CHAPTER II

GOALS OF NONALIGNMENT

In this chapter some of the professed objectives of Nonalignment will be examined so as to determine their validity or otherwise.

As Nehru put it in 1949: "The main objectives of that policy are: the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major group of powers but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue; the liberation of subjected peoples, the maintenance of freedom, both national and individual, the elimination of racial discrimination and the elimination of want, disease and ignorance, which afflict the greater part of the world's population."

From this and similar statements of Nehru have flowed the arguments that "the pursuit of peace", "the liberation of subjected peoples", "the elimination of racialism", and also according to some, the containment of communism, at least in Asia, through democracy and social reform, have been the major


objectives of the foreign policy of India. Some of these
have also been variously described as the 'principles'\(^4\) or the
'pillars'\(^5\) of the foreign policy of India. And that\(^6\) Nonalign-
ment is only "a means by which India seeks to achieve her
policy objectives." By common consent, the first three have
been accepted\(^7\) as the main objectives of all the nonaligned
states, and indeed, of all Afro-Asian states\(^8\), including those
that have joined the Power Blocs.

It will be argued below that though Nonalignment is a
means to an end, it has not been primarily concerned with any
of the objectives mentioned above, including the 'pursuit of
peace.' These also have been means to an end, namely, the
'security and progress' of the country, which in Nehru's own
words, are the first objectives of the foreign policy of every
country, including India.

4. See B.S.N. Murty, loc.cit., and Karunakar Gupta, op.cit.,
   pp.43-44.
5. See Chapter I, note 11.
6. Rajan, India in World Affairs, op.cit., p.58, and Sisir
   Gupta, op.cit., p.9.
7. See The Conference of Heads of state or Government of Non-
   aligned countries, Belgrade, September 1-6,1961, (Publicis-
   tico-Izdavacki Zavod, Yugoslavia, 1961), pp.263-61(Hereafter
cited as Belgrade Report).
8. See Asian-African Conference : Live and Let Live in Unity
   in Diversity, (Issued by : Information Service Indonesia :
   Embassy of the Public of Indonesia, New Delhi), pp.206-
   216.
   See also A.Appadorai, op.cit., p.482.
Nonalignment and Anti-colonialism:

To begin then, the role of India and the United Arab Republic in the 'liberation of subjected peoples' will be examined first, in as brief a way as possible. At the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi, in 1947, under his patronage, Nehru said that "the old imperialisms are fading away." In passing it may be noted that by old imperialisms Nehru meant western empires, implying thereby that he did not distinguish between Colonialism and Imperialism. He used the two words as synonyms more or less. However, it is well known that, Nehru acted with a crusader's zeal in the case of the freedom of Indonesia. As Werner Lehn has sarcastically, but apply put it, "such ambitious heights were never reached again, though opportunity has not been lacking." Again, in his speech at the Belgrade Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries, in 1961, Nehru observed, "the era of Classic Colonialism is gone and is dead, though, of course, it survives and gives a lot of trouble yet, but essentially it is over", and therefore, "the most important thing" was the


11. See below pp.145-46 for an analysis of India's part in the case of Indonesian freedom.

12. op.cit., p. 114.

reducing of tension between the Great Powers. For Nasser, as a publication\[^{14}\] of the Government of the United Arab Republic reiterated, "There was no question of priorities. World peace and Colonialism were both equally important, they were — as they still are — correlated and thus called for simultaneous and urgent action on the part of the conference." For, as a British Scholar\[^{15}\] has put it, Nehru's claim that the era of Classic Colonialism was over, was at that time, far more true of Asia than of Africa." As Nasser pointed out\[^{16}\] in his speech, the Arabs and the Africans were fighting bitter battles against Colonialism in the Congo, in Algeria, in Angola and elsewhere. Even in Asia, and in India especially, Colonies existed. In less than three months after the Belgrade Conference India freed Goa from Portuguese Colonialism, by the use of force. As indicated earlier, the United States attacked this action of India as a set back for the cause of world peace and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. And an American scholar\[^{17}\] has written that "Indian motives for

\[\]
15. Peter Lyon, op.cit., p.188 (Author's Italics).
17. Supra, Chapter I, n.79.
seizing Goa .... surely included India's desire to reinforce its anti-colonialist bonafides among African governments", which "were beginning to view India as a supporter of great power interests in Africa, partly because of its role in the Congo ....." M.C.Chagla, appears to have been more accurate in his reported statement that "If we can send an army contingent to the Congo, to safeguard the integrity of that country, why cannot we send an army to Goa to safeguard the integrity of our own country." However, the united Arab Republic gave full support to India in this venture, whereas India followed a more cautious policy in the Congo, than the former had wanted, for well over a year, though ultimately, it had accepted a more militant role.

Similarly, whereas India had earlier supported the demands for freedom for Morocco and Tunisia from French Colonialism, it was hesitant in its attitude towards Algerian


21. See below Chapter VII for a study of the role of India and the United Arab Republic in this Crisis.

22. See Karunakar Gupta, op.cit.,pp.37-46 for a critical study of India's anticolonialism upto 1955. See also Werner Levi, op.cit.,pp.50-60 and 113-128. Neither study appears to be complete in itself.

23. See M.S.Rajan, India in World Affairs, op.cit.,pp.573-576. See below, Chapter V, n.71, for a brief explanation of this attitude of India.
freedom. Again India and Nehru were indignant at the British and the United States' support to Portugal on Goa. It was in this context that Nehru went so far as to declare in Parliament on July 26, 1955, a sort of Monroe Doctrine for India: "any attempt by a foreign power to interfere in any way with India is a thing which India cannot tolerate and which subject to her strength, she will oppose. That is the doctrine I lay down."

But, as Prof. Rajan has rightly observed, "there was probably little divergence in ..... fundamental objectives", between India and Britain in regard to British Colonial policies. This similarity between Indian and British objectives came into sharp relief in India's stand on the struggle between Britain and the United Arab Republic over the Suez military base and later over the Suez Canal itself, as will be seen later. Suffice it to add here, that even at the height of the Anglo-French - Israeli aggression on the United Arab Republic, India's policy was only mildly anti-British, notwithstanding

24. Suqra, Chapter I, n.75.

25. Ibid. Nehru had made a specific reference to President Monroe's Declaration of 1823.


27. See below, Chapter V.
the indignation expressed by Nehru against the aggressors.

Two things clearly emerge from this brief factual account. The first is an apparent inconsistency in India's support to the liberation of subjected peoples everywhere, the second an apparent difference between the attitudes of India and the United Arab Republic, the latter appearing to be more vocal and militant in its anticolonialism. Neither is in fact true as a proper understanding of Nonalignment would reveal, i.e., as the Foreign Policy of a country and not as the pursuit of moral principles or human ideals. Faced with the apparent inconsistency in India's pursuit of anticolonialism, (in its narrower and anti-western sense), an Indian scholar\(^\text{28}\) has observed that: "such diversity of policy clearly indicates that India has to moderate her principles to suit the situation like any other state in defence of 'National Interest'". This does not appear to be the whole truth.

For, a closer examination of India's foreign policy would reveal that in everyone of these cases, whether in its support to the independence movements, as in Indonesia, or its hesitation to support them fully, as in the Suez crisis, India's

\begin{flushright}
28. Karunakar Gupta, op.cit., p. 44.
29. Supra, n.11.
30. Supra, n.27.
\end{flushright}
policy has been, first of all, a policy of protecting its security and other vital interests, as will be shown in part of this study. Thus India's championship of the liberation of subjected peoples before and after independence was part of Nehru's strategy, along with Nonalignment, to protect India's freedom and security. Besides, Nehru championed Afro-Asian freedom movements, in one way or the other, because Nehru once said that: ".....in the long run it is to the advantage of India to try to attract to itself the sympathy and hope of millions of people in the world without offending others."

In this respect India's championship of freedom movements was very much similar to that of the Soviet Union and might well have been inspired by it, as their close collaboration in the United Nation's organs during the late forties would suggest. It was this collaboration, also reflected in the internal support given by the Communist Party of India to the foreign Policy of India, that appears to have misled the western Powers, especially the United States, into believing that India was in the Soviet bloc.

Even here, one might presume, that India was trying to complete with the Soviet Union for the "sympathy and hope of...

31. See above pp6-11 and also below pp.82-85.
32. Nehru, op.cit., p.34. Nehru also said: "I do not think it is purely idealistic; I think it is, if you like, opportunistic in the long run" (p.30).
millions of people in the world", as Nehru had put it. However, soon Nehru had to use this instrument against the Communists themselves in South East Asia to meet the increased pressure that the latter were applying on some of these states, especially, Burma and Indonesia. It was perhaps the realisation of this fact that was responsible for the sudden increase in the Communist polemics against the nationalist leadership in India, Burma and Indonesia in early 1949. It was only when the Soviet Union and China realised that their pressure tactics against these leaders in India, Burma and Indonesia, and more importantly, in Yugoslavia, would only push the latter closer to the Western bloc, as was evident from Nehru's decision to remain in the Commonwealth and Tito's acceptance of Western Military support and protection, and that it would be far more advantageous to wean them away from the Western bloc, rather

34. The Economist, London, had been right when it said that the Conference on Indonesia had the effect of "taking the wind out of Russian anti-imperialist sails, by giving leadership to Asian opinion on the subject." Id., p. 43. See below, Chapter 4, pp. 145-46 for further discussion.

35. See below, Chapter IV, pp. 142-152

36. For details see J.C. Kundra, India's Foreign Policy: A Study of Relations with the Western Bloc (J.B. Walters: Groningen, Netherlands - Vora & Co., Publishers Ltd., Bombay, 1955), p.120.

37. See below pp. 61-65 for an account of Nehru's visit to the United States in 1949, and pp. 146-47 for an analysis of India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth.

than force them into the Communist bloc, that the Soviet Union and China appear to have made a tactical shift in their policy towards these countries.

Nasser’s support to the Revolutionary movements in Algeria and Yemen compares well with Nehru’s support to Indonesian nationalists and the Burmese Government against the Communists, as his Arab Nationalism has been as much a struggle against the growth of Communism in these areas, as it has been against the colonial and other reactionary forces. And Nasser went to the rescue of Syria in 1958 by accepting its merger with his country, as it was the only way in which he could fight the communists in Syria. As has been indicated earlier, when Khrushchev tried to protect the communists in Iraq, in 1959, Nasser had made it clear that he would not tolerate it. Thus Nasser’s support to the independence movements in Africa and in the Arab world, is not only to rid the areas of Western domination, but also to prevent the infiltration of Communism into these areas, as both are equally dangerous for the independence and integrity of the Arab States. As shall be seen later.

---

39. The Shift, however, became evident during the Korean crisis, See below, Chapter 4, pp. 177-179

40. See above, Chapter I, pp. 36-37


42. Supra, n. 40.

43. See Below, Chapter 7.
Nasser's policy in the Congo reflected, among other things, this dual purpose. And if he is still intensely anticolonial and anti-West, it is only because of the continuing presence of British protectorates, and American bases, etc., in the Arab world, not to speak of the consistent Western support to an aggressive Israel, which is a constant reminder of Western domination and injustices, as against the more cautious policy of the Soviet Union. Nasser had given enough proof of willingness to cooperate with the West on the basis of equality and non-interference in the domestic affairs. The United States has not so far shown any willingness, it would seem, to make any concession to the Arabs against Israel.

Nasser's continuing preoccupation with Western Colonialism and Israel, to an apparent neglect of problems of world peace, compares well with India's and other Asians' neglect of world problems in the early years of the United Nations. As

44. See Nasser's Speeches, 1956, op. cit., p. 365 where Nasser had explained this basis of his policy. See also Peter Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt, (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1965), pp. 96-97 for a good analysis of the problem. See below, chapter 5 for further discussion.

45. This was particularly so, when he signed the 1954 treaty with Britain. See below Chapter 5.

46. This seems to be so inspite of the US pressure on Israel for its withdrawal from Arab territories in 1956-57, which, however, Israel did under certain guarantees. The US unwillingness to do anything against Israel became fully evident during the 1967-June Israeli aggression on Arab countries - See below, Chapter 5 for an analysis of the two Israeli aggressions.
Arthur Lal, the scholar-diplomat from India, has written, there was "a preoccupation with themselves to the exclusion of an interest in world problems except in so far as those problems concerned the questions of colonialism." And that "during the United Nations early years there was practically no contribution from Asia on such questions as disarmament, the peaceful use of atomic energy, the calling of international conferences by the ECOSOC, or even the enlargement of the ECOSOC. Their own affairs, colonial questions, and, as far as the Arabs were concerned, their relations with Israel practically constituted the whole domain of interest for the Asian nations in these years." And it is well to remember that India and the United Arab Republic were the chief spokesmen of Asia as China was represented by tiny Formosa.

And if Nasser's condemnation of Colonialism appears too hostile, one has only to look into the speeches of Nehru in support of Indonesian freedom, or the condemnation of military pacts as at the Bandung Conference, to realise that what

48. Arthur Lal writes that the absence of China 'the Natural helmsman' of Asia from the UN must be taken into account in assessing the part played by the Asian countries' in the UN. (Ibid.).
Nasser still says or threatens to do is little different from what Nehru did on similar occasions. When Allen Dulles of the United States complained of Nasser's bitter attack against the West during the Suez crisis, Nehru is reported to have said that it was a product of the former's youth and inexperience. Nehru would have been more accurate, if he had said that it was natural. For, he himself condemned the tripartite aggression later in very severe language, which, according to Prof. Brecher, was 'highly charged.'

It is now clear that neither Nehru nor Nasser had been 'doctrinaire' in their approach to the question of the liberation of subjected peoples. Nor did they approach it as a moral principle even though they had talked that way. It is also important to note that they were not unaware of the fact that Communism was also expansionist. All this has been well put by Nehru himself in explaining the Government of India's attitude towards British Colonialism, in particular, and imperialism in general. In reply to a debate on foreign affairs, in the Parliament of India, Nehru said on June 12, 1962:

63. See Nehru, op. cit., p. 57 and also pp. 151-152. (Italics are mine). These views of Nehru should prove that the charge that, "there was an a priori assumption that practically all western diplomacy was motivated by imperialism", is not correct (Werner Levi, op. cit., p. 113).
"It is necessary for us to function as a mature nation. It is very easy to talk against imperialism as some hon. Members did. I do not deny that imperialism exists but ...... is hardly what it was in the past. Let Hon. Members understand what it is. Let them also understand that there are other imperialisms that are growing ...... British imperialism does flourish in Malaya, in Africa ...... but ...... today......is an exhausted thing. I hope this House has respect for the way England has tackled her problems since the war and the courage with which she has faced them.....

"There are still colonies that belong to certain powers. I have no doubt that an end should be put to them all ...... Let us by all means put an end to what remains of colonialism in Asia, in Africa and wherever else it exists, but let us understand what the real conflict is about."

The 'real conflict' is a struggle for power. Colonialism or imperialism has always been the result of this struggle between powers. Thus every big power is imperialist to some extent, if only for the sake of its own security. This holds good in the case of India and even the United Arab Republic, in its behaviour towards its immediate neighbours, India is said to have followed or adopted the British policies of imperialism. China's occupation of Tibet was an act of imperialism. India would have followed and insisted on following the British policy on Tibet, if it had the strength to do it. That India,


55. See below, pp.179-95 for an analysis of India's Tibet Policy.
or rather, Nehru could and should have done so, is the charge that is levied against Nehru by the critics of his China Policy. A few writers have, however, written that Nehru only did what the British in India themselves had done, in similar circumstances. It was, however, Jayaprakash Narayan, that posed the moral issue involved in India's acceptance of China's occupation of Tibet, in his reported statement that "It is true that we could not have prevented the Chinese from annexing Tibet. But we could have saved ourselves from being party to a wrong." The Government of India was not motivated by such morals. It accepted the Chinese imperialism in Tibet in the hope that the latter would recognise its interests in Tibet as well as in South Asia, as shall be seen later. But even then, Nehru as well as other spokesmen of India's foreign policy, defended its action in terms of a departure from


58. Cited in Frank Moraes, op.cit., p. 121.

59. Supra, n.56.

60. Ibid.
British imperialism. The temptation to use the bogey of anti-colonialism, obviously, appears to have been too strong, even for Nehru to resist it.

The same maturity is reflected in the attitudes of India and the United Arab Republic towards the Soviet Colonialism or imperialism in Eastern Europe, rather than what a majority of the Western scholars would have one believe, that this attitude of the Afro-Asians has been a product of lack of experience with the Soviet Union as against the experience with Western Colonialism and racialism, and also of the influence of Marxism and Leninism on Nehru, if not the other non-aligned leaders. This does not appear to be substantiated by facts, as for example, the attitudes and policies of India and the United Arab Republic in regard to the liberation of subjected peoples. On the other hand, the scholars themselves appear to be prejudiced against Nehru and Nasser and other

61. See below pp.15-17 for further analysis.

62. See Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia, op.cit., pp. 115-116, David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy Since Stalin, (J.B. Lippincott Coy, New York, 1961), pp.288-289, Peter Lyon, op.cit., pp.76-82, Werner Levi., op.cit., p. 113. An Indian Scholar Prof. Bimla Prasad has also written that Nehru "continued to believe that imperialism was a product of capitalism" see The Origins of India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.239.

63. This appears to be particularly so with Prof. Brecher whose approach to Nonalignment is strongly influenced by these feelings as his criticism of the policies of India during the Suez and Hungarian crises of 1956 reveals. (op.cit., pp.118-120) See below, Chapters 5 & 6 for a refutation of this criticism. Another important illustration is provided by his view that India's attitude towards Israel has been shaped by racial and anticolonial sentiments (op.cit., pp.121-138) See below p.280, n.23 for any comments.
nonaligned leaders. There are some people in India like the leader of the Praja Socialist Party and member of Parliament, S.N. Dwivedi, who seem to believe that Nehru's approach to the Soviet Union and China particularly was dogmatic. As Prof. S.A.H. Haqqi pointed out, Nehru's mind was particularly free from dogmatism. It will be shown in the next chapter that the policies of India and the United Arab Republic towards the Soviet Union, as, indeed, their entire foreign policy, has been based on a sound understanding of the world balance of power and a very realistic appraisal of the mutuality of their interests with the Soviet Union. While the struggle against the west and a western backed Israel have been the major factors in Nasser's relations with the Soviet Union, on the other hand, appears to have cultivated the Soviet friendship more as a counter against China's and Pakistan's threat to India's security, than from any fear of a western attack, which did not and does not exist.

64. Sri Dwivedi had made this observation during a speech at a Seminar on 'India And Her Neighbours', held at the Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, on December 4, 1965.

65. Prof. Haqqi made this observation in his closing remarks at the Seminar. See also Loui Fischer, op.cit., pp. 125-127, for an analysis of Nehru's political and economic views.

66. See below, pp. 82-99

67. See Nasser's Speeches, 1958, op.cit., pp.374-376 and pp. 153-186 for an exposition of the UAR-Soviet relations. Also see below Chapter V.

68. See below pp. 82-99
Nonalignment and Containment:

It does not, therefore, seem correct to argue that the Nonalignment of India has been a policy aimed at the establishment of the superiority of the democratic system in Asia, as some prominent writers in India and America seem to believe. 69 Prof. Morgenthau, for example, has written that "As India sees it, in Asia, at least, the issue between Communism and democracy has been joined and will be decided on the plane of social reform." This is not so much objectionable as what he says next. "..... such a policy which thinks of the struggle with communism in terms of competition between different social systems is not only unable to take interest in military measures, but must also regard western emphasis upon them as a pernicious interference with that competitive struggle." Echoing these arguments Sisir Gupta 70 has observed that" in the Indian conception of the Communist problem, the military aspects of the challenge were relatively unimportant, what is important .... is to establish the superiority of the democratic system even for Asian and other backward countries."


70. Id., p.14 See. also J.C.Kundra, op.cit., p.85. Till the Chinese aggression on India in late 1962, Indian scholars, some at least, seem to have believed in this view. See M.S.Rajan, India World Affairs, op.cit., p. 61.
This would mean that India did not realise the Chinese military threat to her security and that it was not interested in building its military strength. This is so obviously, and, completely contrary to facts, that Sisir Gupta hastens\(^1\) to add " that it would not be entirely correct to say that India did not take into account the military problem that China posed for her security. " Yet, he holds, it was secondary to " the more challenging task of competing with China in other spheres. " This, to my mind, appears a complete reversal of India's China policy.\(^2\) For, if this were the truth, Nehru stands condemned before history as the New York Times angrily prophesied during the Korean crisis. But this is not the truth as Nehru was aware of the Chinese military threat from the beginning. Otherwise, one might ask, what the Panch Sheel\(^3\) was about, with its stress on 'nonaggression', 'territorial integrity', 'non-interference' and 'Peaceful co-existence', etc.?

\(^1\) Ibid.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) See below, Chapter 4 for an analysis of India's China Policy.
\(^5\) See below, pp. 90-99 and Supra, n.73.
\(^6\) Supra, Chapter I, n. 92.
This search for security against China was launched by India from the day China emerged independent under Communism as will be made clear later, for, the Panch Sheel was nothing but the consummation of this effort, as it appeared then.

Another defect in the Morgenthau-Gupta theory is that it appears to make a distinction between Soviet communism and Chinese Communism. So far as democracy is concerned there seems precious little between them to choose. For, if Khrushchev had started the process of de-Stalinisation, he had also crushed a 'spontaneous revolution' in Hungary, in as ruthless a manner as Stalin might have done with India remaining a passive on-looker most of the time. For Nehru, however, it was not the liberalisation of the Communist Party of either China or the Soviet Union that was important. It was the inherent or latent political struggle between the two Communist giants that was important for him and India.

But, then, did Nehru accept western democracy in toto? Did he not make it more socialistic than any western democracy, including England, ever conceived of? If Nehru was really

77. Supra, n.75, see Lorne J. Kavic, India’s Quest For Security: Defence Policies 1946–1957, (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967) for a very good study of India’s defence policies. I could consult this book only after this study was completed.
78. For details infra, Chapter 6, n.1.
79. See Chapter VI, for India’s role in this crisis.
interested in establishing the superiority of democracy through economic and social progress, why did he begin to industrialise the country on the Soviet model, which was considered inimical to the development of a sound economy? The answers to these questions, would appear to suggest that India's policies in the economic sphere represented a success of socialist views, as against the democratic principles of free enterprise. And for the West, and especially, the United States, democracy means as much free enterprise as free elections. However, Nehru was perhaps as much influenced by the British Labour Party as by Soviet Socialism.

Above all, Nehru did not consider the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States as a struggle between democracy and communism. For him it was a power-struggle, pure

81. See Loui Fischer, op.cit., pp.119-122 for a highly unsympathetic criticism of this aspect of the Asians' economic policy. Among the many drastic comments, the one that stands out as particularly so is: "rapid industrialisation is the new Asian religion and steel is god" (p.120).

82. See David J. Dallin, op.cit., p.303.

83. It has already been indicated that Nehru's political and economic ideas were shaped by western European currents of thought - Supra, Chapter I, n.29, According to Krishna Menon's biographer, it was the influence of England in particular that was responsible for the affinity in the thoughts and outlook of Nehru and Menon on international affairs and economic problems - See T.J.S. George, Krishna Menon, (Jonathan Cape, London, 1964), pp.102-117.

84. Nehru, op.cit., pp.53 and 69. See also the 'Appendix' entitled 'Talks with Nehru', in Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia, op.cit., pp.203-204.
and simple. The doctrinal element only added to its intensity. That he was right was amply proved by the fact that the United States supported Tito with massive assistance when he defected from the Soviet bloc. The Sino-Soviet conflict which was clearly anticipated further confirmed it. Similarly, it is unthinkable that the Soviet Union would have given economic and military assistance to India and the United Arab Republic on such a large scale, if their policy was one of containment of Communism on the social plane. It is to keep these states out of the sphere of western influence permanently that the Soviet Union has been giving them aid.

Thus Dulles's view that "there is occurring" between India and China," a competition as to whether ways of freedom or police state methods can achieve better social progress", which Ambassador Bowles has quoted with approval, appears to be more an American wish than the fact of the situation. The real confrontation between India and China was a military one.

86. See Y. Ettinger and O. Melikyan, The Policy of Nonalignment, (Progress Publishers, Moscow), pp.19-31. Moscow has now to contain Peking also. This duality is best illustrated in its present relations with Pakistan and with the UAR since the 1967 war with Israel if not earlier. Indeed Soviet policies towards nonaligned nations appear to have had this underlying goal from 1964 - See Klaus Mehnert, op.cit pp.399-402.
87. Ambassador's Report, op.cit., p. 161. It is interesting to note here that the US-oriented political parties in India

Contd......
However, neither Dulles nor Bowles appear to have been serious in their belief, in that both of them have acted on the contrary assumption. And Nehru refused to be drawn into Dulles's scheme of things precisely because he realised the military threat from China. That Nehru saw it and acted accordingly has been accepted by Bowles himself. It was again because of this that Nehru decided on the industrialisation of the country as rapidly as possible, under democratic methods, to the neglect of good and agricultural production, necessitating dependence upon foreign countries for good. But the choice had to be made, and was made deliberately, as Nehru made it clear.

Nasser is an enemy of Communism, but he has close relations with the Soviet Union and also China. And he is very much interested in social reform and the progress of his people. But (Continued from previous page)

viz., the Swatantra and the Jan Sangh, advocate a ban on the Communist Party of India. They do not seem to believe that this might affect India's democracy. See below, Chapter 3, pp. 109-110 for the other side of this argument.

88. Id., pp. 166, 178 and 180-185.
89. See below, pp. 103-106.
91. Id., pp. 371-372, see below, p. 106.
92. See Nasser's Speech at the Bandung Conference for a brief summary of the aims of his revolution; Supra, n. 8, p. 63. Also see Vital Speeches of The Day, (New York, Volume 21, No. 16, June 1, 1965), p. 1104.
this does not make his struggle a struggle for democracy. He has equal aversion for it, as it is understood in the West. While Nehru did not have an aversion for democracy, he was certainly not a crusader in its service.

Nehru might have made statements occasionally which would support an argument like Prof. Morgenthau's. They might have, more often than not, been prompted by extraneous circumstances or factors which have to be taken into consideration by the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister of a country like India. The United States' insistence on giving aid only to those countries which professed to be anticommunist along with them, might have occasioned such statements to make it easy for the American policy makers to get aid legislation passed. Even Dulles's statement appears to have been motivated by this desire.

This is easy to see from the speeches and statements made by Nehru during his first trip to the United States in

93. This is true in general of most Arabs - See Faye A. Sayegh, 
Dynamics of Neutralism In The Arab World, op.cit.,p.172.

94. See Ambassador's Report, op.cit.,p. 66, See also, Nehru, 
op.cit., pp. 68-69.

95. Pakistan's alliance with the US was of this nature.

96. See above, p. 59.
In the early years of independence, when there was a bitter opposition from the West as well as the East to India's Nonalignment, there was the danger of India being left isolated and helpless, when it desperately needed aid of all kinds. Nehru was sure that once his foreign policy was properly understood, aid would be forthcoming from both sides. But, at that time, the Soviet Union was applying increased pressure on India through the Communist Party of India, and China had just emerged as a Communist Power. The United states, on the other hand, was anxious to rope India into an alliance against Communism, which Nehru did not want. But, Nehru appears to have calculated that the time was ripe to convince the United States that he was interested in social reform and the building of a strong economy which was considered necessary by the Western powers to combat Communism.

97. As will be seen later, it was this very real fear of isolation that led Nehru to remain in the Commonwealth, thus ensuring atleast British cooperation, if not that of United States also - See below, pp. 148-149.

98. Nehru, op.cit., pp. 25, 27 and 35. The help given to Yugoslavia by the United States could not have gone unnoticed by Nehru.


internally. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshal Plan reflected this aspect of the Western policy.

It was with the above aim that Nehru visited the United States and Canada in 1949. In a speech to the Constituent Assembly of India, on 28 November, 1949, Nehru explained the purpose and achievements of this visit in the following words:

"The objective which I had in going to America—both the United States and Canada—was achieved to my complete satisfaction. I did not go there for deals and for bargains and for intrigues. I did go there to create a friendly impression, if I may say so, a friendly interest in our problems, and generally to create an atmosphere of goodwill between the two countries. I believe we succeeded in doing that, and I believe that the responsible people in the United States thoroughly appreciated, if I may say so, the frank way in which I explained our position in world affairs."

101. See Documents 1947-48, op.cit., pp.2-7 for the text of the Truman Doctrine. See also pp. 7-10 for the Russian criticism of this in Izvestia of 13 March, 1947.

102. Id., pp. 23-26 for the text of the speech by Secretary of State Marshal, outlining his plan.

The timing of this visit was also significant. Nehru had already prepared the ground for this by deciding to remain in the Commonwealth, which proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that he was not in the Communist camp as the Americans had thought and believed. It was during this trip that Nehru drew elaborate parallels between the Indian and American Struggles for independence, between Indian democracy and the American democracy and, indeed, between his foreign policy and that of the United States' founding fathers. It was during this trip that Nehru told the United States Congress that "where freedom is menaced or justice threatened or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral."

The extent to which Nehru succeeded in his objectives was evident from the fact that he felt it quite safe to recognise the Government of Communist China, soon after his return.

104. See J.C. Kundra, op.cit., pp.116-120 for an account of this visit of Nehru to the United States. The author wrote (p.116), that it was difficult to understand the reasons for Nehru's acceptance of the invitation to visit the United States in May 1949, when he had rejected such an offer in March 1949.


106. Id., p. 591.

from the United States. As J.C. Kundra has pointed out this did not create "any serious and immediate differences with the United States of America", as "India was not alone in according recognition to the Peking Government but was joined in this by the U.S.A.'s principal partner in the Cold War, the United Kingdom. Secondly the United States' attitude had not yet fully hardened." The failure to do so would have undermined Nehru's position among the Communists inside and outside the country who had after his decision to remain in the Commonwealth, begun to accuse him of having aligned India with the Western bloc, and the visit to America made them still more angry. Thus the principal aim of Nehru in undertaking this visit to the United States was not only to demonstrate to the West his independence of the Soviet Union, but also to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that he was not afraid of moving closer to the West, if the situation so demanded it.

Nasser's policies towards the Great Powers and China during 1954-56 present a close parallel to those of Nehru during 1949-50, as will be seen later. Yet, here also, Dulles acted, as though Nasser was a Communist and unsuccessfully tried to bring his downfall.

109. See Nehru, op. cit., p. 59, for Nehru's defence of this criticism in the Parliament of India. See also J.C. Kundra, op. cit., pp. 120.
110. See below, pp. 211-227.
111. Ibid.
Anti-Racialism and Nonalignment:

It would, therefore, not unreasonable to hold, that neither anticommunism nor anticolonialism have been the major objectives of either India's or the United Arab Republic's Nonalignment. They only opposed Colonialism and Communism to the extent they posed a threat to their security. And they championed the cause of other Colonial peoples to the extent they furthered their security and other vital interests. These have, therefore, been means, rather than ends, of Nonalignment.

This is equally true of antiracialism and such other factors as the elimination of want, disease and ignorance. India's interest in combating South Africa's racial policies is too obvious to need an elaborate explanation. As Author Lal has observed, it was "a matter of direct interest to itself." It still is. And as expected, India has been a major recipient of aid from the Big Powers directly, more than through the United Nations agencies.

Alignment & Anticolonialism and Antiracialism:

That anticolonialism and antiracialism have not been the major objectives of Nonalignment, and that there is no intrinsic


relationship between them, is further evident from the alignment of Pakistan. For, Pakistan has remained as much anti-colonial and antiracial even after its alliance with the west, as it was prior to it, as its policies in the United Nations on these issues illustrate. As an Indian Scholar has explained, though Pakistan followed a pro-western policy on important world issues, "in respect of several other problems she acted like a nonaligned country. This latter fact was true particularly in respect of colonial questions, and apartheid, on which her delegates even attacked United States' policies bitterly." As a British scholar has written, "These are — features shared by all Afro-Asian countries, including those which are aligned."

It is, therefore, difficult to agree with the view that these "have been important in the development of non-alignment and will continue to influence nations in that direction." For, according to the same scholar, "they are not an essential precondition" and "are not the distinctive influences which finally determine the foreign policies of a nation."


116. Ibid.

117. Ibid.,

118. Id., p.207. See also K.P.Karunakaran, ed., op.cit., p.75.
Here again, the case of Pakistan is illustrative. A careful study of the alignment of Pakistan with the United States, reveals that the factors that influenced it were the same as those that influenced India's Nonalignment, namely, national security and economic development. Thus even the problems of economic development are not unique to Nonalignment. And the recent shift in the foreign policy of Pakistan towards closer relation with the Communist Powers, have also been influenced by the same factors. Neither anticolonialism nor antiracialism has been responsible for this shift.

It may, therefore, be concluded that the basic objectives are the same for both alignment and Nonalignment. As Burton has observed: "Nonalignment then is a condition which tends to occur whenever the pressures of circumstances are not sufficiently strong to justify alignments." And Nehru himself admitted: "we might have been compelled by circumstances, but we are not compelled by circumstances to give up,

---

120. Supra, n.9.
because it does amount to giving up our independence in order to gain the goodwill of this country or that country."

**Nonalignment and Independence:**

Here is another misconception on Nonalignment and also alignment. As Nehru had put it: "What does joining a bloc mean? After all it can only mean one thing: give up your view about a particular question, adopt the other party's view on that question in order to please it and gain its favour."

It would appear from these statements that Nonalignment is synonymous with independence. To be aligned is to lose one's independence altogether. This is an extreme view to which Nehru did not always subscribe. In reply to a demand from a member of Parliament that India should withdraw from the Commonwealth of Nations, Nehru said on June 12, 1962: "...... Nations must act with dignity and strength, adopt what they consider the right course and adhere. It is open to us to be associated in an alliance with any country. We have avoided alliances that might entangle us ....... so far we are concerned

124. Id., p. 36.

125. Id., pp.60-61, and, also p.133 (Italics are mine). He said further: "we have associated ourselves with the UN. This association does not deprive us of our independence. Of course it limits our freedom in the sense in which it limits the freedom of every member country. That some limit should be placed on our freedom of action is the natural consequence of our joining on organisation of that nature." (p.63).
we are prepared to enter into a treaty of friendship with every country in the world ..... In an alliance, one invariably takes something and gives something in return. Each country binds itself down to a certain extent and relinquishes its freedom of action to the extent to which it commits itself in the alliance or agreement. An alliance, nevertheless, need not stand in the way of independence of the country."

Paradoxically, however, when Pakistan accepted military aid from the United States in 1954, Nehru declared that it "goes to the root of the problem of peace as well as the freedom of many countries in Asia. These countries, including India have only recently attained independence. They will only retain it so long as they are worthy of it and are capable of defending it." He also said: "I can understand, although I would not approve, military alliances between great powers. But I do not understand military pacts and alliances between a huge giant of a power and a little pigmy of a country....to attach small countries to themselves in alliances really means - and I say so with all respect to those countries - that they are becoming very much dependent on these countries."


127. Nehru, op.cit., p. 66.
This inconsistency in Nehru's views is more apparent than real. For, Nehru objected to the United States' military aid to Pakistan and the SEATO and Baghdad pacts not because he was really interested in the freedom of Pakistan, but because he was afraid that the United States' military aid to Pakistan would pose a problem for India's security. It is also difficult to believe that Nehru really thought that Pakistan would lose its independence or that Pakistan was not interested in its own independence. He was, on the other hand, afraid that Pakistan would become stronger militarily and that the United States might gain greater influence in Indo-Pakistan affairs. There was no question of Pakistan losing its freedom or independence of action in foreign affairs. Though this was not accepted earlier by many Indian scholars, there is now general acceptance of it as is evident from the following report:

128. Lad., p.476 for a frank admission of this by Nehru.

129. As pointed out earlier, Nehru himself had said that an alliance need not stand in the way of the independence of a nation (See above, p.79). The only way in which we can explain this inconsistency in Nehru's views is that Nehru was making an all out effort to restrain Pakistan from taking the US aid. He might have been trying to mobilise opinion in other Asian countries and appealing to the Pakistani public, over the heads of the Pakistani leaders, as was his habit in India.

130. See below pp. 196 - 200.

The discussion on the foreign policies of Pakistan and Japan led to sympathetic understanding of alignment. *It was generally felt that recent trends and developments in the foreign policies of these countries show that alignment with power blocs does not always compromise freedom and initiative in foreign policy.* For these aligned countries have been able to follow a reasonably independent policy and to establish friendly relations with Powers opposed to the leading members of the bloc to which they belong. On the other hand, several non-aligned states have felt compelled to seek military aid from the leading world Powers which are leaders of military alliances. In view of these developments, it was felt that the terms 'alignment' and 'non-alignment' have lost at least some of their original meaning and force.

This is a misconception which has gained currency since the Chinese aggression against India and the latter's acceptance of military aid from the Big Powers. It is a major contention of this study that neither 'alignment' nor 'non-alignment' has lost its original meaning. This misconception is obviously based on the fallacies that alignment meant loss of independence, and that Nonalignment meant a total rejection of not only alliances but also military aid from the Big powers.

**Alignment and Independence:**

It has already been indicated above, that alignment does not lead to a loss of independence of a country as admitted by
Nehru himself. It is, therefore, not correct to say that only "the recent trends and developments in the foreign policies of Pakistan and Japan, "show that alignment with Power blocs does not always compromise freedom and initiative in foreign policy." The implication in the argument that Pakistan did not act independently in certain cases is that it did not act with the majority of the Afro-Asians, or the nonaligned states, though there is no reason why it should have done so, if it were really independent. For example, it is stated that "On the Hungarian question, Pakistan has voted constantly and consistently with the United States." But, it is forgotten that India had voted with the Soviet Union on the most crucial resolution on the Hungarian issue. And those who remember this explain that India had to deviate from the theory of Non-alignment in defence of her vital interests.

Pakistan's stand on the Suez crisis should prove beyond doubt that it was as independent as any other state was.


133. See below, Chapter 6 for an analysis of the voting record of India and the United Arab Republic on the Hungarian issue in the United Nations. It may also be added that a careful study of the voting behaviour of India on all cold war issues would reveal that on a good number of them India voted with this or that bloc. During the Korean crisis India had voted more often with the United States than voting 'independently' —— See Chester Bowles Ambassador's Report, op. cit., p. 172.

arguments that "although she voted always with Afro-Asian group in the United Nations, the tone of her delegates' speech was milder than that of many others in the group", and that "Even outside the UN, her government's reaction was not in conformity with the popular feelings which rose to a high pitch of sympathy for the Egyptians and of condemnation of the aggressors", do not at all prove that Pakistan was not independent, if all the facts of the case are kept in mind. It will be similarly wrong as already indicated, to assume that India had been blindly pro-United Arab Republic during the Suez crisis.

Perhaps, the most important reason for Pakistan's refusal to vote with the majority of the Afro-Asians, was that it amounted to voting with India. And it joined the Power bloc only when it appeared to further its vital interests and causes against India while India did the same, in reverse, as their voting on the Hungarian issue, and much else of their foreign

136. See B.C. Rastogi, op.cit., p. 172.

136. There was no particular reason why Pakistan should have gone all out in condemning England with which it shared defence alliances and membership of the Commonwealth, whereas, its relations with the United Arab Republic were not very happy. In fact, Pakistan and Iraq took the initiative in proposing to suspend Britain from the Baghdad Pact. It is interesting to note that some Indian spokesmen and scholars have defended India's role in the Hungarian crisis and also Nehru's criticism of Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company on the ground that its policy was one of nonviolence in words as well as deeds (See above, Chapter I, n.6).

137. See above, pp. 43 - 44.
policy reveals. Pakistan's alliance with the United States and India's opposition to it reveal the same fact. As already indicated, India opposed, tooth and nail, the United States' military aid to Pakistan, because, it was an attempt on the part of Pakistan to end its isolation, successfully caused by India and to boost its military strength vis-à-vis India. For, as long as Pakistan remained nonaligned, it could not pose a threat to India's security. In the then existing atmosphere of hatred and suspicion on both sides, the fear of an attack from the other, on either side, was natural, far more so on the side of Pakistan before 1954, because of its small size, absurd geographical position and comparative weakness, and according to Nirad C. Choudhuri, this fear on the part of Pakistan up to 1954, was not entirely unfounded.

138. See M.S. Rajan, 'India and Pakistan As factors in Each Other's Foreign Policy And Relations', International Studies (Vol. III, No. 4, April, 1962), and Jayant Kumar Ray, 'India and Pakistan as Factors in Each Other's Foreign Policies', International Studies (Vol. VIII, Nos. 1-2 July-October 1966), for a detailed study of the impact of the 'cold war' between India-Pakistan on their policies. The authors seek to prove that India's preoccupation with Pakistan is not as great as that of Pakistan with India, and, that even then, India's preoccupation with Pakistan is a sort of distortion from her general foreign policy. This argument, I feel, itself distorts India's foreign policy.


140. Nehru, op.cit., p. 82 Nehru singled out Pakistan as the only country with which India's relations were not clean. See also Sisir Gupta, 'India's Policy Towards Pakistan', International Studies (Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2, July-October 1966), p. 38.

141. op.cit., p. 293.
Nonalignment and Alliances:

Coming to the other fallacy that Nonalignment meant a total rejection of all kinds of alliances and also military aid, it has to be pointed out that it is contrary to facts. For, it is a well established fact that India and the United Arab Republic as well as all other leading nonaligned nations have not always opposed all military alliances, either in principle or in practice. In a four-fold classification of pacts, Fayez A. Sayegh, has pointed out that pacts like the "Arab League do not arouse any opposition", and that the three kinds of pacts in the ascending order of objectionability are, "voluntary associations", "Cold War pacts par excellence", and finally SEATO and CENTO pacts against whom "the main opposition of neutralists has been directed."

Nehru's opposition and criticism of the NATO alliance was mainly in connection with the western support to Portugal

142. See J.C. Kundra, op. cit., pp. 87-98 for a more or less objective study of India's anti-pactism. See also N. Paramesharan Nayar, 'Nationalism As A Factor In India's Foreign Policy', The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1962, p. 46. The criteria for Nonalignment evolved at the preparatory meeting in Cairo for the Belgrade Conference of Nonaligned States also made a distinction between Pacts.

143. Dynamics of Neutralism In The Arab World, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

144. Nehru, op. cit., pp. 89-90 and Supra, n. 50.
on Goa, or his anger with the SEATO and Baghdad Pacts. Nasser's opposition to NATO appears to have been a by-product of his opposition to the Baghdad Pact and the support given by the Western Powers to Israel. Besides, India's association with the Commonwealth, and the United Arab Republic's treaty of 1964, with Britain, showed that both the countries were willing to accept British help in the event of an attack by an outside Power. The Commonwealth, however, as Nehru rightly stressed, had no commitments on either side, especially of a military nature. In fact, however, India undertook certain obligations in Burma, in its own interests. And India had accepted British co-operation in building its defence forces. As Panikkar has written "If the Indian army was to be something more than a

146. See Nasser's Speeches, 1958, op.cit., pp.49-50, 133-134, 183. In fact one does not find a direct reference to NATO in these speeches.


148. Nehru,op.cit.,p.144. "we cannot remain completely isolated, and so inevitably by stress of circumstances, we have to incline in some direction or other ...."said Nehru.

149. See below, Chapter IV, p. 146-148.

second class force meant only for internal security, then its training and organisation had to be based on the latest knowledge. It was impossible without adequate co-operation from one of the major powers to acquire this knowledge. Close association with Britain was for India the only practical alternative and India chose it unhesitatingly."

Nasser accepted the British stipulation to reactivate the Suez base in the event of an attack on any of the powers of the area not only because he realised the need for British help in the event of an attack but also because he had to depend upon Britain for the supply of defence equipment etc. 151

Nehru's early attitude to defence and defence preparations comes to light from the two Communiques issued by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London in 1948, to which Nehru subscribed. The first one, issued on October 20, 1948, said, inter alia: "Defence and the maintenance of world peace were the subjects of discussion at the Prime Ministers meeting this morning and afternoon", and that "In the discussion there was agreement that the danger of war must be met by building up the armed forces in order to deter any would be aggressor, and

151. This stipulation was incorporated in Article 4 of the treaty - Supra, n. 147. Also see below, p. 213-214.

that freedom must be safeguarded not only by military
defensive measures but also by advancing social and
economic welfare." The second Communique \[153\] issued on
October 22, 1948, had said, inter alia: "The Discussions
have shown a substantial community of outlook among all
Commonwealth Governments in their approach to present
world problems."

It will be shown in the next chapter \[154\] that Non-
alignment has always meant a readiness to accept military
assistance in the event of foreign aggression. In its simplest
meaning viz., freedom of action in foreign relations, it
could not have meant the contrary, notwithstanding Nehru's
own statements to this effect.

It is, therefore, possible to conclude that Nehru's
opposition to the cold war pacts on ideological and moral
grounds was in itself a cold war tactic. As Devdutt \[155\] has
explained, "The Government of India committed more or less
the same error as the big Powers. The cold war mentality in
a sense implies the introduction of nonpolitical, particularly

\[153\] Ibid.
\[154\] See below, pp. 95-99.
\[155\] Ibid.
\[156\] See K.P. Karunakaran, ed., op.cit., p.73.
the moral or ideological considerations, into the evolving of foreign policies ...." In fact, however, \textsuperscript{167} "self-interest rather than ideological or logical consistency has been her main objective. Moral ends entered the foreign policy only as means or attitude-building factors." Seen from this point of view, the so-called \textsuperscript{168} "divergence in the Government of India's precepts and practice nearer home where her national interest is involved", disappears.

Similarly, it will be shown in Part II of this study that India's role in crises like Korea, Suez, Hungary, and the Congo, was consistent throughout with her actions and policies on issues like Kashmir, Tibet, and Goa etc. The so-called inconsistencies that are pointed out by various writers arise out of the fact that Nonalignment has not been properly understood by a majority of the people everywhere.

A few examples would serve to illustrate the point better. According to one group of writers, \textsuperscript{169} "The reaction of many of the nonaligned nations towards events in Hungary in 1966", was divergent from the theory of Nonalignment. Another scholar \textsuperscript{160} has said that the Indian action in Goa was "an aberration from India's foreign policy style", forgetting India's action in

\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Ibid.}, p.86.
\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{169} \textit{Supra}, n.131, p.112.
\textsuperscript{160} Sisir Gupta, \textit{India and Regional Integration in Asia}, op.cit., p.27, Note 62.
Kashmir in 1947 and its support to the United Nations' military action in the Congo. Kashmir again, is an exception to the rule for many. The Communists and other leftist leaders in India have called the acceptance of military aid from the United States during and since the Chinese aggression, not a mere aberration, but a major departure, from Nonalignment.

All this divergence reveals that each has his own view of Nonalignment and refuses to see it as a whole. As Norman D. Palmer has aptly put it, "In India ...... the major stronghold of neutralism most people who have any views at all on such matters seem to approve of the foreign policies of their Government, but their concepts of the nature of neutralism differ greatly. Some brands of Indian neutralism are vague and naive, with a strong 'out of this world' flavour; others are well thought out and politically realistic. Some Indians lean as far towards Communism and the Soviet Union as their so-called neutralism permits, whereas others seem to be definitely neutral on the side of democracy and have a strong pro-western orientation."

As against all this, Nehru simply said: "I am on my country's side and on no body else's".

161. See below Chapter VII for an analysis of India's role in the Congo crisis.
163. Krishna Menon said: "......our acceptance of aid and advice were at once basic and a catastrophic changes...." See The Hindu, February 6, 1967.