CHAPTER IX

THE UGLY AND THE ERRONEOUS.

§ 1. THE ORIGIN & THE MEANING OF THE UGLY & AND ERRONEOUS:

So far we have considered the principle of coherence as the aesthetic and the epistemic criteria and found that it can most satisfactorily serve our purpose in determining the nature of beauty and truth. We also considered the different forms that the principle takes when it functions in the two distinct spheres of human mind—imagination and discursive thought. Further, we paid some attention to the question whether the nature of thought is there in creative imagination and whether the nature of aesthetic satisfaction can in any form be observed in a work of discursive thought. We found throughout our study that basically the epistemic and the aesthetic criteria are of the same coherence—systematic whole. Now, if we have succeeded in explaining both truth and beauty in terms of one basic principle, we can, and also must, explain the nature of their contraries—the erroneous and the ugly—in terms of the same principle.

Our attempt to determine the ugly and the erroneous with the same principle with which we could determine the beautiful and the true should not give rise to a possible misunderstanding: when we say that the coherent is thought is true, naturally one can deduce that the incoherent is not-truth. In the same way when we mean that the coherent in the imagination is beautiful, the proposition that the
incoherent in the imagination is not-beautiful can be validly deduced. For, incoherence—either in thought or in imagination—is a negative concept; but though a negative concept is the opposite of its relative positive concept, it does not follow that the negative concept itself is positive. If one asserts that it is positive, it should follow that the ugly and erroneous are there, existing in their own right. But is this so? is the problem we have to consider.

In an earlier chapter (III) we entered into a somewhat lengthy discussion on the question, whether a negative judgment makes an affirmative implication. We found that all genuine negation (logically a negation which is not genuine is no negation at all) implies some affirmative basis whether the implied basis is explicitly seen or not. It is on the strength of this logical fact that we arrived from the proposition "Contradiction is the mark of falsity" at the proposition "therefore, consistency is the mark of truth". Now, reverting to the beginning, can we not say that contradiction in thought is the mark of error and in imagination the mark of ugliness? We can definitely say so provided we fulfil certain conditions.

Contradiction, we noted earlier, is the principle of exclusion or otherness. In a broad sense, every bit of our thought excludes—i.e., does not take explicit recognition of—other parts of thought. E.g., when I am thinking of a problem in ethical value, I do not and need not take any explicit recognition of the existence of
chemistry. Though all thought and all branches of knowledge aspire to become organic parts of one all-inclusive whole, for certain practical purposes (even for theoretical ones) we do think without heeding the other parts. If contradiction means simple exclusion like this, it is not a mark of error. The question of truth or error arises when a certain piece of thought claims the value of truth and it is observed that its claim is not justified. In the words of Koyce: "....error is....a partial and (in so far) false view, which is not merely partially false and partially true, but takes itself to be wholly true." In the same way an incoherent piece of imagination as such is not ugly; we find a number of such incoherent pieces in our everyday life. Fancies, wishful thinking and dreams which are also products of imagination are incoherent almost all the times. We know that they are so and yet we do not pass an aesthetic judgment on them. Because they do not claim that they are aesthetic. Just as in the case of error, the question of beauty or ugliness arises only when a given piece of imagination claims beauty; and we judge it as ugly when its claim is not justified. We may put the same matter in another way: The development of thought and imagination is essentially purposive (not in the pragmatist’s sense); its purpose is hidden in its very nature; if in their purposive development, they fall short of their ideal, to that extent they have a negative

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element which we may call by the names of error and ugliness, referring to whether they pertain to imagination or thought.

Here a question arises; Since we have not reached the most complete coherence in thought and we cannot claim that we have before us such a complete, the ideally perfect coherent piece of imagination (work of art), it follows that this negative element is there in all our knowledge and in all the existing works of art. Does it not mean that error is there as a part of our knowledge and ugliness in what we have accepted as works of art?

An answer to this question leads us to another aspect of the principle of coherence which we have not considered so far. A natural corollary of the principle of coherence is the recognition of the degrees of truth, which means that since we cannot claim that our present level of knowledge has reached the ideal all inclusive coherence, we have not realized the complete truth. But it does not mean that we have not realized any truth. Human knowledge is in a process of development from less coherence to more coherence, and from the state of less inclusiveness to that of more inclusiveness. As our thought develops into more and more of coherence, the stage of less coherence must be treated as less true than that of greater coherence. To illustrate: my knowledge of the proposition $7 + 5 = 12$ is less true than the knowledge of the same of a mathematician, because, his knowledge of the far reaching implications and the interconnections of
the implications of this proposition is more inclusive than mine. In this background if we ask the question: Is my knowledge of the proposition $7 + 5 = 12$, erroneous when compared to the knowledge of the mathematician, the answer will be in the negative. For, my knowledge may be less true, but as long as it does not stand in conflict with the greater whole (knowledge of the mathematician) it is not erroneous. Error arises when any part or stage in the developing process of knowledge claims more than what it actually is. In the case of the illusion, when the rope is mistaken for the snake, so long as I maintain "this appears to me like a snake", I am not making an erroneous statement. For, that it appears to me so is a fact. It is a moment of experience and this moment itself does not suffer any inner discrepancy. The error arises when I claim that it is a snake. For the assertion "is" refers to a portion of reality and when I qualify that portion of reality with a certain predicate, that predicate, should be accepted by it even after this moment and for other persons also who see it. So the origin of error is in the truth-claim and not in the lesser truth. The lesser truth whole is not opposed to the greater whole any more than the earlier stage is in antagonism to the developed stage in any teleological movement. Says Joachim: "Error is...... that form of ignorance which poses, to itself and to others, as indubitable knowledge, or that form of false thinking which unhesitatingly claims to be true, and in so claiming substantiates and completes its falsity."2

That the origin of error is in the truth-claim of an object which fails to fulfill its required conditions has its counterpart in the aesthetic sphere. We saw the merely incoherent in imagination like in fancy of dream is neither beautiful nor ugly. In fact the ugly does not include everything other than the beautiful. Beauty is a concept which is applied only to a specific kind of imaginative fulfilment, and such cases of imaginative fulfilment in our experience are comparatively very meagre in number. All the other instances of the experience of life are in a sense excluded by this specific kind of imaginative fulfilment. Hence can we say that all of them are ugly? Tables, chairs, houses, factory buildings, etc., are not beautiful; but we cannot say that they are ugly. It is true that there can be a good-looking table and a bad-looking one, a fine house and an inconvenient or even disgusting one and so on. But a table is not and cannot be beautiful in the sense in which a work of art is beautiful, unless the table is made specially from the aesthetic point of view. A house can also be a good piece of architecture and hence aesthetically beautiful. But it is altogether a different question. So leaving it aside we shall come to our original question: Can we say that a thing which is not beautiful is always ugly?

The correct answer is: when a thing is not created with the purpose of the aesthetic realization and when it does not claim the aesthetic nature--i.e., the realization of coherence in imagination purely for its own sake--it is
neither beautiful nor ugly; in other words, it is not an aesthetic category at all. But when a thing claims some imaginative value but actually fails to fulfil or satisfy that claim, the question of ugliness arises. In this sense, ugliness is the failure of the imaginative activity which failure is claimed for success. Writes a contemporary aesthetician: "...the ugliness is a mark of the failure of aesthetic fulfilment". Now, what is it that claims success instead of failure? We should note that nothing other than the aesthetic experience itself tells us whether the experience is successful or unsuccessful. And when we use the word "claim for beauty or success", it is not any external element that "claims" it. What actually happens is this: When we read a poem or listen to a musical composition or see a picture, we are imaginatively transformed to the mode of that particular piece of art. The tempo or the central note of that work of art sets our imagination in a particular mode and our emotion starts with a certain depth, profundity and seriousness. A certain "logic" unique to that work of art is felt by us and our experience is governed by that "logic". In the process of experience, now and then a little divergence from the main note takes place; this divergence is there as a contrast which adds to the vividness and subtlety of the main note; Thus the divergence itself forming a part of the aesthetic whole. But if the divergence is too far away from the main note or too violent from the measure of the

main movement or too much contrasting that the unity of experience is marred or destroyed, we will get acute dissatisfaction. And this is what we may describe as ugliness.

The same may be made more clear in terms of Indian Aesthetics. Every work of art dominantly expresses one rasa. Yet there will be other moods or rasas, appearing now and then but disappearing into the main rasa, thus contributing to the principal mood or the dominant rasa. The dominant mood is there throughout, which is called sthāyi Bhāva and the divergent moods are called sanchāri Bhāva. If the sanchāri Bhāva becomes dominant suppressing or neglecting the sthāyi Bhāva, the work of art will have doṣa. The Indian poeticians who have elaborately discussed the concept of "appropriateness" (sauchitya), have said that doṣa arises because of inappropriateness or anauchitya. In the words of Ananda Vardhana "there is no other reason for rasābhanga than inappropriateness". 

Viśvanātha who defines poetry as a composition soaked in rasa defines doṣa as that which repels rasa. Indian aestheticians use another significant word to denote distortion from the main mood—rasābhāsa. The reasons for rasābhāsa, how it arises and how the poet should avoid it are very elaborately discussed by Indian Poeticians. But our subject being the Philosophy of beauty and not poetics,
we need not note all those details. It serves our purpose if we note that dosa results from anuṣṭhita or rasābhāsa—imaginative misfit or distortion.

Imagination is set to work in a particular direction and if it fails to reach its natural goal along with that direction or if the direction of the imagination takes a distorted turn which brings a violent disharmony between it and the set mood, the result is displeasure, pain and disappointment. And this is ugliness. If in the Rāmāyana, Sīta who is delineated as the ideal of womanhood, in the end yields to the temptations that Rāvana offers to her, the result is a painful disappointment to our imagination. There is a definite self-created logic governing the imagination and any incoherence in that logic is ugliness. In some works of art, here and there, there will be certain minor incoherences in the matters of detail or even in the use of a simile. But in the sway of the coherent movement of the whole the resulting incoherence might be unnoticed by an ordinary experient. But nevertheless they disturb the harmony of the imagination of a trained experient.

§ 2. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO:

Coming back to our problem of comparing error with ugliness, we should observe that both these are negative elements and they do not pervade everything which the true and the beautiful exclude. But they result when the excluded elements lay claim for the truth and beauty. The contradiction arises because of their claim, because they exist in a situation where they should not have existed.
There are certain readers of literature or listeners of music or connoisseurs of painting who can appreciate and enjoy only a certain type of literature, music and painting. A man who enjoys tragedy may dislike comedy and dub it as a purposeless, childish, and ticklish piece of writing. One who can enjoy a certain style of music may obhor other styles. It is psychologically a revealing fact to observe that specially in Hindustani music even some good musicians obhor the music of some other good musicians only because the latter follow a different Ghairane or style. So is the case with some connoisseurs of painting. This is again another form of the inadequacy in the imaginative ability on the part of the spectator. In tragedy the imagination will be set working in a particular general mode and the spectator is ready to become one with that mode. But if the same spectator is asked to witness a comedy he has to change all his presuppositions, forget everything which he believes in, the ordinary world and completely accept the logic of the world of the comedy where the Fool can fool the queen by putting on the royal garb himself or His Majesty the King is laughed at to his face by the maid-servants of the queen or even God is made to subject himself to the twentieth century spell of monogamy. Can all this happen? This question itself is the indicator of the incoherence in the imagination of the questioner. In this way, various genuine works of art become "ugly" due to the lack of width on the part of the spectator. Much of training is nece-
"There is neither collision, falsity, nor error, in so far as the mind holds this element in suspense against the remainder of the significant context of its scientific thinking.\(^5\) "If there is to be falsity in the full and proper sense of the term, there must be a particular truth affirmed (believed) as truth absolute and whole. And if there is to be error, the incomplete knowledge, which now passes through and possesses some particular mind, must be for that mind as its experience, complete and final, or absolute.\(^7\) Inappropriateness is the root of both error and ugliness. Since in thought the systematic coherence is a very big extended whole, the inappropriateness of any one element (error) can be shown from various sides. E.g., the falsity of a certain scientific proposition might be proved both from the point of view of physics and from that of mathematics. The proposition, atom was indivisible was proved false both by physics and by mathematics. But in the case of ugliness, since every work of art is a unique, self-contained and self-ruled whole, the inappropriateness of an element should be determined only within that context and it cannot be proved by any fact outside that unit.

There is another point of distinction between error and ugliness. In the case of error, as long as we do not have correct knowledge, we mistake the erroneous for the true and believe in it. The knowledge of error arises only when we have or about to have the correct knowledge. Thus

\(^6\) Joachim: Nature of Truth, p.143.
\(^7\) Joachim: Logical Studies, p.270. Italics in the original.
the awareness of error marks a superseded stage in the
development of knowledge. Again, I may be in error;
i.e., claim an inadequate or partial piece of knowledge
as the whole and adequate knowledge. I may claim so in
ignorance of the inner relation of my present piece of
knowledge with the rest of the knowledge system; or I
may mistake those relations. In that case another man
may point out to me the wrongness of my claim. Then
only I realize the erroneousness of what I claimed to be
true. Here, it seems as error to the other man who po­
ints it out to me as he looks at it from the perspective
of right knowledge. To me also what I believed a moment
before as right, appears now as erroneous, because now I
can look at the past belief from the perspective of right
knowledge. One cannot at the same time be in error—
i.e., claim a certain inappropriate piece of knowledge
as true—and know that what is claimed as true is errone­
ous. This is against the law of contradiction and if one
says that he still does both the things simultaneously,
he is simply an impostor. For the error to be known as
error, it is not necessary to be in possession of right
knowledge. It is sufficient if the man in error realizes
or just sees the self-contradictory nature of what he cl­
aims to be true. We should note that the awareness of
self-contradiction is a stage of knowledge which is already
higher than the stage of error proper.

In the case of aesthetic experience too the moment
the imagination finds itself run into incoherence, it
realises the ugliness of the situation. Here also ugliness is the awareness of the incoherent situation. But suppose there is actual incoherence in the performance of a musical composition and a dilettante does not experience that incoherence and enjoys it; is that performance ugly for him, as his imagination derives its complete pleasure without being disturbed? But this is not a genuine question. For, it is like asking: suppose there is a farmer who still believes that the sun actually moves daily from east towards the west and that our earth is standing still; as he believes this without being mentally disturbed, is he in error? When we speak of error and ugliness, we speak from a certain level of thinking and imagination from that of an ideal mind; and the concepts of truth and error, beauty and ugliness are always relative to such a mind.

We have to observe another point of contrast between the awareness of error and of the ugly. When I say I committed some error, I refer to a previous moment and not to the present one. But when I say that I am experiencing the ugly, does it similarly follow that first I should mistake an incoherent for a coherent piece of imagination and claim that to be a genuine continuity of the coherent, and then realize its oncoherence, and then make the judgment that I experienced (note the past tense) the ugly? No. In this respect the ugly differs from the erroneous. Because the experience of our imaginative
emotion thrown into incoherence itself is incoherent. Here, the incoherence and the experience are not two different things. They are one and the same. Further, in aesthetic experience, the awareness of the coherence is not a distinct activity. This awareness is not of the reflective type. We do not think or consciously know that "we the onlookers of this picture by Asit K. Haldar or the listeners to the sitar performance of Ravishanker are having imaginatively coherent experience; since we know that we are having such an experience, we judge that the picture or the concert is beautiful." The awareness of coherence or incoherence is expressed not through the reflective form of knowledge but through a feeling—tone of aesthetic pleasure (ānanda or rasānubhava).

The coherence of experience (nay, the "coherent-experience" as one unit) and the feeling—tone of aesthetic pleasure cannot be differentiated; it is an experience of pleasure; or it is a pleasure-experience. The question whether logically the experience is prior to the pleasure or vice versa is an uncalled for one.

Now, when the coherent experience suddenly takes an incoherent turn or distortion or if the coherent movement abruptly stops before it consummates into its necessary and natural finale, because that experience ceases, the aesthetic pleasure also ceases; and because the experience becomes suddenly incoherent—its incoherence being heightened owing to the experience of its violent contrast with the previous stage—the nature of the new moment is
one of pain. It is a painful-feeling-tone. It is this which we call the ugly. Here, since we are not at the discursive level of mind, the question whether the consciousness of the ugliness is a later stage like the consciousness of error does not arise at all; For, at this stage, the experience and the awareness go together.

§ 3. OUR OWN INADEQUACY AS THE CAUSE OF THE TWO:

We may observe the experience of ugliness from the point of view of practical art-criticism in so far as it throws some light on our main problem. We may introspect our reaction to great works of art when we were less matured. Imagine ourselves as young boys visiting the temple of Mt. Abu or reading Romeo and Juliet during our adolescence or witnessing Macbeth on the stage when we were sixteen. Naturally, we could not appreciate these great works of art; not merely that; chances were that these works appeared to us unpleasant or ugly. What is the psychological reason for these great works of art becoming ugly to the young minds? Though the question is a psychological one, the answer to it has a bearing on the problem of ugliness.

In a sense there are many persons who despite their advanced physical age are mentally adolescents. For them the great works of art become dissatisfying because the artistic qualities of these works are so excellent that their imagination cannot soar up to the height demanded by the works of art. In this connection Bosanquet speaks.
of three characteristics which may prove to be too excellent for the immatured spectators. They are as he calls them: (1) Intricacy, (2) Tension and (3) Width.

In connection with what he calls as "intricacy", Bosanquet speaks of difficult beauty and easy or less difficult beauty. As an illustration, we may give the contrast between a lyric sung in a sweet tone at once expressing all its emotions and a classical musical composition presented by a highly trained singer with all the delicate subtleties of tonal variations. To the dilettante the first appeals immediately, his imagination at once sets in movement, it gets its natural culmination and he gets the aesthetic pleasure that the song has. While in the case of the second, his imagination cannot cope with the mellow, gradual, complicated and subtle evolution of the tonal sequences; his imagination is aroused (because he is a lover of music and for a musically deaf ear it is neither beautiful nor ugly), here and there some tunes and strokes help his imagination to proceed in some direction; but before it collects itself into some form of definiteness, the way is lost and the experience is incoherent. It is a pain, a torture and boredom for him and it is such a man who says that he "hates" classical music; he hates it because it is ugly for him. Proper and patient training is the only remedy to make him capable of coping his imagination to the requirement of the composition.

8. Three Lectures on Aesthetics. p.87 ff.
The second characteristic—Tension—also describes the inadequacy of the spectator's powers or as Aristotle calls it the "weakness of the spectators". When the feeling—tone of the work of art—specially in a work like tragedy—is very deep which requires on the part of the spectator a high degree of imaginative effort to keep up the aesthetic distance and yet to endure the powerful sway of emotion; if the spectator's imagination is not up to the required mark, it runs into incoherence. When on a certain occasion Othello was put on the stage, when Iago was inducing suspicion in the mind of Othello against Desdemona and Othello was beginning to take the suggestions of Iago, a woman from the auditorium cried: "you black fool can't you see that he is lying? He is a rascal." We will appreciate the good-heartedness of that woman, but her imagination is too weak to withstand the situation in an objective way. No wonder if she had said later: "it is a hopeless drama, merciless, fit only for the butchers to witness." This again is a case of incoherence in the development of her imagination. The work of art requires our imagination to develop in a certain way. But if owing to the intervention of any extraneous influence or feeling, the imagination takes a different turn, or if its development is suddenly stopped and we come to the ordinary level of consciousness, the resulting incoherent experience is ugliness.

The third characteristic—width—which Bosanquet speaks of is also another form of incoherence in imagination.
...sary along with a free artistic outlook for one to appreciate all forms of art. The imagination of the man who cannot enjoy the other form or style of art is to that extent not plastic to take the shape demanded by the new style. He has not got the objectivity of imagination and the resulting incoherence is due to the conflict between the way of the work of art and the stiffness of his imagination to become one with it.

The three characteristics that Bosanquet speaks of are by no means exhaustive in explaining how even a genuine work of art may give the experience of ugliness due to the inadequacy of the spectator; nor does Bosanquet claim that they are exhaustive. But the point which we have to note is: experience of ugliness in whatever the form it may appear, is due to some kind of incoherence when the imaginative development is on the way. And it is due either to its sudden stop or distortion.

The ugliness due to the limitation of the spectator is not without its epistemic counterpart. It is as much a case of error to reject a truth as false as upholding a falsity as true. It may be due to the dogmatic belief on the part of a scientist that his science alone is sufficient to pronounce judgment on any and every issue in the universe. Thus we find some physicists outrightly denouncing the truths claimed in speculative philosophy or theology. How about the truth of astrology, palmistry etc.? It is true that these disciplines have not reached that degree of exactitude as the other experimental sciences have done. But the physicist is not justified if he
outrightly disallows any truth to them; whereas legitima-
tely he has to confess his ignorance in those subjects or
simply point out their undeveloped stage. In the same
way the economic truth of free enterprise is dubbed as
total nonsense by a communistic economist while the theory
of the latter is condemned as a specimen piece of disguised
falsity. Though the examples of the kind can be multi-
plied indenitely, our purpose here is to note that the
origin of falsity of error is in the undue claim of any
piece of knowledge; the undue claim may be either in aff­
irming what a thing is not or in denying what a thing is.
The three characteristics that we noted which make a good
work of art appear ugly for an inadequately gifted spec­
tator is also a fallacy of the latter kind—namely unduely
denying what a thing actually is.

§ 4. REALITY OF ERROR AND
UGLINESS:

That error and ugliness are facts of experience is
indisputable; for we do commit errors however intellec-
tually sincere we want to be. Owing to our own limita-
tion or some defect in the aesthetic creation itself, we
have ugliness as a fact of experience. Now, are error
and ugliness invincible, in the sense, whether we never
reach a stage where there is truth uncontaminated by error
in any of its steps of corner and beauty pure and immacu-
late? This question should be answered in two distinct
methods: (1) by refering to reality, which both thought and
imagination try to comprehend in their own ways; and (2)
by asking the question whether error and ugliness are logi-
cally implied by truth and beauty respectively.

We shall take up the first question first: Can reality be erroneous and ugly? This question may be made a little more precise by asking another question: is reality true and is it beautiful? The answer to the latter question depends upon what we mean by truth and beauty. We are speaking right from the beginning that truth is the coherent integration of experience by thought and beauty, by imagination. We also pointed out in an earlier context that the nature of reality should be the nature of this integrating principle of thought; if not there is no fun in saying that truth is the nature of the coherent integration of thought. But this does not mean that thought itself is reality. Thought after all is only an attempt to describe the nature of reality, but the description that thought offers of reality is relational. When we discussed in an earlier place the nature of the relation of thought, we noted that this relation is internal and not external. But because we proved that externality cannot be the nature of relation, it does not follow that the internality of relation is absolutely infallible. For, however internal a relation be, it cannot be merely internal lest it should fail to relate another term to the previous one. In the proposition S is P the relation between S and P is internal to both S and P and yet S is different from P. If S is not different from P, there is no point in saying that the one is related to the other. It is internal and at the same time external. Can we call
it internal-external or external-internal? We can coin such a phrase, but we cannot clearly conceive what the phrase means. The point here is: either we have to treat relation as logically self-contradictory or we should admit that there is some element of inexplicability about it. If we accept the former alternative, the very instrument with which we can approach reality breaks down. The latter alternative suggests that thought itself is a category which cannot be explained by itself. The latter alternative points to the inadequacy of thought, but it saves thought from being reduced to self-contradiction.

There is another point to be noted: thought essentially moves in the duality between the subject and its qualifying predicate. And so reality is always the object of the qualifying thought. When I think that S is P, I think about S that it is P. In this judgment granting that P is true of S, it is the P, the predicate, the ideal description that is true of S in this particular relation. It is not the S which is true of P, but P of S. Now, wherein does truth consist? Truth is essentially the nature of the description and not of the described object. From this point of view, we cannot say that reality is true; which is quite a different thing from saying that our description of reality is true. But suppose that the description becomes one with reality, does not reality become true? No. For, what do we mean by the description becoming one with reality? It only means that there is no duality, that there is no thought. And when there is no
thought how can there be truth—truth in the sense of the coherence of thought?

This does not mean that reality excludes all the ideal element or it is devoid of the ideal nature of any kind. It is a different and a big problem by itself and here we cannot divert into it too far. We will just note and pass on that reality is of the nature of the ideal but it is not of the nature of discursive thought. Thought has a place in reality, but only when it loses its discursive and dual character. But when it loses its dual character, it ceases to be what we mean by it and it cannot claim the intellectual coherence which we described so far.

Our main question is: can reality be error? We found that reality cannot be truth even, but it is of the nature of truth. We should also note that reality appears to be of the nature of truth to our comprehension of it with the instrument of thought. And when we reach the stage of thought becoming one with reality, since thought itself loses its nature of coherence (but it does not become incoherent), we cannot denote thought with the nature of coherence and so neither can we say that reality is of the nature of coherence.

Truth as intellectual coherence cannot be in reality. Nor can error as intellectual incoherence be there. Though truth is not one with reality, it is very near reality; it is at least a description of it; it is a moment on our way towards reality. The description may
be abstract and inadequate but as a description its claim is justified. Error is also a description of reality—but it is an attempted description and the tragedy is, the other elements of the description of reality kill it, and it is nowhere. Yet it may be asserted that its claim might be killed by the other elements of the description, but at least as a fact of experience, as a temporal fact, it did occur and no amount of future correction can eradicate the fact of its occurrence; for that the "it" appeared to me as a snake was a fact of my experience. Here we should point out that what is true is "the-it-appeared" and not "the-it-appeared-as-snake". For, how can the same thing appear once as a snake and next as a rope? Here, "as-snake" is a fancy of my mind. Error, in the words of Late Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya, is merely the subjective ".....the consciousness of the false is the consciousness of the subjective and..... the consciousness of the subjective is consciousness of the false." Yet, error exists at least as subjective and so it cannot be excluded by reality. Error has this double nature of being rejected by reality and at the same time not completely included in it. It is here that we should accept that error belongs to reality after it is corrected. But after it is corrected, it no longer remains as error. But because of this we cannot deny the fact that it once existed. It is here that it becomes inexplicable (anirvacanīya).

We considered so far the place of truth and error in reality. In the same way, let us ask the question: Can reality be beautiful, or can it be ugly? In other words, is art experience of the nature of reality? It is. If the intellectual coherence is the attempt to know the nature of reality through the medium of thought, imaginative coherence is the attempt to experience the nature of reality with feeling or emotion. In this attempt, imagination is immediately at reality while the comprehension of thought is only mediate. In art-experience the unity of experience is most eloquently affirmed and the sense of division created by thought is successfully healed up. But is this reality itself? Can we identify reality with art-experience, as Schelling does? We cannot do so; for, art-experience is not the whole of experience; there are other aspects of experience like the moral experience. As it is described in Indian thought, art-experience is Brahmananda Sahodara—it is not exactly Brahmananda itself. Further, the object of realization in art is Brahman itself. But in each particular medium of art it is described differently. Thus music realizes the experience of NadaBrahma, poetry Sabda Brahma and Silpa realizes Rupa Brahma. This implies that all these forms of art realize Brahman in one of the aspects which is also attributed to Brahman by these arts; and so they cannot give the whole reality.

While speaking about the question whether reality is true in the sense of intellectual coherence, we noted two points: (1) Truth consists in the predication of
reality and so we can only say that this predication to the given reality is true or false, and not that reality itself is true or false; and (2) As we realize the fact that we are seeing reality through the medium of thought, we can not even say that reality is positively coherent, though we can definitely assert that it is not incoherent. Herein consists the mystery of our failure to speak definitely about reality.

With regard to the question whether reality is beautiful: In art experience there is no question of predication. For, predication implies a duality between what is predicated and of what it is predicated, but in art-experience the unity of experience is realized. So the term "beautiful" does not refer to any description of reality, but to the experience of it. So we can say that reality is beautiful.

But another difficulty confronts us: which is the same as the second difficulty with regard to the relation between truth and reality which we stated once again in the above paragraph. We defined beauty as the integration or coherence of our imaginative experience. When we say that reality is beautiful, we mean only that aspect of reality as it is realized through the coherent imagination. No doubt, though this coherence is not the coherence of the discursive thought, it is nevertheless coherence, a form; and to that extent something of an intellectual category. If not how can we say that it is coherent? Here is a tacit attempt to offer a cognitive qualification
to reality, and hence it is an abstraction. Though reality is not incoherent, to say that it is coherent is to stop ourselves at the level of thought itself.

We should add another point to our description of art-experience. Though art-experience is coherent imaginative experience, at the moment of experience itself, we are not conscious of the coherence. We know that it is not incoherent and we can analyse the experience with the conception of imaginative coherence. But the experience itself (which is verily what we call beautiful and not the analysis which is only art-criticism) is something that transcends this concept of coherence. So, bearing all these details in mind, we may say that reality is beautiful.

The main question with which we are interested in this chapter is the nature of error and ugliness and in this section we were interested in knowing whether there is any place in reality for the erroneous and the ugly. But we diverted too much into the question of the relation of truth and beauty with reality and so far we have spoken very little on that of the erroneous and the ugly. Yet from what we discussed on truth and beauty as aspects of reality, the question of the latter—error and ugliness—has become obvious. We already noted what naturally followed on error.

Now with regard to the ugliness: we noted earlier that ugliness is due to some misfitting element in the aesthetic whole, asserting itself so that the unity of the
experience is broken. To describe the same in another way: it is the abrupt obstruction or distortion in the natural development of imagination. Now, when the obstruction or distortion occurs, the unity of experience is broken and all of a sudden we are thrown to a lower level of consciousness, consciousness of discord and opposition. This is ugliness. Is this the nature of reality? It is unnecessary to repeat the obvious answer.

Though we have some difficulties, we noted above, to identify reality with aesthetic experience, we can at least say that this experience is of the nature of reality. And to this extent it expresses something of reality and in this sense it is a description of reality. But ugliness is not even a description as error is not.

At the cost of repetition we may state in one sentence the result of the discussion of this section: though we cannot equate reality either with truth or with beauty, these two categories are at least legitimate descriptions of the former in varying degrees; while error and ugliness are not qualified even to be called such descriptions.

§ 5. ARE THEY POSITIVE CHARACTERISTICS OR MOMENTS OF TRUTH AND BEAUTY?

Now we may address ourselves to the second question which we asked in the beginning of the preceding section: Are error and ugliness logically implied respectively by truth and beauty? This question may imply: (1) Are error and ugliness positive concepts implied by the positive truth and beauty? and (2) are error and ugliness essential conditions of truth and beauty respectively?
We shall treat the first question first: Are error and ugliness positive concepts implied by truth and beauty? This question is a bit complicated one as it is based on the relation between affirmation and negation. In an earlier chapter (Ch.III) we noted that a genuine negation always implies some affirmation either explicitly or implicitly, and in a well-developed system of thought affirmation and negation are on a par. We also deduced our positive conception of coherence from the negative concept of contradiction. Contradiction, wherever it is felt as contradiction implies the conception of coherence though the latter may not be clearly realized. When we are met with ugliness and know it as ugliness, we will have the concept of beauty though we may not be in a position to transform the situation into a fuller expression of beauty. This shows that error and ugliness imply their positive counterpart; they imply so because at the stage when we realize them for what they are we are already at the threshold of their positive counterparts however vaguely we realize them. But our question is: do the positive conception of truth and beauty imply their negative--error and ugliness? Here the nature of the question changes. It is true that all affirmation (determination) is negation. But when we say so, by negation we only mean exclusion. The plain meaning of exclusion is limitation or I-know-not-what for the present or that in which I am not interested at present. In the coherence theory of truth, where we have to recognise the degrees, the limited is always the lesser truth. But the lesser truth is not error as
long as it knows its own limitation. Coherence theory never mistakes the partial truth as such as error; it is a truth (partial) and therefore and on account of its being a truth, it has a place in the wider truth. Prof. A. K. Roger mistakes the real account of error given by the coherence theory, when he says: "What I am claiming is, indeed, that when such a belief (erroneous belief) is corrected always some specific feature of it is discovered to which its inadequacy is due, and that this specific feature is eradicated, not preserved; the elements that remain, mean time, were never in error at all." But we fail to see where he differs from our position. The error—the undue claim of any element of knowledge—is never preserved; the meaning of correction is to annul this claim; and what is preserved is what is due for that partial element. Otherwise, if we deny what is due to a thing we commit another error. The smaller whole becomes an error only when it claims what it is not and thus becomes a misfit—a contradiction in the wider whole. So affirmation does not imply negation in the same sense in which the latter does the former.

Error and ugliness are not positive concepts. Their essential meaning is, they are something wrongly attempted to be positive and their very meaning debars them from the positive value in the same sense in which their positive counterparts are. Their attempt itself for a positive value is positive, but the very attempt is rejected, dis-

10. See Essays in Critical Realism. p. 121.
missed. Are they positive even after they are killed? We are not interested in a mere fact but in the value-claim of the fact. Error and ugliness are not positive categories, yet however minute and deep we proceed in our analysis, they challenge us and show that they have an element of inexplicability (anirvacanīyatā).

We will pass on to the second question: Are error and ugliness essential conditions of truth and beauty? The answer to this question is already implied in the preceding two paragraphs, but we shall briefly refer to the implication of the question itself. We may take the example of an aesthetic whole in which there are some factors of diversion from the main principle of unity. In the metrical system of a poem, we find that certain lines come in a uniform length and suddenly there will be a line relatively too long and its next line will be too short. Are they not diversions but still the parts of the poem? That they are diversions is true, but they are not diversions leading outside the compass of the main unity. A certain line tends to be a diversion and it comes back into the unity, thus enhancing the canvas and the extension of the unity. It is how the unity develops and becomes a bigger whole, growing into a richness of diversity rather than remaining a monotonous and poor unit. Here, the diversion itself is a part of the whole and a part so long as it is a part cannot break the unity and thus become a misfit. So ugliness is not at all a condition of beauty.
And the same is true of error. The coherent development of thought is also an onward movement from the central unit and the movement goes on in a diversified way. And thus truth becomes more and more comprehensive conquering and bringing a wider range within its sway. As long as the movement continues consistently we are on the way in the development of truth. But when perchance a diversity becomes a misfit and it is recognised so, it is recognised as error and thrown out. The misfit can never be a condition of the development of truth. It is true that many times we commit errors and correct ourselves before we reach truth; but because of this we cannot conclude that error itself is a condition of truth.

§ 6. THE IMMORAL, THE UGLY & THE ERRONEOUS:

In the most recent contemporary trends in art, we find the artist claiming that he is not concerned with any moral question or implication of his aesthetic activity; on the contrary, he asserts, his business is to give expression to what comes as true from the innermost level of his consciousness. Thus we find a sudden change in the philosophy of art from the times of Oriental and the Medieval European Art to that of contemporary European Art. The contemporary artist like the surrealist, proclaims that he cares for truth and its expression and not the so called beauty. As a consequent to his proclaimed ideals and methods, his paintings in many cases have become not only unintelligible except for specialists in
his school. The modern artist expresses what he believes to be truths in a symbolic way—the symbols themselves being what the psychoanalytic school calls the natural symbols the unconscious creates and uses as defensive mechanism of the mind. Thus in his painting there will be a child kissing its mother in the way in which an adult male kisses his ladylove with passion and sexual urge. But here in the picture, the images of the child, the mother and the natural surroundings (if they were pictured) are in a distorted form and so the real import of the picture cannot be made out at the first instance by an ordinary spectator. The import is really what Freud has said. When the meaning of the picture is made clear to an ordinary spectator, he is shocked and condemns the picture as a veritable piece of ugliness. But the defenders of this picture rejoin with the charge that the spectator does not have that pure aesthetic sense.

Here the point of interest for us is not whether the surrealist is wrong or the common spectator is right, but how one's convictions of moral consciousness reject what is claimed as a work of art as ugly. Against the claim of the surrealist that he cares only for truth we have nothing to say. For even the medieval European and the oriental artists also expressed what they believed to be true. Thus they expressed eternal salvation, resurrection, the state of perfect peace, dance of the cosmic energy, embodiment of the divine grace etc., and for the expression of these truths they also used suitable symbols.
The surrealist also expresses his truths in a symbolic form which he thinks appropriate. Now, the question is: Why does our common spectator turn away his eyes from the surrealist work of the kind described above?

The aesthetic activity—though it is the function of imagination—is not totally bereft of all the sense of other values. As we noted in the preceding chapter, aesthetic imagination is pregnant with truth—it may be philosophical truth or the truth of human nature or the truth of values; and it should not be supposed that when these truths appear in aesthetic activity, they are exclusive of one another; on the other hand all these truths are synthesised and appear in a perfectly blended form. In the aesthetic imagination there is "a willing suspension of disbelief" and the things of that world is willingly accepted by the imaginative mind. But, for this "willing suspension of disbelief" there is a limit; if any of the factors claimed in the work of art is too strong for it, suddenly our consciousness compares the factor claimed in the work of art with what rivals to it as true in our everyday life. This very attempt at comparing the two—subjecting the free, autonomous imaginative world to stand before another world and asking the former to justify its claim before that of the latter—breaks the unity of the aesthetic imagination. Here the result is exactly what we have described in the process of the resulting of ugliness: the imagination which is aroused into activity is stopped, better say checked, before it reaches its natural
culmination. And the result is the experience of ugliness. Here the experience of ugliness may be due to our own limitation. But the point is, as Bertram Morris puts it: "The case of recognising non-aesthetic repulsiveness blinds us to the more difficult task of realizing positive aesthetic merit." As an example to this, Morris further writes: "When in his alter piece, designed for a colony of syphilitics, Mathias Gruenwald depicts Christ as suffering from the dreaded disease, we find it much simpler to censure the work and to rest smugly in moral elation than to comprehend the aesthetic reality." 11

Let us suppose a human society in which there does not exist any sense of value which we attach to the relation between the child and its mother and in which the relation that Freud claims exists explicitly and in practice; and this relation is held to be not only natural but ideal. Let us further suppose, that in such a society the surrealist picture we described above is painted with natural and obvious symbols. Would it be ugly on this moral ground for the spectators of that society? It will not. For, there is no conflict between what the artist asks the spectator to believe and the indomitable moral presuppositions in the consciousness of the spectator. Whether such a society is possible is a different question, but it only serves to illustrate our point that ugliness arises due to certain moral reasons also.

Not merely due to moral reasons, but due to any

values that come in conflict with the aesthetic value that we experience disturbance in the development of imagination. If a coward is unnecessarily praised or a traitor is glorified and the religious begot is respected in earnestly reverential words, we are disturbed; we become reflective and this reflection, the sudden awakening of our sense of criticism, disharmonises the development of the aesthetic experience.

When we are speaking of the consciousness of the conflict of values as the source of ugliness, we may also point out a parallel source of error. In the sphere of thought also many a time there arises a conflict between two truths. Thus a moral truth may clash with a psychological truth and a value truth may clash with a physical truth. When such a clash takes place, if we decide in one's favour, neglecting the claim of the other, we are already within the premise of error; for the truth which we are favouring, claims more than what it deserves. It is true only within its realm and false when it claims more. Thus the partial truths should be synthesised in a wider truth; and if such a synthesis is not possible for us at present, the wise way is to treat the partial ones for what they are. Freud's theory is right (granting so) as a psychological truth and the child and mother relation (if we want we may put it the other way as the mother and child relation) in the puritan's sense is a truth of value. We cannot simply evade the issue by saying that the positive science of psychology has nothing to do
with the normative science of values or vice versa. In fact notions of the positive and the normative cannot be completely exclusive of each other. The sensible way is to re-examine the bases of both the sciences and to search for the deeper bases of these bases themselves. Then we are at the level of philosophy, it being the synthetic study.

§ 7. A NOTE ON TRAGEDY:

We said that if our sense of harmony is disturbed in the course of aesthetic experience, it results into ugliness. Another problem arises in this connection: Evil as a force can never be accepted as moral. Both in religion and in ethics evil occupies the place opposite to a positive value. In religion it stands for the profane, the unholy and the opposite of the divine; in morality it denotes the bad, the wicked and the opposite of human happiness. Evil is a tale of sorrow and suffering, it is the repellent aspect of life, that creates pain in our consciousness and because of the pain, it creates, things which as civilized souls we abhor even to look at. It is the "ugly" aspect of life.

Now, has this aspect any place in art, or has it not? If it has, what will our sense of value be doing in the course of our aesthetic experience in which evil also is a part? If it cannot have any place in any form of aesthetic value, to that extent art is less revealing of the forces and the realities of life. Our answer to this challenge is: there is no aspect of human experience that
cannot be included in aesthetic imagination. Even the painful and the "bloody" side of life comes within the perview of art. But how does art retain its autonomy from being undisturbed from the moral consciousness and the sense of the values of the real life?

The answer to this question can be found in that form of art known as tragedy. Though the term tragedy means on the face of it a certain literary form, it also means a certain profundity and depth, revealing a vision behind the story of invincible degradation. In the words of perhaps the greatest authority on Shakespearean tragedy, A. O. Bradley, tragedy is "essentially a tale of suffering and calamity conducting to death." In the words of another writer on the nature of tragedy, it "is a spectacle of evil. Evil is that which we do not enjoy. Yet we do enjoy tragedy." Now, do we enjoy this "spectacle of evil" which "we do not enjoy in real life"? In other words, in the course of our enjoying the tragedy, how is it that our moral consciousness does not enter into the course of aesthetic experience and block its way? The answer is quite revealing. In tragedy, what we find is not a brute spectacle of evil shown without its cause or the necessary reason. The evil that takes place in the world may be due to the inviolable rule of destiny or it may be the way in which the moral order itself functions. In a tragedy the evil that befalls all the characters at the cul-

13. Henry A. Myers: Tragedy: A view of life (Cornell Uni-
-mination might be due to a certain flaw in the character of the hero; like unscrupulous greed as in Macbeth, over-credulity as in Lear or lack of practical action to suit the philosophical wisdom as in the case of Hamlet. Now, when the story of evil is told, it is told with a moral lesson implied at the end, but without being didactic. Further, it is not evil as such—the brute spectacle of horror and cruelty—that is shown in tragedy, but it is a picture of men in whom evil works and ultimately devours him. In Marlow's Dr. Faustus, we find successive stages of how the learned hero comes under the increasing power of the evil. To start with, it was due to his flaw that he willingly submits himself to temptation by the evil spirit. It is a picture of human weakness and the whole of the subsequent development of the drama is the gradual explication of the function of evil, culminating in the complete subjugation of the soul of the hero. Here, the hero is a visible instance revealing the nature of evil. It is this vision—the philosophical vision—that is the substance of a genuine tragedy. Or else, in a movie, a railway accident might be shown, in which many of innocent men and women lose their limbs and many others become terribly disfigured. Can it be a tragedy? If it is shown purposelessly, it is only a sight of pain and horror, creating a sense of disgust and repulsion in the spectator. For the repelled spectator it is veritably a sight of ugliness. We may contrast this picture with the picture of the battle field of Kurukṣetra on the night of the seven-
-teenth day of the great war, Duryodhana, having lost all his kith and kin, his heroic brother and beloved Karna, moves alone in the battle field identifying the corpses of all the important heroes who fought to death in his support. It is a picture of disjointed limbs and broken skulls, livers drawn out of the stomach, the soil profusely soaked in blood. Yet the picture does not create disgust in the mind of the reader (or the spectator if the same is filmed) because the whole situation is philosophised in the background of the wholeness of the story: how in the dharma-yuddha the supporters of adharma have parted with their lives. Or if the picture is taken the other way, the picture helps to study the intensity of the tragic situation of Duryodhana.

The point of interest for us is: if evil, horror and pain appear in works of art they should appear in a wider perspective which reveals them. In this manner the nature of the evil that is revealed in art undergoes a transformation and in the new transformed condition it commands our sympathy instead of creating repulsion and disgust. It does not break the unity of the aesthetic experience; on the contrary it intensifies the depth of experience. It does not become a misfit—which is ugliness—but adds a powerful significance to the aesthetic whole and makes the whole all the more strong and binding. And thus the aesthetic distance is kept up.

§ 8. CONCLUSION:

We may conclude this chapter with a brief statement
of the results of the discussion of this chapter: We started by asking the question: What are error and ugliness? We answered that they are the misfits claiming a place in the whole, thus disturbing its coherence. We also further noted, that both error and ugliness arise due to our own inadequacy. Then we entered into the discussion of the reality of error and ugliness and noted that whereas truth and beauty (in the sense explained) can at least claim to be descriptions of reality, error and ugliness can neither claim to be the descriptions nor are they logically conditions of truth and beauty. Lastly, error and ugliness arise when two values are found to be in conflict and we take the side of one without considering the genuine claim of the other.

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