CHAPTER V

THEORY OF ANUMĀNA
IN
SANSKRIT POETICS
The Nyāya theory of Anumāna (inference) exerts its profound influence on the Rasa and Dhvani theory of Sanskrit poetics. A great classic like VV of Mahimabhaṭṭa is based on the Anumāna theory. Almost all the eminent poeticians have more or less dealt with Anumāna in their works. Therefore, an analytical exposition of the theory of Anumāna with its relation to some poetic theories is attempted in this chapter.

V.1 Anumāna as a Pramāṇa

Anumāna is an important means of valid knowledge. Except the materialistic Cārvāka almost all the Nyāya philosophical systems accept Anumāna as a source of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) for the cognition of such objects which are not cognised by means of Pratyakṣa (perception). But, unlike other schools of philosophy, the Nyāya school accepts four pramāṇas and gives highest emphasis on Anumāna and distinguishes it from other pramāṇas in its detailed treatment which has not been so thoroughly and systematically dealt with by any other school. The treatment of Anumāna forms the most important topic in the Nyāya, especially Navya-Nyāya system of logic.
Anumāṇa as its etymological sense (also literally) indicates is 'after-proof'. It is after-proof in the sense that it uses the knowledge derived from perception (pratyakṣa) or verbal testimony (śabda) and helps the mind to march on further and add to its knowledge. Since Anumāṇa consists in making an assertion about an object on the strength of the knowledge of the hetu which is invariably connected with sādhyā, the word Anumāṇa literally means the cognition which follows from other knowledge. Here, the prefix 'anu' means 'after' and 'māṇa' means the means of knowledge. From this literal meaning it follows that the perceptual knowledge of the hetu gives rise to the inferential knowledge. One can infer the existence of fire, for example, after perceiving the smoke which has got an uninterrupted connection with the surface of the mountain. The knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) is the key to having inferential knowledge. This knowledge of vyāpti is not possible without the help of direct perception. Vyāpti is a relation of invariable concomitance between hetu and sādhyā. The knowledge of the sādhyā as related to the subject of inference (pakṣa) depends on the previous knowledge of the hetu as related to the subject and at the sametime as invariably related to the sādhyā. One can infer fire on the mountain by virtue of the fact that one perceives smoke on it and has observed it as invariably accompanied by fire. In both the cases the necessity of perception cannot be denied.
Anumāna, according to the Naiyāyikas, is the most important cause of anumiti (inferred knowledge), or cognition or judgement. It represents the process by which this cognition is obtained. In the instance of inferred knowledge, the mountain is fiery because of smoke (parvato vāhnimān dhūmavattvāt), the conclusion that the mountain is fiery is the anumiti and the process by which it is produced consisting of paksadharmata (existence of probans in subject) and vyāpti (invariable concomitance) is anumāna i.e. parvato vāhnimān dhūmavatvāt. Anumiti differs from pratyakṣa in giving the valid knowledge of a thing that it is not in direct contact with the senses. In the instance of fire on the mountain, senses of a person do not come in contact with the fire at all, as they do in direct perception. In the whole process of inference, one sees only the smoke on the mountain, and to that extent, his senses come in contact with that object. Inferred knowledge (anumiti) depends upon two things - paksadharmata and vyāpti. Firstly, one must see the smoke on the mountain. This is technically called paksadharmata. Secondly, it is necessary that one must have the knowledge of the relation of fire and smoke (i.e., wherever there is smoke there is fire) from the past experience. This is technically called vyāpti. In the process of Anumāna, one brings the past experience to bear upon the present case of the smoke on the mountain. This is technically called parāmarśa.
Anumāna is of two kinds: svārtha (inference for oneself) and parārtha (inference for others). Svārthānumāna causes one's own inferential experience. Parārthānumāna is the syllogistic expression which consists of five members and which a person employs after inferring for himself fire from smoke, with a view to enabling another person to have likewise the same kind of inferential cognition. Parārthānumāna consists in the use of a regular five membered Sanskrit syllogism termed Nyāya. The five members are as follows:

1. Pratijñā
2. Hetu
3. Udāharana
4. Upanaya
5. Migamanam

parvato vahnimān dhūmavatvāt
dhūmavattvāt
yo yo dhūmavān sa sa vahnimān yathā mahānasah
tasmāt tatha
tathā cāyam

The validity of an inference depends on the validity of its constituent propositions. If any of the constituent propositions is fallacious, the whole inference will be vitiated.

This is in essence, the Nyāya theory of Anumāna. With this outline of the Anumāna theory in view an attempt is made here to explore how Sanskrit poeticians have employed this Anumāna theory in the analysis of poetic theory of Rasa and Dhvani.
The theory of Rasa constitutes one of the most important features of Sanskrit poetics. According to Bharata the main object of a drama is Rasa. Alankārikas believe Bharata to be the earliest exponent of Rasa theory and so they try to find his support for their views on Rasa.

Thus, the theory of Rasa realisation is based on the Rasasūtra of Bharata i.e. vibhāvāḥ bhāvavyabhicārisaṁyogat rasanispattih. Thus sūtra has been differently interpreted by different scholars-commentators on the basis of different interpretations. Important questions pertaining to Rasa that were posed and answered in different ways were about the locus of Rasa, the nature of Rasa, the process of its realisation and kinds of Rasa. This gave rise to different theories viz., Utpattivāda of Lollāta, Anumitivāda of Ānukūka, Bhuktivāda of Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhivyaktivāda of Abhinavagupta as available in his Abhinavabhāratī. The knowledge of these theories is gained only through the Abhinavabhāratī of Abhinavagupta and some later writers like Mammata and Hemacandra.

In the history of Sanskrit poetics Ānukūka as a prominent exponent of Bharata's Rasa theory occupies an important place. He, under the influence of Nyāya philosophy, makes a novel and unique attempt to interpret the sūtra on
the basis of the Naiyāyikas' theory of Anumāna. He distinguishes himself from other rhetoricians by his Anumitivāda. After Bhaṭṭa Lollata, Śāṅkuka took up the problem of Rasa and criticised Lollata's view. His own original work is lost. But it has been possible to reconstruct his view on the basis of the brief quotations in the work of Abhinavagupta, which is more or less abridged and copied by Mammaṭa and Hemacandra. Since Śāṅkuka makes an attempt to refute the Rasa theory of Lollata and then propounds his Anumitivāda; it is, necessary here to present Lollata's view also in order to understand Śāṅkuka's stand, his counter arguments and to make a critical appraisal of his view point.

V.3 Lollata's Theory of Rasa

Bhaṭṭalollata appears to be the first writer to attempt a psychological analysis of Rasa. According to Abhinavagupta he interprets the Rasaśūtra of Bharata as follows:

The birth of Rasa takes place out of the combination of the permanent mental state - implicit in the śūtra - with the determinants etc. More precisely, the determinants are the cause of the birth of the feeling, which constitutes the permanent state of mind. The consequents intended by Bharata are not, obviously, those which arise from the rasas - for they cannot be considered as causes of rasa - but the consequents of the states of mind only. Even if the
transitory states of mind, in so far as they are feelings, cannot accompany simultaneously the permanent mental state, still, according to Bharata, this is not absent, but remains in a state of latent impression. In the example too, some flavourings appear in a latent state, like the permanent state, and others in an emergent state, like the transitory states. Rasa, therefore, is simply a permanent state, intensified by the determinants, the consequents, etc.; but, had it not been intensified, it is only a permanent state. This state is present both in the person reproduced and in the reproducing actor, by virtue of the power of realisation (anusāṃdhanā).

V.4 Śaṅkuka’s Refutation

Śaṅkuka gives the following arguments against the view of Lollata:

1. Sthāyibhāva (permanent mental state) cannot be Rasa because without vibhāvas it cannot be known. Vibhāvādi are liṅgas (logical reasons) by means of which the knowledge of sthāyibhāva is acquired.

2. If it is accepted that without vibhāvas, sthāyibhāva can be known by means of Sabda (verbal testimony), then, Rasa cannot be pratyakṣa. For, Sabdajñāna is only a parokṣajñāna.

3. Bharata, therefore, has not expounded the sthāyibhāva first and Rasa afterwards. If the permanent mental states
exist before the Rasa why does Bharata explain Rasa first and thereafter the sthāyibhāvas.

4. If Rasa is nothing more that an intensified permanent mental state then Bharata need not have defined the determinants twice: once in connection with the non-intensified state (NS, VII) and once again in connection with it in its intensified state (NS, VI). It is illogical to explain the causes of the same thing twice.

5. If Rasa happens to be an intensified feeling, the problem of gradation will arise. An intensity admits of many degrees, similarly, there ought to be numberless grades in the realisation of Rasa.

6. If it is argued that only when the utmost intensity is reached, Rasa is realised, then, there would not be six varieties of Hāsyarasa.

7. Bharata explains the ten stages of Śṛṅgārarasa. If each of them would have different grades as per their intensity there would be an infinite number of mental states and of rasas.

8. We see that what happens is just the contrary, in the sense that sorrow (soka) is at first intense, and is seen to grow weaker with time and that in the feelings of anger (krodha), heroism (utsāha) and delight (rati) a diminution is met with when the indignation (amarsa) firmness (sthairya) and sexual enjoyment (sevā) are absent.
Saṅkūkā then explains the rasasūtra in the following way:

The actor (nāta) with his long training and constant practice represents the causes, the effects and the associating causes, (which are technically called vibhāvas, abubhāvas and vyābhīcaribhāvas respectively) so skillfully that they, though artificial, are considered by the spectators as the real ones. The liṅga i.e. vibhāvas etc., lead the spectators to infer the sthāyibhāvas like rati etc., existing in the nāta. But as a matter of fact they are not present in the nāta, because he is imitating the original sthāyibhāvas of the real characters like Rāma. As this is the imitation of the original sthāyibhāvas this is given a different name 'rasa'. The realisation of the spectators is of a very distinct kind. The spectators take the nāta as Rāma, the original character, on the analogy of the knowledge of a citraturaga (the painted horse). It cannot be called yathārthajñāna (valid knowledge), because nāta is different from the character, say, Rāma. It is not mithyājñāna because there is no another jñāna to negate it like 'this is not Rāma'. It is not samsayajñāna because there are no two alternatives (kotis) in the cognition such as 'is this Rāma or not'. In the absence of the similar jñāna as 'he is like Rāma' it cannot be called sādṛṣayajñāna also. Therefore, this jñāna about nāta as 'this is Rāma' is quite peculiar, and different from all the other forms of jñāna like pramāṇa, mithyā, sāmśaya and sāḍrṣaya. This kind of jñāna is the result of the nāta's skill in the four kinds of abhinaya.
It may be argued that the knowledge of Rasa is not valid as it is negated by the subsequent knowledge. According to the rule invalid knowledge is defined as *tadabhāvavatī tatprakārako 'nubhevo 'yathārtha* (to perceive a thing when it does not exist is *bhrama*). In the present case the Rāmatvai which is not in the nāta is ascribed to him; and in such case how can a bhrama produce the real effect? This question is answered by Śaṅkuka by saying that even a bhrama can produce an effect. He quotes the kārīka of Dharmakīrti's Pū "Seeing a gem and a light from a distance a man misunderstands both of them as *manis*." Thus, his jñāna is only a bhrama. But when he approaches, then, he is able to get *mani*. Therefore even a bhrama can produce a real effect. This jñāna is further proved to be bhrama also because in Nātya only the artificial imitation of kāraṇas, kāryas and sahakāris are brought into use and these are given new names *vibhāva, anubhāva* and *vyābhicāribhāva*. Ālaṃbaṇavibhāva and Uddipaṇavibhāvās can be present by reciting appropriate verses. The *anubhāvas* and *vyābhicāri* bhāvas also can be presented by the nāṭa with the help of the trainings etc. But a *sthāyibhāva* can never be presented because it cannot be expressed by merely using such words like *rati*, hāsa etc., being beyond the scope of abhidhā. It can only be imitated. The imitation by nāṭa helps the spectators to infer the sthāyibhāva in nāṭa. Only the sthāyibhāva like *rati*, which are imitated are called by the rhetoricians with the names like *śṛṅgārarasa*. In other
words, *rasa* is the inferential knowledge of the imitation of *sthāyībhāva* like *Rati*. But, unlike other inferences, this *anumiti* is the source of pleasure, because in this, the things inferred are beautiful. In this respect it is quite unique. Since the spectators infer *rasa*, it is to be understood as resting in *nāta*. Though the *sthāyins* are not in the *nāta*, the *sāmājika* have the inference of them as there is no *bādhaka-jñāna*. This is in fact not the inference of actual but only the so called *sthāyībhāva* which is the imitation of the original one. Therefore, ultimately the imitation of the *sthāyībhāva* is understood as the *rasa*.

The above analysis gives rise to the following points:

The process of the *vahnyanumāṇa* as described by the Naïyāyikas is different from the *Rasanumāṇa* because of the following reasons:

1. *Rasa*, the object of inference is unique in nature and is different from the other worldly objects of inference.

2. In the other cases of *Anumāṇa*, both the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* which become the object of perception and of which relation is perceived, become the object of inference. For example: in the case of the *vahnyanumāṇa*, *sādhya* i.e. *vahni* and *hetu* i.e. *dhūma* are perceived in a kitchen and the person who has frequently observed their invariable relation in a kitchen or in many places is able to infer the presence of fire by looking at the smoke. But in the
case of Rasa, it never can become the object of perception. Hence the relation existing between karana-rupa-vibhavadi and karya-rupa-rasa is never perceived.

3. Vibhavadi are karapas for the intensification of the sthaya-bhava (in Rama). But for the spectators they are lingas.

4. The realisation of Rasa which is the fruit of Anumana is unique and cannot be compared with any other anumiti, the knowledge obtained by inference.

Searching for the root of Sankuka's theory of the Ras-anumana one realises that for Sankuka rasa is a kind of knowledge(jhana). Since Rasa is a jhana a sadhana to obtain the knowledge of Rasa is called for (technically called pramana). The pramanas such as pratyaksa, Upamana, Sabda and others are not capable of producing the knowledge of Rasa. Therefore Anumana is the only means which helps one in obtaining the knowledge of Rasa. The knowledge of Rasa is not possible by Pratyaksa as there is no direct connection between respective indriya and Rasa. Pratyaksa is defined as indriyarthasamikarsajanya-jhana. Upamana is also not capable of giving the knowledge of Rasa because the sadarsya-jhana is essential for Upamana as gosadraco gavayah. Since there is no object similar to Rasa, Upamana does not obtain. Rasajhana cannot be obtained by Sabda pramana also because the knowledge of Rasa cannot be obtained by the statements of a trustworthy person/aptavakyam sabdaḥ.
No other pramanas such as Arthāpatti, Anupalabdhi, Saṁbhāva Aitihya produce the knowledge of Rasa. Ultimately it is the Anumāna pramāna which only can account for the knowledge of Rasa. So Rasānumūtī is one type of anumīti. It seems that Saṅkuka follows the well-known Nyāya method of pariṣṭega as given in the NBh on the strength of which he develops his theory of Anumāna.

Saṅkuka is well aware of the fact that the Rasānumūtī is not like the vahīyānumūtī. That is why he says Rasajhāna is different from the four types of jhānas and explains it by the illustration of cittatūraka. He also points out that even if the rasānumūtī is different from the vahnyānumūtī it still leads to arthakrīya. He quotes a verse from Dharmakirti’s PV to that effect. All these go to prove that Saṅkuka had a deep knowledge of the Nyāyaśāstra and the influence of which perhaps motivated him to develop the theory of Rasānumāna.

V.5 Bhatta Tauta’s Criticism

Bhaṭṭa Tauta (10th century A.D.), teacher of Abhinavagupta criticises the Anumitiśa of Saṅkuka. He poses the question: does Saṅkuka’s Anumitiśa propound Rasa as an imitation of sthāyibhāva based on (1) the experience of the spectators or (2) that of the actors or (3) the nature of Rasa or (4) the strength of the statement of
Bharata himself.

(1) Saṅkuka's anumāṇīvāda cannot be based on the experience of the spectators. Imitation (anukarana) is possible only of the things which are already perceived by a means of cognition (pramāṇa). For example, in case of a person drinking milk and saying 'Thus did so-and-so drink the wine', the action of milk-drinking reproduces action of wine-drinking. But it will be realised an imitation only when the spectator has himself directly observed the imitated person drinking wine. But nothing is found in the nāṭa, which may be said to be the imitation of something else. His body, his artificial face, horripilation, faltering voice and the movement of limbs etc., cannot be the imitation of sthāyibhāva like rati. The Anubhāvas appearing outwardly cannot be identical with the sthāyibhāva, which is beyond the perception of others. They, being insentient, being perceived by different organs of sense and having different substrata cannot be called imitation. Moreover, consciousness of imitation presupposes perception of both the original and of its imitation (made by the actor). But nobody (either the spectator or the actor) has ever perceived the rati of Rāma (character). Hence, the possibility that the actor is imitating Rāma is excluded.

If it is the feeling of the actor which is realised as the imitation of the rati of Rāma which as perceived by
the spectators is considered as Śṛṅgāra Rasa; still one has to consider in what form and in what manner it is cognised. If the cognition (pratiti) of the feeling of the nata is similar to that of the ordinary feeling, which consists of causes, such as women etc., when the feeling of the actor would be perceived in the form of rati. Therefore, the idea of the imitation of rati is not sound.

Further, the determinants etc., are real in the character but in the actors they are unreal. If that is the case, are they perceived as artificial by the spectators? And if they are perceived as artificial, the cognition of rati is not possible. If one says that for this reason what is cognised is not rati but the imitation of rati, then it would be possible only for a man of dull wits.

When the cognition of the liṅga (logical reason) e.g. smoke, is erroneous, the inference based upon it will be invalid. Though the vapour appears as smoke, if it is cognised as smoke, the inference of fire from it will not be valid.

Even if the actor himself is not enraged, still he is seen as such, the resemblance is due to contraction of eyebrows etc., Hence, he is like someone who is enraged. But the spectators willingly suspend their awareness of
this resemblance between the actor and the character. As a result of which they are immersed in a certain state of consciousness of the actor. Therefore, the idea that what appears on the stage is an imitation of something is not valid.

Further, the knowledge of the spectator i.e. 'This is Rāma' is not correct. For, this perception is devoid of every doubt, and it is not stultified later by some subsequent cognition which would invalidate it (bādhaka). Then, why should one not consider it as true cognition? And, if it is stultified, why is it not a false cognition? In fact though the invalidating cognition does not appear, it will always be a false cognition. Thus Śaṅkuka's contention, that this is "an experience wherein, it being devoid of any contradictory idea, one cannot distinguish any error", is untrue. Furthermore, in other actor also, the spectators have the perception 'This is Rāma', hence the cognition of Rāma is only in its most universal aspect.

The statement that 'the determinants can be recognised through the power of poetry' is also not true. For, the actor does not have the perception 'This Śītā is the woman I love'. If it is argued that, this is how the determinants are made perceptible to the spectators then in this way the permanent state will be made perceptible on a better way. Since it is predominant, spectators experience it as 'That man(is) in this (feeling)'.

Therefore it is wrong to say that from the point of view of spectators, Raṣa is an imitation of the permanent mental state.

(2) From the point of view of actor it is not valid, for, the actor while performing the drama does not have the notion, 'I am imitating Rāma or his feelings'. The word anukarana can be explained in two ways - one, the production of actions similar to those of someone and two, temporally after-product. If we take the first meaning, then nata has never seen Rāma. Hence it is not possible. If the second meaning is taken, then such imitation would extend to all the activities even of the ordinary life.

If it is said that the actor does not imitate a particular being (niyata) and has only this notion, 'I am imitating the sorrow (śoka) of some noble person (uttamapratī); then the question arises: by what he is imitating? Certainly it cannot be done by sorrow, since it is absent in the actor. It also cannot be done by the tears etc., because tears are insentient, while sorrow, being mental state, is sentient.

If it is argued that nata is imitating the consequent (anubhāvas) of the person, who also wept in the manner he does, then nata also intervenes in his act of imitation and the relation of anukarāya-anukartā no longer exists. Besides the actor does not have the awareness that he is imitating.
The actor's performance takes place only through three causes: his skill in art, his memory of his own determinants, and the consent of his art aroused by the state of generality of the mental states and in this virtue, he displays the consequents (anubhavas) and reads the dramatic text with suitable intonations (kāku). He is conscious of this only and not of imitation.

(3) Nor can it be said that there is an imitation from the point of view of the nature of things (vastuvṛttā), for, it is impossible that a thing of which one is not conscious has a real nature.

(4) Even Bharata has never said that Rasa is the imitation of a permanent mental state. Such a statement was never made by him even indirectly or by a means of an indication. On the contrary the various sub-divisions of women's dance, various music and the dhruva song described by Bharata indicate exactly the opposite. The expression of Bharata i.e. 'Drama is an imitation of all the forms of existence in the seven islands' can have also other explanations. And if it were an imitation, then there would be no difference between it and the imitation of the attire, walk etc., of the beloved one.

V.6 Mahimabhaṭṭa's View

Mahimabhaṭṭa has a rightful place in the context of Anumitivāda among the various theories of rasanispatti.
According to him, Rasa is Anumeya. The permanent mental states of love, sorrow etc., belonging to the characters delineated in a kāvya are inferred through the cognition of the vibhāvas, anūbhāvas and the vyābhi-cārībhāvas described in the kāvya. It is the inexplicable magic of poetry that the inferred sthāyibhāva leads to the exquisite pleasure of rumination whereas in ordinary life the inferred sthāyibhāvas as belonging to others do not lead to any such pleasure. Thus, the instances cited by Ānandavardhana for Rasadhvani like the description of Pārvatī’s entrance with floral decoration of the spring season and the reactions caused by that in Śiva, described in the canto III of Kumārasambhava can be included in Anumāna.

V.7 Viśvanātha’s Refutation

Viśvanātha points out a defect in Mahimābhāṭṭa’s stance, that is, Rasa is Anumeya. He poses the question as what exactly Rasa is in the Anumāna theorist concept. Is it the cognition of love etc., as existing in the characters like Rāma inferred from the cognised vibhāvādi depicted in poetry? Or is it the self-manifesting bliss enjoyed by the aesthete on aesthetically contemplating the dramatic performance? If former is accepted then it is different from that of dhvāni theorist. If the second alternative is accepted, then it is evidently clear that the proposed hetu is fallacious on account of the lack of the knowledge of invariable concomitance between Rasa and the vibhāvādi.
Hence there cannot be any inference.

Moreover, the mere knowledge derived through the reasoning "wherever there is the express statement or dramatic presentation of such and such vyāhāras and vyābhicātriḥbhāvās, there is the origin of the rāsas like Śṛṅgāra, is also not taken as rasa by the dhvāni theorists. Thus the hetu which are adduced by Mahimābhata for the realisation of rasa cause the inference of something else viz., the mere cognition of the presence of a particular mental state in the dramatic character. But they cannot explain the aesthetic bliss that is rasa. Hence it is actually hetvābhāsa in so far as it establishes something other than what is sought to be established.

V.8 Theory of Dhvāni and Anumāna

Ānandavardhana in his Dā presenta theory of Dhvāni refers to the question as known from the Locana, whether Dhvāni can be included in Anumāna. He presents the Anumāna theory as a pūrvapakṣa view perhaps keeping in mind the Naiyāyikas. The argument is that - the suggested meaning being the speakers purport can be understood through inference. Hence, vyāhga-vyāhajakabhāva is liṅgalingibhāva. The so called suggestiveness of sound is none other than a liṅga. This pūrvapakṣa argument is refuted by saying that the suggested meaning cannot be inferred. The knowledge which arises on hearing
an uttered sound has two aspects - 1. the intention of the speaker (tatparya) and 2. the actual meaning (vācyārtha). The former consists in the desire to reveal the form of the sound and to convey some special idea through the sound. These two desires can be inferred from the utterance of the sound. But the expressed and the non-expressed ideas of a sentence fall within the purview of the meaning to be described. These meanings are not inferred. Secondly, there may be differences of opinion regarding the nature of the suggested meaning among the listeners. But no such difference is possible on the case of the inferential meaning which is a definite form of cognition arrived at from a given hetu.

If one argues that since the validity of the suggested meaning is ascertained through inference it can be treated as inferred, this is unsound, since, for the same reason the expressed meaning, when verified through inferential methods, should have to be regarded as inferred, which, however, is not the case. It is regarded as the expressed meaning itself, being originally cognised through the denotative power of the word.

Thus, Anandavardhana makes passing reference to the Naiyāyika theory of Anumāna. He makes a definite attempt to refute the view of Naiyāyikas who attempt to reject the suggested meaning. This becomes clear from the rejoinder of Jayantabhaṭṭa, a Naiyāyika of great repute.
V.9 Jayantabhatta's Criticism

It was not at all necessary for Jayantabhatta to refer to and refute a theory of literary criticism, but Ānandavardhana's action seems to have inspired a reaction in Jayantabhatta, who is drawn to refute the dhvani theory in his Nyāya text only because Ānandavardhana has discussed and refuted the Naiyāyika theory of Anumāna.

Jayantabhatta examines the dhvani theory in his Nyāya while discussing the problem whether Arthāpatti is an independent Pramāṇa. He thinks that the newly reached theory of dhvani does not deserve any serious notice at all. He laughs at the very idea that poets propose to solve the problems concerning words and their import, which have eluded satisfactory solution at the hands of the most learned logicians. He ridicules Ānandavardhana as a 'panditammanya' a man who makes a pretence of scholarship which he does not possess.

He notes the first two instances of Vāstudhvani cited by Ānandavardhana, and remarks that the fact can be explained more satisfactorily by regarding the so-called suggested meaning as being conveyed by the primary function of words with the assistance of other pramāṇas, particularly anumānas.

Jayantabhatta's criticism has been hedged in between his refutations of the views of Mīmāṃsakas on Arthāpatti and Abhāva. According to him dhvani occupies almost the same
place as that of Arthāpatti and therefore the criticism levelled against the latter will, in his opinion, apply mutatis mutandis in regard to dhvani too. Just as Arthāpatti is nothing more than a kind if inference dhvanilalso is another kind of inference only. He kills two birds with one stone by positing that words with their well-known functions are enough to explain all meanings, arrived at through some pramāṇa or another. The variety in meaning is due, in other words, to the variety of the pramāṇas that assist in the grasping of the meaning and not due to the variety of functions (vyāpāra) of a word.

V.10 Mahimabhatta's Criticism

Mahimabhatta’s VV stands foremost among the works criticising the Dhvani theory. He attempted to demonstrate elaborately how all varieties of Dhvani can be included in Anumāṇa. In the third chapter of the VV he cites about thirty examples quoted in the Dhvani and shows how they can be explained away by Anumāṇa. Some of them are analysed as follows:

1. Vastumātradhvani

These words are spoken by the heroine to a mendicant who wanders in the forest to gather flowers. She explicitly bids him to wander as he pleases. The meaning actually
intended here is the prohibition of wandering. This meaning according to Anandavardhana, is conveyed through suggestion, while Mahimabhaṭṭa shows that it is inferred. It can be explained as:

2. Arthāntarasamkramitavacya

Mahimabhaṭṭa points out that the word kamalāṇī (lotuses) is used twice in two different senses. The first word refers to the lotuses in their general capacity and the second to the particular aspect characterised by qualities like excessive charm and perfume caused by the contact with the rays of the sun. These particular qualities are inferred as existing in the lotuses because of the identification of the general with the particular. It cannot be objected that the identification between the same objects is illogical, because there the identification is between the same things characterised by different aspects.

3. Atyantatiraskṛtvacyadhvani

Here the explicit statement that the mirror is blind, being actually incompatible causes the inference of the dimness of the mirror. Blindness can be the characteristic of only a living being; hence we infer that all that is intended is that mirror is just like the eye covered by the vapour of
Here, apart from the contextual meaning referring to the advent of the summer season, we cognise a non-contextual meaning referring to Śiva. Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains that it is because the figure Samāsokti originating due to the greater suitability of the epithets to the Mahākāla (Śiva) serves as the cause for the second meaning of that word. As a result it is able to denote the non-contextual meaning i.e. Śiva in addition to the contextual meaning, the great season (Mahā kālah). The word mahākāla by itself cannot give both the contextual and the non-contextual meanings alike by Abhidhā and it is the association of roaring laughter (attāhāsa) and the destruction of yuga with mahākāla that is responsible for the cognition of a non-contextual meaning. Thus we cognise this meaning also: "In the meanwhile yawned terrible Lord Śiva with a boisterous laughter white like full-blown jasmines", apart from the contextual meaning: "By that time, the great season called summer concluding the twin months of flowering season burst forth whiteness of full-blown flowers rendering the turrets beautiful". Its Anumānavākyya can be possible in the following two ways:

(a) पूक्तां महाकालयोऽ महाकालेवताप्रियग्राहिन्यापाऀनपरम्, सुगस्त्तात्रूहासीवधकपदासांसिध्यायांनतनत्वात्।
(b) महाकालेत नाम देवविशेषः अन्तर्यमहाकालप्रियग्राहिन्यः, सुगस्त्तात्रूहाससमभिधितनात्।
Mahimabhatta insists that some hint should be given by the poet as to the presence of the non-contextual meaning for its cognition. Accordingly he denies the presence of the additional meaning in places wherein no such hint is given. For example:

\[
\text{德拉纳: प्रेमात् समुचितसमयाक्षिष्ठसूत्रं: परंतु: पूर्ण वित्रक्षीरं दिशि दिशि विशेषत्वं प्रेमतारभ: +}
\]

\[
\text{द्वीपावको दृश्यविज्ञ: र्वं अभवभव भयो दुःखाविदग्दास्तानो!}
\]

\[
\text{भी: व: पावनानं परमप्रशिद्धात् प्रेमतारभ: }
\]

Here, there is nothing to warrant the presence of the non-contextual meaning pertaining to cow and hence no cognition of that meaning is possible here. The homonymous word gauḥ itself cannot denote the non-contextual meaning because in that case, there would be no reason why it cannot denote other non-contextual meanings like vajra as well. It cannot be argued that due to the suitability of epithets to cow, only that main meaning is selected from among the several non-contextual meanings; there is nothing to show that a second meaning other than the contextual is intended by these epithets. If we take the word gauḥ to be the determining factor of their non-contextual meaning, it will involve the defect of mutual reliance (anyonyāśraya). The cognition of the non-contextual meaning of the epithets will itself have to be caused by means of the word gauḥ. It cannot be argued that both the homonymous viśeṣaṇas and viśeṣya operating jointly cause the cognition of the non-
contextual meaning; they have no capacity to produce meaning independently without the involvement of the reader's cognitive power. Moreover, if the word were the cause of the cognition of the contextual and the non-contextual meanings alike, it could do so automatically and simultaneously. In that case there would be no sequence in their cognition. Thus Mahima shows that the homonymous words themselves are not capable of giving forth the non-contextual meaning without some hint. In the absence of any such hint there can be no cognition of the non-contextual meaning.

5. Arthāsaktimūladhvani

Mahimabhaṭṭa explains that in case of Arthāsaktimūladhvani the cognition of the suggested meaning from the expressed meaning is like their invariable concomitance. Thus in the verse:

एवं वाणिज्यं देवं श्रवणं पितृपद्मेश्वरं ||
लोकाक्षेप प्रत्यावरणं गणयामास पार्वतीं ||

the expressed meaning consisting of Pārvatī's counting the petals of the lotus causes the inference of the bashfulness of Pārvatī because of the mutual connection between them.30

V.11 The Suggestive Elements in Mahimabhaṭṭa's Perspective

Anandavardhana regards all elements of poetry, beginning from mere letters (vārṇas) to the whole composition (prābandha) as capable of suggestion (vyaḥjaka). Mahimabhaṭṭa examines
this view from his own standpoint. According to him, varnas and saṃghaṭanā do not have the natural power to evoke Rasa directly. They are related to the Rasa only through the expressed meaning. Mahima maintains that the Rasas shine forth more vividly when they are inferred from the expressed meaning given forth by sound adorned with the appropriate varṇas and saṃghaṭanā. The varṇas and saṃghaṭanā are actually the attributes of sound which gives forth the expressed meaning, which in its turn is the cause of Rasa just as dry leaves cause fire which is the cause of smoke. The relation of varṇas and saṃghaṭanā with the concerned Rasa is grasped through experience. It is our ordinary experience that people use style and sound devoid of huge compounds when affected by emotions like love and grief. When angry or excited, they employ harsh sounds and complex style. This experience serves the basis of the inference of the appropriate Rasa from varṇas and saṃghaṭanā.

As to the suggestiveness of words and sentences, Mahimabhaṭṭa points out that they are directly responsible for the cognition of the expressed meaning from which Rasa is inferred. They become the cause of the cognition of another meaning because of either metaphorical usage (upacāra) or factors like the context (prakaraṇasamagri). The word rāmeṇa in रामेण प्रियजीवनिन्ते नु कृतं प्रेमम् प्रियेणोपचितम् is the example where a word becomes responsible for the inference of Rāma's qualities like bravery etc., otherwise
the use of 'maya' in place of 'Ramina' could have served the purpose.

Mahimabhatta concludes W with the observation that the gist of his arguments is that all the elements considered to be responsible for Abhivyakti by the Dhvani theorists are accepted by him as the causes responsible for inference. 34

V.12 Anumāṇa and Mahimabhatta's Theory of Language

Mahimabhatta critically examines the problem of meaning and analyses the concepts like Abhidhā, Laksanā, Vyāhjana and Tatparyaśakti as well as Pramanas like Upamāṇa and Arthāpatti.

The most interesting feature of this theory of language is that he considers all linguistic expressions as the forms of inference. One resorts to language to bring forth some desired effect in the hearer. This effect may be either some positive action or abstention from action. It is the result of yathārthajñāna and ayathārthajñāna. In Mahima's view language by its very nature is pragmatic, having definite aims in its operation. It is through creative conviction of the validity of the communicated fact that a hearer can be persuaded to act in accordance with the speaker's wishes. In other words, linguistic usage always involves the establishment of some fact logically and convincingly leading the hearer to the comprehension of the validity of
that fact. The hearer can be convinced of the validity of a proposition only when he understands the logic in it and this demonstration of logic is done through language.

Mahimabhatta distinguishes between descriptive sentences which do not establish anything new and substantive sentences establishing new facts. In other cases the meaning of the sentence becomes descriptive as in the case of the statement:

अस्तुदयस्याः किर्ति देवताः हिमालयं नाम नगाधिराजः

'there is a mountain called Himalaya in the north'.

Substantiation of new facts involves the presentation of the fact to be established (sādhyā) as the means of establishing that fact (sādhana). The sādhyā and sādhana portions of a sentence are constituted respectively by the subjective and predicative elements of the sentence. In other words, the known facts become sādhana in establishing the sādhyā of unknown facts. The process involved in the comprehension of the theme of an argument is inference undergoing in the mind of the hearer when he cognises a verbal statement.

Ordinary inference is possible only when there is the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (vyāptijñāna) of the sādhyā and sādhana. In the inference of fire on the hill, on seeing smoke, one is prompted by the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between the fire and the smoke grasped by the inquirer from his frequent observations in the places like kitchen. The same procedure is followed in the understanding of the arguments couched in ordinary language,
which can be grasped from three sources of valid knowledge. They are 1. **Loka** 2. **Veda** and 3. **Ādhyātma**. Among the three, the first two constitute verbal knowledge and the last one is perception. First of all Bharata has referred to these three pramāṇas. Abhinavagupta explains the term Lokapramāṇa means pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Āgama etc. whereas, as Ruṭyaka points out, this list significantly omits Anumāna. The omission, Ruṭyaka explains, is due to the fact that Anumāna is the end served by these pramāṇas.

Mahimabhaṭṭa deals with śādhyasādhanabhāva of a language at two different levels. (1) The substantiation of one fact by another at expressed level. (2) The substantiation of a fact by means of the expressed facts, at the unexpressed level. It is the second type that comprises Anumāna wherein Mahima includes all varieties of Dhvani. Though both types of substantiation involve śādhyasādhanabhāva, the former is essentially different from the latter in one important respect. The first type, comprising explicit śādhyasādhanabhāva, causes the cognition of no new idea save the logical relationship between directly stated śādhyā and śādhana.

On the other hand, the second type caused the cognition of the unexpressed śādhyā from the expressed śādhana. Ruṭyaka cites the parallel to kāvyahetu and Arthāntaranyāsa of Udbhāṭa to illustrate the point. Anumāna is like kāvyahetu where something unexpressed is cognised. The explicit śādhyasādhanabhāva is like Arthāntaranyāsa where one
expressed idea is substantiated by means of another expressed idea. All instances of Dhvani, in Mahima's view, consist of sadhyasadhanabhāva between the expressed and the unexpressed meanings, i.e. of the second type.

Mahima divides the whole meaning-complex of language into vācyā and anumeya. He is of the view that the relationship between word and meaning is conventional. Sound can denote a meaning only when there is a convention assigning that specific meaning to it. Hence, he rejects the view that sound can ever denote a meaning not having a conventional relation with it.

V. 13 Critics of Anumāna Theory

1. Mammata

Mammata in his KP makes an attempt to show the defects in Mahimabhatta's theory of Anumāna. He presents the purvapakṣa view as follows:

The suggested meaning without having any relation with the expressed meaning cannot be cognised. If it happens, anything could be suggested by any word without any restriction. So one has to accept that the suggested meaning has some relation with the expressed meaning. Since relation exists between the two there can be no suggestiveness in the absence of that relation existing between the suggested and the suggestor. The relation is such that the suggestor is never
concomitant with the contrary of suggested. The suggestor also subsists in the suggested meaning. Thus the suggestor fulfills three essential conditions of a hetu required in Anumāna viz., pakṣasattva, sapakṣasattva and vipakṣasattva. The knowledge of the suggested meaning becomes inferential in nature. For example in bhrama dhārmika etc., the traveller is advised to move in the wilderness because of the death of the dog. But it leads to the inference that godāvaritīra is not a safe place because of the presence of the lion. The nature of inference is:

Thus presenting the pūrvapakṣa view Mammaṭa shows the three defects of Anaikāntikatva, Viruddhatva and Asiddhatva of hetu in the given example.

The first defect is that the hetu is Anaikāntika which is explained as savyābhicāra in the Nyāyaśāstra. It is so named because it does not possess only one end only or it tends to prove not only one thing but also its opposite. Thus Anaikāntika means inconclusive. Mammaṭa says that the mere apprehension of something frightening is not an adequate reason for abstaining from wandering since people are seen wandering through dangerous places when they are obeying the command of their elders or are impelled by love. Thus the hetu is Anaikāntika by nature.
Secondly, the hetu suffers from Viruddhatva which is defined in the Nyāyaśāstra as that which is invariably comcomitant with the absence of the sādhyā. In the given example the mendicant’s aversion to the dog may not be due to his fear but because of its impure nature. Hence it does not prove that he would be afraid of the lion. If he is a hero, the presence of the lion may prove just the contrary.

Thirdly, the defect of Asidhā also occurs in the given example as it does not establish the sādhyā correctly. The presence of lion on Godavari’s bank itself is not a documented fact. It is conveyed through the verbal statement of a woman in love. Thus the validity of the hetu itself being not established, the whole process of inference built upon it loses certainty required in a normal process of an inference.

Mammatā again demonstrates the same thing with the help of another verse ‘niśesacyutacandana’ etc. In this verse Anumāna theorists cannot explain the cognition of the suggested meaning from the expressed meaning. The signs seen on the messenger’s body cannot conclusively prove that she has returned after enjoying dalliance. The very same signs can warrant the conclusion that she has taken bath. Nor can the term ‘adhama’ establish the bad conduct of the hero since the wickness of hero is not a fact established through valid means. Thus, Mammatā establishes that the indefiniteness of the suggested meaning proves the difference between Anumāna and Vyañjanā.
3. Vidvadhara

Following Ruyyaka, Vidvadhara (1285-1325 A.D.) in his Ekāvali rejects the Anumāna theory of Mahimabhaṭṭa. He repeats the arguments of Ruyyaka but adds Anupalabdhi as vyāptiprayojaka which is not found in the treatment of Ruyyaka in his AS. Anupalabdhi cannot prove dhvani for it can prove only that sādhya which consists of an absence of something as the absence of a jar can be proved from Anupalabdhi. The fact, that 'there is no jar here' can be proved from the perception that it is not cognised here. Since, had it been here it would have been cognised. If Mahimabhaṭṭa attempts to prove dhvanyābhāva from Anupabdhi, the hetu which is vitiated leads to the fallacy called Asiddha. When the cognition of dhvani is evident, its non-cognition cannot be proved. Nor can dhvanyābhāva be proved from the non-cognition of words and their sense. The non-cognition of a jar cannot prove the absence of a pillar. Therefore, the non-cognition of words and their senses cannot prove the absence of dhvani. Thus Anupalabdhi cannot establish the vyāpti between the sādhya and the sādhana, dhvani and śabdārtha.

4. Vidvānātha

Vidvānātha (1325 A.D.) in the Pratāparudriyāyaśobhūṣana while dealing with Mahimabhaṭṭa's Anumāna theory maintains that Arthasaktimūladhvani cannot be included in Anumāna. There
There is no vyāpti between suggestive elements and the suggested meaning, because the intended meaning is cognised from words qualified by the poet's intention. Different meanings are cognised from the same words due to the difference in the implications of the poems. This is not compatible with Anumāna which requires the cognition of the same meaning from the same expression.

5. Viśvanātha

Viśvanātha (1383A.D.) in his SD repeats the arguments of Mammatā with regard to the problem of the inclusion of vastudhvani and alāṅkāradhvani in Anumāna. The hetu in the example like 'bhrama dharmika' etc., is not from the defects like Aniakāntika and Asiddha. Apart from this he further points out some other difficulties with regard to the Anumāna theory. Refering to the verse 'nīśesacyutacandanam' etc., he raises the question as to who is the inferer? or who does infer that the messenger made love to the hero? There would not be any problem if it is maintained that the implied meaning is inferred by the messenger herself or by other people present there. But the Anumāna theorists maintain that it is the sahrdaya who infers this meaning. This is unsound since the same verse may give a different meaning in another context. Thus the vyāpti between the literal and the suggested meaning is not possible. It may be argued that the literal meaning
qualified by background features like the speakers mood can give rise to specific suggested meaning only. But there is no way of comprehending the vyāpti in such a specific form modified by contextual features. Further, Viśvanātha argues that as the subject matter presented in poetry originates from the poet's pratibhā it is essentially different from logical propositions. The hetu depicted in poetry having defects like sandīgdr̥avā and āsiddhatvā may fail to satisfy the technical requirements of the hetu in a logical syllogism.

5. Kavi Karnāpura

Kavi Karnāpura (1505 A.D.) in Alankārakaustubha (II kirāna) in connection with the discussion of vyāñjana deals with the Anumāna theory of Mahimabhaṭṭa and rejects it. Vyāñjana cannot be identical with inference. For, the relation between the suggestor and the suggested is not the same as that of the hetu and the sādhya in the case of Anumāna of fire from smoke. The relation existing between the suggester and the suggested is of the nature of manifestor and manifested like the lamp and the jar. While in the case of vahnyanumāna the relation existing between dhūma and vahni is sāhacarya. Secondly, in the vahnyanumāna of Naiyāyikas the knowledge of hetu produces arthakriyā (a sense of action). On the basis of arthakriyā anumāna is known to be valid one. Thirdly, there should be presence of the hetu in pakṣa otherwise the anumāna is not possible.
Anumāna is a major topic of Nyāya philosophy and it deals with a very fundamental aspect of epistemology. Experience of rasa or realisation of dhvani is also an important type of cognition and as such it also moves on the fringe of the epistemological problem. Thus, the chain of Anumāna to substitute the vyañjanā (and dhvani) is a very serious one, and has constituted a major theory in Indian aesthetics, a major opposition to the Rasa-Dhvani theories, and an important exposition in the VV of Mahima. Aesthetic experience as a kind of cognition has claimed an important portion in the earlier poeticians like Abhāma etc, a major theory of rasanumitī propounded by Śaṅkuka, and a major perhaps the most serious criticism of the Dhvani theory. The graveness of this particular objection to Rasa and Dhvani has been recognised by all the major and minor poeticians beginning from Abhinava and upto Appaya and Jagannatha and even after who, while adhered to the Rasa and Dhvani views of Ānandavardhana, Abhinava, Mammata, could not afford to neglect it and always mentioned it and strove to answer it out. Each successive writer trying to add an argument or two of his own. This shows that this
important part of Nyāyaśāstra, the anumāṇavāicāra has not only constituted a major source of fear to the poetic theories but also has influenced the poetical thought and sharpened the wits of the Indian literary thinkers. It has proved to be a very important aspect of the Na[jāyāyika influence on Sānскrit poetics.
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2. अनुमितिकरणं अनुमानम् | Ts., P.25
3. तत्त्वं परंती बहिःप्रान्। इति दृशमुनुमितिः | ibid.
4. अनुमानस्य बृहोऽयाचं पश्चाद्यत्वं पश्चादपत्ता | TB, P.33.
5. व्यास्यस्य पर्यन्तादिवृत्तिः पश्चादपत्ता | Ts., P.25
6. यद यद स्थूलात्मानिश्चिति साधुपर्यायनियमो वैराग्य:- |
7. विबुधाभिविधमेनानां परमश्रे: | ibid
8. तत्त्वानामां पद्यविधम् | स्वाभावं पराधीन भैरवः | TB, P.25.
9. यस्य कृषितः स्वयं स्थूलात्मानिन्मणयां परं बृहिष्यतः प्राचायवलं वाक्यं प्रयुक्तेन ततः पराधीनमानसं | TB, P.26.
10. N.S., ch. VI, P. 226.
Translation is taken from the above.
13. As Translated by Gnoli, op.cit, p.29.
15. PV. II. 56.

16. विशेषज्ञ भाव स्वतः का सामान्य ज्ञान कानु माननः।
प्रश्नकथा प्रतिष्ठाण्ड प्रश्नसूची। परिशिष्ट्याणि
संपूर्णः। निवयाकोऽक, प. 485.

17. AB. I. 233

18. यापि विभावात्रिवेवा स्वाभाविक भावितिः। सानुभाव
एव भी भवितिः। 'विभावाय भावः' भिन्नायि
प्रति रसादि प्रति ते। साधनानिष्ठिते। ततः
रसादि भावानां कार्यकार्य सहकारुणिता-
स्तानामुमाययति यथा रसादि निप्रदेयनिः।
न यथा रसादि प्रत्येकाना आर्थार्थपदववो गता।
सनो रसा धन्युक्लिते। इत्यक्षमभवो नर
प्रतिनिधिक्रमः। । V. P. 554.

19. तत्र प्रकृत्यम् किं शास्त्रिविभय समर्पिता विभाव्र
यदि प्रत्येकुपस्य निष्ठित सामाधिगत, सामाधिगत
रसादि भिनं स्वतं भवन्, तद्ग्रावण्या भावाकृत्यमानः
स्वप्रकाशानन्देऽवा। च आये न विबाहः।
किंतु सामाधिगत सामाधि न्यायं स्वस्थर्य नीच्यते
सम्बिकः इत्यैव विषयः। द्विनीयतः
20. यथाज्ञम शास्त्राः गदान्ते तत्स्य किंशु-नमस्तवशः यद्वापि निर्विश्वविनिर्विद्य भाव ते ज्ञान यथायत्तव कारणो नापुरः कश्चिद्।

DH. II. 43. P. 216.

22. अथवा नैरेण्यो चन्द्रा कविभि: सूर्य श्रीभानी।
विद्रोहसौरिष प्रभुश्चिल्लिण वाक्यार्थां गहनेषुविनि॥
NM. P. 55.
23. नयं मनया गोपुरा पवित्रमोहितयाः स्थिरः।
पुराणानं तत्स्यान्नमभिमयं नयं॥
NM. P. 45.
24. ईपैं श्यामसाध्वमहिभन्ना सौरीयो भारितः।
यमः अविद्वितमः चरणं धनिम्॥
विवर्णेन वेधाकारार्थ विद्विशक्तिर निषेधतः।
भम धर्ममेक वैसर्थे मार्म पांडु मृदु विश।॥
NM. P. 45.
25. तेनानुमेय एव भ्रमणस्य निर्देशो न यथाय
एवक्तवेत्ते यथा नात्र श्रीत्वष्कृतेश्चैव श्वारामस्य।
दृष्टी भूषभः व्व. P. 565.
26. प्रवचनार्थयुना भावावलोकनः। 
VV. P. 546.
27. नस्या चालवान्तार्थभावं: समार्थतं एव प्राक्।
28. इत्यत्र तच्चकुषाक्रमः प्रकाशो न सम्बवतीति
कुलैक्षणेऽतपुलवत्ति। | VV. P. 546.
29. ibid. P. 549.
30. ibid. P. 549.
31. ibid. P. 599.
32. ibid.
33. ibid. P. 501.
34. नरेश धवनेषसमानं गायत्रिपाः: श्रीयान्ति।
ibid. P. 510
35. Ruyyaka, Com. on VV. ज्ञानानं च निर्धारणं त्रिधां
वैद्याध्यात्मरूपेऽनं। | P. 501.
36. नवनात्मकास्तथातुयायेनानु मानं विविधतम्,
अनन्तरत्नाल्यायेन नृपाधुनम्। ibid. p. 59.
37. VV., P. 54-8.
38. अर्थादिक शिष्यभिषेकावयीकरणमिव। ibid. P. 54.
39. KP., P. 255-1. 
40. यत् पुनर्नमानता नातिनिष्ठेऽति ध्यनिष्ठायाच्छुन्-
कटिमभट्टैः ललश्च व पत्नायामानि …… प्रकृति-
धनिः साध्य सामान्य शब्दः धी व साधनसामान्यः
तत्र व ध्वनि रनुपकिंदिकी श्रुताधीशोऽस्तिकायं
वा नृत्तसिद्ध साधिका। Ekāvai, p. 32.

41. Pratāparudrayādhyāsājanam, p. 33

42. ननु वक्राष्टर वा स्टुकेतवै विश्रीद्या हैनुं—
विनित न वां-फळ एवं विधायातम्यु संधानस्याभावम्
SD, p. 168.

43. Ibid

44. Alamkārakaustubha, p. 27.