CHAPTER IV

INDIA : THE BEGINNINGS

Primacy of Security: Kashmir:

The primary concern of India's foreign policy has been as shown above the security of the country and Nehru did not hesitate to use force as and when it suited the purpose. Nothing illustrates this better than the very first major action taken by the Government of India in the field of foreign relations, to save Kashmir from falling into the hands of Pakistan in October 1947. The popularity of the Government of India and its foreign policy in the early days of independence appears to have been based on this popular action of the Government of India.¹

The importance of Kashmir for the security of India was explained by Nehru in a speech to the Constituent Assembly on November 25, 1947: "Kashmir because of its geographical position, with its frontiers with three countries namely the Soviet Union, China, and Afghanistan is intimately connected with the security and international contacts of India. Economically also Kashmir is intimately related to India. The Caravan trade routes from Central Asia to India pass through

² Nehru, op.cit., p. 443.
the Kashmir State." V.P. Menon, who played an important part in obtaining the accession from the Maharaja of Kashmir has written:

"Personally, when I recommended to the Government of India the acceptance of the accession of the Maharaja of Kashmir, I had in mind one consideration and one consideration alone, viz: that the invasion of Kashmir by the raiders was a great threat to the integrity of India. Ever since the time of Mahmud Ghaznavi, that is to say for nearly eight centuries, with but a brief interval during the Mughul Epoch, India had been subjected to periodical invasions from the northwest. Mahmud Ghaznavi had led no less than twenty-one of these incursions in person. And within less than ten weeks of the establishment of the new State of Pakistan, its very first act was to let loose a tribal invasion through the northwest. Srinagar today, Delhi tomorrow. A nation that forgets its history or its geography does so at its peril."

That was why the government of India decided to send forces into Kashmir and then insisted on the accession of Kashmir to India before aid could be sent to it. Nehru, however, claimed later that:

"The Government of India had been a continuing body through the changes in India's Constitutional status. When India became a republic sometime after power had been transferred to Indian hands, the new Government inherited not only the liabilities and duties


4. See above pp. 7 & 85.

of the old Government but also its assets and its rights. After all, we continued to be a member of the United Nations without a fresh election. Similarly it was as much our right as it was our responsibility to protect not only the States which had acceded to India but also those which had not acceded to Pakistan. Thus, even if Kashmir had not acceded to India, we should have still been obliged to protect the people of Kashmir against aggression. Kashmir had at no time been recognised as a sovereign State under international law. It has always been considered part of India. Partition made no difference to our responsibilities in Kashmir as long as it had not acceded to Pakistan."

One would have, therefore, expected the Government of India to act immediately and to go to the help of the people of Kashmir. But the fact that they had accepted, instead, Mountbatten's advice that forces should be sent only after obtaining the accession from the Maharaja, which Mountbatten himself was not prepared to accept as final, suggests that their first concern was to obtain the accession of the state. Perhaps a great deal of loss of life and property could have been prevented if the Government of India had sent forces much earlier into Kashmir. The Maharaja's letter addressed to the Government of India at the time of the accession makes it clear that he had signed the Instrument of Accession since aid could come only after the accession of the State. Sheikh Abdullah had also made a similar statement at the time.

6. See V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 381.


This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that the Government of India had not thought it proper, during those three days from October 24, 1947, when the Tribal invasion of Kashmir was launched, to October 27, 1947, when the Indian army was flown into Kashmir, to refer the matter to the United Nations, as might have been expected of a Government and a leader, who claimed to have faith in the world body. The fact was, however, that the Government of India as well as Nehru, had a genuine suspicion of the great power unanimity in the Security Council and of a Western majority in the General Assembly. It would not have been very difficult to visualise that in a matter like Kashmir the Great Powers might act together and try to impose a solution. As Arthur Lal has written: "If the arrangements envisaged in Chapters VI, and VII, of the Charter had worked smoothly, it is possible that the fiasos handed down by the Great Powers acting in concert might on occasion have been not only onerous, but, in terms of Asian situations arbitrary." Indeed this was India's complaint against the Security Council's failure to

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12. This became most pronounced during the debates on the 'Uniting For Peace Resolution'. See below, pp. 188-191.

call Pakistan an aggressor in Kashmir and its decision to call for a cease-fire and to hold a plebiscite.  

It was this fear of Great Power fiat that appears to have been the reason for the reference of the case to the Security Council under Chapter 6, instead of Chapter 7 of the Charter, which calls for enforcement action. The Government of India had always been opposed to the admission of any foreign forces on India's soil for obvious reasons. This is quite clear from the correspondence Nehru had with Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan. In his telegram on December 12, 1947, Nehru said: "we have given thought to the question of inviting the UN to advise us in the matter. While we are prepared to invite UN Observers to come here and advise us as to the proposed plebiscite, it is not clear in what other capacity UN help can be sought ...... I find myself unable to suggest any thing beyond what I have offered already." In other words, the Government of India did not want to give any independent role to the UN in Kashmir, as proposed by Pakistan's Premier.

15. Supra, n.7, p.77.
17. Supra n.7, pp. 55-73.
18. Id., p. 73.
Professor Appadorai, therefore, does not sound convincing when, in defence of this action of the Government of India, he says "that clear proof of Pakistani aggression was available only some four months after India referred the matter to the Security Council and after Pakistan committed the act of aggression." On the other hand, the Government of India appear to have been full of confidence about the strength of their case, legally and otherwise, for Pakistan had sent its military forces into Kashmir in the wake of India's military action. The military position also had turned in favour of India. Therefore, it was with reluctance that the case appears to have been taken to the United Nations, and perhaps on the insistence of Gandhiji. As Sisir Gupta writes: "On both sides attitudes had hardened enough and it was almost chimerical to believe that direct negotiations could succeed. And if they would not there could be only two ways; in India's view, of solving the problem of Kashmir: to wage a war against the country which aided the invaders or to ask the world to bring its pressure to bear on the aggressors. Of this limited choice, Gandhiji's preference could never be in doubt."


20. This is admitted by every one. And Nehru's critics base their attacks on him on this point. See in this connection T.N.Kaul, "Idealism And Self Interest in Foreign Policy", Indian And Foreign Review, (Vol.4, No.16, June 11,1967, New Delhi), p. 9.

Not much is known about the actual role of Gandhiji in this crisis, except Nehru's own statements to the effect that he had accepted the sending of forces into Kashmir. It was upon his insistence that the Government of India appear to have agreed to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. But Gandhiji appears to have been opposed to the idea of a war with Pakistan to liberate Kashmir. He had begun, on January 13, 1948, a fast to persuade the Government of India to pay to Pakistan the amount (Rs. 550 m) due to it under the partition arrangements, which the Government of India had withheld lest it might be used against India in Kashmir. It would appear that the advocacy of friendly relations with Pakistan along with this crusade against communalism in the Indian society that was responsible for his assassination, within one month of the reference of the Kashmir issue to the Security Council by India. This was terrible, and must have scared the Government of India terribly. Thus, Nehru's later unwillingness to agree to a plebiscite in Kashmir is quite understandable. It was from this stage onwards that the Kashmir issue got entangled with India's secularism.

22. See above chapter I, pp. 9-11.


It is however incorrect to claim that "It was essentially, if not entirely, Mr. Nehru's faith in the United Nations and the pacific settlement of disputes which actuated him to refer the case to the United Nations." Similarly, it was not again this faith, or according to T.N. Paul, "anxiety to establish peace and good neighbourly relations with Pakistan", that made the Government of India accept the cease-fire agreement in the United Nations. Among other things, there was a very important development which appears to have forced this necessity on India. It was China. Nehru told Parliament in 1962 that "Just about the time when we were busy fighting the Pakistanis, the Chinese came into Tibet. A great power was next to us. We saw that the situation has changed."

To avoid these twin dangers, one internal and the other external, Nehru expressed willingness to partition Kashmir between India and Pakistan and rejected the plebiscite as impracticable, as Joseph Korbel has recorded.


27. Supra n.20.


29. op.cit., p. 89.
Kashmir could no more be the only concern of the Government of India and India was in a fairly strong position vis-à-vis Pakistan. The Chinese threat had to be met adequately, while not giving in on Kashmir. Much of the Indian foreign policy during 1949 appears to have been aimed at this objective.

The India-China Rivalry:

The Chinese challenge was not unanticipated. In a speech broadcast from New Delhi, six days after the formation of the Interim Government, Nehru said: "China, that mighty country with a mighty past, our neighbour has been our friend through the ages and that friendship will endure and grow. We earnestly hope that her present troubles will end soon and a united and democratic China will emerge, playing a great part in the furtherance of world peace and progress."

But very soon Nehru came to realise that the new China was in no mood to cooperate with India. It was not even prepared to accept India as an equal. This became evident, naturally, one might say, at the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi during March-April 1947, under Nehru's patronage. This was the first major attempt by Nehru to assume a sort of leadership of Asia at least against the

30. See Nehru, op.cit., p. 3.
European Powers. In his inaugural address to the Conference, Nehru stated: "For too long have we of Asia been petitioners in Western courts and Chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our legs and cooperate with all others who are prepared to cooperate with us. We do not intend to be the play-things of others.

"In this crisis in World history, Asia will necessarily play a vital role. The countries of Asia can no longer be used as pawns by others; they are bound to have their own policies in world affairs....."

While this was meant for the Western powers, there was also an assertion of India's own place in Asia. Nehru said: "In this conference and in this work there are no leaders and no followers. All countries of Asia have to meet together on an equal basis in a common task and endeavour. It is fitting that India should play her part in this new phase of Asian development. Apart from the fact that India herself is emerging into freedom and independence, she is the natural centre and focal point of the many forces at work in Asia. Geography is a compelling factor, and geographically she is so situated as to be the meeting point of Western and Northern and Eastern and South-East Asia....."

32. Id., p. 23.
This statement was at once an assertion of India's interest in the regions specified and a reminder to the Chinese that India did not want to be led by anybody in Asia, least of all China. The reaction of China was one of indignation, the small nations of South and South-East Asia were alarmed. As pointed out by Werner Levi: "The conference marked the apex of Asian solidarity and the beginning of its decline. The reasons for this were many and varied, the two major sources of discord were the intense rivalry between India and China in the conference and the common distrust of the two Asian giants among the smaller countries of the region...."

Nehru appeared, however, unprepared yet to take up the challenge posed by China, for, when the Chinese delegate protested against a map displayed at the conference dias which showed Tibet as a separate State, Nehru got it removed promptly, giving the first evidence of his future conciliatory approach towards China.

33. A delegation from Burma is reported to have said that "European Capitalism and exploitation may be replaced by 'brown exploitation'." And a Ceylon delegate "referred to the fear of small countries like Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia etc., that they might be faced with aggression not necessarily political but economic and demographic, by their big brothers like China and India." Id., pp.73-74.


35. Ibid.,

But when China came into Tibet while the Government of India were busy fighting in Kashmir, the Chinese threat was realised. China had not yet occupied Tibet and the Himalayas still presented a good barrier. But the fall of either Indonesia or Burma into China's hands might have meant a threat of the greatest magnitude. India, therefore, became involved deeply in the freedom of South East Asia from Colonialism as well as Communism. The conference on Indonesia convened by India in January 1949, was the first major manifestation of India's involvement in South-East Asia. The importance of Indonesia's freedom for India was pointed out by Nehru when he said: "If some kind of colonial domination continues in Indonesia, if it is permitted to continue, it will be a danger to the whole of Asia, it will be a danger to us in India." This statement of Nehru has been compared to the Monroe Doctrine by an Indian scholar. What is important to note, however, is the fact that the continuance of colonialism in Indonesia might have led to a Communist victory in Indonesia over the nationalists. Such a development would have been a great danger for India. This appears to have been

37. It was the period when the Communists were trying to takeover Burma, Malaysia and the Phillipines -

38. Nehru, op.cit., p. 262.

a very important consideration with the Government of India, though it was not made public. But in a speech delivered at the Indian Council of World Affairs, on March 22, 1949, Nehru appears to have drawn attention to this aspect when he said:

"I have no doubt that the countries of Europe and America are themselves very much disturbed and distressed by what is taking place in Indonesia ..... I think they realise that Indonesian freedom is not only desirable in itself, but is also desirable in the larger scheme of things which they have before them, and if by any chance any kind of imperialistic domination succeeds in Indonesia it will affect the larger plan they have for the future. And I realize that the Asian nations as a whole will be very much affected....."

It was about this time that the Government of India began to take interest in the civil war in Burma between the Burmese Government and the Communists. The importance attached to the success of the Burmese Government is evident from the fact that......"apart from financial assistance, India had

40. Nehru, op.cit., p. 263.


42. See Sisir Gupta, India And Regional Integration In Asia, op.cit., p.76. See also V.K.Sinha, 'India And Southeast Asia', in A.B.Shah, ed., India's Defence and Foreign Policies, Manaktala's, Bombay 1966), p. 111.
also rendered military assistance to Burma. There has, however, been no public statement regarding the nature and extent of this aid."

And in a speech in the Parliament of India on March 17, 1950, Nehru made a cautious statement on the aid given to Burma: "There is Burma, which has seen a great deal of internal trouble in the last two or three years and has faced enormous difficulties. Naturally our Government and our people are interested in the present and future of Burma. It is not our purpose—and it is not right for us to interfere in any way with other countries, but wherever possible, we give such help as we can to our friends. We have ventured to do so in regard to Burma without any element of interference."

Nehru was also reported to have told newsmen that "fear on the part of the British and other Governments was that if the present conditions continued, other elements in Burma may begin to play a more important role than either the Karens or the Burmese Government, which they did not want them to play." The other elements referred to by Nehru were only Communists. As Sisir Gupta has explained: "It was well-

45. India And Regional Integration In Asia,op.cit., p.76.
known that the aid was largely needed to tide over the Communist revolt a situation which all the newly-freed countries were facing at this stage."

As Nehru pointed out, this aid to Burma was given with the consent of the British and other Commonwealth Governments of the area. In fact the decision to fight Communism through economic development as well as by strengthening military forces, was taken at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference at London in October 1948. It was from this meeting that India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth flowed. This decision was taken because Nehru said: "If we dissociate ourselves completely from the Commonwealth, then for the moment we are completely isolated. We cannot remain completely isolated, and so inevitably by stress of circumstances, we have to incline in some direction or other." India was not only isolated economically and politically, but it was weak militarily and it was being encircled by enemies or hostile nations. This encirclement appeared to be complete, with the first signs of the success of Communists in China and their

46. See J.C.Kundra, op.cit., pp.185-194 for a detailed discussion of this aspect of India's foreign policy. Also see above chapter 2, p. 78 - 79.

presence in Tibet. As already indicated, the Commonwealth not only assured British economic and military help for India's own progress, but it also opened channels for help from the United States. Above all, British assistance was assured in the case of an eventuality like a major clash with China.

The Commonwealth also ended the search for the much needed regional association or a regional organisation by India which had begun with the first Asian Relations Conference. At the conference on Indonesia, Nehru had pleaded for such an organisation:

"We see creative and cooperative impulses seeking a new integration and new unity. New problems arise from day-to-day which, in their implications, concern all of us or many of us. The Americans have already recognised a certain community of interest and have created machinery for the protection and promotion of common interests. A similar movement is in progress in Europe. Is it not natural that the free countries of Asia should begin to think of some more permanent arrangement than this conference for effective consultation and concerted effort in the pursuit of common aims— not in a spirit of selfishness or hostility to any other nation or group of nations, but in order to strengthen and bring nearer fulfilment the aims and ideals of the Charter of the UN."

48. See above, Chapter 2, pp. 77 - 78.

49. Ibid., See in particular M.S.Rajan, 'The Future of The Commonwealth', Supra, Chapter 2 n.143.


51. Nehru, op.cit., pp. 410-411. Also see G.H.Jansen, op. cit., p. 89 for a comparison between Nehru's views at the Asian Relations Conference and the Indonesian Conference and also p.227 for a comparison with Bandung Conference.
This enthusiasm was shortlived, for it was evident that such an organisation with purely Asian membership would be neither feasible nor would be of any benefit to India. Thus Nehru told the constituent Assembly of India, on March 8, 1949:

"We have not yet decided what the region of cooperation might be, because .... India is interested in several regions of Asia. Whether all should be grouped together or separately we do not know. That is for us to consider together and decide what is more feasible .... Whatever structure we may build up will be entirely within the scope of the Charter of the UN .... there will be no binding covenants in it, and this will be largely an organisation for the consultation and cooperation that naturally flow from common interests."

As Sisir Gupta has written "The change of Indian opinion illustrated by these developments within the span of a year reflected a vast change that had in the meantime taken place in the Asian political scene. Even as the Asian delegates at the Indonesian Conference were deliberating, news from China indicated that Chiang Kai-Shek had virtually abdicated and his successor was seeking peace with the communists; by the end of the year communist revolution in China was complete. It was now futile to expect any regional movement.
in the Asian region which could be made to grow in isolation from this development. It was impossible to think of accepting China in any regional arrangement for Asia without making it a hot bed for communist intrigues; likewise any association formed to counter the Chinese situation would mean a definite lining up of Asia with the West and behind some of the regimes of the continent which felt threatened by China due to their internal weakness...."

What this argument, however, fails to mention is that India itself felt threatened by China and that South East Asia and India had been for sometime hotbeds of communist intrigues. India, therefore, needed closer links with a friendly power or powers. The Commonwealth was chosen because it was free from commitments while providing the necessary protection in case of an eventuality. In this way alone could India rectify the imbalance created by the rise of a powerful communist state right across its borders. This decision might well be considered as the first major manifestation of India's Nonalignment.

This does not mean that India was depending upon Britain for its defence. India itself took certain steps. In a significant move it took over the administration of Sikkim

54. See Hindustan Times, 8 June, 1949.
in June 1949. And, in August 1949, India concluded a treaty with Bhutan placing the latter's foreign relations under its control. India also signed a treaty of friendship with Nepal on July 31, 1950. All this was done, it must be mentioned, in anticipation of the Chinese occupation of Tibet. After this, on December 5, 1950, India concluded a fresh treaty with Sikkim, placing the latter under India's protection.

On December 6, 1950, Nehru declared in the Parliament unequivocally that:

"Frankly we do not like and shall not brook any foreign interference in Nepal. We recognise Nepal as an independent country and wish her well .... From time immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us with a magnificent frontier. Of course, they are no longer as impassable as they used to be but they are still fairly effective. We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated, for it is also the principal barrier to India. Much as we stand for the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security."

And Nehru made a similar statement in the Parliament about the McMahon Line, on the advice of Pannikkar, who was


56. Id., pp. 31-33. This treaty gave India an important right to treat Nepal as of special significance in India's defence - See Nehru, op. cit., pp. 373-374.

57. Id., pp. 39-40. The King of Sikkim in a recent visit to India has pleaded for more autonomy See above, Chapter 2, n.100.

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then ambassador to China. Pannikar, therefore, appears to have been perfectly justified when he claimed that like every Big Power, India had her own area of primary and strategic importance around her; intrusion into which by a foreign power would be considered by India as a threat to her own safety, and this area included Nepal, Burma and in a way Ceylon and that India had made it clear to foreign (big) Powers that she would not tolerate any interference in the affairs of the three countries.

It is submitted here that it was to obtain the recognition of China for this area of primary and strategic importance to India that the diplomacy of India towards China was devoted from 1950 to 1954, for, unless China accepted this, India's position would not be safe, as the most important threat to India came from China. The Korean Crisis appeared to provide


60. Ibid.

61. See The Hindu, August 27, 1954. It is strange that an Indian Scholar has questioned the right and authority of Panikkar to speak in this way as he had by then left the diplomatic service. His argument against the existence of a sphere of interest is not very convincing — See M.S. Rajan, India in World Affairs, op.cit., p. 57, n. 2 and J. C. Kundra (op.cit., p. 71 n. 2), characterised this statement of Panikkar as a 'confusing note'.

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an opportunity to win this favour and India exploited it with more or less success, as will be seen below.

**INDIA'S ROLE IN THE KOREAN CRISIS**

**Introduction:**

The role of India in the Korean Crisis embraced the whole range of India's foreign policy objectives; from the preservation of world peace, to the protection and furtherance of India's vital interests in Kashmir, and the not yet successful aim of establishing friendly relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc. It was the interplay of these objectives, that produced a policy so rich in diversity that many people appear to have been baffled by it. It was essentially a simple policy, dictated by a single minded devotion to the pursuit of India's policy objectives as seen by Nehru and his close associates.

**India and the UNTCOK:**

The pattern for this policy was set quite early by India as a member of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK). It is, therefore, necessary to examine it briefly.
The Korean dispute was brought to the United Nations General Assembly by the United States on September 17, 1947. On September 23, 1947, "The General Assembly decided by a vote of 41 to 6 with 6 abstentions to include the item concerning Korea in its agenda and referred it to the First Committee for consideration." When "The First Committee began consideration of the Korean question in its 87th meeting on October 28, 1947," the United States and the Soviet Union submitted two separate draft proposals. The United States' draft proposal provided for elections to be held by the occupying powers in the northern and southern zones of Korea and the constitution of national security forces before the withdrawal of the occupation troops." It also provided that the "application of that resolution should be supervised by a United Nations Temporary Commission instructed to report to the General Assembly." The proposal of the Soviet Union was "that the General Assembly recommended to the Governments of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the simultaneous withdrawal of their troops from southern and northern Korea, respectively — thereby leaving to the Korean people itself the establishment of a National Government of Korea."

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62. For a brief account of the genesis of the Korean dispute see Year Book of The United Nations : 1947-48. The account of the United Nations action in the dispute and the quotations that follow are taken from the same source. See pp. 81-86 (Hereafter cited as Y.B.U.N.).
At the 91st meeting of the First Committee on October 30, 1947, "India stated that the U.S.S.R. proposal for the immediate withdrawal of occupation forces could lead only to confusion, since there was no Korean Government which could take over the administration of the country. On the other hand, the U.S. proposal that the National Government when constituted should form its own national security forces and then arrange for the simultaneous withdrawal of the occupation troops seemed to be unduly vague." The Indian representative, therefore, proposed that "A general election should be held, not on a zonal basis but on a national basis under the control of the UNTOK, so as to remove the political and moral barrier which had been created by the division of the country." India also proposed that elections should be by secret ballot and on adult suffrage; that the National Assembly should meet immediately after it had been elected and form a National Government which should form its national security forces and dissolve all foreign bases and forces and that a definite time limit should be fixed for withdrawal of occupation forces.

In the 92nd meeting of the First Committee the United States introduced a revised draft resolution incorporating many of the suggestions made by India and others, providing again for elections to be conducted by the occupying Powers. Then India "submitted an amendment (AC1/237) to the United States' proposal to omit reference to the 'occupying powers.'"
This amendment "was adopted at the 94th meeting of the First Committee on November 5, 1947, by a vote of 34 to 0, with 4 abstentions."

Why, then, did India reject the Soviet proposal and oppose the holding of elections on a zonal basis by the occupying powers? India no doubt, was motivated by the desire to establish an unified Korea as that had been her stand right from 1942. But another equally, if not more important, motive appears to have been at work. That was the desire to avoid the creation of precedents in the United Nations which might affect India's interests in Kashmir. The fact that both the issues arose almost simultaneously must have definitely influenced Indian thinking on the Korean dispute.

Though India had not thought of taking the Kashmir issue to the United Nations before October 27, 1947, it was evident that by the end of the month, it was under the active consideration of the Government of India. Panikkar has recorded that amidst rumours in the United Nation's circles


64. See Nehru, op.cit., p.54 where Nehru said that every question had to be viewed from a hundred different viewpoints. Any study of India's policy in the Korean crisis would be incomplete, if not also incomprehensible, if it does not take into account its implications on India's stand on the Kashmir issue.

that India was likely to charge Pakistan with aggression, Mrs. Pandit, the head of India's delegation to the United Nations, was asked by Nehru, through a personal message, to get into touch with the United States' Secretary of State, General Marshall, and to explain India's point of view to him. Mountbatten raised the issue for the first time, in his talks with Jinnah at Lahore, on November 1, 1947. On the next day, Nehru himself made the offer in a broadcast from Delhi, and, in telegrams to Liaqat Ali Khan, on November 3 and 8. The latter accepted it on November 16, and, suggested, inter alia, that the United Nations be requested to stop fighting, to arrange the withdrawal of outside forces, and to undertake a plebiscite under its direction and control. As already indicated, none of these proposals was acceptable to Nehru. The similarity between Liaqat Ali's proposals on Kashmir and the Soviet proposals and parts of the United States' proposals over Korea, was too close for India to accept them without creating a precedent that could be exploited by Pakistan to its advantage.

66. See Joseph Korbel, op.cit., p. 89. See also V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 386.
67. Supra, n. 7, p. 55.
68. Id., pp. 55 & 62.
69. Id., p. 65.
70. See above, p. 138.
This, rather than any principled opposition to measures which might entail the partition of a country, appears to have been the important consideration with the Government of India. For, India's policies do not suggest an adherence to such principles in the matter of recognition of states. For besides accepting the partition of India itself, India had in 1949 established diplomatic relations with West Germany. And, as already indicated, by the end of 1948, Nehru was prepared to partition Kashmir itself, between India and Pakistan, rather than hold a plebiscite under United Nations' auspices. Therefore when the Interim Committee of the General Assembly recommended the holding of elections in such parts of Korea as are accessible to the Commission, India accepted it. So the argument that this "was completely

71. See Karunakar Gupta, op.cit., p. ix

72. As in other matters in this matter also the Government of India is guided by interests rather than principles. Id., p.45. And according to an Indian scholar, the Government of India's recognition policy with regard to the two halves of Germany is inconsistent with the principles of international law on the one hand and its own policy of not recognising territorially dismembered countries on the other. See K.P. Misra, "Recognition of the G.D.R. - An Appraisal of India's Policy, The Indian Year Book of International Affairs (Vol.2,1963), p.131. It has not recognised East Germany. It has recognised Israel and yet has no diplomatic relations.

73. See K.P. Misra, op.cit., p.119.
74. See above, p. 141.
75. This committee was appointed by the General Assembly to attend to its work during its absence. The UNTOK failed to secure the cooperation of the Soviet authorities in North Korea in the implementation of the General Assembly Resolution of November 14, 1947. It then reported the matter for the Interim Committee. See Y.B.U.N.N., 1947-48, pp. 282-83 and 302.

76. Ibid.
77. Supra, n.71.
inconsistent with her policy in the immediate past", cannot be correct. For, "The world", said Nehru, "marches rapidly and changes, new situations develop and we have to deal with each situation as it comes .... In matters of foreign policy especially, one has to decide almost every hour what has to be done." Thus India's position in Kashmir had improved very much. India might have also been disenchanted with the Communists. India might have also been cooperating with the United States in the hope of winning its support on the Kashmir issue.

The most important factor in India's decision, however, would seem to be the recognition of the reality of the situation in Korea. Neither the United States, nor the Soviet Union, was prepared to accept a single Korea except on its own terms. The only alternative to war was, therefore, two Koreas. Thus the holding of separate elections in South Korea did not

78. Nehru, op.cit., p. 51.

79. See Karunakar Gupta, op.cit., pp. ix-x.

80. See K.P.S.Menon, *India And The Cold War*, op.cit., pp. 32-33 and 35. Also see *Parliamentary Debates*, Part II, Vol.V, No.6, 4 August, 1950, where a few members drew attention to this fact.

produce the division of Korea. It was already there. As pointed out by Professor Goodrich: "It would be unfair to say that the condition was the result of UN action, as it might well have happened in any case ......." as, one might may add, in Germany.

The policy of the Government of India became further clear when it refused to vote for the recognition of the Government of South Korea as the National Government of Korea, because it was "too grave a step" as the Indian representative on the Temporary Commission put it. It should be evident that the Government of India accepted the division of Korea as the only practical solution under the circumstances, though they were prepared to try all peaceful methods for the unification of Korea. India, therefore, supported the United States' proposal for the creation of a new UN Commission to work for the unification of Korea. India was also apprehensive that the withdrawal of forces of occupation before peaceful negotiations are instituted might lead to a war between the two Governments.

84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
The Crisis:

Thus when the Soviet-trained and equipped North Korean forces invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, it was clear to India that it was a challenge to the UN and a threat to world peace and the Government of India decided immediately to work for the restoration of the Status quo ante in Korea.

Therefore, both India and the United Arab Republic, who were then members of the Security Council, voted in favour of the Resolution adopted on June 25, 1950, the operative part of which contained, inter alia, the following clauses:

1. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities and calls upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th Parallel;

3. Calls upon all members to render every assistance to the UN in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

As the North Korean authorities did not comply with this Security Council resolution, the latter adopted another Resolution on June 27, 1950, recommending "that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic
of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." India and the United Arab Republic could not participate in the voting on this resolution as their delegations had not received instructions from their respective Governments.

The Government of India accepted this resolution on June 29, 1950. On the same day they issued a statement to the press which said, inter alia:

"The Government of India have given the most careful consideration to this resolution of the Security Council in the context of the events in Korea and also of their general foreign policy. They are opposed to any attempts to settle international disputes by

91. S.C.O.R., 5th Year, No. 16, 474th Meeting 27 June 1950, pp. 14-16. Both B.N.Rau and Fawzi, the Indian and the UAR delegates, respectively, were very much anxious to take part in the voting. The former even delayed the proceedings of the meeting in the capacity of the President of the Security Council for the month, in the hope of receiving instructions. In the end they regretted inability to take part in the voting - See below, Chapter 5 for an analysis of the UAR's stand on Korea.

resort to aggression. For this reason Sir Benegal Rau, on behalf of the Government of India voted in favour of the first resolution of the Security Council. The halting of aggression and the quick restoration of peaceful conditions are essential preludes to a satisfactory settlement. The Government of India therefore also accept the Second resolution of the Security Council. This decision of the Government of India does not, however, involve any modification of their foreign policy. This policy is based on the promotion of world peace and the development of friendly relations with all countries; it remains an independent policy which will continue to be determined solely by India's ideals and objectives. The Government of India earnestly hope that even at this stage it may be possible to put an end to the fighting and to settle the disputes by mediation."

And on July 7, 1950, Nehru further explained India's policy to a press conference in the following words:

"When North Korea launched an invasion against South Korea, it became evident from all the information available that this was a large scale and well-planned invasion. Border conflicts between the two countries as well as internal conflicts, had a bearing on the situation. But they were dominated by this major fact of a well-planned invasion and aggression on South Korea. In the delicate and precarious balance existing in the world, any such invasion was fraught with the most dangerous possibility. If aggression was allowed to succeed, the entire structure of the UN would have inevitably collapsed and a large-scale war resulted.

"The whole basis of the UN is to bring about the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. If aggression takes place and the aggressor ignores completely the UN, then only two choices are left; either the UN should condemn that aggression and try to put an end to it, or

93. See The Hindu, July 8, 1950.
it should come to the conclusion that it has ceased to be an effective instrument of peace and leave the decision of any dispute to war.

"In the context of events the Security Council had no alternative but to declare North Korea the aggressor, and subsequently call upon the members of the UN to meet this armed attack and restore international peace. Whatever justification might be advanced for this aggression and whatever might have preceded it may have some importance, but it does not take away from the fact of a well-planned aggression. India supported the resolutions of the Security Council because they logically followed the context of events and the UN Charter, and because that seemed the only course to avoid the extension of conflict and large-scale warfare. In doing so, India's primary consideration was to serve the cause of peace. This did not involve any change in the basic foreign policy of India, which is one of nonalignment with any group of nations against another group. In accepting the resolutions of the Security Council, India did not accept any enlargement of those resolutions. They refer to aggression in Korea alone and to no other situation....

"The Government of India are of opinion that the admission of the People's Government of China in the Security Council and the return of the U.S.S.R. are necessary conditions to enable the security council to discharge its functions adequately and to bring the Korean conflict to a peaceful conclusion. The best assistance that India can give is to help to limit the area of conflict and try to end it. Any military assistance is beyond India's capacity and would make little difference. India's defence forces have been organised for the defence of the country, and not for service in distant threats of War."

\[93\] This appears to be one of the rare occasions on which Nehru used the word Nonalignment in the late forties and early fifties.
These statements have been reproduced here, in full, because they explain quite satisfactorily, the whole basis of India's policy during the Korean crisis. Still, India's Korean policy, as it evolved fully, was widely misunderstood, and, criticised. It is, therefore, necessary to explain again the essentials of India's policy.

Firstly, Nehru had made it perfectly clear that there was a well planned and large scale aggression on South Korea. Speaking in Parliament on August 3, 1950, he dismissed the Soviet-backed North Korean claim "that before they invaded, South Korea had apparently gone across the border with troops", as a "very feeble plea". He also said that "There might have been border incidents, but to make that an excuse for the well-planned big scale invasion patently does not carry much

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94. The extent to which India's policy was or was not properly understood could be seen from the speeches of members of Parliament and Nehru's replies to them. See Parliamentary Debates, Part II, Volume V, Nos. 1-5, July-August 1950. See J.C. Kundra op.cit., pp.26-140 for an account of the American reaction to India's policy. See also F.S.C. Northrop, The Taming of Nations: for an interesting but, in my opinion, inaccurate interpretation of India's policy. See also G.F. Hudson, 'Korea And Asia', International Affairs (Vol.XXVII, No.1, January 1951). p.22.

95. See Parliamentary Debates, Part II, Volume 5, No.4, 3 August, 1950, Cols. 223-224. See also in this connection Survey 1949-50, p. 477. Karunakar Gupta (op.cit.,p.xi, n.8) feels that the decision of India was based on inaccurate accounts furnished by the Indian members of the UNTOOK and also suggests (p.xiii), that the decision might have been influenced by Loy Henderson, the then United States' Ambassador in India. As Shiv Dayal (op.cit.,p.82) has observed this appears 'highly improbable.'
force." And he declared that "It may be described as a 'Civil Conflict'; it may be described as an attempted unification and all that, but I rather doubt if any of these excuses can be taken to be a sufficient justification for this kind of thing. It was aggression ..... that is the attitude ..... that is described in that statement of June 29....."

Secondly, Nehru made clear that this aggression was an attempt to solve disputes by force which was dangerous from the point of view of world peace, because it was an attempt to upset the delicate balance of power. Therefore, it had to be prevented by the United Nations by the use of force much as India had done in Kashmir, since a call for the withdrawal of forces by the United Nations had gone unheeded. But the use of force had to be restricted to restore the status quo ante and not for the settlement of the problem which could be done only through peaceful means. Therefore, Nehru stated categorically that "In accepting the Security Council resolutions India did not accept any enlargement of those resolutions. They refer to aggression in Korea alone and to no other situation." This was clearly a reference to Truman's declaration on Formosa. This move of the United States appears to have raised suspicions in the minds of the

96. See Documents for 1949-50, p. 632 for the text of the declaration.
Government of India about the United States' intentions in Korea, and they appear to have foreseen that it might be willing to extend the area of conflict, if possible, at least to unify Korea under the auspices of the United Nations, which might escalate the conflict into a bigger war. This appears to have been an important, if not the main reason, as Nehru later clarified, for India's refusal to contribute forces to the UN Command, though the reason given in the statement of July 7, was quite satisfactory.

It seems, however, incorrect to conclude from this that India was not prepared to support the UN action in Korea. India had not only contributed medical units, but both Nehru and Rau, paid handsome tributes to the men fighting under the UN flag in Korea. But Nehru was opposed to a military solution to the Korean problem. He, therefore, made it clear that

97. Supra, n.95, cols.224-225. See also Shiv Dayal, op.cit., p. 96.
99. See above pp. 164 - 165 .
100. See K.Gupta., op.cit., pp. xii-xiii.
101. See Nehru's letter to the Secretary General of the UN cited in B.Shiva Rao & S.Kondapi, 'India And The Korean Crisis', India Quarterly, (Volume VII. No.4, October-December 1951), pp. 303-304.
a permanent settlement of the Korean problem was possible only with the cooperation of the Soviet Union and China. This was possible only when the former returned to the Security Council and the latter was admitted into it.

Nehru Mediates?

It was apparently in pursuance of this belief that the Government of India initiated the move to admit China to the Security Council. As Panikkar has written, the proposal was put forward by him secretly, in a meeting with the Vice Foreign Minister of China, Chang Han-Fu, on July 1, 1950, Nehru having already moved Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, in the matter. It is not known what the reaction of Britain was! However, the Chinese approval came on July 10, and, as an American authority has opined, "Undoubtedly after consultations with its Soviet Partner."

Then Nehru made a formal proposal in identical letters addressed to Stalin, and Acheson, the United States' Secretary of State, on July 13, 1950. Nehru wrote: "India's purpose is to localise the conflict and to facilitate an early peaceful

104. In Two Chines, op.cit., pp. 103-104.
105. Ibid.
107. Supra, n. 96, p. 705 for the text of Nehru's letter.
settlement by breaking the present deadlock in the Security Council so that representatives of the People's Government of China can take a seat in the Council. The U.S.S.R. can return to it, and whether within or through informal contacts outside the Council, the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., and China, with the help and cooperation of other peace-loving nations can find a basis for terminating the conflict and for a permanent solution of the Korean conflict."

Not surprisingly, while Stalin accepted the proposals on July 16, Acheson rejected them on July 18, 1950. An Indian Scholar has observed that "If this peace initiative had evoked as favourable a response in the Western capitals as it did in Moscow, the Korean war would have ended honourably long before or at least, it would have put to test Soviet sincerity about peace in Korea." Nehru did not appear to have been so optimistic as he said later that "I made the appeal in the vague hope that perhaps it might result in something positive." And Panikkar has recorded that "I realised that the proposal of seating Peking in the Security Council, however

108. Id., p. 706.
109. Ibid., for Acheson's reply and Nehru's second letter to him.
112. In Two Chinas, op.cit., p. 104.
legitimate, reasonable and logical, would be resisted by the Americans since it would involve an immense loss of face to them. It was also obvious that in the face of definite American opposition Bevin would not be able to act. Still, there was a chance..." Panikkar added significantly: "That the Russians did not expect anything to come out of this was clear from the fact that Tass published the correspondence before Acheson had a chance to reply....."

Thus it would appear that the Government of India were not unaware that the proposal might be rejected by the United States. Only a little reflection was needed to realise it. What then did they expect from the move? In a lengthy statement in Parliament, on August 3, 1950, Nehru explained part of it: "Now with New China and the U.S.S.R. and some other countries going out of the United Nations, it has assumed a new shape. It has ceased to be what it was meant to be, for the time being at least.....There is no forum left for any attempt at peaceful settlement.....the United Nations instead of being an organ for peace would inevitably drift towards being an organ for war or preparation for war." Nehru also

113. In Two Chinas, op.cit., p. 104.
114. Supra, n.95, cols. 227-229.
pointed out that "the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Trygve Lie communicated repeatedly with the various member nations including us, earlier this year, pointing out these great developments and saying that if something was not done soon the United Nations would simply disintegrate..... That was what Mr. Trygve Lie felt, and that is how we felt....."

"Therefore", continued Nehru, "when this Korean invasion took place and we tried to think what we could do in the matter. .....we felt again, as we felt previously that ..... one initial approach would surely help in creating an atmosphere which would facilitate the solution of that question....."

Thus it would appear that the Government of India did not like to have an United Nations, increasingly dominated by the United States. If they had calculated that their move might induce the Soviet delegate to resume his seat in the Security Council, that was achieved, and the Soviet delegate, Malik returned to the Security Council on August 1, 1950, as its president for the month. Prof. Whiting, has suggested that the acceptance by Stalin of Nehru's 'mediation' might have been an indication of the Soviet desire for compromise and that Malik's behaviour did not preclude a Soviet attempt

115. See Allen S. Whiting, op. cit., p.62 see also Supra, n. 95, 4 August, 1950, col. 378.

116. Ibid.

117. Id., p. 78.
to explore the prospects for negotiated settlement in Korea.

He admits, however, that "nothing in Malik's position committed the Soviet Union to specific settlement of the war and by extending the Indian proposal to include the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as well as the People's Republic of China at the talks he was merely amplifying a position already taken by a respected non-communist power. Should the Soviet Union fail little would be risked, while the potential gains were large....."

B.N. Rau was quick to foil this Soviet attempt to subvert India's proposal. Voting against the Soviet draft resolution of August 4, which proposed to invite the representatives of North Korea besides those of Communist China, and, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, the Indian delegate said on September 1: ".....what we are discussing at present with respect to Korea is not a dispute ..... Briefly what we are engaged in at the moment is not the discussion of the Korean dispute, but rather of the Korean campaign. In the view of my Government, the question of hearing the representative of the North Korean authorities

118. Id., p. 76.
120. See 6th year, No.36, 494th Meeting, 7 September 1950, pp. 15-16.
can not arise until the campaign is over, that is to say, until at least hostilities have ceased and withdrawal of the North Korean forces had been agreed upon. I shall therefore have to vote against the proposal that their representative should be invited to the council table at this stage—and I emphasize the words 'at this stage'.

Thus any hopes that India might have had of a change of attitude on the part of the Soviet Union appeared frustrated by the Soviet behaviour in the Security Council. Intervening in a debate, the Indian Delegate said on August 14, inter alia: "I was hoping that with the President's return to this council, a new effort would become possible and would be made inside the council, with such assistance as the other countries represented here could give. That hope has somewhat receded now. The course of the debates in the Council has served to increase rather than reduce the tension between the two great Powers..." There was, however, the fact that the United States had rejected the Indian proposal. But the North Korean armies were still advancing into South Korea. It was on the ground that any cease-fire at that stage would give the United Nations forces time to strengthen. Their position to launch an offensive, that the Soviet Union

and China rejected the Indian co-sponsored draft resolution (A/C1/641) of December 12, 1950 in The First Committee of the General Assembly. Therefore, even if the United States had accepted the proposals, still there might have been no change in the Soviet position. Having achieved their immediate objective, both the Communist Powers might have become more uncompromising. China would have perhaps demanded the surrender of Formosa, among other things, as a price for stopping the war, as it in fact did later, after its entry into the war. And India could not have opposed this move, especially with Pannikkar as its Ambassador in China. He had frankly confessed that from the beginning he attached greater importance to Formosa, than to the United Nations' action in Korea. The President of India, however, said in his speech to the Parliament on July 31, 1950 that "Had it (Nehru's proposal) been acceptable to all concerned, my Government would have actively cooperated in bringing about a settlement through the agency


124. In Two Chinas, op.cit., p. 103.

125. Supra, n.95, 31 July 1950, Col.10. Nehru also said, "At no time has India suggested that she would resign from her support of the UN Resolution about North Korea's aggression." See Nehru's statement at a Press Conference on 16 October 1950, Documents for 1949-50, p.712. This statement also contains a good summary of India's Korea policy.
of the United Nations and on the basis of the two resolutions of the Security Council."

But Nehru's proposals to Stalin and Acheson did not contain any reference to the Security Council Resolutions and to the need for the withdrawal of the North Korean forces from South Korea. Had this been done, perhaps the proposals would not have been accepted by the Soviet Union, and China. Therefore, this omission by Nehru, appears to have been a tactical move, calculated to secure the approval of the Communist Powers, without insisting on their prior acceptance of the Security Council Resolutions, which they had condemned as illegal. The Government of India, however, could have assured the Government of the United States diplomatically that they were not deviating from their earlier position. They did not seem to have taken this step, though Nehru was in close contact with the British Prime Minister, who seemed to have accepted India's policy on China as the right policy. It is difficult to say whether the Government of India also wanted to leave enough room for a tactical shift, either way, as the occasion demanded.


Wooing The Communist Bloc.

Whatever might be the truth, it seems clear that Nehru had taken extraordinary care to see that his proposals were acceptable to the Sino-Soviet bloc. This, to my mind, appears to be the crux of the issue. For, what India needed to stress most at the time was not its adherence to the Security Council Resolutions, but its adherence to its policy of Nonalignment and friendly relations with both the blocs. And this, for very important reasons. Firstly, India had not yet succeeded in establishing its bonafides as a Nonaligned country with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Secondly, the West and its supporters in India, had begun to believe that India had at last thrown off its mask of neutrality and joined the Western block, in contrast to the United Arab Republic, which did not accept the June 27 Resolution of the Security Council. Finally—and this was, by far, the most important reason—there was the threat of an imminent invasion of Tibet by China. It was, therefore, imperative for India to establish good relations with China, as quickly as possible.


130. See Sardar Hukam Singh's speech in Parliament—Supra n.95, cols. 247-260. The member said that India should have followed the U.A.R.'s example to uphold its neutrality.
It was to achieve these objectives that Nehru appears to have initiated the move to seat China in the Security Council. As seen earlier, the Government of India, and Nehru, in their statements of June 29, and July 7, respectively, took particular care to emphasise that their acceptance of the Security Council resolutions did not mean a change in their policy of friendly relations with all nations. India had also dissociated itself from Truman's declaration of neutralising Formosa. But something more effective was needed to demonstrate India's independence of the Western bloc. Nehru could not have, obviously, chosen a better move at this juncture to please China, than to press for its legitimate place on the Security Council. As Prof. Whiting has observed "the Indian proposal challenged the Communist image of a world neatly divided into warring camps with no 'neutral' nations occupying a third position. Full appreciation of this may not have come immediately in Moscow or Peking. Nevertheless, Jen Min Jih Pao's gradual shift from criticism to praise of Nehru suggested at least a tactical modification of the 'two camps' approach .... the Sino-Soviet reaction to the Indian proposals of early July stands as an important bench-mark in the development of Chinese Communist policy, not only in Korea, but on the

131. op.cit., pp. 61-62.
132. Id., p. 60.
broader problems of relations with Asia and the World in general." The first favourable sign came one day prior to the Chinese acceptance of Panikkar's secret proposal, for, "on July 9 Jen Min Jih Pao reviewed Indian policy without attacking Nehru..."

It was for such a breakthrough that India had been trying ever since China became independent. As Nehru said on August 4, 1960: "What we have suggested first diplomatically and later in the personal appeal, was not mediation. We have suggested a step for which we had been asking for months and months. We have suggested that because we thought that it would ease the situation..... our proposal was something which is entirely apart from the Korean question. We have been trying for that for the last eight months. So it stood by itself and we propose it on its own merits....."

**India, China And Tibet:**

To understand, therefore, why the question of China's representation in the United Nations was raised by India at a time when it was most likely to be rejected by the United States, one has to examine the basis of India's China policy. The

132. Id., p. 60.

Second Protest Note sent to Peking by the Government of India on October 31, 1950, against the Chinese invasion of Tibet, said, inter alia: "It has been the basic policy of the Government of India to work for friendly relations between India and China, both countries recognising each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and mutual interests...." These, one might add, are three of the five principles, later to be known as Panch Sheel. And "our policy towards China," observed Panikkar, "has been of a two-fold character: to cooperate on the basis of respect of each other's rights in every sphere where such cooperation is possible; and secondly to use such influence, as we have to bring about an understanding between China and other nations."

It was in pursuance of this policy that, on August 13, 1950, that is, just one month after the Nehru proposal, "the Government of India represented to the Government of China that they were concerned at the possibility of unsettled conditions across their border. They, therefore, strongly urged that

134. See Leading Events In India-China Relations, op. cit., p.1. See also Documents for 1949-50, pp. 552-553 for the full text.

135. See Purushottam L. Mehra, op.cit., p. 16.


137. Supra, n. 134.
Sino-Tibetan relations should be adjusted through peaceful negotiations." This move was explained by Nehru to the Parliament on December 6, 1950, as follows:

"Ever since the People's Government of China talked about the liberation of Tibet, our Ambassador told them on behalf of the Government of India, how we felt about it. We expressed our earnest hope that the matter would be settled peacefully by China and Tibet. We also made it clear that we had no territorial ambitions in regard to Tibet and that our relations were cultural and commercial. We said that we would naturally like to preserve these relations and continue to trade with Tibet because it did not come in the way of either China or Tibet. We further said that we were anxious that Tibet should maintain the autonomy it has had for at least the last forty years. We did not challenge or deny the suzerainty of China over Tibet... They gave us to understand that a peaceful solution would be found though I must say that they gave us no assurance or guarantee to the effect. On the one hand, they said they were prepared for a peaceful solution; on the other, they talked persistently of liberation."

Thus Nehru and Panikkar appear to have hoped that China might postpone the invasion of Tibet at least till the end of the Korean war, if not indefinitely, in view of India's support to China's claims. When actually the Tibetan occupation was undertaken in October 1950, India wrote to the Peking Government on October 21, 1950 that a military action at

139. Cited in Whiting, op.cit., p. 145. See also Mark C. Freer, op.cit., p. 376.
the present time against Tibet will give those countries in the world which are unfriendly to China a handle for anti-chinese propaganda at a crucial and delicate juncture in international affairs .... opinion in the United Nations has been steadily veering around to the admission of China into that organization before the close of the present session. Military action on the eve of a decision by the Assembly will have serious consequences and will give powerful support to those who are opposed to the admission of the People's Government of China ..... to misrepresent China's peaceful aims."

This was in effect the American argument against the admission of China into the United Nations. China, therefore, wrote ironically that "The problem of Tibet and the problem of the participation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations are two entirely unrelated problems. If those countries hostile to China attempt to utilise as an excuse the fact that China is exercising its sovereign rights in its territory Tibet, and threaten to obstruct the participation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations Organisation, it is then but another demonstration of the unfriendly and hostile attitude of such countries towards China."

140. See Acheson's reply to Nehru's proposal of July 13, 1950, supra, n. 109.

141. Supra, n.139, pp. 145-146. See also China's Note of 30 October 1950 in reply to India's Note of 26 October 1950 Documents for 1949-50, p. 551.
One cannot but conclude, therefore, that Peking had exhibited greater sense of reality than New Delhi. Yet India's move was not entirely illconsidered. In the words of Prof. Whiting, "Just as the People's Republic of China had found it possible to postpone the Taiwan operation so too it could have delayed indefinitely the occupation of Tibet." Talks had actually begun between the Chinese ambassador in India and the Tibetan delegation which was held up in India on its way to China from early 1950, for want of visas for Hongkong which the British Government had refused to grant in the month of June 1950, after some delay in the matter. It was true that these talks were only a tactical move on the part of China. But they were terminated only when China decided in favour of a military solution in the wake of the United Nations' decision to cross the 38th parallel. This decision was taken by the United Nations' General Assembly on October 7, 1950, and Chinese troops began their invasion of Tibet simultaneously, though China announced the fact on October 14 only. To quote

142. Supra, n. 139.

143. In its Note of 30 October, China accused India of delaying intentionally the departure of this delegation to China. India of course denied it in its Note of October 31, 1950. See Documents for 1949-50, pp. 551-553.

144. See Mark C. Freer, op.cit., p. 373.


146. Supra, n. 134, p.2.

147. Ibid.
Prof. White again: "It would appear that China considered the die was cast when the United Nations troops crossed the 38th parallel and that she then abandoned diplomacy pending a decision on the battle front...."

If, on the other hand, the United Nations had called for a diplomatic solution, India's support would have been sought by the Sino-Soviet block. This would have given India an opportunity to bargain with China on all problems, including Tibet, as was done later.

Balancing at the 38th Parallel:

This explains, to a large extent, though not in full, India's impassioned appeal for a halt to the United Nations' military action at the 38th parallel. The Chinese threat of intervention, delivered to India's Ambassador Panikkar, at midnight, only served to confirm India in its desire not to antagonise China. Unlike the earlier proposal of India, this appeal was precise and reasonable. Prof. Goodrich has opined


149. See below, pp. 200 - 201.


151. See In Two Chinas, op. cit., p. 110.

that "It is impossible to say whether a cease-fire could have been achieved at this stage on the basis of the restoration of the status quo ante, with suitable guarantees that armed forces would not again be used. In any case no serious effort was made ...." But the United Nations' forces were in a strong position. South Korea and Formosa were secure. It would have been, perhaps, possible for the United Nations to enter into discussions with the North Korean authorities. The Government of India appeared certain that there was such a possibility, as its delegate pointed out in the General Assembly. After expressing the fear that the crossing of the 38th parallel by the United Nations' forces might "prolong North Korean resistance, and even ..... extend the area of conflict," B.N.Rau suggested that "before the United Nations' forces advance further, we should call upon the North Korean forces to cease hostilities by a certain specified date ..... the North Korean forces would in their present military situation, have every inducement to comply with the call....."

It would appear that such a categorical statement would not have been made by B.N.Rau, unless the Government of India had some indication that North Korea would cease hostilities if the United Nations' forces stopped at the parallel.

B.N. Rau said that each Government has to judge the situation upon the best information at its disposal and to act accordingly." Thus the rumours of North Korean approaches for Indian mediation appear to contain some truth, though they were not taken seriously at the time. Whether or not this was so, the Government of India would not have become prejudiced against the United States and the United Nations, in the way it did, from the moment the United Nations' forces crossed the 38th parallel, if its warning was heeded by the latter.

For, besides spoiling India's chances of seeking a peaceful solution to the Tibetan problem, this move of the United Nations went against other basic considerations of India's foreign policy. India opposed the North Korean aggression on South Korea, because it was an attempt to upset the delicate balance of power in Asia by the use of force. India did not want the United Nations either, to attempt to change this balance of power by force. This has been India's policy right from the beginning as has already been indicated. Thus India would have opposed this move irrespective of all other considerations. It is significant in this connection, to note that India later appealed to the Chinese and the North Korean

156. See *Documents for 1949-60*, p. 713 for the text.
authorities, along with 12 other Arab-Asian states to declare their intention not to cross the 38th parallel. This, it has to be admitted, was a perfect piece of balancing in the classical sense of the term. It is also significant to note that Britain had supported both these moves of India on the same basis.

Clearly, the attempt made by the United States to alter the balance of power in its favour was a dangerous move from the point of view of world peace. It was also dangerous from the point of view of the freedom of Asian nations, for the United States was unwilling to give proper weight to the views and fears and fears of the Asian nations of which China and India are the biggest. Its behaviour was high-handed. Thus China’s entry into the Korean war appears to have come as a relief to many Asian nations. Hence India’s refusal to condemn China for its entry into the war. On the other hand, Nehru/nope

157. See John W. Spanier, The Truman-Mac-Arthur Controversy And The Korean War (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1959), pp.38-39. According to G.H. Jansen (op. cit., pp.105-111), the 13-nation appeal was issued on the initiative of B.N.Ray without prior consultations with the governments concerned and that Nehru did not like it. He has further written that this move was taken upon the repeated urgings of the British and United States delegates to the UN.

158. See Nehru’s statement to a Press Conference on 16th October, 1950. Supra, n.128, pp.710-712. See also Gladwyn Jebb’s speech to the First Committee of the UN GA. Supra, n. 128.

to the conclusion that the military mind had taken over in Korea. He was not entirely wrong. The United States' President had to put up a brave struggle against Mac Arthur, to maintain the supremacy of civilian authority in the United States.

There were other dangers involved in the United Nations' move to unify Korea by force. It directly threatened India's position in Kashmir, as will be shown below.

The 'Uniting For Peace Resolution':

These fears appeared to become a reality when the United States introduced the 'Uniting For Peace Resolution' or the 'Acheson Plan' which sought to give the General Assembly powers to recommend measures against an aggressor if the Security Council failed to take a decision. Nehru was indignant and he came out strongly against it. In his statement of October 16, 1950 he said: "It seems like converting the UN into a larger edition of the Atlantic Pact making it a war

160. Infra, n. 181, col. 5294
162. See below, pp. 190-191.
organisation more than one devoted to peace." On another occasion, he said: "Instead of being a great organisation for peace slowly one of its members had begun to think of it as an organisation for waging war. Indeed, that was not the plan behind the UN and though its Charter remains some facts begin to belie it, more and more."

While Vishinsky of the Soviet Union questioned the legality of the Resolution, B.N. Rau told the General Assembly that "My Government considers that this is not the time for stressing the military aspect of the UN, important though that aspect may be......", and declared India's decision to "abstain from voting on the resolution." As one Indian scholar has written: "The most obvious danger stemmed from the composition and voting practices of the Assembly in the early fifties. One-third of the entire membership of the General Assembly belonged to one of the blocs in the Cold War, i.e., the western camp ...... In that situation if the Assembly had established a force, the contingents contributed by the Member states would

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166. *Supra*, n. 87, pp. 185-186 and 191,192.
not probably have been at the disposal of the UN but at the
disposal of the dominant bloc." And for India there was the
great threat of such a force being created for the purpose
of settling the Kashmir dispute. At that time the Kashmir
issue was under the active consideration of the UN. The
Indian stand on the Korean issue had already antagonised
the United States. The United States and Britain did not
appear to appreciate India's stand on the Kashmir dispute.
Particularly, India's refusal to accept Dixon's recommenda-
tions and Dixon's views on India had generated a great deal
of misunderstanding between India and the United States and
England. Though the question of introducing foreign troops
into Kashmir had not been raised till then, it did not take
long for such a proposal to be advanced. This was done during
the efforts at mediation undertaken by the Commonwealth
mainly on Pakistan's insistence. This proposal was accept-
able to Pakistan while India rejected it.

169. See B.N.Goswami, The Commonwealth And The Uniting For
Peace Resolution : A Study of the Legal stand of some
Commonwealth Committees', International Studies, (v.3,

170. Supra, n.87, pp. 243-313


172. Id., p.470. Also see Sisir Gupta, Kashmir....op.cit.,
pp. 215-223 for a detailed account of this phase of the
dispute.

173. See Sisir Gupta, Kashmir, op.cit., pp.227-228 for
details.

174. Ibid.
Soon after the failure of this Commonwealth effort, the dispute was discussed in the Security Council, in February 1961. It was here that further and final confirmation of India's fears was provided, for the United States and United Kingdom sponsored a resolution proposing, interalia, that the United Nations' representatives be authorised to consider the possibility of raising a force, from among the United Nations members or locally. The British delegates explained that a neutral force was essential for a successful plebiscite.

Not surprisingly, India's reaction was quick and sharp: "It is surprising that any one should think of suggesting to us that we should admit foreign troops whose withdrawal was an essential feature of our independence. It does not matter in what guise they are sought to be introduced or by whom; we shall not permit this to happen."

Tibetan: A Surrender:

It is easy to see now why Nehru did not take a firm stand against China on Tibet. The only way in which Nehru could do that was by seeking the support of Britain and the United States. But the policies of the United States, especially, towards Asian nations were highly provocative. It was

176. Ibid.
177. Ibid.
not at all prepared to accept India's Nonalignment and other policies. Nehru, on the other hand, was convinced that his foreign policy was sound. He was also convinced that the United States' policies towards China were wrong. He had pressed for a peaceful solution of the Korean as well as the Tibetan problems. He had disowned all political and territorial claims in Tibet. It would have been difficult for him and the Government of India to seek military or even political support from the West in the defence of India's vital interests when they were determined to eliminate all foreign influences from Asia.

If India had sought such help, there was no assurance that the United States and Britain would stand by India without a price. Their stand on the Kashmir issue was unfavourable to India. Even if the United States and Britain extended diplomatic recognition to Tibet it would have been of no help to India. Tibet would have become another Formosa or Korea, for China had already occupied it and it could not have been forced out of it, even by the use of force. And finally, if India had sought Western support on Tibet China would surely have championed the Cause of Pakistan in Kashmir and if the Western Powers did

179. See P.C. Chakravarty, op. cit., p. 36 for the contrary view. In 1948 the United States was reported to have told a Tibetan delegation, that Tibet was a part of China. See P., 'Middle Ground Between America and Russia' Foreign Affairs (Vol. 32, No. 2, January 1954), p. 263. They had refused to receive a Tibetan delegation in 1949. See Mark C. Freer, op. cit., p. 373.
not support it, Pakistan might have joined hands with China
and also the Soviet Union, thus increasing the danger to
India's security.

Nehru's policy, on the other hand, was to solve India's
disputes with neighbours without outside interference. He was,
therefore, determined to secure the friendship of China which
was determined to secure its rights everywhere, by force, if
necessary. Nehru, therefore, decided to pay the price demand-
ed by China for friendship with India by allowing China to
occupy Tibet and ending its autonomy. The then Deputy Minister
of External Affairs, Keskar, said that the "Government is not
unmindful of protection of our frontiers adjoining Tibet. I
may go further and say that the best way of protecting that
frontier is to have a friendly Tibet and a friendly China.
It is obvious that such a complicated and big frontier cannot
be well protected if we have a border country which becomes
hostile to us ..... "Thus the Government of India appears to
have attached greater importance to the MacMohan Line and
NEFA and to the Himalayan states and Burma, than to Tibet
180 181 182 183
180. B.N. Rau told the General Assembly that "For us.....the
friendship of China is desirable and natural. We wish
to do everything possible to promote the friendly rela-
tions that now prevail between us, because we feel that
a free and independent China marching with India will be
the most effective stabilizing factor in Asia." Supra,
n.133, p.10.
181. See Parliamentary Debates, Part II, Vol. IX, No.17,
28 March, 1951, col. 5320.
182. See above pp.144-46. See also Taya Zinkin 'Indian Foreign
Policy : An Interpretation of Attitudes', World Politics
(Vol.VII, No.2 January 1955), pp. 204-205. See also
183. See C.H. Alexandrowicz, 'India And The Tibetan Tragedy',
Foreign Affairs (Vol.31 No.3,April,1953), for a good ana-
lysis of the importance of Tibet for India's security.
for India’s defence and security. It was for this reason that India did not support the Tibetan issue in the United Nations, after advising the Tibetan authorities to take the issue to the World body. For, by this time the Korean War had reached a stalemate and there were signs that the parties might start negotiations. India felt that it might still profit if it did not antagonise China further. Towards this end India opposed the move to brand China as aggressor in the First Committee of the General Assembly on January 20, 1951, and voted against the resolution in the General Assembly on February 1, 1951. And, as pointed out by Harold C. Hinton, "China also seemed anxious to retain as much official Indian goodwill as possible because of its involvement in the Korean war, in which friendly neutrality on the part of India was a great help to Communist side."

Towards this end Mao Tse-Tung visited the Indian Embassy in Peking on January 26, 1951, the first anniversary of the Indian Republic and spoke of the Indian people as a fine people, their thousands of years friendship with China and also spoke warmly about Nehru and looked forward to see him in China soon.

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185. Supra, n. 159.
187. See In Two Chinas, op. cit., p. 125. It perhaps significant that Mao’s gesture came after India’s refusal to call China ‘Aggressor’. 
Therefore, when the Sino-Soviet block finally decided, in July 1961, to accept a stalemate truce along the 38th parallel in Korea, India's major objective of restoring the status quo prior to June 25, 1950, was achieved. India's stand was vindicated. Naturally, India was called upon to shoulder the responsibility of conducting the armistice negotiations which began in July 1951. The Indian policy throughout the armistice talks continued to be governed by the desire to pacify China as far as possible. The Government of India kept in close contact with the Government of China through their Ambassador Panikkar who had played a major role in shaping India's foreign policy towards China. India was not willing to waste this opportunity of establishing permanent rapprochement with China and through China with the Soviet Union.

**Aftermath:**

This policy of India and the support given to it by the other nonaligned states in the United Nations led to a reassessment of attitude on the part of the Sino-Soviet bloc towards these states. They realised that these states could be kept away from the western bloc. On the other hand, the west began

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189. See B.Saiva Rao & C.Kondapi, op.cit., p. 309.
a new drive to recruit allies in Asia to contain the Sino-Soviet threat of expansion. This was diametrically opposed to the policies of Nehru and Nasser, the latter having come into power just then in the United Arab Republic, at the head of a military Government. It was this struggle between the nonaligned states and the power blocs that culminated in the Suez Crisis of 1956 as will be seen in the next chapter.

An early indication of the things to come was given, when, in August 1963, the composition of the Korean Political Conference, came up before the General Assembly of the United Nations, while a majority of states including Britain favoured India's participation, the United States and the Latin American States opposed it. India's displeasure with the United States was forcefully expressed by Nehru in a speech in Parliament on September 17, 1963. He said, inter alia, that:

"Certain interesting consequences flow from this vote. If the voting is analysed, you will see that of the twenty-one countries who voted against India, eighteen were from the Americas, seventeen from what is called Latin America. Now I have the greatest respect for the countries of Latin America. But the facts stand out that nearly the whole of Europe and nearly the whole of Asia wanted one thing in this Political conference, while a number of countries all from the Americas, did not want it. They have as much right not to want it as others have to want. But the

191. Nehru, op.cit., p. 429 (Italics are mine).
question that we have been considering is an Asian question. And is the will of Asia and of Europe to be flouted because some people who really are not intimately concerned with this question feel that way? that is an extraordinary position.

"It is interesting because in spite of the major developments that have taken place in the world during the last few years, somehow it is not realised by many of the great powers of the world that the countries of Asia, however weak they might be, do not propose to be ignored, by-passed and sat upon."

This was the crux of the differences between India and the United States, not only in the Korean dispute but in the whole range of problems between India and the West. A careful study of India's refusal to sign the Peace Treaty with Japan, 192 would reveal the same basic conflict of interests. Also, as one Indian scholar 193 has observed the debate on the Korean political conference..... coincided with another incident..... namely the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah in Kashmir on August 8, with which rumours had connected US intrigue." More significant than this, was, perhaps the fact that Pakistan voted against India's participation in the Korean Political Conference, in spite of a request from Nehru to Zafrullah Khan. This was mentioned by Nehru in his letter to the Pakistani Prime Minister on August 28, 1953. Just a week earlier the two

192. See Documents for 1951, pp. 606-611 for Correspondence between India and United States on the issue. See also J.C.Kundra op.cit., pp.140-147 for an account of India's stand on the issue.


194. Supra, n.21, p.273.
Prime Ministers had come to an agreement at Delhi on Kashmir and had issued a joint Communique on August 20, 1953 which said, inter alia, that:

"The Kashmir dispute was especially discussed at some length. It was their firm opinion that this should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of that state, with a view to promoting their well being and causing the least disturbance to the life of the people of the state. The most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by a fair and impartial plebiscite. Such a plebiscite had been proposed and agreed to some years ago. Progress, however, could not be made because of lack of agreement in regard to certain preliminary issues. The Prime Ministers agree that these preliminary issues would be considered by them directly in order to arrive at agreements in regard to them. These agreements would have to be given effect to and the next step would be the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator. In order to fix some kind of a provisional timetable it was decided that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed by the end of April, 1954. Previous to that date, the preliminary issues referred to above should be decided and action in implementation thereof should be taken."

What Nehru achieved through this Communique was the elimination of the United Nations from the picture, at any rate, for the time being, without giving any concessions to Pakistan. The elimination of the United Nations meant the elimination of the Western pressure upon India. The importance

195. Cited in Id., p.270.
attached to this aspect by Nehru became evident when he wrote to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on September 3, 1953 that "If Kashmir becomes also an arena of conflict between the great powers, then not only India and Pakistan but also the people of Kashmir play a secondary part."

The acceptance of military aid from the United States by Pakistan appeared to undo this achievement of Nehru. This appears to have been one of the important reasons for his bitter opposition to the United States' military aid to Pakistan. He told Parliament on March 1, 1964, that:

"This grant of military aid by the United States to Pakistan creates a grave situation for us in India and for Asia. It adds to our tensions. It makes it much more difficult to solve the problems which have confronted India and Pakistan. It is vitally necessary for India and Pakistan to solve their problems and develop friendly and co-operative relations .... These problems can only be solved by the two countries themselves and not by the intervention of others. It is, indeed, this intervention of other countries in the past that has come in the way of their solution. Recently a new and more friendly atmosphere had been created between India and Pakistan and by direct consultations between the two Prime Ministers progress was being made towards the solution of these problems. That progress has now been checked and fresh difficulties have arisen."

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196. Supra, n. 194.
"The military aid being given by the United States to Pakistan is a form of intervention in these problems which is likely to have more far reaching results than the previous types of intervention."

Earlier, in a speech on February 22, 1964, Nehru said that he had no "ill feeling against Pakistan and certainly not against America." But in his statement of March 1, 1954, he demanded the withdrawal of American personnel from the UN observers group in Kashmir, on the ground that the United States was no more impartial in India-Pakistan disputes.

All this seems to have confirmed the Chinese in the belief that India was not in the Western camp. As Harold Hinton has written China then appears to have decided to use India to put "pressure on Britain and through Britain on the United States for a favourable settlement in Indo-China. This was one of the most important aspects of the complex Sino-Indian bargaining that seems to have begun at the end of 1953, when an Indian delegation arrived in the CPR for the ostensible purpose of negotiating an agreement on Tibet."

India, on the otherhand, not only "{....wanted to put trade and pilgrimages between India and Tibet on a more regular and satisfactory footing...."} but also to secure concessions

200. Id., p. 283.
from China on South East Asia. The result was the agreement on Tibet signed in April, 1954. To quote Hinton, "Nehru evidently hoped that, by getting the CPR to subscribe to the 'Five Principles' of Peaceful Co-existence', taking an active part in the Geneva conference on Indo-China, and assuming the chairmanship of the International Control Commissions for the three Indo-Chinese states, India could shield Burma, and if possible the rest of South East Asia except for Vietnam from the Chinese and the North Vietnamese."

Thus Nehru thought that he had at last arrived at an understanding with China. Therefore he declared that India had not done anything better than this in Foreign Policy since independence. It would be unfair to say that Nehru believed that China would uphold the agreement. He wrote to the Congress Party's state units that "It is said, how can you put faith in such declarations? In international affairs, one can never be dead certain and the friends of today might be enemies of tomorrow. That may be so. Are we then to begin with enmity and suspicion and not give any other approach a chance? Surely, it is better, with nations as with individuals, to hope for

201. Id., p. 446.
203. Cited in P.C. Chakravarty, op.cit., p.54, n.21. Also see G.M. Kahin, op.cit., p.7. See also Tuya Zinkin, op.cit., p. 204.
and expect the best but at the same time to be prepared for any eventuality." Nehru was asking for time to be able to stand up to the Chinese challenge. It would have been folly to challenge China at this stage as China had demonstrated its willingness to defend its interests by its intervention in the Korean war. After all, China had been accorded great power status by the Big Four at Geneva. For Nehru China was the third great power. It was for this reason that he did not insist, even at this stage, on Chinese recognition of the McMahon Line. He said that if this were done, then trouble would have started immediately, instead of years later. Perhaps the Government of India believed that it would take some time for China to renew its claims in this area, because of the Panch Sheel. And if it violated these principles, India could profit, as it in fact did. It was for this reason that China appears to have resorted to small scale operations on the borders and to strengthen its position before making its intentions plain.

The Panch Sheel was, therefore, a tactical device by which Nehru wanted to contain China as he explained in 1954

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205. See Nehru, op.cit., p. 305.
That he was not satisfied with the Panch Sheel, was also evident from the fact that he took the lead in arranging the Bandung Conference of 1955, with a view to counteracting the South East Asia Treaty Organisation and to seeking further confirmation of China's acceptance of the principles of peaceful co-existence.

While India was preoccupied with these problems, important changes had taken place in the United Arab Republic since 1962, which were destined to bring the two countries very close to each other and to have a far-reaching affect on the outside world. We shall now turn to these developments.

208. See Kahin, op.cit., pp. 4-7.