CHAPTER III

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Since the end of the Second World War, the World has witnessed many important political changes. The spread of communism and the rising tide of nationalism have been the two of the most potent influences upon the course of international developments. These two forces have affected very much of the many areas of the World and therefore South-East Asia is not an exception. Roughly, South-East Asia is, the area of continental Asia and the off shore Philippine and Indonesian archipelagoes which lies south of China and east of India. The region is very important because of its resources. It is full of raw materials and also provide a market for surplus goods.

And because of strategic importance and fully of raw materials, it has been under the influence of colonial powers. "The French" and the Dutch "have withdrawn, the British are withdrawing; the Chinese are trying to stage come-back", and the United States which was least interested in South-East Asia until the World War II, except for the Philippines, but this interest was almost non existent. Since that time the degree of United States interest in the region has increased greatly, "as it undoubtedly will continue to increase in importance in the future." But Vanden bosch and Butwell observes,

1. King, John Kerry, South-East Asia in Perspective, N.Y. 1959, P-xvii.
"This region produces nearly two-thirds of the World's tin and over four-fifths of its natural rubber. While its output of oil is not large in terms of total world production, it is nevertheless of great strategic significance because so little oil is produced elsewhere in South or East Asia. The loss of the other important products of the region — bauxite, tungsten, iron ore, tea, sugar, coffee, spices, abaca, copra, and coconut oil — would only be inconvenient for the west, but to allow free access to them to communist countries would greatly strengthen the latter's economic and political power. Burma, Thailand, and South Vietnam, for example is normal times produce great qualities of rice, a staple food important to all Asian countries."

The area of South-East Asia covers some 1,650,000 square miles spread over a large portion of the globe with a population of more than 225 million, "half continental and half peninsular, it lies astride the great trade routes of the Eastern World, whose strategic importance became strikingly apparent in the Second World War." North Vietnam under communist domination backed by communist China creates a situation much more alarming then 1941 when Japan over run South-East Asia almost at will and to threaten Australia and India. And moreover China is more advantageous position than it was Japan during Second Word War

3. Ibid., p. 361,
because the Chinese constitute a largest minorities in the region about 14,000,000 person providing a bridge head for infiltration and subversion and the World has watched with grave concern the explosion by China of the nuclear bomb. The Chinese, Indians Europeans and Arabs control a disproportionately large part of economic life of the region, they are not easily assimilated and they are, for the most part, nationals of large and powerful neighbouring countries. According to Vanden bosch and Butwell, there is little cultural unity to be found in South-east Asia. Nearly every country has significant minorities, both religious and ethnic. In Malaysia, where the native Moslem has become a minority in his own country, the division are sharp. Much time must pass before a various communities of the Malaysia can be merged into a nation. Developments in Indonesia indicate rather clearly that the Dutch over three centuries failed to mold the people of the Myriad islands into a real unity. It is much the same regionally. The population of one state is predominantly Christian; that of another, Moslem; that of several, Buddhist; and Malaysia has no majority for any one faith. Because they were ruled for long period by different powers, these countries have been drawn in different directions culturally. The absence of political and cultural unification aid the western powers in establishing their control originally, and today the diversity remains in aggravated form. The colonial administrations have been replaced by weak, independent states, the economy of much of the region has deteriorated, the work of well trained experienced colonial officials and able foreign entrepreneurs
has been taken over by untrained, inexperienced natives. Social and civil unrest, insurrections and armed strife, and political ineptitude have rendered the region exceedingly vulnerable to direct and indirect communist aggression. Even if there were no threat of external aggression, the situation would be acute, for in several of these countries the forces of disintegration are strong. With their societies open to communist infiltration and subversion, the situation is very serious. The region is utterly lacking in the economic and military power with which to defend itself, and, what is worse from the western point of view, it frequently seems to lack the will to defend itself.  

The United States of America became increasingly concerned about communist activity in South East Asia from 1948 onwards. And when communist China and Soviet Union recognized the communist Ho Chi Minh's regime in Vietnam, in January 1950, the United States soon thereafter announced its recognition of non-communist Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Now the area became vital to the security of the United States. Dr. King points out, "Today South-east Asia looms so large in America's national interest that it fights for position will all other international interests, and secures military and economic commitments of scope never previously anticipated." For the safeguards of its interest, the United States and the Philippines concluded a

4. Ibid., pp. 365-366.
mutual defence treaty on August 30, 1951 and on September 1, 1951 the United State, New Zealand, and Australia formed the A.N.Z.U.S. Pact. According to Dr. King, "Present acute American concern for the area emerges from four principal events: (1) the second world war revealed the strategic importance of South-east Asia to the United States both in military and in economic terms; (2) the independence achieved by Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the States of Indo-China resulted in the formation of new relationships between these states and the United States; (3) through the communist victory in China the relatively weak states of south-east Asia became exposed to the possibility of communist aggression and domination; (4) the key role assigned to Great Britain and Japan in American security planning enhanced American interests in South-east Asia because of the economic fact that access to the trade and resources of South-east Asia is vital to both American allies thus, the United States not only has interests in South-east Asia; it has also interests in relation to South-east Asia." It is alleged that American interests in South-east Asia are ideological, humanitarian, political, economic, commercial, and strategic and moreover American interest depends on the whole region because if it is fall under the communist domination, it is a threat to American security. In the words of Dr. King, "When the area is considered as a whole, and when American interests are taken in combination as a multiplicity of interests in the perspective of present world conditions which extend

6. Ibid., p. 2.
from the cold war to an intense global effort by the United State to prevent international communism from engulfing the entire Eurasian land mass, American interests in South-east Asia became extremely significant, perhaps even decisive." It is also said that emotionally, intellectually, and historically the United States is committed deeply to the basic values of democracy - national independence, individual liberty and dignity, representative government, the concept of the State as the servant of the people, economic, political, and social opportunity and progress. Dr. King also observes, "Today the most powerful bearers of these non-democratic, totalitarian values are the communists. Wherever the conflicting values of democracy and communism meet, it is inevitable that they clash; and, because they have already chosen Asia as a major meeting ground, the ominous sounds of war face are clearly discernible. Whether by words or deeds, the battle for South-east Asia and adjacent areas is not only on but will undoubtedly continue for some years to come. Already China has fallen to the communists, leaving the Chinese people to brutal communist or-deal of organised brain washing and regimented hate. The blow against freedom in China has resounded to the detriment of the free world everywhere, particularly the United States. But this does not lessen that the fate of the rest of Asia is yet to be decided, and it is urgent as never

7. Ibid., p. 3.
before that South-East Asia retain a choice for freedom."

According to Dr. King, "In geopolitical terms, South-east Asia occupies a position of global — strategic importance roughly comparable to Panama and Suez. Thailand, the states of Indo-China, and Malaya (now Malaysia) just south-and east from continental Asia more than one thousand miles into the South China Sea. Offshore, the Philippine and Indonesian archipelagoes complete a great barrier between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Only through the narrow Straits of Malacca, which are dominated by Singapore, may this barrier be penetrated conveniently. In South-east Asia, too, the great international air routes converge from the West coast of the United States from Australia and Europe. In the hands of a hostile power, the Peninsula and offshore islands of South-east Asia and Africa would be isolated from the Pacific; India, New Zealand, and Australia would be threatened immediately. The entire area of south-east Asia and the western Pacific, including Australia and New Zealand, is an inter-connected strategic unit of far-reaching importance." He further illustrates, "Another geopolitical interests in Asia is bounded by the recently awakened knowledge of American security needs. This may illustrated by historic reference to events in the Atlantic covering the periods of the two world wars. Although the American public was never fully aware of the fact at the

8. Ibid., p. 5.
time, and American leaders were reluctant to admit it, a basic reason for American participation in the First World War was to prevent continental Europe from falling into the hands of a single hostile power. With German submarines sinking merchant vessels within a scant distance of Boston and New York harbors and the resultant loss of American life and property, for the first time there were demonstrated two facts pertinent to United States security: (1) the Atlantic Ocean no longer was a great protective barrier for the United States; (2) the protection offered by the Atlantic Ocean and the legal concept of freedom of the seas depended, in fact, on the role of the British Navy. The second World War repeated this early lesson of power politics which, the second time round, made a deeper impression. It is now generally recognised that the Atlantic is a source of protection only when policed and that the problem of policing the Atlantic would be infinitely greater if continental Europe were dominated by a single hostile power. Thus, America's first line of defence is the continent of Europe rather than the Atlantic. The principle, recognized in British foreign policy for centuries at least has become a principle of American policy." He further states, "The same principle of American security applies in the Pacific. During the Second World War the question of Japanese domination of continental east Asia and the islands of the Western and South-Western Pacific was a vital Pacific issue. Through such experiences as Pearl Harbor, the instances of the shelling of west coast towns by Japanese
submarines, the defence of Alaska, Australia, New Zealand, and India, there is ample indication of the threat to American security of an unpoliced Pacific Ocean and domination of continental Asia by a single power. "Today, China is a constant danger, if Peking succeeds in establishing control over a large part of Asia, it is just as consistent for the United States to have a continuing interest in free, strong, and independent states in South and South east Asia as for the United States to maintain its interest in the free, strong, and independent States of western Europe. Professor Buss rightly observes, "Idealism was postponed in the interest of expediency as the United States made the unpleasant choice between the unattainable and un-acceptable." There is also commercial interest in the region though it is not on large scale but its importance can not be denied. The significance of the trade, however, is embodied in its strategic implications. South East Asia supplies about 90 percent of the World's natural rubber, 55 percent of the World's tin. "In case of two important strategic materials, tin and natural rubber, the United States depends wholly upon foreign imports for all its requirements. Jute, Kapok, Copra, and tungsten are also important to the American economy. Though

10. Ibid., p. 8.
the United States has succeeded in developing synthetics and substitutes for those materials which had been obtained from South East Asia. But still tin and natural rubber stand as major strategic requirements. Moreover, South East Asia fulfills the requirements of the American's industry because after the Second World War its resources are not ... enough and now the United States is a resource deficit country. Therefore, the region is most important from economic point of view to the United States. Dr. King gives another aspect of American interest in the region. He states, "There is communist China sitting like the cormorant Soviet Union over the captive economy system of eastern Europe, hoping to envelop South East Asia in its wings. Control of South East Asia's rice, rubber, and tin would go far toward solving China's food and foreign exchange problems, if ever the Chinese communist regime, which repeatedly has proclaimed itself a foe of the United States, could move in. It is only practical implementation of security interests for the United States to deny the Chinese communist regime a maximum of South East Asia's resources."

There are variety of previous security commitments in Asia which the United States has concluded such as mutual defence treaties with the Philippines, Korea, Formosa, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand and through the Manila Pact American

security commitments have been extended to include Pakistan, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. Therefore, the United States interest in South-east Asia, is in United States security and welfare and not as a bulwark against communism only. As Dr. King puts it, "Apart from the meaning of the multiplicity of United States interest -- ideological, humanitarian, geopolitical, economic, commercial, strategic, security and accumulative -- all sing point in one direction. In the years ahead, South-east Asia and the surrounding areas are bound to play a role of increasing importance in World affairs, a matter which will be reflected by the continued growth of United States national interests in the area." Now the United States is increasingly interested in the region because of the presence of communist China in South East Asia which is a constant danger to world peace and the security of the United States. Professor Fred Greene observes, "China is the centerpiece, though a considerable measure of its importance derives from the significant geographic setting in which it functions. Its militant advocacy of ideological hostility toward the United States, its commitment to undermine all opposing political orders, and its ready reliance on instruments of violence and coercion give a cutting edge to the power potential that its leaders claim lies within Peking's reach. China hopes to acquire the capacity to gain hegemony over Japan and India and to validate its operational concepts for the

communication of other nearby lands. Peking's leaders further hope to prove their right to lead the rest of the non-Western World - the nations of Africa and Latin America in particular - and set it on a course for revolutionary political warfare while holding the United States, and all other opponents at bay."

About American interest, Professor Fred Greene observes, "To begin with, this country does have a major presence in Asia - and can probably retain a substantial position there in the near future - because of past endeavors and because many states fear the Chinese communists."

The United States committed itself in the beginning of August 1950 when America came to the rescue of France in the struggle of Indo-China because France was not in position after the Second World War to bear the burden of military campaign against the Viet Minh. Therefore, the United States sent an increasing stream of military aid to the French and the Vietnamese, bearing by 1953 about a third of the cost of the war. In spite of this great expenditure and effort the military situation had deteriorated. The Climax and crisis came with the battle of Dien Bien Phu in April and May 1954 with a victory for the Viet Minh. Utterly discouraged and weary of the war, France was determined

14. Greene, Fred, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia, N.Y. 1968, p. 2-
15. Ibid., p. 3.
to withdraw. This situation was painful to the United States which suffered a setback in Indo-China. A conference of American British, French and Russia foreign Ministers which met at Britain in January and February 1954, suggested calling a conference on Korea and Indo-China to be held at Geneva in April. The United States government was unhappy about the conference, and its policy with respect to it was uncertain. Secretary Dulles, obviously frustrated by the trend of events, flew to Europe and publicly appealed for a "United action" policy to stop communist aggression in Indo-China. The result was a public rebuff. Britain, influenced by domestic public opinion, as well as by the views of common Wealth members, and a sincere desire on its own part to attempt a peaceful settlement with the communist countries, refused to participate in any such action "in advance of the results of Geneva." The European fear was that Dulles wanted to scuttle the Geneva conference. But it is quite clear that he wished only to strengthen the anti-communist position in order to get a more favourable settlement. The response of America's European allies was a major reason why the United States took such an inactive part in the Geneva Conference. The allies seemed to be working at cross purposes. As a United States senator put it, the French wanted to get out of Indo-China, the British wanted to stay out, and the United States, it seemed,

16. Vandevbosch and Butwell, op.cit., p. 171.
wanted to get in." Therefore, "the Geneva agreements meant in effect the practical withdrawal of France from Indo-China, the evacuation of the communist Viet Minh forces from Cambodia and Laos as well as South Vietnam, the temporary division of Vietnam at about the seventeenth parallel, and a planned plebiscite in two years to determine the future status of the whole of Vietnam. An International control commission, composed of Canada, Poland and India, with a latter as chairman, was established to supervise the execution of the accords." Therefore, the United State suffered a diplomatic defeat in Indo-China in 1954. An internationally legitimatized new communist state came into being — possessed of some of the most important mineral resources in all South-east Asia, a most strategic location, and an industrious population of more then 15,500,000 persons. The plebiscite scheduled for July 1956 was not held, chiefly because of the refusal of the South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem, supported by the United States, to cooperate in holding it. Vietnam thus joined Germany and Korea as divided countries, victims of the titanic struggle between communism and the free world for the strategic areas of the globe."

Mr. Dulles declared, in a press statement of July 23, 1954, that the "important thing from now on is not to mourn the past but to seize the opportunity to prevent the loss in North Vietnam from

17. Ibid., p. 172.
18. Ibid., p. 371.
leading to the extension of communism throughout South-east Asia and the Pacific South West." He stated that there were two lessons which the free nations should learn from experience: namely, "that resistance to communism needs popular support and this in turn means that the people should feel that they are defending their own national institutions," and "that arrangements for collective defence need to be made in advance of aggression, not after it is under way."

On July 21, 1954, the Settlement reached and it was interpreted by most of Americans as one of the greatest communist victories of the decade. According to Professor Buss, "Under secretary of State Walter B Smith refused to join in the declaration of the Conference but he asserted that the United States would refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the agreement reached. Further more, he declared that the United States would view any renewal of aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."

Now Secretary Dulles of United States redoubled his efforts to consummate the South-east Asia collective Defence treaty, after the tragedy of Indo-China: "Its purpose was to prevent further communist expansion in the region. He was unsuccessful to unite South-east Asia, Nationalist China, Japan,

19. Vandenberg and Butwell, Quoted, p. 372.
and Korea in a solid anti-communist front. Nor could he hope to gain for his ideas the support of those including Nehru, who believed that the American schemes would promote tensions and who preferred the alternative British proposal for an Asia Locarno which would bind both sides --- communists and anti-communists --- a common commitment to preserve the peace. Therefore, Secretary Dulles succeeded in the formation of SEATO. On September 8, 1954, eight nations - the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand signed the Manila Pact. The signatory powers repeated their oft stated promises to settle international disputes by peaceful means to develop their capacity to resist armed attack to prevent and counter subversive activities to strengthen their free institutions, and to cooperate with one another in the promotion of economic progress and social well being. Each party recognised that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area (from western Pakistan to the Pacific Ocean as far north as 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, thus excluding Hong Kong, Formosa, and Japan) against any of the parties would endanger its own peace and safety and agreed that it would in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. The United States specified that it understood aggression to mean communist aggression. The territory covered

21. Ibid., p. 718.
22. Ibid., p. 718.
by SEATO has not increased but shrunk. Malaya was removed from SEATO's operation when it became independent in 1957 and did not join the organization. Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah, also formerly British ruled, underwent a like change when they became members of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 (Singapore becoming independent by itself in 1965 and talking — dangerously about the possibility of a Soviet naval base on its soil if Britain ever abandoned its defence responsibilities towards Malaysia or itself to the United States). Laos ceased to be a protocol state with the Geneva Agreements of 1962. Cambodia, while technically still covered by the protocol, has quite specifically spurned its promised protection. Conceivably Prince Norodom Sihanouk might still call upon SEATO for protection should communist China or North Vietnam invade his country, but it is not likely that Cambodia would be taken over in this fashion. Professor Fred Greene rightly observed, "The United States has had a long tradition of involvement in Asian security affairs without clearly identifying or justifying its interests in terms of a coherent policy. Though at times the engagement has been very extensive in prestige and effort, from the pre 1941 confrontation with Japan to the war in South Vietnam, the United States has tried to restrict its physical — commitments. The American stance has been shaped in a series of responses to aggression or immediate threats. The United States still has to devise a defence pattern based on its own concepts and initiatives and in harmony with its view of its own major interests."

23. Fred Greene, op.cit., p. 34.
Therefore, the United States is alarmed when some Asian power has displayed the potential to threaten and absorb the weak countries of Asia. In the words of Professor Fred Greena, "This review of the diplomatic military record during this century indicates that American security interests have in most instances been closely tied to the stability of relations among the Asian countries. When some Asian power has displayed the potential to threaten and absorb weaker Asian countries, that threat have also posed at least a potential danger to American security interests in the Pacific. Even when the United States has not been involved, it has had to deal in subsequent crises with the lingering repercussions of divisiveness and intra-Asia alliances. Often, of course, the danger to U.S. interest has been direct and immediate." He further states, "The initial American concern in the region was aroused by the impotence of China, and the United States became increasingly involved as the Japanese Empire began to overshadow Eastern Asia. The present commitments again focus on China which, through the changing fortunes of history, has today became capable of menacing all its neighbours."

There began a shift of the United States policy in Southeast Asia. It was more or less Soviet Union's attitude towards Southeast Asia when she came forward for economic aid programme to the countries of the region. In late 1955, the Russian leaders Bulganin and Khrushchev visited Burma when they were returning home from India. "This was followed by an agreement to provide

24. Ibid., p. 35.
technical assistance and equipment in exchange for Burma's surplus rice, which was not readily finding a market. The U.S.S.R. also offered, as a gift, to build and equip an industrial institute. In September of the same year Djakarta announced an agreement between the Soviet and Indonesian governments whereby the former would extend the latter a credit of ₤100,000,000 at an interest rate of 2½ percent and with repayment in 12 years. So there began a reorientation of American policy. Now the United States sought to counter this Soviet diplomatic and economic offensive. Mr. Dulles, Secretary of State paid a visit to several Asian countries and visited Indonesia and invited Sukarno to the visit the United State on behalf of the President Eisenhower. Therefore "President Eisenhower at a press conference on June 6, 1956 declared that military alliances were not always on advantage and involved a risk for the country entering them." This was the open invitation to the countries of the region which were not committed to the Systems. Therefore, it seemed that the United States was prepared to give aid for economic developments. There were reactions from the allies and the United States had to satisfy the allies with the explanatory statement. But it was obvious that there were roots for the reorientation of the policy. Now after some times, Secretary Dulles declared neutrality to be immoral. When Vice President Nixon visited the Philippines and other countries of South and Southeast Asia in July 1956, he also

declared the immorality of neutralism and warned against trade agreements with the Soviet bloc. But soon the United States took the new path. The right of neutrality was recognised and aid was promised to countries even if they did not align themselves with the West and now United States began to emphasize the need for economic and social progress in the under developed countries. According to Vandcn-bosch and Butwell, "The American objective was to contain the communist, particularly China, as far as Southeast Asia was concerned, and to assist the nations of the latter region to become strong and stable so as to be able to survive in a much more troubled world than their nationalist leaders had anticipated en route to independence. Ideally, this meant democratic governments pursuing - progressive economic and social policies and cooperation directly or indirectly with the United States and like minded nations."

Moreover, South East Asia was passing through a transition stage. There was no stable system in the region. In Indonesia, President Soekarno came with the idea of "guided democracy" and Burma experienced two military coups, (soldiers then civilian in 1960 and then soldiers in 1962). Thailand, a firm America ally,

27. Ibid., p. 378-79.
remained nonetheless army run, while military came to dominate the government in South Vietnam after Ngo Diem's ouster and murder in 1963. The tie-cornered struggle for power in Laos and Cambodian Prince Sihanouk's messianic self-image likewise made democracy most improbable for either of these formerly French-governed lands in the foreseeable future. Only the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore (which split away from Malaysia in 1965) seemed destined for democratic government. And therefore, deterioration of economic conditions was a major consequence of the Civil Wars in both South Vietnam and Laos. There were guerrilla activity of communists in Vietnam after 1959 and were joined by "invaders" from north of the 17th parallel. Vandem-bosch and Putwell illustrated another point "countries close to China eagerly sought to make some kind of peace with Peking - usually for different and mixed reasons. Cambodia, especially of Thailand and South (and potentially North) Vietnam, openly desired the protection of communist China against these two traditional adjacent adversaries. The American ambassador in Rangoon rarely saw the Burmese premier, but the latter welcomed visiting Chinese Statesmen and himself travelled to Peking in pursuit of good relations with Burma's giant neighbor. Indonesia and China came to cooperate to such an extent by the
middle 1960s that Sukarno openly spoke of a Djakarta-Peking axis."

Though the United States accepted neutralism as a reasonable species of foreign policy but it gave also a little result. The United States openly encouraged the Laotian government in the half decade 1955-1960 to abandon the neutralist course set for it at Geneva in 1954. The result was a fragmentation of the country initially pitting "neutralist" and communist against a pro-American faction. Therefore, the United States exploited the situation in Laos. In 1963 when there was a Malaysia plan with the inclusion of northern Borneo territories of Sarawak and Sabah and Singapore. Indonesia and Philippines claimed over northern Borneo territories and even Indonesia adopted the policy of confrontation towards Malaysia but Singapore broke away from the political partnership in mid-1965. Therefore, the United States supported Malaysia and had hoped for much but received little. with regard Indonesia, the United States could not win the friendship of the Sukarno government, though the United States had played a major role in the negotiations that led to the transfer of western New Guinea.

28. Ibid., p. 380.
from Dutch to Indonesian hands in 1962-63 and also gave economic aid in large scale to remedy its troubles economic situation. "By late 1965, the United States had been forced to abandon its information services, withdraw Peace corps personnel, and counteract its aid programme in extremely modest proportions. Private American groups - oil firms, foundations, and such - also found their activities curtailed or concluded."

Now Indonesia was leaning towards China and the communist coup was suppressed in 1965 and the fate of Suharto was also decided once for all. Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia spurned American aid and also did not endorse the communists at home and adopted a neutral policy. The Ne Win government of Burma which could not be called procommunist, was seeking an accommodation with Peking that would permit Burma's survival as an independent nation. The Philippine was an ally in the region and Thailand posed no major problems for the United States. However, it was Vietnam that posed a serious biggest problem during these years and absorbed American attention and problems of nearby States.

With regard Vietnam, the United States does not think for a moment under communist domination which will endanger the security of America. "On February 17, 1965, President Johnson - decaled, "As I have said so many, many times and other Presidents ahead of we have said, our purpose and our objective there is

29. Vandev Bosch and Butwell, op.cit., p. 383.
clear. That purpose and objective is to join in the defence and protection of the freedom of a brave people who are under attack that is controlled and that is directed from outside their countries. In a news conference on July 29, 1965, the President declared that, "this .... war ..... is guided by North Vietnam and it is spurred by communist China. Its goal is to conquer the South, to defeat American power, and to extend the Asiatic domination of communism." It is to be noted that the Americans came to South Vietnam as "advisers" in the beginning after the Geneva Accords of 1954 and then established themselves militarily though they decaled that they were protecting South Vietnam from Viet Congs. Reviewing the United States policy towards South Vietnam, Mr. Honey observes, "The United States provided generous civil and military aid to South Vietnam from 1954 onwards, which made possible the restoration of order and rapid economic recovery. As the spectre of insurgency became a reality, so American military aid was increased to enable South Vietnam to meet the growing strength of the Viet Cong. In February 1962, the existing Military Assistance Advisory Group was felt to be inadequate for this task and was replaced by a military Assistance command (Vietnam) American soldiers accompanied Vietnamese military units in the role of advisers, but aeroplanes and helicopters were flown—by American as well as Vietnamese

30. Van den bosch and Butwell, Quoted, The Changing Face of South east Asia, p. 386.
personnel. United States involvement in the war was steadily growing, but serious doubts were awakened in Washington by the political instability which lasted throughout 1964 and by the apparent inability of any government to impose itself upon the country and people. At one point Secretary of Defence Mac Namara made several public appearances with General Khanh the Prime Minister, for the purpose of consolidating the latter's position and discouraging further changes, but all to no avail. By the end of 1964 it being asked how long South Vietnam could continue to defend itself against the Viet Cong unless it put an end to anarchy, and the South Vietnamese people themselves now entertained serious misgivings about the future. In these circumstances Washington hesitated to commit large numbers of American military personnel to Vietnam to watch the rapidly expending might of the Viet Cong, and American uncertainty endangered a feeling of hopelessness in South Vietnam. Emboldened, the Viet Cong launched major attacks against American air bases in South Vietnam and successfully inflicted heavy damage.

He further states, "February 1965 was the turning point in Vietnam. The destructive Viet Cong raids on American air fields finally convinced the United States administration that stronger action had necessary if the situation were not to deteriorate still further. Retaliatory bombing attacks against military targets in North Vietnam were undertaken by the South Vietnamese and United States air forces, with the Americans playing the

dominant role in these, and soon afterwards specific promises were made to commit larger numbers of American troops to Vietnam. Work was commenced upon the construction of immensely strong military enclaves along the coastline, where they could be supplied from the sea by the U.S. Seventh Fleet, and American soldiers were, for the first time, committed to a fighting role."

The war in Vietnam has entered a crucial stage, with both North Vietnam and the United States committing more and more soldiers on a large scale and are unimaginable now. It is estimated that "the number of American fighting men in Vietnam had increased tenfold in 1965 - from about 20,000 to nearly 200,000 and to more than 255,000 by mid-1966 - exclusive of personnel on naval vessels in and near Vietnamese water." And "there were reports that the size of the American military forces in Vietnam would be nearly doubled before 1967." Now President Nixon and before him President Johnson had thrown various peace proposals for peaceful settlements but the Viet Minh, it seems, have doubts about the American's seriousness because the Geneva Accords of 1954 clearly established that the Indo-Chinese States would be neutral and the plebiscite would be held in 1966 but South Vietnam backed by United States refused for this. This is not true. But the North Vietnam is to be blamed. "In 1962, the International control commission reported that "armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies have been

32. Ibid., p. 32.
33. Vandev bosch and Butwell, op.cit., p. 390.
sent from the Zone in the North (North Vietnam) to the Zone is the South (South Vietnam) with the object of supporting, organising, and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks."

It is also reported that in Vietnam -war, there were twenty nine countries which are allies to the United States are giving aid to South Vietnam along the United States. Australia Newzealand and South Korea had contributed combat forces and are actively participating with the Americans. According to Vanden-bosh and Butwell, "The most likely ultimate out come is some kind of negotiated settlement. Total victory by either side is hardly possible. The question so far, however, has partly concerned the problem of which participants in the conflicts should be the negotiators. The Americans has opposed negotiations with the Vietcong. Yet the Vietcong have been the heart of the opposition to the Saigon Government, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, however, has said that Hanoi could include the Vietcong within any negotiating delegation it might form." Therefore, the United States wanted to prevent, such a communist state from absorbing adjacent Laos and Combodia and possibly other nations. It is accepted that it can not be done by the American's alone and in the past the United Stated had tried to create some sorts of system to check communist expansion in

35. Vanden bosch and Butwell. op.cit., p. 395
the region but the Americans would not have succeeded yet. Though there are many American's commitments in the region but there are not very strong and sound. Now it is clear that the advance of communism cannot be checked by military means alone in South-East Asia. The military and economic aids can not solve all the social and political problems. The chief danger, however, is not direct attack but infiltration and subversion, with Moscow and Peking using local Chinese and indigenous persons to spear head the trouble making. It has been Vietnamese who are either communists or support the communists who have challenged the successive Saigon — government — not Chinese invaders. Like wise the communist threat in Malaysia and now-separated Singapore has came from local Chinese whose loyalty lay with Peking or Mao rather than the existing government arrangements and the values and society they represented. Vanden bosch and Butwell rightly observe, "Southeast Asia is not going to be saved from communism unless its peoples and governments have the desire and the will to be saved. This will at the moment does not seem to be strong in some lands. But even desire and will are not sufficient; a nation must have the capability to defend itself from communism, both internally and externally. The region must be capable of defending its self." But Professor Buss observes, "The American record in South east Asia was an uneven record of accomplishment

36. Ibid., p. 397-98.
37. Ibid., p. 399.
and failure. It accepted the truism that Americans could not lead the good life at home without concern for the events of Asia and that American interests in Asia were best promoted by the growth of strong, prosperous, and enlightened Asian States. Americans repeated times and again that they harbored no aggressive designs against any one and that they acted uniquely according to the demands of self-defence. Only Asians could determine for themselves what they wanted in their struggle for improved well-being. Americans were often over-eager to assist and were the unwilling of their own better impulses. They learned bitterly that military strength in itself was powerless to prevent the capture of the sparkling ideas of freedom and prosperity by a concerous ideology. They were shown that economic assistance contained within itself the seeds of misunderstanding as well as the promise of friendship. Asians cherished spiritual and cultural values in the turmoil of Kaleidoscopic changes, and they sought new guidance from those who manifested a fundamental disposition of understanding and respect. Asian believed that present events were transitory and impermanent and that the evil would disappear and the good remain. They interpreted the history of their distinguished part as the prelude to a glorious future; In their own philosophy they challenged the United States to demonstrate its own unswerving faith in itself as the dream of youth and the hope of tomorrow."