CHAPTER VII

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In the preceding chapters some aspects of the influence of Nyāya philosophy have been analysed in general. In some cases we have tried to particularise the influence of particular Nyāyāyikas or their works on the basis of the quotations or some similarity wherever the fact is very clear. When we are not clear we have discussed them as generally under the influence of Nyāyasāstra. Here, in this chapter we particularly make an attempt to trace the influence of Buddhist logic on Sanskrit poetics.

While considering the influence of Buddhist logic on Poetics the first question arises: who among the poeticians are actually Buddhists. There are no concrete historical evidences on the basis of which poeticians can be determined as Buddhists. Therefore different scholars have come forward with differing claims and conjectures. If some say that the famous poeticians like Bhāma and Diśāga etc. are Buddhists and belong to the tradition of Buddhist poeticians, there are other scholars who do not accept this view. However, one has to admit the fact that there is definitely some, at least partial influence of Buddhist philosophy and Buddhist logic on many of the Sanskrit poeticians.
In the development of Sanskrit poetics not only the Hindus but Buddhists have also made important contribution. So in Sanskrit poetics we find different traditions or systems such as Buddhist tradition of Sanskrit poetics. The Brahminic tradition of Sanskrit poetics is well-known and makers of this system are mainly Brahmins, the followers of Hindu religion and philosophy. They are, to mention a few, Bharata, Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Kuntaka and many others. Similarly, the poetics like Bhāmaha, Suddhodani, Dharmakīrti, Medhāvin, Śilameghavarma, Saṅgharakṣita etc., are said to be the poeticians of Buddhist tradition. But it is unfortunate that the works of most of these poeticians are not available; they are completely lost to the posterity. Except the first one they are known only from the references made to them by other poeticians. It is not possible to make proper study of these writers in the absence of their works. We shall have, therefore, to satisfy ourselves only with a broad survey - study of some important Buddhist poetic concepts woven in the fabrics of the general system of Sanskrit poetics.

VII.1 Bhāmaha

Bhāmaha, the author of KA is one of such authors. As the oldest extant poeticians after Bharata, he occupies a place of prominence in the history of Sanskrit poetics. He first laid down normative rules of Alankāras and started
the Alahkāra school. He is not only a poetician but a great philosopher theorist also. He said to be influenced by the Buddhist logic as set out by Vasubandhu and Diṅnāga. Of all the poeticians Bhamaha seems to be the foremost to accept the viewpoints set forth in the Buddhist logic. Prof. K. Krishnamoorthy makes some arguments in support of this supposition. We summarise them here as follows:

1. Bhamaha begins KA with a salutation to one who is given exclusive epithet 'sārva' and 'sārvajña'. Later we see him deriving both the words 'sārva' and 'sārvajña' from 'sārva' in the sense of doing good to others by adding the affix 'sam' as mentioned by Kātyāyana in his Vārttika. Though according to Amarakośa 'sārva' can denote both Śiva and Buddha equally, the compassionate quality of working for the well of the entire world is Buddha's exclusive epithet. Prajñākaragupta's salutation to Buddha in his Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣya makes it clear as:

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प्रमाणभाष्य नगदेखितं निमोश्चनेन
प्रज्ञा कश्च शास्त्रेऽवमत्य तापिने ।
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It is further proved by the following verse of the Maṅgala in praise of Buddha cited by Śridharaḍāsa in his Sādūktikaranaṃpta:

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वाक्रश्य नासुभुजसिपुनि वाचमुशयो
यद्विगः सक्षमं हि सुकृतिनामिव रमने ।
स शास्त्रं सर्वस्य पारंपरिवर्तेन कुलपरं
जिनां जनत्तुन २यं मयं भवावर्तितान् ॥
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Here both the epithets in question are exclusively applied to Buddha in close succession. Taking into consideration this view we can say that Bhamaha pays homage to Buddha as he was a Buddhist poetician.

2. Bhamaha devotes almost the whole of the fifth chapter of the KA to a detailed discussion of the rules of pramāṇas viz., pratyakṣa and anumāna. The whole account is modelled after the Buddhist logic of Diṅnāga. It is generally admitted that the acceptance of only two pramāṇas is an innovation first introduced only by Diṅnāga. There are only two pramāṇas accepted in Sauntrantic thought initiated by Diṅnāga and extended further by the followers such as Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. Bhamaha cites them from Diṅnāga himself almost verbatim.

Diṅnāga and his successors admit only two pramāṇas, because reality as apprehended is itself only two-fold viz, svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa. The former is the subject of only bare sensation or perception and the latter which involves names and forms having universal application is experienced only because of inference. This is also another point proving Bhamaha's greater affinity for the views of Buddhist logic.
3. Dīnāgā's definition of perception as kalpanāpādham is also cited verbatim by Bhāmaha in the same place of his work i.e. V. 6a. Immediately on the heels of it he follows the view of Vasubandhu indicated by the first two words of his definition viz., tato'rtthā the other words left out being 'rupādesta evetiñhānyatah'. Vasubandhu was out and out a Vijnānavāda holding (reality only subjective in samādhi (sense). Pratyakṣa, according to this view, becomes the real subjective experience, arising from the internal sensation of external things. (Again, Bhāmaha explains the idea of kalpana in Dīnāgā's own words viz., nāmajātyādi etc.

कल्याणं नामजात्यादियो जनां प्रति जातनेन् || (KA. V. 64)

4. Bhāmaha illustrates hetuvirādhiṇiprajñā with two statements, one, from Vedānta and other from Sāṁkhya. Ātman exists (asti ātma) is the position of Vedānta and prakṛti exists (asti prakṛtiḥ) is the position of Sāṁkhya. Bhāmaha says that in both the above statements subject(dharmi) of the proposition is unestablished and as such what is predicated of an unestablished subject also becomes unestablished. This makes it likely that Bhāmaha is following possibly the anātmaṇvāda Buddhist logical tradition.

5. Bhāmaha is seen rejecting the Buddhist doctrine of Apoha as constituting the essence of all word-meaning.
It should be noted that *apohavāda* is a distinctive feature of Dīnāgā's logic. In earlier Buddhist texts we do not find any reference to it. Bhāmaha ridicules this doctrine by stating that if the 'gauh' were to mean no positive cow but only exclusive of all others than cow (agotapratisēdha) it would became incumbent on the listener to seek out another word to be aware positively of the cow as such. One and the same word cannot denote both positive and negative entities simultaneously. According to Bhāmaha it is natural to think that the positive meaning should precede the negative exclusion. This refutation indirectly proves Bhāmaha's deep knowledge of Buddhist logic and reveals independence of his mind.

6. Bhāmaha's incidental remarks as a literary theorist evoked a detailed notice and rebuttal at the hands of professional philosophers like Śāntaraksita who were adherents of the Dīnāgā's logic developed by Dharmakīrtī. In the *Tattvasaṅgraha* Bhāmaha is expressly names and his criticisms of *apohavāda* are answered at considerable length by Śāntaraksita. This shows that though Bhāmaha was a poetician his views were considered seriously in the Buddhist philosophical tradition. This could not have been the case, if Bhāmaha were considered as belonging to a non-Buddhist poetic tradition.

7. The Buddhist philosophers do not accept soul as an independent entity and therefore they are known as
anātma
dins. Bhamaha, like Buddhists, does not accept any soul element in poetry also while analysing the poetic elements. Bhamaha seems therefore to be revealing a strong influence of the Buddhist tradition of logic which advocated the theory of anātma
dā.

8. Bhamaha himself admits in his work that his father's name was Rukrila Gomin. This name sounds much nearer to other Buddhistic names like Rahula, Somila, Potrila etc. Apart from this, Gomin is one of the prominent disciples of Lord Budhha. Therefore, this particular name also indicates the possibility of Bhamaha being a Buddhist. Secondly, the name of Bhamaha's son, according to M.Krishyamacarya, is probably Maskari. This is name also confirms his being a Buddhist.

As far as our study goes Prof. Krishnamoorthy is absolutely right in viewing Bhamaha as a Buddhist Logician.

VII.2 Šaṅkuka

As far as the influence of Buddhist logic is concerned we cannot neglect Šaṅkuka, a figure of great prominence. There is no doubt that the Rasa-theory of Šaṅkuka has been developed upon the back-ground of the Nyāya theory of Anumāna. But the question arises: what is that logical system under the influence of which he has postulated his Rasānumitivāda. Since Šaṅkuka
does not leave for us any direct clue, and since Śaṅkukā flourishes during a period of transition when prācina Nyāya was at its peak, Buddhist logic was in full swing and the back-ground for Navya-Nyāya was beginning to be prepared, it is difficult to get a correct answer. However, there are some indications in Abhinava’s presentation of his views that points to a possibility of his learnings towards the Buddhist system of logic.

1. According to Śaṅkukā Rasa is the latent emotion (sthāyibhāva) imitated by the actor. Rasa originally does not reside in the actor. But the spectators consider him as Rāma. In fact there is no real presence of Rasa in the actor but the spectator thinks him as Rāma by means of citraturaganyāya. He, therefore, gets involved with it and thinks Nāṭa’s happiness, miseries etc. as those of the character (Rāma). According to the spectators this knowledge is different from all the four types of knowledge viz., samyakjñāna, mithyājñāna, saṁsrayajñāna and sādāyajñāna. Śaṅkukā admits this fact and therefore the question occurs to him how is it that the spectators experience happiness on the basis of false knowledge. To put it into technical language how false knowledge leads to arthkriyā (practical behaviour). To serve this problem, Śaṅkukā follows Dharmakīrti and quotes the following kārikā from his PV.
2. The Citraturaganyāya employed by Śaṅkuka to explain his theory is the special feature of Buddhist logic. As rajaḥsarpanyāya has been used by the Vedāntins to illustrate their theory of superimposition so also Buddhist logicians apply Citraturaganyāya to elucidate their theory of illusion. Unlike Hindu Naiyāyikas Buddhists do not admit sāmānyā as a special category. But they consider it as a non-existence (abhāvarūpa).

According to Naiyāyikas, sāmānyā is defined as nityatve sati anekasamavetavatvam. The nature of sāmānyā is ekākarapratiti, cognition of oneness of form in various individuals e.g., the realisation of potness in various pots. According to them, sāmānyā is independent and internal category but Buddhists do not admit this sāmānyā as a separate category. It is only of the nature of sāmānyā. The non-difference which is experience among the different ghataḥ is due to the function of the spectator's sight. The truth-seeker finds difference among them. The Buddhists give an example of citradarśana (picture scene) to show how a person finds identity between two different objects. The observer of a picture finds identity between two different objects viz., the original ghata and the painted ghata. Buddhist Vājñānavādins are of the view that anything either gauḥ or ghataḥ or
turaga in a picture is an upādhi (adjunct) of vijñāna. Since the lines, colour etc., of a painted pot seem to be non-difference from a real pot, one is not able to differentiate it. But to a wise person the difference is clarrly visible. Dharmakīrti has illustrated the nature of this nyāya in his PV.

Dharmakīrti
dharmakīrti-viññāna
dharmakīrti

3. While Bhaṭṭa Tauta, the teacher of Abhinavagupta refutes the Rasa-theory of Śaṅkuka, he seems to consider him as a Buddhist. A number of evidences are available in the ABh. Bhaṭṭa Tatta gives four alternatives for the refutation of the theory of initiation (anukaraṇa-vāda).

Among them one is of vyākhyātrānyaya. By saying: oṣṭasaṃśaya:
vikṣiptaviśeṣa. He is quoting from Dharmakīrti.

The text of Dharmakīrti runs thus:

Dharmakīrti

While discussing the sāmānya Dharmakīrti considers it from two points of view, one vyavaharā puruṣa and other vyākhyātā. In the same way Bhaṭṭa Tauta refutes from four points of view viz., sāmājika, naṭa, vyākhyātā
and Bharata. Tauta's statement implies that even if Śāṅkuka follows the *sidhānta* of Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti, *rasa* cannot be prove as *anukaranaṇa.*

5. In the refutation of Śāṅkuka's view one line seems to be significant: "नरकाणिर्देशः य रामो यमिति सत्त्वो नाना प्रतिपुनिषेत् । नान्यत रामत्वः समाय सूपित्स यावत्मः ।" (Abh., P. 249).

Bhaṭṭa Tauta argues here that if Śāṅkuka's argument is accepted then different actors on different stages will have to be considered as 'ramo'yam' and therefore the rāmatva in the form of a universal (sāmānyā) will have to be unavoidably admitted. The implication of the words rāmatvam sāmānyarūpamityāyātam is that Śāṅkuka does not and cannot admit sāmānyā which is the position of the Buddhist logician. Tauta thus indirectly indicates to Śāṅkuka being a Buddhist thinker.

6. Lollāṭa accepts *rasa* to be the *upacita-sthāyī* existing in the poetic character. Thus he admits two conditions viz., the *upacita* (accumulated) and *anupacita* (unaccumulated) of *sthāyi* (permanent emotion). While refuting this Śāṅkuka holds that the *anupacita* condition cannot be apprehended because in that condition there is no conjunction of *vibhāvādi* with *sthāyi.* When the conjunction takes place, that condition turns into the state of *upacita.* *Vibhāvādi* happen to be the *liṅga* indicating the state of *bhāva.* In the *anupacita* state when there are not any *vibhāvādi,* the knowledge of *sthāyi* cannot arise in the absence of the *liṅgas.*
This argument of Śaṅkuka seems to be having relation with the Buddhist doctrine. Buddhist philosophers admit only two pramāṇas - pratyakṣa and anumāṇa. The anupacita state which Lollatā admits as sthāyi cannot be perceived as it is internal bhāvātmaka and there cannot be any inference of it without vibhāvādi which act as ātingas. There is no other pramāṇa to prove this state. Thus the argument of Śaṅkuka gives an indication of his Buddhist background.

7. The Vījñānavādin Buddhist philosophers do not admit the existence of any other object except Buddha or jñāna. Dharmakīrti says that there is no difference between blue colour and the knowledge of the blue colour. The external objects which appears to be different from knowledge is an illusion and just an appearance of jñāna itself. The nilātmaka knowledge itself takes place as the external blue object which appear to be existing. According to Dharmakīrti arthasārūpya is the means of knowledge. The existence of nīla is inferred on the basis of nīlasārūpya or arthasārūpya.  

Similarly the person who admits the existence of external objects admit bhāva or artha as the producer of jñāna.  

So according to them jñāna precedes bhāva and according to vījñānavādins, bhāva precedes jñāna. Thus there are two types of vījñāna, vyavahārabuddhi and tāttvikabuddhi. As per the vyavahārabuddhi, bhāva precedes jñāna and
according to the tattvikabuddhi, jñāna precedes bhāva. Now, while Bharata in the sixth chapter of NS raises a question whether bhāva arises from rasa or rasa arises from bhāva, he gives the following answer keeping its critics in view.

In this connection the criticism of Śaṅkuka seems to be based on the Buddhist ideas. He admits the production of bhāvas from rasa as is clear from the following:

Śaṅkuka admits that first of all the sāmājika experiences the anukriyamāna rasa in anukartā and after that the knowledge of bhāva in relation with anukārya. Therefore, from the point of view of sāmājika, abhāva arises from rasa, while from the vyavahāra or laukika point of view it is said that rasa arises out of perception of bhāva (which is called prakṛti in the above statement).

Here, two points appear to be similar with the Buddhist thoughts. One is the discussion of the relation of rasa
and bhāva from the vyāvahārika and Laukika point of view as well as from that of vyākhyāta and śloka and other is the acceptability of rasa in the form of knowledge as the producer of bhāvas. Further, Śaṅkuka's thesis of janya-janaka is nothing but vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka nature as it known from the statement of Dharmottarācārya

8. While Bhaṭṭa Tauta refutes the anukaraṇavāda of Śaṅkuka from the point of view of vastuvṛttā, vivecaka and vyākhyāta he has almost definitely kept in view the Buddhist thoughts. In the experience of sāmānya while vyavahartā observes identity vivecaka observes difference. Similar is the case with the perception of a picture sāmājika does not make any difference between nāta and Rāma it is the vivecaka who finds a difference there. Keeping this in view Tauta says:

Sāmājika cannot concentrate on the vāstutasātvā because of his deep involvement with the realisation of rasa. Here Bhaṭṭa Tauta presents his view of vastutasātvā in the light of the ideas of Dharmakīrti.

9. The terms and language used by Śaṅkuka also give an indication of the influence of Buddhist logic. The terms like samyakjñāna which is used by the philosophers like Dharmakīrti with a specific meaning in the place of
yathārthajñāna in the age when Śaṅkūya flourished and Buddhist logic was in its full swing definitely bear some significance. All these arguments prove that Śaṅkūya's rasa theory has deep relation with the philosophy of Dharmakīrti.

VII.3 Ānandavardhana

1. Ānandavardhana in his Dharma shows evidences of his close acquaintance with the works of Dharmakīrti, the great Buddhist logician. His following stanza:

\[ \text{yatraṛṣṭ daredābhādi jatāḥ saṃvādā nivartet \text{ (PV. II.33)} } \]

has close connection with the following stanza:

\[ \text{yat saṃśaya samādhiyati jante saṃvādā nivartet \text{ (PV. III.91)} } \]

2. Ānandavardhana refers to the kṛtrimsaṃbandhavādīnāḥ (scholars who accept a conventional relation) between words and their senses. Here, the Buddhist logicians must have been meant along with other Naiyāyikas.

Abhinava in his Locana also refers to PV.III.91, which may be taken as an evidence. He quotes the kārikā in full in a separate context. Abhinava in his Locana refers to another verse attributed to Dharmakīrti by Ānandavardhana himself. They are as follows:
The former verse is said to belong to the concluding portion of *Nyāyavinīśayavṛtti* of Dharmakīrti. 21

3. Ānandavardhana employs the terms like 'nāntariyaka' which are familiar in the Buddhist parlance. 22

4. He is reported to have written a commentary on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti also. 23

VII.4 Mahimabhaṭṭa

Buddhist logic seems to have exercised a profound influence on Mahimabhaṭṭa. The following points make it clear:

1. Mahimabhaṭṭa has cited following four verses from the PV of Dharmakīrti:
2. Ruyyaka, the commentator identifies the following quotation of Mahimabhaṭṭa

यदकं न-न्त्यया न शाब्दपुनरस्तः पूर्वकमात्ययम अर्धपुन-रसकते नैव अगत्यस्वरूपः। न विद्याधिकृते शाब्द-वाक्यश्चिदपि कालिकायः। यथा—

उदस्ति उदस्ति स्वामिनिगुरुः सर्व-प्राप्तिः वेदिति।

द्वारिकाकालिकों कार्यं यन्त्रं प्राप्त्यति स्वामिनिः।

(VV, p. 434)

with a passage in the Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti by saying 'yaduktam vādanyāya.'

(VV, p. 190)
3. Bhaṭṭagopāla, the author of Sāhityacudāmaṇi, a commentary on KP describes Mahimabhaṭṭa as an Anumāna theorist following Buddhist tradition.  

4. His concept of vyāpti as involving the relation of either tādātmya or tadutpaṭṭi between hetu and sādhyā is evidently derived from Buddhist logic since it conceives of this dual relationship in vyāpti.

5. Ruyyaka in his commentary on VV often tries to clarify Mahimabhaṭṭa's position on the basis of Buddhist principles. Commenting on Mahimabhaṭṭa's inclusion of Laksanā as Anumāna, Ruyyaka points out that though Buddhists accept laksanā as arthavyāpāra it should actually be considered Anumāna. He thereby suggests that Mahimabhaṭṭa subscribed to Buddhist standpoint in such matters. Similarly on Mahimabhaṭṭa's comment that pain is a specific form of experience, Ruyyaka observes that this has been stated by Mahimabhaṭṭa as per Buddhististic principles.

6. When Mahimabhaṭṭa points out that from the line 'mohantu harervihārangamo haṇtu' we cognise a particular type of bird characterised by the class characteristic Garudatva. The commentary explains the point that Garudatva is reckoned as a class characteristic as per Buddhististic principles according to which Garudas are many.
Mahimabhatta cites an anonymous passage which accepts only two pramanas viz., pratyaksa and anumana. Apparently this is a quotation from some Buddhistic work, since Buddhist logic accepts only two pramanas. It is true that Vaiśeṣika philosophers also accept only two pramanas but in view of the many other references to Buddhism in VV, the above passage is also probably from some Buddhist source.

VII.5 Trairūpyahetuvāda

(theory advocating the three characteristics of a valid reason)

In Indian logic, the theory of three characteristics of a valid reason or a sadhetu is an important theory. Logicians, from the very beginning, have tried to define the characteristic of a valid reason or a sadhetu and to show how many characteristics exactly a sadhetu should have. In this connection, traipūpyavāda and pañcarūpyavāda have been developed. According to Buddhists, a sadhetu is that which possesses all the three characteristics viz., pervasive presence of the hetu in the pakṣa(pakṣasattva), the necessary presence of the hetu in some similar instances (sapakṣasattva) and the pervasive absence of the hetu from dissimilar instances(vipakṣasattva).

These are the basic tenets for the Buddhists concerning the test of validity or invalidity of a hetu.
In the absence of the three characteristics outlined above the hetu will suffer from the fallacies like asiddha, anaikantika and viruddha respectively.

A lot of controversy has been created with regard to the trairūpyavāda of hetu. In the history of Indian logic we find two interpretations of the concept of trairūpya, one in Prasastapāda and the other in Diṅnāga. Prasastapāda points out that 1. what is conjoined with sādhya and 2. has been found in what possesses it, and 3. is always absent in the absence of sādhya, is linga which brings about inference. What differs from this is one or two aspects is lacking of the mark, being either contradictory, untrue or inconclusive. This view is very close to that of Diṅnāga. In the Pramanāsamaucaya he defines trairūpya as 'anumeye' tha tat-tulye sadbhāvo nāstita'sati'. This means the presence of hetu in the paksā, its presence again in sapakṣa like mahanasa and its absence in vipakṣa like jalāhrīḍa is later modified in the Nyāyabindu by Dharmakīrti as follows:

\[ \text{श्रेणीवचम् पुनःतिकुर्मयाने सत्वमेव, सपक्षे एव सत्वम् असपक्षे चास्तवमेव निनित्यतम्} \] (Nyāyabindu II.5)

Stcherbatsky remarks: 30

The relation of the logical Reason to the substratum of the inference, on the one side, and to the similar and dissimilar cases; on the other side, is expressed in the three rules
of Vasubandhu, which have been endorsed by Dignāga (sic) and Dharmakīrti. They constitute the celebrated Three Aspects of the logical reason as taught by the Buddhists and rejected by all other schools of Indian logicians except the reformed Vaiśeṣikas.

It needs to be specially mentioned here that this trairūpyavāda of hetu is a special theory of Buddhist logic. On the other hand, Hindu Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers add two more characteristics for distinguishing a sadhetu from an asadhetu i.e. asatpratipakṣatva and abādhitatva. Thus they advocate pañcarūpyavāda of hetu. By enumerating the five-fold hetvābhāsas Gautama indicates that a real hetu must possess five characteristics (pañcarūpa) in default of any of which it becomes a hetvābhāsa.

With this background while studying Sanskrit poetics we observe that some of the poeticians who have entered upon some kind of discussion relating to the theory of anumāna have almost always referred to trairūpya of hetu. They have also pointed out that the invalidity of a hetu arises from the absence of any of these three characteristics resulting in the hetvābhāsas like anaikāntika etc.

Obviously, the trairūpya hetu was sufficient for establishing the validity of a hetu. The remaining
two of the pañcarūpa tradition of prācīna Naiyāyikas were redundant. This was soon realised by the brahminical logician also who were flexible enough to modify their views on this point. As Udayanācārya shows doubt about the pañcarūpattva of a valid hetu, it was obvious that neo-logician would adopt trirūpatva only.

Bhamaha was the earliest poetician and the first to accept the trirūpa hetu under the influence of Buddhist philosophers. Later poeticians had only to follow the appropriate example of their staunch ancestor, as it can be seen from the following verses:

1. त्रिरूपाः केवल विन्दुपाट्यां तत्र केवल ॥ कप. V.111.
2. त्रिरूपाः केवल पालकाथां साधनमिति ॥ यज्ञप. 67.
3. अबिदं त्रिरूपाः केवल साधनमिति ॥ इदं प. 81.
4. प्रकृतिविद्वाधिकृतवेव त्रिस्पर्शाः साधनं ॥ कप. 182.
5. तथावति - अनुमतोऽन्मुच्य मुलकस्वात्निकुटिभागनितोऽन्मुच्य पदम् ॥ सदि. p. 165.

Thus, ultimately it was the Buddhist principle of the trairūpya of hetu that proved more efficient and was accepted both in poeticians and logician tradition.
Thus Buddhist Logic, "a system of logic and epistemology created in India in VI-VII century A.D. by the two great lustres of Buddhist science, the Master Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti" has left remarkable influence on Sanskrit poetics. In the broad field of Indian Logic Buddhist Logic constitutes an intermediate state and was developed in a spirit of a decisive opposition to the logic of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. It lasted for about three centuries and constituted an intermezzo after which Indian Logic continued its historical life in India in the absence of any Buddhist opposition. After the disappearance of Buddhist Logic new school of Nyāya concentrated all their attention on the problems of syllogism and was chiefly engaged in finding new and exceedingly subtle definitions of every detail of the syllogistic process.

Hence it is easy to infer that the poetsicians who mainly flourished during the period when the high tide of the Buddhist Logic was continuing in India, have come under the influence of Buddhist logic. Even if many of the rhetoricians were brahmans and followers of Hindu religion, still they, when the occasion arises, unhesitatingly quoted kārikas from the classics of Buddhist logic in support of their contention and used definitions and terminology adopted by the Buddhist
logicians. It is clear that the system of Buddhist logic was very influential, pre-dominant and the propounders of the system like Dhīnāga and Dharmakīrti had made great contributions and the author of Alāṅkāra-śāstra were much influenced by it. Prof. Anantala Thakur remarks:

It (Sanskrit poetics) has many things in common with the Buddhist philosophers - the relation between the words and their import being one such important topic. Buddhist philosophers have written works like Šabarthaṭacintāmāni. The Buddhist definitions in almost all the cases were precise and their terminology very rich and all-embracing. Moreover, Kashmir was the land where Alāṅkāraśāstra thrived more than anywhere else. It was Kashmir where Buddhist Logic and philosophy also flourished a bit earlier and formed an important item in the curriculum. Hence it is but natural that the rhetoricians should take recourse to the Buddhist means and methods of thought and quote from Buddhist works whenever they were found useful. It may be added in this context that Brahminical logic for a time was overshadowed by its Buddhist counterpart to be revived subsequently by scholars like Vācaspati Miśra and others. But the Buddhistic elements
made a permanent impression on the Alakāraśāstra in its hey days.

During the period of development of Navya-Nyāya the poeticians were attracted towards this new system of logic with its new style and methods. The influence of various kinds, which we have observed in previous chapters on Sanskrit poeticians and their works, are purely of Navya-Naiyāyikas. Buddhist logic was almost non-existent then and it had nothing to influence the poeticians of this later period. It was only in the initial stages of Sanskrit poetics that we observe the clear influence of Buddhist logic on authors from Bhāmaha to Śaṅkuka, Tauta, Mahimabhaṭṭa and their contemporaries. In the later stages only those concepts of Buddhist logic (like Trairūpya) which were already assimilated in the main stream of Indian logic remained.
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4. हितप्रकारणे औषधि सर्वशिवाय प्रज्वलने | तन्त्रविद्या यथा सार्व: सर्वेऽहः इवविधः ||

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   यथा नौकादुर्धास्मानं नौकादर्शस्य तद्यथा सार्थकं सार्थकमाकार द्रष्याभासं द्रष्यप्रयिक्यते।
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