Bertrand Russell is most distinguished among the philosophers who have dealt with the problem of perceptual knowledge in twentieth century. In the late nineteenth and the early decades of twentieth century, the philosophical atmosphere in British (and also in American) universities was dominated by Hegelian philosophy which was not only not in tune with the British tradition of empirical philosophy but was also against the taste and temperament of twentieth century western mind. Being so, a reaction against Hegelianism was bound to emerge. In Britain, it was Russell who along with G. E. Moore led the movement of revolt and reaction and it may be noted that it was the problem of perceptual knowledge through which these philosophers combated the representatives of Hegelianism in their country.

Russell was a very versatile philosopher. He wrote on a wide variety of subjects. Problem of perception constituted his second main interest after logic and mathematics. After 1910 which was the year of completion of his *Principia Mathematica*, he engaged himself mainly to determine the nature and extent of human knowledge. Almost all of his works in pure philosophy after this year are concerned with this problem.
It is characteristic to Russell that he developed theories not a theory about the problem of perceptual knowledge. No other philosopher can match him in being so self-critical and so open to modify his views in the light of new facts and new data. There are to his credit, broadly, four theories which he successively developed to explicate his problem. He first advanced a theory but being dissatisfied with it replaced it by another theory and then this was also replaced by some still another theory. In the early phase of his philosophical development, he was an epistemological dualist. Then he became a phenomenalist and then turned to neutral monism. In the last stage he again reverted to his original dualistic position while being within the framework of neutral monism.

Despite the immense importance that Russell enjoys in the history of philosophy of perception, there is, in all probability, no work which deals exclusively and comprehensively with this aspect of his philosophy. No attempt has hitherto been made which can be said to cover the whole panorama of his views which he advanced during the rather long period of about fifty years. In present undertaking, an endeavour is made to trace the gradual development of Russell's views concerning this problem. Our treatment of the subject here is more expository than critical partly because Russell himself was the greatest critic of his theories and partly
because a detailed critical evaluation of his contributions may constitute a separate thesis to be undertaken by some future researcher.

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(JALALUL HAQ)

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