CHAPTER III

THE MEANING OF NONALIGNMENT

Aspects of Nonalignment:

Nonalignment is a policy based on the balance of power principle and its main objective is the protection of the security of the nation. It is not a simple policy but a complex whole having different aspects, all of which aim at the same main objective, viz., the security of the nation. Its various aspects were very well explained, as follows, by Nehru in the debates on Foreign Affairs in the Indian Parliament on December 9, 1958:

"When we say our policy is one of nonalignment, obviously we mean nonalignment with military blocs .... This in itself is not a policy, it is only part of a policy ....

"The policy itself can only be a policy of acting according to our best judgement, and furthering the principal objectives and ideals that we have. Every country's foreign policy first of all, is concerned with its own security and with protecting its own progress. Security can be obtained in many ways. The normal idea is that security is protected by armies. That is only partly true; it is equal to true that security is protected by policies. A deliberate policy of friendship with other countries goes further in gaining security than almost anything else.

"Apart from this, from the larger point of view of the world also, we have laboured to the best of our ability for world peace ....

"Our foreign policy has this positive aspect of peace. The other positive aspects are an enlargement of freedom in the world, replacement of colonialism by free and independent countries and a large degree of cooperation among nations...."

In the previous chapter the policies of anti-colonialism and antiracialism have been examined. Only the major aspects now remain to be explained.

To begin, then, what did Nehru mean by 'acting according to our best judgement' and 'an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue'? Did it mean objectivity or impartiality as has been often claimed by many persons in India and abroad? The answer is no. For, Nehru said in 1948 that "Our instructions to our delegates have always been firstly, to consider each question in terms of India's interest secondly on its merits — I mean to say if it did not affect India, naturally on its merits and not merely to do something or give a vote just to please this Power or that Power, though, of course, it is perfectly natural that in our desire to have friendship with other Powers, we avoid doing anything which might irritate them."


India's interests are paramount because, as Nehru said:

"The art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say. We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare do anything which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country.

"Therefore, whether a country is imperialist or Socialist or Communist, its Foreign Minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country. But... of course some people may think of the interests of their country regardless of other consequences or take a short distance view. Others may think that in the long-term policy the interest of another country is as important to them as that of their own country. The interest of peace is more important because if war comes everyone suffers so that in the long distance view, self-interest may itself demand a policy of cooperation with other nations, goodwill for other nations, as, indeed, it does demand."

Thus neither peace nor goodwill for other nations have been ends in themselves. Peace is necessary to the extent it secures India's security and development. "Therefore", said Nehru, "We propose to look after India's interests in the context of world cooperation and world peace, in so far as world

4. Id., p. 28 (Italics are mine).

5. Ibid.
peace can be preserved." But warfare, said Nehru, "can not be avoided if another party starts it, or if there is aggression one has to meet that. That is why originally we had to go to Kashmir, that is why we have stayed on — that is, our armed forces have stayed on — and ..... we will not withdraw our forces from there so long as there is any danger left of aggression from outside....."

Similarly, Nehru said that "we cannot perhaps be friendly always with every country..... Naturally you are more friendly with those countries with whom you have closer relations ..... Naturally, again, we are likely to be more friendly to some countries than to others because this may be to be our mutual advantage ..... but even so, our friendship with other countries should not bring us inevitably into conflict with some other country."

**Nonalignment Is Balance of Power Policy:**

Very few people seem to realise that this policy of Nonalignment with military blocs and friendship with all countries to protect the security of the nation is in reality

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a policy based on the balance of power principle. The difficulty arises out of misconceptions about Nonalignment such as those examined earlier, also of the balance of power principle itself. As Prof. Penrose has aptly observed: "The idea of a balance of power is often a stumbling block to the general reader, and sometimes a source of confusion to the student of international relations ...." Therefore, a suitable definition of the idea of the balance of power seems necessary to dispel the confusion. In the words of Prof. Penrose:

"A preliminary explanation may best start by considering the position of the statesmen entrusted with the conduct of foreign affairs in any independent state. Obviously, their first concern must be the survival of the state and the preservation of its independence......

In meeting these responsibilities statesmen are obliged to take account of the distribution of power in mind. They must strive to establish such relations with other countries as will ensure that no preponderance of power among the latter, singly or collectively, will threaten their independence or encompass their downfall. In the pursuit of this defensive aim they may decide, from time to time, to enter into or form alliances with other powers, particularly when those countries whose designs they fear are linked by treaty engagements. In other circumstances they may eschew all alliances fearing that by entering into one they would provoke a hostility of a rival group and be drawn into conflicts which they might avoid by remaining dissociated.


9. Ibid. (Italics are mine). The identity of the aim of survival between alignment and nonalignment stressed here has already been indicated in the previous chapter — See above, pp.76 - 79.
from either group. Much depends upon the geographical position and natural resources of the state in question; each state is unique in size, however defined in resources and in geographical position in relation to other states. Consequently the precise measure appropriate to the maintenance of a defensive balance-of-power differ in different countries. What is common is the aim of survival."

This, then, is the first aspect of Nonalignment, that is, not joining power blocs or entangling alliances, or, as Prof. Penrose has described it, the 'maintenance of a defensive balance-of-power'.

There were many circumstances, upon which Prof. Penrose and Nehru himself have laid stress, that were favourable for the Nonalignment of so many Afro-Asian states.

Among the most important of these was the emergence of a more or less stable balance-of-power among the Big Powers, by 1945 or so, which not only ruled out the possibility of another World War, even before the advent of nuclear parity, but also created an atmosphere congenial for Nonalignment. Nehru was quick to grasp this fact, for it was in 1946 that


he first came out with his declaration of Nonalignment as the basis of India's foreign policy. And in 1949 he declared categorically that "there has been a great deal of talk about the possibility of war — world war I mean. So far as I can judge, such possibilities as there were have receded. I don't think there is any great chance of any war on a big scale, on a world scale in the near future...."

Again in a debate in the Parliament of India in 1955, Nehru said:

"As things are today, we have reached a certain kind of balance — it may be a very unstable balance, but it is still some kind of balance — when any kind of major aggression is likely to lead to a world war. That itself is a restraining factor. Whether aggression takes place in a small country or a big one, it tends to upset the unstable balance in the world and is, therefore, likely to lead to war. It is because of this that in the Geneva Conference there was so much argument about the Indo-China states. Either of the major parties was afraid that if any of these states lined up with or coerced into joining one group, it would be to the disadvantage of the other.... So at Geneva they wisely decided, more or less, though not in clear language, that the Indo-China states should keep out of military pacts or alliances on either side, or in other words, remain neutralised.

"If you extend the argument, you will see that the only way to avoid conflicts is to accept things more or less as they are. No doubt, many

things require to be changed, but you must not think of changing them by war. Further by enlarging the area of peace, that is of countries which are not aligned to this group or that, but which are friendly to both, you reduce the chance of war."

This statement of Nehru accurately explains the basis of Nonalignment as a balance-of-power policy. And if the big Powers were suspicious of each other and were keen to have as many of the small states of Asia and Africa aligned on their side, as was the case in the late 1940's, the small states were more suspicious of the big Powers because of their strength and power. Thus the desire not to antagonise them was reinforced by a desire to keep as aloof from them as possible, or in other words, not to have exclusive dependence on either, which was bound to antagonise the other. From the very beginning Nehru was determined to make India, as far as possible, self-reliant. Nonalignment would serve both these aims.

14. It is, therefore, not correct to hold, as is done in some quarters, that there is no basis in Nehru's Speeches for such a view of Nonalignment. Nor is it necessary to say that the Foreign Minister does not always make everything clear. See A.P.Rana, 'The Nature of India's Foreign Policy (An Examination of the Relation of Indian Non-alignment to the Concept of the Balance of Power in the Nuclear Age)', India Quarterly, (XXII, No.2, April-June, 1966), pp. 101-139; Giri Lal Jain, 'Indian Nonalignment And Balance of Power', Id., pp. 177-179 and A.P.Rana, Indian Nonalignment And Balance of Power - A Rejoinder', Id., (No.3, July-September, 1966), pp.279-286.

The desire not to antagonise the Soviet Union, at any cost, has been due to the fact that it was the most powerful state on India's borders, capable of threatening its security, when India became independent, as Nehru had pointed out, as early as 1931, in a masterly analysis of India's strategic-military position, though it was not likely to attempt it, as it would then lay itself open to attack from the European Powers. The emergence of the Cold War almost ruled out even this remote possibility. The surest way to antagonise the Soviet Union would have been an alliance with the West which Nehru, any way, did not want for other reasons as well. In 1960, for example, Nehru said: "So far as India was concerned, placed as she was historically and geographically it would have been quite astonishingly foolish to fall into this business of the cold war, either on grounds of principle or on grounds of expediency." And K.P.S. Menon, has written that "Nehru wrote to Asaf Ali and myself as the first Ambassadors of independent India, on the eve of our departure for Washington and Nanking respectively..... 'The Soviet Union being

16. See Bimla Prasad, *The Origins of India's Foreign Policy*, op.cit., Appendix II, pp.280-283. China, Nehru wrote, would not be such a great threat for a very long time.


18. *India and the Cold War*, op.cit., p.29 (Italics are mine).
our neighbour, we shall inevitably develop closer relations
with it. *We can not afford to antagonise Russia merely because
we think that this may irritate some one else. Nor indeed can
we antagonise the U.S.A.*"

Friendship with the United States was essential because,
it was not only the one power capable of providing substantial
economic help for India's economic prosperity, but, of course,
also the only power which could effectively check the Russian
ambitions of territorial expansion, if any. From the point of
view of India's security, friendship with the Soviet Union
appears to have been more important for geographical reasons. 20
After all, the United States' interest in India became real
only after the rise of Communist China, heralding the failure
of the United States' policies in China. Though it is very
difficult to substantiate, Nehru appears to have calculated
that Russia would look upon India as a possible ally against
an expansionist China, either under Mao or under Chiang Kai-Shek.

19. It is for this reason that perhaps Nehru stated once or
twice that foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy.

20. The geographical closeness of India and the Soviet Union
appears to have been one of the reasons for Nehru's oppos-
tion to the creation of Pakistan as an independent nation
--- See J.Nehru, The Discovery of India, op.cit., pp. 566-
567. If this were so, the fact that a hostile Pakistan
came into being with an independent India might have in-
creased the need for closer relations with the Soviet Union
and for not antagonising it. If the former might exploit
the situation. Indeed K.M.Panikkar (op.cit., pp.39-40)
wrote that the creation of Pakistan had created a defence
problem of great magnitude for India.
For, Nehru had written in the early 1940's itself, that though the Russian leaders were far too busy with their own problems to think of India's independence, "yet they were not likely to ignore India which touched their frontiers in Asia..."

It is more likely that Nehru had from the beginning looked upon Russia as a possible ally against an expansionist China. It is unlikely that Nehru could have neglected the emergence of a powerful China and its impact on India. For, even in 1927 Nehru declared that "The Chinese Revolution is not an event of local interest and importance. It is a world phenomenon of the greatest historic importance ... the country which will be most affected by the issue will be India."

Whether or not all these considerations were taken fully into consideration, it is clear that some thought was given to the emerging Chinese problem. Nehru told the Indian Parliament in 1959: "Even before the Chinese Revolution we tried to develop friendly relations with the Chiang-Kai-Shek Government" Once it was evident that China had gone Communist and was not prepared to accept India's friendship and partnership in Asia, for that was what India wanted from it, India could not but give full thought to the problem. To quote Nehru again:

21. Id., p. 523.
24. See below pp. 142-144.
"Ever since the Chinese Revolution, we naturally had to think of what the new China was likely to be. We realised that this revolution was going to be a very big factor in Asia, in the world, and in regard to us. We realised — we knew that amount of history — that a strong China is normally an expansionist China. Throughout history that has been the case. And we felt that the great push towards industrialisation of that country, plus the amazing pace of its population increase, would together create a most dangerous situation. Taken also with the fact of China's somewhat inherent tendency to be expansive when she is strong, we realised the danger to India. We have discussed it here, and it has been discussed in other countries. As the years have gone by, this fact has become more and more apparent and obvious. If any person imagines that we have followed our China policy without realizing the consequences, he is mistaken. If he thinks that we followed it because of fear of China, he is doubly mistaken."

Perhaps Nehru was right in his claim that his China policy was not based on fear of China. For, while he realised that Communist China was a danger to India, he appears to have calculated that it was not an immediate danger, as he told the Indian Parliament in 1959: "Right from 1950 or, at any rate from 1951, when the Chinese forces came into Tibet we have had this problem before us. It has not suddenly come up before us this year or last year. We have had this problem before us and this developing picture ..... of two power states merging, two power states coming face to face with each other on a tremendous border. Ever since 1950, this was the picture

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before us. We may have differed as to the timing in our minds, as to when this will happen, whether in five years, ten years, thirty years, fifteen years, it was difficult to say. But we had the picture.

Therefore, while he took all necessary steps to meet any possible threat from China, he rightly proceeded to cultivate China's friendship on the basis of mutual interests as will be seen in the next chapter. England also appears to have proceeded on the same assumption. Their aim appears to have been to give the Chinese government the necessary international recognition, so that it need not have to depend upon the Soviet Union exclusively for diplomatic support. Even after this effort failed, through what might have been a deliberate effort on the part of the Soviet Union, and China signed the treaty of friendship with its big neighbour, India hoped that it might still be possible to make friends with the Communist giants, by remaining nonaligned. India's alignment with the United States at this stage would have definitely antagonised the Soviet Union and China, and possibly made them permanent enemies, thus increasing the threat to its security.

27. See below, pp. 142 - 150
29. *Id.*, pp. 40-41.
Defence Through Nonalignment:

30. As has been indicated earlier, leaders in India and many other Asian countries were hopeful that sooner or later, China and the Soviet Union were bound to fall apart. It was all the more necessary, therefore, for India to remain non-aligned. Thus the Sino-Soviet split, when it finally came about, only confirmed the basis of Nonalignment. It was not so much against the West as against China that Nehru declared that the Soviet Union was India's second front and vice versa. Indeed, he is reported to have told the United States that the Soviet Union considers India as its second line of defence against China.

In 1950 these developments were only anticipated. Nehru, therefore, wanted to make it clear to the Soviet Union and China what he meant by Nonalignment. For, they appeared to have taken it for granted that Nonalignment meant permanent hostility to the West, especially the United States of America, for it was the United States that was bitterly opposed to India's Nonalignment. Thus Nehru made it clear to the Communist

30. See above, pp. 53-57.


32. See Sisir Gupte, India and Regional Integration in Asia, op.cit., p. 16.

33. See above, Chapter II, p. 65 Also see below pp. 142-151.
Powers that he would not hesitate to accept Western aid, if not an alliance, if India's security was threatened, by his decision to remain in the Commonwealth, by his support to the Burmese Government against the Communists, and by putting the Communists in India in jail, in their thousands. Stalin might have already learnt his lesson from Tito's successful defection from his control and the prompt support given by the United States to the latter. This must have been a heartening development for India.

If Stalin had learnt his lesson well, it was reasonable to conclude, that the Soviet Union would not like to drive India into the Western camp, by supporting any big Chinese move against India. If, however, this happened India was sure of Western help, alliance or no alliance, as Nehru wrote in 1931: "No country will tolerate the idea of another gaining dominion over India and thus acquiring the commanding position which England occupied for so long. If any power was covetous enough to make the attempt, all the others would combine to prevent this to trounce the intruder. This mutual rivalry would in itself be the surest guarantee against an attack on India." But the West might be checkmated by the Soviet Union if India entered into an alliance with the United States or

34. Supra, n. 16.
even Britain, even against China, for the primary concern of the
Soviet Union has always been to prevent the growth of Western
influence in these countries, if it could not increase its
own. But this is possible, in so far as India is concerned,
only when it is prepared to do more than remain neutral, in
the event of a massive Chinese thrust against India, for, India
does not possess the strength to withstand it, nor would it be
able to do it for a long time to come, without outside assist-
tance, which could come only from the West if it did not come
from the Soviet Union. Obviously, the Soviet Union appears to
have fulfilled this requirement in 1962, at least, in a partial
way.

This explains the major plank of India's defence policy,
and indeed, of all the nonaligned nations. There has always
been a tacit dependence upon the world balance-of-power and
great power support in times of crisis. Panikkar has written
that India's Nonalignment "does not mean that in case she is
actually attacked she would not accept assistance from others.

36. See above, chapter, II, n.36.

1965 Soviet Union moved away from its traditional policy
of support to India on Kashmir and thus appears to have
fulfilled this requirement between India and Pakistan.

37. See Cecil V. Crabb Jr., The Elephants And The Grass : A
Study of Nonalignment, (Frederick A. Praeger, N.Y.,1965),
pp.30-33 for a good discussion of this aspect of Nonalign-
ment.

38. K.M. Panikkar, op.cit., pp. 128-129.
No country has ever held such a view. Faced with Nazi aggression, Britain and France bid for Soviet support. When Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, Moscow welcomed the help of America and the Western allies. That is different from basing one's defence policy on support from stronger powers, or taking shelter behind the strength of others."

This is what Nehru seems to have had in mind when he told the Indian Parliament on November 27, 1959, that: "The policy of non-alignment and of having friendly relations is, I believe, basically a right policy under all circumstances. But if two countries fall out and, in the extreme instance, go to war, obviously that policy does not apply to them. If peace is broken, we deal with the situation in so far as we can. The policy remains good all the same and it applies to the rest of the world, and later, to that part of the world too, because war is not a permanent phenomenon."

Paradoxical as it might appear, this is what Nonalignment means, both in theory and in practice. Explaining his reasons for rejecting the Baghdad Pact and the British protection, Nasser said in 1958: "On February 20, 1955, I met Mr. Eden, the British Premier in Cairo. At that time the British Foreign

40. See Nasser's Speeches, 1958, op.cit., p. 236.
Secretary was prompting the cause of the Baghdad Pact in the Middle East .... I said we could defend ourselves, that in the case of Soviet aggression we would have recourse to the Western Powers, and that we would ask for the help of the Soviet Union if we are attacked by the Western Powers ...." It has already been indicated that India's association with the Commonwealth and the United Arab Republic's treaty with Britain, both meant the tacit acceptance of British help in the event of an attack. Thus, if Nehru had refused to commit himself in advance for the acceptance of aid from the West, it does not seem correct to think that either he, or the Government of India, treated Nonalignment as a 'fetish' or a moral principle, for the simple reason that the moment it was evident that the Chinese attack was a massive aggression, he appealed to all powers for help which came immediately from the west and also belatedly from the Soviet Union. What is important is not that the Soviet Union was slow to respond, but that it did respond in a positive way. Hence Nehru was quite justified in holding that the abandonment of Nonalignment would be a "moral failure", not so much because it was a moral principle, but because it proved valid and stood justified, in its major assumptions regarding India's defence and security. Even today India can not be conquered by China and it knows this well.

41. See above, chapter II, p. 161.

42. See M.S.Rajan, 'Chinese Aggression And The Future of Nonalignment', op.cit., p. 128.
India's Failure:

This does not mean that China's advance into Indian territory in 1962 was not a loss for India. It is very much so. But it would not be easy for China to make similar gains in future, unless the Government of India and its defence forces commit the same mistake again, that of not anticipating the Chinese attack which Nehru himself admitted.

It is, however, difficult to understand how the Government of India failed to anticipate the Chinese attack. Even if the military intelligence was primitive, as the NEFA inquiry revealed, and failed to perform the most elementary function of ascertaining the military preparations of China for a massive attack on a border spreading over some 2,000 miles, it should not have been difficult to anticipate the attack. It appears to me, that any one with a little knowledge of the Chinese behaviour could have foreseen that China was likely to exploit the extremely delicate international situation existing in October 1962, as it did in 1960, when it occupied Tibet.


44. See L.S.D., Third Series, Fifth Session, Vol.XX,2 September 1963, cols. 3549-51 for Defence Minister Chavan's statement placing a summary statement of the inquiry which has not been published. For the text see A.G.Noorani, Our Credulity and Negligence, (Ramdas G.Bhatkal, Bombay, 1963), Appendix 3, p.168.

45. See below, p.183.
It is difficult to say, for want of any information, if the Foreign Ministry and the Defence Ministry had taken proper steps to understand Chinese behaviour and tactics.

But was this the real reason for the debacle? It does not appear to be so. The then Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, has recently said that the acceptance of military aid from the United States after the Chinese attack was a catastrophic change from Nonalignment. It is, therefore, possible to conclude that he was opposed to such a move and might have advised Nehru accordingly. It is difficult to believe that Nehru himself believed that the acceptance of military aid would compromise Nonalignment, for there was hardly a nonaligned state which had not done it at one time or the other. If he really believed in it he was wrong. It is true that Nehru himself was always reluctant to accept foreign military aid. But he would hardly have failed to see the need for it had he realised the magnitude of the Chinese preparations. It is difficult to say whether Menon also believed that it was the sine qua non for averting the Chinese attack. Or was he afraid that the acceptance of the Chinese threat would bring pressure on the Government of India to seek military aid from the United States which he was not prepared to accept? Did he, by any chance,

46. See above, Chapter II, n.163.
forges a demand for his own resignation and an end to his political career? After all, he is an intelligent and shrewd person.

It would appear, from hindsight at least, that it would not have been difficult to prevent the attack, if the Chinese intentions were revealed to the world promptly. Even if the attack came neither the army nor the world at large would have been taken by surprise. At least the nonaligned nations could perhaps have been taken into confidence. As the whole diplomatic practice is shrouded in secrecy, it is difficult to say anything definite whether or not any of these steps were taken and with what results.

But the entire approach of the Government of India to China, in so far as it can be understood from Nehru's speeches appears to have been one of reluctance to take up the Chinese challenge, because of their weakness, and perhaps because of their approach to the defence of India. In a typical statement Nehru told the Parliament of India on December 9, 1959: "In the early years of the Chinese Republic, Mr. Panikkar was our Ambassador there. I read through his notes on the subject and our notes to him and our decisions. From the very first day

47. Nehru, op. cit., p.377. According to V.K.Krishna Menon's Biographer, Nehru and Menon were prepared to lease the Aksai Chin salient to China — See T.J.S.George, op.cit., pp. 255-256. It was also reported that Chou En-Lai was prepared to recognise the McMahon Line in return for the Aksai Chin Road — See A.G.Noorani, op.cit., pp.139-140.
this problem about our frontier was before us. The question was whether we should raise it in an acute form at that stage. We decided not to do ..... we felt that we should hold by our position and that the lapse of time and events would confirm it, and by the time the challenge came we would be in a much stronger position to face it....." Till such time Nehru wanted to keep China at bay through the Panch Sheel as shall be explained later. One would have, therefore, expected the Government of India to be more vigilant and not less, for it was natural to expect, that China would like to settle the issue before India was "in a much stronger position to face it." It was also natural that China did not allow the issue to lapse into insignificance. It did not fall into the trap which the Government of India laid for it.

Meaning of Nonalignment:

In fairness to Nehru and Menon, it has to be mentioned that there might have been another reason for their reluctance to face the Chinese challenge which they could have done, by a more judicious and intelligent use of Nonalignment. And this is fundamental to Nonalignment. For, the Nonalignment of a newly independent nation, means, more than anything else, a desire on its part, to stand on its own legs, as far as possible, and to build its future in its own way with the assistance and under the protection of friendly powers, especially the big
Powers. Naturally it opposes and sometimes even rejects this assistance and protection, if conditions were attached to it.\textsuperscript{48}

It did not want the cold war pacts because these involved firm commitments to one side or the other which were not always in its interests. Alliances were not considered safe because they would subordinate the interests of a country to those of the big partners in the alliance, as England and France learnt in 1956, and, Pakistan in 1966. China's split with the Soviet Union reflects this fact, no less than France's with the United States. Thus Nehru said in Parliament in 1959: "There is one fact which might be remembered when people think sometimes of obtaining outside aid. They probably imagine that in my conceit I say that I will not take outside aid. I certainly have a little conceit about India's standing on its own legs. I cannot, however, say what we may do in an eventuality. But I do not want this idea to get into our people that others will help us and preserve our freedom. I do not want India to go on crutches. .......

\begin{enumerate}
\item See Nehru, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 63.
\item See Nehru, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 89.
\item See Richard Lowenthal, \textit{op.cit.}, Preface, P.VIII and Klaus Mehnert, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 398-402.
\item See to Suez Seen from Paris', \textit{Eastern Economist} (August 17, 1956), pp. 241-242 for a remarkably accurate forecast of the things to come.
\item Nehru, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 379.
\end{enumerate}
In the same way, Nasser said in 1958 that, "we wanted the defence of the area to emanate from the will of the Arab people and from their land and not from the will of any foreign colonialist power." And further that "when we asked Britain for arms to be able to resist aggression, to resist Israel which was getting arms from France and other western powers, Britain imposed conditions on us. She made it a condition that we should not attack the Baghdad Pact, nor oppose the pact, and asked as a price for those arms that we join or condone these pacts that surround us and threaten our safety, our very existence." That Nasser was not far from the truth became evident during the Suez Crisis in 1956.

Perhaps it was some such consideration that stood in the way of Nehru in committing the Government to accept Western help in the event of a major Chinese aggression. The United States' insistence on a solution of the Kashmir problem in the wake of the Chinese aggression might have been quite an expected move. Both Nehru and Menon might not have liked it at all. However, in the true spirit of Nonalignment Nehru had long ago proceeded to lay the foundations of a self sufficient defence force for India in all spheres. As he told the Indian Parliament on December 8, 1959:

54. Nehru, op.cit., pp.371-372. See K.M. Panikkar, op.cit., for an account of the defence preparations of India in all spheres. Panikkar admits that India's preparations were not meant for the defence of India single handed in case of a Contd.....
"If any hon. Member thinks that we had ignored the question of defence in our enthusiasm for the Panch Sheel, then I would submit that he is mistaken...... The basic factor in defence is the industrial growth of the country, and all the armies in the world without an industrial background cannot function adequately. Our Five Years Plans built up this industrial background. As the House well knows, in the last few years, more especially since the Second Five Year Plan came into being, great stress has been laid on the foundations of basic industries and heavy industries in the country. It is on them that defence can ultimately rest...... they...... not only provide the wherewithal for defence ......(but) are supposed to raise the economy of a country to higher levels, thereby putting the people in a stronger position to meet any emergencies that they might have to face.

"A country does not normally go about talking of the steps it takes for defence. Our stress, in particular, has been on peace and will continue to be on peace, but that does not mean any kind of forgetfulness of the country's basic requirements in regard to defence ...... Both for guns and butter we have to lay, as rapidly and as firmly as we can, the foundations of heavy industry....."

Nonalignment and Economic Aid:

Besides this accent on the development of heavy industry, Nehru, Nasser, Nkrumah, Sukarno, and Tito have all been Socialists. They all favoured some form of State Socialism. They were apprehensive of getting aid from the Western countries, especially, the United States, in full measure, unless they accepted some form of capitalism, if not other commitments. The major war (p.108). Also see Supra, Chapter 2, n.77. Many responsible US officials and scholars consider this self-reliance in defence as the greatest asset of India- See Cecil V. Crabb Jr., American Foreign Policy in The Nuclear Age, Second Edition (Harper & Row, New York, 1965), pp.323-324.
only other country that could give them economic aid in a big way was the Soviet Union. Even if aid was forthcoming from one side only, Nehru said it was not "a wise policy to put all your eggs in one basket. Nor should one get help at the cost of one's self-respect." And Nonalignment would give this freedom of choice to take aid from wherever one liked while alignment might restrict it. And as Nehru put it, "we are going to have it and going to get it too in large measure," inspite of Nonalignment. It was left to Nasser to demonstrate the wisdom of Nehru's words in some highly dramatic moves in 1955-56.

Nonalignment and Domestic Politics:

And acceptance of aid from only one bloc, as India had to do, till the Soviet Union came forward with help, could be dubbed as dependence on, or alliance with, that bloc, by its opponents and their sympathisers within the nonaligned country itself. Many of the nonaligned countries possess extremely divergent sections of population creating an acute sense of

55. Ibid., p. 35.
56. Ibid.,
57. See below, Chapter V.
58. See Nehru, op.cit., pp.47 & 59. Accepting that India was depending upon the Anglo-American bloc for economic aid, Nehru throw a challenge to the Soviet Union to enter the field (p.59).
disunity. In the words of an American scholar, "More than any other conceivable approach to foreign relations, nonalignment serves to hold these disruptive political forces in check and to make possible that degree of political unity which is the minimal price for internal stability and national survival. For a policy of nonalignment is generally acceptable to (or is, at any rate not actively opposed by) the principal groups jockeying for power and affords some basis for compromise among them."

Does this mean that Nonalignment can not be practised by destroying anyone of these groups, say, the Communist Party? An Indian scholar has written that "In the domestic sphere it means allowing all parties including the Communists, to function normally ...." And that "Participation in the present cold war and military alliances under western auspices is based on a philosophy opposed to coexistence — coexistence both in the international and in domestic fields. A government of a country, which has a large Communist Party, can successfully oppose coexistence only by destroying the Communist Party at home......."


It may be easy to argue in this way by restricting the field of inquiry to only a few Asian states like India, Indonesia, Burma, etc. But Nonalignment is a world phenomenon and the United Arab Republic follows Nonalignment quite successfully even after crushing the Communists in the country. And a Communist country also follows Nonalignment and is considered one of the leaders of the group.

On the other hand, the fall of Sukarno from power in Indonesia, proves that too much freedom for the Communist Party is not always in the interests of Nonalignment. Thus, if the Communist Party enjoys freedom in India, it is only because it has not yet so far posed a serious threat to the security of the nation and has not so far come in the way of the normal functioning of the government of India. Whenever it exceeded its constitutional limits, Nehru came down with a very heavy hand on it. And Nasser, has crushed it for more or less the same reasons. The unpopularity of the Communists in India and the United Arab Republic is in no small measure due to the acceptance of their Nonalignment by the Soviet Union, depriving the Communists of their most potent weapon against the ruling elite, namely, the charge of their being in the imperialist camp. This was by far the greatest domestic gain for the ruling elite from

61. See K.P.S. Menon, India And The Cold War, op. cit., p. 51.
62. Ibid., See also Nehru, op. cit., p. 52.
their Nonalignment, for it deprived the Soviet Union and China of an instrument of interference in the internal affairs of these nonaligned states, as Khrushchev realised to his chagrin when he attempted to shield the Communists in Iraq in 1959.

This is how the nonaligned states strive to protect their security by maintaining a defensive balance of power, that is, by keeping aloof from the major powers and maintaining correct and friendly relations with them. But the pursuit of this defensive balance of power is not enough, as its success depends upon the world balance of power. Therefore, the maintenance of the world balance of power, as far as possible, becomes the second important aspect of Nonalignment. In this sense it is more or less the same as the traditional British policy of balance of power, though it has also a new and perhaps more important element in it, as will be explained below.

Nonalignment is not Neutrality:

To understand this aspect properly, it is necessary to dismiss, one or two popular but mistaken notions about Nonalignment. The first is that Nonalignment is not 'neutrality'. Though this is no more disputed by any one seriously

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63. See above, Chapter I, p. 36-37.
64. See below, pp. 126-133.
it still seems to hold the field in a different form. According to Prof. Brecher, whose views may be taken as typical of this school of writers, among whom is also Fayez A. Sayegh, Nonalignment is, rather the passive, first stage of neutralism. Neutralism has in common with nonalignment an expressed desire to remain aloof from bloc conflict. But neutralism goes much further, for it involves a positive attitude towards bloc conflicts. In other words nonalignment is the policy guide of the neutralist state, but neutralism represents an attitude and a policy which are much more activist than nonalignment as such. India is the outstanding example of the neutralist state. In short, neutralism is a contemporary expression of the time honoured theme of neutrality."

To substantiate this analysis, Prof. Brecher writes that "From 1947 to 1950 Delhi's posture was strikingly similar to classical neutrality, with the frequent expression of hope that India could remain outside a war, should it occur. After the Korean war, however, there was a realisation that non-belligerency or neutrality were not sufficient. And so India moved to the second stage—an open rejection of the leadership of both blocs but still passive in its orientation; that is:

66. See *Dynamics of Neutralism In The Arab World*, op. cit., p.4.
Nonalignment. In the early fifties India moved to the third stage—a positive role in world politics and attempts to alleviate tensions with the ultimate purpose of avoiding a global conflict, in the belief that this was the *sine qua non* of India remaining free from war. Mr. Nehru most recently has gone beyond neutralism because of its verbal associations and called this a 'Positive Policy for Peace'."

It is submitted that this analysis of Nonalignment in theory as well as practice by Prof. Brecher, is not in accord with facts, as will be shown below, if not also faulty in its logic which, however, is not examined here.

Firstly, as indicated earlier, Nehru, and for that matter, all nonaligned leaders, have always denied that their policy is neutrality or neutralism. Nehru also did not accept 'Positive neutralism', while the Arabs seem to dislike 'Non-alignment'. The least objectionable word for Nehru appears to have been Nonalignment, though by no means satisfactory. Nasser uses both the words, viz., Positive Neutralism and Non-alignment simultaneously, thus indicating no particular preference for either.

68 See above, Chapter I, pp. 33-34.

69 This is the impression one gathers from a study of Nasser’s Speeches published in English annually by the UAR Government.
Secondly, as Nehru himself pointed out, "Neutrality as a policy has little meaning except in times of war. If you think there is a cold war to-day, we are certainly neutral." The cold war is no war in any sense of the word. It is not even an ideological war. It is a struggle for power, more than anything else.

Thirdly, there was no desire, at least in India, to stay aloof from war. Nehru told the Constituent Assembly of India in December 1947 itself: "We have proclaimed during this past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else. If there is a big war, there is no particular reason why we should jump into it. Nevertheless it is a little difficult now a days in world wars to be neutral ..... we are not going to join a war if we can help it. We are going to join the side which is to our interest when the time comes to make the choice. There the matter ends."

No doubt, Nehru had not ruled out, in theory at least, the possibility of India opting for neutrality in the event of war. But that does not seem to make Nonalignment the passive first stage of neutralism, whatever that may mean. On

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70. Nehru, op.cit., p. 58.
71. Id., p. 24 (Italics are mine).
the other hand, what it seems to prove, is that the question of neutrality does not arise till there is a war, that is, till Nonalignment itself fails. For, the first concern of Nonalignment is the avoiding of war, which can be no stretch of imagination be called a desire to keep aloof from war.

In fact, however, Nehru had ruled out the possibility of India remaining neutral in the event of war, because, it is difficult to do so. That was the lesson which the Americans learnt, to their disappointment, in the I and II World Wars. Further, it is not easy to remain neutral unless both the sides recognise it. India did not simply possess the strength to safeguard its neutrality, say against an advance by China, in the event of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union. As the first Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, G.S.Bajpai has written, "moral strength is not enough, either to prevent a collision between them or even to protect a neutral's neutrality." And "the greater the strategic importance of a country because of its geography and resources, the greater the threat to its neutrality in a world conflict." The two thrusts that China had made towards India, the first in 1960,

72. "India and The Balance of Power", The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1962, pp. 5-6.
73. Ibid.
and, the second in 1962, are of significance here.

Nonalignment as Balancing Process:

Thus the first concern of India has been to avoid a major conflict between the Great Powers, for its own security as much as for world peace. As Nehru put it: "The supreme question that one has to face today in the world is, how can we avoid a world war?"

As indicated earlier in this chapter, Nehru said that "the only way to avoid conflicts is to accept things more or less as they are. No doubt many things require to be changed, but you must not think of changing them by war .... Further by enlarging the area of peace, that is of countries which are not aligned to this group or that but which are friendly to both, you reduce the chance of war."

What did Nehru mean by the acceptance of "things more or less as they are?" It meant the acceptance of the balance of power in the world, especially between the Big powers. At the Belgrade Conference he said: "The whole framework of the UN, ever since it was formed fifteen years ago, was recognition of the balance of power in the world ...." This has to be

75. See above p. 88.
clearly understood for a proper understanding of Nonalignment. The acceptance of things as they are meant the acceptance of the power position of the two major antagonists in the cold war, both in Asia and Europe. This position should not be changed by war for it would mean a world conflict and hence any such attempt should be nipped in the bud, as far as possible, if necessary by force.77 This is possible only when a state or group of states, is in a position to act as a balancer in a conflict between two sides and is free from commitments to either side, so that it can shift its weight from one side to the other, as the occasion demanded. This, it will be seen in the next chapter, was what India attempted in the Korean crisis. This is the real meaning of the policy of "pursuit of peace not through alignment with any major group of power but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue...."

The fact that the Korean crisis was the first occasion for India to play the role of a balancer does not seem to prove that this was a sudden shift in its foreign policy. Nehru had formulated his foreign policy as a complete whole and this aspect has been an integral part of it, as already indicated.78 The Korean crisis only gave him the first opportunity to test

77. See below, Chapter IV pp.163-/for the Government of India's statement and Nehru's statement on North Korean aggression on South Korea, in June 1950.
78. See above, p. 82.
his policy and its assumptions. Even before the Korean crisis \(^79\) Nehru had said: "I feel that India can play a big part, and may be an effective part, in helping to avoid war. Therefore, it becomes all the more necessary that India should not be lined up with any group of Powers which for various reasons are full of fear of war and preparing for war. That is the main approach of our policy."

Again, in the same speech he had said \(^80\) "We have stated repeatedly that our foreign policy is one of keeping aloof from the big blocs of nations-rival blocs-and being friendly to all countries and not becoming entangled in any alliances military or other that might drag us into any possible conflict. .....If by chance we align ourselves definitely with one group, we may perhaps from one point of view do some good, but I have not the shadow of a doubt that from a larger point of view, not only of India but of world peace, it will do harm. Because then we lose that tremendous vantage ground that we have of using such influence as we possess (and that influence is going to grow year to year) in the cause of world peace....."

**An Analogy:**

This policy of Nonalignment, it is submitted, is essentially the same as the British policy of 'frechand', both in

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79. *Supra*, n.74.
80. *Id.*, p. 1232.
its language and terminology and its application. As a British Scholar\(^\text{81}\) has written in a recent study of British foreign policy "The policy of isolation was not one of holding aloof but to 'avoid needless entangling engagements'. \textit{The phrase might be Jefferson's; it is actually Gladstone's.} It meant a free hand—

with the implication that the hand could be applied as required by the cardinal principles of British policy." And according to Lord Salisbury\(^\text{82}\) the British policy was to keep absolutely clear of entanglements and to leave the country free to take any action which it might think fit in the event of war." There should be no doubt about the similarity of this policy with Nehru's "independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue."

The similarity, however, does not end there. The very first formulation of foreign policy by Nehru appears to be British inspired in all its aspects. In what is supposed to be a classic formulation of the cardinal principles of British foreign policy, an English authority\(^\text{83}\) had stated that "the policy of Britain had to be directed so as to harmonize with the general desires and ideals common to all mankind ......

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81. Saul Rose, 'The Foreign Policy of Britain', Joseph E. Black and Kenneth Thompson, ed., op. cit., p. 30 (Italics are mine).

82. cited, \textit{Id.}, p. 27.

83. cited, \textit{Id.}, pp. 30-31.
England more than any other noninsular Power, has a direct and positive interest in the maintenance of the independence of nations, and therefore must be the natural enemy of any country threatening the independence of others and the natural protector of the weaker communities." This "analysis", says Saul Rose, "not only represented a typical view of the time, but by its general acceptance helped to maintain a stereotyped approach to foreign policy ....." This applies with equal force to the approach to foreign policy in India. For, in expressing a typical Indian view, as he has himself claimed an Indian scholar has written that," It so happened that many of the policies and actions of the Indian people (e.g., opposition to colonialism and racialism) were in harmony with the needs of world society and the general moral values prevailing in the world at large." This is of course, the same British way of saying "that what is good for the world is good for Britain", while in reality it meant "that what is good for Britain is good for the world." This is how India and the other nonaligned states have been championing the freedom of peoples, etc., as already indicated above.

84. Id., p. 32.
85. See M.S.Rajan, India in World Affairs, op.cit., p. 35. Also see above, Chapter I, nö.6.
86. See Saul Rose, op.cit., p. 31.
Balance of Power is not Obsolete:

This analysis of Nonalignment would not be complete until one or two objections raised against it are examined. Prof. Brecher, for example, does not accept this view: "Is neutralism merely a twentieth-century variation of the balancing process? I think not. The basic difference is that the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century had sufficient power to prevent the outbreak of war, or, if war broke out, to throw its weight into the scales in such a way as to ensure victory for one or another of the participants. Today no state can be a balancer in the nineteenth century sense simply because the gap between the power of the two super-powers and all others is such that the addition of the power of India or anybody else would not make any difference."

This, in effect, is an argument advanced by all those who claim that the balance of power has become obsolete in the post-Second World War era. This objection, to my mind, appears to spring from a wrong understanding of the balance of power as it emerged after the Second World War, as also of the type of role that the nonaligned states can play as balancers.

It may be true that no balancing is possible in the nineteenth century sense of the term. But is it not possible to say that the type of balancing necessary in mid twentieth century is different from it? Has not the balance of power between the two super powers itself ruled out the possibility of a World War? If such a war broke out there may be precious little for the survivors, if any, to enjoy the fruits of victory. Therefore, the type of balancing that is required is to prevent any local war to become a general war. Is it not possible for a nonaligned state, or, a group of them, to play this role in the event of a local war, as in Korea or Suez? Are not the Big Powers themselves bent upon ending all such local wars, as far possible, by throwing their weight into the scales behind the nonaligned states?

It would appear to me that the nonaligned states have been able to play this kind of balancing, precisely because the balance of power was so even, that no great power was necessary to tilt it. Moreover, the nonaligned states belonging to three continents and representing large populations cannot be said to be insignificant, when the Big Powers want their support against each other. Nehru clearly stated that "when

there is a substantial difference in the strength of the two opposing forces, we in Asia, with our limitations, will not be able to influence the issue. But when the two opposing forces are evenly matched, then it is possible to make our weight felt in the balance."

It is this kind of role that Nehru selected for himself and India, as it was the only way in which he could play a part in world affairs and carve out a role for India and other small states, which would otherwise have to join this side or that, dividing the world into two opposing blocs with no one to control them. Thus the very fact that certain states chose to remain aloof from the blocs meant a check to this dangerous trend towards bipolarity. Thus Nehru said "I am not conceited enough to imagine that we can control the fortunes of the world or prevent something happening that otherwise would happen. But there can be little doubt that we can occasionally at least make a difference. Well, I hope that this country will make that difference whenever it has the chance and that difference will be in favour of peace."

Whenever the super-powers are ranged against one another, as they were in the Cuban-missile Crisis of 1962, there is

91. See Susan Strange, 'Cuba And After', Year Book of World Affairs, 1963, for one of the earliest studies of the Cuban Crisis.
nothing that the nonaligned states can do. Similarly, whenever they are together against the nonaligned states, they can not do much. This, as shall be seen in the concluding chapter, is the present challenge which the nonaligned states face, though it was against this trend that Nonalignment was first evolved.

Ideology and Balance of Power:

There is yet another argument which claims that "There are in the twentieth century features which make a balance of power system quite inoperative. Under balance of power, each state must, as a matter of policy, be prepared to declare in advance of changed political circumstances its willingness to switch its support from one state or group of states to another regardless of all other reasons. Such a condition would be possible only in a world of independent sovereign states having no cultural, political or other links with other states, and being completely indifferent on grounds other than strategic grounds with whom they had alliances; for equilibrium to be meaningful, no state could place a value on ideology, or any other interest, or even developing close relationship with any other state, which might prejudice its easy transfer of strategic support as required to maintain equilibrium."

92. See below, p. 137-138.

There are two aspects to this argument. One is that ideology makes the balance of power inoperative and the other is that it is so in the twentieth century. These views appear to be quite contrary to facts, both of the present day world and that of the past. Ideology does not seem to have been the major determinant of foreign policy at any time. Yugoslavia, a communist state has not remained in the Communist bloc. China and the Soviet Union are now as far apart as any two states could be. The Soviet Union is perhaps much nearer to the United States, at least in certain respects, than to China. They might still come closer and it would not be a surprise. After all, they were allies during the Second World War. As Prof. Penrose has written, "It is easy to find much continuity between the foreign policy of Czarist Russia and that of Soviet Russia," adding that "it does not follow that doctrinal influences are thus rendered negligible.... This was a secondary influence, only sustained sporadically over the long period of conflict, but it was important where it occurred."

England did not give all out support to the United States in the Korean Crisis and in Indo-China. England was perhaps nearer to India in these two crises. The United States

94. See E.F. Penrose, op.cit.,pp. 9-16 for an exhaustive study.
95. Id., pp. 11-12.
in turn did not support England and France in the Suez war in 1956. France has all but gone out of NATO alliance. The democratic world could not go to the support of the Hungarian people against the Soviet Union for balance of power reasons, nor could nonaligned India do so. Nepal, supposed to be a Hindu state, is nonaligned between India and China. The Soviet Union did not support China against India. In the Arab World, all are not united even against Israel, if not against others.

Is this not enough to prove that ideology has not played the part it is supposed to have played since the Second World War? The very fact that the nonaligned states refused to take sides in the cold war was an indication that it was of no major concern to them and that they would side with anyone in accordance with their interests. In this sense, they may be said to have reactivated the balance of power which was supposed to have become inoperative.

From the point of view of ideology also, India and other nonaligned states, appear to be capable of playing the role of the balancer in the East-West struggle as has been recognised.

97. See below, Chapter 5, p.
98. See below, Chapter 6.
99. This was Nepal's policy on the Sino-Indian dispute.
100. Tunisia and its President, Habib Bourguiba, are obvious examples — See Peter Mansfield, op.cit., p. 79.
by some Western scholars. According to Coral Bell, "this appears to confer upon the neutralists a role analogous to that of the balancer in the classical balance of power theory, not because of their military strength (which was slight) but because they represented a body of opinion whose endorsement might ultimately prove decisive (psychologically and in various other ways) in a struggle that was as much between two theories of society as between two power systems." According to Charles H. Heimsath: "Within the frame of reference suggested by the ideological competition between the Western and Soviet systems India's position was analogous to that of a classic holder of the balance of power. The possibility of committing its people to one system or the other gained for India the capability of influencing the policies of other states."

Nonalignment as Containment of Big Powers:

Thus Nonalignment does not seem to provide so much 'an alternative game' to the balance of power as it strengthens it and prevents it from reaching the breaking point. It is

101. Supra, n. 89.
Indeed a response to the inadequacies of the bipolar balance of power, rather than of balance of power as such. For, there is nothing like a model or fixed balance of power. It is something which is dynamic and every changing and its success seems to depend upon its flexibility. As Palmer and Perkins have written "Once bipolarity exists, it tends to become rigid as well as unstable, and a peaceful transition to a complex balance—one involving many states—becomes difficult." Nonalignment was an attempt to replace this balance by a complex balance of power in which as many of the major states or groups of states as possible could take part.

This was possible only when the further polarisation of the world into the blocs was first stopped, especially when most areas of Asia and Africa seemed to create what are called power vacuums due to the rapid decolonisation set into motion after the Second World War, with the Great Powers intent to fill the vacuums. This is what Nehru called the creation

104. Id., p. 27.


106. For a most authoritative discussion of this question from the point of view of the peace-keeping role of the UN, see Secretary-General, Hammarskjöld's 'Introduction to the Annual Report on the work of the UNO' (31 August 1960), General Assembly Official Records, Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/4330/Add). (Hereafter cited as G.A.O.R.).
of a 'peace area' in Asia and Africa. India's championship of the independence of subjected peoples and their Nonalignment has to be understood from this point of view to see it in the proper perspective. Nehru's championship of Indonesia's freedom was the first manifestation of this aspect of his approach to world affairs, which has been described as 'messianic neutralism' by Fayez A. Sayegh, in his characteristic style.

As Fayez A. Sayegh has correctly pointed out this is the most imaginative and also the most militant aspect of Nonalignment. Its greatest significance lay in the fact that it is in line with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, as the late Secretary-General, Hammarskjöld, boldly and squarely acknowledged in 1960, at the height of the Congo crisis. This crisis, as will be seen in chapter seven, was a great challenge to Nonalignment and to the United Nations, as it threatened to wreck both.

Once the bipolarisation of the world is stopped it will be easier to achieve a multiple balance, in as much as it would be then easier for the smaller powers, not all of which were

107. See below, Chapter 4, pp. 145-146.
108. See Dynamics of Neutralism In The Arab World, op.cit., p. 76. Sayegh's discussion of this aspect of Nonalignment is the most interesting and useful part of the book.
109. Ibid.
110. Supra, n. 106.
small anyway, to play their part in world affairs. As Prof. Penrose has observed: "The structure of all balances of power before 1914 gave dominating position to the Great Powers and enroached widely and deeply on the independence of the smaller countries, not only through Colonialism but also through all forms of imperialism." Even the Security Council had overlooked the role which the small powers play in the international balance of power," though the Charter itself had not, as Hammarskjöld had interpreted it, in his capacity of the Secretary-General of the U.N. whether or not this was actually so, that was how Nehru looked at the problem from the beginning with his fine vision and he set about his task with conviction, strengthened by similar forces at work in other parts of Asia and Africa.

Thus he told the Constituent Assembly of India on March 8, 1949: "I should like to deal with the general aspects of foreign affairs and foreign policy as they affect India and as we look at them rather than say much about the smaller aspects of the main problem."

"One of the major questions of today is the readjustment of the relations between Asia and Europe. When we talk of Asia, remember that India, not because of any ambition but because of circumstances, because of geography, because of history

112. Supera, n.74, p. 1227.
and because of so many other things inevitably, has to play a very important part in Asia.....

".....India now in this last year or more, emerges again into the main trend of human affairs.....

".....Asia in the long millenium of her history has played a very important part, so has India, of course; but during the last two hundred years or so, certain developments of science and technology in Europe, and in America a little later, led to the domination of Asia by Europe and to a restriction of her activities in the world at large. She became confined and restricted. Various changes took place. I believe (there is) a considerable recognition of these changes now, but it is not enough yet. Even in the Councils of the United Nations, the problem of Asia, the outlook of Asia, the approach of Asia have failed to evoke the enthusiasm that they should....."

Nehru was much more explicit in 1966 in a speech in the

113 Lok Sabha:

"The fact of the matter is that in the 19th century, a certain not very happy equilibrium was established in the world by the dominance of certain European powers practically all over the world. That continued till the beginning of the First World War. The First World War upset that equilibrium in many ways—political, economic. Some empires vanished. The period between the two World Wars intervened, a troubled period, a difficult one. Always an attempt has been made to find some equilibrium and it has been a failure. The Second World War came and upset the old 19th century balances still more. Ever since then, the world has been groping about to find some equilibrium. Meanwhile, apart from the emergence of these great giants, America and the Soviet Union, in terms of material power, this atomic energy comes in—another upsetting factor.

"Now, the countries which enjoyed the privileged position in that 19th century setup, many of them have lost their position. It is not easy for them to adjust themselves to the new thinking, the new balances in the world, the new balances – apart from the giants coming up – and the new renaissance in Asia and Asian countries becoming independent in their different ways, whether it is India or China, or Indonesia or Burma or other countries. The old balances go on being changed and Governments, very wise Governments can not easily keep pace with those practical developments. Of course the most remarkable fact about this lack of awareness, proper awareness, is that a great country like China is there of course they know it. Nevertheless they seem to lack something, or otherwise, their policy would be different.

"But it is not merely a question of China. It is really a question of the outlook on all Asian problems or African problems and the idea that, as previously they have to be settled by the great powers whom we all respect, hardly taking consideration what the countries of Asia might feel about it.....

"So this kind of difficulty is there and facts and events have gone on, bringing about enormous changes and yet, the mind of man can not keep pace, and it keeps in the old ruts....."

No wonder Nehru had become such a tireless champion of China's place in the United Nations. That was the first step for him towards the recognition of Asian resurgence and also towards the evolution of a multiple balance of power, for China is a power in its own right and one which could compete with the two superpowers.

The greatest significance of Nonalignment perhaps lies in the fact that it announced the desire of the Asian and
African states to enter the "balance of power struggle in their own right." Not all the Afro-Asian states had the geographical and other advantages to realise this aim. It was, therefore, fitting that those who had the advantage took the lead. It was not till the rise of Nasser into power that the Arabs could join this struggle in their own right, as shall be seen in the fifth chapter.

Thus, in the words of the once famous Sukarno of Indonesia" Nonalignment does not mean becoming a buffer state between two giant blocs. Nonalignment is active association in the cause of independence abiding peace, social justice and freedom to be free ..... (We) are striving for the speedy establishment of a new equilibrium. What do we mean by a new stable equilibrium? It means all nations must become independent. All nations must have freedom to be free, freedom to live their national lives in accordance with their own wishes, freedom to build their own national foundations, political, economic and cultural. We mean that all nations must be free to arrange international relations as they see fit, based upon principles of equality, justice and mutual benefit. We mean that no power shall interfere in the struggle of another nation. No power

shall attempt to force any other nation to change its ideology."

Stripped of its universalism this description of Non-alignment is quite accurate in all essentials. Ironically, Sukarno seems to have forgotten his own words, thus paving the way for his own downfall.

In conclusion, it seems necessary to mention that since each state, whether nonaligned or aligned is first of all concerned with its own security and other vital interests, there are bound to be differences and sometimes even disagreements in the pursuit of Nonalignment between one state and another, as has been noted in earlier pages. The case studies of the Nonalignment of India and the United Arab Republic that follow, emphasise the similarities as well as differences and disagreements in the practice of Nonalignment by two of its three acknowledged leaders. One fact that emerges from these studies is that the differences and disagreements have been over details rather than over the fundamentals of Nonalignment, on which there appears to have been complete agreement and understanding between India and the United Arab Republic, thus forging close links of friendship and cooperation between them.