CHAPTER VII

THE CONGO CRISIS AND INDIA AND THE
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

The Significance of the Congo Crisis:

The significance of the Congo Crisis for Nonalignment lay in the fact that, Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary General of the United Nations, in his definition of the areas and conflicts in which the United Nations could play a major role, as in the Congo Crisis, identified it with one of the major aspects of Nonalignment, viz., the prevention of the spread of the cold war into Africa and Asia, as far as possible. These views were put forth clearly and pointedly by him in his Introduction to the 'Annual Report on the work of the United Nations Organisation' on August 31, 1960, in the following words:

"In Africa the first beginnings can now be seen of those conflicts between ideologies and interests which split the world. Africa is still, in comparison with others, a virgin territory which many have found reason to believe can or should be won for their aims and interests.....

"Fundamental though the differences splitting our world are, the areas which are not committed in the major conflicts are still considerable ..... Conflicts arising within the non-committed areas offer opportunities for solutions which avoid an aggravation of big power differences and


can remain un influenced by them. There is thus a field within which international conflicts may be faced and solved with such harmony between the power blocs as was anticipated as a condition for Security Council action in San Francisco. Agreement may be achieved because of a mutual interest among the big powers to avoid having a regional or local conflict drawn into the spheres of bloc politics.

"...Those efforts must aim at keeping newly arising conflicts outside the sphere of bloc differences. Further, in the case of conflicts on the margin of, or inside, the sphere of bloc differences, the United Nations should bring such conflicts out of this sphere through solutions aiming, in the first instance, at their strict localisation. In doing so the organisation and its agents have to lay down a policy line, but this will then not be for one party against another, but for the general purpose of avoiding an extension or achieving a reduction of the area into which the bloc conflicts penetrate.

"Experience indicates that the preventive diplomacy to which the efforts of the United Nations must thus to a large extent be directed, is of special significance in cases where the original conflict may be said either to be the result of, or to imply risks for, the creation of a power vacuum between the main blocs. Preventive action in such cases must be in the first place aimed at filling the vacuum so that it will not provoke action from any of the major parties, the initiative for which might be taken for preventive purposes but might in turn lead to counter action from the other side.

"The view expressed here as to the special possibilities and responsibilities of the organisation in situations of a vacuum has reached an unusually clear expression in the case of the Congo. There the main argument presented for the United Nations intervention was the breakdown of law and order, the rejection of the attempt to maintain order by foreign troops, and the introduction of the United Nations Force so as to create the basis for the withdrawal of the foreign troops and for the forstalling of initiatives to introduce any other foreign troops into the territory with obvious risks for widening international conflict which would ensue..." (Talics mine).
"It is with this background that the initiative for the United Nations intervention in the Congo conflict was taken under Article 99 of the Charter for the first time applied fully, according to its letter and in the spirit in which it must have been drafted...."

It is against this background that the roles of India and the United Arab Republic in the Congo crisis have been examined below:

The Crisis Begins:

The Congo, which was under Belgian occupation for a long time, had become independent on 30 June, 1960, without, as it soon became evident, adequate preparation for the tasks of independence. Soon the Congolese army or the Force Publique, which was described by Rajeshwar Dayal (towards the end of his term as the personal representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo) as the "greatest danger to law and order in the Congo today", rebelled against the Belgian Officers who were manning the army. Taking this as a pretext, Belgium moved its troops into the Congo, with the 'professed objective of restoring order and protecting the civil population', especially the Belgians, who were present in large numbers in the

3. For Lumumba's speech on the occasion of Independence (in French), see Documents for 1960, pp. 263-266.
5. See Quincy Wright, op.cit., p.6.
Congo working in different capacities. And on July 11, 1960, Katanga, the richest province of the Congo, seceded under its president Moïse Tshombe.

In those circumstances, on July 12, 1960, the Secretary General received an urgent appeal from the Government of the Republic of the Congo signed by President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba for assistance to "protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is a threat to international peace." They pointed out that Belgium had violated the Treaty of June 29, 1960, between it and the Congo which permitted Belgian intervention only on an express request of the Government of the Republic of Congo, which had not been made. In a second note, the Congolese authorities said that aid was requested "not to restore the internal situation in the Congo but rather to protect the national territory against acts of aggressive force by Belgian troops." They further stated that the United Nations force should include only military personnel of neutral countries, thus excluding the forces of the Big Powers. If the aid was not received without delay, the government would be obliged to seek help from the Bandung Treaty Powers.

6. Supra, n.3, p.269 for Tshombe's appeal to Britain for aid which was refused.
8. Ibid.
Lumumba and Kasavubu also appealed to the Soviet Union on July 14, to watch the situation and developments in the Congo. Earlier, the Congolese Cabinet with Lumumba and Kasavubu absent, had appealed for United States help which was refused with the advice that the United Nations be approached.

The Secretary-General Acts:

The Secretary-General responded immediately to the request of the Congolese Government by invoking Article 99 of the Charter which gives him the authority to bring to the notice of the Security Council any development which in his opinion threatened international peace and security. The Security Council met on July 13, 1960. After stating the case for the proposed UN action he asked the Security Council to authorise military assistance to the Congo as he himself could authorise only technical assistance. In the early hours of July 14, 1960, the Security Council adopted a resolution sponsored by Tunisia, with the United States and the Soviet

10. See supra, n.3., pp. 271-273.
11. Supra, n.3., pp. 271-273.
Union voting for it, and Britain, France and China abstaining. It called for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo and authorised the Secretary General "to take necessary steps in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the government with such assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the government, to meet fully their tasks." It also requested the Secretary General to report to the Security Council as appropriate" on the implementation of the resolution.

In accordance with his views on preventive diplomacy, Hammarskjold decided to make the United Nations Force a predominantly African Force with some troops from Sweden and Ireland, both being unquestionably neutral nations. The United Arab Republic, Ghana, Morocco, Mali and Indonesia, besides Sweden and Ireland, agreed to send troops to the Congo. In his Report to the Security Council on July 18 the Secretary General stated that his statement of July 13 to the Security Council was a "basic document for the interpretation of the Security Council's Mandate." He repeated

that the case for the United Nations intervention was based on the breakdown of the instruments of law and order and the explicit request of the Government of the Republic of the Congo. Therefore, he stated that "it would be understood that Belgium would see its way to a withdrawal", if the Congo Government succeeded in restoring law and order. The United Nations assistance would "yield results only after a certain time" and meanwhile "the force introduced is to be regarded as a temporary security force present in the Republic of the Congo with the consent of the government for the time and purpose indicated." But, he continued, "the force is necessarily under the exclusive command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General under the control of the Security Council. This is in accordance with the principles generally applied by the organisation. The force is thus not under the orders of the Government nor can it, as I pointed out in my statement to the Council, be permitted to become a party to any internal conflict. A departure from this principle would, seriously endanger the impartiality of the United Nations and of the operation."

The Secretary-General also laid down another 'basic' principle of good faith on the part of both the host Government and the United Nations. He laid stress on the exclusion of units from any of the permanent members of the Security
Council, to be followed by both the United Nations and the host country while giving its consent. He said further that "the United Nations' operation must be separate and distinct from activities by any national authorities", and that "the United Nations' units must not become parties in internal conflicts, that they can not be used to enforce any specific political solution of pending problems or to influence the political balance decisive to such a solution...."

On July 20, 1960, the Secretary-General stated that all the United Nations forces had reached the Congo; that India was approached to send a person to act as military adviser to the Secretary-General in the Congo, and that Ralph Bunch of the United States, an Assistant Secretary-General in the United Nations, was sent as the personal representative of the Secretary-General.

On July 22, the Security Council adopted a resolution which reaffirmed the July 14, Resolution and requested the Secretary-General to proceed with the implementation of the resolution. No member of the Council had questioned Hammarskjöld's interpretation of the Security Council's Mandate.


15. (S/4405), Id., pp. 34-35.
Hammarskjöld vs. Lumumba:

In a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council on July 31, 1960, Lumumba complained of delay in the withdrawal of Belgian Forces from the Congo. On August 12, 1960, the Secretary-General, who had arrived in Leopoldville on July 29, 1960, told the Congolese cabinet that all Belgian troops had been withdrawn from all regions in Congolese territory where there were United Nations troops, and that the Belgian Government had accepted his interpretation of the Security Council resolution that all Belgian troops would be withdrawn from all parts of the Congo, as the United Nations forces arrived. The "United Nations", he said "is faced with no problem of Belgian opposition. This was an over simplification of the Belgian presence in the Congo, especially in Katanga. Tshombe had written to him on August 13, that he would oppose the entry of the United Nations Force into Katanga. The Secretary-General had threatened Tshombe, saying

18. Id., p. 46.
19. Id., p. 49.
that he would call for a Security Council meeting which would not let him go easily.

But, in accordance with his interpretation of the principle of non-intervention in internal conflicts, the Secretary-General sent Ralph Bunch to Katanga on August 4, to arrange with Tshombe, the entry of United Nations troops into Katanga on August 6. Bunch returned to Leopoldville on August 5, and reported that he met with "unqualified and unyielding opposition of Tshombe, his Ministers, and the Grand Chiefs." Hammarskjöld then returned to New York to place the question before the Security Council and ask for a fresh mandate.

Hammarskjöld, after giving the above account of his visit to the Congo, told the Council when it met on August 8, 1960, that Tshombe was non-cooperative and that there was

20. Id., p. 49.
21. Id., p. 51.
22. Id., p. 52.
23. See S.C.O.R. 16th Year 884 Mtg. August 8, 1960, pp.2-7 See Lumumba's telegram dated 5th August 1960, which he transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 7th August stating "I shall be compelled to review my position if United Nations troops do not enter Katanga on Saturday 6, August, in accordance with undertakings subscribed to by the United Nations, by yourself and myself ...." (S/4421) Supra, n.2, p.90.
'distrust' of the United Nations among the Congolese Cabinet members. On August 9, the Security Council adopted a resolution which called "for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the province of Katanga under speedy modalities determined by the Secretary-General and to assist in every possible way in the implementation of the Council's resolutions" (para 2). It also declared "that the entry of the U.N. Force into the Province of Katanga is necessary for the full implementation of this resolution" (para 3). And reaffirmed that the United Nations Force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise" (para 4). In paragraph one, it confirmed "the authority given to the Secretary-General by the Security Council resolutions of 14 July and 22 July" and requested him to continue to carry out the responsibility placed on him thereby.

On August 12, Hammarskjöld presented to the Security Council a Memorandum containing his interpretation of paragraph 4 of the August 9 resolution as intimated to the Government of the Republic of Congo. Basing his argument on the experience of Lebanon, the Secretary-General stated:

"Applied to the situation in Katanga this means that the United Nations is directly concerned with the attitude taken by the provincial government of Katanga to the extent that it may be

24. (S/4426) Supra, n.2., pp. 91-92.
25. (S/4417/Add.6) Id., p.64.
based on the presence of Belgian troops, or as being, for its effectiveness, influenced by" the presence ... the resolution of August 9, 1960 which reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention, put the main emphasis on the withdrawal of Belgian troops. Therefore, in the application of operative paragraphs seen in the right of precedents, it can be concluded that if Belgian troops were withdrawn and if pending full withdrawal, a Belgian assurance were given to the Secretary-General that the Belgian troops would in no way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of the conflict between the provincial government and the central government ... the question would be one in which the United Nations would in no sense be party ... It might be held that the United Nations is duty bound to uphold the Fundamental Law.... However, the United Nations has to observe that de facto the provincial government is in active opposition.

".....the United Nations Force can not be used on behalf of the Central Government to subdue or to force the provincial government to a specific line of action. It further follows that the United Nations' facilities can not be used, for example to transport civilian or military representatives under the authority of the central government, to Katanga against the decision of the Katanga provincial government...."

The Secretary-General concluded by adding that "the policy line stated here ..... represents a unilateral declaration of interpretation by the Secretary-General. It can be contested before the Security Council. And it can be changed through an explanation of its intentions in the resolution of August 9. The finding is not subject to agreement or negotiation."

The Secretary-General then left New York for Leopoldville via Elizabethville and Kamina, reaching Leopoldville
on August 14, to report to the Congolese Cabinet. On the same day he received Lumumba's letter stating that "the Government of the Republic of Congo can in no way agree with your personal interpretation which is unilateral and erroneous... in its intervention in the Congo, the United Nations is not to act as a neutral organisation but rather that the Security Council is to place all its resources at the disposal of my Government." Lumumba also charged that "The manner in which you have acted until now is only retarding the restoration of order in the Republic, particularly in the province of Katanga, whereas the Security Council solemnly declared that the purpose of the intervention is the complete restoration of order in the Republic of the Congo. Further more the conversations you have just had with Mr. M. Tshombe, the assurances you have given him and the statements he has just made to the press are ample evidence that you are making yourself a party to the conflict between the rebel government of Katanga and the legal Government of the Republic, that you are intervening in this conflict and

26. (S/4417/Add.7)Id., p.71.

27. Id., pp 71-76 for the correspondence between Lumumba and Hammarskjöld on August, 14 and 15,1960.
that you are using the United Nations Force to influence its outcome, which is formally prohibited by the very paragraph you have invoked." Lumumba ended by saying "It is incomprehensible to me that you should have sent only Swedish and Irish troops to Katanga, systematically excluding troops from the African states even though some of the latter were the first to be landed in Leopoldville. In this matter you have acted in connivance with the rebel Government of Katanga and at the instigation of the Belgian Government."

When the Secretary-General in his reply complained that Lumumba had made allegations against him, the letter retorted in a letter of August 15, that he had only revealed "facts which should be made known to the Security Council and the world at large." In a second letter on the same day Lumumba alleged that "If no member of the security council has taken the initiative to question the validity of your memorandum and your plans of action it is because the members of the Council do not know exactly what is going on behind the scenes..." And he categorically stated that "In view of all the foregoing, the Government and the people of the Congo have lost their confidence in the Secretary-General of the United Nations."
The effect of these developments has been well described by Catherine Hoskyns28. On his return to New York on 16 August Hammarskjöld made no effort to hide the extent of the gulf which now existed between the United Nations and the Central Government. He was clearly furiously angry and felt personally insulted by the tone which Lumumba had adopted. In addition he felt that Lumumba's attitude was damaging the prestige of the Organisation and threatening to split the Afro-Asian block in a way which would only prejudice still further the success of the Congo operation. Joseph Lash states that at this moment Hammarskjöld became convinced that Lumumba was an incipient dictator who in his drive for power was prepared to wreck the Congo and the United Nations...'

Although the Secretary-General was justified in being offended by the tone and contents of Lumumba's letters, he should not have failed to see that Lumumba was making a valid point in refusing to accept Belgian assurances in Katanga especially29. The Secretary-General seems to have failed to see the basic fact that the success of the United Nations Policy and its main aim of isolating the Congo from the cold war depended upon a speedy end to Katanga's secession. After all, it was this realisation on the part of President Kennedy, as Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.30 has pointed out, that led to his support to the use of force in Katanga in 1962, against the opposition of Britain and France.

29. Id., p.178
However, when the Security Council met on August 21, the Secretary-General restated his arguments and answered Lumumba's charges. He said that if any member disagreed with his interpretations, they might introduce a resolution to the effect. He indicated that he was setting up a Consultative Committee consisting of representatives of states with troops in the Congo. The Soviet Union disagreed with the Secretary General and called for the use of force against Katanga or to withdraw the United Nations' Force. Among the Afro-Asians, only Guinea appeared to disagree with the Secretary-General.

The African Dilemma

However, in this controversy, the sympathies of the United Arab Republic and the other African states, especially those who had contributed troops to the United Nations' Force in the Congo, were with Lumumba. But they were not prepared to do anything which might retard the success of the United Nations' operation, which depended so much upon the Secretary-Generals' diplomacy and leadership. Nkrumah, therefore, appears to have taken the lead in trying to impress upon Lumumba the need to keep on good terms with the Secretary-General.

---

32. Id., 888th Meeting, August 21, 1960, pp. 7-8.
33. Id., pp. 3-9.
and to concentrate on internal matters of law and order. He writes that in a series of letters to Lumumba in August, he urged the latter to keep the Force Publique under restraint and to move cautiously in his relations with Kasavubu. In a letter dated August 19, Nkrumah had written:

"I am absolutely certain that the Secretary-General will never allow the Belgians to reestablish themselves in the Congo, but if the situation remains chaotic, as at present in Leopoldville, there is a grave danger that the Congo which is dear to us may become a battlefield between East and West. This would be a disaster for all of us in Africa."

Nkrumah writes further that Lumumba, on the other hand, declared martial law and threatened to attack Katanga unless the United Nations enforced his rule there and that "with each day that passed the situation in the Congo grew more serious. It became clear that the Congo Government could neither command full political support nor maintain order in the country without external help....."

35. Id., p. 33
36. Id., p. 34
The lawlessness in Leopoldville was such that even the Indian personnel in the United Nation's troops were manhandled on August 18, 1960. Nehru informed Parliament on August 20, 1960, that he had written to Lumumba about the incident. "It is a matter of sorrow", said Nehru "that the Indian personnel should have been given unfriendly and rough treatment by members of the Congolese Force Publique".

But Lumumba had other plans. He seemed determined to attack Katanga with Soviet support, which was ready to help him. In the circumstances, it was necessary to take positive action. Either the United Nations or the African States should have been permitted to give necessary aid to the Republic of Congo to end the secession of Katanga. But neither the United Nations was prepared to take the initiative, nor were the African States in a position to do it, since they were committed to the United Nations. The African states who were exerting pressure upon Lumumba to desist from the use of force against Katanga, either unilaterally or with Soviet assistance, were finding it more and more difficult to keep up the pressure in the face of United Nations policies.

37. See The Hindu, 21 August, 1960
38. See Nkrumah, op. cit., p. 38
The United States seems to have failed to understand the needs of the Congo, and also of the difficult position in which the Afro-Asian States were put. On the other hand, it appears to have taken advantage of the situation by supporting Kasavubu against Lumumba, under the easy, but false assumption, that any one that takes help from the Soviet Union was a Communist. Nehru and Nasser either did not teach them anything or taught them too much. They, therefore, chose not only to intensify the cold war in the Congo, but more seriously, to create more chaos in the Congo. The one thing that the Congo could not afford at the time was chaos. But this was precisely what Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba on September 5, admittedly supported by the United States ensured.

A Turning Point.

This appears to have been a turning point in the attitude of the United Arab Republic and other African States with forces in the Congo, towards the United Nations' policy and the United States too. For they did not like Kasavubu whom they considered pro-west. And the western support confirmed them in their fears that the United States was working to turn the Congo into

---

41. Supra., n.3, p.294.
a western strong-hold in Africa. Nasser plaintly told later that he turned against the United States because it had supported Kasavubu against Lumumba and brought it his downfall.

And on September 6, the United Nations' Force took a step in the Congo which created bitterness in the minds of all supporters of Lumumba inside and outside the Congo. On that day Andrew Cordier, the United Nations' representative in the Congo, ordered the closure of the National Radio Station and all airports in Leopoldville. Lumumba was refused permission to use the Radio Station in an attempt to regain control of the Government. Impartial observers agree that this action of the United Nations, though necessary and justifiable in the interests of law and order in Leopoldville, did, in fact, deny the only available means for Lumumba to regain his position. Such was the complex nature of the problems which the United Nations had to face in the Congo.

At this stage the United Arab Republic appears to have decided to give help to Lumumba in regaining power, by allowing him to occupy the Ndjili Airport and the National


44. Hoskyns, op. cit., p.223 Cordier was then acting as the UN representative in the Congo, as Rajeshwar Dayal had not yet joined his post to succeed Ralph Bunche.
Radio Station closed by the United Nations Force.
According to Nkrumah, his ambassador to the Congo wrote to him\(^{45}\) that "the UAR representative told us that in view of the improper interference of the United Nations in the internal affairs of the country, they had received communication from President Nasser authorising their soldiers to withdraw when the Congolese arrived to take the Airport.\(^{46}\)"

The ambassadors of the United Arab Republic, Morocco and others were also reported to be making attempts to effect a reconciliation between Lumumba and Kasavubu\(^{46}\). In a letter addressed to Nkrumah on September 17,\(^{47}\) Lumumba mentioned this and blamed Kasavubu for the failure of these efforts and accused the latter of playing the game of the imperialists. The efforts of Rajeshwar Dayal\(^{48}\) who had taken over from Ralph Bunche as the United Nations' representative on September 8, also failed to bring the two leaders together.

---

46. See The Hindu, September 18, 1960
47. Nkrumah, op.cit.,p.62.
48. Supra, n.46.
Any lingering hopes of a reconciliation between Lumumba and Kasavubu, were dashed to earth, when Colonel Mobutu, the army Chief of power on September 14, dismissed Parliament and appointed a Council of Commissioners consisting of University students to run the Government. He also expelled the Russian and Czechoslovakian missions from the Congo. According to a Western scholar, the immediate object of the United States policy - the ousting of Russia - had been achieved, with Mobutu's expulsion of communist bloc missions in September. The Congo was saved from becoming a 'Central African Cuba' and Lumumba (who accepted Soviet aid for his attack on Katanga) prevented from assuming the role of an African Castro. Lumumba, in the American view, remained completely unacceptable.

India's Initial Response

Meanwhile, the Security Council had met on September 14, for another discussion on the Congo. The Soviet Union, infuriated by Lumumba's dismissal, attacked the Secretary-General bitterly. On September 16, Ceylon and Tunisia introduced a draft resolution, endorsing the fourth report.

49. Supra, n. 3, p. 298.
52. Id., p. 63.
of the Secretary-General on the Congo operation. The Soviet Union vetoed the resolution\(^53\). The United States responded by invoking the Uniting For Peace Resolution, which was approved\(^54\). The Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly opened on September 17, 1960\(^55\). This marked the beginning of greater interest by India in the Congo operation.

India's initial response, as that of the United Arab Republic\(^56\), was one of whole hearted support to the Secretary-General's policy. Though the Secretary-General did not ask India for troops, he was depending upon India for various technical personnel and aid. It was reported\(^57\) on July 17, that India was shipping 1000 tons of wheat to Congo in response to a request from Hammarskjöld. And on August 2, the First contingent of 36 Indian Air Force personnel was sent to Congo\(^58\). Nehru informed\(^59\) Parliament on August 31, 1960, that: Some countries have been called upon to send their armed forces to the Congo. We are not one of them. But we have rendered a good deal of assistance,

\(^{53}\) Id., pp. 63-64  
\(^{54}\) Id., p. 64  
\(^{55}\) Ibid.  
\(^{56}\) See The Hindustan Times, June 17, 1960  
\(^{57}\) Ibid.  
\(^{58}\) Id., August 2, 1960  
\(^{59}\) L.S.D., Eleventh Session, Second Series, August 31, 1960, Col. 5390.
rather important assistance ........... of the principal officers whom we have sent, one is a kind of Military Adviser to Mr. Hammarskjold, and another is very soon going to be his personal representative in the Congo....... There was very recently another rather heavy demand on us for setting up immediately a 400 bed hospital in the Congo..... we were pressed very earnestly, and we agreed." Nehru told Parliament on August 31, that the choice of Dayal was made by the Secretary-General himself and that he had reluctantly agreed to relieve him. He said that Dayal would be representing and reporting to the United Nations and not to the Government of India.

Thus India was not involved in any way in the Congo operations, though it was contributing to it. Nehru also refused to offer an opinion on the controversy between Hammarskjold and Lumumba, on the plea that it was before the Security Council. At his monthly Press Conference on August 11, 1960, he had paid a tribute to the Secretary-General for having acted with "vision and also wisdom." He also said that the situation in the Congo was both straightforward and also complicated and that it was the presence of the Belgian troops that had aggravated the

---

60. Rajeshwar Dayal was appointed in this capacity on August 20, 1960. See *The Statesman*, August 22, 1960.
63. *Id.*, August 12, 1960.
trouble in the Congo, though there might be other reasons too. Therefore the sooner the Belgian troops departed from the Congo the better. He added that India recognised only one Congo State.

On August 31, 1960, Nehru paid a similar tribute to the Secretary-General and the United Nations, in Parliament:\footnote{64} "When the troubles arose in the Congo, the United Nations was appealed to and the latter responded with speed and efficiency. This particular action which the United Nations took in the Congo is unique. In a sense it marked a new phase in the activities of the United Nations. Taken all in all, I think it is a good and desirable phase and the manner in which the United Nations has functioned in the Congo has been commendable. I do not quite know what would happen in the Congo if the United Nations was not there. Apart from the possibility of a great deal of internal conflict, there would be a possibility of intervention by other countries, big and small. I would like to express on behalf of the Government our appreciation of the steps which have been taken broadly by the United Nations in the Congo.".

\footnote{64} Supra, n. 59, Col. 5929.
And as late as September 26, Nehru refused to say anything against the Secretary-General's policy. One reason for this hesitancy appears to have been lack of first-hand information on the developments, people and personalities in the Congo, including the leading figures like Lumumba and Kasavubu. India wisely decided to open an Embassy in Leopoldville, in the last week of August, 1960, and the appointment of a chargé d'affaires was announced on September 12, 1960.

With the opening of the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly India appears to have decided to take active part in the proceedings. On September 20, the Emergency Session adopted a resolution supporting the Security Council resolutions of July 14 and 22, and August 9, 1960 and appealing to all the Congolese within the Republic of Congo to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts for the unity and integrity of the Congo, with the assistance as appropriate, of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, in

65. See The Hindu, September 27, 1960
67. The Times of India, August 24, 1960
68. The Hindu, September 13, 1960.
69. For the text and the voting record see Y.B.U.N., 1960, pp. 99-100. While the date of the resolution is given as September 20 in this source, the G.A.O.R., 4th Emergency special session, 17-19 September, p.102 shows the date as September 19.
consultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose of conciliation.

On October 3, 1960, Nehru urged in the General Assembly that steps should be taken to help Parliament (of Congo) to meet and function so that out of its deliberations the problems of the Congo may be dealt with in the people themselves ... " He also suggested that a Commission might be sent to the Congo to inquire into the situation obtaining in the Congo. Lumumba was reported to have welcomed the suggestions of Nehru.

UN Recognises Kasavubu

The next move of the Afro-Asians was an attempt to seat the Lumumba delegation in the United Nations. Lumumba and Kasavubu had appointed two separate delegations on September 11, and the matter was referred to the Credentials Committee which was expected to meet in December, 1960. The initiative to seat the Lumumba delegation was first taken by Sekou Toure of Guinea when he proposed it in the Assembly on October 10, 1960.

70. G.A.O.R., 15th year, 882nd Meeting, 3 October, 1960, p. 327
72. Supra, n.3, p.298.
On October 18, India and the United Arab Republic joined others in co-sponsoring a joint resolution to this effect. They soon appear to have realised that there was no chance of the resolution being accepted and therefore Ghana moved for an adjournment of the debate till the conciliation Commission which had been set up by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, had visited the Congo. This motion was adopted on November 9, 1960. But the United States pressed for an immediate meeting of the Credentials Committee which on November 9 and 10 and recommended Kasavubu's delegation. The United Arab Republic and Morocco did not participate in the Committee. The General Assembly accepted, on November 22, Kasavubu's delegation by a vote of 53 to 24 with 19 abstentions, with India and the United Arab Republic voting against the resolution.

India's permanent representative at the United Nations, C. S. Jha, told newsmen on November 24, that he deplored deeply the fact that India's vote against

---

74. See *The Hindustan Times*, October, 19, 1960
77. Y.B.U.N. 1960, p. 70.
78. Ibid.
the seating of the Congolese delegation named by
President Kasavubu, was described in some press
commentaries as a vote for the ousted Premier, Patrice
Lumumba and against Kasavubu. He said that India had
always recognised Kasavubu's status as Chief of State,
adding that he had himself gone to convey his Government's
respects when Kasavubu came to New York for the Assembly
meeting. India, he said, did not favour any one person
or party, and had not voted for Lumumba against Kasavubu;
it simply considered that in the existing situation it
was better to delay seating any delegation until the
Conciliation Commission could finish its task. He also
rejected the Soviet interpretation of India's vote as a
vote against the United States as not correct. He finally
stated that the Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission should
go to the Congo on November 26, as arranged.

Nehru was reported to have expressed the opinion
that perhaps it would have been wiser to defer a decision
on the seating of the Congolese delegation in the United
Nations till the United Nations delegation had gone to
the Congo and reported. For, he told Parliament that
"the process of some kind of reconciliation etc.,
envisaged in the Congo was hit on the head".

---

82. Nehru, op. cit., p. 518.
Another result of the United Nations' decision was, as Nehru pointed out, that Lumumba escaped from his place of detention, taking himself out of the protection of the United Nations. He was arrested by Mobutu's men and put in jail. As Hammarskjold told the Security Council on February 15, 1961, the United Nations' Force had neither the authority nor the means to prevent his arrest or to know his whereabouts.

The U.A.R. Attacks The UN Policy

At this stage Nasser appeared to be moving away from the United Nations' policy and contemplating unilateral intervention. On the other hand, Nkrumah had begun to press him for the creation of an African High Command. In a letter dated November 21, Nkrumah made formal proposals for Nasser's consideration. For some reason Nasser did not appear to favour Nkrumah's proposal. Then, on December 2, 1960, the United Nations' Force including the troops of Ghana were asked to stand by, when Lumumba and his companions, were transferred to jail from their place of detention. This was a humiliating

83. Ibid. See also Hoskyns, op. cit., p. 273.
84. S.C.O.R., 16th year, 935th meeting, February 15, 1961, pp. 211.
85. Nkrumah, op. cit. = p. 86.
experience for the Africans and others present on the scene.

Then Kasavubu expelled the United Arab Republic's Embassy Staff from Leopoldville and ordered the closure of the Embassy. Nasser retaliated by breaking off diplomatic relations with Belgium and seizing Belgian assets to the joy of his people \(^86\), and, Nkrumah \(^87\) congratulated Nasser on December 6, saying that Ghana had also severed diplomatic relations with Belgium.

Clearly, Nasser was thoroughly disillusioned with the United Nations' policies in the Congo. The frustration felt by the United Arab Republic was evident from the fact that Al-Ahram, Cairo's most influential newspaper, launched a scathing attack on Brig. Inderjit Rikhye, blaming him for allowing Col. Mobutu to hold an impressive military parade in Leopoldville on the United Nations Day, for permitting the expulsion of the Ghanaian diplomat Helbeck, and, for withholding an inquiry into the allegations that western sources had helped to pay Col. Mobutu's

\(^{86}\) See *The Times of India*, December 5, 1960
\(^{87}\) op.cit., pp. 88-89.
indisciplined forces. Reporting this, K.C. Khanna of the Times of India "News Service" observed\(^8\) that "significantly... the disclosures made by Al-Ahram closely follow a meeting the U.A.R. Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Hussain Sulfi\(c\)ar Sabry, had with the Indian Defence Minister, Mr. V.K. Krishna Menon, at Cairo airport on the morning of November 30, when the latter was on his way to New York. This, and Nehru's own statement\(^9\) in Parliament that it was wrong to have allowed Mobutu to bring back his indisciplined soldiers into Leopoldville after they had been pushed out from there with some difficulty, go to show that Al-Ahram's story was not entirely 'one sided' as the Times of India correspondent had surmised.

The West Asia Correspondent of The Statesman in a dispatch published on December 31, 1960, wrote "in a conversation with one of President Nasser's closest friends and advisers, who because of this wished not to be named, criticism of India's refusal to withdraw her troops and of both Mr. Dayal and the Brigadier were professed, though more of the latter officer than of the former.

\(^{88}\) Supra, n.86
\(^{89}\) Nehru, op.cit.,p.522
They were accused of being too formalistic and of placing loyalty to Mr. Hammarskjöld above loyalty to the cause of freedom. There were many occasions, according to my interlocutor, when they should have disobeyed orders from New York or resigned. Only the U.A.R.'s friendship for India prevented these criticisms from being made more frequently and openly, he said.

And speaking in the Security Council on December 9, 1960, Fawzi asked indignantly: "Are we in the United Nations merely to adopt paper resolutions and express futile resentments if those resolutions are flouted and looked on with disdain? Are we to continue for ever to talk about helping the Congo, while imperialism helps itself to the Congo?... A new, more realistic and responsible approach by all of us to the present situation and eventually to other situations has become imperative." He was pleading for the release of Lumumba.

Though Nasser had threatened to withdraw his troops from the Congo, he had not yet carried the threat into action possibly through pressure from India and Ghana.

---

On the other hand, the United Arab Republic joined India, Yugoslavia, Ghana, Indonesia, Ceylon, Iraq and Morocco, in co-sponsoring a draft resolution on December 19, 1960. The resolution urged the immediate release of all political prisoners under detention, more particularly members of the Central Government of the Congo and the officials of parliament and others enjoying parliamentary immunity; the immediate convening of parliament and the taking of necessary protective measures thereto by the United Nations including custodian duty; and finally demanded that all Belgian military and quasi-military personnel, advisers and technicians be immediately withdrawn in pursuance of the resolutions of the United Nations and the repeated pledges and assurances given by the Government of Belgium in the interests of peace and security. In the first operative paragraph of the resolution, the United Nations was told that it must henceforth implement its mandate fully. Hammarskjöld did not recommend the draft resolution on the ground that national conciliation and a return to normalcy could only be achieved by the normal political and diplomatic means of persuasion and advice. The draft resolution was rejected on December 20, by 42 to 28 votes with 27 abstentions.

91. The operative part of the draft resolution was read in Parliament by Nehru—See Nehru, op. cit., p. 78.
92. See Y.B. U.N., pp. 77-78.
93. Id., p. 78.
With the failure of this resolution the United Arab Republic appears to have become convinced of the need of withdraw its troops from the United Nations' Force and to take unilateral action\textsuperscript{94}. This was the line it appears to have adopted at the much publicised Casablanca conference of heads of the Governments of Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Guinea and the United Arab Republic. According to Nkrumah\textsuperscript{95}, 'The central problem for discussion was whether the African states should withdraw their troops from the Congo. It was felt that the United Nations was clearly not going to take effective action and that our troops should no longer be made available.

'I spoke strongly in favour of allowing African troops to remain in the Congo pointing out that withdrawal would be tantamount to betrayal. But after much heated discussion it was finally agreed that troops of the Casablanca powers should be withdrawn unless the United Nations acted immediately in support of the Central Government of which Lumumba was Prime Minister. I, however, remained adamant ...''

\textsuperscript{94} In fact this was what all the African States with troops in the Congo felt. See Hoskyns, op.cit., p.272. \textsuperscript{95} op.cit., p.91. See also Survey 1961, op.cit., pp.465-66.
In his "Address on victory Day Celebrations" in Cairo on December 23, 1960, Nasser made, perhaps the first major attack on the United Nations' operation in the Congo:

"Western newspapers often claim that the UAR does not support the United Nations in the Congo and that Gamal Abdel Nasser bites the hand that fed him in 1956.

"That is all wrong. When we went to the United Nations in September this year we declared that the Congo was in jeopardy, as was the United Nations itself.

"In 1956, we expressed our gratitude to the United Nations for its attitude against aggression. We had thought that was a turning point in the annals of the world organisation to which small powers attached great hopes.

"However, those hopes were totally dashed later when the United Nations assumed responsibility in the Congo and allowed itself to be used as a vehicle for big Colonialist powers carrying out a Colonialist policy which stands for the overthrow of National rule and makes of Patrice Lumumba a lesson for the entire African continent.

"The United Nations has become a vehicle for imperialism. If it has become a tool in the hands of imperialism, and the imperialistic countries, and if it has become a means for the implementation of imperialistic policy, the people will look at the United Nations the way it looks at the imperialistic countries.

The United Nations has unfortunately betrayed itself in the Congo. I hold the imperialistic countries responsible for this betrayal. And I hold the United Nations Secretariat also responsible.

When I was in New York last September we said that the United Nations had succeeded. We said that we wanted to preserve the United Nations and keep its prestige. But the events in the Congo have given the proof that the administrative system followed by the United Nations requires a change.

Nehru Blames the UN Policy

That the charges levelled by Nasser were not entirely unfounded, is evident from Nehru's own exposition of the failures of the United Nations' Policy in the course of his speeches in Parliament. The Press in India had also begun to criticise and attack the Western policies.

The Statesman, for example, wrote on November 25, that "when .... on August 5th at Leopoldville a nervous United Nations' spokesman told journalists that the move into Katanga, due to start in another four hours or so, had been suspended, the implications of the retreat were already clear to some. At the end of that line of repeated retreat lies the latest United Nations' decision to accept the Kasavubu delegation. Perhaps the United Nations will yet serve some purposes in the Congo; and these may be the ones some big powers consider good.... They are, however, definitely not India's ....". And, The Times of India wrote on the same day that "at the back of it all, of course, is the full undiluted wickedness of the cold war. It is a
matter of deep regret that the United States should be leading its Western allies in a mischievous and dangerous campaign to bolster the lawless and unrepresentative regime of Col. Mobutu*.

On November 22, Nehru drew the attention of Parliament to the Second Report of Dayal on the Congo and said97.

"Many facts come out of this. One basic fact is I regret to say, that Belgians there have not functioned as they ought to have functioned. Indeed, after the first four weeks, Belgians who had left in the earlier stages of independence returned in considerable numbers in the Congo. This became a heavy flow, not only in a province like Katanga which, of course, is practically completely controlled by Belgians of all types, military, civil, technical, and others, but even in Leopoldville itself. The House will remember that the Security Council said repeatedly that Belgians should be made to withdraw. Naturally the Security Council referred to the military element, but the military people are there still, having gone back there in some numbers..."

After quoting passages from Dayal's report, he observed in a significant statement:

"You will find that wherever Belgians are in the greatest numbers, that area is asking for separation from the Congo and the separate statehood. In fact, Belgians are often leading these movements. It is not an unjustifiable assumption for me to make that one of the first things that should be done in the Congo is to carry out firmly and clearly what the Security Council said previously about Belgians. In the circumstances, it is very difficult to draw a line between civilians, military personnel and para-military formations. I feel a basic fact is that the Belgian authorities there are supporting the disruptive elements...."

97. See Nehru, op. cit., pp. 513-516.
Clearly, the premises on which the Secretary-General based his action originally that with the introduction of the United Nations' Force Belgian would see its way out were proved wrong. There was, therefore, now need for strong and positive action. In the circumstances, the failure of the Western Powers, especially the United States to support the Afro-Asian draft resolution of December 19, 1960, was unfortunate. The Secretary-General, as has been mentioned, too did not support this resolution.

In the words of a Western scholar it was questionable, to say the least, whether, the principle of non-intervention on which the Secretary-General laid the greatest emphasis till the end, was a principle which could be applied in the anarchic context of the Congo. Hammarskjöld argued that the Congo operation followed in a direct line from its previous commitments in the Middle East, but the Congo crisis had in fact confronted the United Nations with an unprecedented problem demanding unprecedented responses. But Hammarskjöld appeared extremely reluctant to draw this conclusion.

Thus the United Nations had become largely ineffective in the Congo. Nehru pointed out in Parliament on December 20, 1960, that the position of the United Nations in

98. Supra, n.13.
the Congo underwent a change. They became less and less effective and Col. Mobutu became the most effective person though not wholly so. They (the UN) could not do anything. The instructions that they got were that they must be completely neutral—whatever that might mean. Actually this meant that while the killing of one group by the other took place on a big scale in front of them they looked on. So from the point of view of law and order they had no position at all because of the instructions or the interpretations of the instructions of the Security Council. In effect the Congo gradually began to disintegrate**.

He continued 'If the United Nations can not effectively deal with the situation it would fade away in the Congo and its reputation will continue to suffer. The suggestion that we should withdraw our contingent has not been approved by us. The fact remains that under present conditions, our men, or any country's men there, are frequently insulted and manhandled by the Congolese soldiers under Colonel Mobutu. We have put up with the many difficulties that face us, but I can not, if our people are not treated properly and given opportunities to do the work for which they were sent, guarantee that the question will not arise whether it is worthwhile keeping them there or not. Normally we would have withdrawn them, but we have hesitated and we hesitated to do so because it would really mean the collapse of the United Nations' work. It would mean most inevitably leaving the Congolese to fight it out amongst themselves, and it would also mean the intrusion of foreign powers with their troops and, therefore, war ''. 

On December 21, 1960, Nehru criticised°°°° the draft resolution introduced by the United States and United Kingdom in the General Assembly which failed to secure the required two-thirds majority as containing ' a number of pious hopes but contains nothing you can get hold of. It

101. Id., pp. 521-522. This resolution would merely request the Secretary General to continue to discharge his mandate and continue his vigorous efforts to ensure the non-entry of military and para-military personnel into Congo, to do everything possible to assist the Chief of State of the Congo in establishing conditions in which Parliament could meet and to continue his efforts to help the Republic of Congo to ensure respect for civil and human rights for all persons within the countries etc. See. Y.B.U.N. 1960, p. 75.
again comes against the same difficulty which has been pursuing the United Nations' work in the Congo namely tying up the hands of the Secretary-General, limiting what he can do and he cannot do. This has pursued him almost from the beginning". If the United Nations' Force were to take action only in "self-defence", he said, "they need not have gone there. But they were sent there to help not to interfere, not to encourage conflict, but surely, when the need for it arose, to prevent wrong doing". He pointed out further that "if you look at the whole context of events, you see how by gradual pressures a situation has been created in the Congo in which the United Nations' Forces have been put in a most difficult position. They have been humiliated often and they have to watch humiliating spectacles without being able to do anything. A large number of African countries have been infuriated by the turn of events. They have started withdrawing their forces from the Congo".

Nehru concluded his speech by saying that "In such circumstances, it is difficult for a country like India to function effectively or to help fully ..... Our broad attitude is in favour of the Afro-Asian approach."
That does not mean we agree with everything they say, like the formation of an all African force. They have demanded many measures which we think are not feasible. Our attempt has been to put forward something which we think might avoid this element of anger as much as possible and also be feasible otherwise.

Nasser Withdraws Troops

Thus Nehru had identified himself with the position of the United Arab Republic and other African states of the so called 'radical' or Casablanca group on the role of the United Nations' Force, even while disagreeing with their proposals to remedy the situation. He was still hopeful of making the United Nations change its attitude. But it has to be noted that the Casablanca Powers had been making these attempts ever since they agreed to join the United Nations' Force, without much success. The Secretary-General who had invited them to participate in the United Nations' enterprise, appeared to be less and less willing to take their counsel, perhaps because they had identified themselves with Lumumba, or because they were suggesting what were considered to be 'radical' views, which were being supported by the Soviet Union.

Even then the United Arab Republic had not withdrawn its troops yet. It appeared to entertain a lingering hope of influencing the United Nations' policy and perhaps of saving the life of Lumumba. These hopes might have vanished when Kasavubu took that fatal decision on January 17, 1961, of getting rid of Lumumba when the latter together with his companions was transferred from Thysville army camp to Elizabethville, the capital of Katanga. As Barrclough has observed, clearly Kasavubu now felt the moment had arrived to rid himself of Lumumba's explosive presence before the precarious balance of forces tipped decisively in his favour. Since Lumumba was certainly the most hated figure in Katanga, he was virtually signing his death warrant and consigning him to his executioners.

Three days earlier, on January 14, 1961, Kasavubu had requested the recall of Dayal. And a few days later he requested for a security Council meeting alleging flagrant interference in its domestic affairs by the United Arab Republic, though no specific charges of interference were made. More than anything, this appears to have been a move to counter the United Arab Republic's severe attack on him and its demands for the release of Lumumba. There were, however, rumours that the United Arab Republic had supplied arms to Lumumbist forces in

105. Supra, n. 103-(S/4629).
106. Id., pp. 59-60.
Stanleyville\textsuperscript{107}. At the same time, the United Arab Republic, Indonesia and Morocco announced their intention to withdraw their troops from the United Nation's Force\textsuperscript{108}. Clearly the conditions stipulated in the Casablanca agreement were fulfilled and Nasser appears to have acted accordingly.

\textbf{Nehru Demands Use of Force.}

Whatever might be the demerits of this decision of the Casablanca Powers, it was this withdrawal of troops by them that appears to have given a jolt to the United Nations. For, nobody, least of all the Secretary-General, was willing to pull out of the Congo, for, above all, his own personal prestige was at stake in the failure of the United Nations in the Congo. There were only two alternatives in which he could continue the United Nations' operation. One was to ask the states withdrawing troops to reconsider their decision, and the other was to ask other nonaligned states to contribute troops. In the event Hammarskjöld appears to have resorted to the second alternative by writing to Nehru on January 21, 1960, for a battalion of Combat troops\textsuperscript{109}. Nehru, very wisely, took this opportunity to impress upon the Secretary-General


\textsuperscript{109} Supra, n. 103, pp. 81-82.
that before India could send troops, the United Nations' policy in the Congo had to undergo a change. 110

Explaining the conditions stipulated by India, Nehru, 111 said in Parliament on February 15, 1961, that the United Nations "can stay on only if it changes its past policy very largely and if insists on these basic matters. One of the actions which are quite essential is that the foreign elements must be controlled and must be made to withdraw, specially Belgians.... We hope that it may be possible for the Security Council to come to firm decisions so that the United Nations authority can function there effectively and strongly. This means that it should function even if it is necessary to use armed force and not merely look on while others use armed force for a wrong purpose, that the foreign elements must go from there, and that the so-called Congolese army should be controlled and disarmed. Having got the situation under control, the United Nations should try to get parliament to meet for deciding what kind of government they will have, the object being that the unity, integrity and independence of the Congo should be preserved. If any help has to be given to them it should go through the United Nations and not through other sources.... If our views could be accepted, we would get over our reluctance and help by sending some combat troops to the Congo. That is the position we had taken up earlier and it still holds". 111

Then on February 10, it was announced by one of Tshombe's Ministers that Lumumba had escaped, giving rise to suspicions of foul play 112, which were confirmed on February 13, 1961, by the same Minister at a press conference called for the purpose. It was murder. And it shook the

111. Nehru, op. cit., pp. 525-526 (Italics are mine)
112. Id., p. 524.
113. For the announcement see Supra, n. 3, pp. 734-6.
United Nations to its foundations. The Soviet Union in a 'savage' attack against Hammarskjöld accused him of complicity in the murder, demanded his resignation and announced its withdrawal of recognition from him.\(^{114}\)

Nehru and Nasser were equally indignant. The latter charged Kasavubu and Tshombe for the murder, accused the imperial powers for conspiring in it, and demanded an immediate inquiry into it.\(^{115}\) Nehru wrote to Hammarskjöld that it was an 'international crime of the first magnitude'.\(^{116}\) He wrote further: "I know that you have been trying your utmost to control the situation but unfortunately United Nations activities have been obstructed both directly and indirectly by some countries who have been supporting Mr. Tshombe and Maj. Gen. Mobutu. The feeling in our country is strong and unless effective steps are taken immediately it will be difficult for India to associate itself with policies which permit the perpetrators of these crimes to continue in their gangster methods".\(^{117}\)

\*Security Council Authorised Use of Force*

In addition, the United Arab Republic also extended diplomatic recognition to Gizenga's Government of

---


\(^{115}\) Nasser's Speeches, 1961 op. cit., pp.19-20

\(^{116}\) The Hindu, February 16, 1961.

\(^{117}\) The Indian Express, February 16, 1961
Staneyville. Nehru, of course, did not take this step. It was feared that the United Arab Republic might intervene unilaterally on behalf of Gizenga. Actually, it joined Ceylon and Liberia in sponsoring the crucial resolution of February 21, 1961, which was adopted by the Security Council with the Soviet Union and France abstaining from voting. A Soviet draft resolution of February 14, calling, among other things, for non-military sanctions against Belgium, the arrest of Tshombe and Mobutu, the termination of the United Nations' operation within a month and the removal of Hammarskjöld was defeated by 8 to 1 votes.

The February 21, 1961, resolution based the authority of the United Nations on the threat to international peace and security and it called upon the United Nations to take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort. It also called for the

120. For the text see Supra, n.103, pp.147-8.
121. For the text of the resolution see Supra n.114, pp.23-24. For the voting see Id., 942nd Meeting, 20 February, 1961, p.18.
withdrawal of all Belgian and other foreign personnel of all descriptions and mercenaries and it also decided to hold an immediate and impartial investigation into the circumstances of the death of Lumumba and his colleagues and to punish the perpetrators of these crimes.

The acceptance of this resolution by the United States clearly indicated a change in its attitude, which was expected with the assumption of office by John F. Kennedy as President in January, 1961. Besides, with the removal of Lumumba from the scene, it appears to have felt that the Congo was safe from Soviet and non-aligned influences. At the same time, the image of the United States which the new President wanted to project required this change in its attitude in order to placate Afro-Asian opinion, especially when the Soviet Union was moving earth and heaven to influence the Afro-Asian nations, especially India, as was evident from the letter addressed by Khurschchev to Nehru, on February 22 denouncing the United Nations and the Secretary-General and also renewing his proposal for the reform of the Secretariat by replacing the Secretary General by three Secretaries-General representing the cold war blocs and the neutral bloc.

---

122. See Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *op. cit.*, pp. 468-661, for a brief account of Kennedy's approach to the Congo.
India Sends Combat Troops

On February 23, Nehru indicated in Parliament, in answer to a question that the passing of the Security Council resolution of February 21, had made it possible for India to agree to send troops to the Congo. India announced its decision to send combat troops on March 3, through a letter from Jha to the Secretary-General. It was generally believed that this decision which was made even before the clarifications sought by Nehru from the Secretary-General were received was a polite but firm rejection of the Soviet views on the United Nations and the Congo and a reaffirmation of India's faith in the Secretary-General and the United Nations. While this was true, Nehru did appear to have received some clarifications, at least, before the decision was announced. For it was reported on February 28 that C.V. Narsimhan, Assistant Secretary-General (Political) in the United Nations had met Nehru the previous day in New Delhi on the initiative of Hammarskjöld and had a thirty-minute exchange of views in this regard. Narsimhan was also reported to have met the Defence Minister, Krishna Menon.

126. See, for example, Surveyor's article in The Times Of India, March 6, 1961.
However, on March 6, 1961, Nehru announced in Parliament that he had received a reply from the Secretary-General which was satisfactory, and that India would be sending troops to the Congo. This decision of India and the additions made by Malaya, Tunisia, Ethiopia and Liberia to their troops, rescued the United Nations from its worst crisis to-date.

But the implementation of the February 21 resolution was not easy, since it was opposed by the Congolese authorities as well as Britain, France and Southern Rhodesia. Kasavubu and Tshombe opposed it largely on the ground that it had accepted the views of the Casablanca Powers. They had also opposed the entry of Indian troops into the Congo and threatened to wage war and Hammarskjöld was pressed hard for the recall of Dayal from the Congo. Nehru was reported to have threatened to withdraw the Indian troops if Dayal who had been called back to New York on March 10, 1961 for consultations, was not returned to the Congo. As Kasavubu opposed his return he was not sent again and none was appointed in his place formally.

131. Ibid. Also see The Hindu, March 23, 1961.
133. See in this connection The Hindu, March 28, 1961.
It was stated that Nehru accepted this formula on condition that the British and United States' Ambassadors in Léopoldville would also be replaced, as they were, soon after Dayal's resignation towards the end of May 1961.\(^{134}\)

Also Britain and Rhodesia had started a campaign against India. The resignation of Conor O'Brien, who had been sent to Katanga as United Nations' representative for the implementation of the resolution of February 21 on December 1961, and his accusation\(^{135}\) that Britain, France and Belgium are putting obstacles in the way of the United Nations work and that they had been spreading false accusations against Indian troops in the Congo, which Nehru endorsed\(^{136}\), put a heavy strain on India's relations with Britain. It was also reported that not all of India's anger with Britain and France was based on the Congo issue alone. Their attitude to Portuguese Colonialism and France's Algerian policy were also counted as factors in shaping India's attitude.\(^{137}\)

---


\(^{135}\) See The Hindu, December 6, 1961.

\(^{136}\) Id., December 11 and 12, 1961. See also The Hindustan Times, December 7, 1961.

The United Nations Uses Force

The rest of the story[^138] could be rapidly told. On April 17, 1961, Kasavubu signed an agreement[^139] with the United Nations, accepting the February 21 resolution of the Security Council. Under these agreements Parliament was convened and a coalition government headed by Cyrille Adoula was formed in the first week of August. At the request of the Adoula Government, the United Nations moved against Katanga by occupying strategic points in Elizabethville. Tshombe's troops resisted the United Nations force and the latter opened fire after some hesitation. This brought the United Nations under heavy criticism from Britain, France and their friends. Worried by the happenings, Hammarskjöld decided to fly to Katanga to arrange a cease-fire between the United Nations and Tshombe and met with his tragic death in a plane crash near Ndola in Southern Rhodesia on September 23, 1961.

Soon after, U Thant was appointed Acting Secretary-General and he made it clear on November 24, 1961, that he would not hesitate to take firm action against Tshombe's mercenary force[^140]. Meanwhile a cease-fire

was arranged between the United Nations and Katanga which dragged on for another year. Though Tshombe accepted the authority of the Central Government and the indissoluble unity of the Congo and recognised Kasavubu as head of state and Kitondo, on December 21, 1961, he seemed unwilling to take the logical step of ending Katanga's secession as evidenced by his unwillingness to execute the UN plans of September 1962, and, his harassment of the United Nations' force. The position of Adoula was becoming more and more difficult and things appeared as bad as they were in the previous year.

In the circumstances in December, 1962 U Thant gave his consent to the United Nations Force in Katanga to use force to end Tshombe's resistance. In a swift action the United Nations' Force put an end to Tshombe's resistance which collapsed all too soon. Thus was ended the three-year old secession of Katanga and it was finally integrated into the Congo in January 1963.

141. For the text See Documents for 1961, op. cit., pp. 770-771
Throughout this period, India steadfastly refused to be pressurized by England and others, and stuck to its position that strong action should be taken, if necessary, to end Tshombe's resistance. The United Arab Republic appeared, by and large, to accept India's lead and Nasser continued to keep the United Nations under pressure demanding strict and prompt implementation of the resolution of February 21, 1961. He also continued to support Gizenga's Government, till the Belgrade Conference of the nonaligned states, in September 1961 which was attended by Adoula, Gizenga and Bomboko. This appears to have made him and other Afro-Asian leaders less hostile to the Adoula Government.

In conclusion, it may be observed that India's role in the Congo Crisis beginning with the acceptance of Hjalmarskjoeld's concept of preventive diplomacy and strict non-intervention and ending with the acceptance of a military solution, revealed, once again, that Nehru's advocacy of peaceful settlement of disputes did not preclude the use of force when circumstances really demanded it. If anything, this should have made it clear that India would, if necessary, take Goa by force. But

145. Ibid.
146. For details see Hoskyns, op.cit., p.413.
very few in the west appear to have grasped the significance of the Indian policy and adopted a complacent attitude towards Portugal. When finally, India took Goa by force in December 1961 the United States in particular accused India for violating its own norms and also the Charter. Of all the unhappy things said about Nehru's Goa policy, the views of Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., appear to be unfortunate not because he is an American, but because he is an enlightened American.

Perhaps Nehru's observation at the Belgrade conference on Colonialism was a factor in shaping the western attitude to Portugal. In contrast, Nasser and other Afro-Asians laid as much stress on Colonialism as on the cold war. However, even a perceptive observer like Charles D. Credeans, comments that "unlike Nasser... Nehru seems fundamentally opposed to any arrangement which would involve the uncommitted countries in the use of force". And in a comment on Nasser's Congo policy he observes that Nasser "became so obsessed with the danger of the reestablishment of Colonialism that he would not evaluate Soviet actions with his usual objectivity... Nasser did not see the Congo as a likely seed bed for Communism".

148. See above, p. 40.
150. Id., p. 258.
This, in my opinion, is not correct. An underlying factor in Nehru's and Nasser's opposition to Colonialism has been the fear of the spread of Communism. They understood far better than the Western powers that Colonialism and its continuance were the real seed beds of Communism. Their opposition to Colonialism and support to Nationalist independence movements was an effort to fight Communist infiltration as well as Western Colonialism. If Nasser had supported Algerian Nationalists, it was because of his realisation of this danger. His Congo policy was also an effort to support Lumumba in order to prevent the growth of Soviet influence as well as Western influence, and also of Israel, in Africa.

In the Congo crisis, Nasser appears to have realised that there was less chance of Soviet infiltration, once the Belgian forces were withdrawn and the authority of the Central Government restored all over the country. If there had been a real threat of Soviet intervention, perhaps the United States would have adopted a different

151. See above pp. 44-50, 145-149.

policy in the initial stages. The western scholars tend to overlook or minimize the importance of the fact that Lumumba's government had first sought help from the United States. It is very difficult to find substance in the charge that Nasser failed to see the threat of Soviet infiltration, for on not a single occasion did he appear to support the Soviet policy on Congo. After all is said and done, it has to be admitted that not all of the Soviet Criticism of the United Nations' Congo policy was unfounded. So it was the Soviet Union that identified itself with the nationalist forces rather than the latter identifying themselves with the former.