CHAPTER IV

INFLUENCE OF NYĀYA

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Most of the Sanskrit rhetoricians have allotted a major portion to the treatment of Alāṅkāras in their works. On close examination it is found that some of the poeticians have been greatly influenced by some Nyāya principles, logical terms and concepts on the basis of which they have attempted to classify and formulate some figures of speech. The present chapter makes an attempt to identify the Alāṅkāras based on Nyāya terms and concepts and to analyse them.

IV.1 Principle of Āśrayāśrayibhāva and Anvayavyatirekibhāva

It is known that the Alāṅkāras are classified into Śabdālaṅkāra, Arthālaṅkāra and Ubhayālaṅkāra as they pertain to the word or to the sense or to both. The simple classification of Śabdālaṅkāra and Arthālaṅkāra is started from Rudraṭa's time. But Rudraṭa does not mention the Ubhayālaṅkāras. The AP appears to be the earliest known work to mention the third division.

It is interesting to note that for the classification of Alāṅkāras Sanskrit Poeticians follow two principles, Āśrayāśrayibhāva and Anvayavyatirekibhāva. These two
principles seem to have their beginning in Rājānaka Tilaka's commentary on THE KASS of Udbhāta wherein he gives these principles by which the Alaṅkāras are decided as belonging to śabda or artha. It is the discussion on the Śleṣa Alaṅkāra, its definition and illustration in Udbhāta that brings the issue to a head and results in the clear formulation of the principle of the classification of Alaṅkāras into those of śabda and those of artha.

In the Vivṛti on Udbhata's illustration of Artha-Śleṣa Tilaka says that Guna, Doṣa, or Alaṅkāra is classified into that of śabda or artha by the principle of Anvaya and Vyatireka. In Udbhata's illustration:

\( \text{स्वयं यथ यन्त्रवान्मेव आस्तविकः विशालिनि} \)

\( \text{प्रभुतन्तस्य वैवाच्य पहलुलूक्ष्य विन्त्या} \) (KASSP. 40)

if we replace bhāsvatkara-virajita by bhanu-dipyamāna, then, the Alaṅkāra disappears due to the change of words. Since the Alaṅkāra here depends upon the presence or otherwise of certain words it is case of śabdālaṅkāra. It is clear that Tilaka is propounding the principle of Anvaya-Vyatireka for deciding an Alaṅkāra as belonging to śabda or artha.

V.Raghavan believes that Mammaṭa accepts the principle of Anvaya-Vyatireka in his KP from Tilaka. As he says:

The text of Tilaka is found reproduced to some extent by Mammaṭa.
But the formal actual inclusion of these two principles in the theoretical structure is made by Mammaṭa and then by Ruuyaka. Mammaṭa clearly mentions that the Gunas, Doṣas and Alāṅkāras are characterised as belonging to śabda or to artha only by the principle of Anvaya and Vyatireka. To quote his words:

Mammaṭa also mentions Āsrayāśrayibhāva and explains that even to determine the Āsrayāśrayibhāva one has to use Anvaya-Vyatireka principle. Hence it is better to distinguish śabdālaṅkāras from Arthālaṅkāras through the principle of Anvaya-Vyatireka.4

Ruuyaka differs from Mammaṭa in that he propounds Āsrayāśrayibhāva as the differentiating principle. He in his AS says:

(KP. IX. P. 518)
Concluding the deliberations of Mammata's views at the close of the consideration of the view of Tilaka, Ruyyaka explains that the Anvaya-Vyatireka theory can prove śabda or artha only as the kārana. Resorting to that theory one can only say that a certain Alanāka is the kārya either of śabda or of artha. If one Alanāka of a śabda is due to the presence of śabda then Śrautopama, which due to the anvaya of 'iva' is actually an Arthālāṅkāra, will be a case Sabdālāṅkāra. But there is no Alanāka or special figurative beauty added to the poem by its being a case of Śrautopama with the anvaya of the word 'iva'. So there is no Alanāka as there is 'iva' and it will be contradictory and absurd if one has to say that since there is iva-śabdānvaya, it is a case of Sabdālāṅkāra. Further, Śrautopama can never be anything but an Arthālāṅkāra. So the Anvaya-Vyatireka theory must be discarded.

Now both these principles are the principles of Nyāya philosophy. According to Nyāyaśāstra, Āśrayāśrayibhāva is a relation existing between two objects (dravya) like avyavi-avayavi, guna-guni, kriyā-kriyāvān and jāti-vyakti. Naiyāyikas explain their relations viz., Samyoga and Samavāya on the principle of Āśrayāśrayibhāva. Samyoga-sambandha takes place between two objects only (dravyayoh eva samyoga) out of which one becomes the Āśraya and the later Āśrayi. For instance, a bird is sitting on the branch
of a tree. Here exists the relation of *Saṃyoga* between the bird and the branch, out of which the former is *Āsrayi* and the latter is *Āsraya*. *Saṃyoga-saṃbandha* is temporary. The *Samavāya*-relation is explained by Kaṇāda as *kāryakāraṇayoh sa samavāyah*, the relation of cause and effect. Keśavamitra, the Naiyāyika, in his TB defines it as *ayutasiddhayoh saṃbandhah*, the inherent and inseparable relation between the two objects. *Ayutasiddha* means proved to be not joined (if you join) or proved to be not separated (if you separate) that is, things that are always together until one of them is destroyed. For example, the relation of avayava with avayavi (e.g. *tantu* and *pāta*) out of which avayava is *Āsraya* and avayavi is *Āsrayi*. Thus the relation of either *Saṃyoga* or *Saṃavāya* is in fact one of *ĀsrayāĀsrayiḥbhāva*.

Secondly, *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka* are two technical terms of Nyāya philosophy. The relation of *Vyāpti* which obtains between hetu and *aśādhya* is basically of two types; the positive and negative invariable concomitance, technically known as *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka*. *Anvaya* is defined in the Nyāya texts as *yat-sattve yat-sattvam* and *Vyatireka* as *yadabhāve yadabhāvah*. The conception of *Anvaya-Vyatireka* is very important in Navya-Nyaya. The invariable concomitance between *śādhyā* and *śādhanā* through the force of which the sadhana enables us to draw the conclusion, can be expressed in two ways, *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka*. Naiyāyikas classify the relation of *Vyāpti* in three categories such as *Anvaya-vyāpti*,
Vyatireka-vyāpti and Anvayavyatireki-vyāpti. The hetu also is designated as Kevalānvayi, Kevalavyatireki and Anvaya-vyatireki. Similarly, Māmata and his followers also classifies the Alāṅkāras into śabda, artha and Ubbhayālāṅkāra. The principle of Anvaya-vyatireka is based on kāraṇa-kārya relation. As, according to Nyāya, kāraṇasattve kāryasattvam or dhūmasattve vahnisattvam and kāraṇābhāve kāryabhāva or vahnyabhāve dhūmabhāva similarly poeticon salso hold the view imply in their propositions śabdāsattve alāṅkārasattvam and śabdābhāve alāṅkārābhāva. From this point of view Māmata's principle of classifcation is based on the Nyāya principle of relation particularly of vyāpti. And Ruyyaka's principle of Āśrayāśrayibhāva is based on the Nyāya theory of relation of Samyoga and Samavaya.

By advocating the relation of Āśrayāśrayibhāva Ruyyaka stresses the relation existing between the śabda and artha or both with Alāṅkāra and resulting into kāvyasaundarya. In case of Sabdalankāra this saundarya is based on sabda. So śabda is Āśraya and saundarya is Āśrayi. This is the same in the case of Arthālaṅkāra.

IV.2 Further Classification of Arthālaṅkāras

Ruyyaka in his AS makes an attempt for the first time to classify the Arthālaṅkāras on the principle of Nyāya. He evolves three categories such as Tarkanyāya, Vākyanyāya
and Lokanyāya. The figures based on Tarka are two—Kāvyaliṅga and Anumāna; the Alāṅkāras like Yathāsaṁkhya, Paryāya, Parivṛtti, Parisaṁkhyā, Arthāpatti, Vikalpa, Sammucaya and Samādhi are based on Vākyanyāya; and the Alāṅkāras such as Pratyanāka, Pratipa, Milita, Tadgupta, Atadgupta and Uttara are based on Lokanyāya. We may note that Ruyyaka does not give any justification for such a classification. Even the commentator Jayaratha and the later rhetoricians who accept this classification do not give us any rationale. He does not define either of the term 'Tarka' and 'Nyāya'. But his categorisation of Alāṅkāras stands definitely on some rationale otherwise it would not have been unanimously accepted by his successors only with some slight modifications here and there. Unlike Ruyyaka however, Vidyānātha, Appaya and Jagannātha include Arthāntaranyāsa also in the category of Tarkanyāya. Modern scholars have taken the term 'Tarka' in the general sense of reasoning and according to them reasoning should be the result of poetic imagination. Logical perfection may not be present in the figures based on Tarka. It may be presumed that logical perfection is not insisted upon for the constitutions of all these three figures based upon Tarka but they should not lack in any way the poetic beauty.

Here the two terms 'Tarka' and 'Nyāya' must be defined carefully. To consider the term Nyāya. No doubt he does not refer to the technical sense of the term Nyāya such as
pañcāvayavāvākyam nyāyah or pramāṇairarthaparīkṣaṇaṃ nyāyah.

But it definitely refers to the logical principle on the strength of which Ruyyaka's classification is based. From the Alāṅkāras grouped under the heads like Tarkanyāya, Vākyanyāya and Lokanyāya it appears that he classifies them keeping in view the Śāstras such as Tarkaśāstra, Vākyāśāstra or Mīmāṃsā and others like the Laukika Vyavahāra. Again, a close study of Alāṅkāras grouped under Tarkanyāya category reveals that the term Tarka decidedly refers to Tarkaśāstra in which Anumāna and Liṅga occupy the place of prime importance. The perfection of hetu or liṅga is quite necessary for a valid Anumāna. The poeticians have definitely used the terms like Anumāna and Liṅga in the sense in which they are used by the Naiyāyikas and they have also insisted on the same kind of perfection. Unlike the Naiyāyikas, however, they deal with the objects of beauty in poetics. As Bhāmaha rightly points out, the poetic Anumāna differs from Nyāyānumāna in this respect because the sphere of Nyāya is altogether different from that of poetics. Still, Ruyyaka consciously makes an attempt to categorise them as Tarkanyāyamūlaka and thereby differentiates them from the general sense of the term. Therefore, Tarkanyāyamūlaka means the figures based on the principles as given in the Tarkaśāstra. Similarly, the Alāṅkāras like Yathāśākhya, Arthāpatti refer to the Mīmāṃsāśāstra in which these terms have been used in technical sense. This may be considered as a case of influence of Nyāya of Ruyyaka and his successors.
IV.3 Tarkanyāyamulaka Alāṅkāras

A number of Nyāya concepts and terms have been taken up by the poeticians for formulating their figures of speech, which reveal the conceptual influence of Nyaya school. The Alāṅkāras like Anumāṇa, Kāvyaliṅga and Arthāntaranyāsa based on Tarkanyāya are the examples of such influence. As it is not possible and not necessary here to deal with the development of these Alāṅkāras in historical perspective. We analyse them on the basis of some of the important definitions given by some prominent poeticians.

IV.3.1 Anumāṇa Alāṅkāra (Inference)

As far as the Anumāṇa Alāṅkāra is concerned nothing new is added to the Nyāya concept of Anumāṇa by the rhetoricians. All the rhetoricians accept the Nyāya concept and present it with hardly any difference. Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana and Udbhata do not recognise this Alāṅkāra. Rudraṭa is the first among the ancients to include it under the large group of figures based on Vāstava. Bhoja, Mammatā, Ruṣyaka, Vidyānātha, Vidyādharā, Viśvanātha, Appaya Dīkṣita, Jagannātha and even his successors deal with Anumāṇa Alāṅkāra. Jagannātha's definition of Anumāṇa is anumitikaraṇamanumānam. This definition is exactly identical with the Naiyāyika definition of it as found in the works like Tarkasamgraha. He refers to the views of both old and new Naiyāyikas with regard to the nature of Anumiti-karaṇa. Old Naiyāyikas think that the liṅga
which is cognised as sadhya-vyāpya is Anumitikarana. But Navyas like Viśvanātha Nyāyapācaṇānana accepts the cognition of such a liṅga as Anumiti-karana. In order to distinguish poetic Anumāna from the practical Anumāna of the Naiyāyikas Jagannātha states that the poetical Anumāna should contain camatkāra(aesthetic beauty).

Rudrāṭa gives two types of Anumāna - 1. where sadhya is mentioned first and then sadhana. 2. where sadhana is mentioned first and then sadhya. Rudrāṭa attempts to extend the nature of Anumāna and to differentiate it from the Nyāya concept. But his attempt does not gain any significance as pointed out by Māmaṭa who refutes his view. As the order of sadhana and sadhya does not make any difference Māmaṭa does not accept such a division.

In the Vāgbhataḥalākaṇa, Vāgbhata defines Anumāna as follows:

प्रत्येकाकाळातीत्यवर्तनम्।
किंचिंतो भवति ज्ञातसंन्यासानं लघुस्यं।

Where from a seen reason (liṅga) knowledge of liṅga existing in all the three kālas (past, present and future) arises that is Anumāna.

Here, the word kālatritayavartik is very significant. This reminds us three divisions of Anumāna made by Gautama and his commentator Vātsyāyana. Gautama dividis Anumāna into three kinds viz., pūrvavat, śeṣavat and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. This is
the oldest division available. Purvavat Anumāṇa occurs where one infers the effect from the cause, e.g., one infers that rain will fall when clouds gather in the sky. 19 Śeṣavat is the opposite of this, e.g., when one infers the cause from the effect. When one sees a river in floods he infers that there must have been heavy rain somewhere up in its course. 20 All cases of inference other than these two fall under sāmānyatodṛṣṭa. Thus, if after seeing a person in one place one finds him in another place some time later we know that he must have gone from the first place to the other during the interval. We see the sun in morning in the east and find him in the west in the evening. We therefore infer ādityasya gamanam from the east to the west during the course of the day, though his movement is not directly perceived.

According to Vāgbhaṭa, Anumāṇa Alāṅkāra is of three types viz., Atitānumāṇa, Vartamāṇānumāṇa and Bhavasyānumāṇa. Their examples are given in order as follows:

1. Atitānumāṇam

\[\text{मूनः नयस्तदाभूवननिभिभक्ताभ्जस् विभीः ।}\
\[\text{अन्यथा कथमेतासु} \quad \text{जनः स्नानेन} \quad \text{शुध्यति} \quad \text{॥ (8.58)}

Definitely the rivers were created from the waters of the abhiṣeka of the Lord, otherwise how does a man get purified by taking batha in them.

Here one infers the purifying capacity of rivers due to the water being that of the Lord's abhiṣeka by the
purification of people because of their bath into those rivers. The commentator explains it clearly in the following manner:

Thus the Atitānumāna of Vāgītha corresponds to the Śesavat type of Anumāna of Naiyāyikas.

2. Vartamaṇumāna

This corresponds to the Śamānyatodrṣta Anumāna which is generally based on the commonly known principles. For Example:

As is seen in the case of a servant who does not tolerate the insult of his lord and takes immediate revenge on the defaulter, in the same way the moon as a servant takes revenge on the lotuses who being jealous of the nāyikā's beauty tries to take that away.

3. Bhavisyānumāna

In the Bhavisyānumāna one infers the future incident from the present effect, technically saying one infers the effect from its cause. This exactly happens in case of Pūrvavat Anumāna.
For Example:

हरेकों विदर्भेत् आवस्थाएँ उत्साहितः प्रति गुरुः विजुष्ठनि

Here one infers an object of future i.e. the rising of moon by looking into the present object or cause i.e. the whiteness of the direction of Indra.

This categorisation is Vāgbhaṭa's contribution to Sanskrit Poetics which clearly speaks of Nyāya influence in disguise.

Viśvanattheva in hss Sāhityasudhāśindhu (SSS), a notable work on Sanskrit poetics deals with Anumāna Alaṅkāra, which according to him, is of three types, viz., anvayavyāptika, vyatirekavyāptika and anvayavyatirekavyāptika. But he does not define them. He gives two examples only anvayavyāptika type of Anumāna-Alaṅkāra.

For example:

वन्यालयाकारं यदुश्रयुस्मानसं तत्कलस्मि

Here the hero infers the anger of the heroine. It can be said in the following Nyāya style as is rightly explained by the editor:

हरेकों नाथिका मां प्रति प्रकृपिता उपचारन्तपानानि
उदासमनानि, आसन्तानिकाल्पसकलोपीतप्रमोक्ति
यन् यत्र उपचारन्तनिद्रिप्रवणाः तत्र तत्र कष्टावः
यथा काश्चिन्दुपरः नाथिका तथा चित्तमत्तेऽवै
मां प्रति प्रकृपिता

(SSS, p.496)
In Nyāyaśāstra anvaya is defined as yat sattve yat sattvam (hetusattve sādhyasattvam). In the example given above, from hetu i.e. upacāravacana, udgamana etc., sādhye i.e. kopa of nāyikā is inferred. So the vyāpti, yatra yatra upacāravacanaādiprayogah tatra tatra kopabhayah occurs and thus a the Anumāna is entitled anvayavyāptika.

Jayaratha in his commentary Vimarśini on AS identifies two types of Anumāna viz., svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna. In the example furnished by Ruyyaka:

वधा रक्षै ैैमेन्द्रगणकर्णयामः समकाति ।
सुमुक्तिज्ञानी स्वरपद्धतिः न वधा समकाति ॥

वधा विषुज्ञातिस्रवल्लटपरिपिलितवच ककुक्षः
स्त्राय मन्ये तत्ते पाठितसूक्ष्मे समरद्धः ॥

He explains this verse smoke etc., having the characteristic of three essentials helps us in inferring the fire expressed by the word 'dava'. The commentator, however, identifies it as an example of svārthānumāna for, in this the person himself reaches the definite knowledge of his own parāmarṣa.²²

For parārthānumāna, since there is no example in Ruyyaka's text Jayaratha himself furnishes one:

नयेरिन्देष्टत्तमस्त्रिप्रसरणां
निलोच्चारवं यदै वाचस्थिरतिं ॥

तत: पिण्ये सन्निहत्तित्वहारे वासरे
कथं न तत्संचारणं भविष्यति ॥

(C.P.552)
IV.3.2 Kāvyaliṅga Alāṅkāra (Poetical Cause)

Udbhaṭa is the first to mention Kāvyaliṅga which, he says, occurs when something becomes the cause of recollection. Bhāmaha does not mention Kāvyaliṅga, but mentions hetu and rejects it as an Alāṅkāra. Daṇḍin accepts it but Vāmana again rejects it. It is Udbhaṭa who accepts it and calls it Kāvyaliṅga which term thereafter stayed with this Alāṅkāra.

The commentator, Pratihārendurāja clarifies that the hetu of the logicians is related with the worldly objects and followed by paksadharmanvata and anavayavatireka. Hence that does not create any charm. But the hetu of the kāvyo is of different nature and creates a special charm. Hence the term hetu is rejected from and the word kāvyo is incorporated in the definition. Jagannātha defines Kāvyaliṅga as:

\[\text{अनुमितिकरणप्रवृत्ति सामाजिकशास्त्रभावायाम् व्याख्यातिजितः प्रकृतियोपप्रचुक्तवै विनिष्ठितार्थः काव्यानिः }\]

\[(RG.P.623)\]

The expression 'anumitikarapratvena' excludes Anumāna where the hetu is a means of inference. The hetu in this figure brings poētic charm when it is not expressly mentioned by an ablative or an instrumental case but is suggested. A case of Kāvyaliṅga presents invariably a case for inference also but the poet does not want to convey it to the readers. In Anumāna the poet or the speaker draws the conclusion for the readers. In Kāvyaliṅga the reader himself gets the knowledge of Anumiti due to some reasoning.
A clear demarcation between Kāvyaliṅga and Anumāna is given for the first time in the KP of Mammaṭa. He defines Kāvyaliṅga as a figure where the cause takes the form of the sense of a sentence or that of a word and Anumāna consists in the presentation of what is deduced (sādhyā) and the cause for such a deduction (sādhana). As in logic, in Poetics also the cause of the Anumāna has three aspects.

1. It serves as an attribute to the particular case (pakṣa).
2. It must be present in a positive case (sapakṣa).
3. It must be absent in a negative case (vipakṣa).

Ruyyaka in presenting these two figures follows Mammaṭa. He further observes that in Anumāna something not known before is inferred while in Kāvyaliṅga what is known already is supported by the presentation of a cause.

Kāvyaliṅga definitely differs from Anumāna because it gives stress on hetu and not on the process of Anumāna. Daṇḍin's Hetu Alaṅkāra is in fact Kāvyaliṅga but it has been made more distinct by adding the term 'kāvyā' to it. Accordingly it comes under Tarkanyāya and has been rightly included among Tarkanyāyamūlaka Alaṅkāras.

IV.3.3 Arthāntaraṇyāṣa Alaṅkāra (Corroboration)

Vidyānātha, Appaya and Jagannātha hold that Arthāntaraṇyāṣa Alaṅkāra is based on Tarkanyāya. Jagannātha defines
When a general proposition corroborates a particular proposition or when a particular proposition corroborates a general proposition the figure *Arthāntaranyāsa* takes place. Jagannātha generally follows Ruyyaka but here he differs from him. According to Jagannātha the corroboration of a general by a particular or of a particular by a general is based on some logic; for, a general consists of particulars, and the particular forms part and parcel of the general. Therefore *Arthāntaranyāsa* is a figure based on *Tarkanyāya*.

For example:

उपकारमेव कुसूरते विप्रद्व: सदस्य गतिश्चान्
सम्क्ष्यो गौत्रै गौत्री वा रोजाणपद्धति पार्टः सकलान्

(Rg. P. 634.)

IV.4 *Hetvābhāsas as Alaṅkāras*

*Hetvābhāsas* are invalid reasons which appear to be *hetu* but in fact do not possess the characteristics of valid reasoning. The word *Hetvābhāsas* is used in two senses: first it means a fallacious reason, secondly, it means fallacy or the defect which renders a reason fallacious.

It is interesting to note that Yajñēśvara Dīkṣita in his *Ālaṅkārārāgāhava* (Part II) has treated *Hetvābhāsas* as sub-types of *Anumāna Alaṅkāra*. He perhaps for the first time and perhaps for the only time treats *Hetvābhāsas* also as *Alaṅkāras*. 
Unlike Bhamaha and the Agnipurapakāra who treat Hetvābhāsas as poetic blemishes, Yajñeswara enumerates, under the treatment of Anumāna Alaṅkāra four Hetvābhāsas viz., Asiddha (with its three types), Viruddha, Satpratipaksa and Bādha.

1. Asiddha

He defines Asiddha Alaṅkāra as the reason which does not remain present in its pakṣa and gives its three kinds, namely Āśrayāsiddha, Svarūpāsiddha and Vyāpyatvāsiddha. He, however, gives the examples only of Āśrayāsiddha and Vyāpyatvāsiddha and omits that of Svarūpāsiddha.

(a) Āśrayāsiddha

In the TB an instance of Āśrayāsiddha is given as ganganāravindam surabhīharavindatvat sarojāravindavat. Here we find that viz., a sky-lotus simply does not exist because it is only an imaginary thing. Āśrayāsiddha thus lacks the very first requisite of a valid hetu viz., pakṣadharmanitvam.

Yajñeswara gives the following example of Āśrayāsiddha Alaṅkāra:

अनुत्युन्तं: पुमानेष: भवनि प्रसवारुधः |
अस्री भविष्टिरथि कार्यकारणनित्यिः ||

(A.R. P. 218)

In this example the āśraya, the person who is not born creates charm in mind. The āśraya i.e. pumān is absent.

(b) Vyāpyatvāsiddha

It is explained as vyāpyatvam asiddham yasmin in which
the Vyāpyatva of the reason is not established i.e. in which the reason is not vyāpya or invariably associated with the sādhyā. Yajñēśwara gives the following example of it:

बुधा: केसरिणी: शाण्य त्वा वर्धिनि मस्त्सुत ।
अन्यथा त्वं कथं कारणं भवेन चर्चितं रज्जायत ॥

(RR. p. 218)

In this example candranakhayudhatva is the hetu and keśari-
savatva is sādhyā and the vyāpti between the two is not invariably connected. Since the hetu remains present in tiger, bears etc.

As mentioned above Yajñēśwara does not give example for Svarūpāsiddha.

2. Vīruddha

It has been defined as sādhyābhāvena tadvyāpta vīruddha-
lamākrtirmaṇa. The hetu pervades the locus of sādhyābhāva. This means instead of tending to prove its proper sādhyā the hetu proves exactly the opposite.

For example:

रमचन्द्र ! वर्धिन्त त्वं सर्वकृम्निविचिन्तम ।
अन्यथा सङ्ग्रुः आसि सहितया कथं कत् ॥

(RR. p. 219)

Here the hetu sadvitiyayatva does not prove its sādhyā but actually pooves its absence i.e. sarvādvitiya.

3. Satpratipakṣa

It is defined as the reason for which there exists another reason of equal power proving the opposite of the
sādhyā. The famous example is śabdo nityāḥ śrāvāṇatvāt śabdatvavat and śabdo nityāḥ kāryatvāt ghaṭavat. Here we note that while śrāvāṇatva seems to prove the nityatva of śabda, kāryatva proveś anityatva with equal force.

For example:

Here one hetu, pruṇakalobhanatvarūpa has another reason prakāśatiśāyatva to prove its opposite.

4. Bādha

It is defined as sādhyābhāva pramā yatra sa bādhalān-krtirmatā. It consists in having the negation of its sādhyā already ascertained by another proof. For example: agniranugaṇaḥ dravyatvāt. We know by the perception of touch that fire is hot. Perception is a stronger proof than inference. Anusnātva, which we through perception, contradicts the dravyatva which is intended to be proved by the reason i.e. dravyatva.

Yajñēśwara gives the following example:

Here the kingship (rājatvā) is proved by perception so the hetu simhāsanasthitatva in the kāntāra contradicts the given hetu.

All these clearly prove that Yajñēśwara Dīśita was
highly influenced by the Nyaya theory of Hetvābhāsa. He exactly formulates the definitions as given by the Naiyāyikas and fully accepts the divisions of the Hetvābhāsas made by Naiyāyikas.

IV.5 Pramāṇas as Alāṅkāras

Another classification of Alāṅkāras was made by rhetoricians taking into consideration the pramāṇas as Alāṅkāras. This new classification started from Bhoja and later on developed by his successors. Pramāṇas as the source of valid knowledge have been given an important place in all the systems of Indian philosophy. Epistemology, an important branch of philosophical thought, mainly deals in the context of Indian Philosophies, with pramāṇa, pramāṇa, pramātā and prameya. Among the philosophers of ancient India, Naiyāyikas are particularly known as pramānānikas because of their excessive emphasis on the doctrine of pramāṇas. Gautama in his Nyās, therefore, considers pramāṇa as the first padārtha among the sixteen padārthas enumerated therein. Naiyāyikas even define the term 'Nyāya' as pramāṇairarthaparikṣaṇam nyāyāh.

Pramāṇa literally means the principal instrument (karana) of valid knowledge(pramā). According to the Nyāyaśāstra pramāṇa (cognition) is of four types: Pratyakṣa, Anumiti, Upamiti and Sabda. The most important causes (karana) of these four types of knowledge are called Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāna (inference), Upamāna (comparision) and Sabda (valid
testimony), the source of attaining valid knowledge.

The different schools of Indian philosophy are not unanimous about the nature and number of pramāṇas. The materialistic Cārvāka recognises perception alone, the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣika accept only two (perception and inference), the Sāmkhya recognises three (perception, inference and analogy), the Nyāya recognises four (with addition of sabda), the Prabhakaras admit five with arthāpatti, the Vedāntins and the Bhāttas recognise six with anupalabdhi and the Paurāṇikas add two more sambhava and aitihya.

IV.5.1 Bhoja

Bhoja in his Śrīp treats Pramanālaṅkāras in śastric terminology viz., pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, arthāpatti, sambhava and abhāva.

According to Bhoja, the two means of knowledge, Darśana the mutual seeing and śravaṇa (hearing of each other) by which love may developed between two lovers, bring in a long digression into the Pramāṇas. Bhoja takes Darśana as comprising all Pramāṇas based on pratyakṣa, which is Darśana par excellence, namely, pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, arthāpatti, sambhava and abhāva. Similarly, śravaṇa is taken by Bhoja as all Pramāṇas based on sabda, which is śravaṇa par excellence, namely, sabda, aitihya, śrutānumāna, śrutopamāna, śrutarthāpatti and śrutasambhava.
Bhoja divides Pratyakṣa into six kinds: sāksat, pratibimba, pratibhāna, utpreksa, smṛti and svapna. Bhoja defines Anumāna as liṅgaśrāṇāt liṅgapratipattiranumānani.

He gives six varieties of it: sāmanyatodrṣtra, viśesatodrṣtra, pratyakṣatodrṣtra, paroksatodrṣtra, vidyamānaviśaya and avidyamānaviśaya. All these are varieties of svārthānumāna.

Parārthānumāna, Bhoja says, partakes of the character of sabda and hence each dealt with under śabdiālāṅkāra. Bhoja quotes Gautama's Nyāyasūtra I,1,6. on Upamāna. But he classifies it into six kinds: sādharmyopamāna, vaidharmyopamāna, mudropamāna, śilpopamāna, sangnopamāna and abhiprāyopamāna. According to Bhoja, the fourth part of the syllogism called Upānaya is Upamāna. Bhoja quotes here Vātsyāyana "s Bhāsya.

Bhoja has argued for the superiority of Upamāna among pramāṇas and concludes that this does not mean that the other pramāṇas are unnecessary. Bhoja bases his reply here on what Vātsyāyana says in reply to the point raised by himself regarding the separate enumeration in the opening padāṛtha-

samuddeśa sūtra of categories which can be included in one or the other. Bhoja divides arthāpatti into two kinds: drstārthārthāpatti and īrtārthāpatti. The former is divided again into six kinds: pratyakṣa-pūrvikā, anumāna-pūrvikā, upamāna-pūrvikā, sabda-pūrvikā, arthāpatti-pūrvikā, and sabda-pūrvikā. Again, Saṁbhava is of six kinds: saṁbhāvana, saṁsaya, vitarka, prāyovāda, śaṁpratyaya and pratyayānusandhi. Then Bhoja deals with Abhāva Alāṅkāra and its six kinds: prāgbhāva,
pradhvaṁsabhāva, itaretarabhāva, atyantabhāva, sāmbandhābhāva and sarvabhāva. Abhāva is a padārtha to the Naiyāyikas whom Bhoja deserts here. The Naiyāyikas recognise only four varieties of Abhāva viz., prāgabhāva, pradhvaṁsabhāva, atyantabhāva and anyonyabhāva. Certain ancient Naiyāyikas recognise a sāmayika-abhāva. Bhoja's sāmbandhābhāva is ancient Naiyāyikas' sāmayika-abhāva and sarvabhāva is not different from atyantabhāva. Bhoja then takes up the six pramāṇas of the Śravaṇa-class. As related to the Śabdapramāṇa Bhoja speaks of other six minor pramāṇas, śabdāntara, abhyāsa, saṁgna, saṁkhyā, guna and prakaraṇa. All these are not necessary for our purpose so we have left them.

IV.5.2, Amṛtānanda Yogin

Amṛtānanda Yogin (1250 A.D.) in his Alakārāsāmgraha (ASam) deals with Pramāṇas as Alakārās. He quotes the following passage from the Tārkikaraksā of Varadarāja, a Naiyāyika of great repute:

प्रत्यक्षमैकं यात्राकः कणाय सुंगते पुनः ||
अनन्ताय अपि निन्याः संख्ये शब्दः प्रामाणिः ||
वैभाषिकं कार्यसिद्धोऽयैव मुपपाणिः ये कैत्यनः ||
अथार्थपलो तदेवानि यथवाचे यथाभासः ||
अभावं अभाव्यातामि आदृतां केदारिनिन्तथा ||
संभवतःयुक्तानि तानि तैराणिको अस्मः ||

(ASam, p.60; Tārikāraksā, v. 51-54)
He then defines and explains with examples eight प्रमाणालंकाराः viz., प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान, अगमा, उपामन, अर्थपत्ति, अभ्य, सांभव्य and आय्य्या.

The प्रत्यक्ष अलंकार is defined as the knowledge arising out of the connection of sense organs with the objects. It is of six types with regard to five ज्ञानेद्रियाः and one मानस (मानस). Again, it is of two types: निर्विकल्पका and साविकल्पका. The former is only of the nature of pure perception devoid of any definite knowledge while the latter is the special knowledge having नामा etc., as its object. The definitions and divisions of प्रत्यक्ष अलंकार given by अम्रतानन्दा seem to be quite similar with the definitions and divisions of प्रत्यक्ष given by नैयायिकाः.

He defines अनुमान अलंकार as the knowledge of the ज्ञेयत i.e., ज्ञेया by its ज्ञेय. It is of two types: द्रष्टा and सामान्यत: द्रष्टा.

अगमा is defined as the अपदेश of a trustworthy person. His definition is quite similar with the definition of अपदेश शब्द of अप्ता as यथार्था वाक्ता पुरुषा given by अन्नमभाभत्ता in his तर्कसांग्रहः.

उपामन अलंकार has been defined as साद्यत सद्रसा ज्ञेय, which is essentially not different from the Nyaya concept of उपामना प्रमाना.
Amṛtānanda also includes Abhāva of the Naiyāyikas as an Alakāra. Abhāva has been accepted as a padārtha by the Naiyāyikas like Annambhaṭṭa of syncretic school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. There are in all four varieties of Abhāva: prāgabhāva, pradhvaṁśābhāva, atyantābhāva and anyonyābhāva.  

Ghata-prāgabhāva exists before the production of the ghata and it exists from time immemorial. When the ghata is produced ghata-prāgabhāva comes to an end. Pradhvaṁśābhāva is produced when the ghata is destroyed. Atyantābhāva is the absolute negation e.g. the absence of rūpa in air. Anyonyābhāva is illustrated by ghataḥ pataḥ na denying the relation of identity between ghata and pata.

Amṛtānanda also in the light of this Naiyāyika doctrine of Abhāva, propounds Abhāva as an Alakāra. He defines it as the absence of an object. He then proceeds to illustrate its four varieties though he does not define them individually. The illustrations are as follows:

1. Prāgabhāva:

अनंत्यासेन विद्यानामसंसरोप्यो धीमतम्।
अनिमित्तेन ग्याभाना अयस्मात जायते नुणं॥

2. Pradhvaṁśābhāva:

धृतिरस्तितमिति शरिष्ठति विषयं गृहयतुर्मिति
ग्राममाभोणप्रयोजनं परिश्रवंशयं शत्वीयमयं

3. Anyonyābhāva:

कण्ठितीकं न च द्वक्तीति न च श्रेण अवनोदनयम्।

इति ज्ञातन्निप जनौ मन्यते योऽन्ति त्रिधृतीत्रतम॥

( ibid. )
IV.5.3 Appaya Dīksita

Appaya Dīksita also treats same eight pramāṇas as Alakārās in his Kuvalayānanda. In the age when Appaya flourished, philosophers especially Naiyāyikas like Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya were seriously engaged with the problems of epistemology of which pramāṇa is the backbone. As Appaya was a good scholar of Nyāya as evinced from his language, style and his argumentative method he tried to incorporate pramāṇa doctrine in poetics and, in their light, framed figures of speech. Since we do not have something concrete as a mark of Nyāya influence in Appaya, we shall not attempt here a comprehensive treatment of his Pramāṇa-Alāṅkāras. Instead, we shift our attention to other great poeticians whose treatment of Pramāṇa Alāṅkāras reflects an influence of the Nyāya doctrine of Pramāṇa.
IV.5.4 Viśveśvara Pāṇḍita

Viśveśvara Pāṇḍita (1700-1750 A.D.) also deals with the same eight Pramāṇālaṅkāras in his Alākāra-pradīpā viz., anumāna, pratyakṣa, upamiti, śabda, arthāpatti, anupalabdhi, saṁbhava and aitihya. He defines Anumāna as: vyāpyena vyāpakajñānamamnumanam. He defines śabda as: āptvākyam śabdah. We must mention here that Viśveśvara is a Naiyāyika himself and he also authored some Nyāya works like Tarkakūṭuhalam etc. It is naturally therefore, that he uses the Nyāya technical term like 'vyāpya' and 'vyāpaka' in the definition of Anumāna Alāṅkāra. Even the definition of śabda Alāṅkāra is exactly similar to Gautama's definition of śabda Pramāṇa.

IV.5.5 Devasāṅkara Purohitā

Devasāṅkara (1750-1800 A.D.) in his Alāṅkāramaṁjusā (AM) treats Pramāṇas as Alāṅkāras under the heading Pramāṇālaṅkāravivecanam. According to his Pramāṇālaṅkāras occur wherevalid knowledge and its means are drawn upon by poets. Valid knowledge (pramāṇa) says Devasāṅkara, is of four kinds: pratyakṣa, Anumiti, Upamiti, and śabda, and accordingly their means are of four kinds viz., pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāṇa and śabda. The examples are as follows:

1. Pratyakṣa:

mundavānanchāya nivṛttatadābhidharmāезультатिं-
hastasaṁśaṅkayo vyāpakaśabdāvivecaśikṣeratadābhāt:

धर्मध्रववर्धा लक्ष्यार्थं वहुः कृतप्रणिः सुस्ति ज्ञातया: सम्भवेऽववज्ञाततिः स्वरूपगतिसूक्तवर्तः

॥ (f.223)
(The young damsel's face is bright like the moon; the continuous line of her sweet words is a wave of the nectar; the fragrance of her mouth is extremely intense; her body, too, vies with the sirīsa flower; and there is grape-juice on her lower lip. A certain lucky youth in the course of his carnal enjoyment with the young damsel indeed directly experiences all the sensual pleasures of this earth.)

Here it is noticed that the Pratyakṣa Alankāra is based on direct experience. This reminds us of the definitions of Pratyakṣa given by the Naiyāyikas. Gautama defines Pratyakṣa as: indriyārthasamākṣaṇaḥavyāpdeśyaḥ avyabhācārya vyavasāyatmakam (NyS I.1.4). Annambhatṭa defines Pratyakṣa as: indriyārthasaṃkṣaṇajānayam jñānam. Hence the knowledge which is directly obtained, through the contact of sense organs with objects is called Pratyakṣa and in the example given by Devasaṅkara direct experience, the young lover experiences is a testimony to this effect.

2. Anumāna

According to Devasaṅkara, Anumāna is of two types: Rūpakasankīraṇa and Suddha. The examples are in order:

अनुमितीयोऽद्भवितत्ततेऽसौं:।
न्यात्सिद्धिः परिशिद्धिः।
"अभिन्नतचाक्ष न राधवसिद्धिः।"
नकिनतसम्बन्धो उन्मन्तरः॥ (AR p.224)
(The king named Rāghava who is another fire had burnt the straw in the form of his enemies did not act wrongly although on account of the dust raised by his forces he was inferred to be present by the frightened enemies taking shelter on the mountain.)

B. सैनिजनाम्विकासमेव पतितः प्रविष्टश्च।
कनाकीनातिसङ्केतो भेजिवानि तु दृष्टिैः। (p. 224)

(From the blooming of the lotuses, from the cries uttered by the birds and from the commotion caused among the bees lurking within the creepers it is learnt with certainty that the sun has risen.)

Here in both the examples how a sādhana helps in cognising a sādhyā is shown exactly as it happens in the Nyāya-anumāna.

3. Upamāna

तपाकैै भुवानि यस्मानस्य चन्द्रकृष्ण सन्निभुम।
पुष्करसीकै श्राव ह्रश्स्ति नादयमाधिप्रभु:। (p. 224)

(This person is decidedly king Mādhava, since his eye-brows are bow-shaped, since his face resembles the moon and since his eyes are like lotuses.)

Upamāna is one of the pramāṇas of Naiyāyikas. It is the instrument of Upamiti or analogical cognition which consists in the knowledge of the connection between a name and the object expressed by it. For producing this upamiti knowledge of similarity is necessary. Therefore Upamāna is
analogical cognition. A person happens to be ignorant of the exact meaning of the word *gayaya*, which is similar to cow and recollects the information conveyed by the assimilative proposition (*atideśavākya*). Then the assimilative cognition, 'This is the animal of the bovine species' denoted by the word *gavaya* arises.

In this example king Mādhava is known from the analogical knowledge due to his similarity with other objects.

4. Šabda

(a) Vaidika-šabda:

> नाधाय मुण्या राजामिति ज्ञातन्त्रापि स्वयम्
> नां तः साधने वीश्न न हिःपायिति भावेन् "(P.225)

(Although himself aware of the *śmrī* that hunting does not conduce to a sin in the case of kings, heroic Mādhava gave it up, establishing the *śrutī* that one must not kill other beings.)

The words *śmrī* and *śrutī* are added by the translator. The *śmrī*-dictum is well-known but where from does he infer or refer to *śrutī* is not clear.

(b) Laukika-šabda:

> उपपर्यं पृष्टं प्रृति बली विकर्षेण भिन्नितत्
> ग्राहयिता प्रस्तुतं कृतां दृष्टं राधवप्रभः " (P.225)

(It is the current topic among the people that king Rāghava the might Peśavā who is adorned even by the mightiest is setting out for Indraprastha.)
Sabda is one of the Pramāṇa of the Naiyāyikas. Gautama defines Sabda as Āptavākyam (nyS 1.1.6). So Sabda is a sentence uttered by a trustworthy person or āpta. According to Gautama it is of two kinds: Vaidika and Laukika. In the examples given by Devaśaṅkara he has shown two types of Sabda: Ālaṅkāra as exactly found in the Nyāya works. Secondly, in the first example, he has shown the superiority of Sruti over Smṛti according to which the king Mādhava decided to not to kill other beings. The second example is based on the Laukika Sabdapramāṇa.

Thus Devaśaṅkara accepts only the above mentioned four Pramāṇa Ālaṅkāras and not the remaining four. He opines that their field is duly covered by the four recognised by him; saṁbhava and ceṣṭā can be included in Anumāṇa; aitihya in Sabda and anupalabdhi in pratyakṣa. Therefore, his treatment of these Ālaṅkāras reveals a deep Nyāya influence on him, for, he accepts only those four pramāṇas which are accepted by the Naiyāyikas and includes the other pramāṇas in them just as Naiyāyikas do. Again, the definitions of pramāṇa and pramāṇa given by him are quite similar to those found in the Nyāya works.
IV.6 Other Nyāyaśāstra related Alāṅkāras

(1) Drṣṭānta (Exemplification)

Drṣṭānta, one of the Arthālaṅkāras, is first propounded by Bhāmaha. Indurāja, the commentator of Udbhata named it as Kāvyadṛṣṭānta. It is so named to distinguish it from the Drṣṭānt of Nyāyaśāstra. Except Vāmana almost all the Alāṅkārikas accept it. According to Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka, Viśvanātha and Appaya Dīksita etc., Drṣṭānta is a figure where the upamāna, upameya and the common property are presented as if reflected i.e. where no yathā, iva etc., are used; but the meaning of one sentence is a reflection as it were of that of another sentence. Viśvanātha defines it as: द्रष्टान्तस्तु सध्यस्य वस्तुन: प्रतिलिम्बनम्। (SD. P. 36)

He gives the following example:

अविदितगणापि सत्कविभणिति: करणं बमति सध्यधारा।
अनविदितपरिमलकापि इत्य द्रष्टिन दृश्य मातृत्वाति॥ (SD. P. 36)

Drṣṭānta is one of the sixteen padārthas enumerated by Gautama in his Nyāyaśāstra. It is one of the five syllogistic statements (pañcāvayavavākyam) otherwise called Udāharana.

It has been mainly discussed in the context of Anumāna. It is defined by Gautama as:

कौलिकस्वरुपशकाणि अस्मिन्नर्यथ बुद्धिसाम्यं स द्रष्टान्त:।

(NYS I. 1.25)

In poetry and philosophy both Drṣṭānta is used to strengthen and to clarify the matter in hand. In both, the words like
yathā etc., (sāmyabodhaka) are not used. It is important to note that the two varieties if Drṣṭānta viz., sādhyarṣṭānta and vaidhyarṣṭānta as given by Mammata and Viśvanātha are similar to those of the varieties available in the Nyāya works like TB of Kesavamisra.

(2) Udāharana

Along with Drṣṭānta Udāharana is treated as an independent alāṅkāra only by Jagannātha and Parakāla Swami. Jagannātha defines it as follows: साध्यसाध्यमयां मयथम उदाहरणम् | (p.175)

For example: अमितसूक्तिको परवस्ति क्षेत्रेऽपि निन्दितेन भवति | निन्दितेप्रत्यालीक्ष्णानां रत्नं जाग्नेयोणं कामनं व | (NYS, I.1.36)

In this alāṅkāra the similarity is expressed by the words like yathā, iva etc., as in that of Nyāyasūtra i.e. parvate vahnimān dhūmavatvāt yathā mahānasah.

(3) Viśeṣokti (Peculiar Allegation)

This alāṅkāra is introduced for the first time by Bhamāha. Mammata, Ruyyaka, Vidyādharā, and Viśvanātha follow Bhamāha in this respect and define this Alāṅkāra in the same way.

Viśeṣokti occurs when the effect is not produced in spite of the occurrence of its cause. Viśvanātha defines it as:

साध्यसाध्यमयां मयथम उदाहरणम् | (SD-P.49)

He gives the following example:

धार्मिकाणि निसर्गाः पुनर्नीतिः न्यायानांच: ||

(UD-P.49)
The concept of this Alāṅkāra is related to the Nyāya theory of causality. Naiyāyikas advocate asatkāryavāda, according to which an effect which is anitya gets produced from its cause which is nitya. For example, aniyya ghaṭa is produced from nitya paramāṇa. According to the Naiyāyika theory, kārya does not exist in any form and at any place before its production. It is produced when kāraṇavyāpāra is undertaken. Even if the clay is present, a jar is not produced without the causeal process of the jar maker. In the same way in the Viśeṣokti Alāṅkāra in spite of the cause being present, the effect is not produced. In the example given above youth, the cause of fickleness is present but it does not give rise to fickleness in the absence of the kāraṇavyāpāra.

(4) Smṛti (Recollection)

This Alāṅkāra is propounded for the first time by Rudraṭa by the name Smaraṇa. Narasimha Kavi names it as Smrtimat. Sobhākara, Jayaratha, Jayadeva and Appaya call it Smṛti. Other rhetoricians have termed it as Smarana. Thus all the rhetoricians are not unanimous about its name but the concept of the Alāṅkāra is the same. Visvanātha defines it as: समर्थतुभवाक्ष्यतुस्मृतिः समर्थशुचिोऽः | (Sūtrap. 22) A recollection of an object arising from the perception of something similar is termed as Smaraṇa. For example:

अरविन्दप्रियो वीक्षे योलक्षणमानसास्तमम् ।
समर्थिं बहुतं नस्थविशाले वाचकोपचनम् ॥
(Sūtrap. 22)
In this example the perception of the lotus on which khānjanā bird was playing stirs up the impression which cause the remembrance of the face of the beautiful lady with tremulous eyes. There is similarity between the face and the lotus.

According to the Naiyāyikas the knowledge (jñāna) is of two types: Smṛti and Anubhava. Smṛti is that knowledge which is produced by impression called bhāvanā which is of two kinds: yathārtha (true) and ayathārtha (false). Both these types of knowledge arise in one's waking state. In dream all kinds of remembrance is false.

In the case of the Smṛti of Naiyāyikas the object which is once experienced by a person at some particular time, leaves some kind of impression on the mind of the person and when he again observes a similar object it strikes the hidden impressions which give rise to the knowledge of the object experienced before.

Similar is the nature of the Alāṅkāra called Smṛti. In the example given above, the sādṛṣya (similarity) existing between the lotus with the bee hovering over it and the face with tremulous eyes is an instrumental cause giving rise to the memory of the beautiful face by arousing the bhāvanā sāṃskāra of the face-experience. But the difference in the Nyāya-smṛti and kāvya-smṛti is that in
poetics it must deal with some aesthetic object.

In the TB sādṛṣṭya, cintā, adṛṣṭa are mentioned as the causes of impressions which give rise to Smṛti. Among poeticians Bhoja considers these causes as the base of this Alāṅkāra.

(5) Samāsokti (Speech of Brevity)

In case of Samāsokti Alāṅkāra it is interesting to note that the authors like Ruyyaka, Brahmatantra Parakālaswāmi and Narendraprabhasūri admit the Nyāya element as aprastuta. In Ruyyaka, however, we see for the first time instead of worldly objects occurring as aprastuta we find the elements of Nyāya and other sastras occurring as the elements of aprastuta. Ruyyaka in his AS gives the following example and shows the superimposition of Nyāya objects on worldly objects:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{स्वप्नश्चाकलितस्मृतिर्प्रवेद्यते} & \text{ स्रव्यं स्वरूपविशेषम्} \\
\text{मानं निरक्तं मात्रणम्} & \text{पिकस्य पाणित्यमस्यमास्तीति} \\
\text{(AS. P. 327)}
\end{align*}
\]

Sri Kṛṣṇa-Brahmatantra Parakālaswāmi in his Alāṅkāra-māṇḍhāra shows how in the treatment of the subject pertaining to Vedānta Śāstra the subject of Nyāya Śāstra is superimposed. Here, it is shown that as the persons cognised fire on the basis of its sādhanai.e., dhūma which is free from fallacies
like Bādha and Pratipakṣa, similarly, the wise persons attempt to obtain the Lord who is all pervasive. Here in the treatment of a topic relating with the philosophy of Vedānta superimposition of technical Nyāya concept has occurred.

Again, here in the treatment of dharmaśāstra subject superimposition of Nyāyaśāstra topics like vyāpti and paksavṛttiṇī of hetu has occurred.

Here in the treatment of Vedāntaśāstra topic the superimposition of Nyāyaśāstra objects such as sapakṣa has occurred.

Here, in the treatment of a topic relating to Bhagavadgītā and Bhāgavata the superimposition of Nyāyaśāstra objects has taken place.

In this example, the treatment of a laukikavastu, ērīnivāśādi-vigraha the superimposition of the Nyāyaśāstra topic has taken place. Through Samāsokti he refers to NSM of Viśvanātha, to Śītikapṭhīya, a Nyāya work of Śītikapṭhā, to Raghunātha Siromāṇi and to his Dādhiṭṭi, a commentary on TC of Gaṅgeśa.
Vidyānātha in his Pratāparudrīya similarly shows superimposition of the Tarkaśāstriya objects on worldly objects.

Here in the treatment of a lākika object, khaḍga there is imposition of Nyāya object such as pratipakṣa and hetu.

Narendraprabhasūri in his Alāṅkāramahodadhī similarly shows the superimposition of the objects of Nyāyaśāstra on worldly objects. The example:

In this upon the treatment of lāvanya the superimposition of pramāṇas has taken place.

(6) Tulyayogita (Equal Pairing)

Dealing with Tulyayogita Alāṅkāra, Viśvesvara Paṇḍita in his Alāṅkārapradīpa first gives its definitions on the generally well-known line as:

Then he defines another type of Tulyayogita as:

Obviously this second Alāṅkāra of the same name is entirely based on the Nyāya concept and defined by the Nyāya terminology. It is clear that this second Alāṅkāra is not to be treated.
as a sub-variety of the first one. By the term 'Anyā' given in the definition he perhaps means a kind of Tulyayogitā different from the commonly known Alaṅkāra of the name. This is further proved by the definition of Tulyayogitā given previously. Viśveśvara does not mention anyā tulyayogitā as a kind of Tulyayogitā Alaṅkāra. The terms used by him i.e. sapakṣa and vipakṣa are defined by the Naiyāyikas as niscitasādhyavān and niscitasādhyābhāvavān respectively. As per the Nyāya-Anumāna theory a hetu cannot be present in both sapakṣa and vipakṣa. But, according to Viśveśvara, it can remain present in the sphere of poetry. He gives the following example:

Viśwanāthadeva in his Sāhityasūdhāsindhu (SSS), while dealing with Virodhabhāsa Alaṅkāra gives the following example which interestingly reflects an influence of Nyāya:

This shows how even Nyāya terminology and concepts can be employed with a reversal to poetic ends. Here the presence of karavāladhūma, the hetu is neither present in pakṣa nor in sapakṣa and yet its presence in vipakṣa becomes means of inference of the fire of the valour of the king praised in
the verse. The author here refers to the terms and concepts of Nyaya with the help of panamostic words. The same example is also given by the author as that of Apratitadosa.

IV.7  Alāṅkāradhvani based on Tarkaśāstra

Narendraprabhasūri in his Naṁrājayagobhūsana explains Alāṅkāradhvani (Śabdāśaktimūlā) based on the object of Tarkaśāstra. The example:

Here Vibhāvānā Alāṅkāra is suggested as vahnyanumiti has been shown without a valid vyāpti in spite of the fallacious nature of the hetu.

We have seen above how various concepts of Nyāya are imbibed into the structure of the poetic figures of speech also. As a result we find the Alāṅkāras like Anumāna, Kāvyaliṅga, Drṣṭānta, Udāharaṇa, Smṛti etc. In the matter of the types of Anumāna Alāṅkāra and Hetyābhāsas as Alāṅkāra the influence of Nyāya is very clear. The section of Pramāṇa Alāṅkāras also clearly reveals the impact of Nyāya. The principle of Āśrayāśrayibhāva and Anvayavyatirekibhāva are found to have some relation with the Nyāya concepts. In the Alāṅkāras like Anyaṭulyalogitā we see the poetics
going a step further over the Nyāya concepts where the author says the hetu is present in vipakṣa also. Viśvanātha-deva even shows poetic examples where the Naiyāyika process is reversed or contradicted. The author like Parakālaswāmi would even blur the distinctions of prastuta and aprastuta by putting various sastric concepts including Naiyāyika ones in both the categories. Thus individual Nyāya concepts are included into the Ālaṅkārika fold attain the poetic charm and they are recognised as individual poetic figurative structures called Ālaṅkāras and at a times even bypassed or surpassed as we just saw above. This is not difficult to expalin since the primary concern of the Nyāya śāstra is the validity of thought and thought process and poetry organises various semantic structures. Logical validity or incalidity are therefore bound to enter the thought structure or poetic figures and when we recognise them as such that is when we see a Nyāya structure appearing in an expression whey will naturally be recognised as such. The strikingness (camatkṛti) makes it a poem, the thought structure reveals the Nyāya concept which makes the rhetoricians recognise them as Nyāya-based Ālaṅkāras.
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   AP. ch. 11 1. p. 173

2. काली दैषगणालकाशः य श्रावश्यगानत्यासनवथ—
   अवतिरंजिभयं विभागः कियमसे।
   Kass, ch. IV, p. 40.


4. बीधृक्कर्मिणि श्रावश्यकला: स नंदुकमाल इत्यपि कल्पनायाः
   अवतिरंजितेरविवेक समाधिहि। नंदुश्रयमनैरेव
   विशिष्टस्य श्रावस्याध्याचार्यभावस्य भावात्मिर्तं करणां
   यात्राकालितिः एव परस्परविरिको शास्त्रम्।
   Kp. ch. 8 p. 417.

5. दुःखशैव शरीरोऽद्वितीय धर्म नियमाधिष्ठि भावः।
   Dinakari, p. 87

6. इष्टमिति यथ: कार्यकाराण्योः स समवः।
   Vaiśeṣikasūtra, p. 2.26

7. TB, p. 16.

8. अत्र पर्यवेक्षानिमित्वं साध्यं धूमर्ववं दैनिकः।
   स अवतिरंजितेऽर्किः अववेन अवतिरंजितेर्किः च
   अवतिरंजितवात्। TB, p. 32


10. Shukla Chitra P., Treatment of Alamkāras in
    Rasagariādhaya, p. 197.


14. नस्यथक कारण ओत्तिप्रकारक किङ्क विनिर्वचन
    द्वियथे | ओखात्वेन निश्चियमानेन किङ्कमिन्यपि |

15. N.S.M., p. 286.

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    क्विनिन्यस्मिति न तथा दृष्टिनगरः | K.P. ch. X, p. 524.

18. अथ नतपुर्वकातिविधमुना हृदर्वत्विश्लेषिन्
    सामायथिन्यानि इति | N.S., I. 1. 5.


20. Ibid

21. Ibid. p. 25.

22. A.S., p. 552.

23. पूर्वाच्यमन्त्रित्वप्रिलिका मोक्षप्राप्तियां
    वश्यत्वा तार्किकप्रकृश्चिन्यथे लक्ष्मिकप्रसिद्धि
    वश्निविष्णुकृदन्तमया वेदस्य शास्त्राय भावावस्थितना न
ना भा कायुकैः अतिशयेन सर्वेष्ण जनानां
यो द्विद्य संवाही सरसः परार्थश्चविन्धैः
उपनिवेष्ठ्यभायनवाणः। अतः कायुकिनिर्मिति
काक्षन्तहुण्मुकाम्। Pratihārendrāja, K.S.S. Tika

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25. TB., p. 106.
27. Asam., p. 58.
28. Ibid., p. 58.
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	 ग्रुप्पाकर्षणाः। परभाभो गुणोन्तक्ष वन्ति भौसः। अन्तः कौन्तिकः श्रृविवास दिख्यविग्रहस्वत्तारण
	 न्यायशास्त्रीयर्याब्धारामीहः।

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