CHAPTER I

CAUSES FOR THE INVASION

It was only after Haider Ali had assumed control of the Mysore kingdom that he undertook the invasion of Malabar in the year 1766 (1). The following reasons were ostensibly assigned to this action by the new ruler of Mysore. Firstly to collect the war indemnity from the zamorin of Kozhikode, secondly to realise the debt due from the Raja of Chirakal to the Raja of Neelaswaram by virtue of conquest of that country Haider claimed it, thirdly to punish the Raja of Travancore for evading to pay compensation for the military preparations Haider made on his behalf and lastly to make use of an invitation sent to him for conquering the country by the Aly Raja of Cannanore and Cau Cond, one of the scions of the Kolatiri family. But the actual cause was that Haider Ali wanted to enlarge his sphere of influence and to obtain his suzerainty over this resourceful country with many natural harbours that were centres of world contact.

Haider Ali, who was waiting for an opportunity to interfere in Kerala politics, got it through the agency of the Raja of Palghat when his territory was conquered by the Zamorin of

(1) Pyn. (Rec.) S.No. 56, Part I, Voucher No.4, p.6f.
Kozhikode (2). Komi Achan, the Palghat Raja, in his extremity appealed to Haidar Ali, then Faujdar of Dindigal for military aid when Zamorin was marching against him. Haidar Ali, accordingly sent a force of 2000 horse and 5000 infantry under his brother-in-law Makhdom Saheb. This force aided by Palghat Nairs carried their arms as far the gates of Zamorin's Capital (3). The Zamorin's force fell back and he bought off his opponents by agreeing to restore his Palghat conquests and by promising to pay a war indemnity of 12 lakhs of rupees (4). But Zamorin taking advantage of the dissensions in the Mysore capital opened negotiations with Dev Raj, once the Ministers of the Mysore kaja with the request that he would directly pay the amount to the Mysore Government instead of paying to Haidar Ali. Dev Raj who was jealous of the rising fortune of Haidar Ali, agreed that the Zamorin would pay the promised amount to him through his agents and he would cause the recall of Haidar Ali's army from his kingdom (5). Accordingly, Dev Raj required his Rajput Chief Hari Singh to proceed to Calicut for the realisation of the amount from Zamorin. Haidar Ali withdrew his army, respecting the command from Dev Raj.

But Hari Singh, before he could realise the amount from Zamorin, returned hurriedly to Seringapatam on hearing the death of his patron Dev Raj on June 19, 1758 (6).

Even on this event different views are expressed by our historians. K.K. Ganicker is of opinion that Haidar Ali's army

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5) Ibid.
6) Ibid.
returned from Calicut after receiving the first instalment of
the promised amount from the Zamorin and that Haidar Ali
connived to cause the murder of Hari Singh on his way back
to Seringapatam. (7). This is not correct. The fact that the
Zamorin did not pay a single pie to Haidar Ali is sufficiently
substantiated with evidences by W.Logan, in his *Malabar Manual*
and Prof.N.K.Sinha, in his *Haidar Ali*. (8). To say that
Hari Singh was treacherously murdered by Makhдум Sahib under
the orders of Haidar Ali is also a partial historical truth.
That Hari Singh met his death at the hands of Makhдум is true,
but the circumstances under which it was executed is quite
different. One of the contemporary writers, Mir Fusain Ali Khan
Kirmani, narrates this event in detail in his *Mishar-i-Haidari*.
He says that Hari Singh was the Delwai Daud Raj in arrest and
prevented even water for kitchen use. On witnessing these occu-
rences Haidar with the permission of the Delwai defeated Hari
Singh. (9). The author continues that Delwai was so pleased that
with the exception of the money and articles belonging to him-
self, presented the whole of the plunder to Haidar Ali "whose
prudence in this action acquired for him great renown"(10).

The Zamorin calculated that since the internal con-
ditions of Mysore were unstable he could avoid paying the sti-
pulated amount. But the claim to this war subsidy was never
relinquished by Haidar Ali and to recover the same was one of
his objects in invading Malabar.

(7) K.M. Panicker: Freedom Struggle of Kerala, P.421.
(9) Kirmani: *Mishar-i-Haidari* (Miles), P.41.
(10) Ibid.
When Canara became a part of his Kingdom by conquest, Haider Ali espoused the claim of the vanquished ruler of the place over the Kolatiri Raja who had to pay two lakhs of pagodas to the late ruler of Canara. (11) When the English Company’s agents met him at Bednore and requested him to desist from attacking the Company’s ally, the Raja of Kolatiri, Haider promised to do so if the Raja were to pay two lakhs pagodas due from him to the Bednore Government. (12).

As this claim was overlooked by the Kolatiri Raja, Haider Ali determined to realise it by force and made it one of his ostensible reasons to invade the country.

But Haider Ali’s grievance against the Raja of Travancore was long standing. His attention was drawn to this part of the country when he was only an officer in the Mysore army in 1751, when Marthanda Varma of Travancore requested his assistance for the suppression of his refractory Nair nobles (13). Haider Ali promised to send a powerful army and made necessary military preparations for the purpose. The news of Haider Ali’s military support alarmed the nobles and frightened them into submission to the Raja. (14). The immediate submission of Nair nobility of Travancore freed the Raja from the threatened internal disorder and danger and he therefore declined to accept the assistance and intimated Haider Ali accordingly. But Haider Ali claimed the expenses he had incurred in this respect and the Raja was held liable for the loss of money due to this (15). When this claim was not met with, Haider Ali decided to wait and watch.

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(11) T.F.R.: March 10, 1766; Cons. April 2, 1766.
(12) Ibid.
(14) P.K.S. Raja: Medieval Kerala, P.211.
(15) Memorandum Moons: Memorandum etc., P.154.
the course of events and wreak his vengeance when opportunity would arise.

To facilitate matters for him the Aly Raja of Cannanore and Kappu Thanpan of the Kohatiri family now invited him to invade the country to settle old scores. (16). Aly Raja was the only Muslim ruler in Kerala who might have thought better for his prospects if Haidar Ali conquered the country. (17).

The relation of Aly Raja with the rulers of Malabar was also not friendly. This Mopilah royal family of Cannanore was respected by the rest of the Muslim community of Malabar and in whose rise they found shelter and the Nair community felt envious, the result of which was continuous skirmishes and open fights between these communities. (18). The Malabar Joint Commissioners in their Report give a number of instances that led to bloody massacres and open riots. (19). The story of this development is described by the author of 'The History of Hyder Shah and of his son Tipoo Sultan'. (20). He says that the Mopilahs who grew rich by the monopoly of trade and commerce were envied by the Nairs who often found impossible to repay the money advanced to them and that due to organised conspiracies more than 6000 Mopilahs were massacred by them on an appointed day. (21). He continues to say, "the Mopilahs in their distress, hastened to send deputies to Hyder, to inform him of the catastrophe and implore his protection....." (22).

Haidar Ali might have apparently espoused the cause of the Muslims of Malabar. In this respect, Haidar Ali, as any

(16) Fnq. (Misc.) S.No. 55, P.21, Para.20.
(17) Ibid.
(19) Fnq. (Misc.) S.No. 55, P.242, Para.263; PP.260-61,Para.281.
(22) Ibid, P.66.
other prudent invader would consider the help of a large section of the people of the country that he intended to conquer, might have thought it helpful in minimising his task to a great extent.* Therefore he gladly accepted the invitation of Aly Raja and Capou Thampam to conquer the country which he himself was awaiting for a favourable opportunity. Capou Thampam was one of the junior members of the Kolatiri family who was irreconcilable with the ruling prince - the Prince Regent of Chirakal. He wanted assistance from outside and sided with Aly Raja to fulfil his ambition of becoming the ruler of Kolatiri Kingdom. This was also a favourable situation for Haider Ali.

These were the outward reasons put by Haider Ali to justify his conquest of Malabar. But by far the most important cause was that Malabar became particularly important for him when he became ruler of Mysore. For the existence of his military Government, he had to procure equipments, horses and firearms, from outside India for which easy access to the sea with ports and harbours was felt imperative. The political development

* To say that Haider Ali conquered Malabar due to the only reason of getting the grievances of Muslims redressed as the author of ‘the History of Hyder Shah etc.’ claims, is not correct. The writer of this book falls in line with the other English authors who try to create a sound background to explain away their allegations of religious bigotry of the Mysore Nawabs. Many a literature have come down to us, the authenticity of many of them are critically and reasonably treated by Prof. Mohibbul Hasan Khan in his work ‘History of Tipu Sultan’ (Appendix E, Bibliography, PP. 396-401). If one can establish that Haider Ali conquered Kerala only because he felt grieved by the plight of the Mussalman Community of Malabar, then as a corollary one should be convinced easily that Haider Ali and his son Tipu Sultan might have committed religious atrocities.
and the balance of power made him believe that he could not safely depend on the friendship of the English. Therefore, Haidar Ali cherished to have intimate contact with the French power in India. Thus it was unavoidable for him to possess an independent and unmolested access to the ports in the West Coast. Since Pondicherry was far away from Mysore and since the Nawab of Carnatic, Mohamed Ali was Haidar's enemy whose territory lay between Mysore and Pondicherry thus making the inter-communication too difficult a process, Haidar turned to the West Coast. He would be in a position to have constant contact with Mahe, the French pocket in the Malabar Coast, for all practical purposes in his relations with the French. The most important cause for undertaking the invasion of Malabar by Haidar Ali was to ensure the control of the means of communications and lands leading to Mahe, the French possession in Kerala. Thus Haidar Ali in all aspects was motivated more by political considerations and the least by religious regards in conquering Kerala. To say otherwise will be quite unhistoric.

Conquest.

Haidar Ali conquered Canara in 1763 (1) and thus became a neighbour of the Malabar Coast. Aly Raja of Cannanore, whose principality formed the southern boundary of Canara, met him on a deputation and invited him to conquer Malabar (2). Haidar who was very keen to form a fleet took advantage of the invitation of Aly Raja who had a number of well-equipped vessels at sea, appointed him his High Admiral and his brother Sheik Aly, Intendent of the marine. (3). Thus preparing himself a ground for substantial support he sent a Brahmin envoy - Anand Raw - to Malabar to acquaint with the political developments of the place and intimate to the English, the French and the Dutch of his desire to conquering Malabar. (4). He requested the English to help him with four or five hundred soldiers and sufficient arms. (5). When the Tellichery Factors declined,

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(2) Fgn. (Rec.) S.No. 55, P.21.
(5) Ibid.
Baidar required them to at least not object to his subjugation of the Malabar princes, to which also the Factors could not agree. (6).

The Tellichery Settlement was in alliance with a number of Malabar Princes. They entered into a treaty of friendship with the Raja of Chirakal on April 21, 1757. By this treaty, the Raja had been promised help if he was attacked. (7)

But the English found it very difficult to extend their open support when the Raja required it as it would lead to an open war with Baidar Ali, which they were not prepared at that time. (8)

Therefore the English decided to help the Raja only secretly. (9) At the same time the Company's representatives when they heard in December 1765, about Baidar's preparations to conquer Malabar met him at Bedanore with the demand that all the trade privileges granted to the Company by the several Malabar Princes would be confirmed. Baidar issued a firman on February 23, 1766 granting all the trade privileges enjoyed by them. (10) Thus the Tellicherry Factors were fully alive to the fact that Baidar Ali's invasion of Malabar was only a question of time. (11)

During the month of February 1766, Baidar Ali reached

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(6) Ibid, No. 13, 1764, Tellichery and Bombay - Cons. Nov. 28, 1764.


(8) Fgn. and Home Department - 1756-80, Secret Cons. No. 1

(9) Board's Minute - Cons. April 4, 1766.


Kancalortt with an army of 12000 of his best troops of which 4000 were cavalry and the rest infantry and began his march to the Coast of Malabar directing his route by Mangalore and Cannanore (12). Haider Ali reaching Cannanore was received by Aly Raja with not less than 12000 soldiers of whom the author of ‘the History of Ryder Shah etc.’ speaks “ill-armed.....but superior in courage to Naiks” (13). Haider was very much pleased with his conduct and “by presents and kindness gained his confidence because the Chief was known to be well-acquainted with secrets of the country, he associated him in his plans.” (14).

The combined army marched against the Kolatiri family in the month of February 1766. (15). The opposition was not serious. The Raja of Chirakal was soon defeated and slain. His son who was only seven years old was adopted by Haider (16), and was named Iyes Khan (17). Aly Raja and his men seized their palace at Chirakal. Some members of the royal family with their attendants took refuge in the Brass Pagoda within Tellicbery limits. (18).

There are different versions about the strength of Haider’s army. K.M. Panicker calculates “over 40,000 soldiers among whom were 10,000 cavalry and the rest infantry” (Press Struggle of Kerala, p.430). He claims for his authority on Dutch records. Meems, the then Dutch Governor who is expected to speak more authoritatively about the Dutch Documents neither mention the number of Haider’s army nor K.M. Panicker himself points out his authority on any particular Dutch record which he claims to have consulted. It can be reasonably pointed out that in 1756, Nakhda Saheb, could defeat the Zamorin who was the most powerful ruler of Malabar with an army of only 5000 men of which 2000 were cavalry. Reiterating the strength of Haider’s army to 12,000, the Author of ‘the History of Ryder Shah etc’, writes “...since the Nabob who had ....brought no more than twelve thousand men with him: it was to be presumed, that he was certain that the number he had brought was sufficient to defeat his enemies.” (N.M.D.L.T.: Op.Cit., p.68).

(14) Rimanis in ahan-i-Haidari, P.184.
(16) For a fuller treatment see ‘History of Timo Sultan’ by Mohibbul Hasan Khan, Foot note of page 32.
The Mysore army moved towards Kottayam where the ruling prince and his nobles had already left the place. After the occupation of Chirakkal and Kottayam the triumphant army marched southward aiming at the principality of Madattanad, where for the first time Haider met an organised and serious opposition. To enter into the territory, the Mysorean army had to cross the Nahe river. But in the southern bank of the river, the Malayalee princes strongly posted their Nair militia. Haider Ali appraised the situation a difficult one. Here he employed one of the rare tactics of warfare in surprising his enemy by crossing the river with his cavalry. (19). He left his infantry in the northern bank of the river and required them to pretend to enter into the fleet kept ready for crossing the river. At the same time, Haider with his cavalry traversed the river at a distance, sometimes swimming and sometimes wading, he came to the other side where the Nairs were buried in attempting to oppose the infantry, who pretended to be on the point of passing over. (20).

The Nairs were frightened at the sudden appearance of the cavalry and fled with the utmost precipitation and

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(20) Ibid.

The cause for this complete rout of Nair militia is assigned by our historians in different ways. K.M. Panicker is of opinion that cavalry was totally unknown to the Nairs and that they were panic-stricken at its sight and that this was the cause for their rout. ("Freedom Struggle of Kerala", P.438). To say that cavalry was unknown to the rulers of Kerala is not correct. K.M. Panicker himself writes in his book "Salabar and the Dutch" that Marthanda Varma of Travancore employed cavalry even before 1750. We have seen in 1756-57, when Haider Ali sent his brother-in-law to help the Raja of Palghat, his force included 2000 cavalry.
disorder" (21). Haidar ordered to pursue the fugitives who had escaped into the jungles and hills. They were combed out. Many of them were killed and much more were taken prisoners. (22). Thus the Nairs who were no match for disciplined troops in open fight were defeated on the sole occasion on which they attempted in force to oppose Haidar Ali. Evaluating the military achievements of Haidar Ali over the Nair princes of Kerala Prof. N.K. Sinha, observes, "the conquest of Malabar was perhaps Haidar's most arduous feat of arms." (23).

This was the first and the last opposition Haidar Ali had to encounter with, in his conquest of Malabar. From Kadattanad, Haidar Ali sent his deputies with the offer of peace to the Zamorin and other princes (24). Zamorin at first sent away the envoys of Haidar Ali "with utmost contempt" (25). But the situation changed very much then, after the flight of the combined forces that opposed Haidar near the banks of the Mahe river. Zamorin prepared to submit before the conqueror and informed him accordingly (26). Haidar, it is reported, received him cordially and promised to restore his dominions on condition of paying an annual tribute as soon as his subjects have laid down their arms (27). This is corroborated by Kirmani who says, "the Nawab from convenience and policy...honoured the Chief with a Kawnama..... gave him his life and property and forgave his offences." (28). Thus an agreement was reached.

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(22) Ibid, P.291.
(24) Moens: Memorandum etc., P.132.
(25) Ibid, P.133.
(27) Ibid, P.71.
between Haidar Ali and Zamorin to the effect that the former would not conquer Calicut on payment of the arrears and the war indemnity and the latter agreed to pay the stipulated amount. (29).

But the Zamorin returning to his palace committed suicide. (30). He set his palace on fire and burnt himself to death. (31). The cause for this tragic end of a ruling prince of the renowned dynasty of Malabar was that Haidar Ali demanded to pay him ready cash the agreed amount of a crore of gold mohrs (32), as he was not prepared to listen for any other adjustment, to which the Zamorin pleaded his inability to comply with due to want of sufficient money. Since he had no other alternative, he ended his life with the palace and people therein.

The position was such that no one can accuse either the Zamorin or Haidar Ali for creating a situation leading to such a crisis. Both of them had their own justifications. Haidar Ali might be adamant in his demand and refused to believe the Zamorin, because of his past experience of breach of contract from the predecessor of this prince who evaded in paying the promised amount of twelve lakhs of rupees in the year 1757, as war indemnity. At the same time the Zamorin might not be in a position to pay off his arrears, tribute money and war expenses. The rulers of Kozhikode were always in financial difficulties. As early as 1723, in the negotiations of peace with the Dutch, fell through for the time being over the question of the amount of indemnity, "the Zamorin asserting that he had no cash...." (33). As we know it that the Zamorin could not pay the war indemnity of 12 lakhs of rupees to Haidar Ali as was agreed upon between himself and Makhdom Ali, the realisation of which was one of the

(30) Moens: P.133.
(31) Fgn. (Misc.) S.No. 55, P.19.
(33) D.R.: No.13, P.21, and P.133.
ostensible causes of Haidar Ali's invasion. Again when the Zamorin was re-instituted in 1768, on a definite condition of annual tribute, he fell in arrears and consequent to this, he was removed from the office in the year 1773. (34). Same was repeated when the English experimented with the Zamorin by bestowing his Kingdom under his management after the Treaty of Seringapatam. (35). Thus Zamorin might not have been in a position to clear his financial commitments with the conqueror.

Several reasons were brought out by different writers about this tragic event. The popular version accepted by most of our historians is the opinion of Jonathan Duncan, who was President of the 'First Malabar Commission' in 1792 and afterwards the Governor of Bombay. He writes that the Zamorin was sent under a guard of 500 horses and 2000 infantry to the Fort of Calicut, and that the Raja was confined in his own house without food and was strictly prohibited from performing the ceremonies of his religion. He continues to say that as the Zamorin thought that Haidar might inflict some further disgrace upon him, either by causing him hanged, or blown from a gun, he set fire to the house with his own hand and was consumed in it. (35). Moens says that the prince in fear of his life set his palace on fire and burnt to death. (37). Modern writers in their speculation contribute some other reasons also to narrate.

(34) D.R.: No.13, P.133.
(37) Moens: 'Memorandum etc.', P.133.
unfortunate incident.* But another contemporary writer
asserts that the Zamorin ended his life on account of some
letters he received from his nephews and the Rajas of Travancore
and Cochin. He writes, "these letters contained the
bitterest reproaches and execrations, treating as the betrayer
of his country and apostate to his religion, which he had
abandoned to the Muhammedans. The Brahmin who had conveyed
these letters to him, avowed to him at the same time that he
was degraded and excluded from his caste and that all the
Brahmins and the Rayars had sworn never to have any communi-
cation with him." (38). This statement also does not fully
comprehend the case. The Raja of Travancore was a tributary
to Mohamed Ali, the Nawab of Carnatic, and the Raja of Palghat
sought assistance from Haidar Ali to repel Zamorin from his
territory and the Raja of Cochin was negotiating through the
Dutch Governor Moens for becoming a tributary to Haidar Ali to
save himself from the impending invasion, are all examples to
show that Zamorin committed suicide not because of any fear of
excommunication.

*Prof. K.V. Krishna Iyier in his 'Zamorins of Kozhikode' says
that when his position became weaker and weaker, his deter-
mination not to accept defeat from the hands of Muhammedan
invader also became stronger and stronger and that he decided
therefore, to destroy himself with the Fort that had never
opened its gates to an invader since its inception and
accordingly set fire to the palace. (The Zamorins of Kozhi-
kode', P.240). K.M. Panicker finds one more reason that the
Zamorin might have reasonably apprehended that he might be
converted to Islam and that he did a heroic deed of commit-
ting suicide that was quite appropriate to the time. ('Freedom
Struggle of Kerala', P.434)

(38) M.M.D.L.T: History of Ryder Shah etc., P.71.
With the death of the ruling prince of Calicut under this tragic circumstances the country lay before the conqueror without any opposition. Haidar Ali thus occupied the whole of Malabar without much difficulty. The only one of those Chiefs who appears to have remained unaffected by the general overthrow was the Rair of Coirangotta who under the auspices and protection of the French Government of Raha went out and met Haidar on his march from Cherickeri to Calicut. (39). It appears that Haidar equally respected the district of Randalam which was under the possession of the Tellichery Factory. (40).

Though he respected the territorial integrity of the English possession in Malabar he was not pleased with their conduct who gave protection to the fugitive princes. His indignation was openly expressed to the Dutch Commandant who met him at Calicut for negotiations with him as regards to the Cochin territory. (41). The Dutch records claim that Haidar Ali proposed an offensive and defensive alliance with them to deprive the English from Malabar Coast. (42). The English also regarded the trade privileges confirmed by them to their Company as merely a pretension "to amuse and prevent our interfering in his schemes of conquest." (43). But they were not in a position to come into an open rupture with Haidar Ali as is manifested by the letters received from Madras Government advising the Bombay Council not to enter into an open conflict. (44).

The efforts of the Dutch to purchase immunity for Cochin from invasion were successful. Haidar Ali agreed for a subsidy of two lakhs of rupees and eight elephants. (45). But the

(39) Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, pp. 18-19.
(41) D.R. No. 13, p. 153.
(43) Board's Minute, Cons., April 4, 1766.
(44) Vide supra - Reference No. 6.
(45) D.R. No. 13, pp. 153-54.
Raja of Travancore strong in the assurance of the English support objected to contribute anything on the ground that he was already tributary to the Nawab Mohamed Ali and that he could not afford to subsidise two suzerains at the same time. (46).

Moens says that Haidar Ali dictating terms for immunity from invasion of Cochin and Travancore told them that "they should prevail on Travancore also to pay a substantial sum." (47)

Haidar Ali is reported to have added that if the latter was not inclined to pay "he would pay him a visit." (48).

But the proposed 'visit' was averted by the Monsoon that had set in by that time. After putting garrisons at Calicut and Vengoli, Haidar bestowed the Government of this conquered territory on Madanna, an experienced revenue officer, as Civil Governor of the place. (49). Aly Raja of Cannanore was required to administer the affairs of the Kolatiri Kingdom of Chirakal. (50). The rainy season which is very tempestuous on the Coast of Malabar began to appear and obliged Haidar Ali to quit the place, but in order to be at hand to watch his new conquest he retired only to Coimbatore. (51).

Thus the attempt of Haidar Ali to conquer Kerala was a great success. This was an important acquisition for him, "as it gave him a long Coast and made him a sea-power" (52).

The over-thrown of the Malayalee princes and the conquest of their hereditary principalities, were completed within a

(47) Moens: 'Memorandum etc', P. 154.
(48) Ibid.
(49) Logan: Vol. I, P. 411.
(50) Fgn. (Misc.) S. No. 55, P. 21, Para. 20.
period of four months. It was made easy to his account of the disintegrated political condition of Malabar and the mode of warfare practised by the Saip militia. The defeat was certain under the disunited political set up of the country of which Professor F.K. Sinha comments, "it would not have been possible but for the complete disunion that prevailed among the fighting section of the people - the Saits."(53).

The superior military force with up-to-date war materials and the prowess of its leader on one side and the lack of disciplined and organised composition and want of centralised leadership on the other side made the failure of Kerala princes. The Saik soldiers lacked the essential quality of cohesion and combined effort because they were not used to a disciplined and organised army movement. They could fight in a single combat and put up a nice show of their valour and courage but on the face of a trained and disciplined force they failed miserably. This mode of warfare and want of organisation caused their rout and lessened the task of the conqueror.

Rebellion of 1766 A.D.

Haidar Ali returned from Malabar, after its conquest in the first week of June, 1766 without effecting his proposed scheme of "paying a visit" to the Travancore State.(1). It was due to the impending rainy season that would convert even the smallest rivulets into large rivers and would cut away all the inland communications and would place insurmountable obstacles for military movements. Therefore, he retraced his steps to Coimbatore after leaving an army of 3000 men under his military commandant Raza Sahab, at "adakkara, a place bordering Coimbatore where he stayed with the rest of his army to 'watch his


*Andrien Momen: Memorandum on the Administration of the Malabar Coast, P.132.*

*Raza Sahab or Raja Sahab was the son of Chanda Saheb, ruler of Trichinopoly. Chanda Saheb and later his son Raza Sahab became army Generals under Haidar Ali and later Tipu Sultan (Index to the Fgn. and Pol.Dept.Records, 1756-80 - P.403.*
new conquest* (2).

Immediately after his departure, the monsoon had set in with all its torrents and ferocity. The vanquished princes and the routed Nair soldiers who were forced to take refuge in the forests (3), came out from their hiding places and organised a revolt against the Mysorean occupation of Malabar. This was in the third week of June (4). The Nairs of Chirakkal and Kadattnad were the leaders of this revolt (5). The block houses or military out-posts established by Haidar Ali and garrisoned by a handful of soldiers were surprised by the Nair soldiers fiercely. The communications of these out-posts were cut off by the swollen streams and the garrison inside lost all hope of contacting the chief forts at Calicut and Ponnani. One after another the out-posts were closely invested and some of them were captured. Instead of strengthening and fortifying these captured block houses, the rebels destroyed them immediately after their occupation. In this process, a number of Mysore soldiers were killed (6).

The rebels moved triumphantly to Calicut and Ponnani for a trial of strength. It was only at this stage that the Mysore garrisons at Calicut and Ponnani knew of the adverse developments in the country. Both these garrisons found it well-nigh impossible to convey the news to Raza Saheb, who was at

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(3) Fgn. (Misc.) S.No. 56, Part I, P. 80.
(4) Francis Buchanan: A Travel through Mysore etc., P. 181.
(5) Fgn. (Misc.) S.No. 56, P. 97.
Madakkara, on the frontiers of Coimbatore. At last with the help of a Portuguese sailor, who was promised a handsome reward, the adverse tiding of Malabar was conveyed to Raza Saheb (7). Immediately after the receipt of this revolt and the news of the dangerous position of the garrisons, he started with his army giving due information to Haidar Ali who was at Coimbatore.

Raza Saheb had no cavalry with him. The inundated condition under which almost all the country was laid by the over-flowing of the rivers placed before him innumerable impediments. The Nair soldiers attacked the army from unexpected quarters of their hiding (8). The haste with which Raza Saheb had to lead his army and the flooded situation of the country finally led him to be blocked in between Tutakal and Ponnani rivers. It was a dangerous situation. The army could not advance further on account of swollen streams nor it could retreat due to the depredations of the Nair rebels who stood strongly in the rear (9).

Thus Raza Saheb was entrapped with his force of 3000 men without any means of escape from the ravages of the rebels. No sooner had Haidar Ali heard of the revolt than he recalled a party of his cavalry that had been cantoned at Coimbatore. He required a chosen few of his infantry to be in readiness to march on at the shortest notice. Raza Saheb having contrived to send advice of his perilous situation, Haidar made a bold and remarkable dash with 3000 horse and 10000 infantry. The movement of Haidar's army is graphically narrated by the author of 'The History of Hyder Shah etc.' whose descriptions are the source material used by all historians

of Kerala History. The passage is worth quoting. "...Imagine an army of fifteen thousand men marching from the break of day through a mountainous country........exposed from morning till night to a constant shower, equal to those that fall in the greatest storms, attended with frequent thunder and lightening....frequently obliged to cross rivers up to the chin in water and sometimes swimming..." (10). This unexpected march obliged the Nairs to give some relief to the force of Raza Saheb as they had to collect all their troops to put up an organised fight. The position of the Nair soldiers in a strongly entrenched camp near Pudiyangadi in Ponnani Taluk was highly favourable to them. On the other hand, the Mysore army had to expose themselves in the open field. As the first attempt of the Mysore army to encounter the rebels in an open fight failed, Haidar Ali ordered his European troops to advance forthwith. (12). They jumped into the ditch, hastily ascending the retrenches and were in the face of the enemy in an instant. (13). The rebels were astonished to the last degree and fled from their camp in disorder and precipitate.

Moens, the then Dutch Governor of Malabar observes, "no sooner did the forces of the Nabob make a formidable attack, than the Nairs retreated into the woods and the mountains." (14). This easy victory over his enemies gave him "infinite pleasure", that he gave away a gratification of thirty Rupees to every soldier and twice that sum to each of the wounded. K.H. Panicker assumes that the fight was a severe one

(10) The History of Hyder Shah etc., PP.75-6.
(12) Ibid.
(14) Moens: Op.Cit., P.153,
because the distribution of presents by Haider Ali was the manifestation of his relief in converting the impending defeat of his army into victory. (15). This statement is in contravention of contemporary evidence. In spite of the fact that the Mysore army was exposed to the continuous fire from the entrenched ditch with destructive aims for more than two hours, the casualty of the Mysore army was "no more than one died" (16), will disprove the severity of the fight. Thus without losing much blood, Haider Ali could accomplish a brilliant success over the rebels.

The causes and consequences of this revolt are described by the historians in different ways. K.M. Panicker says that immediately after Haider Ali left Malabar with the utmost satisfaction of a successful conquest, the Nairs organised a national resistance and that the appointment of "the hated Aly Raja of Cannare as the ruler of Chirakal aroused in them the spirit of patriotism to launch a liberation movement." (17). Haider Ali reached Coimbatore on the 4th of June, (18), and "on the 24th June....... news reached the Factors", writes Logan, basing his source on the Tellicherry Factory Diary, "that the Kottayam and Kadattnad Nairs had risen and retaken many places and next day it was reported that Aly Raja had been appointed civil Governor and his brother Sheik Aly, Military Governor of Kadattnad." (18)(a). This shows that the revolt took place only after three weeks since

(a) See N.K. Sinha, Haider Ali, Vol I, P.258
Haidar Ali retired to Coimbatore and not the days following his departure or even before Haidar Ali reached Coimbatore as K.M. Panicker makes us believe. He himself unknowingly agrees when he writes that the appointment of the 'hated Aly Raja' as Governor of Chirakal was the signal for the revolt. This appointment was on 25th June, 1766 (18-b). This again proves beyond doubt that Haidar Ali himself suspected something of the kind when he decided to reside at Coimbatore, "in order to be at hand to watch his new conquest" (19). But the expression of K.M. Panicker to the effect that Haidar Ali left Malabar "with the utmost satisfaction of a triumphant conquest" is to cast aspersions on the prudence of the conqueror. There was ample time at his disposal to reach Serigapatam before the revolt took place; if he was fully contented with his performance and subsequent arrangements of Malabar. If we follow the historian of Kerala, "the vigilance, experience and wisdom" (20) attributed to him not only by Kirmani, but also by hostile historians will give place to gross imprudent and impolitic conduct. It was because of his wisdom and experience, Haidar Ali thought of giving vigilance over his conquered territory by a watch and ward retiring only to the vicinity of Malabar.

K.M. Panicker makes out 'the spirit of patriotism and an unflinching thrust for freedom' of Nair soldiers, as the important cause for this rebellion. Moens, the contemporary writer and the biographer of Haidar Ali remarks that this revolt was the effect of the secret intrigues of the King of

Travancore and the nephews of the Zamorin. He continues to say that the English Factory of Tellichery provided all possible help to the rebels (20). This is corroborated by the author of 'The History of Hyder Shah etc.' (21). The Raja of Travancore fomented disturbances in Malabar and helped his brother rulers who took protection under him, (22) with a view of keeping the Mysoreans engaged with the internal problems of Malabar and save himself from the threatened invasion. The appointment of the Raja of Cannanore as the Governor of Chirakkal deprived the Kolattiri family of their return to power which might be the important cause of the rebellion. The Nair princes and Chieftains who were used to the tradition of the victor being enjoined on to return the kingdoms and principalities after a war to the respective Rajas and nobles found a drastic change after the Malabar conquest of Haidar Ali. This rude shock combined with the ascendency of Aly Raja, though a native ruler but the adherent of a different faith was unthinkable for the Nairs. The lack of communications, transport facilities and the inundated condition of the country facilitated the 'freedom fighters', to rise in revolt against 'the foreign rule', with the help of the native Englishmen of Tellichery Factory! In fact these 'freedom struggles' were skillfully engineered by the English Factors against which a number of protests were made by Haidar Ali (23) and after him, his son Tipu Sultan (23-a). They gave shelter to the fugitive princes (24) and always kept them as their trump cards to fan the flame of disturbances in the country. It was a standing complaint with Tipu Sultan that the English were assisting

(23) Fgn.Secret (Dept.) Pro. 1-22, Sept.1788, S.No.92,PP.3803-4.
(23-a) P.R.C. No.37A.
(24) Myly.Cons, Jan. 1, 1790, Vol., 133 A.
Malabar princes against Mysore. (25). In the following discussions, we can witness how these rebellions sponsored as a corollary of Anglo-Mysore wars. If these can be termed as 'freedom struggles' the not result of which was the end of the Mysorean rule and the ascendancy of the English.

After the rout of the rebels Haider Ali, it is reported to have mercilessly massacred a number of Nair soldiers (26). The author of the History of Hyder Shah etc. further alleges that before he quitted the country, Hyder by a solemn edict, declared the Nairas deprived of all their privileges as and ordained that their caste, which was first after the Brahmins, should thereafter be the lowest of all castes, subjecting them to salute the Parias and others of the lowest castes by ranging themselves before them as the other Malabers had been obliged to do before the Nairs; permitting all the other castes to bear arms and forbidding them to Nairs who till then had enjoyed the sole right of carrying them; at the same time allowing all persons to kill such Nairs as were found bearing arms. This ordinance being found to make the submission of the Nairs absolutely impossible because they would have thought death preferable to such a degradation, he made a new edict by which he re-established in all their rights and privileges such Nairs as should embrace the Muhammadan religion. (27)

These edicts were copied down by all historians of Kerala who dealt with the subject, either to justify the royal proclamation as P.K. Balakrishnan does in his book *Tipu Sultan* (28) or to condemn down-right as K.M. Panicker and other writers do. (29). After a searching scrutiny of available materials, it seems that the so-called edicts of Haidar Ali have borne out from the imagination of the Author of *the History of Hyder Shah etc.*. No other contemporary observer corroborates this. Kirmani who seems enthused to write such acts as a laudable credit of Haidar Ali does not mention these edicts. Another important contemporary author is the Dutch Governor Moens. He would have certainly mentioned this most important royal proclamations in his *Memo-
ranium on the administration of the Malabar Coast*, if they were actually proclaimed by Haidar Ali. It should be remembered that Moens had written a biography of Haidar Ali also. The 'linguist' of the Tellichery Factory who appears to be very informative in his letters to his superiors in gathering even silly news and minor events of the country to help them appraise the actual situation of the place does not mention anything of the kind in his correspondence covering this period. Therefore it can safely be presumed as an inventory of a malicious mien to malign the Mysorean occupation of Kerala as a rule of religious persecutions and forcible conversions. All historians of Kerala swallowed these allegations without scrutiny. The fundamental mistake with the writers of this period of Kerala history is that they had taken the Author of the History

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(28) P.K. Balakrishnan: Tipu Sultan, P.229.
PALGHAT FORT
(Built By Haidar Ali in 1766)
of Hyder Shah etc. as an absolute authority to detail cut their historical narrations. No one tried to scrutinise the utterances of this unknown author.

The hollowness of the invention of this author can easily be exposed by a single argument why did Haidar Ali promulgate a second edict conferring all rights to those Nairs who were prepared to convert to the religion of Islam? It is evident that when they convert they cease to be Nairs and naturally the first edict 'depriving the Nairs of their privileges' will not apply to them. Therefore, the question of a second edict does not arise or if that is proclaimed, it becomes superfluous.

Haidar Ali after suppressing the rebellion made up his mind to construct a fort at Palghat, "which lying in the centre of the gap in the line of ghats, was judiciously chosen as an advanced post and depot to facilitate communications with the newly subdued province." (30). When the erection of the fort was in execution, his attention was drawn to Mysore where the Nizam and the Murrattas supported by the English were threatening his kingdom with an invasion. Therefore, Haidar Ali left Malabar for Mysore.

There were no serious disturbances in Malabar till the out-break of the First Anglo-Mysore War, when under the instigation of the English, some of the vanguished chieftains served them with their retinues. (31) But the two Collectors of British Malabar, whose Manuals and Gazetteers supply immense information, tell a different tale of the disturbances that

(31) Tipu Sultan: P.230.
followed the First Anglo-Mysore War. W.Logan writes, "a force despatched for this purpose (for invading Travancore) had been defeated and this reverse seems to have been the signal for another general rising in Malabar" (32). Innes, observes "the defeat of a force sent by Haidar Ali, to bring the Travancore Raja to reason, led to another general outbreak" (33). This is evidently to wash off the dirty hands of the English, with whose connivance and aid the disturbances occurred in 1768. The Authors of Travancore State Manuals do not enlist this so-called victory of the Raja of Travancore on Haidar Ali, in their flattering admiration of the Raja. If such an event had happened, the compilers of State Manuals would not have missed it. Neither it is in the Report of the 'Malabar Commissioners', nor in the descriptions of Moens and Buchanan. Even the most hostile critic K.M. Panicker, does not dare to support the authors of Malabar Manuals and Gazetteers. The Author of 'the History of Hyder Shah etc' whose utterances about the cruelties of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan were consumed with the sanctity of biblical sayings by these writers, is totally ignored by them in this context. He repeatedly makes observations of the military preparations of Haidar Ali with the avowed intention of 'paying a visit to Travancore' and "the discovery of the intention of the English, caused the departure of the army for Travancore to be suspended" (34). The Dutch Governor, who wrote his 'Memorandum' in 1781 says "in the year 1766, in the month of October, we thought that he was going to attack Travancore and Cochin. But in the month of January 1767, he got tidings with

(34) History of Hyder Shah etc., P.96.
the Mahrattas and Nizam Ally were approaching in order to
in invade Cananore. He at once moved off his army and threw
himself with it into his capital Seringapatam, where he was
blockaded and surrounded." (35). Since Logan, and after him
Innes, do not substantiate with any reliable authority, it
can safely be discarded as a machination of these English
scholars.

A serious defiance of Mysorean authority in Malabar
occurred, when, in the course of First Anglo-Mysore War,
the English invested the Cananore Fort. The fall of Mangalore
and the early reverses of the Mysore army in the First Anglo-
Mysore war made the Nair chieftains to calculate the decline
of Haider Ali's power. Therefore, they allowed themselves to
be made tools in the hands of the English. Logan writes
"on 3rd of March, 1768, the prince of Belattanad and the Raja
of Nottayam had agreed to join with 1700 Kayars" (36). On
this alliance of the English with the fugitive princes of
Malabar, the author of 'The History of Hyder Shah etc' observes,
"the English Government obliged him to abandon the coast of
Malabar among the inhabitants of which they proposed to incite
a rebellion." (37). The declared policy of the Company was to
help the rebels but not to indulge in any direct action against
Haider Ali which can be evident in the remonstrance of the
Bombay Council on the siege of the Cananore Fort by the
Tellichery Factors. It runs thus: "this precipitate and ill-
judged conduct in the present state of affairs lays us under
the greatest embarrassment" (37). But the combined forces were

(37-a) Jny and Home Dept. Sec. Cons. No.1 (1756-80)
repelled by Aly Raja of Cannanore. Realising that the capture of the place was not an easy task, "the scheme was finally abandoned." (38).

The course of First Anglo-Mysore War turned rapidly in favour of Haidar Ali. The recapture of Mangalore and the panic-stricken flight of the English garrison not only created demoralisation among the English in India, but also spread widespread disappointment and fear among the Nair soldiers who with the nice hope supported them in Malabar.

"It was the most shameful retreat", writes Wilks, "with utmost resentment, there were 41 guns, 200 Europeans, 1200 sepoys in the Fort, the retreat was so shameful that they left behind their sick and wounded consisting of 80 Europeans and 180 sepoys and most of their arms and ammunitions." (39). The author of the 'History of Hyder Shah' who claims that he was present in the recapture of the Fort gives the number of the English army thus: "in this manner was the whole English army taken, consisting of the General, forty-six officers, six hundred and eighty English troops and above six thousand sepoys together with their arms and baggage." (40). Moens in his 'Memorandum' also gives a greater number than Wilks writes. (41)

(40) The History of Hyder Shah and of his son Tippoo Sultan, P.235.
* But Prof.Mohibbul Hasan Khan and N.K. Sinha find no reason to disagree with Wilks, who in fact was trying to minimise the disgrace that had befallen upon the English.
The indignation of all the English historians is visibly manifested in their down-right condemnation of the manner the garrison took their flight. Thus the Bombay force was driven out of Mangalore with much more casualties and captives left behind them than Wilks writes, "with such indecent haste", (42) and paved the way for Haidar Ali to dispose of them from the rest of their Malabar conquests.

In this helpless state of affairs, the vanquished Rajas approached Madanna, the Civil Governor, through the good offices of the Dutch and the French to accept their loyalty and reinstate them in their respective territories as faithful tributaries. (43). "The French Commandant at Cane, and the Dutch at Cochin, employed themselves with effect to terminate the difference between Haidar and the Raj princes." (44). Negotiations were successfully carried out and Madanna agreed to reinstate the Rajas on specific terms of agreeing to pay war indemnity and annual tribute. (45).

Thus in the month of December 1768, the Mysorean Company left Malabar (46) and formed a forceful support to the rest of the army in their fight against the English.

About this political acumen displayed by Haidar Ali, different views are expressed by our historians. "Byers provincial troops, whose escape would otherwise have been impracticable" describes Wilks, "not only retreated in safety but loaded with treasure - the willing contributions (47), of the chiefs of Malabar - the purchase of a dream of independence." (48). K.H. Panicker feels that Haidar knew that it

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(43) Buchanan: Vol.II, 304.
(45) Fgn. (misc.) C.No. 56, Part I, P.
(46) Ibid, P.
(47) The Kadattanad Raja alone paid as much as Rs.80,000 (Tellichery Diary, December 1768).
was impossible to subjugate the Bairs and that he began
negotiations with them and finally restored them in their
respective territories. (49). In Malabar, there was no
emergency during this period 'to fear the destruction of
Mysorean army' as Wilks thinks, to adopt a policy of paci-
ification nor it was due to the belief of Haidar Ali that it
was not possible to rule over the country peacefully when
the Bair rebels were at large as K.H. Panicker claims it to
be. The contemporary writers like Moens and Buchanan testify
otherwise which were adverted to above. In fact the Rajas
began negotiations with the help of the Dutch and the French
when they realised that the tide of the war is fast moving
in favour of Mysore. Further the failure of the English and
the Rajas to capture the fort of Cannanore also opened their
eyes and led them to submit to the willing obedience of the
Mysorean conqueror. When the Rajas turned reasonable, Haidar
Ali agreed to reinstate them. It was strictly in consonance with
the Mysorean policy. We have seen that Haidar Ali sent his
deputies to the Rajas requiring them to accept his suzerainty
before he marched against them. When the Raja of Cochin agreed
to pay a tribute annually, Cochin territory was never molested.
Therefore, this was not necessitated by any political expedi-
ciency but because of the general policy followed by them as
regards the conquered territories.

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(49) K.H. Panicker: Co.Cit., p.446.
(50) C. Achutha Menon: Cochin State Manual, p.122.
It was the condition of the country that helped the rebels to raise the flag of revolt. The rainy season which would cut away all inland communications and the hilly nature of the country that would provide suitable hiding places helped them to carry on "occasional depredations" (51). On the other hand these physical features of the place placed innumerable impediments before the numerical army to quell them. But as military engagements, these rebellions were colossal failures. The Nairs though trained in spartan style, were no match to the disciplined Mysorean infantry. That all the rebellions in Malabar took place in the Monsoon seasons, is indicative of the nature of military operations known and practised by the professional Nair soldiers of the country. But the most absurd of all is to characterise these rebellions and disturbances as 'freedom struggle'. In doing so, we will be abusing those words and making a mockery of the same.

Consolidation.

It was in December 1768 that the the Mysore army retired from Malabar after restoring the local Rajas except the Raja of Cherickal (1) on condition of stipulated annual tributes (2). The Kolathiri Kingdom of the Raja of Cherickal was under the management of the Raja of Cannanore since its conquest in the year 1766 (3). He was restored to his ancient possessions only in 1774 (4).

(51) P.R.C. No.103, P.124.
(1) Fgn. (Misc.) S.No.55, P.21, Para.21.
(2) Ilocns. Memorandum etc., P.133.
(3) Fgn. (Misc.) S.No. 15, P.21, Para 20.
(4) Ibid.
Though the First Anglo-Mysore War was terminated in the early months of 1769, when "Haider had dictated peace to us under the walls of Madras" (5) he was confronted with the marauding Marattas who had entered into his territory, ravaging and pillaging the place to the point of ruin, and reaching the capital of his dominion. He had to purchase peace on humiliating terms. But this loss was soon repaired when dissensions arose in the Maratta Camp consequent on the death of Madhava Rao in November, 1772, "Haider as a skilful politician, could not fail to turn to his advantage." (6). In little more than six months - between September, 1773 and February, 1774 - he managed to repossess himself of all the territories he had lost during the English and the Maratta Wars. (7). In this attempt, Haider Ali turned his attention to Malabar also, where the Rajas defaulted the payment of the promised annual tribute since he had restored them in 1768.

The reason for removing them was the non-payment of the stipulated tribute. Hoens observes that the period of seven years (1766-1774) or since the Nawab had left the Zamorin's country, he had not paid a penny of his annual tribute. (8). This is corroborated by the author of 'The History of Hyder Shah' etc. He writes, "this prince (Zamorin) refused to pay the tribute he had consented to give, when Haider in 1767 restored his dominions" (9). Now unconcerned was the Zamorin in acquitting his duties is explained by Hoens in his 'Memorandum on the Administration of the Malabar Coast'. He says that not a month before the Zamorin had to flee, he received letter

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(5) 'Melissas: G.B.: Seringapatam, Capital of Tipu, P.146.
after letter from him dealing only on the appointment of a
Bamboodiri or priest in the Triporatty, pagoda by the King
of Cochin in regard to the Samorin was not consulted.
He continues that the position in regard to this pagoda is
that the appointment of the Bamboodiri must be made after
both the Samorin and the King of Cochin have been informed.
The Samorin asked as strongly for his support in this matter
"as if his head and the existence of his Kingdom depended on
it." (10). Although the modern author of 'The Samorin of
Kozhikode,' closely follows the statement of the Dutch Governor
in this respect (11), Panicker has suggested that the reason
for removing the Malayalee Rajas was that "Haidar Ali hated
the Mysore rulers because they were infidels" (12). This view,
however, goes against other facts as well. For example: the
Raja of Cochin who agreed to be a tributary to Haidar Ali
from the time of his Malabar conquest in the year 1766 was never
molested nor made victims of any kind of vituperations. (13).
On the other hand the relation of the Mysore rulers with the
Raja of Cochin was quite friendly. (14). That Haidar Ali did not
formulate the policy towards the Nair princes on a communal
basis, is borne out by further evidence. Even after the Samorin
and other princes were relieved of their duties, Haidar Ali
did not hesitate to consider most favourably the request placed
before him by the Kolattiri prince to re-instate him in his
ancestral Kingdom on condition of paying tribute to Mysore. (15).

*TRIPRayar near TRICHUR.

(14) See the Topic 'The relation of Tipu with the Kingdom of
Cochin.'
(15) F.Cn. (Misc.) 3.No. 94, PP.69-70, Voucher, 4.
We have seen that Ali Raja, a stipulated prince, was the manager of the Kolattiri Kingdom since its conquest in 1766. (16). But Ali Raja was, however, negligent in paying tribute. Therefore, the management of the Kolattiri was taken away from him and was offered again to the ruling prince on the condition that he should annually pay a tribute. (17). This is supported again by an entry in the Tellicherry Factory Diary: (18), “when this intelligence been known to that neighbourhood that the Nabob received under the shadow of his protection,” writes Kirmani, commenting on this development, “who sought his forgiveness and that he punished the rebels with a strong hand......... the Nizams and Mopilas placed the ring of obedience....”(19). It is obvious, therefore, that the reason for removing them in 1774 was the non-payment of the stipulated tribute whereas the reason for the restoration of the Kolattiri Raja in 1776 was his solemn agreement to remit an annual tribute without fail.

The period in which these Rajas were re-instated and entrusted with the administration of the country was a period of mis-management and mal-administration. This is testified by Buchanan. He says that the Rajas were vested with despotic authority over the other inhabitants and that the condition of the inhabitants under these Rajas, was worse than it had been under the Canarese Brahmins.* He describes how in the space of a few years many of them amassed treasure to an amount unknown to their ancestors. Buchanan concludes “Nothing could exceed the despotic rapaciousness of these men, to oppose which there was no barrier; for it is well-known that none of the

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*Madanna and Sreenivasa Rao, the Civil Governors of Malabar.
inhabitants dare complain against a Raja, whatever injuries they may have sustained, assassination being certain follower of complaint. (20) Farmer, one of the members of the 'Joint Commissioners of Malabar', recorded his sentiments as early as May 27, 1792, against the introduction of the ancient Zamorin's Government which he considers as replete with political vices and as tending to discourage improvement, decrease the revenue and ultimately to produce a great uncertainty as to the receipt of it or to the continuation of the Company's authority in the country without occasional wars to re-establish it, adding that 'it was not till Hyder's experience of the faithlessness of this family that he expelled them and took the management into his own hands...' (21). It was a necessity then for the common weal to replace such irresponsible mal-administration by a better one that could stand par with any other well-governed territory elsewhere in India, the salient features of which are discussed in a later Chapter. (22).

Accordingly a force was despatched under Sayyid Saheb* and Sreenivasa Rao in the month of December, 1773 (23). The Mysorean force, thus once more descended on Malabar, took a new and direct route through Wynad down the Tamarasseri Chat (24). All the Malayales princes except the Raja of Cannanore, were removed from the reins of administration without even picking up a quarrel. The only noteworthy event on this occasion was the submission of the Zamorin, his country and his subjects to the King of France and obtain promises of protection against his enemies. (25) A treaty was entered into between Zamorin

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(22) See Chapter III.
*Sayyid Saheb was one of the military commanders of Haidar Ali. Tipu married his daughter.
(23) Tellicherry Factory Diary, dated April 2, 1780.
(24) Fgn. (Misc.) S.No. 56, P. 69.
and Governor Duprat on January 12, 1774, by which Zamarin submitted himself to be a vassal of the Crown of France in lieu of immunity from Haridar Ali's army. (26) The Commandant at Hahe accepted this and came with a few troops to take possession of the fortress of Calicut where he hoisted the French standard. "This was a most imprudent and inconsiderate step for many reasons," comments the author of 'The History of Hyder Shah and of his Son Tipuoo Sultan'. (27) on this foolish act of the French Commandant. Immediately after the French forces took charge of the fortress, the Commandant informed Eroenivas Rao that he had taken the Zamarin under his protection on behalf of the King of France. "The General, however, troubled himself little about this," writes Moens, "but continued his march towards Calicut." (28) The Commandant of Hahe had no forces sufficient to sustain the consequences of a possible clash, evacuated the Fort with all haste and returned to Hahe from Calicut, "on the vessel by which they had arrived." (29).

Consequent upon this failure of the French to save him, the Zamarin made another attempt to free himself from the Mysoreans, that can best be put by the contemporary authority in his own words: "When the Zamarin fled, he wanted to take shelter in our territory, but I diverted him from it. So he retired with his family by sea to the south on a native vessel to the Kingdom of Travancore, where with the connivance of that ruler he still resides." (30). The Zamarin who had submitted to the French had tried to seek the protection of

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(26) Ibid., P.155.
(29) Ibid.
*Moens wrote his 'Memorandum' in 1781 A.D.
(30) Ibid., P.156.
the Dutch, later went over to the English. He could not have enjoyed such popular support, otherwise he would not have sought the protection of all the three European powers one after another. Grenivas Rao was instructed by Haider Ali to make arrangements this time for direct administration of the country. Thus Malabar formed one of the provinces of Mysore Kingdom.

The consolidation of this Malabar conquest was complete with this direct control of the State affairs. Grenivas Rao, the Civil Governor of Haider Ali undertook country-wide enquiries and organised a systematic land revenue administration, based on the principles followed in other parts of the Mysore Kingdom. (31) The whole system of administration was remodelled and set aright. It seems that till 1782 when Colonel Remberstone who had been sent by the Bombay Government to act with Major Abington from Tallicherry, (32), landed with his force in Malabar during the Second Anglo-Mysore War, "the condition of the country as a whole was comparatively peaceful." (33).

During this interval, Haider Ali made up his mind to conquer the Travancore Kingdom and made preparations to this effect.* In a letter dated December 31, 1774 from Ross on Hart Raddan, the Chief of Tallicherry Factory, to Fort St.George, conveying that Haider was making great preparations for proceeding down this Coast, by way of the Ghats in land by Calicut, supposed with an intention to attack the Cochin Kingdom and after that conquest to proceed to Travancore. (34). This observation did not fall short of fact. Sardar Khan was set in motion

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(34) Fgn. (Sec.) Dent. Cons., 3-2-1775, No. 7.
at the head of 10,000 men, in August, 1776, and entered the Cochin territory. (35). At this time the Raja agreed to pay the arrears of tribute and promised to remit regularly the annual payments, he returned with his army (36), without making any attempt to cross the frontiers of Travancore. At the same time, Hydar Ali renewed his request, to the Dutch Governor Hoens, to allow a free passage to his army towards Travancore through the Dutch possessions of Chatwai and Cranganore. Since Hoens evaded to give a satisfactory reply, Serdar Khan captured the Fort by a surprise attack. The whole of the island including Chatwai, Ayroor, or Papanetty and the territory of the Raja of Cranganore (excepting the Dutch Fort) all of which were tributary to the Dutch now succumbed to Hydar's General; but he found his further advance impeded by the Travancore lines (37). This was communicated by the Raja of Travancore who was in a state of fear, to the Governor of Fort St. George in a letter dated October 20, 1776. (38).

But the scheme of conquering Travancore was parted also, because the next few months were wasted partly in skirmishes with the Dutch round Chatwai and Cranganore and partly in fruitless negotiations for an alliance and for a free passage through the Dutch territory along the Coast. (39). "About this time, Hydar who was now most indignant with the Dutch was obliged to go to war with the English and the Nabob of Aroost." (40).

(36) Hoens: Memorandum etc., p. 158.
(37) Batavia Diary: F.S.N. 1054, pp. 219, and 238.
Also see Day: Land of Perumals, p. 153.
(38) Fgn. (Sec.) Dept., Cons. 1777, 20th January-D.
(39) Dutch Records No. 13, p. 159.
On March 13, 1778, the French recognised the 'Declaration of American Independence' and thus brought on another war with the English (41). "Hyder being informed in the month of August, 1778," writes the Author of the History of Hyder Shah etc., "that hostilities had commenced between England and France, made a truce of six years with the Marattas" (42). Haider determined to make war with the English. He was indignant with them for their breach of treaty provisions by evading to help him against the Marattas. Haider Ali failed also to induce them to renew the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance which they had concluded in 1769 (43). He had made more than one overture with that end in view, one of them so late as 1778 (44). Therefore, when the news reached him about the outbreak of war between England and France, Haider Ali foresaw that he had to enter into an open hostility with the English.

The French possession of Pondicherry fell to the English soon after the commencement of the war and the English wanted to capture Maha, the French settlement on the Malabar Coast (45). This awakened Haider Ali to the grave situation that would arise if Maha fell into the hands of the English. Haider Ali claimed full sovereignty over the whole area including the European settlements. This claim was reiterated in a letter dated March 19, 1779, to the Governor of Madras in which Haider Ali wrote: "now you have set on foot an expedition against Maha. There are many factories in

my country belonging to the Dutch, English, French, Portuguese and Danes, who trade in my country on the footing of subjects. None of those possess forts or countries which should cause to any other to attack them and if anyone should attack them it will be proper for me to give assistance to those whom I consider my subjects."(46).

Subsequently, Prince Regent of Kolattanad was required to join the French with his force and orders were sent to Kolattanad to send a force of 2000, for the same purpose (47). The Eair soldiers who were all the while completely subservient to the Rysorean joined the English during this Anglo-French contest on Nahe. The Samorin and the Raja of Kolattanad and Pottayam were also inclined to join the English."The Factors of Tellicherry took every possible means to secure these allies," writes W. Logan, "and as the event turned out, the Kolattanad Prince was the only Chief who remained faithful to Haider Ali's interest until after Nahe had fallen."(48). In spite of the combined efforts of the Prince of Kolattanad and the French forces at Nahe, the English succeeded in capturing the place.(49). During this period some of the Eair Chieftains including the Samorin, who with the assistance of English, made an attempt to recover their lost territory from the Rysorean authorities.(50).

But the Rysorean troops had no difficulty in putting down the recalcitrant chiefs. At the same time, the English, after the occupation of Nahe, apparently showed no sign of

(46) Fgn. (Sec.) Pro. of Sec. Select Committee, 4th January to 20th June, 1779. Haider Ali to Governor, March 19, 1779.
(47) Fgn. (Misc.) S.No. 56, Part I, P. 74.
(49) Fgn. (Misc.) S.No. 55, P. 32. Also J. Mill, Vol. IV, P. 144.
hostility towards the Mysore forces, as the Company was nominally at peace with Baidar Ali and therefore "no over encouragement, beyond the grant of supplies of arms etc., was held out to the country powers." (51). In short when the English stopped hostility with the Mysore troops, the Baisirs found themselves helpless, and "suffered the fury of Baidar Ali single-handed" (52), in spite of the fact that they received, "the grant of supplies of arms etc.," from the Company.

The Kolatmad prince who was loyal to Baidar Ali, easily dispossessed the Kottayam Baisirs and marched against Kodattmad where the senior Raja who had sided with the English was deposed in favour of a young prince. (53). It was a hard time for the F Porteck of Tellicherry (54). The English did not wish to enter into a war with Baidar Ali at this stage when their affairs elsewhere in India were not favourable to them. In the Secret Consultations of the Select Committee of February 14, 1760, this is clearly stated thus: Part taken by Baidar Ali in fomenting these disturbances and marching a large body of his troops to take possession of the ruins of Hahe, on account of its proximity to Tellicherry shows no favourable disposition towards us and that the gentlemen at Tellicherry have imprudently provoked hostilities by interfering in the country disputes and giving protection to people amorous to Baidar and the Nayars. (55). The document lays down the line of action that would be taken by the English at Tellicherry. They were required to be always defensive and not to show any sign of hostility towards Baidar Ali. (56).

By November 1779, Hahe had been evacuated and all the British troops in Malabar had been concentrated in

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(51) Logan: Vol., I, P.425.
(56) Ibid.
Tellichery for the defence of the town against the forces
of the Kolattnad and Kadattnad Rajas (57). In the month of
February, 1780, Sardar Khan arrived in Malabar with a force
and after settling some domestic disputes with the Rajas of
Kottayam and Kadattnad appeared before Tellichery on
July 8, 1780 and "Tellichery continued to be closely invested
by Ryder's and Rajas' joint forces." (58). "Sardar Khan refused
to assign any reason," says Logan, "for this action. But
it was no longer doubtful that Baidar Ali had finally broken
with the Company." (59). The reason for this drastic step
of Sardar Khan can be presumed from a letter sent by Braith-
waite to the Governor and President of the Select Committee,
Fort St. George, Madras, on the month of February 1780. It is
entered in the Proceedings as follows: "I had private
intelligence that Sardar Cawm has orders not to enter into
the disputes between Tellichery and the Bairs unless the
Madras troops at Maha took it up in which case he has to join
the Prince of Cherickal. The Commandant and the Factory both
write to me that they did not believe that Ryder would inter-
ference the former still require assistance." (60). Another
reason assigned for this action is that Baidar wrote himself
in February, 1780, to the Resident that the Principals of
the Bairs and others who had taken refuge in Tellichery being
delivered up to the Prince of Cherickal, the troubles should
cease. (61).

The above manifests the reason why Sardar Khan
interfered in the siege of Tellichery. The Madras troops who

(57) Ibid., Cons.April 5, 1779.
(58) Fgn. (Misc.) S.No. 55, P.36, Para.30.
(60) Fgn. (Pol.)Sec.Pro. 1756-80, S.14, February, 80 (2).
(61) Fgn. (Misc.) S.No. 55, P.36, Para. 30.
had evacuated Maha, in the year 1779, now came to the rescue of Tellicherry Factory and openly fought against the tributaries of Haidar Ali, evidently against the directions of the Supreme Council. Thus it is clear that "the gentlemen of Tellicherry had imprudently provoked hostilities." A few days after the siege of Tellicherry commenced, Haidar Ali with an army of 90,000 men descended upon the plain of Carnatic on July 20, 1780. (62). Thus began the second Anglo-Mysore War. The defeat of Baillie (63), which was summed up by Thomas Munro, "the severest blow that the English ever sustained in India" (64), and other reverses of the English in the war made the condition of the besieged in Tellicherry "very serious" (65). The siege lasted for 18 months. The Factors at Tellicherry showed unabated vigour and inexhaustible heroism in defending the Fort. By the end of the year 1781, reinforcements arrived from Bombay under Colonel Rumberstone with the instructions to act in conformity with Major Abington of Tellicherry Factory. On February 8, 1782, Sardar Khan who was invested Tellicherry was defeated by Major Abington (66), and was taken prisoner with 1200 men. (67). The Author of Haidar Nama writes that Sardar Khan who was very much ashamed of this defeat ended his life by committing suicide. (68).

Hearing of these losses Haidar sent Mahbub Ali to the Malabar Coast. On this action Wilks comments, "He determined

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(65) Logani pp.Cit., P.248
(66) History of Tipu Sultan, P.23.
(68) Haidar Nama, P.97, quoted by Mohibbul Hasan Khan, P.24.
to concentrate his force, to abandon his scheme of conquest in Coromandel and to direct his undivided efforts first, for the expulsion of the English from the Western Coast, and afterwards for the preservation of his dominions and for watching the course of events." (69). When the Company knew that the war in the Calabar Coast was intended to be intensified, letters were despatched by the English to the Zamorin and the Raja of Travancore with the request of helping them "to crush Baider Ali's force on the Coast." (70). As a result "Colonel Humberstone as senior officer assumed also the command .......and being joined by a body of Eairs, anxious to emerge from a long and cruel subjugation he moved about 20 miles to the southward of Calicut and close to Trincomalee," (71) came in contact with Baider's detachment under Nakhoom Ali already adverted to above. (72). Nakhoom Ali who was confident of the strength of his army gave battle on April 8, 1782, (73) in a strong but dangerous position with a deep and difficult river in the rear of his right. (74). "He paid the penalty for his temerity with his own life and the loss of a good part of his army." (75).

It was only after the defeat and death of Nakhoom Ali that the Eair rebels joined hands with the English. But their number was also very small. The ruling princes fought on the side of Mysoreans. Wilks himself admits as Humberstone confessed that he was ignorant of the road and situation of the

(71) On 8th April, 1782 - Tellicherry Factory Diary, 13th and 15th April, 1782.
(73) Tellicherry Factory Diary, 13th and 15th April, 1782.
(75) Sec.Pro., May 26, 1782, P.1684.
country and could place little dependence on the information of the Haidar's natives of that part of the country, probably because they might not have thrown off the allegiance. (76). The Manual of Standing Information of Madras Presidency reports this instance that a rebellion had broken out in Malabar and a small force of English sent to their aid gained a considerable victory at Tellichery, which necessitated the immediate despatch of Tipu to the Western Coast. (77).

The news of the disaster which befell an Haidar's army greatly perturbed Haidar. He, therefore, ordered Tipu to proceed to the West Coast to retrieve the situation. (78). Colonel Rumberstone when at Calicut received information on June 16, 1782, that "Tipu Sahab will most undoubtedly command the army on this side in the ensuing campaign." (79). This information proved to be correct and Tipu Sultan marched with a division of the army with immense capacity to oppose the invaders. Though the English detachment reached Palghat on October 19, yet Colonel Rumberstone finding the place much stronger than he expected and it being rumoured that a large force was advancing against him, "very prudently determined to retreat." (80). Wilks emphasises that Rumberstone was ordered to retreat by the Bombay Government and he would have done so, but for the late receipt of the order. (81). This is corroborated by an entry in the Tellichery Factory Diary which reveals that he had intended marching on the evening of the 18th. (82).

When Tipu reached Palghat he found that the enemy had retreated. Without loss of time, he pursued the English.

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(79) Tellichery Factory Diary, dated July 1, 1782.
(80) Charles's Stuart's: Catalogue and Memoirs of Tipu Sultan, P.264.
(82) Tellichery Factory Diary, Nov., 22, 1782.
"inaudently harassed and commanded" (83) and a large part of Tipu’s cavalry who had preceded the enemy captured much of their baggage and provisions (84). This was continued throughout the day until Bunderstone reached the river Ponnani by sunset. The river was swollen by rains. Tipu believed that it was impassable. Therefore he determined to rout the English force by the next day break and gave rest to his army. To his surprise, he found early in the morning that the enemy had crossed the river and escaped from his clutches. Wilks graphically describes how the English force was saved from total annihilation in these words: "The early part of the night was passed in anxious search for a practicable ford and at length one was found so deep as to take ordinary men to the chin; yet in clinging together in silence, the tall assisting the short, the whole got across without the loss of a man." (85). Those who saved their lives from possible disaster took the greatest speed to escape to a suitable shelter. Though Tipu made a desperate attempt to overtake them, he could not, because by that time, they had taken up a strong position in the Ponnani town (86). There, Colonel Nacleod having arrived with a reinforcement from Bombay took up the command of the whole army.

Tipu, on reaching Ponnani encamped in front of the English army and made preparations for an effectual assault. On November 25, with the assistance of Lally, he made a regular and vigorous attack on the English line. But the strong position occupied by Nacleod obliged Tipu to retreat to his former

(84) Memoirs of Tippoo Sultan, (Mills) P.264.
position. (87). Wilks observes that Tippu after his inaephy-
cital attempt retired a further distance to await the arrival
of his heavy equipments in order to resume the attack on the
position of Coonam. "But on the 12th of December, the
swarm of light troops which had continued to watch the English
position was invisible, and successive reports confirmed the
intelligence that the whole Mysorean force was proceeding by
forced marches to the eastward." (88). Having received the
sad news of the Death of his father (89), Tippu suddenly broke
up his camp and proceeded with all possible haste to Caringa-
patam. (90). Before he left the place, he ordered Arshed
Beg Khan to take charge of the Government of Malabar and to
remain on the defensive at Palghat. (91).

No doubt Haider Ali's achievements on the Malabar
Coast was great. But only a few years remained under him
without wars. The consolidation of his conquered territory
was thus interrupted by these hostilities. Haider's death in
the midst of the Second Anglo-Mysore War left Malabar in an
unsettled political state.

Relation of Haider Ali with the
Rajas of Cochin and Travancore.

No study of Haider Ali's rule in Kerala would be
complete without an examination of his relations with the
ruling chiefs and princes. This problem has been considered
to some extent in the previous sections. In the present
section, an attempt has been made to trace his relations with
the two most important chiefs, the Rajas of Cochin and
Travancore. Apart from the importance of the two chiefs, the

(87) Sec. Cons., Nos. 17-19, dated January 23, 1783.
(89) Sec. Cons., Sec., dated January 6, 1783.
study of Haider Ali’s relation with them would indicate the fundamental basis of the policy towards the rulers and princess of Kerala.

Haider Ali reached Calicut in the year 1766 after defeating the Rajas of Chirakal and Kodikode. He called upon the other two important rulers of Kerala, the Rajas of Cochin and Travancore to become his tributary. (1). Rama Varma, the defacto ruler of Cochin, became a vassal of the ruler of Mysore through the intermediary of the Dutch (2) and agreed to pay two lakhs of rupees and eight elephants annually. (3). This was done in consultation with the Raja of Travancore. Dutch Records say that he not only advised the Cochin Raja to do so, but also lent him money for it, in order to induce Haider Ali not to become further south than the Zamorin’s territory. (4).

The relation of Cochin as a vassal and Mysore as suzerain was continued unhampered. Cochin records indicate that Haider often wrote friendly letters to the Raja and sent him costly presents every year. (5). The only instance of a quarrel with the Raja occurred in 1776, when he supported the Dutch in a dispute over certain lands around the Chenni Fort and also defaulted his tribute amount. (6). Consequent upon this, Sardar Khan marched against him and reached Trichur (7). This insensate act of the Raja forced the Mysoreans to make a show of arms against the Cochin Raja. But the case was soon amicably settled. (8). The Mysore General agreed to withdraw

(2) Buchanan Vol.III, P.432.
(3) C.R.E., L. LXXI, 1st S., No.176.
(4) D.R., No.12, P.156.
(5) Vide L.LXXI, L.VIII, 1st S.
(6) L.VIII, Dis.No.156.
(8) L.LXXI, S.I, No.175.
the army provided Cochin would pay a nuzzam of two lakhs of pagodas and eight elephants at once and an annual tribute of fifty thousand pagodas. (5). But Sardar Khan allowed the Raja to represent his case before Baidar Ali when the latter pleaded that the amount demanded was too large to the resources of the State. (10). Baidar Ali disposed the matter most favourably when the Raja placed his case before him. He reduced the nuzzam to a lakh of pagodas, inclusive of the nuzzam and tribute from Cranganore. (11). Accordingly, Sardar Khan returned when assurance was given by the Raja to the effect that he would regularly remit the promised amount annually. Thereafter, no act of high-handedness from the part of Mysoreans occurred. Their relation with the Raja was "decent, gentle and decorous" (12). All kinds of favours were bestowed upon him. Even the vexed question of Perumpadappu and other villages in Vannari, which have been out of Cochin's possession for over a century, was decided in her favour, when their importance to Cochin was brought to the notice of Baidar Ali. (12-b).

Despite all these friendly connections, the Raja hated his relation with Mysore. It was due to an apprehension of Baidar Ali's power and designs, the Raja preferred to be a vassal to the Mysorean conqueror. (13). From the very beginning he had fixed up everything with the consent of the Raja of Travancore, the inveterate enemy of Mysore. (14). When the

(10) Ibid.
(11) Ibid.
(12-b) L. VII, Dis.No.166.
(13) L. LEXI, S. I, No.176.
(14) D.R., No.13, P.155.
Dutch possession of Chetwa and Cranganore was attacked by Sardar Khan; the Raja of Cochin served the Dutch and tried to harm the Mysorean interests which can be traced from his correspondence with the then Dutch Governor Van Angelbeck. (15). In the year 1782, when the second Anglo-Mysore War was at its pitch, the Cochin Raja allowed the Raja of Travancore to erect a fort at Paliport and dig trenches around it, ignoring the protest registered by the Dutch. (16), to impede the expected expedition of the Mysorean army against the Travancore territory. It was with his connivance, again, the Meduncottah (Travancore Lines) was strengthened and extended to the Cranganore Fort by the Raja of Travancore through his territory. (17).

Throughout his relation the Raja was intriguing with the Raja of Travancore and the Dutch against the Mysoreans. A number of letters written by him to the Supreme Council of Batavia, requesting military help to get him relieved of the vassalage from Mysore have come to light. A letter dated September 19, 1773 to which the Governor-General of East Indies replied on November 13, 1774, makes it clear that the Raja was conspiring against Mysore, even from the early stage of his relation with that State. (18). In the year 1782, when the affairs of Malabar was at stake, due to the successive defeat of Sardar Khan and M. Khudum Ali, by the English, the Raja showed an inclination to join with the English, but was stopped by the Dutch Governor who warned him of "the severe consequences if he incurred the displeasure of Haidar Ali." (19). In the month of January of the same year, Angelbeck advised the Raja to take refuge in Travancore, if he was afraid of any invasion.

(15) L. LXXI/A, S. I., No.4, P.2711.
(16) L. LXXII, S. I., No. 31, P.2760.
(18) Letter from J.W.F. Ribiero, Governor-General of Indies, to the Raja of Cochin, dated November 13, 1774.
from Haider Ali (20). His fear was probably due to the fact that he was playing trick on the Mysoreans by apparently showing friendliness and at the same time conspiring with their enemies against them.

When Sardar Khan proceeded to lay siege to Tellichery in 1780, he requested the Raja to allow him to take with him, a contingent of 1000 Nair soldiers of Cochin who were con-
toned in Calicut, "for the ungenial task of assisting the Mysoreans to put down the disturbances caused by the Zamorin's Nairs." (21) the Raja objected to it on the plea that as he had no quarrel with the English, he was reluctant to act offensively against them (22). Thus it can be summed up that the relation of the Raja of Cochin with Haider Ali was con-
ditioned by fear alone though Haider Ali was apparently keen to show him goodwill.

Relation with Travancore. Haider Ali wanted to con-
querr the Kingdom of Travancore after his Malabar conquest. When the Dutch Officers met him at Calicut in the year 1766, on behalf of the Raja of Cochin, he proposed to them an offensive and defensive alliance and guaranteed immunity to the Raja of Cochin from invasion as he was allied with the Dutch, but purposely omitted the mention of Travancore (1). On his part, Haider Ali had his own grievances against the Raja of Travancore. When Haider Ali was Paujdar of Dindigul, in the years 1750-51, Marthanda Varma, the ruler of Travancore requested military help from Haider Ali (2), to quell the refractory Nair nobility of his country who had raised

(20) Ibid, dated January 22, 1702, No.16, p.2746.
(22) L. INYI, S. I.
the standard of revolt against him. (3). Haider Ali promised to send a powerful army and made necessary military preparations. The news of Haider Ali's military support alarmed the nobles and frightened them so much that all of them submitted obediently to the will and pleasure of the Raja. (4). The immediate submission of the Nair nobility freed the Raja from the threatened internal disorder. Therefore, Marthanda Varma, intimated Haider Ali, declining the offer of assistance. Haider Ali claimed the expenses he had incurred in this respect. (5). But the Raja made evasive replies. (6). When this claim was overlooked by Marthanda Varma, Haider Ali, decided to wait and watch the course of events and wreck his vengeance when opportunity would arise. Pressed by the Dutch Officers, Haider Ali, however, agreed to return without 'paying a visit to Travancore', provided the Raja paid him 15 lakhs of rupees and 30 elephants (7). To this the Raja did not agree on the ground that being tributary to Nawab Mohamed Ali of Carnatic, he could not pay tributes to both sides. (8). As the rainy season was about to commence, Haider Ali returned from Malabar without realising his dream of conquest of Travancore. In 1768, Haider Ali made military preparations to fulfil his desire of conquering Travancore (9). But it was averted by the discovery of the intention of the English, who were on a war-gale against Mysore. This caused the departure of the army for Travancore to be suspended (10). Again in the year 1775, Sardar Khan came with 10,000 men with the intention of conquering

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(3) Sankunni Menon: History of Travancore, P. 156.
(4) P.D.K. Raja: Medieval Kerala, P. 211.
(6) P.Raman Menon: Saktan Thekkum. P. 70.
(7) D.R., No. 13, R154.
(8) Francis Day: The Land of Perumals, P. 144.
(9) M.H.D.L.T.: History of Hyder Shah etc., PP. 93, 94.
Travancore. (11). He tried in vain to get a passage through
the Dutch territory of Cranganore for his army towards
Travancore. (12). Failing in his attempt to secure a free
passage, Sardar Khan captured the Fort of Cranganore and the
next few months were spent in skirmishes with the Dutch
round Chemre and Cranganore. (13). Meanwhile Haiidar Ali came
into an open rupture with the English and the Nawab of
Carnatic. Thus the scheme of conquering Travancore was not
materialised during Haiidar's life time.

The Raja was also not keeping quite. He strengthened
his northern frontiers by the famous Travancore Lines (Nedum-
cottah) (13), and created a standing army which was so far
unknown. (14) to this 'land of Parumals'. The Raja of Cochin
was persuaded by him to accept the suzerainty of Nysore, so
that a buffer State between his and Haiidar Ali's Malabar
possessions could be created. (15). He indulged in inciting
rebellions in Malabar (16) with the help of fugitive princes
to whom he had given shelter in his kingdom (17), with a view
to keeping the Nysoreans engaged in confronting the internal
problems of Malabar. Rama Varma, the successor of Marthanda
Varma and the Raja of Travancore, continued vigorously his
hostile activities against Haiidar Ali and showed definite
inclination towards the English (18).

He also allowed the English army to pass through his
territory on their way to attack Maha, the French possession

(11) Fgn. (Sec.) Cons., No.7, February 3, 1775.
(13) The Land of Perumals, P.144.
(14) P.K. Malakrishnan: Timx Sultan, P.290.
(15) B-iens: 'Memorandum etc.', P.156.
(16) Tellichery Factorv Diary, April 2, 1780.
(17) Fgn. (Sec) C. No. 56, Part I, Voucher No.4, P.69.
in Malabar, in the year 1778, ignoring the protest registered by the Dutch (19). Acknowledging this service of the Raja, the Select Committee recorded, "the Raja of Travancore allowed the Honourable Company’s army to pass through his territory and gave abundance of food and provisions for them."(20). "I know very well that you are the most sincere friend of the English in India", wrote Colonel Bumberstone, to the Raja of Travancore, "I shall let the Governor and Council know the services rendered by you especially to the army led by me."(21). On October 20, 1776, the Raja wrote to the Governor, Fort St. George, Madras, that Baidar Ali’s army attacked the Dutch Fort of Cranganore and "some shells fell close to my fort"(22), and requested help from the Company. When the Second Anglo-Mysore War broke out, the Raja actively helped the English by sending two battalion of his soldiers (23) and aiding the Sair rulers of Malabar to create disturbances in that area.(24). For these useful services, the English insisted to include him as 'a friend and ally' of the Company in the First Article of the Treaty of Mysore which was concluded in the year 1784.(25).

The attitude of Baidar Ali and later, of Tipu Sultan had driven the Raja closer and closer to the English camp. He had outwitted all, in his connivance to oust the Mysoreans from Malabar and avert 'the sword of Democles' hanging over his head. Baidar Ali and after him, Tipu Sultan at the same

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(19) L. LXXI, S. I, No. 17, P.2746
(20) Madras Select Committee to the Board of Directors, March 13, 1779.
(21) Colonel Bumberstone to the Raja of Travancore, March 27, 1782.
(22) Fgm. (1777), Sec. Cons., D, January 20, 1777.
(25) Logan: Treaties etc., i, XIII.
time felt that the tranquillity of Malabar could be realised only if the Raja of Travancore who was privy to all rebellions in Malabar, was brought under submission. The development and culmination of this strained state of relation between Hyder and Travancore is attempted in the following chapter. (26).

(26) See Topic 'Relation of Tipu with the Rajas of Cochin and Travancore.'