CONCLUSION
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It is not my purpose here to give a brief resume of the main conclusions made in the earlier pages. What follows is a general discussion containing certain general observations based on the analysis of the foreign policies of India and the United Arab Republic, in theory and practice made in the preceding pages, and in the light of some recent policies of the big Powers vis-a-vis India and the United Arab Republic.

The central thesis of this study has been that Nonalignment is a balance of power policy and that its primary object has been the protection of the security and the progress of the country. According to its Chief exponent, Nehru, the policy has three main aspects viz.

(i) The maintenance of a defensive balance of power through friendly relations with the Big Powers,
(ii) Maintenance of the world balance of power as far as possible, and
(iii) Prevention of the spread of the influence of the Big Powers in the Afro-Asian states which have attained statehood in the wake of the second world war.
As has already been indicated the three aspects were closely integrated and have the same main objective namely the protection of the security and the progress of the nation. The other aspects of the foreign policies of India and the United Arab Republic such as their fight against Colonialism, recialism and communism have also the same main objective.

This policy has been based on a deep understanding of international politics as well as the forces at work in the resurgence of Asian and African nationalism and its basic urges. For, Nonalignment stood and stands for these basic urges, which are common to all national movements. Firstly, there is the desire to throw out vestiges of foreign domination and to shape one's own future to the best of one's ability. Secondly, there is the desire to be independent in foreign as well as domestic policies as far as possible, in a world of ever increasing interdependence. Thirdly, there is the desire to play a major part in world affairs consistent with their past achievements, present possibilities and future potentialities.

When the second world war ended, and the United Nations was created, there emerged two super Powers, with a number of satellites around each, each being hostile to the other. And both were determined to dominate the
vast areas of Asia and Africa which were struggling to throw out the shackles of colonialism. It appeared to many at that stage that these small, weak, and poor nations, have no other choice, except to join this or that bloc. The Big Powers seemed certain about it. Hence they were shocked when there arose a voice which clearly declared that there was a third alternative, that of nonalignment. They could not believe either themselves, or these voices, which had soon multiplied, and, therefore, denounced them out right.

However, the architects of Nonalignment clearly saw that the struggle between the Super Powers was not primarily ideological, as it was presented to them, but that it was a struggle for power. In so far as the ideologies represented by these Powers were concerned, they found that neither was of exclusive use to them. Even after accepting one or the other of these ideologies, either in full, or in part, these states were not prepared to join in the ideological crusade.

In so far as the struggle was a power struggle, the nonaligned leaders realised that their interests would be better served by not joining either side, rather than joining one side against the other. This was, again, conformity not only with the hard realities
of international life, but also with the deeper urges of national resurgence, awakening the Asian and African nations from decades and centuries of slumber and slavery.

Nonalignment, therefore, put a halt to the growing bipolarity of the world driving it to a precipice from which there might have been no possible retreat. It also put the nonaligned nations in a position to influence world affairs in a larger measure than would otherwise have been possible for them. That this was a well thought out policy is evident from Nehru's statements on foreign policy made in the late forties, which have been extensively quoted in section one of this study.

It was unfortunate that this policy should have been interpreted in terms of human ideals and religious-philosophic terms. Indian scholars, and in terms of anticolonialism, antiracialism and procommunism by western scholars. While Indian scholars like Prof. Appadorai have taken the balance of power to be outmoded following some of their counterparts in the

1. See A. Appadorai, 'India's Foreign Policy, International Relations', (vol. II, No. 2, October 1960), pp. 69-70.
western countries, some other western scholars like Alan Du Rousett, have argued that the nonaligned powers deride the balance of power while taking shelter under the balance of power which is maintained by the western powers. While accepting the criticism that the Indian scholars have failed in a larger measure to explain India's foreign policy in realistic terms, I find that to be no reason why the western scholars should be excused for their own failure to understand it, especially when India's chief spokesman on foreign policy for over 18 years, had more often than not, explained his policy in realistic terms.

Moreover, there is no substance in the argument that the nonaligned states are shielded by the balance of power, maintained by the Western powers for it requires more than one side to maintain it. Even if this were accepted for the time being, it is no proof that the Western Powers were willing to allow the nonaligned states to be shielded by the balance of power without asking a price for it.

It has already been explained in earlier chapters, how the nonaligned nations have been struggling to play

2. 'On understanding Indian Foreign Policy', Id. (Vol. I, No. 11, April, 1959), pp.543-556.
a more and more responsible role in mitigating the dangers of a bipolar balance of power and to bring about a more stable balance of power. It has also been seen how these attempts have been often foiled by the Western Powers, only to realise their folly and to make one retreat after another. Even now the United States appears unwilling to accept the legitimate policies of the nonaligned states since they stand in its drive for an all powerful place in the world, which is being opposed by its own allies in Europe.

Some of the misunderstanding of India's foreign policy abroad and in India is no doubt due to the false image of India projected outside India mainly by our embassies abroad and also by our politicians who visit foreign countries. And some of our failures in foreign policy were also no doubt due to lack of proper understanding of the basic tenets of Nonalignment, especially among the persons who were in charge of the implementation of this policy. Sometimes Nehru himself, and his closest political advisers like Krishna Menon, appear to have been carried away by what they wanted to see, instead of seeing what actually existed, especially in India's relations with China. Some of these defects in the working of the
External Affairs Ministry, and its executive organs abroad, have been pointed out by Badruddin Tayabji, India's former Ambassador to Japan, and a one time Secretary in the External Affairs Ministry. It is difficult to say how far the situation has improved in recent years.

However, as Tayabji says "Nonalignment was and is the right policy for India, situated as she is, historically, geographically, and economically. India is too big a country to align herself with either of the Super Powers".

Even Nehru's policy towards China does not seem to be that bad on second thoughts, especially in the light of the more recent trends in the Big Power policies. Nehru wanted to be friendly with China, as far as it was humanly possible, because he realised that India would not be able to meet the Chinese challenge without depending upon the Big Powers for a very long time to come. This is precisely the position in which India finds itself today. Some might say that this was of Nehru's making but it is not true.

3. 'Subjective Policies without the subject', The Statesman, March 5, 1968.
Nehru's approach to Pakistan was also marked by the same concern not because Pakistan posed a serious threat to India, but because he realised that Pakistan as a small Power would naturally lean towards some big Power, if it felt insecure. Perhaps Pakistan would have made friends with China and the Soviet Union, instead of the United States, if India had taken up the Chinese challenge at the time of the Korean Crisis and the Chinese occupation of Tibet (as Sardar Patel is believed to have advised) in the company of the United States. It is difficult to say what the consequences would have been for India, but Nehru, as already indicated, said that the present troubles would have arisen then. It would have led to a further bipolarisation of the world. Internally, perhaps, there would have been a polarisation in public opinion between the right and the left, with what consequences, it is difficult to say. Certainly, the foreign policy of India would not have made the impact it had made on world affairs, due to Nonalignment.

Again, the criticism of Nehru and his approach to China, seem to overlook the fact that when China became independent in 1949, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, had all been particular to make
friendship with China. Even today, the United States would prefer China's friendship to that of India. The friends of the United States in India, do not seem to know this, either in their enthusiasm for it, or out of fear of, or hostility to, China.

Perhaps China knew its own position, and it is this that appears to have made it press its demands on India to such an extent as to make India an enemy. Of course, it might have also realised that it would not be able to make good its claims if it allowed India to grow stronger, for India was building its strength, though at a slow pace. Hence it struck the blow in 1962, for which the Indian leaders should have been prepared, when they were not prepared to accept a compromise solution with China on its claims on India's border, possibly because of the fear of public opinion.

The same fear of public opinion appears to have been responsible for Nehru's inability to translate his desire for friendship with Pakistan into some compromise solution more attractive to Pakistan and to the popular leaders of Kashmir. Of course, Nehru himself and many of his advisers on foreign policy had, for historical reasons, a greater dislike of Pakistan and what it
stands for, than for China and what it stands for: them

Thus, given a chance, it would have been easier for them to
make up with China, than with Pakistan.

Moreover, friendship with China rather than with
Pakistan, is of greater importance to India, for it
would relieve the big Power pressure on India's foreign
policy, especially in other fields like Pakistan,
because Pakistan is able to exploit India's conflict
with China, not only to seek concessions from India,
but also from the big Powers themselves, who are more
afraid of China, than is realised by many people in
India.

It is not without significance, that after the
initial angry outburst against the Soviet Union, at its
proposed military aid to Pakistan, Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi said that India's attitude towards China and
Pakistan was not rigid but flexible. Thus the Soviet arms
supply to Pakistan, has put India back by two decades.
It has created for the Indian policy makers the same
dilemma in which their predecessors were probably placed
in the late forties viz., whether or not to seek the
friendship of China and Pakistan in order to be Nonaligned
and be free from the big Power pressures.
It is difficult, therefore, to agree with the view held by many important people in India, that Nehru's policy towards China lacked reality. Nehru's realism was so great that he was dubbed an idealist.

India's struggle with China is a struggle for Power in Asia. If it has to succeed in this struggle, it has to act as a potential big Power, which it is. The solution does not lie in joining the western bloc or depending upon it exclusively as some of the opposition parties in India seem to believe. The solution lies rather in building India's own strength as rapidly as possible and at the same time to isolate China from its neighbours and its allies. India simply cannot afford to lose the friendship of the Soviet Union, not only because it is essential for its security against China, but also because it is a great power which is capable of providing aid to India in many ways. Otherwise, India would have to depend exclusively upon the western powers which is not at all desirable. India has, therefore, to avoid interfering in the Soviet Union's struggle against the western Powers in Europe, which had been divided into zones of influence by the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. There is no use blaming the Soviet Union alone, for the state of affairs in Europe. It is a legacy of the past which was a legacy of conflicts as Nehru said again and again. And Nehru also said a number of times that India would not take any part in these conflicts.
In the circumstances, the stand taken by the
government of India on the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in August 1968, seems justifiable from
the point of view of India's national interests.
Still the popular reaction against the Soviet Union
seems to have been enough to put heavy strains on
Indo-Soviet relations. The Indian Public does not seem
to realise that the state of affairs in Europe is a
direct consequence of the division of Europe into
zones of influence. This was no direct consequence
for India's interests, and hence the popular reaction
appears to have been mostly ill-informed, if not
irresponsible too.

Whether this was in any way influenced by the
anger generated in India at the proposed Russian supply
of arms to Pakistan is difficult to say, but there can be
no doubt that the latter had some affect on the former.
While the government and the people of India had
greater justification in protesting against the supply
of arms to Pakistan by the Soviet Union, I feel that it
should not have been carried to such hysterical
proportions, bordering almost on jingoism. In a
speech in Parliament in 1959 Nehru cautioned the
House against jingoism. One wonders whether Nehru's
caution has gone unheeded.

4. See Rajya Sabha Debates, Part II, Vol. 27, December 9, 1959
cols. 1982-83.
It is difficult to say that the Soviet supply of arms to Pakistan was an exclusively anti-Indian move. It might, however, well have been a caution to India that the rise of anti-Soviet elements in India in the recent past, is not unnoticed by the Soviet Union. Shrewd tacticians as they are the Soviet leaders seem to be building Pakistan as an alternative to India in their struggle against the West and if necessary against India. Any way it is not only in their interests, but also in our interest that Pakistan should remain out of China's sphere of influence. We could have, therefore, been more restrained in our protests to the Soviet Union.

In the normal course it should have been India's responsibility to isolate China in Asia. Since India is not able to do it because of its hostility to Pakistan and its weakness vis-a-vis China, the Soviet Union appears to have stepped into the Asian arena. It is time India plays a more positive role in Asia, than merely reacting to the moves of others in an irresponsible and hysterical fashion. India has, therefore, to strive to improve its relations with Pakistan. If Big Powers like the Soviet Union and the United States try to help Pakistan in one way or the other, it should be a lesson for India.
It is difficult to say what should be done by India to improve its relations with Pakistan, since it is not merely a question of India's intentions alone. But one or two steps might yield positive results. The first is to allow Pakistan to secure the arms it might feel necessary for its defence without opposing it all the time. We have, of course, to be prepared for all contingencies, which does not call for angry protests against the Western Powers or the Soviet Union, which, however, go unnoticed and would create unnecessary frictions.

A more positive step might be to make use of the good offices of a country like the United Arab Republic to make Pakistani leaders realise the need to seek better relations with India. It is difficult to say whether the government of India, had at any time made such an attempt. Perhaps they had been concentrating on the need to isolate Pakistan from these friends. Now that India has fairly strong ties with the United Arab Republic in particular, it may not be difficult for India to make such an effort, as it is not merely in the interests of India but also of the United Arab Republic and also of Pakistan that India and Pakistan should live in peace. For it would then remove the major irritant in the relations between India and the United Arab Republic.
on the one hand, and the United Arab Republic and Pakistan on the other. India might then be able to have the entire Muslim world behind it in its struggle against China. They might then be able to make a greater impact on the super powers than they are able to do at present. Since such a development would be as much in the interests of the Arabs as of India, the Arab States friendly to Pakistan should be made to exert some pressure on Pakistan to come to terms with India, provided the Arabs want to retain the goodwill of India on a permanent basis.

Even otherwise, India needs to be on friendly terms with as many Arab states as possible, since Pakistan is at present able to carry half the Muslim world on its side. India can hardly afford to lose the support of the other half represented by the Arab states. It is, therefore, difficult to understand the attitude of the opposition parties and a large section of literate public in India towards the Arab–Israeli dispute.

Harrassed as they are by Israel supported by the United States, the Arabs now look mainly to the Soviet Union and other nonaligned powers to support them. They have fairly good relations with China but they do not have
as good relations with it as with either the Soviet Union or India. Still China is potentially capable of helping them in their struggle against Israel, if they chose to take its help. Since we cannot help the Arabs in any significant measure, we should not demand outright condemnation of China from the Arabs for what it has done to us. The United Arab Republic had incurred the displeasure of China in its role in the Sino-Indian border dispute. It is not for nothing that the Soviet Union is supporting the United Arab Republic and the Arabs in its struggle against Israel. If the Soviet Union does not support them, they would have only one source of support and that is China.

Public opinion in India, appears to be at present as hostile to the Arabs as to the Soviet Union. If this trend continues it is possible that these countries might become unfriendly to us, one after the other or all of them together. And with China and Pakistan already hostile, India would be completely isolated in Asia. Whether the United States and its allies would then be able to protect all our interests is difficult to say. India might then be reduced to the status of a western satellite.
The Government of the United Arab Republic appear to have committed the same mistakes in June 1967, which the Indian Government did in 1962, that is of not being prepared for the aggression from Isreal and then to rely too much on the capacities of the Great Powers to restrain unscrupulous states like China and Isreal, unless their own vital interests are at stake. In both the cases the aggressors have not so far vacated their aggression. China is a great Power. Hence it is difficult to see how China would be made to vacate its aggression unless there is a big war against it. But it is not so with Isreal. Isreal is neither a great Power nor is one potentially, unless it succeeds in expanding itself for more than at present in size as well as in numbers. Hence, the failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to make it vacate its aggression seems to pose a greater challenge to Nonalignment than the Chinese aggression on India did.

Indeed, it seems to have brought about a crisis in Nonalignment in as much as capacity of the Nonaligned states to influence the Big Powers has declined. This is due to the detente in the East-West relations and the desire of the United States and the Soviet Union to decide
international issues on a bilateral basis. This has come to pass because the nonaligned nations have come to depend upon them more than ever, in view of their disputes with their neighbours. This is particularly so with the United Arab Republic and India. For both, the solution would seem to lie in seeking a detente with China, in order to make the Big Powers more reasonable. But this has its own difficulties, and it might be very risky to take this step at this stage. Moreover China does not seem to be in any mood for a rapprochement with India. May be a day will come when China would need the support of the nonaligned states. But this would be possible when it is completely isolated and when the nonaligned states strengthen their own position.

Thus the one course open for the nonaligned states is to close their ranks, and to recruit more members into them. If possible from Europe also. For India, as already indicated, it may be necessary to make friends with Pakistan and other neighbours. The Arabs have to close their ranks. If the Arabs could do this, then their position in the world would undergo a great change. The Arabs seem to need many more Nasser, than they have at present.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia may present a similar problem to Tito of Yugoslavia. He has to be more cautious and careful in his dealings with the Soviet Union as well as the western Powers. It is difficult to say whether the proposed conference of the nonaligned states would achieve greater unity among them, and whether the nonaligned states would emerge stronger and more determined in their efforts to resist Big Power pressures and also to meet the challenge posed by aggressions from China on India and Israel on the United Arab Republic. Clearly, a great effort is needed to rescue nonalignment from the present crisis. Otherwise, nonalignment might not die, but it would cease to be a force in international affairs. Each nonaligned state may then have to salvage its own affairs to the best of its ability with the support of one or the other of the Big Powers.