CHAPTER II

INFLUENCE OF NYĀYA ON ŚABDĀVRṬṬIŚ
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INFLUENCE OF NYĀYA ON ŠABDAVRTTIS

The present chapter gives a brief analysis of Šabdavṛttis treated by the Sanskrit poeticians and attempts to show the influence of Nyāya philosophy on them.

The treatment of Šabdavṛttis in connection with the problem of meaning is given an important place in Sanskrit Śāstras. It has attracted the attention of philosophers, grammarians and poeticians throughout the ages. In ancient India the philosophers such as Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas, Vaiyākaraṇas and rhetoricians have devoted much thought to the problem of meaning and evolved different theories to explain manyfold aspects of Šabdavṛttis. The Śāstrakāras differ among themselves and hold divergent views about the nature and purpose of vṛttis on their own grounds. Being a Śāstra dealing with the relation of śabda and artha (sāhitya), the Alanākṛasāstra naturally has to make its own contribution to the problem of vṛttis. But a perusal of the rhetorical works gives an impression that the poeticians have given more attention to the discussion of Rasa and Alanākara then to Šabdavṛttis. Even though Ānandavardhana has made monumental contribution to the treatment of vṛtti, yet he is confined only to the treatment of vyañjanā. A few works have been written on the problem of vṛttis such as Mukulabhaṭṭa's Abhidhāvṛttimātrkā.
Mammata's Sabdavyāpāravicāra (which is almost a summary of the discussions contained in his KP), Appaya's Vṛttivārttika and Āśādhara's Trivenikā. From a study of the rhetorical works it is known that the Alāṅkārakas mainly follow the views of Vikakaraṇas and Mīmāṁsakas in their treatment of Sabdavṛttis. As far as the influence of Nyāya philosophy on this particular aspect is concerned, there is not much of it in Sanskrit poetics. The following analysis will clarify the points on which the influence of Nyāya philosophy is observed. We shall briefly discussed here only such points or cases as reveal Nyāya influence without dwelling much on details.

II.1 Concept of Vṛtti and Its Kinds

The term Vṛtti in Sanskrit literature has been used in a number of senses. Āśādhara defines Vṛtti as a function by which a word conveys a particular meaning. Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa in his Vṛttidīpikā, a work on grammar says that Vṛtti is the cause of Sabdabodha, a relation of word and its meaning which is congenial to the presentation of that meaning from that word. Gadādhara in his Saktivāda defines Vṛtti as a will (icchā) or indication (saṃketa) in the form of 'let this word indicate this meaning' and 'this meaning is to be understood from this word'. The terms like vyāpāra and kriyā are said to be synonyms of Vṛtti. Viśvanātha in his SD uses the term sakti for Vṛtti while many other writers restrict the word Sakti to only
Abhidhā, the primary function of the word, one of the vṛttis. The word vyāpāra has been used in the sense of vṛtti as is known from the work, Sabdavyāpāravīcāra of Mammāṭa. In the second ullāśa of KP also Mammāṭa uses the term vyāpāra in the sense of vṛtti. Thus vṛtti is used in the sense of power or function of a word.

There is a great difference of opinion regarding the number of vṛttis among the philosophers, grammarians and poeticians. Mahimabhaṭṭa recognises Abhidhā alone as a vṛtti. The Naiyāyikas accept two vṛttis, sakti and laksanā while poeticians accept three vṛttis- Abhidhā, Laksanā and Vyanjana.

II.2 Abhidhā, the Primary Function of Word

The primary function of meaning, Abhidhā (denotation) conveys the realisation of the meaning which belongs to the word. Naiyāyikas used the term sakti for Abhidhā. "The relation existing between pada and padārtha is sakti". It is defined as a god-ordained convention that such and such meaning should be understood from such and such word. According to this definition each word in every language is capable of conveying a particular sense because the God has so willed it. This is the view of the prācīna Naiyāyikas. The Navya-Naiyāyikas say 'icchāmātram saktih', thereby intimating that even the human will can endow words with meanings as in the case of proper names like 'Devadatta' etc. Thus it is seen
that Naiyāyikas identify Sakti and saṅketa or icchā. On the other hand the Mimāṁsakas consider Sakti as an independent padārtha. They say it is apprehended from the convention. When a man ascertains that a particular word has a convention in respect of a particular sense then only he recognises the power of the word to express that particular sense. But some influence of Nyāyaśāstra is also seen in this connection.

Kesavamisra, for example, in his Alaṅkāraśekhara says:

शक्तिरूपेण या संकीन्त्रो बन्धुच्यते। (०.१)।

His definition seems to be formulated on the basis of the definition of Sakti as given by the Naiyāyikas like Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya and Viśvanātha who in their Saktivāda and NSM have given similar definitions of Sakti. The concept of Sakti as the will of God (īśvarecchā) is accepted by the ancient logicians. Kesavamisra, therefore, seems to follow the view of the prācīna Naiyāyikas as recorded in the NSM of Viśvanātha.

Again, Jagannātha’s treatment of Abhidhā also exhibits an influence of Nyāya. Though he mainly follows grammarians in the treatment of Abhidhā, yet we can trace the Nyāya influence on it on the basis of two points. Jagannātha defines Abhidhā in the following words:

शत्यास्याध्यायाः प्रत्येक शब्देण शब्दस्य अर्थगते च वा सर्वेक्षणोपप्रत्येकार्थविधा। (R.G. P.176)

He further explains it as अर्थस्य शब्देण: etc. Now the terms anuyogi and pratiyogi are two concepts of NavyaNaiyāyikas meaning respectively 'substratum' and 'dependent'. Abhidhā
otherwise called Sakti is a particular relation (sambandhaviśeṣa) between the saṣṣṭa and artha. The relation being connected with two objects one of them is technically called 'pratiyogika' and the other 'anuyogin'. But in the absence of any deciding factor in the present context both of them can be called pratiyogins or anuyogins. Defining Abhidhā in this manner Jagannātha postulates a relation of anuyogi and pratiyogi between that of śabda and artha only. To maintain the absolute validity of an expression the logicians have postulated certain relations. Since the validity of an expression involves both epistemic and ontological consideration it is difficult to determine the exact nature of Śabdabodha. Words hold different position in Śabdabodha and also signify something more than what they are to express. As such there is no unique property characterising them. In a stipulative way the logicians try to characterise them through certain relations. To avoid ambiguity and multiplicity the Naiyāyikas have generalised certain relations. Anuyogita-Pratiyogita is one of such relations. It determines the pratiyogi (counter-co-relate) and the anuyogi (subjunct). But anuyogi may refer to different things on different occasions in case of absence, (abhāva) the anuyogi is the locus of absence. For instance when we say there is absence of pot on the ground (bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti). we understand that ground the anuyogi and ghaṭa as pratiyogi. When it is conceived as a relation the absence of pot e.g. pot it is said to be connected with its locus (bhūtalā) through such a relation.
Though Jagannatha brings into the discussions of Abhidhā the relation of anuyogi and pratiyogi yet he is not able to reach a definite conclusion because of the complicated nature of the relation of sabda and artha.

Secondly, Jagannatha presents the Naiyāyika view of Śakti in the following words:

Nāgeśa, the commentator clearly says that the word 'apare' refers to Naiyāyikas. Here Jagannatha seems to refer the views of Gadadhara and Viśvanātha who were his elder contemporaries.

Apart from this in Appaya Dīkṣita's treatment of Abhidhā the influence of Nyāyaśāstra is observed. In his Vṛttivārtikam while referring to the types of meaning Appaya refers twice to the views of the Naiyāyikas at length without mentioning the name of the author or his work.

After explaining the nature of Śakti Appaya proceeds to discuss its three-fold classification in details. The classification of Abhidhā made by Appaya seems to have some relation with the divisions of pada made by the Naiyāyikas. So here before entering into the discussion of Appaya's treatment of Abhidhā and acquaintance with the view of the Naiyāyikas on the matter is necessary.
The Naiyāyikas define pada as one endowed with an expressiveness (Sakti) and classify it into four types - yaugika, rudha, yogarūḍha and yaugikarūḍha. In bringing out the characteristic features of these four types of pads, the Niyāyikas point out that a term which signifies a concept conveyed by its component parts is one of yaugika type. This is exemplified by such term as pācaka and the like. As regards the rudha type of word they maintain that the meaning pertaining to the word as a whole signifies the concept quite independent of the meaning belonging to the component member. This is illustrated by such term as 'Go', 'Mandapa' and the like. What is understood by 'Go' is not a moving thing but an animal possessing a particular physical form. Similarly what is meant by the term 'Mandapa' is not one who drinks gruel but the covered area.

In sharp contrast to the yaugika and rudha types of words the variety known as yogarūḍha is one in which the Sakti belonging to the component members and that belonging to the words as a whole conjointly bring a concept into light. For example the word, paṅkaja, which neither refers to the objects which sprung from mud nor the land lotus (sthalapadma), but the lotus sprung from mud. The word paṅkaja can etymologically convey the idea of all the objects growing from mud, for example, the lily as well through the Sakti belonging to its members. alone, because lily also grows in water. But it is of no avail, because it militates against the dictum that the cognition of a content presented by the word as a whole stands in the way of
comprehension of the idea presented by its component members. The Naiyāyikas explain the cognition of the idea of the lily, from the term pañkaja and say that Abhidhā does not present the idea of lily, but what presents this content is the function of lakṣanā which is called into play only when the Abhidhā proves itself unable to present the intended meaning.

Yaugikarudha (both derivative and conventional) is that when their meanings are determined either by the potency of the whole or by those of the parts, for example, the word udbhidha. It means a germ or the sprouting of a seed or a sacrifice.

Appaya defines Abhidhā as the capacity to signify a meaning with the help of Śakti. In summing up the discussion on the issue Appaya maintains that the term pañkaja signifies the lotus of a particular kind through the words denotative power of the third yoga-rudha type. In this context he refers to the Naiyāyikas' view. According to Naiyāyikas in such cases both the ideas conveyed through Śakti belonging to the word as a whole and through Śakti pertaining to the component members are cognised and at a late stage, the term 'pañkaja' signifies the lily and other water-born flowers. In order to explain such cases the Naiyāyikas take help of lakṣanā which according to them presents the sense of one grown in the mud only. Appaya, however, does not subscribe to their viewpoint on this issue.
Secondly, Appaya records the viewpoints of the Naiyāyikas on the exact part played by the restrictive factors (abhidhāniyāmakas). When the meaning is comprehended, it has no bearing on the context only because the particular word is used to signify that particular meaning. It is evident that the context does not regulate the function of Abhidhā. The inability of the context to restrict Śakti pertaining to terms is evident from non-recollection of contextual meanings, even in those cases where the particular word has not gained currency to signify that particular meaning. Thus the Naiyāyikas contend that the meaning is comprehended in all those cases where convention is present, even though it has no bearing on the context. On the other hand the recollection of the meaning related strictly to the context does not ensue in those cases where convention is not present. This view, therefore, controverts the thesis of the rhetoricians that the context and the other allied factors are competent to regulate the denotation of terms. Abhidhā is restricted by the dexterity of the comprehender in recollecting Śakti pertaining to the words. As the comprehender cognises for the first time the Śakti pertaining to a term, the knowledge that a particular term is endowed with the capacity to signify a particular meaning, the impression of that Śakti remains in him; as he subsequently cognises that a particular term, the impression deposited by that term regarding Śakti is awakened. As a result of it, he recollects the corresponding
idea and understand the meaning. The restriction of Abhidhā by the restrictive factors, therefore, is a myth. This restriction is made by the sensitiveness of the cogniser to the impression deposited by the word. In reply to the question as to what then is made by the restrictive factors, the Naiyāyikas hold that they go only to ascertain the intention of the speaker, and nothing else. In illustrating the point they cite the word 'Hari' which is treated as a multi-meaning ed term in Sanskrit lexicons and say that though the term Hari is able to present a number of ideas, the context goes to determine the intention of the speaker and thereby to point out the exact meaning the signify which the particular word is used.

In this connection it is significant to note that if one accepts the yogarūḍha type of Abhidhā as its third type it straightway encroaches upon the concept and the area of rudhi lakṣanā. On account of this the area of śabdāśaktimuladhvani will also be restricted. Even in the cases of Alankāras like Samāsokti the aprākaraṇikāarthā will also have to be expressed by Abhidhā. Therefore, Śleṣa in such cases will not be suggested but expressed.

Thus, Appaya's treatment of vṛttis reveals that he has great respect for the Naiyāyikas whose views he records.
II.3 Sources of Śaktigraha

Kesavamisra in his Alaṅkāraśekhara gives the following verse which refers to the different means of Śaktigraha:

कैशक्ष्योक्ताभिन्नवाक्यश्रोधित्वः।
प्रसिद्धपद समवधान व्यवहारार्थ बुध्यते॥

This is directly from the Nyāyaśāstra where the same eight sources of Śakti (denotation) are found in a number of Nyāya works. Kesavamisra is possibly mentioning there from Viśvanātha’s NSM and Jagadisa’s Sabdaśaktiprakāśikā, where the verse occurs with slight variations. But the oldest standard work referring to them is the TC. The relevant verse is as follows:

शक्तिग्रहो व्याकरणोपिमानयिन्यायगत्वः व्यवहारार्थः।
वाक्यरूप शौचान्तिविद्वेष्ट्रणात साधितान्तिन: सिद्धिप्रस्ह्य बुध्या॥

1. Vyākaraṇa: The meanings of the roots, terminations and rules are learnt from the Vyākaraṇa (dhatupratipadāpyaṃ śaktigraha, vyākaraṇaḥ bhavati).

2. Upemāna: Analogy is the instrument of assimilative cognition which consists in the knowledge of the relation between a name and the object denoted by it. This may be illustrated thus: A person happens to be ignorant of the exact meaning of the word gavaya. From a forester, he learns that a gavaya is similar to a cow; he goes to a forest, sees the animal called gavaya, which is similar to a cow and recollects the information
conveyed by the assimilative proposition (atidesavākya).
Then the assimilative cognition, 'this (5) the animal denoted by the word 'gavāya' arises.

3. Kośa: The words which have several meanings are understood through the help of a dictionary.

4. Āptavākya: Śabdapramāṇa is defined as āptavākya. Āpta means a person who speaks the truth. Āptavākya or the direct statement of a trustworthy authority is another way by which people generally understand the meanings of words. In this case the learning is conscious and deliberate. When parents or their relations directly point out with the finger the various persons and objects, and say to the child, 'this is your father' etc., the child can understand the relation between the words and the persons or objects denoted by them. We may also know the meanings or certain words when an authority tells us that such and such words denote such and such objects.

5. Vyavahāra: This is the most useful method for a child to learn the language. It is the most important among all the eight methods and is the natural way of observation in actual life. Jagadīśa, the great Naiyāyika says that the first and foremost method of learning the meanings of words is that of observing the use of language in actual life.

6. Vākyaśeṣa: This method is used in obtaining the correct meaning of a word. The meaning of the word 'yava' (generally
used by the Āryas in the sense of the long-bearded barley, and by the Mlecchas in the sense of the panic seed) in the sentence yavamayas’carur bhavati. It is known to be the long-bearded barley from the rest of the passage i.e. yatrāṇyā ausadhyā māyānte athātte modāmāna ivottīṭhati (when the other plants droop down, these stand up as if they are happy).³

7. Siddhapadasāmnidhya : Syntactic connection with the words already known. In the sentence 'The pika sings beautifully on this mango tree', the meaning of the word 'pika' is known to be 'cuckoo' from the presence of the other well-known words.⁴

8. Vivṛti : The meanings of words are known from a commentary giving the synonyms of the word, or describing the meaning.

II.4 Lakṣaṇā, the Secondary Function of Word

That brings us to the next function of word Lakṣaṇā (indication). The rhetoricians define Lakṣaṇā as:

सुरूव्याधिभद्वां तथागते संतीवृद्धिप्रविषयनात् ।
अन्वयिकाः लक्ष्यते यन्त सा लक्ष्यांशिक्षिताक्रिया ॥ (KP. II.9)

सर्वध्विषां तथाभावं यायान्वितक्षणं प्रतीयते ।
सूते: प्रयोजनार्थानि लक्षणां शक्तिकर्षितां ॥ (SD. II.5)

लक्षणा शक्यसम्बन्धी: अलंकारकेशार, प. 11.
शक्यसम्बन्ध्युपस्तकारिणी वृद्धिक्षणां ।

(Trivenīka, p.12)
When there is incompatibility of the primary meaning of a word, a secondary meaning, connected with the primary sense, and arising either through usage or through some intention of the speaker is also understood. This meaning is called the *laksya* meaning, and power, by which such a meaning arises, is called *Lakṣaṇā*. This function of the word, indicating a referent different from its normal and primary one, but somehow related to it, is also called *upacāra*; other terms like *gaṇiviṛtti* and *bhakti* are also used to refer to the secondary function of the word. As it is not possible to include all the meanings of the words under *Abhidhā*, there must be another *vṛtti* to explain the meanings which are not directly denoted but are indirectly indicated. Earliest indications of an attempt to explain such indicating power and indicated senses are found in the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama and the *Mahābhāṣya* of *Patañjali*. As time went on *Lakṣaṇā* was accepted as an independent *vṛtti*.

Among rhetoricians themselves there is great divergence of opinion. Vāmana and the author of the *Agnipurāṇa* (AP) treat *Lakṣaṇā* as one of the *alāṅkāras* based on similarity. Kuntaka also includes it under *vācya* and *vācaka*. With Ānandavardhana has come the scientific treatment of this power of word. Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa and others have mostly toed his line.

Gautama in his NyS applies the term *upacāra* for this secondary function of words. He says that such transfer of
meaning is quite common, when the actual referent is closely related to the normal and primary referent. He enumerates with examples ten such relations.

1. Sahacarana (Association): e.g. vaṣṭikam bhojaya (feed the stick) In this sentence the Brahmin is referred to as 'stick', as he is always associated with the stick which he carries. Another example of the same relation is the use of the term kantāh(lances) for the lance-bearers' in the sentence, kantāh praviśanti (the lance enter).

2. Sthāna(location): e.g. maṇcāh krośanti (the cots cry). Here the term 'maṇcāh' (Cot) is used to refer to the children on the cot'.

3. Tādrthya (purpose): e.g. katam karoti (He makes a mat). The sentence means: 'He collects reeds for the purpose of making a mat'. Here the reeds intended for making a mat are referred to as mat.

4. Vṛtta (behaviour): e.g. yamoraja. Here the term 'yama' is used in the sense of 'one who acts like Yama', 'god of death'.

5. Māna(measure): e.g. adhakasaktavah (one adhaka of flour). Here the term adhaka denoting the measure is used to mean that which is measured(adhakena mitāh saktavaḥ).

6. Dhāraṇa (weight): e.g. tulācandanam (one tula of candana) Here the term tulā is used in the sense of that which is weight in the balance (tulāyam dhṛtam candanam).
7. Sāmipya (proximity): e.g. gaṅgāyām gāvah caranti (the cows are grazing on the Ganges). Here Gaṅgā is used in the sense of the bank of the Ganges.

8. Yoga (inherent connection): e.g. kṛṣṇah sātakah 'the black cloth'. The word black primarily means 'blackness' but here it means 'the thing having blackness'. The use of the term denoting quality for the thing qualified (e.g. 'I love beauty') comes under this.

9. Sādhanā (cause): e.g. annam prānāḥ (food is life). Here food which is the cause of life is referred to as life itself.

10. Ādhipatya (prominence): e.g. ayam kulam (He is the family). Here kula is used in the sense of the prominent person in the kula (family).

In this way, Āautama gives popular example of figurative usage from everyday life, the list is intended only to be illustrative, and not to be exhaustive. He also refers to the Mīmāṃsakas view that the primary meaning of every word is the universal and that the particular to which it refers in a sentence is known through the secondary function, upacāra; but he does not accept that view, since according to him a word means all the three things: universal, the form and the particular.
II.5 Definition of Laksanā

The definition of Laksanā given by Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana in his NSM is: laksanā sakyasambandhā tātparyānupapattitationah. The definition of Laksanā given by the rhetoricians like Jagannātha and Keśavamiśra are quite similar to this. They seem to follow the view of the Naiyāyikas in defining Laksanā. Even Māmata has definition appears essentially to be not different from the Naiyāyika's definition. He defines Laksanā as:

मुख्यार्थाधि तद्भवी ललितेऽपि निप्रेषणात्।
अन्येऽतिरं तःप्रवते यत्सा लक्षणोपिनितिर्मया।

In this kārtikā, Māmata combines the definition, cause and the purpose of the Laksanā. The presence of Laksanā anticipates three things: 1. the incongruity of the mukhyārtha 2. connection between the vācyārtha and the Laksyārtha 3. any of the two purposes, Rūḍhi or Prayojana. Mukhyārthabādha is a real cause. But the Mukhyārthā-yoga is the svarūpa of the Laksanā, or, in other words 'sakya-sambandhā laksanā'. The term 'prayojanāt' explains the reason why Laksanā has to be accepted at all. His definition of Laksanā is accepted by almost all the Ālaṅkārikas including Viśvanātha. But Jagannātha and Keśavamiśra following the Naiyāyikas define Laksanā as sakya-sambandhā.

About the hetu or bija of Laksanā there are two views: Anvayanupapatti and Tātparyānupapatti. Naiyāyikas accept
Tatparyanupapatti as the bija of Laksana. Though there is anvayanupapatti in cases like gangayam ghosah, for, ganga (the pravaha of Ganges) cannot be the adhikarana of ghosa, still Tatparyanupapatti is to be accepted as the cause of Laksana. For, in cases like 'kakebhyo dadhi rakyatam', there is no sakyarthabadh or anvayanupapatti but tatparyabadha is there. For what is meant to be conveyed is that dadhi should be protected from all the birds that destroy it and not from crows only. Jagannatha accepts tatparyanupapatti as the bija of Laksana and seems to follow the Naiyayika view as stated in the NSM.

II.6 Relations Causing Laksana

Aasadhara in his Trivenika explains three types of relations which cause Laksana (laksana prayojakasambandha). They are according to him samyoga, samavaya and viisatabuddhi-yoga. The definition of samyoga as given by him is : dravyayoreva samyuktabuddhihetuh samyogo gunavi^esah. He explains a number of varieties of samyoga such as : vyapya-vyapakabhavasamyoga, dharyadharakabhavasamyoga, bhartbharyatvam samyoga, adheyadharihavasamyoga etc. His definition of samyoga is formulated on the basis of the definition of samyoga given by Kesavamisra and Annabhatta. Naiyayikas accept samyoga as a guna. Here also Asadhara accepts samyoga as a guna as well as the cause of samyuktavyavahara with the only difference
that he accepts a very large variety of *samyogas* while Naiyāyikas accept only three types of it. Similarly his definition of *samavāya*, *nityasaṃbandhaḥ samavāya* and its elucidation as the relation occurring between *avayava* and *avayavi* etc., clearly reveals that he borrows the concept from some Nyāya work.

II. 7 *Tātparya*, Another Function of Word

Sanskrit poeticians have treated *Tātparya* in a significant manner. The treatment of *Tātparya* by some of the poeticians also reveals the Nyāya influence.

Almost all the schools of Indian Philosophy, Grammar and Poetics recognise the importance of *Tātparya* in the understanding of sentence meaning. The Naiyāyikas define *Tātparya* as the intention of the speaker. The intention of the speaker as an essential factor in *śābdabodha* is admitted by the Naiyāyikas. Some Naiyāyikas are even of the view that in common sentences like 'ghaṭam ānaya' the meaning of *ghaṭa* is understood by *Tātparya*. Otherwise the pot may indicate a piece of cloth in a particular context through *Lakṣaṇā*. It is the incompatibility of the expressed sense with the intention of the speaker that prompts the hearer to interpret the sentence by resorting to *Lakṣaṇā*. In the sentence like 'gangāyāṃ ghosah', the intention of the speaker gives the meaning, *gangātīra* to the word *gangā*. The Naiyāyikas maintain that the intention
need not be that of the actual speaker, but could sometimes be traced to the original author of the statement.  

Some Naiyāyikas believe that Tatparya need not be treated as a separate condition of śabdabodha. It could be included under ākāṅkṣā itself. Ākāṅkṣā is the need of a word for another in order to convey the intended meaning of the speaker. In the sentence ayam iti putro rājñāḥ puruṣopāśāryatām, it is knowledge of the speaker's intention that decides that the word rājñāḥ (of the king) is to be construed with the word putra (son) and not with the puruṣa (man), to satisfy its ākāṅkṣā.

According to Gangeśa and Viśvanātha the knowledge of the Tatparya is the fourth condition necessary for śabdabodha. Some are of the view that Tatparya is an all-embracing factor and it has apart to play in the working of the first three factors. Naiyāyikas say that the contextual factors help only indirectly by showing the meaning intended by the speaker. Some of the early Naiyāyikas, prominently Jayanṭabhaṭṭa, accept Tatparya as a separate Vṛtti. Navya-Naiyāyikas call this function as samsargamaryādā.

Abhinavagupta in his Locana refers to Tatparya as accepted by some Naiyāyikas as a separate vṛtti in the context of Abhihitānayavādā while explaining the syntactic unity of a sentence. He speaks of four distinct functions of a word, Abhidhā, Tatparya, Lakṣaṇā, Vyaṇjanā and arranges them under
four separate classes. In a sentence the individual words by their primary function, Abhidhā refer only to the isolated word-meanings. The syntactic relation of the words is conveyed by the Tatparyāsakti of words. The intention of the speaker gives a unified purposeful meaning of a sentence. Hence the words are considered to have the power to convey the syntactic relation among the various isolated word-meanings. Ānandavardhana also refers to the importance of the speaker’s intention in conveying the meaning of a sentence. But he does not accept Tatparya as a separate vṛtti.

Bhoja (1050 A.D) in his Śrṅgāraprakāśa treats Tatparya in a unique way. He has used the word in the general sense of the total meaning and divides it into three types, abhidhiya-mānavačya (expressed), pratiyamāna (implied) and dhvanirūpa (suggested). Bhoja does not accept both the theories of Abhihitānvyaya and Anvitarhīdāna but prefers a third view according to which the word convey the sentence meaning by their cumulative effect (saṁhatyakārita). In this regard he seems to follow Jayantabhaṭṭa who in his NM advocates this view by attributing the cumulative effect to the Tatparya sakti of words.

Dhanika in his commentary on Daśarūpaka on Dhanañjaya also treats Tatparya as a separate vṛtti. According to him Dhvani could be included in Tatparya and it is not necessary to recognise independent function called dhvanī. He refutes
the ghaṭapradīpānaṇa given by Ānandavardhana to explain the relationship between the expressed and the suggested meaning, since the two senses are not as distinct as the the pot and the lamp. The relation between kāvyā and rasa is vācyavācaka or lakṣyalaksaka. There can be no limitation of the term Tatparya to the expressed sense. It can also include the whole range of the speaker’s intention and cover all implications coming in the trend of the expressed sense.

Mammaṭa in his KP refers to the Tatparya as a separate vṛtti for conveying the syntactic relationship among the various word-meanings according to the Abhihitānvaya theory. We will discuss them in detail in the context of Abhihitānvayavāda.

Viśvanātha in his SD repeats the same idea and refers to Tatparyavṛtti as accepted by the Abhihitānvaya theorist. It is the sentence as a whole that conveys the Tatparyārtha and so the power of Tatparya must rest with the sentence as a whole. Many of the later rhetoricians have also refer to Tatparyavṛtti mainly on the basis of the statement of Abhinava and Mammaṭa.

It is interesting to note that Jayantabhaṭṭa (10th century A.D.) in his NM was the first to bring forward the theory of Tatparya as a separate vṛtti. According to him the words in a sentence express their isolated word-meanings by the power of Abhidhā but the mutual relationship among the word-meanings is
indicated by Tatparyaśakti. The function of Tatparyaśakti is to reveal the meaning of words contained in a sentence as being mutually related. This power belongs to all the words generally and lasts till the intended meaning is finally produced.  

The Tatparyavrtti of the Prācīna school of Nyāya philosophy is the same as the saṁsargamaryādā of the Navya-Nyāya school. In the words of S. Kuppuswami Sastrī:

The additional element conveyed by a sentence, over and above the separate concepts conveyed by separate words, is the intended relation of the concept (padārthasaṁsarga) and this additional element, which is the distinctive feature of a verbal judgement (vākyārtha), is conveyed through the particular juxtaposition of words (saṁsargamaryādā) and not through a primary or secondary significative power of words, (abhidhā or laksanā).

II. 8 Abhihitānavaya Theory

The abhihitānava theory advocated by the Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas does include the concept of Tatparya and as treated by poeticians particularly Mammaṭa it does not need some elaboration here. According to this theory the meaning of a sentence is a concatenation of the
individual entities expressed by the words. The individual words have in themselves a meaning which can be comprehended separately. On hearing a sentence, we first an understanding of the separate meanings of the words one after the other. Then we put together these meanings according to the three factors: अकान्त्या, योजयता and सन्निधि and as a result, get the meaning of the sentence.

As shown above, Abhinavagupta accepts Jayanta's modified form of Abhihitānvaya theory, not that of the Bhatta Mimāṃsakas. The Abhihitānvaya theory though primarily propounded by the Mimāṃsakas is also accepted by the Naiyāyikas. It is a fact that early Naiyāyikas like Gautama and Vātsyāyana have not discussed the problem of the sentence. They have discussed only the exact import of a word. But they believe that the sentence is only a collection of words, and the sentence-meaning is only the mutual association of the word-meanings. After discussing in detail the various theories about śabdabodha held by various schools, Jayanta, perhaps for the first time, advocates a modifies form of the theory.

Mamata in the second ullāsa of his KP presents the theory of वाक्यार्थम पूर्ववत् upheld by the Abhihitānvayavādins as follows:

तत्त्वयर्यधिकिर कैषुचित्त। इ।
आकांक्षायांत्यान्तरान्तरान्तरात् शिवश्वेतमाणास्त्रयाणां पक्षार्थानां
समन्वये तत्त्वयर्यधिकि विशाववयवस्तुधार्यि नाल्याधि
कमुन्दमतीत्यभिधितान्त्यवादिनां नन्दन्।
From the above presentation itself it is not very clear who, in fact are intended by the term 'abhīhitānvyavādins'. Since the theory of Abhihītānvyaya is advocated by both the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas it becomes difficult to decide whose view Māmata is referring to. The subtle difference however is this: according to this concept the individual words of a sentence would denote only universals and it is through their anvaya that one gets the vākyārtha which, of necessity, must refer to particulars. The distinction between the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā theory of Abhihītānvyayavāda is that while Naiyāyikas believe this anvaya as a result of Tātparyavṛtti, the Mīmāṃsakas believe it to be of laksanāvṛtti. Among the commentators of Māmata's KP both ancient and modern there is a lot of controversy about whose abhihītānvyayavāda Māmata refers to. A host of commentators seem to believe that Māmata accepts the view of Naiyāyikas and 'keśucit' means Naiyāyikas. Many modern commentators like P.V.Kane, G.N.Jha believe that by the word 'keśucit' Māmata is referring to Mīmāṃsakas since the theory of abhihītānvyaya was so popular and prevalent among the ancient Mīmāṃsakas. However, the word Tātparyārtho'pi in kārika II.6. quoted above the presence of Tātparyya itself clarifies Māmata's position and shows without doubt that he follows Nyāya and not Mīmāṃsā, because Tātparyya is a Nyāya term.
Thus Mammaṭa seems to present the Abhīhitānvayavāda mainly of Jayantabhaṭṭa, a prominent representative of the Prācīna school of Nyāya philosophy, who has given a status of vṛtti to tātparya and who considers tātparyārtha as vākyārtha. The facts that both the authors belong to the same age and hail from the same region also goes to corroborate this inference.
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