§ 1. INEXPPLICABILITY & THE INADEQUACY OF THE RELATIONAL LEVEL:

So far we considered the principle of coherence as the principle of both truth and beauty and further noted that negatively the incoherent will result in error and ugliness. But now a question arises: Is our study complete? i.e., have we said all that we should on the nature of truth and beauty in terms of coherence? or should we go a little further to complete our account?

That we are yet short of completion in our account is suggested by what we noted in a previous chapter. With regard to our conception of truth, we noted that the ideal of thought is to seek its most comprehensive and coherent system which claims to be the most comprehensive and systematic description of reality. If it can be called truth, it should remain a description, a mere description of reality and it cannot claim a higher status than this.

To express the same with the help of a logical proposition: the P should always remain in some sense outside the real S, and only then P can claim to be a true description of S. The moment P tries to become one with S, it ceases to be a description and it is no longer truth. Thus the conception of coherence as truth which we considered so far is valid as long as we recognise a necessary distinction between truth and reality. But in this distinction nece-
Further, we noted previously that the concept of relation which is the main nerve of coherence has something which challenges our understanding. The P is internally related with S, yet it is distinct from it. What is the exact sense in which we should understand the terms to be internally related and yet keeping up their distinct identity? If the relation is completely internal to the term, how can it relate another term which is not the same? But this difficulties however perplexing they are, cannot lead us back to the already refuted theory of external relations. We should conclude that relation is either a self-contradictory concept or it has an inexplicable element in it. The former alternative is suicidal to discursive thought; for all discursive thought is relational and if relation is self-contradictory, thought itself is self-contradictory and so it has no right to claim any level of truth. Bradley holds that all relations are self-contradictory and hence they are appearance; and so the knowledge that thought gives us is also appearance. It cannot give us the valid knowledge of reality. But, even if we accept the view of Bradley, we cannot totally dismiss the validity of thought. Even Bradley's position appearance also is truth, a limited truth and as long as it is taken for what it is, it is not untrue. Hence the latter alternative—that relation has an inexplicable element about it—seems to be more sensible.

We may explain the same thing in another way: Relation aims at an ideal at the complete realization of which
the concept of relation itself sinks into an unbroken unity. As long as we have the concept of relation, we have the duality between the related terms, and the aim of relation is to bring together the two terms, bring them together in all the possible respects. But till both the terms are merged into one unity, the task of bringing them together still remains an yet unaccomplished ideal. And the moment the ideal is fully realized, the concept of relation will no more be there. Hence the realization of non-dual unity is not a stage opposed to relation but it is the realized condition of the aim of relation. The relation has an inexplicable element with it because the fully realized condition of relation is not fully explicable and to the extent the nature of its realized condition is there in it, it is an inexplicable.

Now, we can clearly state the implication of these observations: Coherence, which is the systematic whole of thought, is of the nature of truth (nay, is truth itself) as far as it goes. But when coherence becomes self-conscious and turns inward, for self-criticism, it realizes that it is a little short of reaching the stage impelled by its own inner nature and in order to reach that stage, it should transcend itself. But now the question arises: Can this transcended stage also be called by the name of truth? The answer is simple: When coherence is called truth, why can we not call the transcended stage of coherence as the transcended form of truth? Or, to put it in another way: we have to extend our conception of
truth or if necessary we should call this truth in a distinct terminology. Another point of distinction we have to note is, whereas the coherent-truth is mediate because of its relational character, the supræ-coherent truth should be immediate as there is no duality between the subject and the predicate.

Coming to the aesthetic counterpart of the supræ-coherent truth, we should note that though beauty is the coherence of imagination, the nature of diversity is not so explicitly felt in aesthetic experience; and so the nature of relation in it is at a more realized level. In the case of discursive thought the given experience is first broken into subject and predicate etc., and then the attempt is made to relate them. But in the case of aesthetic imagination, the experience is not broken; it takes place in its unity. So the diversity in it is not as acute as it is in the case of discursive thought. But this does not mean that there is no diversity and hence no relation in a work of art. On the contrary, a work of art is a unity of diversity; the greater the diversity the stronger and more binding will be the unity. But these diversified parts in a work of art are there, only as parts of the feeling--tone and so the diversity never gains an upper hand over the unity. That is why the coherence that we find in a work of art is not of intellectual nature. It is a coherent unit and something more than it; i.e., the transcended stage of coherence in which the diversity is more powerfully overcome than in the case of intellectual coherence.
But to the extent a work of art is a whole, it is not completely above the nature of coherence. A work of art is at a greater transcended level of coherence than a logical whole. But the transcendence is not so complete as to be completely free from any mark of coherence. Otherwise, how can we describe it as harmonious, rhythmical, balancing, etc.? 

So the question arises: Can there be a stage of aesthetic experience to describe which our terminologies of coherence—harmony and its laws like rhythm, balance and contrast—prove to be miserably inadequate? That we have some such stage of aesthetic experience is a fact of experience and so we need not divert into the question whether it can be. Hence our question should be: What is its nature? And can we compare and contrast that experience with the experience of beauty? 

The kind of experience which we call the sublime is this aesthetic experience which transcends the coherence of imagination. Before we can give a description of the sublime, it is better if we explain more fully what we mean by its aesthetic counterpart—the supra-coherent truth? 

§ 2. NATURE OF THE SUPRA-COHORENT 
TRUTH: ITS RELATION WITH 
THE COHERENT TRUTH: 

It follows that the supra-coherent truth is a higher stage in the purposive development of thought; it is a stage where thought matures itself into a condition of non-duality. One may raise an objection that this stage cannot be said to belong in any way to the nature
of thought and so it is something alien to thought. That this stage is not of the nature of thought is true if by the nature of thought we mean the discursive character. But this is not sufficient argument to prove that it is alien to thought. The higher stage can never be alien or antagonistic to the lower stage. On the contrary, as we shall observe, we find that this higher stage allows the lower stage to approach it without encroaching upon the former's real nature.

This higher stage one may call by the name intuition or mystic experience. But due to the usage of these terms by philosophers—rationalists and empiricists alike—and theologians and the bitter critics of theological dogmas, these terms have gained a variety of meanings. Thus they mean sometimes a kind of religious ecstasy, sometimes an anti-intellectual approach to the ultimate reality and sometimes it is used by theologians with an air of shobbish superiority to support the authority of their religious dogmas. But when we use the term—we shall retain the term mystic experience throughout this chapter—we use it only in the epistemological sense. We mean that the mind has a capacity at its most intense moment for a flash of enlightenment which cannot be obtained by any amount of cool and deliberate ratiocination. Everyone of us has such moments of experience at times and it may be longer or shorter and about a profound problem or an ordinary one. In the case of some persons, this experience lasts a little longer and in a more intense manner. When they are having this experience, they are quite unaware of the ordinary
experience. When we are deeply immersed in a mathematical problem, or in the experience of a work of art, or when the scientist has lost himself in observing a new mystery revealed by his experimental analysis, we (and the scientist) are also deaf and blind to what is happening outside the room. But in the case of a mystic—by whom we mean a philosopher of the highest kind—he is not absorbed in any particular problem of a particular science, but in the most ultimate problem of being or reality. Philosophy differs from all other sciences in that its subject matter is only the ultimate nature of things while that of the sciences some special aspects of things. In the same way, a scientific-mystic (i.e., when the scientist has lost himself in the mystery of the problem) differs from a philosopher-mystic: the former is absorbed in the particular problem of the particular aspects of things while the latter is absorbed in the ultimate problem of the ultimate nature of things. The scientist also "sees" a mystery and later on he tries to construct a rational system out of it or he tries to resolve that mystery into already existing rational system or to change the already existing system in order to accommodate this "vision" also. So is the case with the philosophic-mystic.

The truth of the matter is this: either in science or in philosophy, experience is the starting point. But any and every brute piece of experience cannot be the impelling point of either science or philosophy. That there is a stone on the road does not attract the mind of a
scientist or a philosopher, unless it serves to catch their mind in a significant way. When thinking starts about any problem, it is a kind of vision that flashes first as the solution and then the attempt is made to translate this vision into a coherent description. As has been said humorously by Bradley, "Philosophy is finding bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct." What he meant was, it is vision which gives the real content of our philosophical knowledge.

Some philosophers do recognise such a vision or the sudden flash of knowledge but they hold that it cannot be accepted unless it is tested by the other aspects of experience. Thus Prof. Montague writes: "..... the ideas and beliefs which are yielded by intuition should neither be discarded as false nor accepted as true, but taken tentatively as hypothesis which need to be tested by further experience. They should, in short, be treated precisely like those ideas that are derived from the testimony of others—as suggestions which are thankful to receive but careful to substantiate."²

Montague is right in his suggestion in so far as it is applicable to the sciences. Because science is essentially a rational system which explains the facts of experience as such. Hence the value of a hypothesis should be tested in the light of its possible coherence with the other facts of experience. But we cannot apply the

2. Ways of knowing. p.64.
suggestion of Montague to the philosophical system. For, to accept the epistemological value of a mystical experience only after it is tested by the intellectual coherence implies that intellectual coherence is still the final judge of truth.

The relation between the mystic vision of the philosopher and the intellectual coherence of the sciences and philosophy is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in the Republic of Plato. In this famous passage of the line, Plato says that our intellectual pursuit starts from below upwards. From the level of the images we come to the level of the sensible things and then we reach the third level, that of the sciences and mathematics. We can describe this as the level of intellectual coherence of the scientist. Now, the man at this level is consistent but without having tested his own grounds. Then, if the upward journey continues, he will have a direct vision of the ideas and the idea of the Good and how all the ideas are related with the idea of the Good. This vision is direct, without the help of any sensible symbols. And then with this indubitable knowledge, we come downward in order to check up the bases of our scientific knowledge. But the upward and the downward processes are not the same. As has been so clearly stated by a Platonic scholar: "The upward process is not a process of proof, but the search for a principle which does not need nor admit of proof, a process that terminates in the direct vision of such a principle. The downward process is that which the conse-
quences of this principle are exhibited in their due order, right down to those hypotheses which have survived examination and to those new ones which have taken the place of any that have been discarded. It will not be a mere reduplication of the upward process, because the upward process has been tentative, with many false starts (in all probability) while before the downward process begins all such errors will have been purged away; and the process will be through a chain of propositions in their due order of dependence."

Now, the point of importance for us is to observe that for Plato real knowledge consists in a moment of direct vision of reality and in the light of that vision the several coherent systems of our thought (sciences) should be checked up and reinterpreted if necessary. So in the case of the mystic experience of a philosopher, it is not the mystic vision that should stand the test of intellectual coherence but it is the latter which should gain its due value or add value in the light of the former.

§ 3. THE MEANING OF INEFFABILITY:

We maintain that the coherent truth is not opposed to the super-coherent or mystic truth. But this position might be challenged by a characteristic of mystic experience which has been found to be universal among all the mystics: ineffability. The mystic says that the experience defies expression, and that it is impossible to express it.

adequately in words. Thus William James treats ineffa-
bility as one of the most universal characteristics of
mystic experience. 4

One may argue: Even if such a truth as the mystic
truth were possible, it cannot be expressed in words and
that which cannot be expressed in words cannot be commu-
nicated to others. In which case there is neither the
possibility of confirmation nor that of confutation by
others and so one can merely revel in one's own experience
calling it truth. But can it be truth? As it is put
by a recent writer: "I am not saying that such incommuni-
cable, inexpressible, mystical truths are devoid of any
sense; rather I would like to say that when we cannot talk
about them, we cannot talk about them either sensibly or
non-sensibly. What we would do about them, if we could
do anything at all, would not be a talk, and therefore it
would be inaccurate to call it meaningful or meaningless.
The mystic's dissatisfaction with language can never be
removed because no amount of linguistic improvement ac-
cording to him, will ever make language capable of describing
adequately the content of mystic experience. Therefore,
the only alternative left is to keep quite. 'Whereof one
cannot speak' says Wittgenstein, 'thereof one must be
silent'. 5

While appreciating this observation, we shall only
examine two questions in this connection: (1) How far and

5. Rajendra Prasad: Ordinary Language and Linguistic Licen-
ge. The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.XXXIV.No.4.
Jan. 1962.
in what sense mystic experience is ineffable? and (2) Is not to some extent all our experience ineffable? We shall explain the second question first.

There are aspects of our experience in which the feeling or emotion is dominant which also are ineffable. Unless a man has had the experience of love or religious devotion or the emotion of patriotism, no amount of explanation by another man can make these states of experience effable to the former person. William James also observes: "In this peculiarity mystical states are more like states of feeling than like states of intellect." Only because much of our feeling and emotion defies expression, can we say that they are untrue or opposed to the effable aspect of our experience?

In order to clear the confusion about the relation between the effable and the ineffable aspects of our experience, we will do well if we note that the experience is a composite out of which, at a logically later stage, the intellect, the self-consciousness etc., will solve. Strictly speaking, it is the intellect which is effable. And that which is effable should be coherently effable because of the inner demand of the intellect itself. But how far one can make one's experience coherently effable is a matter connected with one's linguistic ability and imaginative capacity to coin new symbols and words to express the deeper regions of experience. Further, the expressed aspect of experience will always be in the form of symbols

and concepts which are universal in character. And as such what they express is not the fresh and unique individual experience, but the pale transformation of some aspects of this living experience. It is only the artist who can to a greater, but not to the fullest, extent express the experience without removing their uniqueness and freshness. But the artist can express only the artistic experience, i.e., those feelings and emotions which are synthesised by the creative imagination and even he cannot express the particular sensations like the pain of toothache. Even the expression of the artist is not expressed in the intellectually coherent way. Hence much of our individual experience is in this sense ineffable and so beyond the grasp of our coherent-truth; and in the same way if the mystic truth is ineffable, it does not prove it to be either anti-coherent or anti-rational.

We shall now come to the first question that we asked: How far and in what sense mystic experience is really ineffable?

Prof. Walter Kaufman distinguishes two aspects of our experience which can be called ineffable: direct acquaintance and emotion. It can be illustrated in this way: Suppose a man has heard much about the scenes of the snowy Himalayas without having seen it directly, and he goes to the mountain range once. Naturally he feels that all the descriptions that he read about it are true, but the descriptions were so pale that they had given only a [7. Critique of Religion and Philosophy, p.225-26.]
glimmering shadow of the real brilliance of the snowy heights; But he himself cannot improve upon the description. Here the object, the real, individual object is ineffable: it is not possible to describe it adequately. Or, he may also mean that the emotional experience that he had is ineffable in the sense that he cannot describe it. Here, the inexplicable nature of all the deep emotional experience is common to both the mystic and art experience and other forms of intense moments. In the same way the nature of the objects we deal with in our work-a-day world through direct acquaintance is also not completely effable. In all these senses, the lack of adequate expression may be to a great extent due to the limitation of the experient himself. Instead of an ordinary man, if it were a poet who went to the Himalayas, he would have made it less ineffable and his emotion also would have been expressed in a better way. In the same way, all mystics are not endowed with the powers of verbal description as an artist is and if a mystic has this power he would have better succeeded in expressing it.

The real import of ineffability and effability is this: much of our experience is transcendental, transcendental from the point of view of our intellectual coherence. Coherence is truth, but it is not the whole of truth and that region, depth and height of truth which one cannot express in terms of coherence, but which is nevertheless known to be true, is called ineffable. Nobody calls a false piece of information (as such) as ineffable. Effa-
-bility stands for being grasped by the intellect through the symbols of words, images and analogies etc., and that which is made effable should be made so in a coherent manner, either in science or in art. As Prof. Kaufman observes we find that mysticism and the ineffable nature of mystic experience are more strongly emphasised in the histories of religions when religions tend to become excessively rationalistic and theological. The theologian is essentially a rationalist in so far as he tries to construct the religious dogmas in a coherent manner. When rationalism and theology try to reduce the whole of religious experience to intellectual coherence, as a protest the ineffability is emphasised by the mystics rather in a louder tone than necessary; and thus the impression that it is anti-intellectualistic is created. Kaufman holds that the negative reply emphasised in the upanisads is also of the same nature. "Upanisads means something like 'seminars'; and the typical situation is that a teacher answers the questions of a student. The plea of ineffability is a last resort. The student asks whether the experience was like this? Like this? Like this?. He always misunderstands."9 "This is the scheme of many an interrogation in the upanisads. An older man tries to describe an experience to a younger man who has not had the experience and who keeps asking bright questions which are overliteral and show no imaginative understanding whatsoever until the teacher finally exclaims 'neti! 'neti!'...

8. Ibid. p.229.
Ineffability is not the mark of scepticism. "The ineffabilist believes in one ultimate reality and has not any doubt of its existence at all. And again though he conceives the knowledge of such reality as unattainable by the commonly recognised means of knowledge, he believes that reality is realisable in a mystical experience. Such experience, being altogether individual in its nature, is incommunicable to others as all experience as such is."  

All that we have to remember before we pass on to the aesthetic counterpart of this transcendental level of truth is: Truth in its profound sense is transcendental to the intellectual coherence. But the transcendental truth is not opposed to the intellectual truth as long as the latter stands for what it is. The transcendental truth is not coherent, but neither is it incoherent. The transcendent truth is implied by the coherent truth in a negative way.

§ 4. THE SUBLIME: THE SUPRA-COHERENT BEAUTY:  
Just as the mystic truth is the supra-coherent truth, the sublime is the supra-coherent aesthetic experience. In the European aesthetic tradition, it is Longinus, who for the first time makes the concept of the sublime a category of literary criticism. But the credit of treating this concept from the philosophical point of view for the first time and in a profound manner goes to Kant. Later, Schopenhauer also devotes a few pages to discuss this concept. In the eighteenth century a number of English

10. Ibid. p. 230.
12. Third Century A.D. There is no unanimous opinion,
writers were interested in this concept, among whom an independent treatise by Edmund Burke on the "Enquiry into the origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful" takes the foremost place. We may give a brief exposition of this concept before we can compare and contrast it with the concept of beauty or imaginative coherence.

It is better if we start with a series of graded concepts like the pretty, the graceful, the beautiful, the grand and the sublime. Out of these concepts beauty seems to occupy a middle position. A pretty thing, whatever its other characteristics be, should essentially be small in magnitude; it should be small in comparison with the spectator. Thus we speak of a pretty twinkling star, a pretty child and a flower. The graceful is little bigger than the pretty in magnitude, but usually the graceful is characterised by the easeness of the movement or composition. In the case of beauty the movement or composition is bindingly coherent and though there is rhythm in it, it is not characterised by so much of ease as the graceful is. The graceful implies a little more of freedom than what the strict coherence of imagination allows. The grand or the grandeur on the other hand is a beautiful thing with a greater dimension or magnitude. It is something which by

among the scholars with regard to the exact date of his life.


14. A. C. Bradley starts with a comparison of the Sublime with all these concepts; the comparison makes the concept of the Sublime at once clear. For the same advantage we have followed his method in this paragraph. See his Oxford Lectures on Poetry. p. 40 ff.
its wider canvas and expanse strikes the power of imagination and draws the imagination towards itself by its magnitude in addition to its being coherent. Here the distinction between the pretty and the graceful, the graceful and the beautiful or the beautiful and the grand—all of which when they are taken as aesthetic concepts—cannot be drawn very sharply. The pretty will have a little grace of its own and the ease of grace can be found in any beautiful thing. In the same way, we cannot make any rule to limit the dimension of a beautiful thing and that of a grand thing. But we will at once perceive the difference when we compare a pretty thing with a beautiful thing or a graceful one with a grand one or a work of beauty with the expression of the sublime.

Now, if the grand requires the coherence of imagination to expand to its maximum dimensions, the sublime is so expansive that the coherence of imagination proves itself to be wholly incapable of comprehension. It is a state in which the overwhelming magnitude of the aesthetic experience violently challenges the powers of imagination and breaks its form into hopeless inadequacies. The imagination accepts its defeat and the magnitude of the presentation triumphs. Like the mystical experience for the coherence of thought, the sublime is something beyond the comprehension of imagination. The writers on the sublime are unanimous in giving examples of the sublime. They illustrate this concept with the examples of the endless stretch of waters in the ocean with its mighty roaring...
waves; the lofty mountains piercing arrogantly into the blue above; the terrible eruption of fiery volcanoes; or the maddening swiftness of the unundating floods. Writes Longinus: "So it is that, as by some physical law, we admire, not surely the little stream, transparent through they be, and useful too, but Nile, or Tibre, or Rhine, and far more than all, ocean; nor are we awed by this little flame of our kindling, because it keeps its light clear, more than by those heavenly bodies, often obscured though they be, nor think it more marvellous than the craters of Ætna, whose eruptions bear up stones and entire masses, and sometimes pour forth rivers of that Titenic and unalloyed fire. Regarding all such things we may say this.....What passes his (man's) thought wins his wonder."¹⁵

Here one may say that all the examples for the sublime that we are giving are taken from the phenomena of nature and hence the sublime cannot be accepted as aesthetic experience unless it is illustrated from works of art. But we need not feel any difficulty in pointing out the sublime situations in works of art. In fact any work of art which is considered to be very great is so because of its sublimity. The situation in the Mahābhārata, when knowing fully well that it is Kṛṣṇa who has come in the disguise of a Brahmin to ask for the pot of Amṛta from him, Karna gives it away. Though the giving away of the pot of Amṛta meant his own approaching death, it was foreign to the moral ideal of Karna to decline to give the alm

¹⁵. The Sublime. Tr. by A. O. Prickard. Oxford Clarendon Ch.XXXV.
asked from him. When we read this situation not only our breath stops with wonder but it takes an appreciable amount of time for the imagination to collect itself from this "unimaginable" height of generosity and to proceed with the rest of the story. After a series of murders and hopeless disappointments in his ambition to enjoy the throne with his wife, when Macbeth defines life as a "tale told by our idiot full of sound and fury signifying nothing"; we feel that all the strings of the play from the beginning are struck at once in that utterance of the tragic hero. We are dumb-founded, we are at a loss to comprehend the meaning though it is obvious in the situation; the situation is so profound that the comprehending imagination stops but the experience continues. It is this state, the state in which the profound aesthetic experience sways with an avowed failure of the imagination to comprehend, that is called sublime. In a musical sequence, say in Rāga Kanāda, the tonal development moves at a very slow pace making us to feel the perfect stillness of existence and all of a sudden moves up into swiftness of the upper tones; here we fail to comprehend the situation. It is not our inability or lack of training to comprehend it, but it is the very condition of the musical sequence that makes us so. The contrast of the tonal sequence produces a sense of depth and power—the power that is experienced in the transformation into the moving condition of existence from the condition of stillness—which is really beyond our imaginative grasp. Here, the more trained and imaginative the listener, the deeper will be his experience and the greater will be
the helplessness of imaginative comprehension.

In this way examples can be multiplied from the arts of painting, dancing, sculpture etc.

§ 5. ANALYSIS OF THE SUBLIME EXPERIENCE:

One may ask whether the experience of the sublime is a negative experience: i.e., when we are impressed by the ocean or the mountain peak or the starry heaven, is it not their limitlessness, the absence of limit, that causes in us the sense of the sublime? No. Here the absence of limit as such is an indirect indicator of the presence of a positive power which in the context is beyond our comprehension, that causes in us the sense of the sublime.

A. C. Bradley recognises two aspects in the experience of the sublime. These two aspects can be better understood if we compare the experience of the sublime with that of the beautiful. In the case of the latter, the moment the beautiful object is presented before us, there is a sweet, harmonious outflow of our imagination into it and both the object and the imagination become one. This outflow is so immediate that only as a sort of logical analysis that we can say that there is an outflow etc.; but temporarily we cannot point out which is first and which later—i.e., the presentation of the beautiful thing or the outflow of our imagination.

But in the case of the sublime, the moment we are face to face with the limitless spectacle of the magnificence

we are for a moment checked; the imagination finds its inadequacy; it realizes its feebleness or insignificance; it is the self-realization of the imagination that it is too poor before the mighty power. This is the first stage which can be called by "the convenient but too strong name of the negative stage."^{17}

But this stage, itself is not sufficient for sublimity. It is suddenly followed by a powerful reaction from the side of the subject. The self—the subject or the power of imagination—that at once experienced its insignificance now asserts its power; it appeals to a higher source than itself; the imagination itself sinks into a higher level or contemplation. To put it another way: the imagination overgrows its limitation by drawing some strength from a higher source and it tries to comprehend the mighty power before which at first it had sunk into insignificance. Now, it makes an onward rush, an expanding, a comprehending movement and at last becomes one with the presented vastness of the spectacle. This can be called the positive stage. What happens here is the same that happens in the case of beauty. In the latter, the imagination becomes one with the presented object and in the sublime too the process is complete only when the imagination—if it can be called any more by that name—becomes one with the object. But in the sublime, it cannot coherently become one with the object, as the object is too big, too powerful and violent to be brought

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17. Ibid. p.52.
within any possible form of imagination. Yet, unless the object is brought within the comprehension of the subject or the spectator, it cannot be called an aesthetic experience. And in fact it is brought so in the sublime.

Now, what is it that brings the object within the comprehension of the subject? It cannot be the visual imagination that functions in beauty. It must be a higher faculty. But before we enter into a further description of it we have to note in a little detail two points which will throw some more light on the nature of this experience. We may put these two points in the form of two questions:

1. Does fear constitute the sublime? and 2. Are these two stages which we described as negative and positive temporally distinguishable?

We shall answer the second question first. These two stages may not be temporally distinguishable. Sometimes the two stages take place at an appreciable pace of a moment (let us not define the duration of a moment), and sometimes the whole experience may be so sudden that we may not be even aware of the two stages. But whether we are aware of them or not they are logically there and it is sufficient if we know that our analysis is logical and not psychological. Now we may take up the second question.

§ 6. DOES FEAR CONSTITUTE THE

SUBLIME?

We have said above that in the first stage of the experience of the sublime the imagination realizes its insignificance. But does it mean that we are afraid of
the object? Edmund Burk who devoted a lot of energy and
labour for the analysis of the sublime and the beautiful
says that fear is an essential condition of the experience
of the sublime. In his own words: "Whatever there is
terrible, with regard to sight, is sublime too, whether
this cause of terror, be endued with greatness of dimen­
sions or not; for it is impossible to look on anything
as trifling, or contemptible, that may be dangerous."18
"Indeed terror is in all cases whatsoever, either more
openly or latently the ruling principle of the sublime."19
Burke says that obscurity is a condition of the sublime
because "To make anything very terrible, obscurity seems
in general to be necessary. When we know the full extent
of any danger, when we can accustom our eyes to it, a great
deal of the apprehension vanishes. Everyone will be
sensible of this, who considers how greatly night adds to
our dread, in all cases of danger, and how much the notions
of ghosts and goblins, of which none can form clear ideas,
affect minds, which give credit to the popular tales con­
cerning such sorts of beings."20

Burke is typically empiricistic in his analysis of
the sublime and the beautiful. He holds that fear is an
essential condition of the sublime because he cannot rise
in his analysis above his empirical presupposition. In
fact, fear is not only the unnecessary condition of the
sublime but it is the very opposite of it. For, the moment

    by J. T. Boulton. Routledge and Keganpaul. Part II.
    Section II.
19. Ibid. Part II. Section II.
20. Ibid. Part II. Section II.
the spectator feels fear at the sight, he cannot enjoy the situation; he tries either to overcome the danger or to turn away. A man who is really afraid of water can never enjoy the sublimity of the ocean. In so far as the sight of the situation is enjoyed as sublime, he is not thinking it as an object of danger. There is another fallacy in the view of Burke: In aesthetic experience, what we called the aesthetic distance must be kept up. Otherwise it becomes a personal experience of the spectator which results into mere sentimentality; it is a dose in the terminology of Indian Aesthetics. Further, there are some cases of the sublime which has not got any tinge of fear. The wonder of the rainbow which appears to be sublime is never an object of fear. The narration of "that love sublime" of the dog for its dead master is not a story of fear or danger. It is only a situation of the inability of our imagination to comprehend the wonderful love of a creature which we ordinarily consider as below the human species.

There is a sense in which the sublime can be said to involve a sort of fear, which however is not physical fear as Burke supposes. It is rather an ethical fear when the word ethical is used in all its broad sense. The same kind of fear is reported by the mystics also. Swami Vivekananda describes his first experience of trance in the same way. When Paramahamsa put his leg on Narendra, the young seeker of God got the mood of trance. Gradually he began to feel that he was entering into a deeper...
A profounder state of experience. At first he could not withstand it and so cried to the master, "save me! save me!". But this type of fear is only a fear of losing the illusion by knowing a higher truth. When Narendra went home from Dakshineswar, he longed to have that experience again. Nobody longs to have the repetition of a fearful experience if it is merely fear.

A similar thing—if not the same—happens in the experience of the sublime. Both the mystic and the experient of the sublime want to have that experience again and again. There is a certain feeling in their experience which may appear to an empiricist as fear; but which in fact is the feeling of elevation or self-expansion, beyond one's normal capacity, intellectually in the case of the mystic experience and imaginatively in the case of the experience of the sublime.

"We burst our own limits," says A. C. Bradley, "go out to the sublime thing, identify ourselves ideally with it, and share its immense greatness. But if and in so far as we remain conscious of our difference from it, we still feel the insignificance of our actual selves, and our glory is mingled with awe or even with self-abasement."

What is actually felt in the sublime is awe and not the feeling of danger and the awe is due to and to the extent of the consciousness of our own limitation from complete expansion.

§ 7. THE BEAUTIFUL & THE
SUBLIME COMPARED:

In a preceding section we raised a question the answer to which we had postponed: What is the faculty to which the appeal is made when the sublime is experienced? Here we shall try to suggest the answer to this question by way of comparing the sublime and the beautiful. All the writers on the subject including Edmund Burke are unanimous in that the beautiful is comparatively small in proportion while greater magnitude is a condition of the sublime. The magnitude of the sublime may be in the form of physical expanse or it may be qualitative magnitude. For example, the starry heaven is a sublime spectacle and the unimaginable strength of love of the dog for its dead master in Wordsworth's poem "Fidelity" is also sublime. The underlying principle of interest for us is, that while the beautiful is within the comprehension of the imaginative coherence, the sublime is beyond it. But what is it that comprehends the limitlessness of the sublime? The imagination, when it realizes its feebleness before the too powerful spectacle, appeals to the self, the basic reality of our personality. In fact, when the limitlessness of the sublime is comprehended, it is this self that expands itself and becomes one with the presented stretch of the object. Thus the experience of the sublime is an act of the awareness of the self of its own strength; it is an act of the expansion or the development of the self. So

the experience of the sublime is an experience of elevation.

In the view of Kant, as is known, imagination is a higher faculty than understanding, but Reason is the highest principle. Though Kant does not call Reason by the word self, he describes it in such a way ("the original transcendental synthetic unity of apperception") that we can take it to be analogous to what we mean by self. Now Kant says that "the beautiful seems to be regarded as the presentation of an indirect concept of understanding, the sublime as that of a like concept of reason." That is, the beautiful is the presentation of an indirect concept of understanding, which must be understood to mean that the imagination which is responsible for beauty makes use of the concepts which actually belong to understanding; but it uses them in such a way that they are free from the rigid rule of the understanding. But the sublime uses the concept of reason, the highest principle in the transcendental scheme of Kant. Now, according to Kant, there is a difference between the type of the satisfaction that we derive in the experience of the beautiful and that of the sublime. In the case of the former "the satisfaction is bound up with the representation of quality, in the other (sublime) with that of quantity........ this (beautiful) directly brings with it a feeling of the furtherance of life..... But the other (Sublime) is a pleasure that arises only indirectly; viz., it is produced by the feeling

of a momentary checking of the vital powers and a consequent stronger outflow of them. 

It might be asked that since the pleasure (joy is a better term) that we enjoy in the sublime is due to the expansion of the self or to the awareness of the self of its own greatness and that the pleasure of the beautiful is due to the harmony of imagination; are not the two pleasures different in kind? For, the one is aesthetic and the other, though aesthetic, is something more than aesthetic.

This is a very important question, the answer to which demands us to remember the nature of the ultimate experience (say, the one like the mystic's) in the aesthetic experience. The experience of the beautiful is the experience of harmony. But it is not the harmony of the personal sentimentalities of the experient that is aimed at in the aesthetic experience of beauty. In fact any element of personal emotion and sentimentality will become a dosa and it mars the nature of the impersonal aesthetic autonomy. Now, this impersonality cannot be of the nature of ordinary pleasure that we experience in, e.g., eating, drinking or sexual experience. Impersonality which is another name for universality stands for the extension of the self and the aesthetic joy that is experienced is due to this very extension. A question might be asked whether the joy is the result of the extension in the sense it is the effect of which extension is the cause.

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24. Ibid. Section 24. Words in the bracket are ours inserted for clarity.
But we should remember that here such a question is uncalled for. The category of cause and effect cannot be applied at this level of experience because its very impersonal nature denies that it is of phenomenal character. The joy is identical with the extension of the self or the former is the very nature of the former, or it is a state of the self enjoying itself.

Explaining the experience of ānanda at the transcendental level of aesthetic experience from music according to Abhinavagupta, Dr. Pandey writes: ".... when the perceiving subject is free from all elements of individuality, when object is reflected on deindividualised self, it is not experienced as either pleasant or painful, but simply produces a stir in the universalised self of the percipient, brings about the predominance of the Ānanda aspect of the self." 25

So the joy that is experienced in the beautiful is not different from the joy of the experience of the sublime. Had it been different, the two states of aesthetic experience should be essentially different—or might even be positively opposed to each other—in kind. We may put the difference between the beautiful and the sublime in this way without setting either apart from the other: beauty is also, as A. C. Bradley puts it, 26 "an image of infinity." It is infinity, that is, in a restful state, that appears itself in a form—of coherence—smooth, unruffled

and calm. It does not show any tendency to go beyond the self-imposed form of coherence and as such the limit is assured of perfect safety. It is a self-completed or a self-contained whole. But on the other hand, the sublime represents the transcendent aspect of the infinite, the aspect which is in the state not of rest but of power. This aspect refuses to assume any form; it is the extended aspect, so that the form cannot be recognised in the vastness of the extension.

To quote the Oxford Critic again: "Beauty, then, we may perhaps say, is the image of the total presence of the Infinite within any limits it may choose to assume; sublimity the image of its boundlessness, and of its rejection of any pretension to independence or absoluteness on the part of its finite forms; the one the image of its immanence, the other of its transcendence." Now, the transcendence is neither exclusive of nor opposed to the immanence. It is the same joy that is enjoyed in both.

§ 8. SCHOPENHAUER & SANTAYANA ON THE BEAUTIFUL & THE SUBLIME:

Though we have been able to form a clear idea of the difference between the two aspects of the aesthetic experience, it would not be irrelevant if we very briefly consider how two other Philosophers—Schopenhauer and Santayana—view these two aspects. We have specially chosen these two philosophers because they represent two aesthetic positions: one is evidently an idealist while the other is a realist who defines beauty as "Value, intrinsic and objectified" or as "the pleasure regarded as the quality of

27 & 28. Please see next page.
a thing." Our choosing of this realistic aesthetician also serves to show that he also makes use of the concept of harmony in his characterisation of beauty. Here we are not concerned with the details of the difference between the positions of the two opposed schools of philosophy, but we are interested only in indicating how in broad outline both of them explain the beautiful and the sublime in a similar way.

For Schopenhauer the real content of the work of art is reality itself or, as he prefers to call, the Idea. Art "represents or reproduces the eternal ideas grasped through pure contemplation, the essential and abiding in all the phenomena of the world." All our experience including our scientific knowledge is only an attempt to grasp the Idea. But our scientific knowledge approaches the reality with its fourfold determination (Kant's quality, quantity, relation and modality) and as such it can "never reach a final goal nor attain full satisfaction, anymore than by running we can reach the place where the clouds touch the horizon." On the other hand, art can directly reach and grasp this reality, because it is the "way of viewing things independent of the principle of sufficient reason," which forms the web of the determination of thought. Art or the experience of beauty is the

29. The World as Will and Idea. (Routledge & Kegan Paul) p. 239.
30. Ibid. p. 239.
31. Ibid. p. 239.
way of pure contemplation. In it "pure knowledge has
gained the upper hand without a struggle. For the beau-
ty of the object, i.e., that property which facilitates
the knowledge of its Idea, has removed from consciousness
without resistance."\textsuperscript{32} So what remains in the experience
of beauty is "the pure subject of knowledge."

But when the beautiful objects which invite our
pure contemplation have a hostile relation to the human
will in general or "if they are opposed to it so that it
is menaced by the irresistible predominance of their po-
wers",\textsuperscript{33} the human will sinks into insignificance. It
is this that makes the experience of sublime. But this
menace is overcome by a free and conscious transcending of
the particular will. So that what remains is not the
individual will or volition but the "human volition in ge-
neral, so far as it is universally expressed in its ob-
jectivity."\textsuperscript{34}

Now, we may put the difference between the beautiful
and the sublime according to Shopenhauer in a succinct
way: In the case of the beautiful, the experience takes
place without awakening the individual will. But in the
case of the sublime, the individual will is awakened and
it is menaced so that it transcends itself into the uni-
versal will. And apart from this difference, we should
note, both in the beautiful and in the sublime the content
of the experience is the Idea, the eternal, abiding reality.
The fact that in the sublime the individual will is cons-

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid. p.261.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid. p.260.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid. p.261.
ciously awakened and made to transcend itself while in
the beautiful the experience takes place without even ma-
king the will conscious of itself, shows that the sublime
is a higher form of aesthetic experience from the point
of view of consciously overcoming the limitations of one's
particularity.

SANTAYANA:

Santayana holds that we have a number of impulses
which are vague or powerful, memories and energies to enu-
erate and designate all of which baffles our imagination.
In our everyday life there will not be possibly any har-
mony between these warring impulses. Now, "it is essen-
tially the privilege of beauty so to synthesise and bring
to a focus the various impulses of the self, so to suspend
them to a single image that a great peace falls upon the
perturbed Kingdom. In the experience of these momentary
harmonies we have the basis of the enjoyment of beauty,
and of all its mystical meanings."35

For Santayana, there are two ways of securing this
harmony; one by including all these impulses and thus
being deeply in the world; in which case, it can be cal-
led beauty. Second, the harmony of unity (of the self)
can also be secured by excluding these impulses, excluding
by way of rising ourselves above these impulses and the
world. This is called the sublime. Both the beautiful
and the sublime give us pleasure. But the pleasure of
the beautiful is "warm, passive and pervasive" while that.

35. The Sense of Beauty. p.177.
of the sublime "cold, imperious, and keen."36

Santayana says that we cannot have the experience of the sublime unless we have the comprehensive and impartial view of things. It may be our own life that we view, but the objectification of our experience is an essential condition if it can be sublime for us. Thus the great heroes—e.g., Macbeth or Othello—attain that height of viewing the whole panorama of their own past with that sense of detachment and thus purge themselves of their own hideous misfortunes. Thus in the end, the struggle and violence are overcome and the hero reaches a stage beyond the sense of either sorrow or happiness. This can be considered a state of the liberation of the self of the hero. From this height, the whole vision of the hero's life appears to be sublime. And we, the spectators will also experience the play with the same vision.

In the case of the beautiful, according to Santayana, we sink into the world, our imagination identifies itself with the object. In the sublime, the contemplation reaches "such an intensity that it begins to lose its objectivity" and declares itself "what it fundamentally was, an inward passion of the soul."37 The sublime is an experience of the elevation from the world and ordinary emotions and impulses, it is an elevation to the level of the superhuman. While in beauty we look at the things from the human—the anthropocentric as we may style it—point of view, in the sublime we are at a much more exalted

36. Ibid. p. 177.
37. Ibid. p. 183.
height. Thus in the sublime, says Santayana, "We fail to sympathise with the struggling sailors because we sympathise too much with the wind." If the story of the struggling sailors be the picture of the beautiful, that of the mighty energy of waves is the experience of the sublime. Perhaps there is an element of mystical cruelty in the latter experience, but it is a cruelty that we can extend to ourselves too. "We can so feel the fascination of the cosmic forces that engulf us as to take a fierce joy in the thought of our own destruction. We can identify ourselves with the abstract essence of reality, and, raise to that height, despise the human accidents of our own nature. Lord, we say, though thou slay me, yet will I trust in thee. The sense of suffering disappears in the essence of life and the imagination overwhelms the understanding."  

By way of concluding our comparison of the sublime with the beautiful, we may state that whatever their differences be, both of them are two stages in the aesthetic experience. The question whether the beautiful is superior to the sublime or vice versa is a needless one. For, it is like asking whether the immanent is superior to the transcendent or vice versa. However exalted we may feel, we cannot speculate on the transcendent minimising the importance of the immanent. But if we confine the whole of truth to the immanent itself, the error arises. 

We should remember that all great works of art are

38. Ibid. p. 184.
39. Ibid. p. 184.
beautiful, and they are great works because they have reached the height of sublimity. Thus there is neither opposition nor exclusion between the two. They are two aspects of the same aesthetic experience, the one always tending to enter into the other.

§ 9. THE MYSTIC AND THE SUBLIME EXPERIENCES COMPARED:

In our comparison of truth and beauty we noted that both of them consist in the realization of coherence; the one in the sphere of thought and the other in thought of imagination. And hence, we further noted, the basic forms of coherence in thought like the principles of identity, contradiction and excluded middle correspond in their nature to the basic principles of coherence in imagination like the laws of harmony, balance and contrast. When we are making an attempt to compare the mystic experience with that of the sublime we are only trying to compare the supra-stages of what we have already done with each other. Here a question may be asked whether it is a logically tenable attempt to compare the incomparable. That both the mystic and the sublime experiences are incomparable can be explained in this way:

When we are actually under the experience of the sublime, if we are conscious of another sublime experience and begin to compare whether the previous experience was more sublime or the present one; we are already at the level of discursive thought for which only the memories of the two sublime experiences are the material. But
memory, the instruments of which are only concepts, images etc., is a form or function of the understanding. Memory cannot completely reproduce the full depth and profundity of the sublime experience, though it may vaguely recall its faint shadow or image. If by memory alone (granting that it is possible!) one can get the experience of the sublime, then one is not comparing the past experience with the present, but is already at a stage where the strength to compare is baffled. All this is a hopeless and an impossible attempt.

So we have to mark that each experience of the sublime is profound that the one cannot be compared with the other. And to attempt still to compare is only like the attempt of the fond novice in mathematics to compare two infinities. Here one may ask that since infinity is what it is, can there be two infinities in the same sense and same respect? There cannot be. In the same way, if the question is further extended, can there be two sublimities? Here also our answer logically should be in the negative. But we should clear off some possible misunderstanding. The physical phenomena (attempted to grasp imaginatively) or the sublime situations in works of art may be numerous, but the kind of experience that we have will be similar: Similar in so far as the supra-coherent state of imagination and other characteristics that we described in the previous sections are concerned. But there may be differences in the tone or the colour of the experience. Thus the kind of the Baffling of imagination
that we have when we read the superb act of fidelity of the dog and when we read the philosophising state of Macbeth in the evening of his action are different in their colour or the nature of the emotion. But both of them are sublime in the sense they transcend the imaginative coherence. And it is with this point that we are concerned.

We may put the same question with regard to the mystic experience. Can two mystic experiences be compared with each other? Some mystics recognise even levels in their experience. The yogasūtra also recognises levels. Thus it speaks of e.g., samprajñāta samādhi and asamprajñāta samādhi. We have to distinguish clearly what these levels mean. If the asamprajñāta is the higher stage than the samprajñāta, what is it that retains the Prajñā in the latter? Whatever it be, it cannot be the thought, the discursive thought at the level of which truth is coherence. If this discursive thought as such were responsible for the praṇaṇa in the mystic experience, we can clearly doubt the genuineness of its mystical level. So the praṇaṇa there, is of a higher character.

What it means in this: We should not confine our knowing faculty only to the discursive level of the understanding. There is a higher or more basic level of knowing which is in a way different than that of the understanding. We clearly agree with it and we do not deny that there is the neotic quality in the mystic experience.

We maintain our original position without standing
in opposition to the view we considered above, that from the point of view of the understanding, the mystic experience is "supra" or transcendental. And while being at this level we cannot compare one mystic experience with another. Again we remember what we maintained earlier that though it is not possible for the coherence of the understanding to describe this experience fully and positively, it can negatively imply its nature. And what it negatively implies is inadequate and not definite. But since every genuine negation does give a form of knowledge, these negative implications do indicate to us the nature of this experience. But this indication itself is transcending from the point of view of understanding. We may observe that negation is the self-transcending aspect of thought and it is here that coherence and the supra-coherence are connected.

With all these preliminary clarifications, we may now set out to compare the mystic experience with the experience of the sublime. Both these experiences are transcendental from the points of view of the epistemic and aesthetic coherence. But can we say that both these transcendental experiences are one and the same? That is, can we say that the supra-coherent state of beauty is the same as the supra-coherent state of truth? As long as imagination was imagination distinct from thought, it could not be identified with the latter; and in the same way, when thought was what it was, distinct from the character
of imagination, it also could not be taken for imagination. Now that both of them have transcended themselves can we say that they become one?

Whether both of them become one is a point which is rather still early for us to say and even if we hold that they become so, we have to state it with a lot of qualifications, to indicate properly the sense in which they are so. But at this stage, we may say that if both of them are not identical they are similar to each other in certain respects:

(1) In the case of truth and beauty we are at the relational level (though the sense of relation is less acute in beauty) and while at the mystic and the sublime levels we experience a supra-relational state. And so the distinction between the subject and the object is overcome in the latter. It may be pointed out that in the experience of beauty, this distinction is already overcome and, it is only in truth that we persist labouring under the distinction. Now, in the mystic experience truth has overcome what it could not do at the level of coherence and hence truth has become more akin to or more comparable with the aesthetic experience.

(2) Secondly, both the mystic and the sublime experiences are instances of the extension of the self. In order to avoid misunderstanding we may even say that the experiences of epistemic and aesthetic coherence are instances of the extension of the self. When I think of the far off nebulae, I am extending my self through the
instrument of my thought and in the same way when I experience a work of art my self stands in accordance with the form of the work of art. But the sense in which we speak of the extension of the self in the epistemic and aesthetic coherent experiences, is different from the sense in which we speak of the same thing in the case of the mystic and the sublime experiences. In the latter case, the self completely recognises its oneness with the object and becomes one with its underlying reality. This identification of the self with the object was there in the case of the aesthetic coherence also. But as it was coherent, it was a limited or an immanent aspect and in it the self could not completely realise the transcendental aspect of its own experience; while it has become possible in the sublime.

In the case of the coherent thought, however, though the self could extend itself even up to the far off nebulæ, as long as the distinction between the object and the subject like in, "I am thinking of or seeing the far off nebulæ," the "I" by implication is logically pressed from outside from being really extended. It is pressed from the object which is set against the subject and then related. But the self can reach the complete and unopposed extension in the mystic experience.

(3) Consequent to the extension of the self both in the mystic and in the sublime experiences, the self feels its own strength. This strength which is considered to be very nature of the self (caitanya) was not given
a suitable condition to express itself (to become Prakāta or Prakāsa) in the case of the epistemic and the aesthetic coherent states. The experience of the sublime is evidently an experience of the elevation of the self. The self raises itself to that condition where its innate potentialities are awakened and it overcomes the ordinary limitations which are the opposite of strength.

William James says that one of the characteristics of mystic experience is passivity. The self is said to be overpowered by a far more superior power and the self, finding its helplessness, submits itself. Though this is a good description so far as one's getting the mystic experience is concerned, this is not the final account of the experience. In the experience of the sublime, we recognised two stages: positive and negative, the stage when the imagination finds itself insignificant before the mighty spectacle and the stage of the resurgence of a higher faculty. Something similar to it takes place in the case of the mystic experience also. To refer once again to the experience of Swami Vivekananda, the first stage of the mystic experience may be one of passivity but it is a passivity that will be followed by the realization or self-experience of unlimited power. It is the discovery of the self of its own power.

(4) There is another point of difference that we can observe between the beginning of the mystical experience and that of the sublime. In the former, the self

tries to get inward, receding from the presented phenomenon. But in the end it finds out that its own inner essence is the same as the basis of the "external" presented phenomenon. But in the sublime the self makes an outward movement with the instrument of imagination to grasp the presented object—may be a sea or a situation in a work of art—and in the end the self itself grasps the presented object and this establishes the oneness between itself and the object. The result of both the experiences is similar in the end, but the starting process of each is different.

(5) While stating the chief characteristics of mysticism (of course, to criticise) Mr. Russel says that it is always characterised by (1) its belief in the unity, and its refusal to admit opposition or division anywhere; (2) its denial of the reality of time; and (3) its belief that all evil is mere appearance, an illusion produced by the divisions and opposition of the analytic intellect. 41

The first two characteristics that Mr. Russel states are true not only of the mystic experience but of the sublime also. Both these experiences are monistic in their philosophies, for it is the very core of these experiences to be one with the objects of the experience and to realize the basic oneness of the diversified phenomena.

41. Mysticism and Logic and other Essays. Allen & Unwin. p.10. Russel states some other characteristics also which we have not stated here as they are so obvious.
We may here point out that this monistic philosophy is not peculiar to the mystic and the sublime experiences, but it is the very goal of epistemic and aesthetic coherence. In the case of the epistemic coherence, the goal is not completely realized and what is unrealized there is realized at its own higher stage. In the case of the experience of beauty, the unity is already experienced but the transcendental aspect of the unity is revealed in the sublime.

The second characteristic that Russell states is that the mystic denies the reality of time. But this should be explained with a qualification. The mystic denies the reality of time at the height of the mystical experience and not at the level of the world of intellect. Time is a concept based on change, division and distinction and the very aim of mystic experience is to overcome this distinction. The concept of time cannot enter into the experience of the sublime also. When the imagination is baffled and reduced to a state of inoperation and when the self and the spirit of the object are merged together, the sense of time cannot lurk in. I cannot have the experience of the sublime in the genuine and profound sense of the term and at the same time look at the wrist watch to calculate the number of minutes left to run up and catch the train; as the busy tourists seem to do when they go to the Konarak temple or the Jog Falls.

We shall postpone the discussion of the third point stated by Russell. So far we have compared the mystic
continuous glimpses of reality. What is called intuition is not so much an independent faculty of knowledge, but the purified being of the knower itself constitutes its enlightenment. This is the purport of what Goethe said, 'All the thinking in the world does not bring us to thought; we must be right by nature, so that good thoughts may come to us, like free children of God, and cry 'here we are!' The same view is expressed by Plotinus: "The vision of God is not to be regarded as unfruitful. In this state the perfect soul begets—like God himself—beautiful thoughts and beautiful virtues." The modern man may disagree with Plato's saying that morality is knowledge. Actually what he meant was, when a man gets the intuitive vision of the Idea of the God and the other Ideas, their relation with each other and the place of the sensuous things in the light of that knowledge, he will not act wrongly. Plato only indicates the indelible influence of this knowledge on human mind and action.

Now, what is the ethical condition of the experience of the sublime? We may treat the problems from the same point of view, from which we treated this question with regard to the mystic experience. Any or every man cannot have the experience of the sublime. It requires not only a soaring imaginative gift but the highest degree of sympathy. A murderer or a typical villain cannot ex-

43. Enneads. 6. 9. 9. Quoted from Dr. R.D. Ranade: Pathway to God in Hindi Literature, p.5.
-perience the sublime and when a murderer reaches the stage of having that experience, he is already at a higher stage of ethical consciousness. All ethical problems arise because of the confinement of interests for and within one's own self; it is due to limited thinking that the self is a limited entity seeking its limited end. But this very notion is shattered into pieces in the sublime and what results is an extension of the self or the realization of the self of its own boundlessness.

One may ask the question; in the case of both the mystic and the sublime experiences whether the realization of the self of its own boundlessness is the cause of morality or morality is the cause of the realization of the realization of the boundlessness of the self. This question itself is vicious. For, unless certain moral or ethical conditions are fulfilled this realization is not possible and unless morality matures into realization, one has not reached the highest stage of moral life. As a Karkātaka mystic says: "Knowledge of Reality is the core of morality." There have been attempts to search for the basis of morality in humanism, universal pleasure, epicurianism and several other views. But while appreciating the emphasis of all these views, if we ask the final question, why should one seek universal pleasure or other man's happiness etc., one is at a loss to answer it without referring to a metaphysical basis. And this

44. "Nītige nijāvāgiha mukuta". Quoted from Dr. R. D. Ranade: Pathway to God in Kannada Literature. Bhavan's Series. p.216.
metaphysical basis can be fully comprehended not by mere intellectual reasoning but by a direct experience. That is why, so far, the greatest moralists of mankind are saints and mystics. The scholars and the analytic philosophers have rendered very valuable service in analysing and explaining the moral principles, but the purely analytic theorist has never been successful in establishing the foundation of his own moral theory.

There is another point. When morality is explained in a merely rational manner, it also becomes a coherent system; it takes the form of a harmonious whole like any other well developed science. But morality treated as a science remains outside our concrete experience like mathematics or physics, or biology which is also a science. It is only when all these systems develop and transcend themselves that all of them meet together, expressing themselves as aspects of one and the same source. At the lower level, each becomes exclusive of every other in so far as each is a distinct science, because each wants to maintain its coherence. Thus, coherence becomes a limiting principle. The limit is overcome when all transcend themselves and begin to include all others.

The ethical condition of the sublime is appreciated so clearly by no other philosopher than Kant. Kant holds, as we have noted earlier, that while the concepts made use of in the experience of the beautiful are of the understanding and those that are appealed to in the experience of the beautiful are of the understanding and those
that are appealed to in the experience of the sublime are of the reason. For him, reason is the foundation of moral law—reason not as it expresses itself in thinking but as it is realized in practical moral action. Kant characterises the behaviour of the moral man as sublime.

"...... even though the idea of duty implies a subordination to law, a certain sublimity and dignity is attributed to the person who fulfils his whole duty. He is not sublime because he obeys the moral law but because having made that law he then subordinates himself to it."$^{45}$ Acting in accordance with moral law is the life of freedom, life of universalising one's action; and this universalisation is possible because of reason which is also the basis of the experience of the sublime.

To express the same in a less technical manner: the elevation of the self in the experience of the sublime is of the same nature as the elevation of the self in the experience we have while performing moral duties. The sources of both the higher moral experience and that of the sublime are the same. But in the case of the moral duty, the elevation of the self is expressed in practical autonomous action while the experience of the sublime begins through imagination which having found the inadequacy of imagination ultimately appeals to the same self.

While discussing the characteristics of mystic experience—as they are stated by Mr. Russell—we postponed

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the explanation of one characteristic; that evil is con-
sidered by the mystic as an appearance created by the di-
visions and distinctions of intellect. Before comple-
ting this section, we may make a brief reference to this
problem from the point of view of both the mystic and the
sublime experiences. Even from the point of view of the
intellect, evil is a moral misfit, like the ugly is a
misfit in the course of the development of the imagination
and error in that of thought. Ideally speaking, the mis-
fit cannot be taken as an irremovable condition of either
truth or beauty or goodness. The fact of moral misfit—
evil—is not the final description of moral life; for,
were it so, to that extent the autonomy and the power of
the will is denied. And that is what the mystic emphasi-
ses on the strength of his immediate experience. What
the mystic denies is not the fact of evil in the everyday
world but its claim of ultimate invincibility. Evil is
a negative condition of the self and when the self over-
comes the consciousness of limitation there is no evil for
it. And it reaches that stage of realizing its own st-
rength, moral and spiritual both in the mystic and the sub-
lime experiences.

§ 11. THE IDEA OF THE HOLY:
RUDOLF OTTO.

We may turn to consider a concept developed by a sig-
nificant modern thinker of religious thought: the Idea of
the Holy. We consider it here because this concept resem-
bles (we shall merely say so to begin with) our description
of the mystic and the sublime experiences. After we give an account of the holy according to Prof. Otto, we shall show its relation with the mystic and the sublime experiences.

To start with, Prof. Otto says that the holy is a non-rational idea, for it eludes the conceptual way of understanding. But still it is in some way within our grasp. At first sight the holy gives us a sense of moral excellence; it is so much associated with the sense of moral excellence that usually we cannot separate in our thought the notion of the holy from moral exaltation, for the sake of the clarity of investigation, Otto uses a special term to stand for "the holy" minus its moral factor or 'moment', and, as we can now add, minus its 'rational' aspect altogether." The term that Otto uses is "numinous" which is an independent category of the mind, which awakens or stirs in us the sense of something like the noumenon of Kant. The mind does so without any reference to the other categories of the mind like the categories of the understanding or forms of perception.

Though for the sake of the convenience of analysis to Otto asks us to think for a moment the holy as separate from the moral excellence, by separation he only means this: that when moral goodness reaches the highest stage of its development, it transcends itself into the holy; which from the moral point of view is neutral. It is like the neutrality of the all-inclusive and transcendental.

The holy is a mental state or a category which is sui generis, and irreducible to any other category. Hence it is absolutely primary and as such though it can be discussed, it cannot be strictly defined. With this warning, if we ask the question, what are the elements that can be distinguished in this category? we find that it is characterised by a "note of self-abasement into nothingness before an overpowering, absolute might of some kind……which cannot be expressed verbally, and can only be suggested indirectly through the tone and content of a man's feeling response to it……which should be directly experienced in oneself to be understood." Thus it is felt as objective and outside the self. Otto uses another Latin phrase to describe it: mysterium tremendum which contains four essential elements: awefulness, overpoweringness (majestas), energy or urgency and the wholly otherness. The awefulness is marked by a feeling of a peculiar dread which should not be confused for any ordinary dread; it is a category of the numerous. It is a feeling which we have before an august spectacle, which augustness, ideally speaking, even the greatest of emperors cannot possess. The awefulness implies that the mysterious is already looming before the mind. "It implies the first application of a category of valuation which has no place in the everyday natural world of ordinary

47. Ibid. p.10.
experience, and is only possible to a being in whom has been awakened a mental predisposition, unique in kind and different in a definite way from any 'natural faculty.' And a quality of special importance of this awefulness is, it survives with the quality of exaltedness and sublimity or it is symbolized by means of them.

The second element that can be found in the mysterium tremendum is the sense of overpoweringness ('majestas'). At the first instance it appears as "absolute unapproachability." But as it is evident in the mystic experience, it is approached. Still, the sense of overpoweringness is not simply the recognition of the finity self before the overpoweringness of the infinite, but the recognition of the nought of the finite self. As in the case of mystic experience, the self is identified with the infinite, but may be in different degrees of completeness.

The third characteristic is, the overpowering infinite is experienced as energy (which can be described in Indian terminology as Caitanyamaya).

The last characteristic namely "the wholly other" stands for the transcendental nature of this reality. However we may experience it, from the point of view of knowing it, even with the category of the holy, it is transcendental. Otto expresses this aspect very clearly with a quotation from Tersteegen: "A God comprehended is no God."

48. Ibid. p.15-16.
Having explained the nature of this Numinous in detail, Prof. Otto proceeds to ask the question: what are the means of expression of the Numinous? There are three means which he calls: (1) direct means, (2) indirect means; and (3) means by which it is expressed in works of art.

(1) The direct means of expression of the Numinous does not mean the "transmission" of it in the proper sense of the word. It cannot be taught, but it can only be awakened, induced, incited or aroused. It means that by proper description of it, a man may be brought to a mood in which what is latently in him can be stirred up.

(2) The indirect means of expressing the Numinous is the way of arousing it in the mind by a sort of "anamnesis" or reminder. It is a way of analogical representation. Thus whenever we are encountered with great and powerful events or grand sights that stir up our sense of the tremendum, we get into the mood of this Numinous. Otto gives the example of the image of the Durga of Bengal and the description of the Lord in the eleventh chapter of Bhagavadgita—where appaling frightfulness and most exalted holiness are expressed in an identical spectacle.

Otto here points out that these two states of mind—appaling frightfulness and most exalted holiness—existing together show a hidden kinship between the Numinous and the sublime "which is something more than a merely accidental analogy, and to which Kant's critic of Judgment bears distant witness."49 There is a hidden relationship

49. Ibid. p.65.
between the sense of awe and that of the Numinous. Whatever has loomed upon man's world of ordinary concerns as something aweful reminds him of the mysterious or the Numinous and it is by grasping this inner principle that various indirect means can be devised to arouse this feeling like the uncanny images, and frightful descriptions and miracles attributed to God.

(3) When the Numinous is expressed in a work of art, that work of art becomes sublime. Here also the point of interest for us is, the sublime is not merely an aesthetic category; it is something which is of the nature of the numinous. The relation between art and the numinous can be clearly observed in the way in which art was utilised for religious purposes. When religion was using art at its (religion's) primitive stage, art was called magic. Art as magic marks a crude stage where it has not expressed the numinous fully. But when art reaches the level of embodying the vision of the numinous, then and then only does it become great art; and at this stage it is called sublime. Otto illustrates this principle very clearly by quoting a passage from Oswald Siren's "Chines Sculpture" (Vol.I. p.20), which describes the great Buddha from the Lung-Men Caves (T'ang Dynasty): "Anyone who approaches this figure will realize that it has a religious significance without knowing anything about its motif........... It matters little whether we call it a prophet or a God, because it is a complete work of art permeated by a spiritual will, which communicates itself to the beholder...... The religious figure of such a fi-
All great art makes us have the experience of the numinous.

**THE A PRIORI NATURE OF THE HOLY:**

Having described the nature of the experience of the holy and the means of its expression, we may note the a priori nature of the holy as it is explained by Prof. Otto. Here also the word a priori is used in the Kantian sense. That is, "it (the holy) issues from the deepest foundation of cognitive apprehension that the soul possesses, and, through it of course comes into being in and amid the sensory data and empirical material of the natural world and cannot anticipate or dispense with those, yet it does not arise out of them, but only by their means."51

The natural world serves only as a means or stimulus or "occasion" to asp the experience of the holy. At the first stage, a naive person may mistake the numinous for the natural object that astirs it, but gradually according to the evolution of his knowledge, his idea becomes purer and he realises the absoluteness of the holy. The proof for the a priori nature of the cognition of the holy should be found in the introspection and a critical examination of reason as Kant made. It is an a priori idea in the profoundest sense "which, because of the surpassingness of

50. Ibid. p.69.
51. Ibid. p.117.
its content, must be distinguished from both the pure theoretical and the pure practical reason of Kant, as something yet higher or deeper than they.**52

As it is a priori, the holy is not a cognition that everyone must have, but it is something which everyone is capable of having. Among the multitude of the human beings, we find men of varying degrees of this capability. We have prophets and followers, just as we have, in the sphere of art, creative genius and the connoisseur. The difference between the prophet and the follower is this: the follower requires certain means which stir the experience of the holy in him while the prophet does not require any means, as in him the capability of having that experience is so highly developed. The prophet expresses his experience through some means which the follower uses for the arousing of his capability. In the same way, the artist can have the aesthetic experience or vision without a means and he records his experience, which record is called the work of art; which later on arouses the same experience or vision in the connoisseur.

Thus the ideas of both the holy and the beautiful are a priori, the capacity for which is developed in different degrees in different persons; the capability for which is universal.

§ 12. GENERAL CONCLUSION:

It is time for us to sum up the significance of the discussions scattered throughout this work. In a sense

52. Ibid. p.118.
writing a conclusion like this appears to be unnecessary in the context of our work; for, the position that we have been maintaining and the point that we have reached are so obvious by now that a restatement of them may appear to be a needless repetition. Still, by way of pointing our attention to the chief moments of our discussion we may briefly sum up their import.

We started with the assertion that as values, both truth and beauty have their origin in human mind and so the attempt to seek them either in the world of nature directly, or indirectly in the utility or function is a misleading attempt. The proof of truth and beauty is in themselves and any attempt to find it elsewhere is a vain search. Hence we searched for them in those capacities of the mind which are responsible for them respectively, which are thought and imagination. In the function of these two capacities also there is similarity, or one and the same principle operates in the purposive development of these capacities. The difference that is exhibited in the way in which this same basic principle is made use of is due to the unique purpose which each of these capacities is meant to fulfil.

Though they are meant individually to serve certain unique purposes, from a higher point of view there is no separation between the purposes of the two; on the other hand, the purposes of both appear to be one and the same. Hence we find the elements of truth in beauty and those of imagination in thought in so far as thought does not become too much rigoristic. Yet the two, truth and beauty,
are distinct modes of experience in so far as the two assert their uniqueness. Truth and beauty, therefore, can meet more closely when both overgrow their individual nature and thus transcend themselves. In this transcended stage, both the mystic and the high priest of beauty are in possession of a spirit—an experience—which will be the source of the reality of what both of them assert.

Truth and beauty, in so far as they were taken to mean only coherence in thought and imagination respectively, was by definition amoral and hence they might have come in conflict with morality again and again, the former resulting in error and the latter in ugliness. Moreover, as long as we are at the level of coherence, there is always the possibility of the resulting of the erroneous and the ugly, while at the level of the mystic and the sublime, these negative elements cannot assert themselves.

We have noted that the descriptions of the mystic and the sublime experiences resemble that of the idea of the holy. One might say that the idea of the holy is a religious experience, while the other two are not; the one a way of knowing and the other a stage in aesthetic experience. It is here that we should recognise the oneness of the philosophical or the highest epistemological (mystic) and the highest aesthetic (sublime) and the highest religious (holy) experiences. It has already been observed that the holy contains the moral exaltedness or that it is a stage when moral exaltedness has transcended itself into the highest form of spiritual experience.
Now, to forget the idea of the holy for the moment. We should observe, that the experience of either the sublime or the mystic is essentially religious in nature, if religion is not taken to be a body of some dogmas which are the results of various historical accidents, but to be a genuine experience of the individual self in which it is in communion with the absolute of which the individual self is only a form of expression. From this point of view, the difference between art and religion or religion and philosophy cannot persist significantly. It has been said that religion has made use of art or that art has been in the service of religion; thereby reducing the activity of art to the status of a mere craft. The truth of the matter is, all genuine and highest works of art are at their core religious. They are religious whether they have accepted and expressed themselves in terms of the symbols of some existing religion or they have created their own symbols. It is not without any significance for us that Dante and Goethe, Kalidāsa and Valmīki and Vyāsa, the builders of the great temples and cathedrals and the greatest musical composers have taken religious themes. Even Shakespeare who does not create his characters in the light of any existing religious dogma, is religious in his art in the sense that his great tragic characters transcend their ordinary self-hood expressing universal significance; thus making themselves inexplicable from the ordinary point of view. //

It is interesting to ask why almost all greatest poets have taken religious themes for their greatest works—
Goethe, Dante, Vyāsa and Vālmiki? When the poetic consciousness reaches its supreme height, it cannot adequately express the real significance of its vision with an ordinary theme. And it finds some allegory of religion or fable which is used by some religion, quite suitable for its purpose and that fable is developed into an epic. Or even a new theme can be invented, but that theme will become a part of some existing religion if the authorities of the existing religion allow it. Whether the authorities will allow it is a different question; it is an accident. But the fact that religion and art at their highest, stand on the same level more often stimulating each other is clear. What is the real significance of the Mahābhārata if it is not the august spectacle showing the individual souls in their relation with the Supreme Soul? It is because of this significance that the Mahābhārata is both a religious text and one of the greatest artistic achievements.

Art need not be in the vassalage of religion, but it is another form or condition of religion. In the words of a very influential modern thinker in the field of art, Clive Bell: "Anyway, both (art and religion) seem to express emotions different from and transcending the emotions of life. Certainly both have the power of transporting men to superhuman ecstasies; both are means to unearthly states of mind. Art and religion belong to the same world. Both are bodies in which men try to capture and keep alive their shyest and most ethereal conceptions. The kingdom of neither is of this world. Rightly, there-
-fore, do we regard art and religion as twin manifestations of the spirit; wrongly do some speak of art as a manifestation of religion. Kant had said that the beautiful is a higher category than the understanding and the sublime is higher than the beautiful, but the highest is the judgment of the teleology. That is, the experience which is completely free from, but the originating source of, the mechanical conditions and rules of the understanding is at the highest. Though Kant's account of the sublime is so wonderful that no other western philosopher has so far offered a better description of it, it would have been still better, as Dr. R. D. Ranade thinks if Kant had placed the sublime above the teleology. For, in the present scheme of Kant, though the sublime in so far as it is based on an appeal to the ideas of reason and not to the concepts of the understanding, the appeal is to a condition of the freedom of the self (if the word self can be used without doing injustice to Kant's position). Yet, in so far as it is not complete teleology, the sublime is not an experience of complete freedom. Had Kant been absolutistic in his ultimate position in the analogy of the Upanisads or theistic in the analogy of the Gitā, he would have placed the sublime either above the teleology or identified the two. Here, the point of our criticism is only to show that the concept of the sublime without a profound idea of the divine revelation or

53. Art. p.82.
something like the holy of Prof. Otto, is only to stop at the phenomenal description without throwing much light on its ultimate source.

In the same way, the description of the mystic experience as only a state of knowing which is above the stage of the understanding, leaves the picture incomplete. The fact that this knowing goes beyond the powers of the understanding implies or should justify that it should account for the possibility and the way of the cognition of things which are beyond the reach of mere understanding. Truth, even in the limited sense of intellectual coherence, is a value and so is beauty in the sense of imaginative coherence. When the question arises, whether and how far these two values can stand independently, we have to seek a common source of both. In the same way, if the same question is asked with regard to the other values, this common ground must be the source of the other values too like the religious, the moral etc. Now, if we widen our concepts of the true and the beautiful, we arrive at this source.

What is the ultimate truth, the truth of existence? And what is the highest level of the experience of the sublime? Indian Philosophy and literature are full of such situations. We can also point to such situations in great literatures and works of art of other nations also. To quote but one such situation from Romain Rolland's novel John Christopher: When the musician John Christopher, after a long life of musical career with name and fame is
on the deathbed, remembers all the persons and situations who passed through his life. Now he is dead. But the novelist describes the death of the musician referring to his soul: "... Christopher has crossed the river. All night long he has marched against the stream. Like a rock his huge limbed body stands above the water...... Those who saw him set out vowed that he would never win through, and for a long time their mocking and their laughter followed him. Then the night fell and they grew weary. Now Christopher is too far away for the cries of those standing on the water's brink to reach him. Through the roar of the torrent he hears only the tranquil voice of the Child clasping a lock of hair on the giant's forehead in his little hand, and crying: 'March on......'

"Suddenly the Angelus sounds, and the flock of bells suddenly springs into wakefulness. It is the new dawn! Behind the sheer black cliff rises the golden glory of the invisible sun. Almost falling Christopher at last reaches the bank, and says to the child:

" 'Here we are! How heavy though wet! Child, Who art thou?'

" And the child answers:

' I am the day soon to be born.' "

The viśvarūpa dārsana in the eleventh chapter of the Bhagavadgītā is an unparallel example of both the highest truth and the sublime. We may quote one passage from Jñānesvara, the Marāthi poet-saint:

55. The Last Page of the Novel: John Christopher. Tr. by Gilbert Cannan.
"Arjuna saw himself along with God in God and God saw Himself along with Arjuna, and Śaṅjaya saw both of them together......... when one mirror is placed in front of another, which shall we say reflects which? The difference between the original and the image vanishes and each will give an infinite number of reflections of the other. Supposing another sun arose before the Sun, who is the illuminator and who the illumined?...... So Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna reached a state of unison. I myself, said Śaṅjaya, found my at-one-ment with them."56

Here, who is Arjuna and who is Kṛṣṇa? They are simply images in a work of art which describes the highest truth of philosophy, the recognition of the universal in the particular. A literary critic would view it as a perfect work of art and describe the images of the mirror and the sun as cosmic images. The child, and the soul of the musician are the images to signify the eternity of life.

It is when art reaches this kind of supreme height and truth matures itself into this kind of profoundest conception, that we can say not only that truth and beauty meet each other, but they are verily one and the same: the true is the beautiful and beautiful the true.