true, that he saw the ghost because it was there and now he does not see it because now it is not there; even here he is trying to bring some consistency between his experiences and thus showing their truth. This shows that already he is giving up the imitation theory and appealing to some other principle of truth.

In addition to the difficulties that we have seen above, we find that the imitation theory of truth suffers from other serious limitations. Granting that it is a valid criterion of truth, its scope refers only to the present, the immediate now, and in the case of the judgments about the past events, the theory cannot have any say, as in the example taken by Prof. Bhanshard, when we say "Burr killed Hamilton in a duel", the material fact of the

judgment is something that has already irrecoverably lost and all that we have as the basis of our judgment are certain evidences on records, statements from journals etc. In fact, our judgment is implicated, and it does not correspond to the materials that have come down to us. But the advocates of the theory may say that our judgment is true if it is a clear imitation of the existing materials—namely records and journals. But how can we believe in those materials and what is the criterion that determines the acceptability or otherwise of these materials? We have to submit these materials and their implications to certain critical tests; these tests may be anything, but not imitation.

We have seen above that if one follows the imitation theory of truth, one's conception of truth will be hopelessly poor; because it excludes all the kinds of value judgments. In the same way if beauty is taken for the imitation of the real, we have to dismiss the major portion of what mankind has accepted as art as simply not art. The mythological stories, the great epics which, though they might have some germs of historicity, are magnificent creations of great poets. But they are not "real". The form of art known as architecture has nothing outside it

29. Throughout we should bear in mind that for the imitation theory the real only means the empirical object or that which is sensuously present before us, without any associative ideas of idealistic philosophy or even those of modified realist philosophy like critical realism.
to correspond. A beautiful temple or a cathedral did not have another building from which it was copied. And the queen of all art, music, has nothing in nature of which it is the imitation. No doubt some musical modes have a vague natural basis, e.g., the Rāg-Megh, Makhār is said to resemble vaguely the disturbance in the sky with thunder, lightning and the play of clouds. But when this Rāg is actually listened to and experienced, we do not feel anything like an actual rumbling of thunder or the blinding flash of lightning or the fury of the showers; we only feel a mood (bhāva) which we experience in a rainy day if we have that temperament to receive and to move about in the rain with aesthetic joy. It is the similar mood the Rāg aims at and not the imitation of anything actual. If the realist still wants to say that it is also a case of imitation, it only shows his fond affection for the word when what is meant is entirely different. In the famous Rajput School of painting, we have some works called after some musical modes. Thus e.g., in the work Rāgini Todī, the painter has aimed at evoking in the spectator when he beholds the picture the same mood which he experiences when he listens to the musical mode Todī, sung by a good musician. This is an attempt to express in colours a mood which has been already expressed in sound. Thus we find all great works of art are great not because they

30. See the two volumes of "Rajput Painting" collected and edited by Dr. A. K. Coomaraswamy.
essence. He makes this point clear when he writes:\footnote{31}
"Poetry is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history, for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular." "By a universal I mean how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act." This shows that imitation is not concerned with the accidental features of particular things, but it is selective. It selects only the essential elements. We should add a few words on the meaning of the "essential" in this context. In philosophy the word essence means the basic underlying substance of things and hence the essential means the invariable and indispensable element. And by virtue of this, it also means the universal. Since, according to Aristotle, what the artist should imitate is the universal, art is not only selective, revealing. The same view appears even in the 18th century literary criticism. Says Reynolds:\footnote{32}
"the whole beauty and grandeur of the art consists, in my opinion, in being able to get above all singular forms, local customs, particularities, and details of every kind." Any keen student of western literary critical tradition knows that this view is repeated in several forms and during many phases of the tradition.

Now, our concern here is to point out the similar difficulties found in the view that truth and beauty are imitation of the universals. There is a similarity on

\footnote{31. Poetics. Ch.IX.}
\footnote{32. Reynolds: Letter to the Idler. Discourse III. Quoted from Jerome Stolnitz: Aesthetics and philosophy of Art Criticism. p.122.}
this view between the scientist and the artist. The former who stands for the discovery of truth leaves aside the particular accidental features even as the latter does. But the artist cannot depict the universal without the help of a concrete particular. Thus though the tragic characters represent a general type, each of them is an individual who represents the universal. And the same is the case with the scientist. He should also imitate the universal through the particular event or phenomenon. How can either the scientist or the artist come to know the universal? By the observation and a careful study of a number of particular cases and aiming at a general conception. In the case of both— the scientist and the artist— the process of reaching the universal requires a great deal of intellectual construction. And the result is: the knowledge of the universal can neither be attained nor be verified by "imitation" in the proper sense of the term.

The theory of the imitation of the universal was advanced to overcome and supplement the defects of the imitation of the particular things. But in the end the defensive modification itself deserted the protected.

The imitation of the universal in its aesthetic application has another difficulty. The term "Universal" is essentially an epistemological and ontological concept. The imitation aesthetician may refuse to recognise it, but it is a fact. Now, in virtue of its universality it should
conform itself with all the basic principles of logic like the principle of contradiction. But we find that several artists, or even a single artist in different works of art, depict several universal visions or types. Thus Macbeth and Hamlet represent opposite types. And each artist in every of his work on this theory claims for a universal vision. But when we try to compare these several visions, they lead to hopeless mutual conflict.

The truth of the matter is this: in a sense we may say that the artist reveals a universal vision. But its universality is due to its being a value, and not in virtue of its imitating a universal which exists there.

§ 8. SYMBOLS OR SIGNS?

We may briefly consider the approach to truth and beauty as semiotic and see whether from this point of view the imitation theory stands the test.

In the terminology of semantics when a thing stands in our minds for some other thing, it is called a "sign" of the other thing, and the thing of which it is a sign is called its "referent" or in some contexts its "meaning". In addition to the word sign, we also use another word: Symbol. A symbol is distinct from a sign in that while a greater degree of conceptualization is involved in the case of a symbol, signs do not involve explicit conceptualization. A sign only calls for overt behaviour, as in the case of animal behaviour, Pavlov's dog salivating when it heard the bell's ring. But a symbol does not directly invite overt
behaviour, but it only stimulates the formation of a concept in the mind. As Mrs. S. K. Langer puts it, symbols are not proxy for their objects, but are vehicles for the concept of objects. To conceive a thing or a situation is not the same thing as to 'react towards it' overtly, or to be aware of its presence. In talking about things we have conceptions of them, not the things themselves; and it is in the conceptions, not the things that symbols directly mean."

The use of symbols marks the beginning of human intelligence. The same thing may act as a sign to an animal and a symbol to a man. For the dog or Pavlov the word 'meat' can only be a sign which calls for its overt behaviour while it makes a man to have the conception of meat.

When symbols are used in thought they must be transparent—i.e., the symbol should suggest in our mind what the speaker meant and it should vanish. But in the case of art, the artist uses the symbols for their own sake also. To put the other side of the same thought in a different way: in artistic expression there is nothing "differentiable" between the symbol and the referent. A work of art becomes a work of art only when the form of its expression and its content become one. As Croce emphasises throughout his book (Aesthetic), to separate the language from thought, the medium from the content is impossible in a perfect work of art. If a sonnet is a good one, it is only in its present form that it could ever have been written and if we

can conceive it in a slightly different form it becomes another sonnet. What the artist wants us to do is to take what he presents simply as he has presented. We should not, either by association or by any other psychological conditions take the work of art as a sign or a symbol of some other thing. But the imitation theory of art asks us to do the opposite.

Roger Fry said: 34 "If before a landscape you say 'what a lovely picture!' the artist, if he hears you, will be flattered— if however you say 'what a lovely place!' he will probably resent it as a damning criticism of his work, although in point of fact he set out to tell us what a lovely place it was."

Here we should note that both in truth and art we are concerned with symbols and not with signs. One may say that the signal post of the railway line is a sign and it represents an act of thought. But actually the signal post is not a sign; it is a symbol which helps us to conceive a situation which "is not the same thing as to 'react towards it overtly.'" If we remember clearly the distinction between a sign and a symbol which is stated in the lines we quoted from S. K. Lenger, it becomes obvious that thinking takes place not through signs but through symbols. In this background if we study truth and beauty as imitation, we find that either we have to change our views of truth and beauty or what we are speaking of is anything but truth and beauty.

34. Last Lecturers. p.13.
In the case of a portrait that we hang at home, we pay so much of money to the artist either with a view to use the portrait as an improved photograph or to look at it as a work of art. In so far as we look at it as a good work of art, we appreciate its colour scheme, curves, volumes, designs etc., and the expression that it bears. In the case of the portrait of our grandfather it expresses either the dignity and wisdom of old age or the foolishness of senility or any other quality of old age. In this case the portrait is not the one of our grandfather in particular, but it is simply a creation of losting value by a genius artist. When we look at it from the purely artistic point of view, the symbols (curves, lines, colour designs etc.,) do not serve to refer to another person who has died but they are appreciated and enjoyed for their own sake. But, when we look at it and use it as a means to evoke in our minds the memory of our late dear grandpa, we are not looking at it as we should do at a work of art, but we are using it as a means, a convenient instrument, to serve a certain purpose. Now we are using it as a symbol in the ordinary sense. That is to say, in so far as the portrait is treated in the imitative sense of art, it is first an ordinary symbol and not artistic; and when it is treated and appreciated as a work of art, it is above its imitative reference.

In the same way when we appreciate the picture of a Kerala damsel (The reference is to Malabar Belle, painted...
by B. N. Jijga, included in contemporary Indian painters, Govt. of India Fbn.) or a scenery from the Kashmir valley, on the ground that the picture corresponds in all details exactly to the features of Kerala damsels and the scene calls up in our minds exactly the Kashmir Valley; we are not looking at these pictures as pictures should be seen but we are only using them to serve some other purpose; may be one has seen Kerala damsels and since it is not possible for him to go to Kerala when he wants to see once again, he is using that picture as a good, detailed reminder. The same may be the reason for one’s appreciation of a picture of the Kashmir scene. In this case the work of art serves only with a certain utility value. We want the picture to be as realistic as possible and we mistake that extra artistic purpose for genuine art appreciation. In other words, the work is used as a sign and not as a symbol; and even if direct overt response is not stimulated by it and to that extent if it can be treated as a symbol, the symbol is not used for its own appreciation to serve an ulterior purpose.

In exactly the same way in so far as we stick ourselves to the imitation theory of truth, we cannot deal with symbols but with signs. A symbol is already something which indicates our explicit development of conceptualization. What is presented in pure thought is the symbol which many times is treated as though it were the final
referent itself. In higher mathematics, the Xs and the Ys and the other innumerable complicated, and inter-implying symbols are treated as though they were the things themselves to be thought of. But the real referent is a quantity—quantity of real object, temporal or spatial, time or space itself. The numbers 1, 2, 3 etc., are all symbols and so are the words which serve as the tools of thinking. But when thinking is reduced to concern itself with mere signs, we will not be actually thinking but making some overt behavious or physical reaction. The imitation theory of truth, strictly speaking, should recognise only signs and it cannot allow our consciousness to reach the level of symbols which can be done only at the mediate level; a level which transcends the immediate sense object.

A sign is always an instrument, an instrument that demands from us a reaction towards what signifies. To put the same thing in another way: the sign is used by us sometimes as a means for a further end.

In this connection we may note, that the last appeal of the imitation theory either in logic or in art lies in pragmatism. In logic we believe that there is a thing outside us, for it serves our purposes and guides the course of our action. As T. E. Hulme wrote, what we see and hear is simply a selection made by our senses to serve as a light of our conduct. Our senses and consciousness give us no more than a practical simplification of reality. Though

35. Quoted from the Foot-note to p. 78 of Osborn: Aesthetics and Criticism.
the follower of the imitation theory tries to distinguish himself from the instrumentalist (pragmatist), when the question of verifying the object arises, his criterion is sensuous verification, which may be with a utility value or without it. But sensuous verification means "the working of" the object.

In beauty also, if the imitation theory is accepted, the spirit of art becomes pragmatic. That picture is good which to the greatest degree helps me to have the most vivid visualization of a place I have not seen; or if I have seen it, if the picture helps me to recall the same in my mind in all its vividness. That literature is good, which gives me the most authentic information about a particular society or place of people. Now, what is the difference between a photographer and a painter, a novelist and a journalist? The artist ceases to be what he should be and he becomes a person in whom, as lovers of art, we are not interested.

But we find the critics, of literature, of painting, sculpture etc., lavishly praising the descriptive elements of the works of art. Keats is praised so much for the sensuously detailed descriptions he gives. Zola is acclaimed as a master artist because of the descriptive value of his novels. A picture is praised because it causes us to see vividly the faint luminescence of flash and almost to feel its palpitating softness. Another painting is appreciated because it reproduces the texture of silk with such
accuracy that we might imagine to touch its rich glossiness with our fingers. One other picture puts before our eyes the "fruitiness" of apples and grapes until almost we could eat them.

But when the critics recommend works of art of these grounds, they are judging them not as works of art should be judged; but they are judging as though they are the works of a reporter (may be an excellent one). If the artist is a painter, he is only a reporter in colour and if he is a literary artist, he is a reporter in verbal language; and the form that he gives is just to make them "catchy". And then art is virtually reduced to the position of a craft.

Here we shall not enter into the details of the view that truth and beauty are instrumental to a further end, as we intend to study it in the next chapter. But for the sake of the better understanding of our statement that the imitation theory of beauty reduces art to the position of a craft, it is better if we study briefly the distinction between art and craft and how the theory under examination at its core stands for craft under the garb of art.

§ 9. IMITATION BELITTLES ART INTO CRAFT:

Collingwood, following the central thesis of Grote develops about six points of distinction between art and craft 36 we shall here note only five points which are sufficient to understand whether the imitative view of art is really art or craft.

36. Principles of Art. Ch.II.
Craft always involves a distinction between means and end, each clearly conceived as something distinct from the other but related to it. For example, when a carpenter makes a chair, the means of his work namely his instruments, the mode of the chair which is in his mind etc., are different from the chair that he finally makes. But in the case of art this distinction does not exist. In poetry, for example, the poet consciously does not have all words, the theme in detail, the way of writing etc., in his mind till he completely writes it down. As he goes on writing, the words themselves come and get formed. Even the theme cannot be there in his mind readymade. He does not know the full theme till he writes it out. When the content of what he feels like writing hums in his mind he has already a vague poem, he fully knows not what, ringing in his ear. In the words of Croce, the spirit only intuitts in making, forming, expressing. He whose separates intuition (i.e., the content of intuition) from expression never succeeds in re-uniting them.

In the case of craft, a distinction between planning and execution is always involved. The craftsman knows what he wants to make before he actually makes it. This foreknowledge is not possible in the case of art. In some works of art with a very big canvas like a big painting with a number of persons or spatial volumes in it or an epic or a drama, this distinction might be spoken of. But it is a permissible characteristic and not an essential one.

When a poet writes a lyric there is nothing like planning and then executing it.

(3) In craft, means and end are related in one way in the process of execution. In planning, the end is prior to the means; the end is thought out first and then the means are devised. In execution the means come first and the end is reached through. But in the case of art, since we cannot distinguish either the means or the end, planning or execution, the question of the reversal of order does not arise.

(4) In craft, there is always a distinction between raw material and finished product. A craft is always exercised upon something and it aims at the transformation of this into something different. In other words, a distinction between form and matter is always made, matter meaning the raw material and the form given by the craftsman. This distinction between form and raw material cannot be made in the case of art. No doubt there is something in any work of art which may be called by the name form. But the point is, there is nothing in it of which we can say: "this is a matter which might have taken a different form." If a poem is a good poem, it can be so only in the form in which it is, and if its form is changed even by one phrase, it changes in the subtle shade of its emotional import and hence to that extent it becomes another poem; i.e., its content is also changed. Here we should not confound the medium
with the content of a work of art. Paint is the medium, but the Buddha of the picture is the content. Two painters might have created two Buddhas; but both Buddhas are certainly different in their contents i.e., emotional import.

(5) There is a hierarchical relation between various crafts, one supplying what another needs, one using what another provides. The raw material of one craft, is the finished product of another; one craft supplies another with tools. In the hierarchy of parts, a complex operation like the manufacture of a motor car is parcelled out among a number of trades. In art there is nothing which resembles this hierarchy. Words, gestures, music, scenery are not means to opera, nor are they its raw materials; they are only its parts. Art is not a co-operative enterprise in the mechanical sense of the term. It is one man who does the job.38

38. A question might be asked: What about architecture in which a number of artists work? We should note here that architecture has two sides: one, it is a craft in so far as it furnishes a certain set model for convenient living; and two, it is an art in so far as individual doors, pillars, walls etc., are painted or designed or carved. A number of artists may work here. But the work of each is a unit in itself; the collection of which on a big wall gives the appearance of magnitude. In a temple like Mount Abu's, every pillar, nay, every figure on each pillar, every flower on the dome is an independent work of art; which collectively give the appearance of a very big unit. No doubt the entire temple is artistically one. And even here the whole design of the temple is the work of one artist, say the chief architect. When we look at the temple as one big unit, we do not attend to and appreciate the individual small carvings. And when we attend to the latter, we are not so much conscious of the former. Ajanta Caves are collective enterprises from the point of view of production, but artistically they are several different works of art.
Now we may consider to which class the imitative art belongs: to the class of craft or art? When the advocate of the imitation theory holds that art is imitation, may be perfect imitation? we at once notice that it becomes simply a skilled craft. When, e.g., a natural scenery is to be painted, the painter has already the end before him, namely, the scenery. All that he wants is to give the same given form to the medium at his disposal. That is to say, the form and the raw material or medium are different. He should plan to reduce the given scenery to the size of his canvas into the corresponding small proportions of each part. First he plans and then he executes it and thus the distinction between planning and execution is involved. The end is the production of an exact likeness of the given object and the means will be the proportionate measurement of the various parts etc. The different colours that he uses must exactly correspond to the natural colour of the scenery. The colours for him are just raw materials which he brings to a certain form, which also is given. His business is a matter of skill, which may require little aptitude and more practice and training. And if a number of persons have the same skill, it can be a placed together. If a figure by one artist resembles that by another, it is because both belonged to the same school. We should admit that to the extent an artist follows a school, he has something like craft in him.

The definition of epic by Chesterton that it is a "poem begun by the grandfather and completed by the grandson" is only jocular.
co-operative production, each person producing a specific part. Then what is the meaning of the originality of the artist? In so far as the artist is allowed to show his originality, even in catching the given in a special angle of his own, he is not completely an imitator. And in so far as he does not (and should not, as the theory implies by its stand) exercise any originality, he is deprived of the creative ability attributed to him.

Imitation theory in its application in epistemology does not give due recognition to the constructive nature of mind; and like-wise in its application in aesthetics, reduces the creative artist to the position of a dull, mechanical but a skilled labourer.

§ 10. SĀDṚSYA IN ART:

Here we may ask a relevant question: If art is not imitation of nature or life, should there not be at least likeness between the objects of the world and the creation of art? Or else, how can we recognise the content of a picture or a story? No body can deny that there should be likeness. But what is the sense in which we should understand "likeness" when we apply it to art. It will be profitable for us to understand it in the meaning in which Dr. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy uses the word Sādṛṣya, following the Indian Philosophical and artistic tradition.

39. In his Transformation of Nature in Art, Sāmskṛta terminologies used in the brackets and the references are taken from the same work.
First of all with regard to representation (ākṛti, sādṛśya) and imitation (anukarana, anukṛti) we find it stated that sādṛśya is essential to the very substance (pradhāna) of painting (Viṣṇudharmottara XLII, 48). The word sādṛśya has been usually been translated by 'likeness' and may bear this sense. But the meaning properly implied is something more like "correspondence of formal and representative elements in art." In drama also there are such definitions as Lokavṛttta anukarana or following the movement (or operation) of the world; and "Yo' yam svabhā-vo lokasya..... nātyam ity abhidhyate", "which designates the intrinsic nature of the world"; or again what is to be exhibited on the stage is avasthāna 'condition' or 'emotional situation' of the hero Rama or the like, is thought of as the anukārya.

But though Indian view of art gives right emphasis on sādṛśya, the meaning that it attaches to it is not the empirical one. Sādṛśya is not empirical likeness. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika defines sādṛśya as Tadbhiṁttve satī tad-gatah-bhūyodharmavattvam, ⁴⁰ which literally means "the condition of embracing in itself things of a manifold nature which are distinct from itself." "Sādṛśya is then similitude, but rather such as is implied by simile than by simulacrum. It is in fact obvious that the likeness between anything and any representation of it cannot be likeness of nature, but must be analogical or exemplary, or both of these.

What the representation imitates in the idea or species of the thing, by which it is known intellectually, rather than the substance of the thing as it is perceived by the senses.\footnote{41}

But should there not be the similarity of appearance in the work of art in order that the spectator can recognise it as such and such a thing? Following Bhartrhari Coomaraswamy says that recognition is not dependent on the \textit{visimilitude} but on convention. The realistic spectator reverses the imitative procedure of the artist who has given form to natural shape, by interpreting the manufactured image (\textit{rūpa}) as though it were the thing itself present to the eye (\textit{pratyaksa}). It is the limitation or the mistake of the spectator who is in the ordinary level of artistic consciousness and we commit the greatest blunder if we elevate the mistaken notion of the common spectator to the level of aesthetic criterion.\footnote{43} That recognition is dependent not on verisimilitude but on convention is supported by the art of iconography. The lotus of iconography is not the lotus of sensible experience. It is \textit{paroksa}, it is not recognisable by those who do not "understand art". In fact most of the accidental features proper to the lotus of the botanist are omitted from the symbol, which is, moreover, of indefinite dimension (again, "out of proportion", again, "out of proportion")

\footnote{41}{Coomaraswamy, Op., Cit., p.13.}
\footnote{42}{Vākyapādiya. III. 7. 5.}
\footnote{43}{Coomaraswamy, Op., Cit., Ch. V. titled \textit{Paroksa}.}
for those who do not "understand art"; the same who say with regard to Italian primitives "that was before they knew anything about anatomy") amātra, like the prthivī that is symbolized, not like the specifically dimensional objects (mātrāḥ) seen by the eye's intrinsic faculty (caksusā).

In other words the reference of the lotus of iconography is angelic (adhidaivata), that of the lotus of the botanist 'sensible' (pratyakṣa). 44

Following the distinction made by Jung between a symbol and a sign, Coomaraswamy distinguishes a language of symbols from a language of signs. A symbolic expression is held to be the best possible formula by which allusion may be made to a relatively unknown 'thing' which referent, however, is nevertheless recognised or postulated as 'existing'. 45 The use of any symbol, such as the figure Vajra or the word Bhūrmāna implies a conviction, and generally a conventional agreement resting on authority, that the relatively unknown, or it may be unknowable referent cannot be any more clearly represented. A sign on the other hand, is an analogous or abbreviated expression for a definitely known thing; every man knows or can be informed of, by indication of an object, as to what the sign 'means'. Thus wings are symbols when they 'mean' angelic independence of local motion, but signs when they designate an aviator. In the same way the cross is a symbol when used metaphorically to represent the structure of the universe with respect to hierarchy and extension— but it is a sign when used practically to warn the motorist of a

44. Ibid. p.125.
45. Note the slight difference in the meaning given to the word 'symbol' by S. K. Langer and Coomaraswamy.
nearby crossroad. The use of the words wings or cross to designate relatively known "occult" or abstract referents is symbolic, parokṣa; if it is to designate known, visible or potentially visible, concrete referents, it is semiotic pratyakṣa.

Having made this distinction clear, Coomaraswamy goes further and agrees that in any decadent art symbols are replaced by what are merely signs, a formal by an informal referendum. And "in such times of decadence it is even believed that the impulse of the 'primitives' were also descriptive; it is believed, that the vedic enchantments (mantra) are descriptions of natural phenomena." This kind of interpretation arises because of the 'realistic or 'naturalistic' assumption on which the attitude of interpreter rests. Hence "it is in this connection--- that we are led to understand how and why it is that 'realistic' art must be regarded as 'decadent', that is to say, falling short of what is proper to the dignity of man as man, to whom not merely sensible, but also intelligible worlds are accessible." Coomaraswamy even goes to the extent of saying that realistic art commits two-fold falsehood. For an image being more "true to nature" the more it lies, because it lies in both the senses of pratyakṣa and parokṣa. "The portrait of the artist's wife he is making posing as the mother

46. Ibid. p.128.
47. Ibid. p.128.
of God is untrue in its implication of likeness (the being of the mother of God is not in the human mode), and on the other hand, the portrait of the artist's wife as such is untrue with respect to human affectability, in that it cannot take the place of living flesh. Hence we may conclude that art resembles nature; but it resembles not by being a reproduction of the latter but because of certain accepted or easily acceptable symbols. It is an indirect or implied (dhvanita) resemblance which can be described by the word sadrasa.

§ 11. IMITATION AND CRITICAL REALISM:

If the advocates of naive realism maintain that we know the object as it is and directly, some moderation was aimed at by some less-overenthusiastic supporters of the objective existence of the sources of our knowledge. They held that now doubt the object is there; but the object as such cannot be known. Applying the physics of perception, either visual, auditory or any other form, they realised that certain stimuli will come from the object and fall on our respective perceptive organ, on which they will make their impression. The mind which 'knows' will be in contact with these impressions. Thus when we see the table before us or the blue mountain yonder, what we actually have the sensations of are the light-stimuli which fall on our retinae; which will be reported to our mind through the optic nerves. When the report reaches the brain the

48. Ibid. p.129.
act of perception is complete. By our long practice of imaginative faculty, we locate the spot from which the stimuli come to us. Thus we say that the table is 'before' me and the mountain is about five miles far etc. This position which Prof. Kemp Smith calls the theory of representative perception comes nearer the idealistic position; or this view recognises and appreciates the idealist's criticism of naive realism and it tries to keep itself up with the view of science, specially Physics, Physiology and Psychology. But it hesitates to accept the idealistic position completely when the latter says that experiencing does make difference to the thing experienced or to be known is incomplete and incompatible with to be for itself without any relation with that which knows it.

The new position of realism also maintains that the object is there and our knowing does not make any difference to it. Thus while recognising the psychological facts of perception urged by idealism, the new school wants to maintain the independent status of the object.

When idealism reigned far and wide in Europe and the U.S., the school of realism was almost pushed to the background. Attempts were made by some thinkers to save realism, to save in such a way that it should escape the criticism of the idealists. In this direction a co-operative effort was made which resulted in the volume titled "Essays in Critical Realism," by seven professors, Drake, Lovejoy, Pratt, Rogers, Santayana, Sellers and Strong. The authors of this volume take very great care to distinguish their view from naive realism. Theirs is not primitive realism which does not give due importance to human mind; but they
are as keen and stubborn as the naive realists in condemning idealism; and they try to recognise the realistic elements implied in the other great contemporary philosophical current namely, pragmatism, at the same time proving the latter's position as unintelligible when it is subjected to logical criticism. These different thinkers have sought to seek among themselves agreement only with regard to the epistemological problem. And with regard to the metaphysical problem they differ among themselves; which difference, they hold, is quite irrelevant from the point of view of the theory of knowledge and it is "entirely possible to isolate the problem of knowledge." 50

In the first Essay titled "The approach to critical realism" Prof. Drake tries to offer a criticism of both naive realism and subjectivism and tries to pave the way for establishing the theory they want to propound. He argues that even a subjectivist should be a realist as regards other persons' minds. He holds that the subjectivist's position shuts us up into our mental existence and it does not constitute even a presumption that there is no other kind of existence. And the rest of existence can be conceived like our experience in its intrinsic characters and "yet not be experience or experienced." 51

If we recognise, he argues, that there is an objective

49. Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge, a. L. E & W.
51. Ibid. p.7.
world outside, which exists for itself there was no necessity of an Absolute, or any such far fetched expedient to patch together the tattered world of the subjectivist. "The belief in the existence of independent physical objects is not only in view of commonsense and practical life— which, in lack of strong argument to the contrary, gives it an immense presumption— but is, from a standpoint unbiased by practical considerations, the simplest and most sensible hypothesis to account for the peculiarities of what appears." The belief in the independently existing objects is satisfied by our strong feelings and instinctive urge to believe. "Everything is as if realism were true; and the as if is so strong that we may consider our instinctive and actually inescapable belief justified."

"Perception is a one-way process, proceeding from the outer source of radiation to the organism. There is a sense indeed, in which it is true to say that we project our sense data into the objects we perceive; we imagine them there. But this 'projection' is not an existential proceeding; the characters we conjure up in the world about us are not really there, except in so far as they really were there before perception took place." But at the same time the critical realist takes precaution to avoid saying that everything that we perceive has its basis in the object outside e.g., in the case of persons with not-normal sense organs, things may appear as

52. Ibid. p.7.
53. Ibid. p.6.
54. Ibid. p.9.
something different to what it does to all other persons. But for the man who senses it as something different, it is true. And hence the critical realist thinks that "our differing sense data do not exist out there in the physical objects." But in the cases of memory and inference also the subjective factors cannot exist in the object independently of perception. Further, if all the sense-data are ascribed to the object, sometime we ascribe contradictory qualities to the same object. The object appears to us according to our mood and inner states and then so lavish will its qualities be that it ceases to have any definite nature and become mere blurs of contradictory qualities. Again, if all our sense-data are objectively true there must be objects according to each moment's perspective of every individual man. Then "each mind sees at each moment an immensely complex three-dimensional world; but there is absolutely nothing which is seen by the minds simultaneously. The three dimensioned world seen by one mind contains no place in common with that seen by another." Yet "each exists entirely exactly as it is perceived, and might be exactly as it is even if it were not perceived." "There are as many private spaces as there are perspectives; the one, therefore, at least as many as there are percipients and there may be any number of others which have a merely mental existence and are not seen by any one." But this position

55. Ibid. p.11.
is still less tenable than the extreme form of subjectivism; or it is a thorough-going relativism, repudiating definiteness of character in existence, and giving us, instead of a single coherent world, an infinite welter of qualities.\textsuperscript{57}

And the position also makes error impossible; for if everything is real for the individual percipient himself there cannot be any question of verifying it by others. If we identify the sensation with the object it results in "the temporal-spatial dislocation of appearance from Reality."\textsuperscript{58}

Thus, for example, a particular star is 'seen' at a particular point or in a particular direction in the space; while the same star might be at some other point and it might have appeared to be in that position due to the refraction of light from other stars. Physical existence may always have its series of shadows which instead of the original events, constitute our sense data.

Now, what is the status of our sense data? The data of perception are simply character complexes or essences, which are taken to be the characters of the existing outside objects, at the moment of perception. But here also the sense of the outer existence of these essences is indistinguishably fused with their appearance. Here the critical realist tries to distinguish himself from the idealist and holds that these two aspects of perception—i.e., the appearance of the character-complex and the implicit affirmation of its outer existence—must be distinguished by

\textsuperscript{57} Drake, Op.Cit., p.15.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid. p.16.
reflection. In so far as perception is veridical the essences that appear are really the essences of the objects. But there is no guarantee that they are not the appearance of some other object. So "our perceptual data are at best only in part genuine aspects of outer reality. So that what appears as a whole is never quite what exists." 59

In the cases of dream and other hallucinatory experiences what appears does not exist outside. So the meaning of givenness is simply concretion for discourse and action; which does not mean a concretion in existence.

Prof. Drake again and again makes his position clear in saying that perception is in a sense imagining character-complexes out there with an implicit attribution of existence; which may be occasionally mistaken. Some character-complexes are real while some are merely imaginary; they are not found there by a sort of telepathic vision, but are imagined there by a mind. The difference between a true perception and a hallucinatory experience is in that, while in the former the nature of what we imagine is partly determined by the messages reaching our brains from the outer objects, and the imagined character-complexes have a vividness and tinge of reality; in the case of centrally excited experience we do not have such vividness. Hence, taking all these into consideration Prof. Drake defines perception as "a sort of imagination—vivid, controlled, involuntary imagination, which is to some extent veridical." 60

59. Ibid. p.20.
60. Ibid. p.23.
He further goes to speak that in this act of perception, the objects themselves, i.e., those "bits of existence" do not get within our consciousness. Their existence is their own affair, private, incommunicable. But the mechanism of consciousness is such that we can conjure up, imagine, and perceive the location and characteristics of the objects about us to a certain extent correctly. What appear, our data, data of any form like sense, memory, thought etc., are merely character-complexes. They are logical entities, but not another set of existants to find a locus for in the world of existence.

By now already the position of critical realism has become clear to us and the proofs it offers for the existence of the outer objects are also made known. Still, we may consider before we can make a critical appraisal of this position from the point of view of the correspondence notion of truth, to some extent the proofs of realism offered by George Santayana.

Santayana starts by making the distinction between knowledge on the one side and the object of knowledge on the other. "A portrait to be a portrait, must be distinct from the sitter, and must at the same time somehow resemble or be referred to him; the question how good a portrait is, or what are the best methods of portraiture, would not otherwise arise. So knowledge could not be knowledge at all unless it was a fresh fact, not identical in existence with its object; and it could not be true knowledge unless, in its
deliverance, it specified some of the qualities or relation which really belong to that object."

But the critical realist recognises two tendencies in knowledge. The one has a tendency to separate appearance from substance only in existence; but the other has the tendency to identify them only in essence. But neither of these processes is absolute. Here the critical realist maintains that "whatever is distinguishable is separable." But the identity that he speaks of is only with regard to essence and not to existence—i.e., appearance and reality cannot be identified in existence; but the essence of what appears somehow characterises the mind.

Critical Realism thus is based on the union of two distinct assumptions; (1) Knowledge is transitive, i.e., self-existing things may become the chosen objects of a mind which identifies and indicates them. If transitive-ness is denied, the object cannot subsist when not known; nor can it become the object of any other thought than the one which now knows it. And then thought and its object would become identical, which means the perishing of knowledge (2) Knowledge is relevant—i.e., at least some of the qualities indicated by knowledge must be there in the thing outside. If there is no relevency, genuine knowledge cannot be distinguished from error or any other type of misleading cases.

Having spoken these features of knowledge, Santayana offers three proofs for realism, of which we shall consider two:

(1) Biological Proof: Under this argument the author appeals to our instinctive, i.e., unlearned behaviour towards the objective existence. Thus behaviour does not even consciously assume that there is an object outside; it simply believes and acts. When the child cries for the moon the child himself is cocksure that there is a shining object called the moon, though the psychologist may have some difficulty in fixing exactly the sensations and images.

(2) Psychological Proof: From the psychological point of view one may believe that all supposed facts are only ideas constructed by the human mind according to its own principles and having no further existence. But the consequence of this position, the psychologist himself does not accept consistently when he comes to practical life. This clearly shows the futility of thinking without reference to practical truths. Even psychologically, we cannot think if we do not believe in the objective existence of the object we think about.

The position of the critical realist, we may observe, tries to overcome the difficulties involved by naive realism. Critical realism is explicit in saying that everything that we perceive does not have an objective basis. Memory, hallucinatory experience, dreams, etc., are all no doubt
perceptions; but they cannot be ascribed to outer existence. Further, it takes a cautious view when it says that the object as such we do not know; we know only certain essences which we cannot existentially attribute to the outer reality; but we should believe that these essences somehow characterise reality when we have perception.

Our criticism of this position is not with regard to its scheme of metaphysics, nor even with their theory of essences. But our question is: Is imitation—notion of truth logically compatible with the scheme of knowledge that critical realism propounds? or can critical realism accept imitation theory as the criterion of truth? The answer is, no.

What is the nature and the position of outer existence according to critical realism? Outer reality is a something—we—cannot—know—what. It lives for itself in its solemn aloofness maintaining its isolated dignity, whether we know it or we do not know it. In fact we cannot say that we know it in its completeness and with certainty. We know only the essences and we only attribute them to the reality as the former somehow characterising the latter. And the proof put in various forms for the existence of such a reality is only our belief, our faith. Biologically our practical life forces on us the necessity of believing in an outside object; psychologically also, same assumption is forced on us. We "imagine" it to be there; but we have not found it. Every bit of our experience tells us 'as
But our question is, when we think or perceive, can we determine the veracity of our cognitive act by appealing to correspondence? We cannot. For, the critical realist himself frankly admits that we have no guarantee that the essences which we attribute to the reality somehow characterise it; which we only believe, imagine, but never found. How can we assure ourselves that our perception corresponds to such a reality?

Again what is the nature of valid perception? What is the criterion of deciding a genuine piece of perception from a mistaken one, and how can we distinguish a genuine perception from a hallucinatory experience? The difference is that while in genuine perception the nature of what we imagine is partly determined by the messages reaching our brains from the objects; and the imagined character-complexes have a vividness and tang of reality; in the case of hallucination, the messages are centrally excited and they do not come from outside. The latter lacks vividness. Hence the characteristics of correct perception are vividness, being controlled from outside and involuntary imagination. But this explanation simply begs the question from the point of view of correspondence. True perception is perception in which the messages come from outside. But how is the percipient to decide whether the messages come from outside or from the cortical centres? Again vividness as such cannot be the proof of genuine perception; for in the case of a highly imaginative experient, even hallucinatory objects seem as vividly and clearly as do in the case of actual
perception. If the perception is distinguished as involuntary, and the hallucinatory experience as voluntary, we betray some defect in our meaning of the words voluntary and the involuntary. When hallucination occurs, the experient does not voluntarily—i.e., consciously and willingly make himself to have the experience. Hallucinatory perception is as compulsory to him as actual perception is to us.

The conclusion of our criticism is this: The imitation-notion of truth cannot work even under the revised scheme of the critical realist. Here our aim is not to criticise the critical realist about the nature of his outer existence etc. Our objection is only that his way of distinguishing correct and incorrect perceptions cannot stand logical criticism and he has to modify his view of truth and he cannot appeal to imitation. 62

§ 12. PLACE OF NATURE IN TRUTH AND BEAUTY:

That truth and beauty are imitations are based on two assumptions: in the case of truth it assumes that nature by itself is real—i.e., the ultimate object of knowledge; in the case of beauty it assumes that nature in itself is neither true nor false, neither beautiful nor ugly. The values of truth and beauty are given to nature

62. We are not first ascribing this view of truth to the critical realist and then criticising him. We are only comparing certain epistemological position to see whether a particular view of truth holds good with a particular scheme of perception.
only in so far as the latter serves as the stimuli for the functioning of human thought and imagination. Nature taken by itself is simply a raw phenomenon, shadowy appearance. The phenomenon appears differently to different persons and it is the business of thought to interpret it so that it becomes objectified in its meaning. So the value of truth consists not in the raw nature but in the interpretation. The ultimate object of truth, therefore, is not the raw nature but what stands as the object of our intellectual interpretation.

In the same way beauty is also not the property of nature. Challenging the belief that beauty inheres ready-made in nature, which the artist may ransack for copying but cannot improve, James McNeill Whistler had vociferated that nature provides no more than the raw materials of beauty, from which the artist must select what he needs for a composition in which beauty will be fully displayed. In the words of Whistler himself: "To say to the painter, that nature is to be taken as she is, is to say to the player, that he may sit upon the piano. That nature is always right is an assertion, artistically as untrue—— Nature is very rarely right to such an extent that it might almost be said that Nature is usually wrong; that is to say, the condition of things that shall bring about the perfection and harmony worthy of a picture is rare, and not

common at all. Seldom does nature succeed in producing a picture."

Now it is admitted that careful study and observation of Nature are matters of individual style and even in that the artist purposefully selects and emphasises some elements to the exclusion of others irrelevant from his point of view. This is not all. The artist does not merely select and combine them in the way he likes, but he interprets them in such a way that the interpreted combination gains a new value which was absent in the original brute raw objects. It is this value, this expression, that forms the entire disposition of the work of art; and into this disposition the entire material is moulded and transformed. This process is essentially the creation of something new, "something which should claim attention and respect in its own right and not by reference to any similarity it might or might not have to anything else whatsoever." In fact as the Cubists say, "the painter, careful to create, rejects the natural image as soon as it has served its purpose." Gauguin, the famous painter said: "It is said that God put a piece of clay into His hand and created all that you know. The artist, in turn, if he wishes to create a really divine work, must not imitate nature, but use the elements of nature to create a new element."

64. Obsborn: op., cit., p. 84.
65. Ibid. Foot-note to p. 84.
The function of thought and imagination is the creation of truth and beauty. One might object to the view that truth is a creation and hold that it is a discovery, discovery of the principles that govern the behavior of nature. But granting that it is a discovery, we should not overlook the fact that this discovery is the result of a lot of intellectual construction. We can say that there is no truth outside intellectual construction as there is no beauty outside art. Truth and beauty, falsity and ugliness are not positive attributes of matter. Matter is made true because of its being intellectually constructed and it is made beautiful by the emotional reaction to it; because it is depicted that it embodies those emotional reactions. Thus truth becomes another word for the intellectual construction which by its very nature is objectified. So also beauty becomes another word for objectified aesthetic emotion. The philosopher and the scientist construct truth and then make others understand it. The artist creates beauty which afterwards makes others also to partake the same for similar emotion.

"We become aware of beauty and acquire the habit of transferring it from the work of art to the aspect of nature which was the source of its inspiration. We learn to see beauty in a tree, in a mountain, and even in things which, before the artist had opened our eyes, left us cold or even repelled us." 66 In fact "it is doubtful if anybody..." 66. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Article on Art.
found anything but dinginess and ugliness in the mist and fog of the Thames-side in London before Whistler, by the work of his brush and the poetic imagery of his 'Ten-o'-Clock Lecture' invested the murky London atmosphere with permanent beauty."

Though there is much similarity between truth and beauty in their creative aspect, both of them should be kept distinct and they should be taken for the value which is individual and unique to each. But the imitation theory confuses the one for the other. Truth is the imitation of the object by the mind and beauty of the same by the artist. In the case of the one, the mental image will be the product and in the case of the other it will be the image on the canvas. But the latter presupposes the knowledge of the former. In order that the image on the canvas can be considered beautiful, it must be first verified with the criterion of truth: whether it is a faithful imitation. The result is, beauty is made subservient to truth.

But there is a special capacity in us, the capacity of imagination. As Kant made it clear, imagination, the faculty for creating and appreciating beauty, is neither real nor unreal from the point of view of the categories of the understanding. The principles of understanding cannot be directly applied to the world of imagination and when we enter the latter realm, we should cease bringing in the logic of the former. We know that all the contents and 67. Encyclopaedia Britanica. Article on Art.
referents of art and art experiences are unreal. We know that the murder that takes place on the stage is a pretense, a make-believe and that the food and the flower shown on the screen are there only for being seen and not eaten and smelt. When an old woman loudly shrieks at the sight of the murder of Desdemona, we judge the old woman as an unfit member of the audience. She had forgotten that she is witnessing the life on the stage and not the life of the world. When we see the picture of a fruit, instead of appreciating the colours, lines and forms the artist has created to exhibit the emotional significance of the object, if we salivate, it is the indication of our lack of artistic capacity. Even a dog may be made to salivate at the picture of a piece of meat if it is clearly drawn. Osborne illustrates this point with the example of a child listening to the mother's song:

Hey didle didle,
The cat and the fiddle,
The cow jumped over the moon,
The little dog laughed to see such sport,
And the dish ran away with the spoon.

If the child laughs with glee, it does as a child should do. But if he is a modern child, the chances are that he will say "Get away, you can't fool me. Dogs can't laugh and cow can't jump that far." We feel that the reply of the child is not befitting, that there is something wrong in it as the child. Here the point that we should note is, in all art-experience there is and there should be a sense of the awareness of unreality. We know that it
is simply a stage and we know that the murder is merely an action. The murderer and the murdered are not the actual persons on the stage, but two imaginary or historical (but imaginatively re-created) characters whose course of destiny we can neither change nor stop. But this awareness of unreality does not make us disbelieve in the theme of the work of art when we are in the process of experiencing it; because in the course of art experience, we ourselves voluntarily suspend the disbelief. It is this peculiar blending of two activities—awareness of unreality but yet a voluntary tendency to suspend the disbelief in it—that distinguishes the nature of art experience from the every-day experience of worldly life. These two activities operating at once cannot take place in the empirical level of experience, but it is possible only in the imaginative world of art; nay, it is the core of it.

But the imitation theory does not recognise these facts, because it starts on the dogma that truth and beauty are imitations. But a closer analysis reveals that according to it, beauty is only a species or a modified application of truth.

In conclusion of this chapter we should note that we do not dogmatically abandon any realistic tincture from works of art and statements of truth. Nor do we completely denounce the descriptive value. Truth is that which states the inner principle of things; but if in addition to it the external appearance of things is also described
it also adds to our service. If a picture, a novel or a poem is praised because of its descriptive value, such a praise is not wrong. A work of art may be looked at from any point of view. Even the anthropologist and the historian have every right to see the works of art from their points of view and praise them lavishly if it helps their study.

Art and truth have various functions and many of these functions are utilitarian in nature. We do not say that art and truth should be placed on isolated marble towers. But our point is, imitation cannot be the criterion with which we can judge either of truth or beauty.