CHAPTER I

COBWEBS AND ILLUSION

Introduction:

The Chinese aggression on India's borders in the last quarter of 1962 had "swept away many accumulated cobwebs and illusions" about Nonalignment from the Indian mind, said an editorial in The Indian Express of November 29, 1962. This might have been a confession. It cannot be taken as a generalisation for some important and somewhat paradoxical reasons.

Firstly, Nehru, the Foreign Minister of India, at the time, had no illusions of any kind about the fundamentals of his foreign policy, notwithstanding his confession, soon after the Chinese invasion that "we were getting out of touch with reality ..... and were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation." This confession had limited application, at the most, to only a few aspects of India's China policy as Nehru had later clarified. About Nonalignment as such he had no illusions. In his famous message to the nation, broadcast on October 22, 1962, he declared; "we have followed a policy

of nonalignment and sought friendship of all nations. I believe in that policy fully and we shall continue to follow it. We are not going to give up our principles because of the present difficulty. Even this difficulty will be more effectively met by our continuing that policy." Nehru was, I believe, perfectly right. He did not have to learn anything from the Himalayan tragedy. None of the major assumptions of Nonalignment was disproved by Chinese aggression. On the other hand, these were further strengthened during this crisis as shall be seen later.

Secondly, it is, however, not yet certain that all the accumulated cobwebs and illusions have completely been swept away from the minds of the Indians as well as the Westerners. For, while only a few of the illusions have disappeared, some new ones have since developed or are in the process of development.

It is, therefore, necessary to dispel and destroy, as far as possible, all these cobwebs and illusions, past, present and those that are in the process of development. Then only will it be possible to understand Nonalignment properly and to make a proper evaluation of its worth and validity or otherwise as a principle of foreign policy.

4. See below, p. Also see K.P.S. Menon, loc. cit.
Nonalignment and Nonviolence:

The most widely held misconception is the claim that
India's foreign policy "has its foundations in India's culture
and traditions, in her religiophilosophic ideology, in her
immediate and remote past", all of which have "found best
expression in recent times in Mahatma Gandhi's writings." Non-
vioence or peaceful settlement of disputes and the employment
of just means to achieve just ends, besides Nonalignment, are
claimed to be the really noteworthy features of India's foreign
policy.

5. See T.M.P. Mahadevan, 'India's Policy of Nonalignment : A
philosophical point of view', The Indian Year Book of Interna-
tional Affairs, 1963 (Volume II), p.97. See also K.P. Menon,
loc.cit., and India and the Cold War, (Bharatiya Vidya

6. See A.Appadorai, 'The Foreign Policy of India', in J.E.
Black and K.W. Thompson, Ed., Foreign Policies in a World
of Change (Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1963),
p.488.

7. Id., p.484. Also see M.S.Rajan, India in World Affairs
Professor Rajan's views, as expressed in this book, are
inconsistent and self-contradictory. For example, he says
that "The rightness of a policy of action depended as much
on the means by which a certain objective was sought to be
achieved, as by the inherent rightness of the objective
itself" (p.31). Therefore, "even while fully supporting
the Egyptian act of nationalisation of the Suez Canal
Company in July, 1956, Indian spokesmen did criticise the
way it was done." Similarly, "India's sympathies for the
Hungarian national aspiration of independence was tempered
by the fact that it took the shape of violent uprising —
and India believed violence was not a worthy means even to
achieve worthy causes (pp. 31-32. Italic is mine - see
below chapters V and VI respectively for an analysis of
India's policy on the Suez and the Hungarian crises). At

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It is, however, admitted that "the ideal set by Gandhiji is a very lofty one, even with the limitations of which he himself was conscious. It is but natural, therefore, that in our attempt to follow in the footsteps of the Mahatma we should fail sometimes, and fail grievously." It is also admitted that "How far in the implementation of

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the same time he also asserts that "there was, and is never, any question in the minds of the Indian policy makers of consciously trying to operate on an idealistic or moral plane in world affairs" (p. 38). There is here not merely a self-contradiction but also a strange double-standard. That is, while India did not adhere to these ideals, its spokesmen and scholars not only spoke of them, but also judged the actions of other nations on such ideals. Yet Professor Rajan writes that "when Indian foreign policy spokesmen sometimes talked in idealistic and moral generalities (as the spokesmen of any other country are wont to do), they were misunderstood to be following a wholly idealistic or ethical policy ..... many a foreign critic not merely succumbed to this error, but also made the further error of criticising Indian policies and actions in the world from idealistic and ethical planes ....." (pp. 39-40). These views, claims Professor Rajan in the preface to the book, represent a 'typical Indian view'. In 'Chinese Aggression and The Future of India's Non-alignment', International Studies (Vol. V : July 1963-April 1964), Professor Rajan has succeeded in freeing himself of these inconsistencies but he has blamed our policy makers and the Congress leaders for having confused Nonalignment with nonviolence and for having treated Nonalignment as a 'fetish to worship', asserting at the same time that "the Government of India has never been a devotee of nonviolence" (p. 128).

8. Mahadevan, op.cit., p.28.

9. Appadorai, op.cit., p.489. Thus Professor Appadorai says that in the case of Goa, India simply decided to use force and against China too, Nehru was not "prepared to take the risks involved in the adoption of Nonviolence as a way of resolving international disputes" (p. 614).
foreign policy India has kept up the ideal is a matter for investigation in each specific instance." "Yet", it is asserted, "there is no denying the fact that Gandhian ideology is a powerful force in our outlook and policy", and, that "the nonviolent tradition is an integral part of the thinking of Indian leaders."

Therefore, it is concluded that "India's foreign policy is on the cross-roads, not in the sense in which some members of the Indian Parliament viewed it — substitution of alignment for nonalignment — but in the more fundamental sense of finding adequate sanctions for a policy based on Panch Sheel." At the same time, it is asserted that "China's aggression on India's soil shows that it is very important for a nonaligned country especially, to have its defences in readiness, in case, the other party is not prepared to negotiate on just conditions."

10. Mahadevan, op.cit., p. 98.

11. Appadorai, op.cit., p.514. According to Professor Michael Brecher, Nonviolence is one of the 'pillars' of India's Foreign Policy — See India's Foreign Policy : An Interpretation, (International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1967, Mimeographed) p.9.

12. Id., p.513.

13. Id., p. 419.
Neither of these conclusions is correct. It did not take 'China's aggression on India's soil' for Nehru to grasp the importance of having the country's defences in readiness. The fact that India suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of the Chinese forces does not mean that Nehru did not realise this earlier. The fact is that Nehru realised it very early and he said it a number of times. In a speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) on March 8, 1948, Nehru said that "nothing is more important in the opinion of this Government than to make India strong economically and militarily—not strong in the big power sense, because that is beyond our capacity, but as strong as we can to defend ourselves if anybody attacks us." Again, on March 22, 1949, Nehru said: "the first duty of every country is to protect itself. Protecting oneself unfortunately means relying on the armed forces and the like and so we build up, where necessity arises, our defence apparatus. We cannot take the risk of not doing so, although Mahatma Gandhi would have taken the risk no doubt."


16. Nehru had stated on other occasions that even Gandhiji was in favour of the use of force in certain cases like Kashmir (See below pp. 9-17). Professor Mahadevan wrote that Gandhiji "was advocating only a limited form of nonviolence, 'nonviolence restricted to the purpose of nonviolence.'"
and I dare not say that he would have been wrong. Indeed, if a country is strong enough to take the risk it will not only survive, but it will become a great country.  But we are small folk and dare not take that risk. If there is fear of future aggression we have to protect ourselves against that."

That was exactly why the Government of India sent forces into Kashmir in 1947. Therefore, the view that the foreign

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warming our freedom and therefore perhaps for preaching the regulation of international relations by nonviolent means." (op. cit., p.38). And Prof. Bimla Prasad has observed that "where the way for nonviolent resistance is not open, Gandhi was prepared to appreciate violent resistance, provided it did not involve the destruction of the entire society on whose behalf it was carried on." Prof. Prasad was, therefore, justified in holding that a thorough study of Gandhiji's views on world affairs is needed (see 'Survey of Recent Research Studies on India's Foreign Policy and Relations' International Studies Vol.V, July 1963-April 64), p.436. Prof. Prasad expressed these views in a comment on Paul F. Power, Gandhi on World Affairs (London, 1961).

17. See Appadorai, op. cit., p.531 for a similar view.

18. But Nehru was never tired of saying that India was a great country and that we would not be conquered by force. It would appear that Nehru was trying to point out that Gandhiji's ideals did not suit us, however great we might be. As Gandhiji identified himself with India's policy of Kashmir in October, 1947, it is possible to argue that perhaps he himself realised this towards the end of his career, as Plato did, though like Plato he might have insisted that it was all the more necessary that we should know the ideal.

policy of India is based on the philosophy of nonviolence 
preached by Gandhiji, Buddha and Asoka is not in accord with 
facts. As an Indian scholar has put it. A concept so 
patently absurd may not need a contradiction but for the fact 
that it is often repeated by many important people in India.
and abroad. For, "there is nothing in the political behaviour of the Indian people and the administrative and other measures of the Indian Government which substantiated this concept. In both Kashmir and Hyderabad the Indian government used its armed forces and acted more or less in the same way as other governments have acted in similar situations."

Nehru himself explained clearly the reasons for his decision to discard the Gandhian ethics in a speech in the Constituent Assembly on March 8, 1949:

"We were bred in a high tradition under Mahatma Gandhi .......

"And with that idealism and ethical background we now face practical problems and it becomes an exceedingly difficult thing to apply that particular doctrine to the solution of these problems. That is a conflict which individuals and groups and nations have often had to face. We have not often thought enough of Gandhiji and his great doctrine, of his great message and while we praised it often enough we felt,

"Are we hypocrites, talking about it and being unable to live up to it ......." if we are hypocrites, then surely our future is dark. We may be hypocritical about the small things of life but it is a dangerous thing to be hypocritical about the great things of life. And it would have been the greatest tragedy if we exploited the name and prestige of our

24. See C.A.D., Part II, Vol. II, 8 March, 1949, pp.1229-1230. (Italics are mine). That such an important part of this speech had been omitted from the collection of Nehru's speeches (supra n.14) is rather unfortunate. Similarly Nehru's speech of 28 November, 1949 (See above n.19), does not find a place in this otherwise excellent collection of Nehru's speeches on Foreign Policy.
Great Leader, took shelter under it and denied in our hearts, in our activities, the message that he brought to this country and the world..... we can not and I am quite positive that our great leader would not have had us behave as blind automatons just carrying out what he had said without reference to the changes in events.....

"It was a curious thing that we who carried on the struggle for freedom in a non-violent and peaceful way ..... should have had to undertake a kind of war in a part of the country. The whole thing seemed to be a complete reversal of all that we stood for, and yet circumstances were such that I am quite convinced that we had no other way and that the way we took was the right one.

"May I mention to the House that towards the end of October 1947, when the question of Kashmir suddenly came upon us ..... I went as I often did to Mahatma Gandhi, for his advice. It was not natural for him to give advice about military matters. What did he know about them? His struggles were struggles of the spirit. But listening to me, if I may with all respect say so, he did not say "no" to the course of action that I proposed. He saw that a Government as we were had to follow its duty even to military obligations when certain circumstances arose. And throughout those few months, before he was taken from us, I conferred with him on many occasions about Kashmir and it was a great happiness to me that I had his blessings in the step we took."

Nehru was more categorical and unequivocal, when during a debate on Goa, he told the Indian Parliament on July 26, 1965, in reply to a question from a member of the Parliament that:

"Acharya Kripalani put a straight question: whether our Government was pledged to non-violence. The answer to that is no, the Government is not. As far as I can conceive, under the existing circumstances,

no Government can be pledged to non-violence. It we are pledged to non-violence surely we would not keep any Army, Navy or Air Force ....

Acharya Kripalani reminded us of Mahatma Gandhi, saying that the Polish defence against the German armies might also be called satyagraha. Also Gandhi defended — not only defended but in fact encouraged — the Indian Army going to Kashmir against the raiders. It is surprising that a man like Gandhi, who was absolutely committed to non-violence should do that kind of thing. So that, even he, in certain circumstances, admitted the right of the state as it is constituted, to commit violence in defence. The Government of India cannot give up that right in the existing circumstances....."

These statements prove beyond the shadow of a doubt that India's foreign policy is or was not based on non-violence and that even Gandhiji had accepted the use of force whenever and wherever necessary.

**Nonalignment and Hinduism:**

But in the opinion of another Indian scholar who does not seem to take Nehru or anybody else seriously "we

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26. R. Bhaskaran, 'The Philosophical Basis of Indian Foreign Policy', The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1963, (Volume XII), p.448. Prof. Bhaskaran claims that India's foreign policy is based on the 'transcendental urge' which, according to him, moves Indian 'politicals as it does the illiterate peasant or the learned philosopher'. The learned professor attributes this 'urge' even to such down-to-earth acts of Indian politicians as "proposing to go into a sort of political 'retreat' to rejuvenate the party and clean the administration." This is a reference to what was at the time known as the Kamaraj plan as it was the brainchild of Kamaraj, the president of the Congress Party from 1964 to 1967. Under

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have let our philosophy actually guide our conduct as persons and group" and that:

"Our nonalignment like our noncooperation and nonviolence is a principle of conduct tested and proved viable in four millenia of civilised existence ... It is essentially an Indian principle demanding an open eyed indifference to the discipline of consequences. Its basis like that of everything else Indian is religious and is to be found in the permanent unshakeable faith in a divine ordering of the universe which permits endless variety and does not call for human exertion to extinguish difference and promote uniformity."

It is also claimed that "however distasteful it may be to the sophisticated architects and exponents of our foreign policy in its duirnal manifestations to consider its roots, it is the Hindu view of the ultimate truth that nourishes them."

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this scheme a few top ranking congress politicians including Lal Bahadur Shastri were made to resign office to work for the party. Not all these congressmen were 'clean' themselves, and had to face inquiries on charges of corruption subsequently. However, neither the party was rejuvenated nor the administration cleaned. The learned professor claims that such acts "show how utterly impossible it is to 'make sense' of our thoughts and actions without the key to understanding furnished by our philosophy." It does not seem so at all. It is a different matter if such acts would 'make sense' to some only when they were given a mystical or philosophical coating. If this were true, it is difficult to blame Nehru for having so often resorted to this method. After all, he had to justify his foreign policy to his people in the language they understood. This perhaps gives us a clue to an understanding of the Indian mind and Philosophy.

27. Ibid. Needless to say this is a reference to Nehru and other British oriented Indian leaders.
That this view of Nonalignment is not correct will become evident in chapter three. Here certain facts have to be noted which go against the claim that Nonalignment is an Indian and hence a religious principle. Firstly, Nehru was the chief architect of India's foreign policy. It is incorrect to say that he was nourished by 'the Hindu view of the ultimate truth'. Perhaps it would be easier to make such a claim about Gandhiji. But Gandhiji himself is reported to have said that 'Nehru is an Englishman'. For the same reason, Gandhiji and Nehru differed on almost all important political issues. The former did not favour parliamentary democracy. He did not like the Indian National Congress to function as a political party after independence. He was not a socialist. Finally, he was not in favour of the use of force at least in internal affairs. In every one of these matters Nehru's outlook was shaped by European currents of thought. Nonalignment was also a product of these influences. As a well informed Indian writer put it, "In fact it is the British and west European currents of thought which have for decades been determining Indian elite thinking on world affairs resulting on the


one hand in an overly enthusiastic participation in European affairs and in a broad socialistic fervour on the other.

Secondly, it is a well recognised fact that Nonalignment is practised successfully by a large number of Afro-Asian nations, especially the United Arab Republic, not to speak of Yugoslavia. India, Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic evolved it independently though simultaneously, and drew inspiration from one another and in fact collaborated with each other, especially in the United Nations as will be seen in later chapters.

30. As K. P. Karunakaran has observed in the Introduction to Outside The Contest (op.cit., p.97), "the policy of Nonalignment in the cold war is not that of India alone, but is also the policy of many Governments like those of U.A.R., Iraq, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, and Ghana, and therefore, there must be something common to these countries which is at the source."


32. See Peter Lyon, Neutrality (Leicester University Press, 1963), p.120, according to whom "India, Yugoslavia, and the United Arab Republic are the contemporary neutralist states par excellence. Each of these has pioneered policies which are now, in some respects at least, generally regarded as being typically neutralist."
Thirdly, there has been a demand from an important section of the Indian public for the abandonment of Non-alignment by India on the ground that India is not strong enough to face the Chinese threat or to take Kashmir from Pakistan. Among the advocates of this policy are leaders like Rajagopalachari and K.M. Munshi, who are known for their attachment to Hinduism and Gandhism. And the most vocal champion of dependence on the United States and the need for the manufacture of atom bombs by India, is the most militant of the Indian political parties, the Jan Sangh, which claims to be the champion of Hinduism in India, against what it calls the communalism of the Congress Party. Are all these gentlemen, then, not nourished by 'the Hindu view of the ultimate truth'? Or have they all lost their religious moorings to demand the abandonment of Nonalignment?

Finally, Nehru always spoke of Asia and Africa rather than of India alone. He said that Asia as a whole was

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33. C. Rajagopalachari was almost the first leader to oppose publicly India's Nonalignment. When he founded the Swatantra Party, opposition to Nonalignment became its foreign policy plank.

34. For a study of Jan Sangh's Foreign Policy see M.A. Kishore, [Jan Sangh's Approach to Problems of India's Foreign Policy](unpublished Ph.D. thesis presented to the Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh).

different from Europe, and that Asia and Africa had common experiences and circumstances favouring Nonalignment.

Therefore, the argument that Nonalignment is either an Indian principle or a religious principle has to be rejected as ultra vires the facts.

**The Basis of the Misconceptions:**

In order to appreciate this better, it is necessary to examine the reasons for these widespread misconceptions.

Firstly, the close similarity of the word Nonalignment to words like nonviolence and noncooperation seems to have been a factor. For example a western Scholar has observed

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36. **Id.,** pp.248-252 and 280-281. In view of this fact, it would appear wrong to say that "Peoples and nations outside India do not have a similar history and all of them, national idiosyncracies notwithstanding, have opted for the western power-oriented attitude and for deliberate participation" (See R.Bhaskaran, op.cit., p.448). There is not a shred of evidence in the entire argument of Professor Bhaskaran to show that India's foreign policy itself is not power-oriented except an assertion to the contrary. Such attempts as this, to prove the greatness of India, appear to be, to say the least, entirely misplaced.

that "Nonalignment, by its very term is a negative conception. In this it resembles the idea of non-resistance, non-violence and nirvana (non-illusion) ....." This view conflicts with Nehru's own views. In fact Nehru rarely used the term Nonalignment in his early speeches on Foreign Policy. He is also reported to have expressed dissatisfaction with it for its supposedly negative connotation. For the same reason, Nasser and other Arabs prefer the term 'Positive Neutralism'.

38. See Nehru's speeches under the title 'An independent policy' in Nehru, op.cit., pp.24-85. In this section the word occurs only on pp.79 and 83. Nehru also used the term once in a speech in Parliament on 29 September, 1954, (Id., p.166). But see below for what appears to be the earliest recorded use of the term Nonalignment by Nehru himself. It has also to be borne in mind that it was only at the Belgrade Conference of the Nonaligned States in 1961, that the term Nonalignment was officially accepted by all states. Even then the Arabs seem to have disliked it (See below, note 40).


40. The Arabs' dislike of the term Nonalignment, was voiced by Faye A. Sayegh, the distinguished Arab scholar in a comment on the Belgrade conference: "Nonalignment", selected in Belgrade ..... is essentially and incapably negative; and yet it was chosen at the gathering at which the most militantly affirmative of meanings was assigned to the policy pursued by the participants. It was ironical that the supreme leaders of neutralism should have chosen its most affirmative moment as the occasion for broadcasting the purely negative element of their policy" (See Faye A. Sayegh, ed., The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World: A Symposium (Chandler Publishing Company, San Francisco, 1964), p.4.)
Nehru did not approve even this term. He had instead preferred such phrases as 'keeping aloof from blocs', 'independent policy', and 'friendly relations with all', etc. and he declared repeatedly that his foreign policy was neither negative nor passive. In 1947, for example, he said: "We have proclaimed during this past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else." And in 1962 he said: "You may call it neutral or whatever you like it but I, for my part, fail to see how this approach is neutral ...." Again, in 1968, he declared: "When we say our policy is one of nonalignment, obviously we mean nonalignment with military blocs. It is not a negative policy. It is a positive one and, I hope, a dynamic one ...." This was not an empty claim as will be seen in chapter three.

Another factor which appears to have contributed to the misconceptions in question was a wrong understanding of the

41. See Nehru, op. cit., p.86, Nehru said: "I do not even like ...... 'positive neutrality' as is done in some countries ......" He said further "we are unaligned we are uncommitted to military policies, but the important fact is that we are committed to various policies, various objectives and various principles, very much so." (Italics are mine).

42. Id., pp. 24-25.

43. Id., p.24.

44. Id., p. 58.

45. Id., p. 79.
Indian role in the Korean crisis and the nature of the Panch Sheel, as will be made clear in chapters three and four. A third factor was, of course, Nehru's own reference to the past in some of his speeches, especially after the Panch Sheel agreement. While Nehru had used such arguments for understandable reasons, Indian scholars took them at face value. Even when Nehru was clear and explicit, he was misinterpreted or bypassed as has been noted earlier. To give another example, here is a statement of Nehru which has often been quoted in support of the view that India's foreign policy is based on

46. See below, chapter IV for an analysis of India's policy in the Korean crisis.

47. See below p. 32 for another factor of importance.

48. See Nehru's speeches under the title 'Panch Sheel and Coexistence' in Nehru op.cit., pp.98-106. On p.101 Nehru said: "Peaceful coexistence is not a new idea for us in India. It has been our way of life and is as old as our thought and culture. About 2,200 Years ago, a great son of India, Ashoka, proclaimed it and inscribed it on rock and stone." It has already been indicated that Asoka's commitment to non-violence or coexistence was not total (see above note 21). It may also be added that many of Asoka's edicts had no binding force and were only ideal statements (See Charles Drekmeier, op.cit., p.167). It is also important to note that these remarks were made by Nehru in a speech at a civic reception to Bulganin and Khrushchev at Calcutta on November, 30,1956.

49. As indicated earlier, Prof. Rajan has written that "naturally ...... Indian foreign policy spokesmen sometimes talked in idealistic and moral generalities (as the spokesmen of any other country are wont to do)....." (See above note 6).

50. See above p. 11.

51. For example see A.Appardorai, op.cit., p. 487.
India's culture and religion. Nehru said that "it is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom, and inherent in the circumstances of the world today. It represents every circumstances that goes towards making the thought of India on these subjects."

It is on the basis of this and similar other statements of Nehru and, particularly, of the phrase 'mental outlook of India', that the whole edifice of the philosophical or cultural basis of India's foreign policy has been raised by Indian scholars. "The essence of that mental outlook", says Professor Appadorai, "is a spirit of tolerance among the common people in India, who have inherited the traditions from their scriptures and from their history." And, according to Prof. Bhaskaran, "Few foreigners can acquire the patience and equipment...."

52. Nehru, op.cit., pp. 80 and 83 (Italics are mine).

53. A. Appadorai, op.cit., p.487. This is a questionable view. As has been noted earlier (see above p.12), Prof. Baskaran wrote that Nonalignment "is essentially an Indian principle demanding an open eyed indifference to the discipline of consequences." (Italics are mine). This indifference rather than tolerance appears to be the dominant trait of the Indian mind as the existence of such social evils as 'Sati' and 'untouchability' go to show. The evil of 'Sati' was abolished only with the help of the British might in India. And Gandhiji understood the 'sin' of untouchability in South Africa and not in India. It would have been hypocrisy on his part to tolerate 'untouchability' any more in India after his experiences in South Africa. He sacrificed his life for religious tolerance in India. Does this prove that religious tolerance has been a tradition of the Contd........
for the proper study of our foreign policy while most Indians who are interested have no need to spell out and justify for themselves the drives which govern our policy for they are like the foundations of a building which the resident has no need to examine........." This is to ignore the fact that Nehru had himself taken the greatest pains, through-out his long career as India's Foreign Minister, to explain and to justify his foreign policy to his countrymen more than to foreigners.

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Indian mind? Prof. Appadorai himself admits that "The rise of communal outlook in the first half of this century ending in the partition of India, and the prevalence of untouchability as a custom ... warn us that one can never be compacent of the strength of the tolerant attitude in all the people" (p.488). And Buddha's teaching of ahimsa would have been superfluous if ahimsa and tolerance were already part of the life of the common man. Dr. Radhakrishnan wrote: "Buddhism would justify Buddha's attitude by saying that every religion exaggerates the suffering of life, for the aim of religion is the redemption from sin and suffering. With a happy world there would have been no need for religion." (See Indian Philosophy (The Macmillan Company, New York, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1958), p.364. If "Buddha overemphasises the dark side of things", it is proof of the intensity of his feeling as well as of the complete or near complete absence of good around him. The fall of Buddhism in India is also proof of the absence of tolerance and the predominance of indifference in India, for as Dr. Radhakrishnan (op.cit.p.608) put it: "slow absorption and silent indifference ... are the causes of the fall of Buddhism". In politics also nonviolence does not seem to have been the predominant force in ancient India. See J. Duncan. M.Deritt, 'The Maintenance of Peace In The Hindu World', The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1958. One has only to name Kautilya's 'Arthasastra' in this regard. See T.M.P. Mahadevan, op.cit., pp.99-104, for a contrary view. Nehru attributed Gandhiji's attachment to nonviolence to his early life in Gujarat and the Jain doctrine of nonviolence. He denied that India as a whole was influenced by this doctrine - See J.Nehru, The Discovery of India (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1967), p. 479.

Similarly, the fact that Nehru had laid the greatest stress on 'every circumstance that goes towards making the thought of India on these subjects', is either forgotten or bypassed. As already indicated, Nehru also said that these circumstances were common to the whole of Asia as well as to Africa. Moreover, there is nothing in Nehru's statement to suggest that he was referring to the influence of Hindu philosophy and scriptures on India's foreign policy. As seen already he had clearly rejected Gandhiji's ideals as impracticable quite early in his career as India's Foreign Minister. Thus the words 'inherent in the whole mental outlook of India' do not refer to the influence of Indian philosophy and scriptures at all. All that Nehru meant was, in my opinion, that India's foreign policy, "was in line with the policy which we had broadly thought of even before we became independent." Even though the pre-independence thinking of the Indian leaders was idealistic and moralistic, mainly under the influence of Gandhiji.

55. See above, pp. 15-16

56. See above, pp. 9-11. Nehru also appears to have convinced Gandhiji in this regard - see above note 18.

Nehru made it clear, as early as 1947, that it did not suit an independent India, because, as he said, "Foreign affairs are utterly realistic today. A false step, a false phrase makes all the difference." This realism has been the most distinct feature of India's foreign policy as also of the United Arab Republic. It was the failure to understand this subtle change from the pre-independence days that had misled many to dub Nehru as an idealist and a dreamer. 60

Nonalignment and Islam:

Nasser has often said that "our policy emanates from our country, our land, and our conscience." Does this mean that the Nonalignment of the Arabs has its basis in Islam? Nasser has never claimed that it is so. As Fayez A. Sayegh 62

58. Nehru, op. cit., p. 27. See also Speech at pp. 50-55. These two speeches of Nehru are extremely important for an understanding of Nehru's foreign policy and his approach to it which was thoroughly pragmatic and practical. In the latter speech Nehru even ridiculed the talk of blogs as outdated.

59. Ibid.

60. See Werner Levi, Free India in Asia (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1952), p. 50.

61. See United Arab Republic Information Department, President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews, 1968, pp. 89 and 100. (Hereafter cited as Nasser's Speeches). See also Nasser's Speeches, 1959, op. cit., p. 13.

has observed, "The marks of Islam upon the thought processes and expressions of Muslim leaders, in matters relating to internal affairs is pervasive and unmistakable; but in matters pertaining to international affairs in general and neutralism in particular, the reasoning of the contemporary generation of Muslim leaders is indistinguishable from that of non-Muslims. Nasir, Nehru, and Nkrumah .... seem to speak the same language and to draw inspiration from the same public philosophy when they discourse on neutralism and the cold war ...." He has also observed that "leadership in establishing the doctrinaire

(Continued from previous page)

of every contemporary Muslim statesman. But ... I have studied ..... a fairly representative cross-section of the voluminous literature in question.

"....I have found neither indications nor admissions of such influence, neither explicit references nor allusions! See also the contribution by P.J. Vatikiotis, 'Islamic and the Foreign Policy of Egypt', for a somewhat qualified acceptance of these views.

63. Id., p. 73.

64. Id., pp.82-83. See also Fayez A. Sayegh, Ed; op.cit. In the introduction to this book (p.10) the author makes a distinction between Doctrinaire neutralism and Pragmatic neutralism. In view of the dismissal above of the view that India's Foreign Policy had any doctrinaire basis, this classification of Fayez A. Sayegh loses significance. Nehru had been as much 'impervious' to the doctrinaire factors in foreign policy as any other nonaligned statesman had been, though he might have philosophied or theorised more often than others. It will be shown in the following chapters that India's foreign policy from 1947 onwards has been as practical as that of Nasser's from 1964.
grounds of neutralist policy has come from outside the ranks of Muslim statesmanship, particularly from Hindu and Buddhist statesman....when a few Muslim leaders, notably Sukarno, Nasir, and Sekou Toure began some what belatedly to inject some doctrinaire elements into their neutralist views, they did so, as the terminology and the conceptual context of their expressions clearly demonstrate, not by drawing inspiration from the spiritual heritage of Islam but by echoing the words and paraphrasing the thoughts of non-Muslim neutralists, especially Nehru. The majority of Muslim neutralist leaders, however, have remained impervious to the doctrinaire factor in neutralism. In short, as he has put it65 "Islam is irrelevant to neutralism."

It was the absence of religiosity that, in fact, made it possible for Nehru and Nasser to collaborate on many international issues. Indeed, as Prof. Boutras Boutras-Ghali66 has observed, Nasser had abandoned his idea of Islam as the 'Third Circle'67 of which the United Arab Republic should form the centre, in favour of the more influential and powerful circle of the nonaligned states. It is not without significance that

65. Id., p. 86 (Author's Italics).
66. 'The Foreign Policy of Egypt' in J.E.Black and K.W. Thompson, ed; op.cit., p.331.
there are now signs of some strains in Indo-U.A.R. relations, partly as a result of the influence of religious propaganda on the foreign policy of India and some Arab countries, though not the United Arab Republic itself, as will be seen later. 68

In practice the foreign policy of the United Arab Republic has been highly pragmatic and down-to-earth. In the long-drawn-out dispute with Israel, Nasser's stand has been as unambiguous as possible. He has always declared that he would not—indeed, he could not—recognise Israel unless Israel accepted the Security Council Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab Refugees. He secured weapons from the Soviet Union to meet the Israeli threats of aggression, when the west

68. M.C. Chagla the Foreign Minister of India for a short while, gave public expression to these feelings against some Arab countries - See The Hindu, March 26; 1967.

69. See below Chapter V for an account of the evolution of the Nonalignment of the United Arab Republic.


71. Id., pp. 317-318.
refused such help to him. He has depended upon the United Nations for a just solution of the problem. Meanwhile he has declared that the United Arab Republic is at war with Israel. He has never claimed that he would solve the dispute through peaceful negotiations, as Nehru did in the case of Goa.

The Expendiency of Non-Violence:

But if Nehru wanted a peaceful settlement to the problem of Goa, it was not because he was either attached to non-violence or believed in a divine ordering of things, as already indicated. In October, 1961, he told a Seminar on Portuguese Colonialism, in New Delhi, that "At no time did we in our minds

72. Supra, N.69.

73. Nasser's stand has not changed so far, even after the June 1967 war with Israel. See below, Chapter V, for a brief analysis of this crisis.

74. See Nehru's speeches, 1957-1963, op.cit., pp.367-368. Speaking at a mass rally at chowpathy, Bombay, held under the auspices of the Seminar on Portuguese Colonialism, on October 23, Nehru repeated the warning - See The Hindu, October 24, 1961. See also R.P. Rao, Portuguese Rule In Goa : 1610-1961, (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1963), p. 6. In view of this and other categorical statements of Nehru (See below note 82), the charge that "The non-aligned countries unless they manage to clarify their attitudes and the situations in which they regard the use of force as justified, are open to the charge that they do not differ fundamentally from the Great Powers ....." (See J.W.Burton, International Relations : A General Theory (Cambridge University Press, London, 1965), p.203 appears to be contrary to facts. A large part of his study of Nonalignment appears to be contrary to facts - See Robert L.Rothstein, 'Alignments, Nonalignment, and small Powers 1945-66; International Organization (Vol.20, No.4, 1966), pp. 397-418.
and in our actions renounce the possibility of military action.... we are not in any sense tied down absolutely to pursuing the policy which we have thus far pursued in the interest of removal of Colonialism. If we have to take some other action, we shall take it. We keep an open mind." That India did not renounced the use of force completely was also evident from the bitter opposition of India to the Western support to Portugal over Goa. Otherwise, as an Indian scholar put it, "it is inexplicable that the Government of India should express so much concern towards the Anglo-Portugal Alliance and the N.A.T.O., which would come into the picture only in case of an armed attack against the territories of the contracting parties." Nehru also said that "I do not say that it is impossible for India or some other country to have a limited war. It may yield results too."

But he did not like to use force against Goa because, he said: "we are fighting against these vague ghosts and phantoms which create the cold war..... If we ourselves move


77. Ibid. (Italics are mine).

away from that level and think in terms of some kind of police action or limited war, then we are injuring all the larger causes that we stand for, and possibly getting ourselves entangled in great difficulties." For, as a British Scholar has observed: "If 'aggression' can be justified in Goa it can be justified in cases in which there are remnants of colonialism, and in which there are boundaries arbitrarily drawn by colonial rulers." Though the Government of India defended their acceptance of the Chinese occupation of Tibet on the ground that the British Policy on Tibet was imperialist, they were not prepared to accept it either on Ladakh or N.E.F.A. But they did not have the strength to defend India against an invasion from China. Nehru was afraid that if India took military action in Goa, China might be tempted to do the same in Ladakh and N.E.F.A., as it did in Tibet. This was what he must have had in mind when he told the Rajya Sabha on March 20, 1962, while

79. This was precisely the line adopted by the delegate of the United States of America in the Security Council in his bitter attack against India on its military action in Goa. See Year Book of United Nations, 1961, p.130.

80. J.W. Burton, op.cit., pp.202-203. The author also wrote that "if the nonaligned nations justify the use of force by themselves in the post-colonial situations, their position would seem absurd when they protest against the actions of major powers to which they take exception."

81. See Nehru, op.cit., pp.313 and 332. See also Nehru's Speeches, 1957-1963, op.cit., pp. 188.

82. See Parliamentary Debates: Rajya Sabha, Volume 37, No.7, 20 March, 1962, cols. 802-803. Nehru reminded the House that 'I declared in this House, about six months before the Goa operation that we did not rule out any stronger steps, military steps" (col. 802).
moving the Constitution Amendment Bill for the integration of Goa into the Indian Union, that: "It is true that when we decided to send armed forces to Goa I did so with a great deal of reluctance, not because it was not right in my opinion, not because it was not needed — that is why we sent it — but because we felt that this might be made an excuse by other countries and other people for military excursions even though they were not justified. People do not go into the long history, do not know all the facts, they only see a certain result."

It was, again, this fear that appears to have restrained Nehru from undertaking strong measures against China for a very long time. And the fact remains that as soon as India started military measures against China, it took advantage of the situation by mounting a large scale offensive on India's borders in October, 1962, just as Israel did against

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84. Id., pp.246-247 for an account by Nehru of the measures India took and of their limitations. Thus, it is difficult to believe that Nehru would have taken these measures without being assured of positive results or that there was no fear of an attack from China on a massive scale, or both. Nehru himself confessed that "we expected that they would not attack in such large numbers and to bring about a regular invasion with several divisions, as they did" (Id., pp.237-238). See below pp. 100-106 for further discussion. An American Scholar has written that through these military measures India had provoked China to attack. See Harold C. Hinton, Communist China In World Politics, (Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1966), pp.299 and 307.
85. See below Chapter V for a case study of these two crises.
the United Arab Republic in 1966, and, again, in 1967.

It is clear now that India's policy of peaceful settlement of disputes has been a policy of expediency more than of principle. Thus, once Goa was freed, Nehru declared that there was no change in India's adherence to this policy. But, as indicated above, Nehru found it difficult to stick to this policy on China and had to resort to the use of force, with disastrous results. And when Pakistan sent infiltrators into Kashmir in 1965, Prime Minister Shastri ordered the occupation of the Haji Pir Pass on the Pakistani side of the international border which, in turn, precipitated the 22 days' war with Pakistan in September, 1965. At Tashkent, however, both Shastri and Ayub agreed to solve their disputes through negotiations, which appears unlikely in the near future.

86. See S.A.H. Haqiqi, 'Some Reflections on India's Foreign Policy', The Indian Journal of Political Science (Vol. XVII, No.1, January March, 1966), pp.48-49. It is interesting to note that right up to the military action in Goa, Indian scholars have been citing India's policy on Goa as the most impressive illustration of India's adherence to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. See M.S. Rajan, India in World Affairs 1954-66, op.cit., pp.32 and 36, and also A. Appadorai, op.cit., p.614. As the occupation of Goa occurred after Prof. Appadorai sent his paper to the editor he had to add a footnote saying "one week after this paper was sent to the editor, Goa was taken by India through what the Government has officially termed police action..."


88. See Lok Sabha Debates (Hereafter cited as L.S.D.), Third Series. Twelfth Session, Vol.XLV, Nos.1-10, August 30, 1965, Col.2631 for Chavan's (then Defence Minister) announcement.

89. See The Statesman, 11 November, 1965, for the text of the Tashkent Declaration.
It is also clear that there is no correlation between nonviolence as is generally understood in India, and the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. The latter is a principle of international law of long usage and is not at all of Indian origin. It is the failure to make this distinction that is at the root of the misconception that Nonalignment is based on nonviolence of the Gandhian type. India adhered to and advocated the peaceful settlement of disputes on occasions, while it has never been committed to the former.

Nonalignment and Non-Interference:

Another misconception about Nonalignment which needs to be dispelled is the view that it means noninterference or non-intervention in the affairs of others, which one may add, formed part of the Panch Sheel. Every independent nation which has the power to do so would resent and oppose unnecessary interference of others in its own affairs while it would itself accept

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90. Prof. A. Appadorai wrote, for example, that nonviolence or peaceful settlement of disputes and the employment of just means to achieve just ends are the really noteworthy features of India's Foreign Policy. See above, p.2

91. See M.S. Rajan, 'Chinese Aggression And The Future of India's Nonalignment', op.cit., p.128 (See above, note 71).

foreign help if circumstances demand it. Much depends upon the attitude of the Government concerned.

But a British scholar has written that "If a nonaligned Government were to enter into any agreements under which it could receive protection from another nation, its nonalignment would automatically be destroyed. Neither can a nonaligned nation support any intervention in the internal affairs of any other country, and revolt or political change in policy is a matter for the people concerned."

This view would reduce Nonalignment to neutrality. The author himself admits that "In many matters the nonaligned countries have a duty to be neutral, in the traditional sense...." This is simply not true as Nehru and Nasser had rightly emphasised over and over again in their speeches and statements, as has been indicated earlier. They have not acted on this principle as shall be seen in the following chapters. Nonalignment has nothing to do with neutrality or impartiality.

93. See J.M. Burton, op.cit., p.120.

94. Id., p.224. This is a presumption rather than a statement of fact. But it will represent the claim in question.

95. Ibid.

96. In a joint statement issued by Nehru and Tito on December 23, 1964 a specific reference was made to this aspect of Nonalignment -- See Texts of Documents, op.cit., p.146.
There are no such obligations. In its most elementary sense Nonalignment means freedom from all obligations and commitments. Nehru even declared that "we are free to join an alliance."

In practice the nonaligned states interfere and have interfered in the internal affairs of neighbouring states as the other big powers do or have done. India had continuously interfered in the domestic affairs of her neighbours like Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. This aspect of India's foreign policy has been forcefully explained by an Indian scholar, who wrote that "we find that in dealing with these territories, India simply took up the mantle of the old British Diplomacy of direct or indirect control over these territories, if only for the security of India. Indian policy in Hyderabad, Kashmir and Junagadh comes under this category. The agreements with Sikkim and Bhutan place them as vassal states of India. Though Nepal

97. J.W. Burton (op.cit., pp.218-227) has evolved an elaborate theory of rights and duties of Nonalignment which appear to be far removed from the facts. It is hoped that this study would bear out this point. See above, N.74.

98. Nehru, op.cit., p.61 See below pp. 69-81 for further discussion.

99. See below pp.151-53 for further discussion.

is still regarded as a sovereign state, interference by India in her domestic affairs is now too well known and is resented among the vocal sections of the Nepalese population. As in other territories, the question of India's security must have been the predominant thought behind this interference...."

The aid given by India to Burma during the Civil War in 1949 has been criticised as interference in Burma's internal affairs, though Nehru denied it. Nehru's opposition to Pakistan's acceptance of arms from the United states could be called 'interference' in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries. Nehru did not deny this, but, he said that the matter was too important for India to remain silent. He went further and said that it was not merely against the freedom of India but against the freedom of Asia as a whole. Nehru opposed the South East Asia Treaty Organisation on much the same lines. In fact, Nehru's 'Asia Policy' or the 'peace area' approach was a sort of Monroe Doctrine which declared that South Asia was India's primary concern as shall be seen later.

101. See below pp.146-48 for further discussion.
103. Ibid.
104. Id., p.89. How far Nehru was justified in these views shall be examined in the next chapter — see below pp. 69 - 75.
105. See below pp.142-163.
Finally, India is said to have violated the Panch Sheel when it gave asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1959. For example, Lord Linesay of Birker has observed: "The reasons for the revolt in 1959 belong to Chinese internal policies. The International repercussions came from Indian expressions of sympathy with the revolt."

Nasser also has his own sphere of influence in the Arab world, in which he does not want the interference of any foreign power. This is the basis of his Arab Nationalism. It seems wrong to say that Arab Nationalism is a myth. It is on the basis of Arab Nationalism that Nasser has been opposed to the Western Policies in the Arab World. And it was in the name

106. For an account of the flight of the Dalai Lama from Tibet to India see Frank Moroses, _The Revolt in Tibet_, (Sterling Publishers Private Limited, Jullundur and Delhi, 1966), pp. 1-31.


108. See Nasser's Speeches, 1958 op.cit., pp.49-50,88,133-134, 236-237, 250. It is in this sense only that one can say that Nasser interferes in the affairs of his Arab neighbours. But the Arab League gives him the initiative. It is, therefore, difficult to call him an imperialist as many western scholars and writers depict him. Nasser's so-called imperialism springs from his opposition to the attempts of the big powers to dominate the Arab world."

109. Ibid.

110. Many people in India and abroad seem to believe in the myth of Arab Nationalism. Clovis Maksoud, the former Chief Representative of the Arab League in India, vehemently denied that it was a myth in a Seminar on Indo-Arab relations held at the Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.

111. See below Chapter V for further discussion.
of Arab Nationalism that he crossed swords with Khrushchev in 1959, when the latter accused him of anticommunism. Indeed, this policy was not Nasser's, it was inherent in his country's position in the Arab world. Nasser, however, translated it into reality by his bold policies. This is the secret of his success and popularity.

CONCLUSION

It is now possible to conclude safely that Nonalignment has not been a policy of either nonviolence or pacifism, it has no commitments, not even a commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes. Its basis is not religious, be it Hinduism, Buddhism or Islam. It does not mean non-interference or neutrality in any sense of the term.

These, one might say, are one category of misconceptions on Nonalignment. In the next chapter, another category of misconceptions will be discussed. To this we now turn.

112. In a classic sentence Nasser said: "If Khrushchev raises today to defend a small minority of the sons of our country saying that he is defending communism as a principle we tell him that we do not consider this as defence of the communist principle, but as intervention in our affairs"—See Nasser's Speeches, 1959, op.cit., p.164.


114. This does not mean that Nasser has no opposition in the Arab world. But those who oppose him, like Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia are unpopular in the Arab World. See below Chapter V, for an analysis of the evolution of Nasser's Nonalignment.