In 1573, Gujarat was annexed to the Mughal Empire by Akbar. But it took him some ten years more to quell all rebellions and upsurges and settle down to a peaceful rule. In 1573, Mirza Muhammad Hussein advanced from Khandesh to Broach and Cambay, with a view to capturing the trade of Gujarat, but he was defeated. In 1582 Sayed-ud-Daulat seized the port of Cambay and kept it for a year. Akbar could overcome him only in 1583. In the same year Muzaffar III, the Sultan of Gujarat made an unsuccessful attempt to recover his kingdom, but was overwhelmed by the Mughal army. After 1583, somewhat peaceful conditions prevailed in Gujarat except for the revolt of Bahadur II in 1606, when Jehangir was the Mughal Emperor. He made a last attempt to re-establish the Gujarat Sultanate but by then the Mughal rule had already been stabilised in the province by the efficient administration of Akbar, that Jehangir had no great difficulty in overthorwing him.
Akbar also annexed the greater part of the Kingdom of Ahmednagar, but his conquests did not really establish Mughal rule in the Deccan. It was left to Aurangzeb, (1658-1707), the last of the Great Mughals, to subdue the Bahmani Kingdoms and establish the Deccan Subah of the Mughals (Ahmednagar, Bijapur, Bidar, Berar and Golcunda). Aurangzeb's Empire sprawled beyond Kandahar and Kabul in the north-west to Padma-Meghna in the east and from Kashmir and the sub-Himalayan regions in the north to the river Kaveri in the south. There is record that the Rajah of Ladakh paid tribute to Aurangzeb. Broach was once again included in a very large Empire with opportunities to extend its hinterland to the Gangetic Plain and the Deccan through the age old routes which converged on it from all quarters of the sub-continent. But Aurangzeb's Empire though large, lacked the stability and the efficiency of Akbar's Empire.

The Empire began to show signs of bankruptcy after the death of Akbar in 1605. Under Jehangir (1605-1627) and Shah Jehan (1627-1658), trade slowly passed into the hands of the foreign companies. For the first time in the history of the Indian Ocean, the trade had passed into the hands of a power outside the region when the Portuguese made their appearance in the Indian Ocean in the 16th century. But Akbar's policies had somewhat stabilised the trade of the Indian Ocean States. The capture of the trade by foreign companies was speeded up
by the policies of his successors. Further Shah Jehan’s campaigns in Central Asia, Balkh and Badakhan and his attempts to recover Kandahar brought the Empire on the verge of bankruptcy. The fiscal and religious policies of Aurangzeb also eroded the stability of the Empire. The extension of the Mughal Empire to the Deccan proved fatal. It brought him into a headlong clash with the Deccan Kingdoms and the Marathas.

Akbar followed a policy of friendship with the Portuguese. During his reign they were the most powerful at sea. The Portuguese also, finding the Mughal army stronger than that of Gujarat, were anxious to come to terms with Akbar. The alliance they had drawn up with the Gujarat Sultan against Humayun, the father of Akbar, proved dangerous for the peaceful continuance of Portuguese trade in India. Humayun’s attack and sack of Cambay, Ahmedabad, Broach, Surat and Rander, even though not completely successful, had proved that the Mughals were serious about conquering Gujarat. Akbar had consolidated his empire in the north and was far more powerful than Humayun. In 1573, when Akbar invaded Gujarat, the Portuguese switched over to the side of the Mughals. Peaceful conditions thus prevailed between the then leading sea power in the Indian Ocean and the Mughal Empire in India. Added to this was the fact that Portugal’s sea power itself was on the decline towards the end of the 16th century, partly because of its union with Spain and partly due to the loss of the Netherlands
which revolted and became independent of the Spanish Empire in 1584. Akbar therefore was comparatively free from European challenges in the sea. But when Jehangir succeeded Akbar in 1605, the English had rounded the Cape of Good Hope, determined to set up trade with the East. In 1608 they received a firman from Jehangir, permitting them to trade at Surat, the main port of Mughal India. But they had to face the rivalry of the Dutch at Bantam and of the Portuguese, who were still powerful at Goa. The Dutch East India Company captured Mokha in 1620 and controlled the Red Sea trade of Surat. In 1641, during the reign of Shah Jehan, they captured Malacca. In 1642 they staged a successful come back to Surat and challenged the English Company. The rivalry between the Europeans in the Indian Ocean trade had a crippling effect on the trade of Mughal India.

Akbar also followed a policy of friendship with the Rajputs whose territories controlled the vital Malwa route to the Gujarat coast and the all important Mughal port of Surat. His conciliatory attitude towards the Rajputs paid off and he was able to keep the Malwa trade routes open for the trade of the Gangetic Plain. The tribes and chiefs of the Vindhyan-Kaimur range also acknowledged the might of Akbar and the Gwalior-Sironji route was safe for trade during his time. But Mughal relations with the Rajputs deteriorated after Akbar's death and particularly with the
policies of Aurangzeb. Mewar showed signs of revolt under Rana Sanga. Many of the Rajput chiefs continued their defiance of Mughal authority as law and order broke down. The chiefs of the Central Indian hills also began to show signs of restlessness and revolt.

The inclusion of the Deccan Kingdoms to the Mughal Empire towards the end of Aurangzeb's rule also contributed to the general deterioration of Mughal authority. Aurangzeb could not control the Deccan. He recognised his favourite son Kambaksh as an independent ruler of the Deccan. Although Kambaksh died soon after, every Mughal Viceroy aspired to independence, in the Deccan. Added to this non-subjection of the Mughal Viceroys was the ambition of the Bahmani kingdoms to establish their own dynasties. Of these Ahmednagar, Bijapur and Golconda, in turn, challenged Mughal rule. They enlisted the services of the Marathas who were wellknown for their horsemanship, quickness of action and plunder. In the early days of Maratha supremacy, Sivaji was well disposed towards the English East India Company. In 1666 the important pepper port of Rajapur was claimed by him. In 1670 he won a naval victory over the Portuguese East India Company which laid the foundation of Maratha sea power along the strategic Konkan coast of the Mughal Empire. With services rendered first to the kingdom of Bijapur and then to Ahmednagar, both of which were struggling against the Mughal Emperor's
authority in the Deccan to retain their Indian Ocean trade, Sivaji became a serious challenge to Aurangzeb. Seeing the rising strength of Sivaji, both on land and sea, the English Company thought it fit to have a commercial understanding with him. In 1670, after Sivaji's victory over the Portuguese, the English Merchant Company, drew up a trade contact with him by which they were permitted to carry on trade at all the ports and market towns over which he established for himself certain claims, although they were in Mughal territory, for payment of a small duty of 2½% (1) With the military prowess and popularity of Sivaji behind them, the English merchants were able to carry on their trade in defiance of Mughal authority in certain ports and resort to piracy, smuggling and robbery. In their struggle for independence and commercial gain, neither the Mughals, the Marathas nor the Kingdoms of the Deccan, had any idea of "balance of power" as a political weapon for territorial and economic stability. They allied with any power which offered them immediate gain. The English Merchant Company made the best of the situation but kept its eyes firmly fixed on one single goal, namely commercial gains and trade monopoly. One by one the key commodities which sustained the Indian Ocean trade, such as textiles of India, the spices of the Moluccas, corals from the Red sea, pepper, ivory etc. from Malabar, the Far East and Africa, fell into the hands of the English or the Dutch.
The English in India had one great advantage over the Dutch. They had the full backing of the Directors of the Company in London and even the Monarchy. The English merchants in the east were given full freedom to act according to their own discretion. The Company kept them busy by demanding more and more of the eastern luxuries. The Company's merchants including the highest officials were permitted to indulge in private trade and amass wealth on their own. The ordinary servants of the company were paid only an average salary of $30 a month, but a country of great wealth, they were told, lay at their feet, if they were shrewd and bold enough to make good in trade. They had to satisfy not only the demands made on them by the Directors but also find ways and means to make themselves rich on Indian soil, so as to enable them to join the aristocracy of England. Wealth alone could purchase the coveted post of the Director of the Company which office could be used to promote trade in India and the Far East. The Company never took any responsibility for the actions of its merchants but always sided them against the native in a dispute. This support gave the merchants great confidence to act in a high handed manner. They were a shrewd cunning lot, quite ruthless and crude, with no high moral standards or honesty in business. Under-cutting their partners, breaking promises, and deceiving them by...
dubious methods were considered by right by them. More than anything else it was the methods, used by the English, that ruined Indian trade.

Akbar also improved the road network in his Empire to facilitate the movement of goods to the ports for their export trade. When Akbar reached out to Gujarat and the Kingdom of Ahmednagar it was to establish contacts with the sea for the Gangetic Plain and Malwa and to capture the overseas trade of the Western Coast ports. Ports are however put into function only when a rich hinterland, with marketable surpluses, demanding an outlet, are linked to them by an adequate and efficiently organised system of transport. A network of roads converging on the ports and their maintenance by a strong administration are therefore necessary for commercial stability. Akbar’s Government provided these in a large measure. Most of the roads in his Empire existed since Mauryan times, but Akbar paid special attention to repairing and maintaining these roads to improve his trade.

By the time Akbar conquered Gujarat, Surat had displaced Cambay as its premier port. The navigation channels in the Gulf of Cambay to the Cambay port had silted up sometime in the 16th century forcing the Sultans of Gujarat to shift their trade to Diu. When Diu was also surrendered to the Portuguese, by Sultan Bahadur in the hope of getting military assistance against the Mughals, the Indian trade
had suffered. About the same time the Dumas Channel in the Gulf improved giving access to Surat. The physical facilities endowed upon it by nature's vagaries, its inclusion in the Mughal Empire by the conquest of Gujarat by Akbar, and the fact that Akbar made it the port of embarkation for the pilgrims going to Mecca, made Surat The Emporium of Mughal India.

All roads now converged on Surat leaving Broach and Cambay, the older ports of Gujarat, collecting and marketing centres on the trunklines to Surat. Some of the more used highways of trade of the 17th century were only connected to these one time ports by branch lines. Broach in particular benefited by the improvement of the road network from the Gangetic Plain through Malwa to Gujarat. Its location between the Northern Plains and the Central India Plateau on the one side, and the Gulf of Cambay on the other, had always given it a nodality far superior to the other ports of Gujarat which, because of nature's vagaries and political upheavals, eclipsed Broach. It is its location that permitted it to maintain both sea and land contacts with any port in Gujarat that emerged as the leading outlet at a given time. Broach was now connected with Surat by a coastal sea route as well as by several land routes. Its link with the ports of Konara, Konkan and Malabar, its trade with the Deccan by the Burhanpur route were both established ones. The
peaceful rule of Akbar revitalised the Malwa routes to Surat, and Broach had no difficulty in maintaining its contacts with Surat. Burhanpur being the gateway to the Deccan, rich merchants of Gujarat, including that of Broach, set up agencies there and carried on their trade with Surat and the Deccan. Broach was now important enough to be classed as a manufacturing town along with Ahmedabad, Cambay, Agra, Patan, Banaras and Surat. It was also a port of great trade in Mughal India.

The main roads of Akbar's Empire were the Fatehpur Sikri-Surat road which ran through Bayana, Merta, Ahmedabad and Broach, the Agra-Surat Road through Sironji, Vidisa, Khandesh and Burhanpur, and the Multan-Surat Road through Ahmedabad and Broach. The Agra-Surat Road had an important branch road to Broach which took off from Sironji and ran through Sehore, Ujjain, Dohad and Godhra to Broach. Ujjain had ceased to be the main market town of Malwa but it still provided a link between Broach and the Gangetic Plain.

The old Multan route via Sind to Afghanistan and Central Asia, had important connections to Broach and Cambay through Ahmedabad. It was now linked by the coastal route and the Burhanpur route to Surat. The land trade of Mughal India with Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf ports of the Ottoman Turks and Central Asia was quite brisk till the relations of the Mughals with the neighbouring countries deteriorated.
The Bengal Province of the Mughals was linked with Gujarat by the old Hindustan road through Banaras and Agra. Agra was now the leading market town of the northern plains. On it converged routes from Kabul and Kandahar, Lahore, Multan, Sind, Rajasthan and Gujarat, besides those from Bengal. Broach was linked to Agra by the Fatehpur Sikri-Surat road and the Agra-Surat road. The road facilities to Agra opened out a wide hinterland for Broach. Most of the goods going to Surat were channelled through Broach.

After Aurangzeb conquered the Deccan, the major southern routes fell within the Empire but Burhanpur continued as the control point for the Deccan routes. The main routes in the south were the Surat-Golconda route to Masulipatam and the coastal route to Goa. Broach was connected to both these routes.

Broach had thus links with important market centres in the Gangetic plain, Punjab, Rajasthan, Sind, Bengal, Central India and the Deccan. The speed of travel had improved somewhat in case of necessity. A journey from Agra to Ahmedabad took only 5 days. Although the general mode of travel was still by caravans of oxen, Gujarat bullocks were wellknown for their speed. Ain-i-Akbari says that the speed of the Gujarat bullocks was 120 miles in 24 hours, and that it surpassed even swift horses. They were much more costly
than bullocks from other provinces selling at 100 Mohurs as against 10 and 20 mohurs for others. The best camels were also available in Sind and Cutch, while the horses of Cutch were considered equal to those of Arabia. The connections of the early Mughals with Central Asia, Persia and Arabia made it possible for them to get horses from these areas. They were in great demand in India both for wars and for trade.

With the efficient maintenance of roads and Akbar's relations with the neighbouring countries, a healthy land and sea trade developed. There was a steady flow of goods to Gujarat from Malwa, Ajmer, Agra, Kashmir, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Even goods from the Deccan which was outside Akbar's Empire came to the Gujarat ports, particularly Surat, for export because of the facilities available at that port. Broach benefited by its connections with Surat and by its location between the administrative centre of Mughal India and its major port, Surat.

Akbar also followed a sound road and port policy to encourage the trade of the Empire. He fixed the rate on goods in transit at 2½%. He reduced the dues on many goods. Further the introduction of cash payment of revenues encouraged Gujarat to develop its commerce, and industries, cultivate commercial crops and depend for its food requirements on the grain rich lands of Malwa and the Gangetic
plain. A healthy inter-regional trade developed inducing the hinterland of Gujarat and its market towns to extend far into the northern plain, Central India and other areas. Its increasing capacity in manufacturing permitted it to sustain its import trade by an export of manufactured goods.

Jehangir who succeeded Akbar improved upon his father's road policy by totally abolishing the dues on goods in transit and by discontinuing the practices of checking goods en-route. But by this time the Dutch and the English Trading Companies had found a firm footing in many towns of the Empire, that the reforms of Jehangir mainly contributed to the development of foreign trade. The English Company, particularly manoeuvred into a position of strength through Thomas Roe's friendship with influential people at Jehangir's court, and extracted several concessions for trade. From Jehangir they got exemption from paying dues on goods if they had already paid these at Lari Bandar in Sind. Sind was an area over which Jehangir had little control. Its ports were nearest to the Persian Gulf and conveniently situated for trade with that region. The English had an agency in Thatta. Their Indian Dalals in Surat had personal contacts with the port officials at Lari-Bandar through whom they could import any commodity to that port and easily transport to Surat without further commitments. Jehangir's firman virtually legalised the smuggling of goods by the English merchants at
Lari Bandar. With the facilities given to move the goods to Surat, a close trade contact between the English agencies at Thatta, Ahmedabad, Broach and Surat was soon achieved and the trade was channelised through English agents. The Sind road was never very safe even in Akbar's time. But conditions deteriorated further after Jehangir assumed authority and the English gained concessions from him. Nicholas Withington (1613) gives an account of his journey from Ahmedabad to Thatta. He was obliged to stop on the way because of thieves and wait for other caravans to join him. His camel was stolen and a man killed. He met a hundred and sixty nine coolies (Kolis) "all robbing people" on the way. The journey was through desert and only salt water was available. The people, he says, did not acknowledge any king "but robbed at pleasure". When the Mughal army came upon them they burnt their houses and fled to the mountains "taking with them what custom they could". These were ideal conditions for clandestine trade, bribery, and high handedness, all of which were increasingly becoming the modus operandi of the foreigners.

Jehangir on the whole had a peaceful reign. But the first blow which finally crippled the Mughal Empire, fell when he permitted the English to trade at Surat. His last years were marred by the rebellion of his sons Khusru and Khurram. Although he quelled the rebellion, he recognised Khusru's
son as heir apparent which intensified Khurrum's struggle for the throne. Jehangir, old, tired and frustrated failed to give any directive to the policies of the Empire. (7)

As the Mughal hold weakened, there were several rebellions, which hindered trade. The exemptions and concessions given by Jehangir and Shah Jehan to the foreign companies placed them at an advantage and enabled them to compete with the native traders. Plunder and brigandage became frequent, as Mughal authority broke down. Traders had to pay huge sums of money to move their goods. In 1630 one of the worst famines hit Gujarat and as poverty became rampant, thefts and robbery increased. After the 1648 famine even the environs of Ahmedabad became unsafe for travel. Caravans were attacked and divested of all their goods. (8)

In the 1650s, Mughal relations with the Rajputs deteriorated. The Maratha wars also caused great havoc to trade towards the latter half of the 17th century. The worst hit roads were the Agra-Surat road and the Sind roads. But by 1680 the Deccan roads also became unsafe for trade. Tavernier mentions the illegal actions taken by the chiefs. He gives an account of his journey through Bargant. "All my peons assembled to tell me that by taking the route through Bargant we should run the risk of being strangled and that the Prince of that country spared no one and lived by robbery alone". Tavernier had to make friends with his lieutenant and present him with "brandy and Spanish wine". The Raja then gave him 200 horses
and escorts to take him safely to the frontiers of his Kingdom, "for only 4 pounds of tobacco which is all the present I gave". (9)

The English also resorted to the method of bribery and friendship to carry on their trade. Since the accession of Jehangir, Sir Thomas Roe had done his best to cultivate friendship with the Royal House. But their friendship proved to be more dangerous than their enmity because in friendship they extracted from the authorities, the merchant and the common man, more benefits and facilities. If Indian trade survived at all during these crucial years it was because the foreign companies and its individual merchants were dependent on the rich Indian merchants and to the authorities for getting the commodities of trade from the interior market towns. The trade of the ports depended on their ability to draw goods from a wide hinterland. The foreign merchants were also dependent on the natives for raising loans, getting letters of credit and bills of exchange. The overland trade was conducted through a system of hundis, letters of credit and bills of exchange. One could encash hundis issued at Gujarat at any of the important market towns in the north or the Deccan. Bills of exchange could be transferred from Gujarat to any other place for payment of a small commission. Letters of credit were also available to traders from the well known Indian merchants for whom they normally acted as
agents. The English merchants maintained contacts with the rich local merchants to avail themselves of these facilities. They came out to India without any capital to back their trade. No one would deal with them without letters of credit from well known merchants or without firmans from the authorities. It was such facilities placed at the disposal of the English merchants from time to time and from place to place, that expanded the trade of their Company. Loaning money and providing facilities to foreign companies became a characteristic feature of Gujarat trade. As law and order broke down, these facilities were misused and there was no organisation efficient enough to control them. The English merchants gradually changed from the role of a subservient agent of the rich Indian merchant to that of a master, demanding terms. They began to ask for concessions and privileges for the safe carriage of goods and extracted them very often by threat and bluff. Thus from a position of hired labourers they assumed the role of masters till the Indian and other local merchants found that they could not enter any port or deal in any goods without the permission of the English Company of Merchants.

Some of the agreements drawn up between the Company and the local authorities and merchants bear proof of the type of demands made by the English. In 1624, barely 16 years after they were given permission to trade at Surat, they came to
an understanding with its authorities. The 1624 agreement was an elaboration of the 1616 agreement between Sir Thomas Roe and Jehangir regarding their rights to trade at Broach. Amongst other things the agreement stated 1) that the English shall trade freely at their pleasure in the ports of Surat, Broach, Goga, Bengala, Scynda and the cities of the Kings Dominion and they shall have liberty to import and export all sorts of goods excepting "Curral" (coral) for one year, "We" (that is the Indian authorities) "promising not to question either touching the quantity or the time, be it silver, gold or any other commodity whatever they shall export from Hindustan"; 2) that neither the Governor, the officers or the Droga (chief or head) of the Custom House shall have authority to sell any of the goods brought by the English for their own profit; 3) that the houses which the English were permitted to use for their trade shall be continued to be given to them on rent; 4) that the English be furnished with carts, water and other expenses for transporting their goods from the ports and other places and all facilities be provided to them. They shall not be molested in any way by the Governor "either present or to come"; 5) that if any Christian or other were to offend any man belonging to the King, the English were not to be questioned but if any Englishman were to commit an offence they were answerable for it (This guarantee for the good behaviour of the English
was often overcome by them by pretending to be non-English or by assuming non-English names when caught in an offence); 6) that the English were not to be charged customs at Broach, Baroda, Ankleshwar, Kherka, Vyara and other places belonging to the King and they shall not be molested for road cesses on the way. The claim for exemption of customs at Broach was on the ground that, although a port, the English brought their goods to it by land and not by sea; 7) that nobody should enter the premises of an English Factory or House of Trade; 8) that their "Caffelas" (caravans) shall be allowed to pass through the country without trouble, and if any commit offence against them they shall be brought before the Governor of Surat and the President of the English Company and punishment meted out; 9) that the Governor, the Droga of the Customs and others shall not detain any goods brought by the English nor shall they fix a price on them at any place. They shall be given facilities to transport them instantly to the English House, whosoever brings them; 10) that the English in the Kings realm be given the freedom to exercise their own religion. In the case of any quarrel arising between Englishmen, the Captain (the President) of the English Company may be given the right to settle disputes without interference from any one. But if the quarrel be between an Englishman and a Muslim, it was to be decided by the Captain and the Governor together. If the fault was with the Englishman, the President of the Factory was to make out
the punishment and if the fault lay with the Musalman the Governor was to punish him; 11) that if any Englishman died in the King's country (India), no one shall claim his goods except an Englishman. If no Englishman was present, the goods were to be kept in safety by the Governor and an exact account given of these when claimed by the English House; 12) that the English shall not assault any King's ship nor claim any King's shipping at the "Kings ports". But if they take any revenge or surprise any ship belonging to the Portuguese or other "enemies of the King" neither the King nor his people shall lay claim on it or assist such enemies; 13) that when the English are permitted by the Governor to go on their ships, no person shall molest them; 14) that all just demands of the English in the province of Gujarat be satisfied justly and whatever amount is due to them be recovered from the court. The agreement was signed by the Governor of Surat and its rich merchants such as Virjee Vora, Ali Hassan, Jam Quli Beg (Captain of the Surat Castle), Hari Vyasa, and others. (10)

The above agreement like the "Capitulations of the Ottoman Turkish Empire" sowed the seed for ruthless and unabashed exploitation of Indian resources and commerce. All agreements of the English Company with any party in India bore the same features. It gave wide powers to a foreign trading company amongst which were 1) the right to defend
themselves and wage war against the "Enemies of the King" (where the judgement of enemity was left to the Company) and the guarantee that the local authorities will not take sides in such wars unless agreed to by the English. 2) Exemption from their premises being examined by the authorities. 3) Freedom to try their own cases. 4) Freedom of trade without molestation. 5) The right to capture ships on the High seas. 6) Exemption from any dues, taxes, bills and customs at strategic places mentioned by the English at every agreement drawn up by them. The agreements were really a contract given by a local merchant body to a foreign merchant company, but when Empire building became the goal of the Parliament in London, these commercial contracts were given the status of treaties between two sovereign countries. The agreements were amended and expanded according to the requirements of English trade in India at a given time and place. In 1650 Shahjehan issued a firman improving upon the earlier firman of Jehangir regarding English trade at Lari Bandar. The English extracted a permission from him that they be exempted from tolls and taxes on goods brought by them and transported from Agra, Burhanpur and Surat. Agra had now become the major market centre in the Gangetic Plain and the English company had an agency set up in that town. It was a centre for indigo and cloth trade, two commodities which commanded the Indian Ocean trade. Agra was also a
route centre which drew to itself commodities from Bengal, Banaras, Malwa, Punjab, Kashmir and Kabul-Kandahar. Burhanpur likewise was a well known market town on which converged the routes from the Deccan, Malwa and Surat. The Indian traders had several representatives at Burhanpur, and facilities, such as hundis, bills of exchange and letters of credit, were available in that town to facilitate trade. Surat was the main commercial centre and the headquarters of the English. In 1667 the English succeeded in getting a firman from even Aurangzeb.

The demand for exemptions from dues and taxes extended to overseas trade as the English and the Dutch gained a firm footing in the strategic areas along the sea routes. Right from the beginning, the English Company had a tendency to capture the trade from the Indians by showing personal favours to individuals and extracting trade facilities from them. When they had neither the capital nor the shipping facilities to conduct their trade, they offered to carry the goods of rich merchants and even those of royalty itself, across the seas safely. Very often the English themselves were the pirates on the High Seas who captured Indian ships. An agreement with them was hoped, would ensure safe passage and the Indians had no other alternative but to entrust their ships and goods to them. However even after such agreements were drawn, the English continued their high handedness in the sea to keep the Indians under check.
Most of the members of the royal family and nobility, governors and officers in India had interests in private trade. In Broach, the Governor indulged in private trade and resented English entry into his areas of interest. The English agent thereupon came to an understanding with his broker Mirza Muhammad(11) to carry on their trade. The English were not content with controlling the strategic ports as the Portuguese, and to a large extent the Dutch, did before them. They entered the retail trade, controlled the sources of supply and even entered the field of production as early as the beginning of the 17th century. Partnering the rich and influential Indians, they discovered ways and means by which to establish themselves in trade. In areas where they were harassed by the officials they did not hesitate to join hands with the common merchants to undermine the authorities. The Indian Ocean was subject to the depredations of the English and other foreigners. The names of the Henry Every, the notorious English smuggler and pirate, Captain William Kidd and others who captured Indian ships without provocation, never make their appearance in the Indian Histories of English merchant historians. The techniques the English used, to capture the Indian trade were the same everywhere. In 1623 for instance, a few years before Jehangir died, and despite the favours extracted from him by Thomas Roe, the English captured the Gujarati junks going to the Red Sea ports. They expected retaliation from the Surat
authorities but showed no apprehension. They loaded their ships with the goods seized and set off for Achin and Bantam in the beginning of 1624. So when the Surat authorities' blow fell on them, there was no sign of any English ship at the port. The local merchants made a strong representation at the court regarding English conduct at sea. Jehangir issued a firman and the English merchants were arrested and their warehouses ransacked. President Rastell of Surat agreed to "satisfy the merchants" from whom they had captured the goods, but on "condition that they accept payment in goods such as pepper, madder and coral. Amongst the goods taken from the Gujarati junks were nine chests of coral, pepper from Malabar, Chaul and Bantam and a great deal of money. The acceptance of the "conditions" so blatantly put out by the English pirates would have virtually meant the sale of their own commodities, illegally confiscated by the English, at a price, as well as legalising English high handedness at sea. It would also have meant the gradual surrender of the Indian Ocean trade to the English, acceptance of the English in the role of middlemen in the trade and allowing them to reap the profits. The prices of the goods thus exchanged were to be agreed upon by both parties. Even while these negotiations were going on, the English ships coming from Gombroon had instructions to seize more Gujarati junks going to Arabia. The Surat authorities appealed to the Dutch Company for protection of their ships on the high seas and
the ships sailed with Dutch colours and a Dutch crew. The English, knowing full well the strength of the Dutch at sea allowed the Gujarati junks to sail without further molestation but registered a protest against "Dutch aids to our enemies, these people". In the process, the English merchants had shifted from the role of the aggressor to the role of a complainant whose woes had to be redressed. The English manoeuvring did not stop with the protest. Amongst the ships captured, was one belonging to the Turks of Chaul. The Turks complained to the Surat authorities and clamoured for justice and compensation. They promised to give Saif Khan, the Mughal Governor of Gujarat, half the sum if he succeeded in making the English pay. The English hearing of this, agreed to pay Saif Khan 70,000 mahmudis. But the bribe, they said was for permitting the English to board on their ships the indigo they had brought down to Surat, a demand which had nothing to do with the complaint of the Turks. The English, without committing themselves to anything with regard to the compensation, had succeeded in getting facilities to export indigo from Surat. Further the bribe offered to Saif Khan, made him a pawn in the hands of the English to attest against the Turks. At Delhi, Sir Thomas Roe had taken up residence at the Mughal Court with the specific purpose of extracting trade concessions from Jehangir. He had the steady support of Noor Mahal,
the Empress, and Asaf Khan her brother. The result of all this lobbying was that the Turks were told that the Emperor could not interfere, as neither the complainant nor the defendants were his subjects and the crime had been committed outside his jurisdiction.

In September, 1624 when the final decision was made on the issue, the English were to receive another firman which further contributed to the advancement of their trade. They were to be given the right of "unimpeded trade", allowed to occupy the same houses as before, conducting their business at Surat, Broach and Cambay, protected from "all oppression and freed from paying tolls at specific places mentioned by them". All money extracted as bribes from the English was to be returned to them. This would have included the bribe given to Saif Khan but the English Company thought it best to leave matters as they were, regarding that particular bribe. A special favour shown to the Mughal Governor, they knew, would keep him under their obligation. The arrangement to accept payment to the native whose ships had been captured, left the English free to fix the price and sell the corals to them at a profit of 60%. In spite of all this, the English still bargained and reserved for themselves "the right to capture Gujarati ships if they so desired as a just revenge on these people", but characteristically made it an amicable settlement by stating that the Company did not think that such an action on their part would be necessary on "advisable" and that they were not likely to resort to such drastic method. They would rather cultivate
"friendship" with the Indians and trade "peacefully".

Conditions of overseas trade became worse as the English gained a firm control over the Persian Gulf trade. In 1617, the English, finding the Portuguese too powerful at Hormuz, persuaded the Shah of Iran to set up an exclusive port at Gombroon and divert its silk trade to that port. The Shah, anxious to free himself of the Portuguese strangle hold on his trade, agreed to the English proposal. The English in return for their friendly advice was to be given permission to set up their trade agency at Gombroon and to be exempted from dues. The rivalry of the Portuguese at Hormuz had also diverted the major part of the Indian trade with the Persian Gulf to the Ottoman port of Basra. The rise of Gombroon affected the trade of Basra and Hormuz. The Portuguese were losing grip over the sea routes with the loss of their sea power. Towards the end of their supremacy at sea, they adopted a system of issuing licences permitting the licences to trade at any of their ports on payment of dues. The system partially revived the Indian trade at Hormuz. The English friendship with the Shah and their anxiety to capture the Portuguese and Indian trade with the Persian Gulf, involved the Shah in a war with the Portuguese. In 1622, with the help of the Shah, the English captured Hormuz. When Shah Jehan ascended the Mughal throne in India, therefore, the English were in control of Hormuz.
Shah Jehan's wars in Central Asia placed him in a vulnerable position. He needed horses from Persia and Arabia for his wars but his forward policy strained his relationship with the Ottoman Turks. He became more and more dependent on the English at Hormuz for his requirements. It virtually forced the Indian traders out of the Persian Gulf.

Seventeenth century Broach was witness to the deteriorating conditions and the many adverse forces which made one of the mightest of the Empires of India captive to a mere Company of Traders. Surat, as the premier port of the Mughals and the Headquarters of the English East Company's Agencies in the East, bore the major brunt of foreign thrusts into the trade of the Indian Ocean. Before Surat could re-establish its trade after it was captured by Rander in the 13th century, the English and later the Dutch companies had found a firm footing in that port. Surat's fortunes were subject to the jealousies and competitions of the foreign trading companies and the inherent weaknesses of the Indian trade organisations. None of the Indian Ocean States had ever tried to monopolise the trade of that Ocean. It was virtually a barter trade where the resources of one country were exchanged for those of another. Almost all the States took part in the trade. But the European Nations sought to monopolise the trade by superior naval strength and by controlling the strategic gateways on the major sea
routes. This in turn necessitated control of production and the subjugation of the people who produced the wealth, by territorial acquisition.

Broach became a target of attack partly because of its nearness to Surat and its location on the trade routes from the Gangetic Plain to Surat and the Deccan. But the main attraction for Broach was its richness in textiles and indigo, two of the commodities sought after by the 17th century traders. It was also away from the prying eyes of officialdom, a fact which suited the English merchants. But it had a nodality which in a sense made it more important than any other place in Gujarat. Broach was the natural port of convergence for the flow of commodities from Malwa, the Gangetic Plain, Rajasthan, the Punjab, Kashmir, the frontier territories of the north west, Sind, Central India, the Deccan and Bengal. With all these regions it had well established connections since Mauryan times. It was natural for traders from the Konkan, Kanara and Malabar coasts to bring cardamom, cloves, pepper and other imported goods from the Far East, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea to the markets of Broach. Its merchants were still enterprising, rich, and willing to take risks in trade. It was the chief market for cloth, and yarn. It still drew to its markets the products of the textile rich region of Baroda, Dabhoi, Ahmedabad and Cambay. Its markets abounded in indigo, which
came from Sarkhej near Ahmedabad, Jambusar in Broach district, Bayana and Agra. Most of the commodities that entered Surat's overseas trade were brought to it through Broach. It is not surprising therefore that frequent references are made to Broach by the 17th century European travellers.

William Finch (1611) says "here are made the rich baftas, in finesse surpassing Holland cloth, for fiftie rupias a Booke, which containeth 141 English yards and are not 3/4 broad". He also mentions that agates were available nearby. The city, he says, is 16 cos from Jambusar and "is a fair castle on a river as broad as the Thames to the mouth of which is 12 cos". In 1628 the English purchased 500 pieces of narrow bafta and 200 broad cloth besides 60 to 70 maunds of cotton in the Broac market.

Nicholas Withington (1613) says that "Broach is a pretty city on a high hill enclosed by a wall, a great river running by as broad as the Thames; divers shippes of 300 tonnes and odd riding; the best calicoes in the Kingdom; store of cotton".

It was the richness of Broach in cotton textiles and indigo that prompted Sir Thomas Roe (1616), who was befriended by Noor Mahal and Asaf Khan and who extracted concessions from Jehangir, to advise the Directors in London to
open a trade agency in Broach. Sir Thomas came to an understanding with Mirza Muhammad permitting him "to receive our Nation and to give to them a House near to the Governour, strictly commanding no man to molest them by sea or by land to take any customs of them or any way trouble them under colour thereof. Finally, they may buy, sell and transport any commoditie at their pleasure without any molestation". (21) The 1624 agreement between the Surat authorities and the English Company was an elaboration of the above agreement. Within eight years of having established themselves at Surat, the English had extended their trade to Broach. They received wide powers to trade in any commodity at Broach without custom and without being challenged or questioned by any authority. Their trade was protected and they could buy, sell and transport goods from Broach to any other place. Roe in his letter also gives the reason for his choice of Broach. "Broach" he says "is provided for a good retrait (retreat) from the Prince's injuries and the custome given, whereby 1500 pound per annum will be saved besides all manner of searches and extortions". (22) The English merchants always preferred a place away from the prying eyes of officialdom. Surat of the early 17th century was beset with the rivalry of the local administrators, who in the earlier period were in favour of trading with the Portuguese and unwilling to give facilities for English trade. More over
the English found the Dutch a serious threat to their trade at Surat after 1642. The export trade of the English factory at Surat depended on getting the commodities of trade at the cheapest possible rate which alone enabled the company to undercut the Dutch at Surat. It took the English merchants far into the interior in search of commodities at lower cost. The English found that goods were often cheaper at Broach, Baroda and Cambay than at Surat, particularly cloth, that Ahmedabad (Sarkhej) had good indigo which was available cheaply at the source of cultivation and manufacture. All these rich towns were near enough to Surat and their commodities fetched a high price in the markets that they could easily stand the cost of transport. The English Agency at Broach in 1617 to the E.I. Company in London advising them not to send cloth. "The cloth sent forth lieth rotting at court, the country being fully cloyed... the inhabitants of the land having no use thereof save for novelty's sake... the King and some of his nobles clothe their elephants and cover their saddles with it..." Kerridge and Rastell from Surat also advised the East India Company in London to purchase Broach baftas and other goods of Ahmedabad and Cambay for England in 1616. Thomas Roe also wrote to the East India Company in 1616 that Broach had the best cloth in India. "Though Bangala and Syndu have as fine, yet is far fetched and here you may bespeak what sortes you will, what length, breadth and finesse and buy them from the
Sir Thomas Roe at one time thought that it would be advisable to shift the English factory from Surat to Goga because of undue pressures and customs at the former. But one reason given by the factors at Surat against such a move was the Company's investments were mainly in the baftas of Broach and the indigo of Ahmedabad, and these could be easily transported to Surat. Goga they said was not "well seated for provision of cloth". Surat was well situated for trade with Broach, Cambaya, Ahmedabad, Malabar and the Deccan. "For the new cloths made at Broach and such other provision that are to be marketed southward", Surat was better placed. Goga, although opposite Broach, was dangerous because of the Portuguese in Diu. Roe also suggested that the English Company be transferred to Broach which suggestion was also objected to by Kerridge of Surat. In a letter later, Roe thanked Kerridge for warning him in time. Kerridge's main objection was that the anchorage at Broach was too shallow and treacherous. However the English Company began to invest large amounts on purchasing goods at Broach. From the time of Thomas Roe, the Company recognised the richness of the Broach markets and its nodality. In 1628 the Company invested 40,000 Mahmoudis in Broach baftas. They wanted also more money to invest in 500 bales of cotton yarn and fine narrow baftas. Another bill for 5500
Mahmoudis was received for fine baftas of Broach in the same year and they wanted Rs. 9000 for 6000 more baftas and 500 maunds of yarn.\(^{(29)}\) Before the year closed a sum of 4000 and another of 5000 Mahmoudis were invested in Broach bafta.\(^{(30)}\) The English found the city "Commodious for all kinds of Indian cloth that is made in these parts, as Cambaia and other towns of some note bordering about it".\(^{(31)}\) Except for the Portuguese menace in the Gulf of Cambay and the shoaling up of the navigation channels to Broach, which necessitated ships being anchored at a distance and frigates used to transport the commodities to and fro, Broach was a suitable place for trade.\(^{(32)}\) The English however had to compete in the Broach market with the Malabaris whose activities in trade put up the price of cotton wool and yarn.\(^{(33)}\) But on the whole the English trade at Broach was quite brisk by the beginning of the 17th century. Of the commodities vendible in Broach and parts, William Leske of Surat\(^{(34)}\) and Salabancke\(^{(35)}\) wrote to the East India Company that lead, tin, elephants' teeth, etc. had a good market, that swords, sword knives, guns, hot waters, looking glasses, coral bracelets, cordials etc. had some sale. Others were combs, pictures, spectacles, knives etc. But ready money according to both was "the main sinew of trade", From the above reports it is clear that Broach was a centre of English trade by the beginning of the 17th century. They benefited greatly by
their friendship with Muhammad Khan (Mirza Mahammad) of Broach, who allowed them to trade free of dues.

Pietro-Della Valle who came to Broach in 1623 says that "it is considerable for a very great trade of fine cotton cloth of Calico, made more plentifully there than any other place and dispersed not only throughout Asia but also into our Europe so that the English and the Dutch, (which two nations have houses of constant residence here), freight five or six great ships therewith every year and for better embarking of it make them into very great bales, each as big as a Roman coach, and every piece of cloth little bigger than one of our towels being carried to Aleppo will not be sold for less than three or four piastres and in Italy atleast for six crowns. Whence you may infer what wealth comes out of this small city alone which for compass and buildings is no greater than Siena of Tuscany although it is three times as populous. You may also consider to what sum the Prince's costumes (costoms) arise". Della Valle also says that "a few cos from the city is a mine of chalcedonies and agates, white and green, but these stones are carry'd less to Barocci than to Cambaia, although it be further from the mine, because there, is a sea port and a greater concourse of foreign merchants". About the city of Barocci he says it is called Bahrug by the Persians. "Under the walls where of on the south runs a river called Nerbeda which we ferried
over. The city is encompassed by a wall of moderate bigness built high upon a rising hill. For the circuit 'tis populous enough as generally are all parts of India". "The sea", he says "comes not up to Barocci at the highest tides but it is about as many miles distant as 'tis from Surat". When Della Valle arrived at Broach, the Dutch trumpeter sounded his instrument "giving notice of our coming to his countrymen residing in Barocci; and they, at the summons, came immediately to the bankside to meet us. From there we went with them to lodge in the Dutch House there. Late in the evening they carry'd us to see a patache, a small Indian ship, which they were building and was not yet finished, in which they treated us all night drinking of tari".\(^{36}\)

From the above account of Della Valle, Broach, in Jehangir's time, was a populous city with a sizeable trade in cloth with the Mediterranean cities. Its textiles were of great value in Europe. Even though the agate industry was shifted to Cambay, Broach still had a locational advantage with regard to the raw material. It also had a small shipping industry. The fact that Pietro Della Valle was received by the Dutch at the bank of the river and was taken to their House of Trade without any interference or official scrutiny, is proof that foreign trade was conducted in Broach as a matter of course by the beginning of the 17th century. There was however a great deal of competition
between the Dutch and the English in procuring goods at Broach. The local governor was quite resentful of the entry of the foreigners in the trade of the city.

Broach maintained its place as a textile and yarn centre till the last quarter of the 17th century. It had not only its own production but calicoes were brought to it from all parts of the Empire. White baftas came from Navsari, Agra, Lahore and Bengal. In 1639 the English Factory at Surat noted that "Broach yet retains its wonted perfection and has preference before all other places although the ancient making of calicoes be somewhat adulterated."(37)

Broach at this time is also described as the chief place in India for yarn.(38) The English began to buy yarn at Broach and employ weavers to weave for them. In 1622 there were 800 weavers in the English Factory at Broach. The local weavers protested against the shortage of yarn.(39) The English were compelled to agree not to deal in yarn.

In the 1660s Aurangzeb's policies lead to further deterioration in trade and economy. The Surat weavers working in the English Factory in the port found conditions so poor that they migrated to Broach. When the fate of Surat pursued Broach in the 1670s, the weavers migrated to Ankleshwar. Smaller towns such as Navsari, Ankleshwar, Gandevi etc. became refuges for the weavers and they set up
their own textile industry away from the pressures of the English and the taxes of the Mughal. Navasari and Gandevi commanded a market for its cloth because of its cheapness. Baroda vied with Broach in the manufacture of cloth but its cloth was considered of inferior quality. In the last quarter of the 17th century, Broach calicoes were still valued for its superior quality. Thevenot, who came to Gujarat in 1666, says that the cotton stuffs called baftas (calicoes) were made in Broach and that they "sold in so great plenty in the Indies". About the town of Broach he says, that the "fortress is large and square, standing on a hill which makes it to be seen at a great distance". According to Thevenot Broach was till "one of the chief strengths of the Kingdom and had therefore a large jurisdiction". The town he says "lies on the side (banks) and at the foot of the Hill, looking towards the River of Nerbada". It was a walled town. Its "bazaars or market places (Bazaars) are in a great street at the foot of the hill".

Careri who came to Broach in 1695 also found it a very rich textile town. "Barosee" he says "is excellent for its white and stained (coloured) calicoes-- the best market for its commodities being Surate"-- because of the good vent there". Broach was however fast giving place to Surat as a manufacturing centre, even in cloth, by the end
of the 17th century. With the English Company's Headquarters at Surat, their gradual capture of Surat's trade, their participation in local trade and production, together with the general decline of authority in the Empire, the English East India Company was able to draw to Surat much of the manufacturing of Ahmedabad, Cambay and Broach. Striped cloth (Tapsil) was produced in Surat in large quantities and it was considered to be of better quality than that of Broach and other places. It had a big market in East Africa and the English found it profitable to produce it in their factory at Surat, employing Indian weavers. Allijah (Alehas), a mixed silk and cotton cloth, either simply striped or floral motives, sometimes with gold and silver work, was a special product of Broach but it was produced mainly in Surat by the end of the 17th century. It had a market in the Malay Archipelago and Japan. The English Company knowing full well that the spices of the Moluccas could be purchased only with Indian cloth, and that Japan's silver was a priced commodity in India and elsewhere, began to get large consignments of Allijahs from Gujarat, to enable them to break the Dutch monopoly in the spice trade. The Allijahs also had a market in Mokha where also the Dutch were strong. Surat gradually began to displace Broach in manufacturing. The process began in the early part of the 17th century but was an established fact by the close of the century. Later Bombay became a centre of English trade and manufacture.
Broach was also a centre for bleaching and washing, the Narbada waters being suitable for the purpose. (46) Bleached and unbleached cloth were produced at Broach, Navsari and Baroda. (47) White cloth (baftas-woven cloth) came to Broach from all parts of the Mughal Empire, from Navsari, Lahore, Agra and Bengal, to be bleached. Lemon juice being necessary for the purpose, Broach was considered suitable because of the lemons available in large quantities in the surrounding areas. (48) But this activity also deserted Broach by 1640s.

Dyeing and printing were also done in Broach. But Ahmedabad, Agra and Baroda became centres for this industry. Black, red and blue were the main colours used. The Sarkhej indigo near Ahmedabad and Biana indigo in central India contributed to the dyeing industry. The English set up a dyeing factory at Ahmedabad in 1647, (49) and ordered that the Company should no longer send its cloth to Broach. Apart from using indigo in their own factories, both the Dutch and the English companies exported large quantities of Indigo from Gujarat. By the middle of the 17th century however Europe began to look to the West Indies for their indigo and its Indian trade declined. Indian indigo began to be mixed with sand and was considered to be of poor quality. (50) The withdrawal of foreign competition in indigo however did not re-establish the dyeing industry in Gujarat.
Broach was a main centre for indigo trade before the 1650s. But its indigo was considered to be coarse as compared with Sarkhej indigo. The Sarkhej indigo was cheaper than that of Bayana and Agra being only Rs.12 per maund as against Rs.36 and Rs.37 for the latter. It could also be transported easily to Surat through the Ahmedabad-Broach-Surat Road. But the keen competition of the Dutch in the indigo trade of Ahmedabad often drove the English to get their indigo from Agra and Bayana.

Broach markets also abounded in goods from the various parts of the Empire and outside the Empire. Pepper came from Malabar and Kanara, white cloth, calicoes and lawns from Agra and Bengal, sashes and turbans of all kinds, gumlac from Bengal and Pegu, spices from Bantam and a variety of other goods from far and near.

Tavernier gives an account of the commodities that entered the trade of Mughal India. The major port in the west for Mughal India and the English Factory was Surat. Bengal was an outlet for a limited hinterland and for the trade of the Dutch Company in the north. Broach was an independent outlet of secondary importance only. But situated where it was, it became a link between Surat and its hinterland in the north and north west. It is difficult to assess the quantity and the type of commodities that were handled.
Textiles formed the major item of export of 17th century India and Broach was a major centre of its production. Of these silks were not produced in Gujarat but in Kazimbazar where the Dutch had a strong Agency. They took annually about 6000 to 7000 bales of silk, out of the total of about 22000, and sent it to Japan and Holland. The second major buyers of crude silk were the merchants from Tartary who also took a sizeable quantity. The Gujarat merchants bought what was left and send them to Ahmedabad for weaving by the Agra-Broach-Surat roads. Broach itself used silks for some of its specialised mixed textiles.

Crude silk was never made pure white in India. The Kazimbazar silk was yellow. So also was the silk which came from Persia and Sicily. White silk came only from Aleppo and Tripoli. The local people of Kazimbazar however knew the art of bleaching it with a dye made of the ashes of plantain leaf and roots. The bleached silk was taken by canal to the Ganges and from thence to Hoogly by the Dutch for export. But the Indians took it to Ahmedabad for weaving.

Silk was used in the weaving of carpets. Silver and gold thread were also used sometimes along with silk. The best carpets were manufactured in Surat in Taverner's time. Fatehpur Sikri manufactured woollen carpets. Founded by
Akbar in 1570, it was the metropolis of Mughal India for a short period. It was connected to Surat through Broach as well as through the Gwallor and Sironji. Fatehpur Sikri had also many other industries in Akbar's time such as silk spinning and weaving, carpet making, stone cutting etc. But towards the end of the 17th century it was only a centre for making carpets of wool and its silk industry had declined.

Patoles mentioned by Tavernier are properly chintz and not the Patolas of Patan. The chintz was a special product of Ahmedabad. They were very soft silk decorated all over with flowers of different colours. The crude came mostly from Kazimbazar. The Dutch Company invested large sums in the chintz of Ahmedabad and also forbade private trade in it by the servants of the Company. It could be sold at a great profit or exchanged for the spices of the Moluccas. It had a great market in the Philippines, Java, Sumatra, Borneo and the neighbouring countries. Most of it was exported from Surat. Broach situated on the Ahmedabad-Surat road benefited by its traffic. Chintz was also available in the Broach markets.

Cotton of every kind abounded in Gujarat. Chintzes were made of pure cotton as well. They were called "Calamandis" (Kalamdari) from Qalam (pen or brush) with
which the cloth was painted. Kalamadari came also from Masulipatam and its neighbourhood, one reason why the Dutch established an agency there. But by the latter quarter of the 17th century, the quantity of Kalamdari that came from Masulipatam dwindled. Kalamdaris of different fineness and printing were available in the Mughal Empire. The coarsest type was made in Lahore. They were cheap, costing about Rs.16 to 30 for a corge of 20 pieces. Those that came from Sironji were finer and cost about Rs.20 to 60 per corge. But the best variety was made in Ahmedabad. They were famous for their fineness and beauty of printing. Bed covers, Sufras (table covers) pillow cases, pocket handkerchiefs and waist coats were made out of these cloths. Burhanpur also made a kind of chintz (Kalamdari) which was made into handkerchiefs and Udnis (half saris). The Burhanpur Kalamdari was noted for the brightness of its colours. All the manufacturing towns of Kalamdari were connected to Broach through the various roads from Hindustan and Sind and Central India to Surat.

The baftas (woven cloth) for which Broach was famous were dyed blue, black and red or taken uncoloured. In Tavernier's time its manufacture was being shifted to centres like Agra and Ahmedabad where indigo was available. Its cost varied from Rs.2 to 30 or 40 according to its fineness and the amount of gold thread used at the end and
sides. Tavernier says that the Indians knew how to pass the cloth through certain water which made it look like waved camlet. These were very costly.

The cheap cotton cloth costing about Rs. 2 to 12 per piece was chiefly marketed in East Africa. The "Kafirs" to whom it was sold took them far into the interior of Abyssinia and Sa'aba (south-Arabia) when trade with the Red Sea ports was disrupted with Dutch and English atrocities at sea. The cloth was valued particularly because it could be washed without soap and had only to be washed and dried. The costlier cloth, selling at more than Rs. 12, had a market in the islands of the Far East. There was keen competition between the Dutch and the English in the cloth trade.

The white cotton cloth came mainly from Bengal, Agra and from the vicinity of Lahore. But Broach, Baroda, Navsari and other places in Gujarat also manufactured them. They also came to Broach in a crude form from Navsari and the north for bleaching.

The cotton cloth of Agra, Lahore and Bengal were made according to the direction of the merchants and varied in fineness and width. But usually it was 20 cubits wide. These sold at Rs. 16 to 300 or 400 for a corge. The cotton cloth (baftas) of Broach and Navsari were either broad or narrow, the former being 1½ cubits wide and 20 cubits long
selling at 5 to 12 Mahmoudis each and the latter selling at 2 to 6 Mahmoudis per piece. But very fine baftas fetched 500 and 1000 Mahmoudis a piece. It is reported that Mahammad Ali Beg sent 60 cubits of cloth to Shah Safi of Persia (1629-42) of such fineness "that you would scarcely know what you held in your hand". The entire piece could be packed in a cocoanut which was set with precious stones. Tavernier took with him one ounce of the thread to his country "and the late Queen Dowager and many of the ladies of the Court were surprised at seeing a thread so delicate which almost escaped the view".

Unspun and spun cotton (yarn) came mostly from Gujarat and Burhanpur. The unspun cotton was too bulky and low in value and hence was not sent to Europe. They were sent to the Red Sea ports, to the Sunda Islands of the Far East, and to the Philippines. The spun cottons were taken in large quantities by the English and the Dutch for the European markets where it was used for making candle wicks and stockings. The fine yarn had no market in Europe.

Indigo, another well known product of export from Gujarat at this time were of various qualities and prices. Biana, Indou (Old Jaipur State) and Corsa (Khurja, Bulandshahi District), two days journey from Agra, were indigo producers. But the best indigo came from Sarkhej, 8 days
journey from Ahmedabad. It was also available in Golconda, Broach, Burhanpur and other small villages in the neighbourhood, and Bengal. The indigo of Burhanpur and Ahmedabad could be had 30% cheaper at Surat than that of Agra.

Salt petre was another valuable product of Mughal India. They came mostly from Agra and Patna. Most of the salt petre the world used came from India. Refined salt petre cost three times more than the impure product. It was sent from Patna to Hooghly by river. The Dutch tried to manufacture it but did not succeed. The natives knew how to refine it by lixiviation of the soil in deserted or even occupied villages. Salt petre was one of the items exported from Surat at this time and being a commodity (gun powder) used in warfare, its export was prohibited or restricted.

Of the commodities imported to Mughal India for consumption at home as well as for re-export, spices were the most important. Of these only ginger was produced in Gujarat. Both the neighbourhood of Ahmedabad and Broach were rich in ginger. They were exported to foreign countries in candied form. All other spices were imported to Gujarat either from other parts of the country or from Ceylon and the Far East. The English wanted to make Surat a centre of spice trade for the Company.

Of the spices cardamon came from the Kingdom of Bijapur. But it was a scarce commodity sold at a high price, so that
only rich people could afford to buy it for consumption. But it was exported.

Pepper was of two varieties - big and small. The big (long) variety came from Malabar and Tuticorin. Calicut in Malabar was an important pepper mart. Some also came from Bijapur and it was purchased at the port of Rajapur both by the Dutch and the English. The Malabar pepper was exchanged by the Dutch for other merchandise such as cotton, opium, vermilion, quick silver etc. which they brought from Gujarat, the Far East and other places. They got a 100% profit over its trade. The long pepper could be had in great quantities in Gujarat and its market towns.

The small pepper came from the Far East. Bantam and Achin were its main ports. The English bought it at Surat at the rate of 13 or 14 Mahmoudis a pound and sent it to Hormuz, Bussara and the Red ports.

Cinnamon came from Ceylon and the Dutch were in full control of the trade in the latter part of the 17th century. The English got them earlier from the Portuguese.

The trade in nutmeg and cloves was also controlled by the Dutch. Cloves came from the Moluccas till Zanzibar and Pemba began cultivating it in the early 19th century. But
cubes could be had at the port of Makassar in the Celebes, where the islanders secretly traded in it in exchange for rice. This clandestine trade at Makassar in cloves was vigorously pushed by the English with the object of destroying Dutch monopoly in the spice trade. They bought them at Makassar and sold them at all the Dutch markets. They took advantage of the established trade custom in India that the first who fixed the price for any article of merchandise eschewed all else. He had to agree to sell at the same price throughout the year. The Dutch, to overcome the English competition at Makassar, opened a factory in that port and raised the price of cloves. Neither the English nor the Portuguese were strong enough in the Far East to oppose the Dutch.

The Makassar people exchanged cloves for anything they wanted. Amboyna, Seram, Gilolo and Boeroe were the chief islands of clove production. They also exchanged, tortoise shells (which were in great demand in Mughal India) for the commodities they required. Another commodity they exchanged was gold dust. Exchange of goods brought more profit to the trader than direct purchase. The commodity most required by these islanders was Indian cloth.

Nutmeg came from the Banda Islands of Pulo Neira, Lontor, Pulo Ai (Pulo Wai), Rosingen, Pulo Run and Gunongapi, all of which yielded nutmeg in great abundance.
The Dutch sold both nutmeg and cloves at Surat as they had a virtual monopoly of the Far Eastern spice trade. But the English Company was stronger at Surat than the Dutch and its merchants had drawn various contracts with its rich merchants. Their one aim was to destroy the Dutch trade in spices by controlling it in the various market towns in India where their company had an upper hand. They also tried to destroy the Dutch trade by controlling the strategic sea route to the Persian Gulf ports by coming to an understanding with the Shah of Persia.

A large number of "drugs" used in medicine and for other purposes were also imported to Gujarat. Of these borax was available in Ahmedabad and saffron in Kashmir. But all others generally came from overseas.

Gumlac came from Pegu but it was also available in Bengal. The Dutch sought the Bengal gumlac and exported it to Persia where it was used as a dye. The Bengal gumlac was costly. They extracted a beautiful scarlet colour from it which was used for dyeing cloth. The gumlac of Pegu was cheap as it contained impurities. Many women in Surat made a living out of making lac after the colour was extracted from it. They then gave it any colour and made them into sticks like Spanish wax which had a market. They also used it to paint and colour toys made of wood and mud or used it as sealing wax.
Sugar was another commodity which entered the trade of Mughal India. Very little however was exported from Gujarat. Loaf sugar was made in Ahmedabad. But its great trade was confined to Bengal. Hooghly, Patna and Dacca were its centres of trade. Gujarat purchased it from Bengal and Agra.

Opium and Tobacco came from the neighbourhood of Burhanpur and the Dutch Factory there, exchanged them for pepper from the Far East.

Coffee came mainly from a place eight days journey from Mocha, on the Mocha-Mecca road. Very little of it was used in India. But the Indians, returning from the Red Sea, loaded their ships with coffee, instead of bringing them back without freight, and sold it to the Persian Gulf ports. Its principal trade was at Basra (Bussara) and Hormuz. The Dutch also when returning from the Red Sea loaded their ships with coffee because it sold well at Hormuz. The English tried to control this trade at Hormuz, which they captured in 1622. From Hormuz the coffee went to Great Tartary and from Bussara to Chaldaea in Arabia, along the Euphrates and the Tigris. The Indians had a profitable trade in coffee, although it had no market in India. The Gujarati traders found it most economic to bring coffee from the Red Sea ports, take them to the Persian Gulf ports and re-load their ships with the products of the Persian Gulf which were vendible in Gujarat such as pearls, horses, resin, medical drugs, etc.
The trade of Mughal India continued to be in the same direction as in the previous era namely to the Red Sea Region, the Arabian coast, Africa, and the Persian Gulf to the West and to Ceylon, Burma the Far Eastern Archipelagos, Philippines, China and Japan to the East. But no longer were the people of the Indian Ocean region in control of the trade. What was started by the Portuguese in the 16th century was continued by the Dutch and the English in the 17th century. When ports better endowed with natural and man made facilities, like Surat fell to the foreign companies it was not surprising that Broach, which was but a hand maiden to Surat at this time, should have felt the impact of the changing economy. The trade of Western India certainly increased with the coming of the European trading companies but the trade of the indigenous merchants slowly declined. The general pattern of India's trade was reflected in Broach as well.

By the beginning of the 17th century, the English East India Company had a firm hold of the trade of Surat. By 1622 it had gained control of Hormuz and had a share in the Persian Gulf trade of India. The English therefore had an edge over the Dutch in Gujarat as well as in the Persian Gulf by the beginning of the 17th century. The Dutch, on the other hand, were stronger in Bengal and Masulipatam (Eastern India) while it had a virtual monopoly of the Far Eastern spice trade. By 1620 the Dutch took Mokha in the Red Sea.
region and controlled the Red Sea route and in 1641 they took Malacca, commanding the Far Eastern Sea route. The Portuguese were still strong in certain ports, with the English and the Dutch controlling the sea routes in the 17th century and the Portuguese, vital enough as a lever between the two, the Indian trade was bound to suffer.

a) Trade with the Red Sea Region

In the Red Sea Region the Indians had a great trade with the ports of Mokha, Aden, Guardafui, Djibouti, Berbera, Dahlak (an island in the Red Sea) and Suakin. They also maintained trade contacts with Jedda and Mecca and the Mediterranean ports of the Levant. The Socotra Islands, off the coast of Arabia and the Horn of Africa, had always a commanding position with regard to the Red Sea trade. It was a convenient stopping place for the Gujaratis on their way to or from the Red Sea. Commanding the entrance to that sea, the Socotra Islands could be used to conduct a trade with Arabia and Africa even when the ports of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa were out of bounds for Indian and Arab trade for political reasons. Being islands, away from the mainland, the control of the mainland powers on them was comparatively loose. When the Portuguese took Socotra and Jedda, they were able to harass the Indians and the Arabs trading with the Red Sea ports. But towards the end of 16th century, when Portuguese sea power began to decline, they had resorted to
issuing licences to traders to maintain the trade of their ports. The well-nigh absence of European rivalry in the Red sea region in the last quarter of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th century had somewhat revived the Indian trade with the Red Sea. But in 1608 the English had begun to trade at the Arab port of Delisha in Socotra. The Arab hold on the port was not very effective. It had a sheltered harbour. William Finch in 1607 noticed that "although the wind bloweth in the valley with such violence, yet in the flight shot, off towards the town of Delisha against the Road you shal' not have a breath of wind". Finch saw both the English and the Gujaratis "build for them houses for the time of their stay at Socotra". 

Besides Finch, the two ships which Middleton saw at Delisha were from Diu and Naggina in Gujarat and they were bound for the Red sea. Nicholas Downton also reported that King of Tamerin (Socotra) was unwilling to allow the English ships to anchor at his port too long because he was afraid that it would put off the Gujaratis. He depended on his trade with Gujarat for the prosperity of his kingdom.

The English Company, right from its inception, had concentrated on the Red sea trade because of the competition of the Dutch in the Far East and of the Portuguese, (who were still strong at Hormuz) in the Persian Gulf. But the Mughals had a thriving trade with the Red sea. Joseph
MAIN CARAVAN ROUTES IN INDIA C.1650

SOURCE: THE TRADING WORLD OF ASIA AND THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY.
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MAP 17
Salahaneke, in a letter to the East India Company in 1617, refers to the trade of Prince Kurram, Governor of Surat, (and afterwards Shah Jehan) with the Red Sea ports. Prince Khurram had forbidden the English to buy cloth in his dominion.\(^{58}\) But Middleton's activities in Babel Mandeb in 1610-11 had a great impact on the trade of Gujarat with the Red Sea.\(^{59}\) The Indians began to be convinced of the English determination to establish themselves at Surat as well as at Mokha. Soon followed Sir Thomas Roe's friendship with Noor Mahal and Asaf Khan and his growing influence on Jahangir. The rebellion of Khurram against his father gave the English Company the opportunity to further its trade at Surat and Mokha. The English were convinced that if they could prove their strength at the Red Sea they would be able to pressurise the Mughal for concessions. The Mughals were quite aware of the danger of English participation in the Red Sea trade but the high-handedness of the English and the decline of the Portuguese on the Gujarat coast by 1612, forced the Mughals to come a compromise with the English in order to enable them to maintain trade contacts with the Red Sea. The English became more and more confident at Mokha which was the main centre of Indian trade at the time. It was the profit of the Indian cloth trade with Mokha and other ports in the Red Sea region that prompted Sir Thomas Row to advise Kerridge of Surat to open up an English trade with the Red Sea.\(^{60}\) "I desire
you to endeavour by all persuasions to procure us some assistance by the Guzerati's goods or by their waftage (convey), for that I feare our own means will not be able to undertake --- Asaph Chan (Asaf Khan, brother of Noor Mahal) has done all in his power to help us". However wafting Gujarat ships by English guards was not easily accomplished. In 1617 Frances Fetiplace of Surat wrote to the East India Company that "for wafting Guzerati ships to Moha (Mokha) or other places, they put so much confidence in our nation as that they had rather go alone or if haply they should be desirous of our guard, yet we doubt whether they would be willing to part from so much money to us as might countervail the charge and wear and tear of those ships which shall so guard them". The English Company at Surat however had begun to build ships with Indian know how by 1617 "in case the Guzerattis may not require our convoy". The English were not only facing Indian challenges at Mokha but also that of the Turks on the Arabian coast. The Portuguese menace had somewhat weakened, so much so that Sir Thomas Roe advised Martin Pring that he need not fear them and "could make a bolder attempt at the Red sea". One of the greatest attraction in the trade with the Red Sea, was the abundance of corals in that region. But the silver, lead, zinc and other metals available at the Red sea ports were also valuable for
purchasing the textiles of Gujarat, \(^{(67)}\) which in turn enabled the English to enter the spice trade of the Far East. The English Company at Surat knew that participation in the Trade of the Red Sea and that of Surat would enable them not only to pressurise the Mughal but also to break up Dutch power in the East Indies.

The English decided to penetrate into the Red Sea trade by befriending the rich merchants of Surat and the royal house in Agra. They offered to carry the ships of Noor Mahal, Asaf Khan and others at Jehangir's court and also those of some rich merchants of Surat, safely across the sea. They also came to an understanding with the ruler of Sa'ana and offered to take his goods to Mokha. The economy of Sa'ana depended on its trade with Mokha. The Indian merchants felt the impact of the English entry into the Red Sea trade. But the English merchants in Surat and Agra were able to use influence with men who mattered in trade. In Broach also they captured a sizeable part of its trade by befriending Mirza Muhammad (Muhammad Khan), the brother of the Governor, when they found the Governor antagonistic towards them. The English began to invest huge amounts for procuring goods (particularly cloth, yarn and indigo) from Broach, Cambay, Navsari, Ahmedabad, Baroda, Nadiad, Jambusar, Burhanpur, Agra, Bayana, Lahore and many other places to meet the challenge of the Indians at Mokha and the Dutch in Bantam (Java).
In 1620, the Dutch, sensing English challenge at the Red Sea, captured Mokha. They also began to hold up Gujarati ships. The Indian trade with Ethiopia in ivory, elephants' teeth and gold was a profitable one and could be checked at Mokha. The competition from the Dutch and the English in the Red Sea trade made the Indian trade with that region risky even before the accession of Prince Khurram as the Mughal Emperor in 1627. By 1623 he was purchasing the corals, brought by the English from the Red Sea, at Surat. Others reconciled themselves to requesting the English or the Dutch to carry their goods to the Red Sea. Since the rich merchants and royalty could continue their trade thus and invest in the foreign trade of the country, nothing substantial was done to safeguard the interests of the ordinary merchants. The traders of Broach and Cambay, were forced to divert their trade to the less frequented ports of the Red Sea such as Suakin, Catsini, Hodeida etc. In 1627, the year Shah Jehan ascended the throne in India, the Arabs succeeded in wresting Aden. Aden, more than Socotra or Mokha commanded the entrance to the Red sea. The Arabs encouraged Indian shipping at Aden by reducing the dues from 20% to 2½%. The Indian trade at Aden picked up and it became a rival to Mokha by 1636. But in 1637 the English and the Dutch renewed their piratical activities in and around the Red Sea. In 1641 Dutch sea power reached its height when they captured
Malacca, the eastern gateway to the Indian Ocean. In 1642 they made a successful comeback to Surat. They were determined to monopolize the Red Sea trade. The English tried to defy the Dutch by persuading Gujaratis to use English ships for their trade with the Red Sea. But the Gujaratis had become quite reluctant to trade with the Red Sea, because the Mokha trade was no longer profitable. The English also closed their factory at Mokha in 1660 and decided to trade in Asian and Gujarati shipping. They diverted their trade to East Africa and the Persian Gulf. The withdrawal of the English from Mokha gave a boost to the Indian trade. The Dutch also began to relax controls. But the Mokha trade of the Indians was never the same again. When Sir Thomas Roe declared in 1617 that the coming of the English to Mokha had ruined the Indian trade with Bandam and Achin, Mokha was the control point on the Red Sea. But in 1660 its trade was all but ruined with European rivalry. Towards the last quarter of the century the Dutch sea power also declined. The officers and merchants of Surat began to look to the English for protection of their vessels against pirates. During Aurangzeb's reign Maratha raids on the West coast made Surat vulnerable. The English Company began to shift their activities to Bombay which Charles Stuart of England had received as part of the dowry of Queen Catherine. In 1675 the inhabitants of Bombay were allowed to trade with the Red Sea and Gujarat's trade with the Red Sea slowly declined.
Some Gujarati traders moved to Bombay but it was an English port right from its inception. The merchant community of Gujarat became impoverished. It was in the last few years of the 17th century that English and European piracy in the Indian Ocean assumed gigantic proportions.

The Commodity that entered the Red Sea
Trade of Gujarat:

From the accounts of Middleton, Downton, John Saris and Salabanke there is reason to believe that cloth and indigo formed the bulk of export from Gujarat. In one of the ships captured, Downton saw indigo, cinnamon, cuminseed, cotton yarn, myrobolans. John Saris gives an account of the commodities purchased at the Red Sea in 1612 from the Surat merchants. It included indigo, Cambay cloth, carpets, cotton quills, rice, butter, ginger, sugar, broad cloth, gumlac, spikenard and cinnamon. Later tobacco also became an important item of export.

The imports from the Red Sea consisted of coral, gold, silver, zinc, lead, copper and coins. Imports of coffee from Mokha and Abyssinia became important in the 1660s. The Indians did not bring it to India where it was not vendible but took it to the Persian Gulf. Hormuz was the port for coffee trade in the Persian Gulf. Coffee began to be exported from Surat by the English Company by mid-17th century. From England it found its way to the continent.
b) **Trade with the East African Ports.**

The Indian trade of Gujarat with the East African ports had suffered with the coming of the Portuguese. In the latter quarter of the 16th and in the early part of the 17th century the Portuguese hold on the East African trade was still strong because the Dutch and the English had not yet made their appearance in that region, to be a serious challenge. The traditional Indian trade with East Africa had, on the other hand, picked up with the decline of Portuguese sea power and their willingness to co-operate with the Indians on the basis of licences for trade at the Portuguese ports.

The main ports at which Indian traded were Mogadishu, Malindi, Mafia, Zanzibar, Mombasa and Sofala. When John Saris came to the East in 1609-13, he voyaged round Africa to Madagascar, made his way to Sofala, Mozambique, Moyella (Comoro Islands) Malindi, Mogadishu and Guardafui and from thence to Socotra and the East. He found that Gujarat (and Indian) cloth had a great market in most of these ports. The ruler of Moyella was clad in Gujarat cloth.\(^{75}\)

The English merchants began to seek the ports of East Africa for their trade when their Red Sea trade met with serious challenges. They were very keen to capture the Indian trade of Mokha. But the Indian, Arab and Turk resitence and later Dutch competition forced them to divert their trade
gradually to the Persian Gulf as well as to the East African ports. The same techniques used to capture the Red sea and the Persian Gulf trade were used by the English in the East African trade. They captured and plundered Gujarati ships to impress upon the Mughal, their strength at Sea. Side by side they also offered to carry the goods of rich Indian merchants and the members of the royal family safely across the sea. Gradually, after penetrating into the trade by collaboration with an influential section of society and threat on the High Sea, the English supplanted the Indians in the East African trade. But the trade of the English with East Africa never assumed any primary importance either to Surat or later to Bombay. The English Company continued to concentrate on the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. East Africa however had gold and ivory which could be exchanged for Gujarat cloth. The English found that cheap cotton cloth costing about Rs. 2 to 12 per piece had a market in East Africa and that the "Kafirs" to whom they were sold took it to the interior to as far as Ethiopia. (76) The Tapsils of Gujarat, a striped cloth, which was produced in Broach and Cambay and later at Surat, had a big market in East Africa. (77) The gold and ivory which came from the East African ports and Ethiopia were very much valued in Gujarat. The trade was thus very profitable, particularly at a period when trade with the Red Sea ports was proving risky.
c) **Trade with the Persian Gulf.**

A large part of the trade of Mughal India with Persia, in the late 16th and the early decades of the 17th century was by land. The overland route was through Laristan, the Baluchi country, to Jask and Hormuz. But with the deteriorating conditions on the Sind-Multan road after the death of Akbar, and the wars of Shah Jehan with Persia, the Laristan route became unsafe for trade. The bulk of the trade of Gujarat with Persia was diverted to the sea, a fact which stood in favour of the trade of the European East India Companies, which mainly depended on sea power to capture the Indian trade.

Even in the early years of the 17th century the Portuguese were quite strong in the Persian Gulf. Their trade was concentrated at Hormuz but they were also quite powerful at Jask and Muscat. The Turkish Empire's port on the Persian Gulf was Basra. But the trade of Basra was eclipsed by that of Hormuz. During the declining years of Portuguese sea power, in the latter quarter of the 16th and the early years of the 17th century, they had come to a compromise with the natives of the Indian Ocean States and allowed them to operate at their ports on a system of licence and payment of dues. The Indian trade at Hormuz therefore had somewhat been revitalised.
When the English established their factory in Surat in 1608, they were quite keen on controlling the Persian Gulf and the Red sea trade of Gujarat. The presence of the Portuguese at Hormuz drove Middleton to Babel Mandeb in the Red Sea. He captured Gujarati ships going to Mokha to impress upon the Indians the strength of the English at sea. The Red Sea trade was more attractive to the English at the time because of the absence of any great European rivalry in that area. But things did not work out favourably for the English at the Red Sea because of the rivalry of the Turks, the Arabs and the Indians. Moreover, when the Dutch captured Mokha in 1620 the English had to contend with their sea power. They were forced to look once again to the Persian Gulf and divert some of their trade to East Africa. In the Persian Gulf the Dutch were not very strong and the main challenges to the English opening up trade with that region, were the presence of the Portuguese and the animosity of the Turks. Hence the English came to an understanding with the Dutch Company, although they resisted them in Surat, the Red Sea and Bantam. But the alliance lasted only till the break up of the Portuguese and Turkish power in the Persian Gulf.

When Sir Thomas Roe, was sent to India for the specific purpose of advancing English trade in the east, through a policy of friendship and alliance, he found that the Portuguese and the Indians had a profitable trade with the Persian Gulf.
The English agents had brought to the notice of the Surat Company that the Portuguese were exchanging sashes, striped cloth, striped chadars, cotton wool, alejahs, white and narrow baftas, dutties, dried and conserved ginger, sugar etc. mostly goods from Gujarat and particularly from the environs of Broach, for the silks of Persia and that it was a profitable trade. They also brought spices from Bantam, pepper, nutmeg, cloves, mace and cinnamon from the Maluccas and Ceylon, rice, opium and wax etc. and sold them at the Persian Gulf. But the Portuguese trade was declining both at Jask and Hormuz. The English also found the Armenians of Gujarat carrying on a profitable trade with Persia in sugar and the Persians paying a very high rate for Indian goods because of the war between Persia and Turkey. The English reported that the most vendible commodities in Persia were the baftas from Broach, cloth of Gujarat, spices from the Far East, rubies from Pegu, all of which could be exchanged for the silks of Persia which were in great demand in India and elsewhere.

The Persian Gulf trade of India was a very profitable one and Sir Thomas Roe wanted the English Company to open up trade with that region. He was quite sceptical about the English establishing an Agency at Jask. He advised Smythe of Surat that in his opinion Jask was unsuitable because of the
Portuguese presence at Hormuz. The land route to Jask was infested with the Baluchis who were prone to highway robberies. More over the silks, which were the most valuable commodity available in the Persian ports, actually came largely from Georgia which was nearer to the ports of the Turkish Empire than Jask, a Persian port at the time. Roe stated that the moment normal conditions were resorted between Persia and Turkey and the war came to an end, the silk trade would be diverted to the Turkish ports and Jask would be abandoned. It was because of these apprehensions of Roe that the English decided to open up a new port at Gombroom with the help of the Shah. The Shah, they knew was tired of the Portuguese strangledhold on his trade at Hormuz. The silk trade of Persia was a monopoly in the Shah's hands and if he had an outlet of his own on the Persian Gulf he could defy the Portuguese. The Indian trade at the Turkish port of Basra and at Hormuz would also be affected adversely with the rise of an exclusively Persian port at Gombroom. The only request the English made to the Shah, for their advice and moral support, was that their Company should be given free access to the new port, exemption from paying dues at that port and a share in the profits of the silk trade of the Shah. In 1618, just over a year after Sir Thomas Roe had advised the Surat Company of the advantages of the Persian Gulf trade, the English had succeeded in persuading the
Shah, of the advantages of an exclusive port for himself at Gombroom (Babdar Abbas) for his silk trade which would be free of Portuguese restrictions. Backed by English advise and moral support the Shah involved himself in a war with the Portuguese. In 1622 with the Shah's military help the Portuguese were forced out of Hormuz but only to become an English port. The advantages given to the English Company at Gombroom and Hormuz soon drained the Shah of his commercial wealth. The English, with the Shah's friendship, were in full command of the entrance to the Persian Gulf. At Gombroom and Hormuz they had full freedom to trade and to stop any ship going up the Persian Gulf. They began to function at these ports in the name of the Shah.

On the other hand the relations of Mughal India with Persia deteriorated with the Indo-Persian wars of Shah Jehan. Shah Jehan prohibited trade with Persia. To circumvent Shah Jehan's restrictions the Indian trade of Gujarat was diverted to the Turkish port of Basra. But Shah Jehan wanted the horses of Persia. Many Gujarati traders had a profitable trade in Persian goods such as silks, horses, pearls, carpets, dry fruits, rose water, runa (a colouring material) and pickles. Shah Jehan proved willing to overlook smuggling between the Turkish port of Basra and the Persian port of Gombroom. The English were extracting concessions for themselves in Mughal India as well, at this time. Their hold on Gombroom and
Shah Jehan's needs soon made the Gujarati traders dependent on the English to carry on their trade with Persia. A close contact between Basra and Gombroom established the English ascendancy in the Persian Gulf trade of Mughal India. But the Persian Gulf trade of the English in the 17th century was not as lucrative as hoped for. The capture of Hormuz annoyed the Portuguese and it had grave impacts on English trade. The Dutch ambition to enter the Persian Gulf trade and the English alliance with the Dutch in the Persian Gulf trade saved the English trade for a time. The English had to wait a long time before the Persian Gulf was completely subjugated. In 1629 the English brought 93 bales of silk and 3 horses from Persia. The English exports from Surat consisted mainly of sugar and candied sugar. The concentration of trade at Gombroom, however, gradually caused the decline of Basra by the end of the 17th century.

The main exports of Gujarat to the Persian Gulf were baftas, both narrow and broad, sugar, tobacco, cotton, cotton-wool, indigo, myrobolan, ginger and some rice. But the export of rice was prohibited after the famine of 1630. The English Company for a time began to import rice from Persia and sell it at a high profit in Surat. But events in Surat soon put a stop to this trade. The Indians generally handled traditional items of import from Persia such as silks, pearls, horses, woollen carpets, dry fruits, runa, rose water and pickles.
d) Trade with the Far East.

The Far Eastern lands were known to the traders of Gujarat since centuries. They frequented the Maldive Islands and Ceylon, Pegu, Martaban and Tenasserim in Burma, Achin, Pedir, Pasai, Tiku, Priaman, Japara, Demak, Kedah, Perak, Malacca, Selangor, Bruas, Patani, Machian, Njamjam, and Lugor in the Malaysian and Indonesian Archipelagos, Amoy and Taiwan in China and Firando (Japan). In the Philippines, Cebu and Manila were known to them. The Portuguese traded in Malacca till the Dutch ousted them from that strategic port in 1641. But as in the other ports of the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese sea power had declined and they were permitting the Indians to trade at their ports on payment of dues and on the issue of a licence. The Dutch had their head quarters at Bantam in Java and defied the Portuguese at Malacca till it fell to them. They controlled the spice trade of the Moluccas and Banda from Bantam, preventing the Portuguese at Malacca and the Indian traders, direct access to the spice rich lands of the Moluccas. They had to get their spices at Bantam or from any of the lesser ports in Malaya or Sumatra. By the 17th century the Portuguese were forced to seek a share in the spice trade by entering into secret deals with the local merchants of Macassar and by harassing the Dutch and Indian traders from their base at Timor. The English Company had not made any great headway...
in the Far East in the 17th century. Knowing the strength of the Dutch at Bantam they preferred to carry on a trade in partnership with the Dutch. They chose to centre their commercial activities in the East on India where they were on surer grounds and undermine the Far Eastern trade of the Dutch by using their influences and commercial understandings with the rich merchants in Surat and the royalty in India. Side by side they also made friends with merchants in the Far East, came to an understanding with the small chiefs of the ports to permit them to trade freely in their cities and thereby gained an entry into the trade. Neither the English Company, nor any other European Company, was interested in the China trade in the 17th century. They traded with China only if conditions permitted. Efforts to open up trade with that country had met with only limited success. The scramble of the European powers to seize the China Sea route came only in the 18th century with the growing China cotton and tea trade on the one hand, and the advent of the Industrial Revolution in England. Surpluses of manufactured goods flowed out of its factories with the Industrial Revolution and the enormous population of China seemed to offer unlimited possibilities for English commercial expansion in the East. The strategic value of South East Asia as a link with China was not yet of any great importance to the Europeans in the 17th century. Their interest was confined to the Malaysian-Indonesian Archipelagos and the spices of the Moluccas and
Banda. The major sea route was through Malacca to the Moluccas. Celebes and Banda. The Maldives, Ceylon and Burma with their rich resources in cowries, cinnamon and gems, rubies and gumlac, and an enlightened trade minded population, offered convenient stopping places for a profitable exchange of goods on the major sea route from India to the Spice Islands. Commercial activities were thus concentrated at the narrow Straits of Malacca, the Banda-Java Seas and the ports bordering them.

Malacca was the point of convergence for the sea routes, and held the key to the spice rich lands of the Moluccas. It was held by the Portuguese till 1640 but Portuguese sea power had long since declined giving way to Dutch sea power in the Far East. The concentration of Dutch trade at Bantam in Java and the dominance of spices in the Indian Ocean trade made Bantam virtually the control point on the major sea route to the east, despite the natural advantages offered to Malacca by the narrow straits and protected channels. The Portuguese had also, towards the end of their dominance in the Eastern trade, permitted the Indians and Arabs to trade at their ports on payment of dues and issue of licences. The Indian trade at Malacca was therefore quite substantial. But European rivalry in the area had forced them to seek other lesser ports like Achin, Pedir, Pasai, Tiku, Priaman, Japara, Demak, Kedah, Patani, Machian, Lugor etc. The English trade in the east was concentrated at Bantam in partnership with the Dutch.
and in the smaller ports frequented by the Indians, with an understanding drawn up with the local chiefs or merchant princes. The Indians also traded at Bantam.

As early as 1608, when William Hawkins was permitted to land his goods at Surat, he found that the Gujaratis carried a great quantity of goods yearly to Priaman, Achin and other ports and made a good profit. Hawkins decided to follow suit and bought a large amount of goods at Surat which he said "would cut their (Indians') own throats at Priaman and Bantam, they not suspecting that I would buy commodities for Bantam but only for England". John Saris (1605-1609) also reported that the Dutch had seized Indian ships going to Priaman from Bantam, with a view to curbing the latter's trade.

When Saris came again to the East in 1613 he noticed that Gujarat cloth was sold at Bantam for pepper and that it was a very profitable trade. He therefore entered into an agreement with the Dutch Captain at Bantam to set a price for Gujarat cloth at Bantam so that neither would undersell the other but would meet the Gujarati challenge jointly. But the arrangement did not work out as the Dutch were not willing to partner John Saris. Michelborne who travelled to the East in 1606 saw Gujaratis buying mace and nutmeg at Banda and Bantam. They were exchanging Gujarati cloth for cloves and pepper of the Moluccas. Bantam was also a collecting centre for the silks of China. Elephants' teeth, iron,
aloes, powder (gun powder) etc. came from different places. Thomas Best in 1613 saw Gujarati goods being sold at Achin and Tiku. The great attraction for Gujaratis at these ports was the availability of pepper, cloves, nutmeg and mace for Gujarat commodities. There was a close link between the Gujarat ports and Achin. However by the time Shah Jehan ascended the throne the English at Surat reported that "of late Gujaratis have sent few ships to Achin". The English were making efforts to send Broach baftas to the East. "Rarities we have few to send but they (the factors at Bantam) will receive some Broach baftas to use as presents, besides fine sashas or turbants." In 1628 Kerridge of Surat also wrote to the Factors at Bantam that calicoes and fine blues from Broach will be sent and the ships were to return with 5000 maunds of pepper from the Maluccas. The spice trade with the Far East was more or less controlled by the Dutch. But the English with their strong base in India was beginning to challenge the Dutch monopoly in spice trade by the 17th century even though they were not in control of the sea route to the Far East. The English did not also have any exclusive port in that region in the 17th century.

c) Coastal Trade

Gujarat had a thriving coastal trade with Sind, the Konkan, Malabar and the east coast as well as with its own ports. In the first half of the 17th century Surat continued
to appropriate to itself the major share of Gujarat's trade. But by the middle of the century its trade was fast slipping into the hands of the foreign Companies, particularly that of the English. Towards the latter quarter of the 17th century the English, having acquired Bombay in 1667, were making a determined effort to develop that port as a rival to Surat and divert the bulk of the trade of Gujarat to Bombay. All facilities for a safe trade were provided by the English Company to Bombay. In 1675 its merchants were permitted to open up trade with the Red Sea ports. Persian and Armenian merchants also were encouraged to trade with Bombay instead of Surat. Surat gradually began to serve as a transit port for certain goods coming from the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. But the rivalry of the Dutch in the Red Sea and that of the Portuguese who were still strong in some of the ports of the Persian Gulf, continued to restrict the trade of the English in the Indian ports of Bombay and Surat. The Dutch also had a firm control of the trade of the Far East. Besides, the control of the foreign Companies over the strategic sea routes to the Indian ports, the coastal trade of Gujarat was also conditioned by the continued strength of the Portuguese at Goa and of the Malabar traders on the Kerala-Konkan coast. The rivalry of the Dutch all along the coast, was a further handicap.

The Portuguese had trade depots in Goa, Chaul, Daman and Diu. The trade of one of the ports of Gujarat namely that of
Cambay which was captured by the Portuguese in the 16th century, continued to be in their hands in the 17th century. The Portuguese had also established a trade with Dabul and Danda Rajapur (Janjira) which were the main ports of the Kingdom of Bijapur. But towards the latter part of the 17th century, the alliance of the English Company with Sivaji opened up the ports of Bijapur for English trade. Broach had a trade both with Cambay and Surat but with the rise of the English at Surat and the fact that they had an active agency at Broach, had, on the whole oriented its trade to Surat more than to Cambay. Broach therefore maintained closer relations with Danda Rajapur and Dabul on the Konkan coast than with the Portuguese port of Goa. The textiles of Gujarat could be exchanged for the pepper of Bijapur. As the textile trade of Gujarat fell into the hands of the English and the Dutch, they gained control over the pepper trade of Bijapur. The Portuguese trade was confined to Diu, Daman and Goa. The decline of the Portuguese power in the Konkan gave the English the opportunity to assert themselves and oust the Gujarati trade of Surat, Broach and Cambay. The English further began to build their own boats. As early as 1655 they had come to an understanding with the Portuguese which enabled the English Company at Surat to use the Portuguese shipping yards at Bassein, Daman and Dahanu. But by 1640 English had quite a small fleet secured with the help of the Governor of Surat and Indian
craftsmen challenge the Portuguese and the Dutch. Still later their mercantile marine expanded and they were able to persuade the Gujaratis to use their ships for coastal trade. The practice of depending on the English for carriage of goods contributed considerably to the decline of the coastal trade of the Gujaratis with the Konkan and other ports.

The profit of the trade of Gujarat with the Konkan ports depended on their capacity to draw the goods from the ports of Kanara and Malabar. The Gujarati trade with these ports was disrupted when the Konkan trade fell into the hands of the foreigners. The coir of Malabar, timber, bamboo etc. from Kanara and Malabar and even copper from Goa were sustaining the textile trade of Gujarat with the Konkan. The necessity to procure these commodities drove the English and others further south. Bhatkal had betel, coir, pepper, local textiles and yarn and the English Company at Surat began to get these directly in order to improve their trade at Surat. The English gradually extended their trade to Hubli where, besides cotton yarn and textiles, salt petre was available. The Gujarati trade suffered with the penetration of the English into this trade. The main port of English trade on the Kanara coast was Karwar which was very rich in betel, betel nuts, pepper and textiles all of which had a market in Gujarat. The decline of the Gujarati trade and the rise of the English trade had a great impact on the pattern of the trade of the
Gujarati ports. Broach which had conducted a direct trade with the ports of the Konkan-Kanara and Malabar coast, now began to depend on the English Company at Surat.

In the coastal trade of Gujarat, Malabar had a premier place and the trade was handled mainly by the Gujaratis in the beginning of the 17th century. Malabar was rich in spices. It also was more favourably located with regard to the trade with Ceylon and the Far East than were the ports of Kanara and Konkan. It received the spices and other valuable products of Ceylon and the Far East as well. The Malabar sea farers were also as enterprising as the Gujarati traders and had successfully defied the Portuguese and the Dutch. But as in Konkan and Kanara, the English penetration into the Malabar trade was initially achieved with their partnership with the rich Surat merchants. Having established a firm footing in the trade of Malabar the English succeeded in ousting the Gujaratis and the Malabaris from the trade. The Malabaris resisted for a long while. Their capture of English and other foreign ships became frequent. As early as 1608 William Finch reported the capture of a Portuguese ship by the Malabaris.\(^{95}\) Pietro Della Valle in 1623 saw the sea seething with "Malabar Pirates".\(^{96}\) Even as late as 1668 Aurangzeb is said to have appointed the Sidi of Janjira (Danda Rajapur) as the Admiral of the Mughal fleet put down to the Malabar traders.\(^{97}\) Surat, Broach and Cambay had direct trade with the Malabar ports of Calicut, Tellicherry...
(Dharmapatnam), Ponnani and Tanur. But the unsettled conditions on the coast affected the trade of the Gujaratis. The most highly valued commodities which the Malabaris could purchase from the Gujarat ports were corals, textiles (mainly coarse) and cotton yarn. They brought to the Gujarat ports spices, timber, red wood and coir. By the Middle of the 17th century the English merchants were directly trading with Calicut, Ponnani and Tellicherry. Cochin became a port for the pepper trade of the Dutch by the 1660s. Broach received its pepper through Surat. It was only its richness in cotton textiles and cotton yarn that enabled it to cope with the changing pattern of Gujarati's trade with Malabar.

The Gujaratis also had a trade with the east coast ports and the ports of Bengal in which Broach had a direct share in the early part of the century. But this trade also met with the same fate as that of the trade with Konkan, Kanara and Malabar ports as the hold of the English and the Dutch Company on the Coromandel Coast became stronger.

Gujarat's trade-links with Sind were always very close. The English had strengthened their trade depots in Sind to draw the resources of Gujarat. Their agents at Thatta had established commercial links with Surat and Broach and also got permission for exemption from duties at Thatta and Lari Bunder from Jehangir, Shah Jehan and Aurangzeb. Even in the first
quarter of the 17th century the Sind trade of Gujarat was
beginning to fall into the hands of the English merchants.
The English made use of the facilities given to them at Lari
Bandar and found that Gujarat goods could be had at Sind at
better bargains. Besides, Sind and Cutch were both rich in
cotton, a commodity sought after by the 17th century traders.
The trade of the English gathered strength by the middle of
the 17th century and the profits of the Gujarati traders
declined. The English however had to cope with Dutch rivalry
in Sind after the 1650s. The trade of Gujarat with Sind also
suffered because of the unsettled conditions on the Makran-
Persian coast. Gujarati traders began to look to Konkan,
Kanara and Malabar for profits in trade as the Sind trade
became risky and dangerous.

While significant changes were taking place in the
pattern of Gujarati's coastal and overseas trade in the 17th
century and Broach was being relegated to a second place as a
market town for cotton textiles and cotton yarn in the hinter-
land of Surat or later Bombay, the character of the English
Company in India itself was undergoing subtle changes which
were to change the position of the English from a mere trading
Company to one with sovereign powers to rule territories. In
1661 King Charles of England issued a Charter to the company
placing under its authority "all fortifications, factories
and colonies where the Company had a trade". The Companies
agents were given the new designation of Governor. He was empowered to appoint other Governors and officers under him. He was given full powers "to govern, judge and punish all persons belonging to the Company". The Charter of Charles Stuart above all gave the company liberty and licence "to send ships of war, men and ammunition into any of its places of trade for security and defence". Its officers were given the authority "to make war, conclude peace and draw up agreements with any Prince or people for the advantage of its trade, demand compensation for loss or damage of their property, fortify any of their trade settlements if they thought fit, and send arms and ammunition, stores, implements and anything they required free of custom dues". These powers given to the English Company in India were accomplished by an Act of Parliament in England and a Charter from its King, without any reference to the authorities of the land they had a trade in. The changing character of the company was not revealed or made clear to the native authorities in the East. While the native merchants and Governors were under the impression that the contracts made by them were trade contracts, the English King and Parliament had already given them the authority of a treaty between two sovereign powers. These "commercial understandings" were thus exploited by the English to build the British Empire in India and the East by the 18th century. The Company assumed the right to engage in offensive wars and make territorial acquisition their goal in the East.
Under the guise of protecting the trade of the Company, the English Government's special Representatives extended their administrative authority over huge kingdoms and provinces by intervening in local politics and family disputes. The English merchants in the various towns where the Company had trade depots, became Residents and took upon themselves the responsibility of advising Indian Governors and rulers. Advice thus freely given made them rulers of large chunks of territory. Any opposition meant military threat, not so much from armies and navies sent from England but by using the military strength of the Indian Kingdoms and territories against each other and by promises of recognition by the British Company. Everywhere the Company began to set up their own stooges who would advance British interests in the east. Out of this policy grew the British Empire in the 18th century. Often, the rank and file of the English Merchant Company, had no idea of the crucial changes that were being effected by the British Government in collaboration with the special officers they sent out as Governor Generals, Governors and Residents of the Company.
References:

THE MUGHAL PERIOD


(10) W. Foster, English Factories in India 1624-29, op.cit., pp.27-30 and pp.32-34.

(11) W. Foster, English Factories in India, 1624-29, op.cit., The friendship of the English with Mirza Muhammad is referred to in many letters : pp.212, 294, 322, 323, 330, and 337. On p.330 he is referred to as "our ancient and good friend".

(12) W. Foster, English Factories in India 1624-29, op.cit., pp.55-57 and pp.191-192. See also introduction of the same volume.

(13) W. Foster, English Factories in India 1624-29, op.cit., Introduction, pp.v-vii and also pp.55-57.

(14) a. W. Foster, English Factories in India 1624-29, op.cit., p.50 and also introduction.
   b. W. Foster, English Factories in India 1624-29, op.cit., p.327. Letter from Wylde, John, George Page and Richard Boothby at Surat to the Company at London dated 11 and 13, April 1629. Where the English officers
mention that "Azuph Caun" (Asaf Khan brother of Noor Mahal) is held in great esteem "is our friend still".


(19) W. Foster, English Factories in India, 1624-29, op. cit., p.230.


(22) Purchas, Vol.IV, op.cit., p.343.


(25) Letters Received, op.cit., Vol.IV, p.251, Letter from Thomas Roe to the E.I. Company dated 1-12-1616.

(26) Letters Received, op.cit., Vol.IV, pp.152-153.

(27) Letters Received, op.cit., Vol.IV, p.202 and footnote (3).

(28) W. Foster, English Factories in India 1624-29, op.cit., p.231, Letter from William Martin, and Jeremy Shuker to the Agents at Surat dated 30-1-1628.


(30) W. Foster, English Factories in India 1624-29, op.cit., p.244, Letter from William Martin, Nathaniel West and Jeremy Shuker to the Agents at Surat dated 27-2-1628.

(31) Letters Received, op.cit., Vol.IV, p.233.

(32) Letters Received, op.cit., Vol.IV, p.233.

(33) William Foster, English Factories in India 1624-29, op.cit., p.245, Letter from William Martin etc. to the Agents at Surat dated 29-2-1628.


(38)  Letters Received, op.cit., Vol.III, p.33.

(39)  a. Letters Received, op.cit., Vol.III, p.299.
    b. William Foster, English Factories in India 1630-33, op.cit., p.22.

(40)  Surendranath Sen, Indian Travels of Thevenot and Careri, (National Archives of India, New Delhi) 1949, p.9.

(41)  Travels of Thevenot and Careri, op.cit., p.9.

(42)  Travels of Thevenot and Careri, op.cit., p.9.

(43)  Travels of Thevenot and Careri, op.cit., p.164.

(44)  a. Letters Received, Vol.VI, op.cit., p.60 and p.288.
    c. W. Foster, English Factories in India 1624-29, op.cit., p.337 footnote (1). Where it is mentioned that Allejah is a striped cloth (often partly silk) manufactured in the north of India (Letter from President Wylde, John, Sikkbow and George Page at Surat to the Agents of the Company at Persia dated 27-4-1629.

(45)  W. Foster, English Factories in India 1624-29, op.cit., p.350, Letter from William Knightly to the Company at London, 1629.


(49) William Foster, English Factories in India 1646-50, op.cit., p.59 and p.127.


(51) a. Letters Received, Vol.VI, op.cit., p.151, Letter from Sir Thomas Roe to the Factory at Surat dated 8-11-1617.
   b. Letters Received, Vol.VI, op.cit., p.221, Letters from Thomas Roe to Kerridge at Surat dated 6-12-1617.

(52) a. W. Foster, English Factories in India, 1624-29, op.cit., p.335, Letter from President Wylde of Surat to the E.I. Company dated 27-4-1629.
   b. Letters Received, Vol.VI, op.cit., p.151 and p.221.

(53) a. W. Foster, English Factories in India 1624-29, op.cit., p.189, Letter from Gregory Clement and others from Agra to the President at Surat dated 31-12-1627.
   b. W. Foster, English Factories in India 1624-29, op.cit., p.208, Letter from President Kerridge of Surat to the E.I. Company dated 4-1-1628.
(54) Tavernier, Vol.II, op.cit., pp. 122


   b. William Foster, Early Travels in India 1583-1619.
      (Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press) 1921,
      p. 132.


(58) Letters Received, op.cit., Vol.VI, p. 192, Letter from
     Joseph Salabancke to the E.I. Company 1617.


(60) Letters Received, op.cit., Vol.VI, p. 129, Letter
     dated 21-10-1617.

(61) Letters Received, op.cit., Vol.VI, p. 129-130, Letter
     dated 21-10-1617.

(62) Letters Received, op.cit., Vol.VI, p. 254, Letter
     dated December 1617.

(63) Letters Received, op.cit., Vol.VI, p. 258, Letter
     from Edward Mennox to the Company.

(64) Letters Received, op.cit., Vol.VI, p. 196. Letter
     from Joseph Salabancke of Agra to the E.I. Company.

(65) Letters Received, op.cit., Vol.VI, p. 155, Letter
     from Thomas Roe to Martin Pring 1617. See also p. 176,
     Letter from Martin Pring to the E.I. Company.

(66) Letters Received, Vol.VI, op.cit., p. 227, Letter
     from Roe to Kerridge dated 18-12-1617.


(69) Purchas, op.cit., Vol.III, pp.120-121.


(72) Purchas, op.cit., Vol.III, pp.82-83, Salabancke refers to the richness of the land between Surat and Agra in cotton and cotton products.


(76) Tavernier, Vol.II, op.cit., p.5

(77) a. Letters Received, op.cit., Vol.VI, p.60 and p.283.
    b. Letters Received, op.cit., Vol.IV, p.306.


(80) Letters Received, op.cit., Vol.IV, p.247.


(82) Foster, English Factories in India, op.cit., 1624-29, Introduction, p.v.

(83) Foster, English Factories in India, op.cit., 1624-29, p.335, Letter from Surat to the E.I. Company dated 27-4-1629.

(84) Purchas, op.cit., Vol.III, p.3.


(90) Purchas, op.cit., Vol.IV, pp.137-144.

(91) Foster, English Factories in India, op.cit., 1624-29, p.224.

(92) Foster, English Factories in India, op.cit., 1624-29, p.224.

(93) Foster, English Factories in India, op.cit., 1624-29, p.227, Letter from President Kerridge of Surat to the Agents at Banta, dated 20-1-1628.

