CHAPTER III

INFLUENCE OF NYĀYA ON POETIC BLEMISHES
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III.1 Concept of Poetic Blemishes

In the Alakāraśāstra an important place is given to the treatment of poetic blemishes (kāvyadoṣas). Almost all the prominent Alankārikas beginning from Bharata have dealt with the nature and types of blemishes which are definitely to be avoided in the literary compositions because they mar the aesthetic beauty of poetry. Doṣas, are, therefore, very rightly defined as the causes of diminution (apakarsa) of kāvyā. The absence of doṣa is counted by Bhoja as the first condition which makes an utterance fit to be called kāvyā. Among the four poetical relations of śabda and artha the first is the avoidance of doṣas (doṣahāna). Only after taking due care to avoid all flaws a poet can think of embellishing his speech with excellences. Emphasising on the avoidance of doṣas in kāvyā, Bhāmaha states that nobody is enjoyed by scriptures to write poetry under compassion or coercion or punishment, but to be a bad poet is declared by the wise to be death itself. Similarly, Daṇḍin observes that one should not make even an insignificant blemish in a poem as a handsome body may cause disgust on account of a single leprous spot. Even the poeticians like Mammaṭa explicitly
and others like Viśvanātha and Jagannātha implicitly advocate the rejection of blemishes in the definitions of kāvyā.

Generally the poetic blemishes are classified under different headings such as padadosas, vākyadosas, rasadosas etc. But all these doṣas can be classified as shown by V.Raghavan under the following heads:

1. Grammatical
2. Literary
3. Logical

A thorough examination of the concept of poetic blemishes reveals the fact that poeticians have emphasised upon the logical aspect of śabda, artha and their relations. As a result it is found that some of the faults are based on breach of logical doctrines and concepts of Nyāyaśāstra. All those doṣas which seem to have been influenced by Nyāyaśāstra are discussed in the following pages.

III.2 Bharata's Treatment of Poetic Blemishes

In the literature of Sanskrit poetics, Bharata's NS is known to be the oldest extant work dealing with the concepts of poetics. Therefore, an examination of the concept of doṣa should begin with Bharata's treatment of it. Bharata's chief concern being dramaturgy and the techniques to be employed in the composition of drama for stage
performance he deals with various ways and modes of expressions, which add beauty, force and dignity to the speech. As defective expressions detracts from the beauty of verbal and formal aspects of poetry, he, therefore, has taken note of blemishes which are to be avoided by the dramatists. The list of blemishes propounded by Bharata appears to be the oldest formulation of the concept and later writers have made it their starting point. Bharata enumerates ten blemishes in poetic composition. They are as follows:


Of these, the five doṣas, viz., Guṇḍārtha, Arthāntara, Arthahī, Ekārtha and Nyāyādapeta are more important from our point of view. The following analysis will show how all these dosas are formulated on the basis of the logical defects enumerated in the Nyās.

1. Guṇḍārtha

Guṇḍārtha is defined by Bharata as 'paryāyaśabdābhhihita'. It occurs when the meaning becomes hidden owing to the use of synonymous words. Bhāmaha does not define this doṣa. But he says:

गुण्डशब्दपरिवर्त्तनं ये न प्रोक्तव्यं कथयति।
कुछिण्यासिद्धिस्य नैवेद्यमुपनार्थयो कल्यणे। ॥ (KA.I.45)
The use of difficult words with a hidden meaning is a defect. Kāvya with such an expression fails to appeal to a connoisseur who finds difficulty in appreciating its beauty. For example:

(असिताराति), he who has a black (asī̃) path (ṛtī)-Fire, his son (tuc) is lord Skanda.
(b) adricchit—piercer (chit) of a mountain (adrī)
(c) svahkṣitam patiḥ—the lord (pati) of the dwellers (kṣitam) of heaven (svah). He is the commander of the army of gods.
(d) advidrāk—not having two (dvi) eyes (drāk); hence, many eyed may destroy again and again (jeghiyāt) your enemies (vah dvīsah) with his fearful (Amidbhīh) and white (subhra) glances (drṣṭa).

Here the meaning is understood with the great labour. Bhāmaha's Guḍhasabdābhidhiṇā may be compared with Gautama's Avījñātārtha (Unintelligible statement), one of the nigrāhastānas propounded by the Naiyāyikas of the Aksapāda school.

It is defined by Gautama as the argument which is not understood by the audience or by the opponent, though it is repeated (.)
three times. Disputant being opposed by a stronger opponent tries to hide his inability to defend himself by using words with double meaning, or of uncommon use, or which are too quickly uttered to be intelligible. For example, स्वतःधवति, It means a white animal runs. But if a person uses it in the sense of a dog runs away from here (स्वा इतो धवति), he commits this defect. In this blemish meaningful but unintelligible words are uttered.

From the above point of view Bhāmaha's example of गुच्छासब्दाभिधान may be taken as a case because it contains unintelligible words which are not in common use. Raghavan rightly remarks:

The second of these, apratita-sabda (one of the causes of avijnātārta as given by Vātsyāyana in his Nyāyabhāṣya) is met with in Alāṅkāra-āstra.

It is akin to Bhāmaha's गुच्छासब्दाभिधान.

2. Arthāntara

Arthāntara is defined by Bharata as: अवर्ग्यम वर्णयते यात्रा तदार्थान्तरांमिष्यते i.e. when anything not to the point is described it constitutes the fault called Arthāntara. This is regarded so because it is uncalled for description. It expressly states what is implicitly contained in the essential nature of the subject. Bharata does not give an example of it. Abhinavagupta gives the following example:

स्थिततसम्बन्धमनुष्यं तनुं विप्रकटां सुभूम्ब ।

(P. 23)
(The beautiful lady's look spreads indeed love as well as anxiety and stupor)

Here the mention of anxiety and stupor is not to the point. Love includes these states of mind and therefore they are understood. There is no need of its special mention in the verse. Though the above statement is not non-sensical it is certainly illogical.

The influence of the Nyāyaśāstra can be observed here. Arthāntara is one of the nigrāhasthānas of the Naiyāyikas. Gautama defines it as:

प्रकृतियाध्याद्व अप्रातनसंबंधाध्यांनीतनम् । (v. 2. 7)

Vātsyāyana says that one gets defeated in an intellectual debate if he falls a prey to this flaw of irrelevant digression. He gives a humorous illustration of this flaw. If one has to prove dnyatva of ābda he should give a valid hetu which can prove it. But instead of giving a hetu in support of his proposition if he derives the word 'hetu' from its root, points out the pratyaya and shows how it is a kṛdantapada and then proceeds to give various kinds of padas, he commits the flaw of Arthāntara. Bharata's concept of Arthāntara seems to be identical with the concept of Gautama's nigrāhasthāna.

3. Arthahāna

Arthahāna is defined by Bharata as:

अर्थहान त्संबंध साहीपार्थमैव ॥
Bhāmaha calls it Aparthaka and defines as:

\[
\text{समुदायोणिष्ठं अनुदायोर्ध्यकारित्वं} \quad \text{दृष्टिमात्रं भ्रष्टापरिणमम्} \quad (\text{क.अ.म्.8})
\]

It occurs when the combination as a whole is devoid of meaning. There is not a single harmonious meaning inherent in all padas of a verse. The incoherence is of two types Viz., incoherent words and incoherent sentences. Ten pomegranates, six cakes, goat's skin, lump of meat are examples of inherent words (pada-apārthaka). "A person rice in a tank eating goes and bathing", is an example of incoherent sentence (vākya-apārthaka).

Aparthaka also is a nighraśatthāna in Gautama's philosophy. According to Gautama, Aparthaka is an argument of which words or sentences are combined without any syntactical order and do not convey any connected meaning. The example of pada-apārthaka is straightway taken from Vātsyāyana's MBh; in fact Bhāmaha clearly referring to Vātsyāyana since the example is verbatim from Vātsyāyana, and again as is clear from his words 'ityādi yathoditam'. We should also note, however, that the two types of Arthahīna that of pada and of vākya are not mentioned in the Bhāṣya; they are introduced by Bhāmaha himself. Dāndin follows Bhāmaha in this manner.

4. Ekārtha (Tautology)

It is defined by Bharata as 'avisesābhidhānam yat'. This fault occurs when indiscriminative use of many words for a single purpose is made. Abhinavagupta cites an example
of this defect as: कुण्डलिन्यूष्णभास्मित्वा (यशस्तः)।
(your fame is white like the kunda flower, the moon, the garland of pearls and the laughter of Śiva).

In this example, all words have practically one and the same purport. Any one simile would have been enough. Each simile here serves the same purpose and hence tatulogy has occurred. Since 'yasah' is regarded a to be white in poetic convention and āśa is also regarded white, it consists of re-duplication of the same idea without adding anything new or special to the sense.

It is significant to note that Gautama in his Nyās speaks of Punarukta as a niṣṭhā. Bharata's Ekārtha may be similar with Gautama's Punarukta. Raghavan rightly remarks:

Punarukta is very well-known and is seen as Ekārtha in Bharata.

Bhāṭṭa also borrows from Bharata the concept of the dosa called Ekārtha. He defines it as:

यथैव भवन्ति सोर्वाल्ये तेषां तेषां च पुनःस्वार्थे निर्माणे।
पुनरक्तामिद्र प्राहुर्भये राग्निधिभूतिरः || (Ka. IV. 12)

(when statements convey the same meaning as stated before, it is a fault called Ekārtha.

Bharata does not give any divisions of it while Bhāṭṭa divides it into those of śabda and artha. He does not exemplify
śabda-ekārtha and calls it sthūla (obvious). He further notes that repetition is not a defect if the same word is repeated under the influence of fear, sorrow, jealously etc., e.g. 'gaccha gaccha'. He gives the example of the second type as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{तामकामनस्य नूनं कस्तेरति हनिरहस्यम्} \\
\text{सौधीषु चन्दसूकानि प्रणालिनिरवभाविनाम्} \! (\text{Kn. IV. 16})
\end{align*}
\]

(The sound reproduced by the rain falling from the clouds on the roof of the house and discharging through the mouth of spouts renders her anxious).

Here the word 'utka' includes the meaning of 'manas' in its own meaning and so the use of the word 'manas' is futile.

It is important to note that Bhāmaha identifies Ekārtha with Purarukta. He says: punaruktam idam prahur 'anye'.

To whom does he refer by 'anye' is not clear. At least, Bharata does not call if 'punarukta'. It could be some other poetician prior to him whose work is now lost or it could also possibly be the NBh of Vātsyāyana since in his treatment of Apārtha and Vyārtha he has alluded to it, and the two faults of Vyāghāta and Purarukta occur in the NBh together in the same sutra.

Dāndin and Vāmana also follow in the footsteps of Bhāmaha. But, Mammaṭa calls it Punarukta. He, however, before treating this ēōṣa, treats another doṣa named Anavikṛta which
has a close similarity with that of Punerukta. It is a repetition of the same set of words or phrases without giving some variation through turns of expression. For example:

\[
P\text{प्राप्ता: श्रिय: सकल्कामुद्धःकृत: किं दृष्टं परं शिरसिः विदिविन्तं नन् किम्!} \\
\text{संतप्तिनां: प्रणयिनी विभृद्धिःकृत: किं कल्यं स्थितं तनुभुतं तनुभिस्थितं किम्॥ (KP. VII. 393)}
\]

(All-affording wealth has been attained—so what? The foot has been placed on the head of the enemy—so what? Friends have been fully supplied with riches—so what? The bodies of men have lasted for a whole cycle—so what?)

Here the frequent use, the repetition of 'तताः किं' is monotonous and it adds nothing new to the meaning,

This दोषa corresponds to the Artha-paunaruktya as illustrated by Gautama and Vātsyāyana. V. Raghavan remarks:

Both Gautama and Vātsyāyana speak of Śabda-puṇaruktya and Artha-puṇariktya. The latter, illustrated by Vātsyāyana corresponds to what Mammapā has given among his Artha-doṣas as Anavikṛta.

The Agnipurāṇa (AP) in its 11th chapter of Alaṅkāra-section deals with Punarukta. In transferring the logical defect of puṇaruktata to the sphere of poetics the AP certainly follows
Bharata, Bhāmaha, Dāndin and even perhaps Vāmana who all mention and define this fault under the name of Ekartha. The AP defines it as: ābhikṣṇyādabhidhānam. It means continued repetition (ābhikṣṇasya bhāvaḥ). It is of two kinds:

1. Arthāvṛtti (the repetition of meaning) and 2. Padāvṛtti (repetition of words). Again, Arthāvṛtti is of two kinds:

1. Prayuktavaraśabdena (use of a better word different from the used one) and 2. Ṣabdāntarenā (use of an altogether different word). In giving the above division of Punarukta AP differs from earlier poeticians and in this respect it seems to follow Gautama's division of Punarukta as given in the NyS. But it should be noted that the two disisions of Arthāvṛtti are found neither in the NyS nor in any other poetic work. And prayuktavaraśabdena also does not appear to be different from padāvṛtti. Therefore, in our present state of knowledge, nothing can be said either about the source of the AP's classification of Arthāvṛtti or about the classification itself.

Ruyyaka, the author of Alaṅkārasarvasva (ASS) defines and illustrates Punarukta in the context of Punaruktavadābhāsa. According to him Punarukta is of three types viz., śabdapunarukta, arthapunarukta and śabdārthapunarukta. But in the context of lātānuprāsa alaṅkāra he quotes the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama which is the definition of Punarukta Nigrahasthāna i.e. śabdārthyoḥ punarvacanam punaruktaman-
yatānuvādāt. (Nyās. V. 2. 14)

Jayaratha, the commentator in his Vimarśini also identifies that sūtra by giving the name of Aksapāda—ahurityāksapādah.

5. Nyāyādapeta

The fault Nyāyādapeta occurs in a poetic expression or a sentence when it deviates from or is devoid of logical propriety. It is defined by Bharata as: pramāṇavarivarjitaṁ 'an expression devoid of meaning'. Abhinavagupta divides it into two kinds: 1. desakālāviruddha (defying the limitation of place and time) 2. kalāśāstraviruddha (contradicting the established notions of arts and sciences etc.). The example of the first type is:

(There is a city called Mathura in Suvira (panjab) whose vicinities abound with oilnuts and coconuts).

Here one observes lapse of logical propriety with reference to place. The city of Mathurā is not situated in Panjab but in the Uttarapradesa. This shows the writer's ignorance of Geography. Oilnuts grow in Kashmir and coconuts in the South India. Coconuts flourish in the regions adjacent to the sea and oilnuts in cold mountainous
regions. Hence the above given statement is in conflict with Geographical and topographical data and suffers from the fault of Nyāyādapeta.

Abhinavagupta does not give any instance of the second type of this defect. But an example of it can be furnished if a Buddhist is represented as an upholder of the soul theory (atmavāda) which is flagrantly inconsistent with his creed because the Buddhists never believe in the metaphysical reality of a person; or if a Naiyāyika declares the objective world as an illusion like the Viṣṇunāyakins.

This fault has been treated by the later poeticians by making a little modification. Bhāmaha treats it by the name Nyāyavirodhi but the word Nyāya according to him stands for Śāstra in general. While treating this fault Daṇḍin briefly deals with its subdivisions an deśa, kāla, kāla and lokaviruddha and pays more attention to hetuvidyā (nyāya). According to him the term Nyāya means hetuvidyā. Later on the poeticians like Māmaṭa and Viśvanātha treated this fault by using the term Śāstravirodha or Vidyāviruddha. While treating this, Puṇjarāja, the author of the Śiśuprabodha-kāvyālaṅkāra, particularly gives an example of Tarkavirodhadoṣa as follows:

यथार्थानुभवाकथा प्रमा संयं समोविलिता | (p.116)

This sentence is incorrect from the Tarkaśāstra point of view for, according to Tarkaśāstra, anubhava is of two types:
yathārtha (valid) and ayathārtha (invalid). Yathārthā-
anubhava is called pramāṇa. But here in this verse pramāṇa is said to be different to be different from Yathārthānanubhava and therefore is not reasonable. This shows Puṇḍrāja’s knowledge of the Tarkasastra.

Above analysis of this fault makes it clear that from NS onwards, this doṣa continuously recognised under the Nyāya influence. Bharata does not use the term Nyāya in a general sense of propriety etc., but in a special sense of pramāṇa. We, may, therefore, conclude that he and all the poets after him propound this doṣa with the Nyāya principles in their mind. PV. Kane rightly remarks:

the discussions about logical matter in the province of poetry were started by Bharata. His Nyāyādāpeta which is defined as 'pramāṇapari-
varjitam' is an example of this defect. The pramāṇas are the special province of logic.

III.3 Bhāmaha’s Treatment of Poetic Blemishes

Bhāmaha in his treatment of Kāvyadōgas, not only follows Bharata but also adds many more new faults to the list. He enumerates more doṣas based on the Nyāyaśāstra than his successors. He not only just gives importance to the grammatical accuracy and aesthetic value of the word and
sense in poetry but also endeavours to focus the light on the requirement of logical accuracy.

Of the seven *dosa* treated by him under the *Nyāya* influence viz., *Gūḍhāsabdābhādhanā* *Ayuktimat*, *Apārthaka*, *Vyartha*, *Ekārtha*, *Apakrama* and *Nyāyavirodhī*, *Gūḍhāsabdābhādhanā* *Apārthaka* *Ekārtha* and *Nyāyavirodhī* are already discussed above. The meaning three are taken up here.

1. **Ayuktimat**

*Ayuktimat* occurs if a poet makes the cloud, the moon, the wind, the bee, the bird etc., a messenger in poetry.

\[ \text{अयुक्तिमयः दूता जलभूमाकालेन्द्रः।} \]
\[ \text{तथा भूमरंगास्तः चक्रवाहः कारः॥ (K.A.I.42)} \]

Such delineations do not fit in either Reason, argues Bhāmaha, and suffer from the sense of impropriety. But if these are addressed by persons suffering from an excess of longing, it is not considered as a blemish. This device is adopted by the poets of outstanding genius. For example, Kālidāsa in his *Meghadūtām*, describes the cloud as messenger. But he, perhaps aware of this fault, supplies a rationale for it.

\[ \text{कामात्मः हि प्रकृतिकृपणाः चोतनाचिनि नेषु।} \]

*Ayuktimat* may be translated as 'illogical'. The example given by Bhāmaha suggests that he emphasises extreme and empirical reality provable by *pramāṇas* only. He does not approve of superficial imaginations which are contradictory
to the pramanās. Similarly, Nyāyaśāstra also accepts the validity of the things which are cognised only by the pramanās, and asserts the falsity of others. From this point of view, then, Bhāmaha's Ayuktimat agrees with this concept of Nyāyaśāstra. It takes place only where the things presented in a poem cannot be proved by any valid means of knowledge.

2. Vyartha

This fault arises when the subsequent statements contradicts the previous one. He gives the following example:

सर्वां स्त्रिया स्त्री स्त्री तपुत्राः स्त्रिया मा न ग्रामः |
अनूपरिष्यो नुवर्तिन्याः प्रेम चन्दनिः न हि स्त्रिया: ||

(0 friend! do show your anger towards your lover, do not become mild to him; women who follow the wishes of their husbands do not hamper their lover)

Here, the first statement 'manam dhehi' (show anger) and the second statement chandanuvartinyah (follower of husband's wishes) are opposed to each other.

It is significant to note that this Vyartha of Bhāmaha may be compared with Vyāghata of Gautama. The discussion of Vyāghata takes place in the section of Šabdapramāṇa of NyS of Gautama where the pūrvapaksa argues against the validity of the verbal knowledge because of its flaws as anrta (untruth), vyāghata (discrepancy) and punarukta (tautology). 

Vyāghata is explained by Vātsyāyana as that between the
enjoinments of two mantras. For instance, there are some mantras directing a person to offer oblation before or after sunrise or when the stars are shining and the sun is not visible. Regarding these three times for the oblations, there are corresponding deprecatory texts: oblations offered at three different times are eaten by different kinds of dogs. The simple answer to this accusation is that once a person has agreed to offer an oblation at a certain time, the time that he has accepted should not be altered. The texts in question are meant to carry disapproval of alteration in the procedure already adopted. From this point of view Bhāmaha's Vyartha seems to be identical with the Vyāghāta of Dāndin. Dāndin follows Bhāmaha in treating this doṣa by naming it Pūrvapara-viruddha.

3. Apakrama

This fault occurs due to the reversal of the order of the statement (krama). Since syntactical regularity demands that the things attributed should follow the order of the first statements, violation of this regularity results in the defect called Apakrama.

For example:

May Śiva and Viṣṇu who carry the crown and the moon, who
have splendour of a black cloud and a snow like lustre, who
carry the disc and a trident, protect you.)

Here the dharmas should have been mentioned in the same order as their dharmis i.e. Śiva and Viṣṇu. But this order is violated and therefore it is a case of Apakrama. This fault may be compared with the aprāptakālanigrasthāna of Gautama.²⁹ Aprāptakāla consists in stating the members of an inference in an illogical order. There is a definite order among the members of an inference: 1. pratijñā (preposition) 2. hetu (reason) 3. udāharaṇa (example) 4. upanaya (application) and 5. nigamana (conclusion). The logical order among them conveys a connected meaning of the argument. If it is reversed it cannot convey any connected meaning. Bhāmaha has taken up the words of Vātsyāyana such as viprayāsa and krama to explain his concept of Apakrama.³⁰ For this doṣa there is an agreement in the concept as well as expression of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.

Apart from the treatment of faults as shown above Bhāmaha also explains the pratijñāhinādidosas which are purely logical faults. He has definitely borrowed the concepts from Nyāya treatises. The pratijñā (proposition) is the most important feature of anumānavākya. Bhāmaha first of all explains the defects of the pratijñā (an avayava of syllogistic statement). It consists of a statement in which a subject (pakṣa) is already known specifically to both the parties in a discussion and a predicate in a specific form
is proposed to be established in the subject. In other words it is in the form of a definite proposition. Its chief purpose is to bring about a definite knowledge of the pakṣa as such or what is proposed to be proved as having a sādhyā. Gautama in his Nyāya Sūtras defines pratijñā as sādhyānirdeśa. But Bhamaha defines pratijñā as a statement of pakṣa in which dharma and its dharma are present.

Bhamaha explains all the six varieties of pratijñādosas with the examples as follows:

(1) Tadarthavirodhini: It is the proposition which contradicts its own meaning. In other words it is a self-contradictory statement.

Example: यत्तमेव जिवतैं अन्यायस्यार्थस्यांत्यांतर्विकारः |
           (Ka. V. 14)
(My father is a celibate monk from his childhood and I am his legitimate (āuraśa) son).

(2) Hetuvirodhini: The proposition contradicted by its reason (hetu). It is illustrated by a case which is a subject of dispute.

Example: अस्यायनम् प्रकृतिर्वैति कैम् विद्वानवादिनः |
          धर्मिनोद्भवस्यप्रसिद्धं तवात् मामिषम न स्वत्वमवि |
          शास्त्रानि अभिशिष्टश्चैव बैतिक प्रतिकृत्तिः धर्मिनिः च वर्णैः |
          जायमि ऋषिविविशये विवाहों वादिविरितिः |
          (Ka. V. 13416)
Here the proposition whether the soul is existent or the Prakṛti is ahetuvirodhini-pratijñā. Since in the above proposition dharmi (atmā or prakṛti) is not established, its dharma cannot also be established. Here in the given proposition both dharmi and dharma are unestablished in the absence of proof.

3. Svasiddhāntavirodhini - the proposition which contradicts one's own siddhānta.

Example: कणांभौत्कथा यथा शत्मान्यक विनिविश्वरम् |

According to the Vaiśeṣika school of Kanāda, śabda is anitya. But if a proposition like śabdah nityah (sound is eternal) is made by a Vaiśeṣika, that will be svasiddhāntavirodhini-pratijñā because the later contradicts the former.

4. Sarvagamavirodhini - the proposition which is contradicted by all the Śāstras.

Example: अथा शुचिस्तनुस्त्रीणि प्रमाणानि न सत्तिवा |

This is illustrated by the contradiction of a position which is universally accepted. The proposition like 'the body is pure' is in contradiction with the assertion with all the schools of philosophy. Similarly the assertion that there are no pramāṇas is a case in point.

5. Prasiddhadharmavirodhini - the proposition which is contradicted by its excessive popularity.

Example: श्रीत्रग्राहिः व्यविनिर्द्धर्था |

What it accepted by all and not subject of doubt does not
require an express statement.

6. **Pratyakṣabādhini** - the proposition which is contradicted by direct perception.

Example: अथा शीतोदनको नासिन समुद्र: क्याकरः।

The statements like 'fire is cool,' 'moon is hot' are contradicted by direct perception.

According to Bhāmaha there should not be an absence of any member like hetu etc., in the Pratijñāvākya because it leads to the defective anumāna.

**Duṣanābhāsa** (illusion of fault), according to Bhāmaha, are called jāti and they are numerable and therefore not explained by him.

The foregoing discussion of pratiñjā etc., says Bhāmaha, is useful in the poems which are Śāstra-like in nature. But in other kāvyas, Pratijñā etc., of different types occur.

Because poetry depends on worldly experience and Āśtras depend on truth. A poet cannot be bound when he composes a general kāvyā but he has to follow the rules of the Āśtras when he specially compses śāstrakāvyas. Bhāmaha gives definition of other types of pratiñjā etc., i.e., the undertaking of desired task which are likely to occur in kāvyas based on worldly experience (lokāśritakāvyas). It is of four types as the desired task pertains to dharmā, artha, kāma and lopa.

About the nature of hetu Bhāmaha says that in poetry
too hetu has three aspects as in Śāstra. Anumāna is based on anvaya (agreement) and vyatireka (difference). Bhāmaha also gives the example of it the analysis of which can be made in the form of sādhyā and sādhana.

यथायथत्त्व वनाधीनमेतृसित महत्सवः।
कूजनात्कुलक्रिणाय कमलानाथः सौरभान्॥ (KA.3.48)

Here the existence of pond is known by the kujana of kurari and fragrance of lotuses. The anumāna may be put in the following form: वनाधीन महत्सवः असि कृष्णाम कूजनान्, कमलाना सौरभान्।

Here, vanabhoge is pakṣa, mahatsarah asti is sādhyā and kujana and saurabha are sādhanaś or hetus by which the existence of sāras in the forest is inferred.

Even in the stock example 'parvato yahnimān dhūmat' this depends on the inevitable relation between sādhyā and sādhana.

The smoke seen in the sky is instrumental in effecting the inference of the fire only in the mountain. In poetry sometimes reason is not distinctly stated from sādhyā and the latter is established even without positive and negative concomitance.

The example: दीपस्वप्न निशा यद्रेण व्यवस्तिरिर्मार्गः । (KA.3.5)

Here, night is the substratum which is the object of inference sādhyadharmini and disappearance of the sun is sādhyadharma. Long disappearance of the sun can be logically proved only by the reason dipra dipatvam possessing brilliantly shining lamps.
The hetu in poetry is also liable to be vitiated by the three defects which violates the triple character of probans (hetu) in the Nyāya logic. Bhāmaha gives several examples of these defects which arise due to ignorance of doubt or false knowledge or the person concerned. Thus the statement: काशा टरित्वं तत्तद्यमणी घुसुमसंरभान् (का. ५. ३६) (the kāsas captivate the hearts of people by fragrance of their flowers).

This is a wrong statement because the kāsa has no fragrance. It is an evidence of the ignorance of the speaker. The poetic reason as stated above i.e. fragrance of flower, is absent in the pakṣa. All these are to be understood as harmful or injurious on account of their vicinity to water. This gives rise to doubt as it is not an established fact that all things which grow in the neighbourhood of water are harmful. Another statement, certainly this is cakora because it has white corners in the eyes, is based on false knowledge, for the cakora bird is known for red corners in its eyes. So this statement gives false information as the hetu, "white corners" is falsely attributed to the bird.

The drṣṭānta or udāharana consists in stating a parallel to the subject. Bhāmaha does not illustrate it. The kitchen in which smoke and fire are found together is cited as an example for inferring fire in the hill on the basis of smoke observed in it.
Bhāmaha than refutes the contention that simile is a case of inference. There is no statement of hetu in simile. The statements of probans (sādhana) and probandum (sādhyā) is only appropriate in the cases already noticed. The face is like a lotus is the case of simile without reference to sādhana and sādhyā. The simile above stated is entirely different from the following statement.

(You are pre-eminent even in this fallen sage. Just as you have been taught by man of superior intellect and wisdom; just as people were in the older age (kṛta-yuga).)

Here one comes across a hetu and sādhyā along with an example. But all the examples are not illustrative of concomitance of hetu and sādhyā.

The conclusion that particular king possesses certain qualities is not possible simply on account of the example as the relation of sādhyā and sādhana is not present. The use of the example (drṣṭānta) alone results in neyārtha doṣa.

Thus Bhāmaha almost devotes his entire fifth chapter on the discussion of the logical defects with the regard to anumāna and its related matter. He discusses various kinds of doṣas pertaining to anumāna. This shows his deep
knowledge of Nyāya philosophy especially logical and epistemology as well as his great genius in relating the topics of logic with poetics. He seems to be profoundly influenced by the Nyāya system of logic in postulating the doctrine of poetic blemishes. To which Nyāya system he adheres to will be discussed in the chapter on Buddhist Logic.

Dandin closely follows Bhāmaha in treating the poetic blemishes. So his treatment is not specially discussed here. As far as the pratijñāhīnādīdosas (logical faults) are concerned he does not follow Bhāmaha and shows his independence of mind in rejecting them. He makes a cursory reference to it for its outright condemnation and says "the deliberation whether the defect of pratijñā, hetu and drṣṭānta is a flaw or not (in poetry) is almost tough" what is the good of pursuing it? Vāmana also follows Dandin in leaving the blemishes of Pratijñā-hetu-drṣṭānta-hinādīdosas out.

Similarly, we do not find something concrete in the treatment of Bhoja so we have left him. But he in his Śr.P deals with virodha, one of the vākyadosas. He classifies it into pratyakṣavirodha, anumānavirodha and āgamavirodha. Under anumānavirodha he includes Bhāmha's pratijñāhīnādisodas.

III.4 Treatment of Poetic Blemishes in the Kalpalatāviveka

Chronologically, AP's treatment of dosas should follow that of Bhāmaha but since the treatment of the anonymous
author of Kalpalatāviveka is very close and complimentary to the one of Bhāmaha. We here put aside the chronological order as an exception and deal with Kalpalatāviveka first.

Bhāmaha’s treatment of Anumāna and poetic blemishes like Pratijñāhinādi has exerted profound influence on Kalpalatāviveka, a valuable work on Sanskrit Poetics. The Viveka is a sub-commentary on the Pallava, a commentary on the Kalpalata. The author of the Kalpalata and Pallava is Ambaprasada, the chief minister of Siddharāja Jaisīnha (1094-1143 A.D.) of Patana (Gujarat). The author of the Viveka is not known.

Kalpalata is divided into four chapters viz., Doṣadarśana, Gunaviveca, Śabdaśākadārśana and Arthāśākadārśana. Since the treatment of doṣa is the most important topic of the work, it devotes a complete chapter constituting nearly half of the entire work and gives it a prime place. The Viveka largely follows Māmata in his treatment of doṣas and classifies them into four varieties viz., padadoṣa, vākyadoṣa, arthadoṣa and rasadoṣa. Accordingly, the first paricceda is divided into four sub-sections of the same names. Since padadoṣas, vākyadoṣas and rasadoṣas do not reveal any influence of Nyāya, only other doṣas would be of direct interest to our purpose.

Under the arthadoṣas the Viveka comprehensively discusses some logical faults and closely follows Bhāmaha regarding pratijñāhinādidoṣas and explains them as follows:
TABLE 1

प्रतिज्ञाग्रहण: (Intra. p. 63)

साधकप्रमाणाधातुति  
(when pratiṣṭhā is viciated by 
a means of proof proving it)

बाधकप्रमाणाधातुति  
(when it is viciated by a 
means of proof disproving 
it)

प्रत्यक्षण वाधिता  
(when it is against 
perception)

अनुमानी वाधिता  
(when it is against 
inference)

शब्देन वाधिता  
(when it is against 
word)

अभ्युपातशब्दबाधिता  
(When it is against word which is a 
accepted as authoritative by 
one's own self)

अभ्युपातशब्दबाधिता  
(when it is against the 
word accepted as 
authoritative by all)

Hence: आनामविशेषाधिनि

तात्त्कालिकस्पृण  
(temporarily or presently 
it is नद्यैवविशेषिनि)

कालान्तराधिकृता  
(at some other time 
it is सिद्धान्तविशेषिनि)
After pratijñādāsas, the Vivekakāra deals with hetudosas. Bhamaha also has dealt with them, but he did not give illustrations whereas Vivekakāra does. The divisions of hetudosas as given by the Vivekakāra are as follows:

A hetu must have three aspects viz., pakṣasattva, sapakṣasattva and vipakṣasattva. If a hetu is deficient in any one or more or all of them it becomes defective. When a hetu is deficient in one of the aspects three hetvābhāsas viz. sādharana-anaikāntika, asādharana-anaikāntika and asidha arise. When it is deficient in two aspects three other hetvābhāsas viz. viruddha, asiddha-sādharana-anaikāntika and asiddha-sādharana arise. When the hetu is deficient in all the three aspects another hetvābhāsa viz. asiddha-viruddha arises. Thus there are seven hetvābhāsas which are illustrated and explained in the Viveka (pp. 60-61) as follows:

1. विरुद्धः-निम्यः: शब्दः: कृत-कारणम् | Here the hetu, 'being a product' is not present in the similar case (ākāśa) and also in the dissimilar case (ghata).

2. असिद्धाधारणाने-कालिकिनः-निम्यः: शब्दः: न्यूनतरानां | Here the hetu, 'having limitedly extended body', is absent in the pakṣa (sabda) as well as present in vipakṣa (ghaṭādi) and also in sapakṣa (paranvādi).

3. असिद्धाधारणः-निम्यः: शब्दः: अप्रभेदनात्त | Here the hetu, 'not being cognisable' is absent both in the pakṣa (sabda) and the sapakṣa (paramāṇvādi) and also from the vipakṣa (ghaṭādi).
4. साधारणेन्तरकालिका:— अनित्य: शब्द: अमूर्तत्वात्। Here, the hetu 'not having limitedly extended body' is present in pakṣa (sabda), sapakṣa (buddhi) and in the vipakṣa (ākāsa).

5. असाधारणेन्तरकालिका:— अनित्य: शब्द: श्रवणनात्। Here the hetu, 'being apprehended by the sense of qudition', is present in (sabda) and absent in both the vipakṣa (ākāsa) and the sapakṣa (ghata) For śraṇaṭṭya belongs to sound alone, according to Bauddhas, though according to Kapāda it belongs to genus (sāmāṇya) also.

6. असिद्दः:— अनित्य: शब्द: अनुपपत्तिः। Here, the hetu being perceived by vision is present in sapakṣa (ghata) and absent in vipakṣa (paramāṇyādi) and the pakṣa (sabda).

7. असिद्दविसिद्धः:— अनित्य: शब्द: अनूपपत्तिः। Here, the hetu not being a product is present neither in the pakṣa (sabda) nor in the sapakṣa (ghatādi), but on the contrary present in the vipakṣa (ākāsa). Hence it is deficient in all the three aspects whereas the first three of the above are deficient in two aspects and the next three in one.

Thereafter, the Viveka explains and classifies the drṣṭāntadaṇgas which are presented in a tabular form as follows:

1. Sādhyavikala: Drṣṭānta becomes defective when it is devoid of sādhyā e.g. श्रवणिन्त्य: अमूर्तत्वात् आकाशवन्। Here the sādhyā is absent in the Drṣṭānta which is nitya.
2. **Śādhana-vikāla**: If ākṛta is devoid of śādhanā it becomes defective, e.g. अमूर्तत्वान्त: द्विवेद्व।

Here the śādhanā is absent in the ākṛta which is mūrta.

3. **Ubbhayavikāla**: If the ākṛta is devoid of both śādhaya and śādhanā it becomes defective, e.g. अमूर्तत्वान्त: परमाणवत। Here neither the śādhya nor the śādhanā is present in ākṛta which is nitya and mūrta.

From the above exposition of Kalpalatāviveka's treatment of arthadāsaghas it is clear that the Vivekakāra is closely following Bhāmaha and where Bhāmaha could enter into details or exemplification of it, Vivekakāra fulfills that lacuna in a very able way. Bhāmaha tried to show by examples from worldly life like bharataśtvam dilipastvam etc., or yatirmamam pita etc., but did not give theoretical explanations of it, Vivekakāra supplies the theoretical explanation of Bhāmaha's practical exposition and thus compliments his efforts.

### III.5 Treatment of the Poetic Blemishes in the Agnipurāṇa

The important feature in the treatment of poetic blemishes of the AP is that it touches upon Hetvābhāsas (logical fallacies) as kāvyadosas. The AP does not give any definition of Hetvābhāsas or hetudasas which are treated under the term 'hetvasamarthatā'. It is defined as īstasādhanavyāghāṭānukāri (an impediment to the accomplishment of the desired object, the īśta being anumiti in the
case of anumāna. Though the AP does not explain a hetu become asamartha in achieving its desired object because of the impediment standing on its way it may be explained as follows.

Example: parvataḥ dhūmavān vahnimatvāt

Here the hetu vahnimattva ia defective and therefore asamartha in producing anumuti i.e. the knowledge of smoke on the mountain it is because the vyāpti yatra yatra vahnimattvam tatra tatra dhūmavattvam is not correct. As in the burning iron-ball (tapta ayah golaka) though vahni is present dhūma is not present. This hetu is sopādhika (endowed with an adjunct). Hence it is fallacious.

The AP gives eight varieties which are in fact the causes leading to hetvasamarthata as follows:

1. Asiddha (non-existent) 5. Kālātīaa(
2. Viruddha (contradictory) 6. Pakṣasattva (presence in pakṣa)
3. Anaikāntika (inconclusive) 7. Sapaksasattva (absence in sapakṣa)
4. Satpartipakṣa (antimonic) 8. Vipakṣasattva (presence in vipakṣa)

As regards the first five varieties of hetvasamarthata enumerated in the AP, Gautama (I.2.45) seems to be the source of the AP, though it differs from it in its order, and nomenclature.
The Ap’s Asiddha, Anaikāntika and Satpratipakṣa are synonymous with Gautama’s Sādhysāma, Savyabhicāra and Prakaraṇa-sama respectively. Gautama himself (1.2.46) explains Savyabhicāra as a naikāntika. Gaṅgeśopādhya (12th century A.D.) inserts Satpratipakṣa and Asiddha for Gautama’s Prakaraṇa-sama and Sādyasama. Viśvanātha Nyāyapaṇcānana (16th century A.D.) in his NSM employs the terms similar to that of the AP viz. Anaikāntika, Viruddha, Asiddha, Pratipakṣa and Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa.

As regards the last three varieties, the AP obviously follows Bhāmaha who speaks about the three essential attributes of a hetu viz., pakṣasattva, sapakṣasattva and vipakṣasattva in the absence of which the reason becomes defective. The AP puts them forth in the reverse order, namely, pakṣasattva, sapakṣasattva and vipakṣasattva.

Thus on the basis of the above discussion it may be concluded that the author of AP reveals some influence of the Nyāya system and incorporates their logical doctrines in the form of kāvyadoṣa. It is possible that they might have recieved this influence via Bhāmaha.

III.6 Mammaṭa’s Treatment of Poetic Blemishes

It is interesting to deal with Mammaṭa’s method of presentation of poetic blemishes which reveals the Nyāya influence. He deals with them in the following order:
The important point here to note is that Mammaṭa treats the padadoṣas first and then the padāmsadoṣas. Generally the reverse order is expected. But in doing so he perhaps follows the technique called saṅgati (relevancy of sequence), which occupies a significant position in the Nyāya school as Mathurānātha in his commentary on the Vyāptipaṅcaka says nāsaṅgataṃ prayuṅjeta. The author of a work must first state his prayojana and discuss issues followed by typical statement in a logical order. All scientific works should always be governed by logical consideration. The issues which logically arise from the previous statement should be discussed. The author must write in response to an actual or hypothetical question likely to be put to the student or the enquirer of truth for whose edification the book is written. All logically considered assertions are of the nature of answers to questions posed implicitly or explicitly. The next assertion must ne such as could naturally satisfy that question. This is in nutshell the meaning of saṅgati.⁴³
The logic treating the padādosaś first instead of padāṁsadisaś says Govinda Thakkura in his commentary, Kāvyapradīpa on NKP is the consideration of saṅgati anī logical economy. The padāṁsadośaś are fewer in number and are identical with those of padādosaś. So after treating the padādosaś Mammata speaks of padāṁsadośaś by way of extension (atideśa). This constitutes economy. Had the process been reversed he would have to give fresh definitions of all those padādosaś which are not included on the list of padāṁsadośaś. Govinda Thakkura's observation gives us a clue to understand that Mammaṭa was following the principle of Nyāyaśāstra to make his presentation logically sound.

Most of the padādosaś of Mammaṭa have already been treated before along with those of Bharata and Bhāmaha. Only Nirarthaka is left out which we deal here with.

Nirarthaka

Mammata defines Nirarthaka as follows:

निररथकाḥ पादुपूणमात्रप्रेणे चासिप्रिंम् | (KP. VII. p.273)

Its example is:

उत्कृष्टके नमस्ते सर्वप्राणोऽग्रगच्छनि मम त्रिं मोरि! अभवविक्षितो प्रसिद्धाः प्रसिद्धाः गृहस्मपश्चातिः II (KP. VIII.44)

(O blessed Gauri, whose complexion is bright like the poolen of the full-blown lotus, may my desired object be accomplished by your kindness).
In this verse the particle 'hi' is nirarthaka. Gautama in his Nys treats Nirarthaka as a Nigrahastana, which is defined as-\textit{varnakramanirdešavat nirarthakam} (\textit{v}, 2.8).

Vatsyayana gives the following example:
\begin{align*}
\text{nityah šabdah kacaṭatapānāṁ jabagaḍadasatvāt jhabhaghaḍha-}
dhasatvāt.
\end{align*}

The letters kacaṭatapa etc., in the above are just arranged in the sequential order but they do not convey any significant meaning. It is clear that Mammaṭa is employing the term in a sense different from one in Nyāyaśāstra.

Mammaṭa also reveals a rare command over the loops and corners of Nyāyaśāstra in the method of presentation, in his arguments in the course of his exposition, in the tricks with which he traps the opponents and takes advantage of their inaccuracies and in such other aspects of his exposition. In this chapter, however, we are limiting our concern with Mammaṭa only to the limit of his treatment of doṣa.

In the preceding pages of this chapter we have tried to show how the treatment of kāvyadoṣas of some poeticians reveal an influence of Nyāyaśāstra on them. They are Bharata, Bhāmaha, Dāndin, Mammaṭa, Bhoja, Agnipurāṇakāra and Kalpalatāvivekakāra. Other poeticians have more or less
repeated the topics discussed by their predecessors with a little change in language or in terms without adding something substantial to the doctrine of kāvyadoṣas. They, therefore, do not need any special mention in this chapter.

We have seen that Bharata's treatment of poetic blemishes is mainly concerned with the dramatic performance. Keeping in view the perfection of oratorial expressions or dialogues (vācikābhīnas) he has conceived and formulated the doṣas which are supposed to occur at the time of stage performance. Gautama also has formulated some vādadoṣas (faults which occur during the process of vāda) keeping in view the process of debate which takes place between a proponent and an opponent or two groups, for either to reject or to establish one's own position. Thereafter Gautama in his exposition enumerates also some of doṣas which are supposed to occur at the time of argumentation leading to the defeat. Both Gautama and Bharata intend the same thing. Since, a statement devoid of any kind of flaw is necessary both in case of a nāta and a debator all the flaws have been formulated both in Gautama's Nyāyasūtra and Bharata's NS keeping that purpose in view. That is why we find some similarity in the treatment of some logical and poetical defects.

The Nyāyasūtras of Gautama deal with doṣas twice. The first is the section on śbbdāprāmāṇa, where the
pūrvapakṣa states that the verbal source of knowledge is not valid since it is liable to such flaws as Anṛta (untruth), Vyāghāta (contradiction) and punarukta (tautology).

Secondly, a large number of doṣas are met with towards the end of the Nyāyasūtra where the Nighaṇṭhānas are enumerated. Here the flaws in the methodology of debate which would result in defeat, are given,

However, the direct reference to the Nyāyaśāstra with regard to poetic blemishes are not found in the works of poeticians who seem to be influenced to certain extent by the logic of Nyāyaśāstra. From a critical examination we find similarities both conceptual and linguistic in their treatment of doṣas. The logical faults like Vyāghāta and Punarukta propounded by the Naiyāyikas are also found in the works of Alankaṇḍaśāstra. We have shown in this chapter that Vyāghāta of Naiyāyika is the Vyārtha of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin; their Punarukta is Ekartha in Bharata, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, Māmata and AP and others directly deal with this fault without ever changing the name. Further, the Argha-punarukta corresponds with Māmata’s Anavikṛta. And Ruyyaka while dealing with Punarukta even quotes a Nyāyasūtra which is also identified as that of Aksapāda by Jayaratha.
The *Nigrahasthānas* of Gautama are also accepted by the poeticians as they develop their concept of poetic blemishes under their influence. *Arthāntara* is found in Bharata's *NS*, *Nirarthaka* in Mammata; *Avijñātārtha* is akin to Bhāmaha's *Ghūḍhaśabdābhidhāna*. *Apārthāaka* is exactly identical with the *Apārthāaka* of Bhāmaha and Dandin. The *Nyūna* and *Adhika* *nigrahasthānas* of Nyāyaśāstra which refer to *nyunatā* and *ādhikya* of the syllogistic statement like *Pratijan* etc., are met with in the *Nyunapada* and *Adhikapada* of Rudrata, Bhija Bhāmaha, Vāmana, Maṇḍa and Viśvanātha. Thus we may conclude in the light of the above discussion that Nyāya philosophy has definitely influenced some major poeticians in their treatment of poetic blemishes.
REFERENCES


7. Ibid. ch. XVI, p. 331.
8. Ibid.


14. NS, ch. XVI, p. 332.
15. दैविकबोधीयोगीयाश्रयत्रिसबझितनित्यावधिकारम् | Nys. v. 2.10;
यन्नापैक्षत्य पदस्य वाक्य्य न दैविकबोधीयान्वयपदम्
वाक्यं भासितं हत्यासंबझितं गुर्दति नन्नरव्यायं
धीर्यार्थादहु प्राप्यार्थेन्चा यथा 'दुः' यद्याविना,
व्रणपद्वः, कृष्णमाजऱ्यास्मृतं पन्तकपिण्डः --- द्वितीय्।
NBh. on Nys v. 2.10.


17. ABh. p. 332. Abhinava quotes only "upto सितम्।
The line is completed by Jha Bechen by adding the words 'अष्टादशे', though he does not quote the source.

18. श्यायायः: पुनर्वन्धु पुनस्त्रिमय्यानुवादत्। Nys. v. 2.114.


20. ibid.

21. अर्थात्: प्रयुक्तस्तिर्भूतिशिरपि दिन्धा। AP. 15. 1.15.

22. ASS, p. 70.

23. Viṣṇusūrya on ASS., p. 70.

24. NS., ch. XVI, p. 333.

25. HŚp., p. 110.

26. विलोकनस्ति मनः व्यक्तं विलोक्तं नवदित्यात्।
पुष्पार्थ्यायायान्तिक्यकरि यथा ॥ KA. IV. 9.

27. तत्प्राप्यायायम् अनुपरयायायान्त्यस्मृतिदृष्टान्यः।
NYS. II. 1: 57
28. अधारपूर्वी क्रमश: निर्देशित्त्र क्रम माने।

तन्त्रेन विचयित्वातित्यास्तविन मायकर्तम्।। KA. ४. २०।

29. अवयवविचयित्त्र मुधनमूम्प्राण्तकालम्।। Nys. ५. २. ११।

30. प्रतिप्रत्यामनं मध्यवानं अधानक्रणमथे निविधान

cकः तन्त्रावयवविचयित्त्र मुधनमूम्प्राण्तकालम्।।

असंबंध्य निराश्च निभाश्याममिति। NBh. on Nys. ५. २. ११।

31. KA. ५. १२।

32. Nys. १. ३३।

33. KA. ५. १३।

34. Ibid. ५. २९।

35. Ibid. ५. ३०।

36. Ibid. ५. ५३८ ५४।

37. Ibid. ५. ५५८ ५६।

38. प्रतिप्रत्यामनं दृष्टान्तान्तरितिः स वैवर्तजी।

विचारः कर्णः प्रयत्नकालिन चिन्ता फलम्।।

KD. ३. १२७।

39. E. P. २. २१६।

4०. दृष्टान्तान्तरितिः कार्तिकेन दृष्टान्तसाधनाः। AP. २०।

4१. Ibid. २१।

4२. अन्नेनार्थी विचारः आय्यविचारः प्रतिप्रत्यामनं।

कार्तिकेयापपशुवपथेन भएष्यासाय फल्याच।।

NSM. १. २१६।

4३. अन्नेनार्थविचारः प्रतिप्रत्यामनं ज्ञासान्तरक आय्यवाय्यान्तरितं संग्रामः।

Mathuri, on Vyafi Tinaacakam, ३।