It is an interesting thing to note in the histories of epistemology and aesthetics that whenever a certain position holds the sway in the field of one, a corresponding position becomes prominent in that of the other. From this phenomenon in the history of thought we may be tempted to conclude that either the epistemological standpoints are always influenced by the aesthetic ones or vice versa. But that is not the correct explanation. The real explanation of this problem lies in observing and appreciating the fact that behind the "standpoints" of these two value sciences lies the concept of human mind, our conception of which shapes our epistemological and aesthetic theories. This similarity is also due to unity of the underlying metaphysical or ontological point of view. Whenever the creative ability of mind was duly recognised and a legitimate importance given to the activity of the mind in creating and appreciating the values such as truth and beauty, a certain theory of these values—like the one we have maintained as coherence—evolves. And whenever the importance of the mind is minimised, if not completely eliminated, the other theories of truth and beauty we have considered gain prevalence: theories like truth and beauty as imitation and as instrument. Even in the positions with which we disagree, we can find this principle operating, viz., both truth and beauty are defined in terms of one basic
This similarity in the nature of both these values becomes still more clear when we find that theories like the imitation and instrument suffer from similar fallacies and difficulties in both of their applications: epistemic and aesthetic. When we compare the basic principles of both epistemology and aesthetics which we accept, we find that both of them exhibit remarkable similarity to each other. It will not be hard for us to appreciate that whenever these two basic principles differ from each other, they differ only in their applications, and the difference is due to the spheres of human, discursive thinking and imagination (which includes feeling also), in which they operate.

This operation of the same principle as the basis of epistemology and aesthetics can be found in the case of ethics also. For one who believes that the function of philosophy is to explain the fundamental nature of reality and all the values of human life, the principle of the true and the beautiful should also be the principle of the good. Though I believe in this view, I have not included the value of goodness on the scale of the comparison in this study. I have confined myself only to the first two values.

There is a significant factor forming the basis of this study: the conviction that our world-view or our conception of the ultimately real can be found in our con-
ception of the values. It is a very old fallacy—repeated again in the modern times in the dress of logical empiricism—which holds that values are merely subjective; and this fallacious view applies more to beauty and goodness than to truth which has been considered somehow to be factual. This view (excluding the position of logical empiricists), by implication gives universality or objectivity only to truth or the principles of physical sciences; and thrusts the claim of beauty and goodness to the merely subjective status. But a merely subjective value is a self-refuting concept, the correct view being: values are as much objective as the laws of sciences and every individual value is a distinct expression of the human mind in viewing or realizing what it considers to be ultimately real. There is similarity in the underlying principles of all our basic values because each value expresses in its own way the basis of all the values. Truth is as much a value as beauty and beauty as much factual as truth. And only because truth (scientific truth) explains us the nature of the physical phenomena it need not be overglorified; and beauty should not be looked down upon. After all, truth and beauty stand for certain distinct aspects or spheres of our experience and a dispassionate view warns us not to undervalue any of these aspects as a utility-minded onlooker does.
As a glance at the contents makes it clear, I have started the work with a critical study of the two influential theories: truth and beauty as imitation and instrument. These two chapters (i & ii) logically suggest to us the view of truth and beauty as coherence which is discussed in the iii chapter. The same problem is further discussed in the iv chapter in our attempt to bring out the clear meaning of the terminology used in art criticism. Chapter v continues to discuss another aspect of coherence, both in its epistemic and aesthetic applications, namely, the meaning of relation and necessity. Throughout these chapters attention is given to pointing out the difference between the two applications of this theory, trying to indicate the reasons for the difference. Chapter vi compares the claim of coherence with those of some modern theories of truth and beauty like the sense-verification theory of truth and the emotionalist theory of beauty of logical empiricism. Chapter vii tries to describe the conceptions of the mind which is presupposed by the divergent theories that we considered.

After an account of truth and beauty as coherence, the question naturally arises: if the same principle is at the basis of both truth and beauty, can we not speak in a certain sense of aesthetic truth and epistemic beauty? This question is discussed in chapter viii. In this
context, the negative aspect of our principle also deserves our close study: If truth and beauty are explained in terms of one basic principle, should we not explain their contraries, error and ugliness, in terms of the same principle, showing the similarity between the two? Chapter ix deals with this problem. The last chapter contains an account of the supra-coherent states of truth and beauty and a comparison between them with the discussion of the sense in which we can speak of these states. This chapter leads us to the conclusion that though truth and beauty as such are distinct from each other; when they transcend themselves into supra-coherent states, both of them tend to become one in the sense that both originate from a common all-inclusive ground, namely, reality.

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