CHAPTER VI

NYĀYA METHODOLOGY

AND

SANSKRIT POETICS
The present chapter makes an attempt to show how
the poeticians have employed the Nyāya methods, style
and language in their works.

VI.1 Nyāyasāstra as Vādaśāstra

Nyāyasāstra is mainly a Vādaśāstra. It is specially
a science of methods. The Nyāyasūtra of Gautama (c.100 A.D.)
are devoted to the methods of argumentation, disputation
and dialectics. Out of the sixteen padārthas enumerated
by Gautama all, except the prameya (object of valid
knowledge) are directly related to the method of disputation.

Kathā

In the NyS Gautama uses the term kathā for debate.
He says kathā is of three types: Vāda, Jalpa and Vitandā.

VāDA consists in the putting forward of statements
by two parties, paksā and pratipaksā, in which there
is the procedure of establishing and confuting by means
of pramāṇas (proofs) and tarka(hypothetical reasoning),
neither of which is quite opposed to the main thesis
(siddhānta) and both of which are conducted in accordance
with the method of reasoning. Vāda basically meant for
the discernment of truth or the real nature of the thing
under investigation and imparting the truth to the other party. Hence, in Vāda there is no consideration of victory or defeat.

**JALPA** possesses the above characteristics of Vāda. Moreover, it establishes or confuts the statement by means of Chala (quibble), Jāti (futile rejoinder) and Nigrahasthānas (grounds of defeat). In Jālpa, the procedure is similar to that of Vāda, but the aim is to establish one’s own position by defeating the opponent.

**VITANDĀ** (wrangling) is a kind of disputation when there is no establishing of the counter-view. The Vaitāndika does not care to establish his point, but keeps on criticising and condemning the proofs employed by the other party. Vaitāndika confines himself to merely criticising the opponent’s view. The Vārttika defines Vitandā as criticism only (dūsanamātram vitandā).

Gautama emphasises the role of Jālpa and Vitandā in theoretical discussions. Some people transgress all bounds of reasoning through excessive partiality for their own theories. In that case one should be practical and employ Jālpa and Vitandā for the purpose of protecting one’s own determination regarding the real nature of things, just as the hedge of thorns is put up for the protection of sprouting seeds.
A जलपावादिन aims at parapakṣadūṣanā as well as svapakṣasādhanā; a वितंदावादिन is merely concerned with parapakṣadūṣanā and does not care for svapakṣasādhanā.

Vāda is carried on with the person who is willing to learn or to impart knowledge, while Jalpa and Vitanda are carried on with persons who are perverse in their ignorance and too proud to learn. Thus, whereas Vāda aims at the ascertainment of truth, Jalpa aims at the establishing of a counter-thesis, and in Vitanda even this is absent.

VI.2 Devices of Debata

Chala, Jāti and Nigrahasthānas are auxiliaries to Vāda, Jalpa and Vitanda. These devices can never themselves be the direct means in supporting or establishing a thesis but only in condemning they can independently serve as such. Gautama defines Chala as विचारस्यार्थविचल्याय-प्रपेक्षासमार्थम्। It consists in opposing a proposition by assigning to it a meaning other than the intended one. It is of three kinds: vāk-chala (verbal quibble), sāmānya-chala (generalising quibble) and upacāra-chala (figurative quibble).

Jāti is defined by Gautama as:
साधुस्यं विचार्यायं प्रत्यक्षस्यां आत्मिः। (NyS. I. 2. 18).

It is a kind of futile objection. It is of twenty four kinds such as utkarsasama, apakarsasama etc.
Apart from this, Gautama has also enumerated the methods of debate like *Tarka* etc., which are useful in the process of disputation. The successors of Gautama like Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra etc. developed these methods further. Prominent Buddhist dialecticians like Dharmakīrti, Diśnāga etc. also made significant contribution in their development. This methodology reached its climax in the period of Navya-Nyāya.

Prof. Solomon remarks:

Navya-Nyāya evolved a new method and gave different turn to the growth of dialectics.

Originally these methods developed as dialectics or oral debates. But then they were also employed in written works. Thus, the style of a Sanskrit polemical work was often assumed the tone of an oral or verbal debate. The scholars have structured their arguments even in their written works just as one would be involved in a practical debate and argue with his opponents, refute the opponents' proposition and establish his own thesis. This has resulted into the arguments developing as the discussion of pūrvapakṣa and uttarapakṣa or siddhāntapakṣa. This methodology was so appealing that all the śāstras in Sanskrit have almost spontaneously adopted it and shaped their own thoughts in a dialectical form instead of descriptive or commentatorial presentation.
The Nyāya influence in their style is a foregone conclusion. Naiyāyikas took a leading role in transforming the descriptive style of prakaraṇa works into a dialectical one. Navya-Naiyāyikas wrote their works entirely in this new methodology of dialectics. Hence the works like Tattvacintāmani of Gaṅgāśa, works of Raghunātha, Mathurānātha, Jagadīśa, Gadādhara and many others are very rich in dialectical wealth. In fact, they are known as vāda-granthas only. While studying all those Nyāya works one gets confused in deciding the pūrvapaksa and the siddhāntapaksa. But they are identified in some cases by direct mention of the names of the persons or by terms like 'kecit', 'eke', 'apare', 'nanu'... 'iti', 'cet', 'na ca... vācyam, nāpi... and so on and so forth. These expressions to indicate pūrvapaksa have also overflowed into works of other śāstras. We shall see some illustrations from works on Poetics below.

1. परस्यप्रतिष्ठितश्रेयकविकल्पार्थीन वाकारिणा ॥ या परस्यप्रतिष्ठितोपाधिक्षेत्रविशेषप्रायोगिना तद्धिक्षयवृत्तयकार
   निरपेक्ष्यक्षिणीयक्षिणी निरपेक्ष्यक्षिणी निरपेक्ष्यक्षिणी निरपेक्ष्यक्षिणी
   निरपेक्ष्यक्षिणी । वा भवति शैपमेयपमेयते
   पर्यावरणति । (Appaya Dīksita, Citramīmāṁsā, p.199-200)

2. तत्त्रिधमशैपमेययोः प्रमेयात्वेतेन्मेयन्मेयविज्ञानीयविज्ञानीयमेयते यति न ।
   केवला व्यवस्थितहियत्तिरितिः स्त्रोतवादितानि
3. अनुमानसिद्ध। तथा च्याग्रसनक्षाबिधूतिः रसान्ति
पद्यां, आलाच्यां, यथिचयां यथिचयां भिधीतत्त्वां अकल्यानां। न च श्रीनमीलि
रसया गैलब्राडिङ्गश्वयाः चा प्रतियांस्या प्रतियोक्ष्ण
परिकलिताः समाकानौलात्मिकः भिधाया। कन्याने
नासित भ्राम प्रिति बायस्य | साहा-युगायाः सत्तेः
निनामकारणाः | गैलब्राडिङ्गश्यामकारणया। (रज. 1.183).

4. अभी सामाजिका रसानुभवनां, ये ते विशिष्टः
-विद्वातिशिष्टानं ते रसानुभवस्मात। यथा
नासितात्मानान्तरत्वां तास्य चैमें विद्वातिशिष्टाः।
लेकां रसानुभवनां (वैनि)
(Taking up the Anumāna in its variety
sāmānyatodrīta (based on analogy) Viśvesvāra
in his camakāracandrika proves Rasa
syntactically.)
The poeticians like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Vāmana mainly devote their works to formulate the poetic theories of Alaṅkāra, Gunas, Dosa and Riti. Their works are mostly free from dialectical arguments. It is Ānandavardhana who for the first time in Sanskrit poetics employs the dialectical method in his great work Dhau. In the first Uddyota, he presents three views as pūrvapaksa and deals with them logically and even employs terms like 'avyāpti', ativyāpti and asambhava etc. The Dhau may be considered as a good model of dialectical work and his successors have adopted this model. After Ānandavardhana came Mahimabhaṭṭa who in the beginning of his VV declares his aim of refuting dhvani theory, and devotes his entire work for it. Ruuyaka wrote a commentary on VV to show the validity of the dhvani theory. This dialectical argumentations for and against the dhvani theory have continued up to Jagannātha and to some extent even thereafter. The method of dialectics has fascinated the post-Ānandavardhana theorists like Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha, Vidyādhara, Appaya, Jagannātha, Devasaṅkara, Viśveśvara, Yajñēśvara etc., who attempt to attack the loop-holes in the opponent's viewpoints and then established their own theory. This tendency somehow seems to have increased in the period of Jagannātha and thereafter. It is found that the works written by the poeticians in the period of Navya-Nyāya (12th century onwards) and very rich in dialectics.
VI.3 Threefold Objective of the Nyāyaśāstra

Vātsyāyana in his NBh considered three elements to be the main concern of the Nyāyaśāstra. They are: uddeśa (enumeration of the concept), laksana (definition) and parīkṣā (examination). Uddeśa is the mention by name of what is to be enumerated. Laksana is the statement of the distinctive quality which belongs only to the thing defined and to none else. According to Uddyotakara definition is made for demarcating or particularising the objects from others. Tarkadīpikākāra rightly says; व्यावृत्तिभिष्कुलाः वा अभिविश्वयम्य योजनम् (१८,९) It is usually translated as 'definition'. In fact a laksana points out not the thing to be defined but the differential or the particular characteristics possessed by the thing defined alone and which is not common to others. The technique of definition, however, in which the Navya-Naiyāyikas evince such a deep interest, was not clearly developed in the early school. Vātsyāyana states, the purpose of definition is to differentiate an entity from those which does not possess the nature or essence (tattva) of that entity. Thus in so far as the term 'nature' or 'essence' remains vague in meaning, the notion of laksana also remains vague. The new school attempts to avoid the vagueness by specifically mentioning that the purpose of definition is to distinguish the laksya from all entities that are different from it (etara-
Thus, the laksanavakya of the Naiyāyikas shall usually consist of two parts: laksya and laksana.

It is not an easy task to formulate a logical definition, as per the strict rule of the Nyāyaśāstra. A definition according to Nyāyaśāstra should be free from the three defects viz., avyāpti (being too narrow), ativyāpti (being too wide) and asambhava (impossibility). An illustration would make this clear.

If a cow is defined as 'kapilatvam gotvam', the definition suffers from the defect of avyāpti, as all cows that are not kapila (tawny) would be thereby excluded, and only a few number of cows having a tawny colour will be covered by this definition. The definition thus will become too narrow (avyāpta).

Now, if 'paśutvam gotvam' is proposed as a definition of a cow it also will not be correct as the cow undoubtedly possesses paśutva, but paśutva is also found in other animals like horses, buffaloes etc., which are not cows. Thus this laksana will be too wide, possessing the doṣa of ativyāpti.
Ativyāpti implies that the laksana covers the lakṣya completely and in addition extends to other objects.

Again, if 'ekaśaśātyam gotvam' is proposed as a definition of cow it will suffer from the defect of asambhava, as no cow possesses ekaśaśātya (having one hoof) or undivided hoofs. Thus it will lead to the fault of asambhava.

So 'sāśāntādimattvam' (having dew-lap), according to Naiyāyika, is the correct definition of cow as sasna is possessed by a cow only.

Apart from these three defects there are other defects like 1. ātmāśraya 2. anyonyāśraya (itatetarāśraya or parasparāśraya) 3. cakraka 4. aprasiddha which are to be avoided in a definition.

1. Ātmāśraya (self-dependance) is a logical defect and a type of circularity. It takes place whenever we explain a concept by using the same concept in some way or other in our explanation. Nyāya defines it as: स्वप्राप्तज्ञातानिविद्यतांमोक्ष्यः. For example: गृहिणैव तु मनो विद्यते सति गृहिण्यवृत्तिः ज्ञातिसंबंधवे जीविक्षणम्.

Prof. Matilal explains it nicely using modern symbols:
X is self-dependent if X is explained as an object of some cognition which dependent upon a cognition of X (sva-graha-sāpeksa-graha-visayatvam ātmāsrayatvam).

2. Anyonyāśraya is one of the logical defects from which the definition must be free. It is defined as:

\( svaprajna-sapadeva-prajnaprajna-vivekayam-viveka-ratvam \) or

\( parisprajna-sapadeva-prajna-ratvam \): Ananyāśraya. \( \text{(TB.6.18)} \)

where the object to be defined depends on the other which also depends on the first object. For example:

The knowledge of gotva depends on mahisatva and vice versa.

Prof. Matilal explains it as:

X and Y are mutually dependent if X is explained as an object of cognition which is dependent upon a cognition of Y and Y in its turn is explained as an object of cognition which is dependent a cognition of X (sva-graha-sāpeksa-graha-sāpeksa-graha-visayatvam anyonyāśrayatvam).

3. Cakraka is sometimes related to another defect i.e. anavasthā (recurrere ad infinitum). But anavasthā, in certain cases like in the question whether the chicken comes first or the egg has to be tolerated. But it is to be devoided in the logical definition.
Apart from this, another important feature of Nyāya methodology is the excessive stress on lāghava (simplicity or parsimony) and Gaurava (prolixity), which are to be taken into consideration while formulating a definition. So many definitions and explanations fulfilling all the logical requirements and conditions are found to be rejected in Nyāya works because of either lāghava or Gaurava. Like Grammarians who are famous for brevity (cf. अन्धकारात्मकान्तायमेन वृद्धासंवर्त्तम: मयंति) the Naiyāyikas also emphasise these two conditions the most.

Parīkṣā is the examination of the validity of a definition. Nyāya defines it as:

कल्पितम् संशोधस्मुपययते न वैति विचारः परीक्षणः (N8h.67)

In parīkṣā with the help of pramāṇas and tarka the ascertainment is made whether the defined object (lakṣita) confirms, in fact to the definition as given. After formulating a definition, one proceeds to show why and how his definition adequately meets the acceptable standards or the necessary requirements of a definition and how the defined object is appropriately characterised by the definition. This eventually leads him to a discussion, and a criticism of the rival theories showing inadequacy of the rival definitions of the same concept. This constitutes an important feature of Nyāya methodology.
Looking from such a perspective in Alankāraśāstra the tradition of defining is started from Bharata and Bhāmaha. The other rhetoricians coming after them also define the objects in a similar vein. But one thing to be noted is that their definitions are not definitions in the strictly Naiyāyika sense of the term. They do not fulfil the logical conditions which are necessary for a definition. That is why the later poetics find scope to find fault with them while examining their definitions as per the rules of the Nyāyaśāstra. Jagannātha and Yajñēśvara Dīkṣita etc., aim at making a critical review of the previous definitions of poetic objects before formulating a definition of their own. Side by side their criticism also speaks how their definitions are logically correct and fulfills the conditions. Since the task of defining the object is the hardest of tasks only a few have succeeded in their undertaking. Another important factor which motivated these Navya-Ālankārīkas, was that the Navya-Naiyāyikas were also engaged in a similar task. Thus the Naiyāyikas' influence and inspiration gave rise to a new trend in the treatment of the śāstric topics of poetics and gradually becomes its distinct characteristic. It became a sacrosanct tradition as it were, all the scholars who followed Jagannātha fell in the stream of this tradition almost gāḍḍalikāpravāhanyāyena.
The rhetoricians of the last phase of Navya-Nyāya logic have taken a leading role in this respect and thereby they have made Alāṅkāraśāstra so complicated that the Alāṅkāra works of the last phase are hard nuts to crack. Minds boggle in getting at the implications and essence of their definitions. No doubt they have exhibited their deep scholarship of Nyāyaśāstra and distinguishes themselves from their predecessors, but it has also contributed to the loss of its originality and saukumārya. Some of the examples are given here:

(a) यव्यिन्धुकाशनातिनिसिप्तार्थतःश्रीरङ्गेश्वरी न ते विना तत्त्वायतःमानृपानिता विभावनालभेः।

(b) उपमान्यांवच्छेद्यक्रपाकारकशन्नवे सति
उपमान् नानोवच्छेद्यक्र प्रकार कौमिन्य चर्चीनिः।

(c) अनुवाकारम् न रसाधिति भविन्यः कृष्णभिन्नवे सति
शाख्यधीन्यश्चर्चिता। विषयितासमवेश्यार्थितिः
नालकृतता नालकाकृतिवेद्यतीता नालवेद्यतीतात्।
अनुवाकारस्व विकृतीश्च शाख्य शान्तरुपसारि विषयाद्यक्र
ज्ञान-तेषु यामांकाराद्युपेशु संक्षणसमन्यः।
शाख्यधीश्च वैनिष्ठय-वस्मकृति नानकाव्या
विषयितासमवेत्यकार्ये नालश्रीशाश्वै-परमार्थ सत्त्विन्धुवेद्यकृतिनावेद्यकर्तव्यः।
रसब्राह्मणस्य गयांविधिमं भावविधिमान्याव व
शैवद्धम भेषज सत्कृतिपादनम्। (Vāidyānātha अलाम्काराचंद्रिकाः, पृ. 2.)
VI.4 Padakṛtya Method

Padakṛtya is a method used by the Naiyāyikas for examining the correctness and logical relevance of each and every word constituting the definition (dalaprayojana). This is known as a commentatorial or expository method. As per this method an attempt is made to show how each and every word in that definition is relevant and how it contributes to the total intended sense convincingly and adequately, and that it is indispensable and valid. If the definition is found faulty it is remodelled either by modifying words or by adding more words until it becomes perfect and flawless. This method is also called dalavyāvṛtti. Candrasimha Paṇḍita, a Naiyāyika has names his entire gloss on TS as Padakṛtya.

Navya-Naiyāyikas of Gaṅgeśa and post-Gaṅgeśa period (12th century onwards) use this method profusely and by means of it accept or reject the definitions of proponents and opponents. This trend has influenced the Alāṅkārikas also. The prominent figures who arrest our attention for adopting this technique are Viśvanātha, Appaya, Śobhākara, Viśvanāthadeva, Viśveśvara Paṇḍita, Jagannātha, Devaśāṅkara etc. Because of such tendency of theirs we do not find originality in their theoretical discussions but rather dialectical war-fares. Alāṅkāraśāstra of this period is quite different in its nature and objective from that
in its earlier period. It now becomes a veritable dialectical discipline like Navya-Nyāya and Navya-Vyākaraṇa. Hence Ālāṅkārikas of this period need to be distinguished from their predecessors and be designated as Navya-Ālāṅkārikas.

Some of the examples which show how the poeticians have employed the Padakṛtya method, are given below:

Visvanātha in the first chapter of his SD uses the Nyāya method of Padakṛtya to examine the definition of kāvya given by Mammata and shows how it contains the faults like avyāpti and ativyāpti as follows:

Mammata’s Definition of kāvya:

\[ \text{padakṛtya} \]

(KP, p. 13)

1. (tat) adosau - First of all Visvanātha examines the word adosau and shows the fault of avyāpti in the definition. He argues if kāvya is defined as a piece free from fault than the vāse, nyakkāro etc., would not be a poem as it has the fault vidheyāvimāra. But it has been admitted to be a specimen of the highest type of poetry as it contains suggestion. Therefore the definition is avyāpta (too narrow) as it excludes the poetic verse in question which is universally acknowledged to be the best type of poetry from the province of poetry.
2. sagunau - This term is inappropriate, says Viśvanātha. Mammaṭa himself has declared that the qualities such as mādhurya are the properties of rasa alone and not of anything else. But in the definition, sagunau is shown as the adjective of ābādārthau and guṇas are said to be the properties of word and sense. This leads to inconsistency and does not logically define the object.

3. analāṅkrti - Following the words of Vātsyāyana, atattvavyavacchedako dharmaḥ Viśvanātha says that the term analāṅkrti in the definition is irrelevan. Figures of ābda and artha even when they are present serve merely to highten a kāvya. They are not the essence of the poetry.

Jagannātha in his RG profusely uses the method of padakṛtya while explaining and examining the logical validity of the definitions of alāṅkāras given by predecessors. After rejecting the definitions of alāṅkāras which do not appear to him logical, he completely formulates new ones. The following one is an example which shows that all the terms in his definition are significant and fulfill the logical need. Jagannātha's method of defining objects, therefore, provides the best examples of Padakṛtya.
Definition of *sasaṇḍeha*:

सासाण्डेहाः आसमानविरौध्याः समवता नानाकोक्षयां

(RO.3340)

1. *sāḍṛṣyamulā* - This adjective is used to remove the fault of *atīyāpti*. If it is not given there would not be any difference between *sasandeha alaṅkāra* and common *sandeha* (doubt). To clarify it Jagannātha gives the following example:

अधिरैत्य ह्रस्य ठूलत् पापं

परितां पशम्य बालेनाम् ||

परिशिष्टयति व न का युवाये

निरपयें निधिकाँविनाथपुत्रेः ॥ (RG. P.340)

This is an example of *sāṇḍeha*, and not of *sasaṇḍeha alaṅkāra*, for, in this statement of the people of the Mithilā there is only doubt. To differentiates the *sasandeha alaṅkāra* from the common *sandeha*, the term 'sāḍṛṣyamulā' is used. It means that the cognition of doubt should be as the result of the knowledge of similarity. Any doubt cannot constitute this *alaṅkāra*.

2. *bhāsamānavirodhakā* (dhīḥ) - 'having only apparent contradiction'. This term differentiates *sasaṇḍeha alaṅkāra* from the *Mālārūpaka alaṅkāra* which has more than one *aprastuta* expressed in poetical superimposition while in *Sasandeha* the superimposition is suspended.
If this term is absent in the definition, it will lead to ativyāpti, for, the definition will be applicable to the Mālārūpaka.

3. samabala - To differentiate Utpreśa alaṅkāra from Sasaṅdeha this term is used. The alternative which is predicated is more powerful in Utpreśa, while in Sasaṅdeha all the alternatives are equally powerful (samabalā).

4. nanakotyavāgahini - Though the adjectives bhāsamāna-virodhaka and samabala imply that the alternatives should be any, this term is used to make this point more clear.

5. ramanīyā - This adjective excludes ordinary doubts which arise in the worldly life in the form of sthāṇurvā puruṣo vā.

At last Jagannātha says that in the absence of the three terms i.e. nanakotyavagāhinī, ramanīyā and sādṛṣyamūlā the definition will define only doubt and not Sasaṅdeha alaṅkāra which is different from an ordinary doubt.

VI.5 Poeticians of Navya-Nyāya Period

The poeticians who flourished during the period of Navya-Nyāya (after Gaṅgēśa) reveal the influence of Nyāyaśāstra in a gradually increasing degree in regard to their language, method, style, technical terms and
and principles of Navya-Nyāya etc. From among those poeticians only those who have earned illustrious name by making valuable contribution to Sanskrit poetics are introduced here. Some of these poeticians are masters of both the poetics and the Nyāya have composed works in both the fields. Some of them who have written only on Alāṅkāraśāstra through their works clearly prove deep knowledge of Nyāyaśāstra.

1. Śobhākara

Śobhakara (1500 A.D.), the author of the Alāṅkāra-ratnākara derives inspiration from the Nyāya system and uses some of the important techniques of Navya-Nyāya in his work. G. Parthasaradhy Rao who has made a critical study of his work, remarks:

It has to be noted here that Śobhākara lived at a time when 'Navyanyāya' (Modern Logic) was making its initial progress taking the scholars of the day under its sway and as a consequence there developed a tendency in the scholars to view any matter critically setting aside the views and conventions of the earlier writers. This is the period when the great logician Gaṇgeśopādhyāya, the author of the 'Tattvacintāmaṇi' flourished. Śobhākara sufficiently imbied in the characteristics of this new age and so his writings in the Alāṅkāra-ratnākara
have a colouring of modern logic. His references to 
to the aphorisms of Gautama, the Vrtti he composed 
under the definition of the figure 'Sañdeha', the 
definition of 'Samāsokti' where he brought in a 
new term 'avacchedaka', the arguments he presented 
while establishing the view that the common 
characteristic (Śādhāranadharma)in 'upamā' can be 
of twenty four kinds, the stress he gave that 
qualities (gunas) can be twentyfour only as 
enumerated by the logicians and finally the 
arguments he presented while extending the scope 
of different figures, splitting them wherever 
necessary and introducing several new figures with 
narrow differences, amply bear testimony to the 
fact that he was influenced by the thoughts of 
modern logic.

We have quoted Dr. Parthasaradhy Rao in extenso only 
to show how and in how many different ways does 
Śobhākara reveal the Nyāya influence so deeply imbibed 
in the entire fabric of his work on Poetics.

2. Viśvanāthadeva

Viśvanāthadeva (1552 A.D.) is the author of three works 
on poetics viz., Citramāṁśā, Mṛgāṅkalekhā and Śāhitya- 
sudhāsindhu. Among these works only SSS is published. 9

Dr. Ram Pratap, the editor of SSS says that following
the Nyāya method of defining the objects, Vīśvanātha formulates the definitions of doṣa in the 5th chapter and of alaṅkāras in the 8th chapter with a deliberate attempt to make them entirely free from all logical faults. Further, because of his adopting the style of Navaṇa-Nyāya, Dr. Ram Pratap remarks, some of the portions of his texts are not clear.

3. Appaya Dīksita

Appaya Dīksita is a great name in the history of Sanskrit literature. A versatile scholar and a prolific writer, he has to his credit the authorship of over one hundred works, including at least three on literary criticism. His Citramīmāṃsā is a scholarly work on Alakāraśāstra, dealing with the definitions of arthālaṅkāras given by predecessors and their discussions in the light of his own definitions, Vṛttivārtika is a shot treatise on semantics, and Kuvalayānanda is a work on Sanskrit poetics dealing with arthālaṅkāras only.

All these works exhibit his deep scholarship of Navaṇa-Nyāya. While reading them, readers must face lot of probabilities offered by Appaya, which are presented in a language that strictly follows the track of the Nyāya philosophy. Dr. Satyaśrayana Chakraborty remarks:
The very approach of Appaya Dīkṣita in discussing the figures of speech betrays the style of Nyāya philosophy.

Though his Citramāṁśā and Vṛttivārtika are written in a lucid style, yet in a quite a number of cases, the mode of argumentation is that of a mature Naiyāyika. Examples of such Naiyāyika technicalities will be discussed later at the proper place. Here we may simply point out that Appaya, a scholar of great genius, flourished in an age of Navya-Nyāya and could not but adopt the Navya-Nyāya methods, style and language.

4. Yaññēśvara Dīkṣita

Yaññēśvara Dīkṣita (1600 A.D.) has written three Alāṅkāra works viz., Alāṅkārarāghava, Alāṅkārasūryodaya and a commentary on Kāvyaprakāśa. Besides being a poetician he is also a great Naiyāyika. He has written two Nyāya works, Śāstracūḍamani and Vivaranopjīvinī. His deep study of Nyāya method of defining the objects is revealed from his treatment of the Alāṅkāras in his work, Alāṅkārarāghava from which an example is already given in this chapter.

5. Jagannātha

Jagannātha was a great scholar of Navya-Nyāya. His magnum opus, the RG exhibits his deep erudition in the
Nyāyaśāstra. He himself holds a rare epithet: padavākya-
pramāṇapārāvāriṇa which is found in a colophon of the
printed text of his Manorama-kucamardini; the epithet
appropriately praises his scholarly attainment in the
three great śāstras -Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya. In
the beginning of RG he declares that he had received
the knowledge of the Nyāyaśāstra from his father,
Perubhaṭṭa whom he refers to in glowing terms23. The
whole scholastic atmosphere in and around the age of
Jagannātha was surcharged with the Navya-Nyāya. In his
age Navya-Nyāya was on the peak of its development both
in the Navaadvīpa of Bengal and Mithilā in Bihar with
the great Naiyāyikas like Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra,
Gadādha Bhaṭṭacāryya, Viśvanātha Nyāyapaṇcānana,
Rājacuḍāmaṇi Dīksita and Veṅkatadhvarin and many others
flourishing in that period. Jagannātha could not avoid
their influence even while composing his work on poetics
and he reveals it in his Navya-Nyāya language and style.

6. Viśveśvara Pandita

Viśveśvara Pandita (18th Century A.D.), also known
as Parvatiya Viśveśvara Pāṇḍeya has earned great
reputation both as a Naiyāyika as well as an Ālaṅkārika.
He had wielded his pen with ease in both the areas and
compose many works like Tarkakutūhalaṃ and Dīdhitipraveśa
in Nyāya and Ālaṅkāramuktavālī, Ālaṅkārapradīpa and
Alanākārakaustubha in Alanākārasāstra. The editor of the Tarkakutūhalam rightly remarks that Viśvesvara's Alanākārakaustubha is written in the style of Nyāya-Nyāya. In refuting the views of other Alanākārikas and in establishing his own position he mainly follows the method of Nyāya-Naiyāyikas. His other rhetoric works also exhibit his liking for the logical precision and technical expression so peculiar to the Nyāya-Nyāya style.

7. Devasāṅkara Purohita

Devasāṅkara Purohita, the author of Alanākāranaṃjusā (18th century A.D.) was also well-versed in Nyāyaśāstra. The learned editor Prof. S.M. Katre rightly remarks:

It seems our author was primarily a logician and secondarily a poet... (sic)

His constant use of Nyāya-Nyāya style of highly technical expression speak of him more as a logician than a poet. It is interesting to note that Devasāṅkara in his work refers twice to Aksapāda Gautama, the promulgator of the Nyāya system and once to the Naiyāyikas in general.

Extracts from the works of the above authors are presented below to show the language, technical terms, style and method which reveal the clear influence of Nyāya.
VI.6 Use of Navya-Nyāya Language

One will be definitely surprised while looking at the rhetorical works written in the garb of the Nyya-Nyāya language. The authors and the commentators of such works of the Navya-Nyāya period adopt the Navya-Nyāya language in such a fashion that the works of poetics seem to be the works of Navya-Nyāya, rich in technical terms, logical techniques, long compounds and dialectical style. Because of this peculiarity all these works become quite technical in nature and difficult to understand.

It is well-known that the language of the Navya-Nyāya is one of the distinctive feature of Indian logic. It gives an unique status to Navya-Nyāya and also distinguishes it from other śāstras in Sanskrit. It is altogether different from the commonly known Sanskrit language. Even the language of Prācīna Nyāya system has got no similarity with that of Navya-Nyāya. Some of the passages from the rhetoric texts are produced here as specimen:

(2) समवाय सम्बूधा वदिचिन्न-यमक्तिनिगुष्ट कथानालिलित- समवाय सम्बूधा वदिचिन्न जनकता निललित विषाधिता- सम्बूधा वदिचिन्न वदिचिन्न तावद्येकक मुन्मुणाहि- विशिंधूत तत्ववृत्त गाता नूर्ध्यूपमार्य विशिंधूत बधात्माना- ध्रमवा। नत्त्रातित्वानिवारणाय नादशकार्यतानिस्कृति- समवाय सम्बूधा वदिचिन्नकारणातानिस्कृति विषाधिता- समबूधा वदिचिन्न वदिचिन्न तानिलिलितावद्येककात्-
(6) तथा अरविन्दसिव शुद्धितविभूती सातयुक्त-निपृथित संसर्गाण्वम् । नस्य -न नीमोकला संसर्गाण्व शैवाय । र्दव न्यायनिरस्यतः सातायुक्तविभूति । अरविन्दनिरस्यसत्त्वसर्वनिरस्यतः सातायुक्तविभूति निपृथितत्व । समाज-सातायुक्तविभूति। 

(7) नन्दन वषयक्रता । सत्यनुसारसनिस्थापति शास्त्राः । संख्याः परिपूर्णितः तत्त्वां विन्यम्बे भगववात । जयसमविद्याय प्रमुखात्मनाशोहितवत्वाः -न्यं । नेह द्वारा शास्त्राद्वितियोऽर्द्धमाहवाचार्यानामाभावाद् । जयश्वरास्मृतीवैलिता चैव । उच्चतेन ।

सत्यसमविद्याय सममात्रं शूकलानाय । नेह द्वारा शास्त्राद्वितियोऽर्द्धमाहवाचार्यानामाभावाद्। जयश्वरास्मृतीवैलिता चैव ।

(AM. P. 242)

(SSS. P. 199-200)
VI.7 *Navya-Nyāya Technical Terms*

With the use of *Navya-Nyāya* language poeticians also use the technical Nyāya terms in their works. Mainly the poeticians of later period who flourished in and after the development of *Navya-Nyāya* logic employed Naiyāyika terms while explaining their poetic concepts. Among them are Jagannātha, Yajñeśvara, Devasaṅkara, Viśvanāthadeva, Viśveśvara Pāṇḍita and Śobhākara Mitra whose works are well-known and are available to us in a published form. Because of the incorporation of the Nyāya terms which have particular significance and connotation these works have not attracted as many scholars as they otherwise should. Some of the technical terms are illustrated and explained below:

1. *Avyāpyavṛttitvam*

In *RG*, Jagannātha, while discussing the adjective *adosau* of Mammata's definition of poetry remarks as follows:

> न च संख्यामुक्तवाचालनृवृत्तिः संख्यातिविषयवाचालनृवृत्तिः।
> 
> व्यवस्थार्तिन्युष्टुन्तियुक्तमिति व्यवस्थायां वाचालनृवृत्तिः।
> 
> ‘संख्यामुक्तवाचालनृवृत्तिः’ व्यवस्थार्तिन्युष्टुन्तियुक्तमिति वाचालनृवृत्तिः।
> 
> अन्य व्यवस्थार्तिन्युष्टुन्तियुक्तमिति व्यवस्थार्तिन्यूष्टुन्तियुक्तमिति ।

(RG. P. 4)
Here the term of our special interest is *Avyāpyavṛttitya*. The author of Tarkādīpikā defines *Avyāpyavṛttitya* as *svātyantābhāvasāmānadhikaraṇatvam* (simultaneous presence of *samyoga* in one locus of the referent of sva-pada and its absence in other locii).

In the Nyāyasāsana, relations are broadly divided into two categories, *vṛttiniyāmaka* (occurrence-exacting) and *vṛtyaniyāmaka* (non-occurrence-exacting). *Sāmyoga* is a *vṛttiniyāmaka* *sambandha*. This relation is known as a relation of incomplete occurrence (*avyāpyavṛtti*). Because when a contact takes place between two substances it occurs only in a part of them. When Jagannātha discusses the term *adōṣau* (*iṣadarthe naḥ*) he gives an example of this *Avyāpyavṛtti* nature of *sāmyoga*. He uses this technical term and his words reminds one of the definitions of this type as given by a famous Nyāya work, *Siddhāntalakṣāpa* of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya. Gaṅgeśa uses the term as follows:

अर्थः कपिसंयोगानं एनदुव्रश्रव्यादिकारित्यदिशृष्ट्याय-समानाधिकरणात्मः । (P. 90)

--- अर्थः कपिसंयोगानं एनदुव्रश्रव्यादिकारित्यदिशृष्ट्याय-भावः वियमालवातः ।

When a monkey is sitting on a branch of a tree, both the presence and the absence of *kapīśāmyoga* are present in the tree. Presence of monkey on the particular branch
and the absence of it in other parts of the tree, like its root etc. Therefore, *samyoga* of the monkey and the tree is of an *avyāpyavyāpti* nature. Similarly, persons who argue that *adosau* means having absence of defect in one part of the poetry and presence of it in another, define it as *duṣṭam kāvyam* but this is not correct, says Jagannātha, because in the case of poetry the experience that some part contain defect and some does not is not universally accepted. Hence, *dosa* in the definition as poetry is not of the nature of *avyāpyavṛtti*.

2. *Avaccheda*.

The conception of *Avaccheda* in Navya-Nyāya is of utmost importance from the point of view of subtle analysis of ideas and their accurate expression. Though the term *Avaccheda* in Navya-Nyāya is generally used in highly technical sense, yet instances are not rare in which the term has been used only in the sense of an adjective. Thus, if we want to make someone to understand each and every case of fire or all the cases of fire as distinguished from the pot or any other object, then, according to the Navya-Nyāya technique, we would say 'vahnitvāvacchinna' वह्नित्वावच्छिन्न ('vahnitvāvacchinna' वह्नित्वावच्छिन्ननस्य शब्दस्थितः श्रुतादिकारणस्य इत्यादि वाक्यान्तरं अविभक्तिज्ञातां, श्रुतादिकारणस्य इत्यादि वाक्यान्तरं. (*siddhāntalakṣāṇa* Jagadīśi, p. 209.)
in which expression vahnitva or fireness is understood to be the avacchedaka (limiter) of vahni. Here vahnitva is an adjective of vahni in as much as it differentiates vahni from other objects. In this general sense avacchedaka may be defined as that property which itself being one of the primary meanings of a term, differentiates the primary meaning of that term from other objects. Avacchedaka also means a determining attribute.

Viśvanātha uses the term Avacchedaka to clarify the figures between Rūpaka and Parināma. He says:

When we say mukham candraṁ what the word candra effects is simply to tell us that the face is one which possesses most of the qualities of the moon and it is similar to it. It serves to distinguish the particular face from other faces which do not possess any similarity of the moon. Hence in Rūpaka what is superimposed (upamāna) is construed simply as characterising or distinguishing the subject; but in Parināma, the thing superimposed (āropya) is construed as being completely identical.

Viśveśvara Pāṇḍita also uses the term while discussing Rūpaka alaṅkāra:
Visvanathadeva uses the term as follows:

उपमेयोऽन्तःकरणिनिषेधविषयिका (उपमे)
उपमानतिकतःकदाक्षरप्रति (SSS, P. 433)

3. Siddhasadhana

Vidyadhara in his Ekavali refutes the views of the opponents of the dhvani theory on the basis of two logical faults called Siddhasadhana and Vyaghata which are generally mentioned by the Naiyayikas. The Nyayakosa defines Siddhasadhana as:

(निषेधविषयिकां अस्वक्त प्रमाणान्तिकतःकदाक्षरप्रति अनुमानम्। यथा पर्वते विनिषेधविषयान्तिकतं युक्तं पर्वते विनिषेधविषयान्ति धुमात् विनिषेधविषयान्ति। (P. 109)

Abhavavadins deny dhvani on the strength on the argument that it is not found in some places. This argument, says Vidyadhara, is opened to the fault of Siddhasadhana for proving what is already proved. It is admitted that dhvani does not exist in Citrakavya. If dhvani is considered as apprehended and further denied because it is not found anywhere it leads to the fault Vyaghata.

4. Vinigamana

Vinigamana is a Nyaya technical term. The Nyayakosa defines it as anyatarapaksapatin yukti.
Jagannātha uses this term repeatedly in his RG*

We may consider one example below:

While deciding the factors which are the suggestors of dhvani Jagannātha refers to the view of the old ones and says that there is not Vinīgamanā, the argument definitely proving any one side whether vyanājakatva resides in padavākya characterised by racanā and varnas or in racanā and varnas characterised by pada and vākya. Therefore, just as danda, cakra etc., elements are considered to be the cause of ghata, similarly all the elements like pada, vākya, racanā etc should be considered as the suggestors.

VI,8 Navya-Nyāya Methods

1. Śābdabodha

Śābdabodha means the verbal knowledge of a sentence. The term is explained as - śabdajanyam śābdam, śābdasācasau bodhaśca śābdabodhaḥ i.e. the knowledge which is generated by the causal factor i.e. śāda is called
śābdabodha. It is the apprehension of sentence-meaning (vākyārthabodha). A vākya is a collection of padas. The meaning of a vākya is understood by remembering the meanings of the individual word constituting that vākya. But the relation existing among those individual meanings is not understood when they are individually remembered. Hence, the understanding of the relation is a new product when the vākya is understood. So śābdabodha means the comprehension of the relation of the meanings of padas (anvayabodha).

The Navya-Naiyāyikas have propounded independent theory of Śābdabodha. According to them, only a determinate cognition (savikalpaka-jhāna) is embodied in, and conveyed by a sentence. Every sentence comprises of at least a subject (uddesya) and a predicate (vidheya). In a Śābdabodha arising in hearer's mind from a sentence, the meaning of the chief substantive or qualifier in the nominative case plays the role of the leading concept (mukhyaviśesya) and all other concepts are directly or indirectly subordinate to it. The cognition arising from a sentence is always non-perceptual and the additional elements conveyed by a sentence, over and above the separate concept conveyed by separate words is the intended relation of the concept (padārthasamāsarga). This additional elements which is the distinctive feature of a śābdabodha is conveyed through the particular
juxtaposition of words (samsargamaryādā) and not through the denotative or indicative power of words. For example, the Śābdabodha of a simple sentence like 'caitraha grāmam gacchati' will be as follows:

एकत्राविषेषः ग्रामनिर्देश्योगानुकूलक्ययापारानुकूलकः कुलात्

In this sentence Caitra is the chief qualificand (mukhyaviśeṣya) and other meanings are qualifiers. Caitra is the agent and is the substratum of the agentness (kārtyātva) which is the meaning of 'tīṅ', the verbal suffix (ākhyātapratyaya). Kārtyātva is related to Caitra by the relation of samavāya. The meaning of the root ṣvam 'go' is the activity (vyāpāra) conducive to the contact (saṃyoga) of the agent with the destination. The phala viz., the contact of the agent with the destination and vyāpāra are the meanings of the dhatu. Vyāpāra is related to the kārtṛtva by the relation called anukūlata. Saṃyoga is related to vyāpāra by the relation janyatā or anukūlata. The meaning of the substantive, grāma is the village and the meaning of 'ām', the accusative case-ending is karmatva and ekatvasaṃkhyā. The āsaṃkhyā is related to grāma by the relation of paryāpti. The import of village is related to karmatva by the relation of adheyata. The karmatva is related to saṃyoga by the relation of āśraya. Thus finally we get the Śābdabodha as stated above.

With this background let us now examine how Jagannātha employs the method of Śābdabodha in his RG:
While treating the prominent figures of speech like Upamā, Rūpaka etc., Jagannātha gives Ābhbodhās of the alāṅkāras and thereby attempts to bring out subtle distinctions between the figurative statements. In this task he follows mainly the Naiyāyikas though he also shows the Ābhbodhā prakāras accepted by the Vaiyākaraṇas and the Mīmāṃsakas. As an example of the Ābhbodhā of Upamā-alāṅkāra is given below:

Here, the expression "अरविन्दसमस्याः" or "अरविन्दभिमिश्रिता" may apparently bring out śādṛṣya in the same manner but there is some subtle difference underlying these expressions. Jagannātha gives the Ābhbodhā according to the prācīna as well as the Navya-Naiyāyikas. The Navya-Naiyāyikas believe that śādṛṣya is something different from the common property. The ancient ones, however, think that śādṛṣya is identical with the common property. For example, in "मूर्तिः चन्द्रैः सून्दरः", śādṛṣya is nothing but the common property of saundarya existing between the moon and the face and therefore this śādṛṣya is not an independent padārtha.

Jagannātha first elucidates the example of samāsa-gatāpamā i.e., aravinda sundaram. In this proposition according to the well-known rule - "निपातानिर्मितानामार्थयोऽरविन्दसमस्या: " abhedānvaya is to be accepted between aravinda
and sundara which would result in the **Sābdabodha** अरबिन्दाभिन्न सुन्दरम्. But such a **Sābdabodha** is prevented because in that case the word **sundara** being an adjective should have **pūrvanipāta** according to the rule विशेषणं विशेषणं बहुकम् और उपसर्गान् पूर्वम् and so the **samāsa** would have been **sundarāravindam**. Jagannātha contends that the part **aravinda** in the compound conveys by **Abhidhā** lotus only. Since the word 'iva' in the vigrahavākya, is elided, the word **aravinda** itself conveys the sense अरबिन्दे निर्देशितसारस्यः प्रक्रियाक्र (that which contributes to similarity with lotus) by **laksanā** on the basis of **tātparya**. The part of the sense of the word **aravinda** i.e. **prayojaka** is related to the part of the sense **sundara** i.e. **sundaratva** through **tādātmyasambandha**. The whole sense of the proposition is: अरबिन्दे निर्देशितसारस्यः प्रक्रियाक्र-भिन्न संयोजितवर्तिनः (मुखः).

Thus following the Naiyāyikas Jagannātha gives prathamāntamukhyaviśeṣyaka सābdabodha of Upamā-alaṅkāra.

As can be seen this attempt of Jagannātha is remarkable. It appears from the study of his work that the **Sābdabodha** method for him is not an exhibition of his technical erudition of Śāstras as it may appear to a casual reader of first sight. Ramaswamy Shastri rightly remarks:

The distinction between one figures of speech and another as explained by their definitions can be easily known from the forms of **Sābdabodha**.
that are arrived at from the statement containing this figure.

Jagannātha has been successful in handling the method of Śābdabodha for exploring the special traits of the figurative statements. Strangely, however, Dr. Ramaçandrudu remarks:

This śāstra (i.e. Alakāraśāstra) has gained nothing by the introduction of this prakriyā.

But this does not seem to be correct. Śābdabodha being a śāstric method had indeed helped in making logical analysis of the figurative statements more sharp and accurate and adding a greater clarity to the understanding of the essential characteristics of the figures of speech.

2. Anugama

Anugama is also a method of Navya-Nyāya logic. The term Anugama means comprehension of objects in common form (anugatarupena sarvasaṅgraha). Anugama is defined by Bhīmācārya as a common concept, for example, all the ghaṭas have got the common connotation in the form of the generic character like ghaṭatva. Mathuranātha Tarkavāgīśa defines Anugama as a common statement. But it is used as a method by the Navya-Naiyāyikas to make the definition free from all kinds of possible ambiguities and to make it easily comprehensible. It is applied for making a
single statement including diverse objects of the same category as well as of the different category. There are two types of Anugama i.e. saṃsargamudrayānugama and prakāramudrayānugama. In the first type of Anugama, a component part of a relation is qualified by another relation, the component part of that relation is again qualified by another relation and thereby a common statement through the process of relation is made. It is done for the sake of avoiding possible defect of the statement and also for making the statement universal. The second type of Anugama is through the process of mentioning the prakāra with a view to eliminating the undesirable objects for making the statement free from doubts.

This method is useful for making clarification of object and giving it a general form without leaving any scope for ambiguity. In this connection Prof. Guha says:

This method of Anugama had subsequently become very popular with the Sanskrit scholars in other fields of Sanskrit study also. The new school of grammarians in particular and almost all the scholars in other subjects of Sanskrit in general, were so fond of this technique of Anugama that even a casual reader of the new school of Sanskrit study in any branch would undoubtedly be convinced of the situation.
Jagannātha gives the definition of Kāvyā as रमणीयायः

प्रतिपादक: शब्दः | (R&N.3)

In this if the meaning of the word ramaṇīya is to be understood in the general sense the defect ativyāpti arises because the statements like 'you are blessed with a son' etc., are sources of pleasure. Hence they will be kāvyā. To avoid this he explains the ramaṇīyata as केवल नशरासादिनकरणकरणीतः। The pleasure that is derived from the above statement is only Laukika, in as much as it is directly caused by a particular man's worldly prosperity and so it is quite personal.

Again Jagannātha makes lokottaratva a synonym to camatkāra-kāritva and accepts it to be a jātiviśeṣa to avoid the lack of Anugama. This camatkārāvatva should be realised only through one's experience and cannot be described in words. This kind of lokottarāhlāda is the result of Bhāvanā which is no other than the constant contemplation.

Here by substituting the word Bhāvanā for jñāna Jagannātha slightly modifies his previous statement:

रमणीयात्वे भावना विचारायः प्रतिपादकशः वर्मः

(RG. P. 5)

and this has been necessitated by the following reason.

There may be some samuḥālaṁbana-jñāna comprising of two co-ordinate thoughts of which one may be of ramaṇīyārtha and the other of aramaṇīyārtha. This kind of samuḥālaṁbana jñāna also will have to be taken as camatkārajanaka-jñāna. Such cases are excluded by replacing jñāna by Bhāvanā.
Bhāvana being chain of cognitions, it can be connected only with remaniyārthas, under special circumstances.

In other words one may be thinking of a particular object again and again for a long time only if it is beautiful as only beautiful objects can be the viśaya of Bhāvana.

Thus by substituting the word jñāna by Bhāvana, Jagannātha modifies his definition as shown above.

Jagannātha gives two more amplified forms of the definition as follows:

1. यत्प्रतिपदाविताधिविषयकमभावनातः समकारणकारकस्यस्यनत्तुम (Rg. P. 5)

2. स्वविशिष्टजनकन्तानन्यविद्यकेध्रप्रतिपादकान्तासंसारणे समकारणत्ववर्तम् ।

The second definition is made in Anugama style.

Not content with first Jagannātha gives second amplification in Anugama style. He feels that the first one is much cumbersome because it contains yacchabda and tacchabda, which begin the words of uncertain meanings, hinder the Anugama. Therefore, he gives the second modified Laksana which is comparatively simple according to the tradition of Naiyāyikas as there will be no need of bringing many things into Sādodbodha as in the case of the first form of Laksana. Thus the final Laksana is:

स्वविशिष्टजनकन्तानन्यविद्यकेध्रप्रतिपादकान्तासंसारणे समकारणवर्तम । (Rg. P. 5)

Thus, after first defining kavya as चामकारस्ववर्तम Jagannātha specifies further and narrows down the meaning of remaniyata to characterise the poetic delight exactly
by thrice resorting to the *Anugama* technique of the Naiyāyikas.

We can adduce many more examples from Jagannātha and other poeticians of this later period but that is not necessary. Our aim in this chapter was to illustrate how the *nyaya* methodology, style, terminology and concepts have the warps and woofs of the fabrics of the works of Sanskrit poetics and in showing this by explaining the *Nyāya* terms and concepts and illustrating them from the works of poetics in the foregoing pages we hope we have succeeded in our aim.
REFERENCES

1. NYS. I.1.1

2. तिस्मूँ: कथा भविन्त - वाद्य जनविन विषणा भोगिः।
   NBh. on NYS. I.2.1

3. प्रमाणनके साधनायांभ: सिद्धांतान्वित: पथ्यवयोऽपन्नः प्रमाणप्रतिपक्षपरिणामगे वादः। NYS. I.2.1

4. यथौ तापपणनः दक्षरङ्गिनिर्वहिस्थान साधनोपयोगानां जन्यः। NYS. I.2.2

5. स प्रमाणप्रतिपक्षस्थापनाख्याती विषणा। NYS. I.2.3

6. NBh. on NYS I.2.2


8. त्रिविधा शास्त्रो आस्त्रस्त्र पुष्पितः - उद्धोल तक्षणः परिभा भोगिः। NBh. P. 15

9. तत्र नामधैर्येऽन पवार्धमात्रायाभिधानस। ibid.

10. उद्धोलस्त्र तक्षणवेदीको धर्मी तक्षणम। ibid.

11. Vārttika of Uddyotakara on NBh. I.1.1.
   सबें हि तक्षणाः तरस्पदार्थवेदीकरः।

12. अत्याविभाजित्यावस्थमः भवितिविप्रत्येकव्रिम्बो विप्रतियोजिताः
    धर्मी तक्षणाः। TB. P. 12

13. तरस्पदार्थवेदीकरसामानाधिकरणादाभावप्रतियोजितः
    - अन्यावितः। ibid.

14. अत्याविभाजित्यावस्थायोजितः। ibid.
15. केक्यतावरहोतकथापको भूमा विविधतिकोमूल 
असंभव। 1 Ibid.

 p. 82.

17. Ibid.


 intro. P. lxxxii.

21. अधिकप्रकृतिप्रामाण्यः प्राणायामकारश्रीपरिणुत्तरायणजगन्नादिः
कुटीं महासरस्वतिणास कर्मसर्वशिवित्वं पर्यसर्वशिवित्वं
समानित्वमात् ।

22. RG. P. 2.


26. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2.1.54 & 2.2.30.

