CHAPTER V

PHILOSOPHIC DOCTRINES OF IBN TUFAYL

Ibn Tufayl has built up his philosophic doctrines step by step, carrying the reader with him through various stages of the development of Hayy, who serves him as his mouth-piece. This method has advantages as well as disadvantages. The advantages consist in the fact that we are acquainted with the starting point and the data, the premises and the nature of arguments on which the final results are based. But the disadvantages lie in its inability to give us a unitary picture of the whole philosophy. In following the psychological details of the intellectual voyage of our hero we often lose sight of the logical relation of various parts of his philosophy. So it requires to be supplemented by a method in which we start with the end-products i.e., final results of the philosophy, and try to analyse them into their constituent elements, particularly attending to their organic relationship. It is this method which we propose to follow in these pages, in giving an exposition of Ibn Tufayl's views on the 'Holy Trinity' of philosophy, God, Soul and the World, and other connected problems.
A. GOD

I. Proofs of the Existence of God.

Ibn Tufayl offers the following arguments for the existence of God:

(i) All bodies that we see around us are subject to generation and corruption. They are coming into existence and then dis-appearing after sometime. In other words, they are all produced anew. There was a time when they were not there; and at a certain point of time they began to exist. Whatever comes into existence or is produced anew must have a Producer or an Agent, to bring it into existence. Now suppose, in explaining the existence of a body, we assume another body to be its Producer. Being a body, it will also be subject to the law of generation and corruption, and will itself stand in need of a Producer, to account for its existence. If this second producer or Agent is also a body it will need another producer, and that, still another, and so on. If we go on supposing every producer or agent to be a body we shall be involved in an 'infinite regress', which is rationally unacceptable. We must stop at some ultimate Agent or Producer who should not be a body. This Immaterial Agent is God.
Even if one does not find the evidence for total corruption in some bodies, he cannot deny the fact of partial corruption or change. All bodies, in this world of generation and corruption, are subject to change. Change always implies a change in form. We always find bodies changing from one form to another. Water is rarefied into vapours, and vapours are again condensed into water. A piece of wood, if it is burnt, changes into coals, ashes, flames and smoke. The smoke, when its path is obstructed by a solid object, sticks to it in the form of soot. Now, reason demands that there should be some cause to explain these changes of forms. If we assume a body, as cause, to explain the change of form in another body, this cause will also be subject to the change of form and will need another cause to explain its change. If that cause is also a body it will need another cause, and that still another, and so on, leading us to an infinite regress. To avoid it we shall have to believe in an Immateriel Agent as the First Cause.

This Immateriel Agent or the First Cause is God. He has no cause of His own existence, but is the cause of the existence of all other things. He is the Necessarily Existent Being, i.e., He must
necessarily exist if the existence of other things is to be explained rationally.

(ii) The second argument is derived from the very notion of form.

With regard to the matter or corporiety every body would be just like any other body. It is the form which gives a body its special character and individuality. All its qualities and functions seem to proceed from its form.

There are different objects in nature, which are classified under various classes on the basis of their actions and functions. Some of them, like stone, earth, water, air, etc., show elementary functions. This leads us to believe that they have an elementary form or a simpler form. Some other objects, like plants and animals, show more varied and complex functions. This makes us attribute a higher and richer form to them.

It is this form which, in popular language, is referred to as the animal soul of the vegetative soul or the nature or inanimate objects.

But have we really seen the form or soul or nature of these objects? Have we penetrated behind
an object to see that mysterious something which is called its form, and have we actually seen its functions and acts proceeding from that form? No. We have simply seen those functions and actions, and nothing more. On the basis of these functions alone we have supposed that there is a corresponding form. In fact, form is nothing but the disposition of a body to produce such or such action. Those actions could be very well conceived to belong to another body. For instance, we can imagine fire with a cooling function, and ice with a burning function. In that case their forms would be reversed. Thus it is clear that we do not see any form in any object. What we perceive is certain actions proceeding from a body. This fact we express by saying that the body has fitness or disposition (or form) to perform those actions. But we do not see any necessary connection between those actions and that particular body, nor do we see any form from which those actions are emanating.

Now the question is: How to explain those actions, if we have done away with the form? What is the efficient cause behind those actions? The body itself cannot be such a cause because those actions have no essential connection with body as body. If some other body is supposed as the efficient cause for the actions of this body then
the same difficulty will arise. The actions will have no essential connection with that body also. Thus we are left with no alternative but to assert an Immaterial Being as the efficient cause for all the actions and changes that we perceive in bodies, in the physical world. This Immaterial Being, the Efficient Cause of all the phenomena, is God. It is God who moves all things and who acts in all things. In support of his point of view Ibn Tufayl refers to a tradition of the Prophet which says, "I am his Hearing by which he hears, and his seeing by which he sees."

Some persons may not find this argument convincing. They may say: If Ibn Tufayl is postulating one Immaterial Agent to explain the functions of different bodies, what was the harm in attributing those functions to the 'forms' of those bodies? In other words, why should he not suppose so many immaterial agents (forms) instead of one Immaterial Agent? To this Ibn Tufayl would reply that plurality has application only to the bodies and what possesses bodily attributes. It is irrelevant in connection with the spiritual world. The Immaterial Agent, whether connected with the actions of one body or
of many bodies, in every case, is one and the same. In fact it is above the distinctions of one and many. All that is important for our purpose is the fact the Immaterial Agent is necessary to explain the phenomena of the world.

(iii) Ibn Tufayl's third argument is based on the mystical experience or intuition. This mystical experience, according to Ibn Tufayl, is such that no man can ever conceive it. It is immediate, unique and personal. One who has this experience does not entertain the slightest doubt about its validity, but others cannot be convinced of it rationally, because it cannot be communicated to them. The only way to know it is to have it. However, Ibn Tufayl tries to give some idea of it by way of parables and metaphors, "without knocking at the door of Truth". This is how he describes it:

"Then both the Heavens and the Earth, and whatsoever is between them, and all spiritual forms, and corporeal faculties, and all those faculties which are separate from matter, (namely the Essences which know the self-subsisting Necessary Being), all disappeared and vanished like scattered dust, and amongst these his own Essence
disappeared too, and there remained nothing but this one, True, perpetually Self-subsisting Being." 18

In this state, in short, the mystic witnesses that which "neither eye hath seen, nor ear hath heard, nor hath it ever occurred to the heart of man." 19

The mystic does not find in this state anything contrary to what his reason tells him. But this experience differs from the rational knowledge in so far as it exceeds it in clarity and the degree of pleasure and felicity derived from it. 20

(iv) An interesting aspect of Ibn Tufayl's arguments is the fact that he tries to prove the Existence of God both from the eternity and non-eternity of the world.

(1) If the world has been produced anew it is obvious that it could not have come into existence of itself. There must have been some Agent to produce it. And this Agent could not be a body. If it is a body it would be a part of the world and consequently a being produced anew. So it
will stand in need of another cause or Agent to have produced it. If this second Agent is also a body it will need a third, and the third will need a fourth, and so on ad infinitum, which is absurd. Thus we have to believe that the world was produced by an Immaterial Creator, having wisdom, knowledge and power, etc.\textsuperscript{21}

(2) Now, suppose the world is eternal—it has always been as it is now. Then its motion must also be eternal. And eternal motion would obviously be infinite. There should be a mover for this motion. If we suppose this mover to be a power diffused through a body, or even through the body of the world, it will be finite, as the world itself and all bodies in it are finite.\textsuperscript{22} A finite cause cannot produce an infinite effect—the eternal motion of the world. The power which moves the world and the Heavenly bodies, therefore, should not reside in any body but should proceed from a Being free from bodily attributes, i.e., an Immaterial Agent. This Agent must possess knowledge and power so as to be able to produce such wonderful and
regular movements as we find in the heavenly bodies, etc.\textsuperscript{23}

An objection may be raised here. If God and the world are both co-eternal, how can one be the cause of the other? Ibn Tufayl anticipates it and solves the difficulty in the following way: The world must be posterior to God in nature, if not in time. Suppose you take a body in your hand and begin to move it. The movement of the body will depend on the motion of the hand but will not be posterior to it in time.\textsuperscript{24} Similarly, we may take the world as caused and created by the Immaterial Agent, out of time.\textsuperscript{25}

No doubt, Ibn Tufayl has solved the difficulty in an ingenious way but his argument seems to be exposed to another serious objection. His way of thinking poses the world as a rival to God and thus cuts at the very root of Theism. This objection is met by Ibn Tufayl through his analysis of body and mystical interpretation. Body is a combination of Form and Matter. But matter cannot subsist without form and form cannot exist without the Immaterial Agent;\textsuperscript{26} i.e., God. Hence
the world is nothing but the manifestation of God. It is not an independent Being limiting or negating God.

(v) Another subtle argument used by Ibn Tufayl is based on the knowledge of God. It has not been expressly mentioned but can be inferred from some of his statements: I have the knowledge of an Immaterial Agent. Being Immaterial, His knowledge is his presence. To know Him is to possess Him. But this Immaterial Being cannot be present but with Himself and His very presence is His Essence. It means that I have that Essence in so far as I know Him.27

II. Attributes of God.

God is the Immaterial Agent who has produced and created all things. He is the necessarily Existent Being. He has no cause of His own existence, but is the cause of the existence of all other things.28

He is the creator of all things.29 When He would have anything done, His Command is Be, and it is so.30

All things are dependent on Him while He is independent and free of them.31
He is the Maker and producer of the forms. He is the efficient cause behind them. All the functions and actions, that are generally attributed to forms, really proceed from Him. He is our hearing by which we hear, and our seeing by which we see.\(^{32}\)

He is the source of all bodies and all forms. Matter is inconceivable apart from form and form proceeds from God; so the whole world of bodies, forms and matter, is derived from God, and is nothing apart from God.\(^{33}\)

He is the true, perpetually self-substant Being. There exists nothing but the Essence of this True One.\(^{34}\) From the wonderfullness of His workmanship we infer His accurate wisdom, subtle knowledge, unlimited power and infinite Perfection.\(^{35}\) The smallest atom, whether in Heaven or Earth, is not unknown to Him; no, nor any other thing, whether lesser or greater than it.\(^{36}\)

He is the maker of the world and has the full command and knowledge of it. "Shall not He know it that created it?" He is wise, omniscient.\(^{37}\) When we perceive beauty, elegance, perfection, strength or excellence of any kind among His Creatures, we are led to infer that the Agent (God) from whom all these qualities flow must possess them in more perfect and complete form.\(^{38}\)
He has given such wonderful bodies to animals and has taught them how to use them for different purposes of life. Moreover, He has provided for their needs in abundance. It shows He is exceedingly Bountiful and Gracious.  

He is incorporeal and cannot be perceived by the senses, nor apprehended by the imagination. As He is incorporeal and immaterial, to know Him is to have Him. It is our immaterial essence alone by which we can know Him.  

He is free from matter, and the properties of body. He is separated from every thing which we can either perceive by our senses or reach by our imagination.  

He is free from all attributes of imperfection. The notion of imperfection is nothing but mere non-existence. How can He partake of it? He is pure existence. He gives being to everything that exists. There is no existence besides him.  

It is interesting to compare Ibn Tufayl with Spinoza with regard to this point. Spinoza, discussing his theory of Substance, puts forward the maxim that "All limitation is negation." The critics have been at pains to explain
it and to reconcile it with Spinoza's Theory of Attributes and Modes. However, it can be easily understood in the light of Ibn Tufayl's remark that all imperfection is nothing but mere non-existence. As Spinoza was familiar with Ibn Tufayl's work, 'Hayy Ibn Yaqzan', it would not be far from the truth if we supposed that he was influenced by Ibn Tufayl in his philosophy.

In short, God's attributes are of two kinds, (1) positive, as knowledge, power, wisdom, etc., and (ii) negative, as immateriality. Immateriality does not merely imply the fact of not being a body, but it also signifies freedom from every thing that has the least relation to body. His negative attributes require that He should not be likened to a body. But His positive attributes too demand that they should not be interpreted in any bodily sense. For instance, multiplicity is an attribute of bodies. There can be no multiplicity in God—not even in His attributes. The Divine Essence is not multiplied by these attributes. All of them are one—they are nothing but His real Essence.

III. Relation of God to Soul.

Descartes had first proved the existence of the Ego and then, from its idea of Perfection, had derived the existence of the Perfect Being, i.e., God. Ibn Tufayl
reverses the order. He first proves the existence of God and then, from this knowledge of God, proceeds to infer the reality of his Soul. His argument is as follows:

I have knowledge of God, and apprehend the Divine Essence. But this Divine Essence or the Necessarily Existent Being is immaterial and free from all bodily attributes. He cannot be apprehended by body, or by any faculty residing in body. It follows, therefore, that I have apprehended Him through my own Essence which is immaterial like Him.

This immaterial essence or soul is derived from God. It proceeds from God just as light emanates from the sun. It is joined to body so closely by the command of God that it can hardly be separated from it, even in thought. It should not, however, be understood to mean something that is substracted from the Divine Essence and added to the body. No. It is a command of God which is related to the body in a unique way, so that we are not able to say that it is inside the body or outside the body, or whether it is identical with the body or distinct from the body. This soul is acting upon all creatures but some show strong manifestations of it while others, very dim impressions of it. It is due to their varying capacities to receive it. Thus the nature of the inanimate objects, the vegetative soul,
the animal soul and the noble Essence of man are all derived from God.\textsuperscript{52} These differences can be illustrated by the analogy of the light of the sun falling on different bodies. Some bodies, like thin air, do not seem to reflect this light at all; others, like unpolished opaque bodies, show a little reflection of that light. The polished bodies, like looking glasses, reflect the light in the highest degree. Some of these polished bodies not only reflect the light but also give an image resembling the sun. Lastly, there are some bodies, like lenses, which collect so much light as to produce fire.\textsuperscript{53}

In this example, the last but one category represents man. Man can be compared to those polished bodies or mirrors which reflect the image of the sun. In other words, man alone has an essence resembling the Divine Essence.\textsuperscript{54} This is the sense of the Prophet's tradition that God created Adam in His own image.

Now, the last category represents the Prophets, in whom this image prevails to such a degree that it consumes all else.\textsuperscript{55}

In fact, the relation between God and the Soul is unique. We cannot say about the soul that it is God; nor we can say it is distinct from God. It is like the image
of the sun being reflected in a mirror. We cannot say that this image is identical with the sun, or with the mirror. Yet it is not different from them.

But this is only an analogy and analogies are never perfect. In case of the light or image of the sun we find a body or mirror already present to receive that light or image. But in case of the forms or souls proceeding from God there is no body prior to them. It is this very emanation that gives existence to bodies. Bodies are combinations of matter and form. Matter is nothing without form and form is nothing independent of God. So the whole body comes from God. It is not something over and above God, but only a manifestation of God.  

There is another important point to be borne in mind in this connection. These essences (or souls) do not imply a division of the Divine Essence. In reality nothing is separated or subtracted from God. God remains as He is. The generation or destruction of bodies neither adds anything to God nor takes away anything from Him. Similar is the case with multiplicity. The Divine Essence does not become 'many' on account of these essences; nor these essences can be said to show multiplicity side by side with God. Ibn Tufayl solves this apparent paradox by point-
ing out that separation and union, aggregation and distinction, agreement and difference, multiplicity and singularity are words which can be understood in the context of the sensible world only. They have no application to the Divine world. It would not be out of place here to remark that Ibn Tufayl does not seem to be in sympathy with the abstract notion of pure Unity. This fact is borne out by his remarks on Al-Ghazālī, in his Introduction. There he refers to a statement of Al-Ghazālī to the effect that 'those who have attained to the vision of God or Union with God are aware of the fact that God has an attribute which goes against the notion of pure Unity'. Ibn Tufayl does not challenge this statement of Al-Ghazālī but simply shows his disagreement with the view that it implied multiplicity in God. And this is quite consistent with his general point of view as discussed above.

In short, Ibn Tufayl believes that all souls are derived from God. But man possesses a soul or Immaterial Essence like the Immaterial Essence of the Divine Being. He tries to support it by two arguments. First, the fact of the knowledge of God leads him to believe that he has an immaterial essence through which he knows Him. Secondly, the mystical experience convinces him of the same fact. When he returned to himself from the mystical state, which
was like a state of intoxication, he was convinced that his own essence was not different from the Essence of the True One but that both were one and the same thing.\textsuperscript{62}

IV. Stages of the Emanation of Form or Soul from God.

Ibn Tufayl seems to be in agreement with the neo-Platonic idea of emanation. He also seems to be in agreement with Farābī and Ibn Sīnā that only one can emanate from the One.\textsuperscript{63} But he does not follow them in details. He takes the central idea from them and develops it in his own way, on the basis of his own mystical experience. As he has made Hayy Ibn Yaqzān his mouth-piece, let us follow the mystical experiences of Hayy as described by Ibn Tufayl:

"Having attained this total absorption, this complete annihilation, this veritable Union, he saw that the highest sphere, beyond which there is no body, had an essence free from matter, which was not the essence of that One, True One, nor the sphere itself, nor yet anything different from them both; but was like the image of the sun which appears in a well-polished looking glass which is neither the sun nor the looking glass, and yet not distinct from them. And he saw in the essence of that sphere such perfection, splendour and beauty, as is too great to
be expressed by any tongue, and too subtle to be clothed
in words; and he perceived that it was in the utmost per­
fection of delight and joy, exultation and gladness, by
reason of its beholding the Essence of that True One, whose
Glory he exalted."

In the same manner he saw the essences of other
spheres, one by one, and found the same beauty, splendour,
felicity and joy as he had perceived in the first—which
eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, and which hath not occured
to the heart of man. It was true about each one of these
essences also that it was not identical with the sphere or
spheres or with the preceding essences, nor it was distinct
from them. Lastly, he perceived that this world too had an
immaterial essence like the rest, but this essence had seven­
ty thousand faces, and every face seventy thousand mouths,
and every mouth seventy thousand tongues with which it
praised and glorified the Essence of the True Being. This
many - faced essence included his immaterial essence and
those of others like him. All these essences exhibited the
same elegance, beauty and perfection as was found in the
preceeding essences, and what was true of them was true of
those also, i.e. they were neither identical with bodies
or other essences nor distinct from them. These essences
appeared to be many from the point of view of the bodies
in which they were manifested. But considering their immaterial nature and their common ultimate source they were all one. Their relation to the source can be explained through an analogy. Suppose there is a series of mirrors reflecting the image of the sun, in a descending order. The first mirror receives it directly from the Sun; from the first it reflects in the second, and from the second in the third, and so on, ultimately falling in fluctuating water where it appears as multiplied. Now, with regard to these images we cannot say that they are identical with the mirrors or with the Sun, or with one another; nor we can say they are different from them. When we look at the mirrors in which they are being reflected we call them 'many'. But looking at their source we will say it is nothing but one and the same Sun which is being reflected in so many mirrors.

Here Ibn Tufayl anticipates an objection. According to the Decree of Reason a thing must be either one or many. The same must hold good of the spiritual world of the immaterial essences.

Ibn Tufayl answers this objection in two ways. First, the analogy of the Sun and its images in a series of mirrors offers a solution of the difficulty. Here we
find that there is unity in one sense, and multiplicity in another. The same may be said of these immaterial essences.

The second solution that he offers is more philosophical and more subtle. He says that multiplicity and singularity, separation and union, agreement and difference, and, for that matter all words with which our ears are familiar, have essential reference to bodies or things connected with bodies. When we use these words to express the truths of the Divine World they always insinuate some wrong notion about them. In fact, those truths are above these distinctions and their antithesis or contradiction does not apply to them.71

Moreover, even with regard to the physical world, it is difficult to decide whether it is one or many. Take for instance any body and consider whether it is one or many. With regard to its constituent parts and their divisibility, it is a multiplicity beyond comprehension. But considering the relationship and compactness of the parts, even the whole physical world may be regarded as one huge body.72 When it is so with regard to the world of bodies how can we say about the Divine World whether it is one or many?
V. Relation of God to the Physical World.

Ibn Tufayl, like Spinoza, seems to believe in Pan-Psychism. Every object of the world has a soul. This soul is joined to the body by the command of God. This soul is continuously emanating from God and is acting on all things, but different bodies manifest it in varying degrees, according to their capacities to receive it.

This soul, emanating from God and uniting with a body, is the 'form' of the body. The body comprises two notions — matter and form, corporiety and something superadded to that corporiety. Now matter or corporiety is something inconceivable without form. And form, as we have seen, proceeds from God. In fact, it is nothing distinct from God. Thus the forms depend on God and bodies depend on forms. So the whole world of bodies depends on God, and is nothing apart from God.

Far from being a rival to God, or a hindrance to belief in God, the physical world, with its changing phenomena and occurrences, serves as an argument for the existence of God. Every body that is created anew and every form that comes into being requires that there should be a maker or producer to bring it about. To avoid the in-
finite regress we have to believe in the Necessarily Existent Being as the ultimate Immaterial Agent behind all these changes.

Ordinary Theism treats the physical world as a stumbling block in its way. But it is different with Ibn Tufayl. Even the question of the eternity of the world does not bother him. If the world is eternal, it is still in need of God and is dependent on and derived from God, and not a rival being, other than God.  

B. S O U L

I. Form or Soul.

Soul is the 'form' of body. A body consists of two aspects, matter and form. Matter is common to all bodies. They are indistinguishable from one another with regard to matter. Matter is the same as corporiety — just the fact of being a body. Matter or corporiety is not yet a body—nay, it cannot even exist without something superadded to it, i.e., form. It is the form which distinguishes one body from another. The form makes the body what it is. All the properties and functions of a body proceed from its form or soul, as we may call it.
II. Grades of Soul

The differences that we find in bodies, with regard to properties and functions, are all due to their form or soul. The animal soul is responsible for the peculiar functions of an animal — sensation and movement. The vegetative soul is responsible for the peculiar functions of the plants — nutrition and growth. Similarly, the form of the inanimate objects (their nature) is responsible for their functions — levity or gravity.

Thus it is clear that bodies show different grades depending on the simplicity or complexity of their forms. Some bodies have an elementary form only, e.g., air, water, earth, etc. So a few elementary functions proceed from that form, such as gravity, levity, cold, etc. The plants possess this first form in common with the inanimate objects. But they have another form superadded to it, from which proceed their peculiar functions — nutrition and growth. The animals possess the forms of the inanimate objects and of the plants in common with them but have a third form also, which is the source of their peculiar functions — sensation and movement.

Now, man possesses the forms of the inanimate objects, plants and animals, in common with them, and also his own
peculiar form which is the source of his reasoning, contemplation and knowledge of God. In ordinary usage, it is this peculiar form of man alone that is referred to as soul.

Here, a possible misconception may be corrected. We have spoken of the several forms of a man, animal or plant. However, it should not be taken to mean that these forms remain distinct and separate from one another and have real plurality in them. No, it is from the point of view of the resulting functions, and for the purposes of comparison, that we speak of several forms. In fact, plurality is inapplicable to them, as they are immaterial.

Not only the several forms of the same individual are one but, according to Ibn Tufayl, the innumerable forms in the whole Universe are all one and indistinguishable from God.

If forms are all one, why do they show such a plurality and differences of grades? Ibn Tufayl's answer is this. With regard to their source, i.e. God, they are one. With regard to the bodies in which they are manifested, they are many.

The bodies manifest them in varying degrees because of their varying capacities to receive them. Just as some
bodies reflect the light of the sun more strongly than others, similarly, the effects of the soul are more visible in some bodies than in others.\textsuperscript{82}

III. The \textit{animal spirit} and the \textit{Soul}.

Now let us see how this form or soul is related to the animal spirit. The animal spirit is a fine hot vapour residing in the heart of the animal. As it too is a body, it is composed of two aspects, form and matter. We have seen that form is the source of all properties and functions of a body. So the functions which seem to proceed from the animal spirit are really due to the form of the animal spirit. Further, an animal body, or a species of animals, or the whole animal kingdom is one in relation to the animal spirit from which its common functions proceed. When the form of the animal spirit is seen to be the source of those functions, it becomes the chief principle of Unity underlying those bodies.

Moreover, the animal spirit is a superior body resulting from the most perfect and harmonious combination of various elements. That is why it is capable of higher manifestations of soul—the animal soul. And this is the secret of the rich and varied functions of an animal body.
IV. Soul and the physical world.

The soul is the principle of Unity underlying the physical world. It is an immaterial principle and so there can be no multiplicity in it. As the physical world is a huge body and a body is composed of Form and Matter, so there is a world-soul corresponding to the body of the world. This world-soul includes other forms and essences without becoming a plurality itself.

A body comes into existence when the form is joined to it. Without form it is inconceivable. It is dependent on form and derived from form. So is the physical world.

Again, it would be wrong to suppose that the matter (of the physical world) existed prior to form, and then, at a later stage, the form was joined to the matter. In fact, matter is mere nothing without form. Take away all form (shape, colour, properties and functions, etc.) from a body and nothing would be left there. So bare matter, divested of all forms, could not have existed. From this it logically follows that the physical world (of bodies), with all its matter, owes its existence to the form or the Soul.
V. Human Soul.

Human soul refers to the peculiar form of man. Like other forms and souls it also proceeds from God. It is joined to the human body by the Command of God. But it is not something placed in the body. We cannot say that it is inside the body or outside it. These terms (outside and inside) have application to the relation of two bodies and the soul is not a body. Its relation to the body is so intimate that we cannot separate it from the body even in thought. It constitutes the very essence of the body. But again, as essence it is not to be located in any part of the body. It is connected with the whole body, or rather, its benefits and manifestations extend to the whole body.

We may raise here the question of the individuality of human soul. On a superficial glance it appears that Ibn Tufayl merges all souls in the all-embracing Divine Essence. But that is not really so. He neither sacrifices unity for the sake of multiplicity, nor multiplicity for the sake of unity. He affirms God as the real Agent and Efficient cause behind all phenomena, yet it does not entail a denial of human freedom and responsibility. He solves this apparent paradox by pointing out that the terms one and many, singularity and plurality do not apply to the spiritual
world. If these terms do not apply to the truths of that world the contradictions based on these notions cannot be ascribed to it either.

This is something like Kant's solution of the problem of freedom. Kant affirms it as a truth of noumenal world, which cannot have any clash with causality which refers to phenomena.

VI. The beginning and end of Human Soul.

In this world of generation and corruption death signifies corruption or change of form. When a body gives up its form and assumes a different form we call it death. It is the death of a flower when it changes into dust. Fire is dead when it is reduced to ashes. Thus it is clear that death or corruption is the fate of the bodies. What is not a body is free from death and corruption. Soul is an immaterial essence and it remains so for ever. Corruption and dissolution cannot touch it. In other words it is immortal. It is the connection of the soul with the body that comes to an end — the body dies and assumes the form of the dust. But the Soul does not die with the body.\footnote{83}
Similarly, the connection of the soul with the body has a beginning in time. It is an event produced anew. But the soul itself, viewed apart from the body, is not created in time.\textsuperscript{84} It was eternally present with its source.

In this sense, however, all the forms, even the forms of inanimate objects or plants are immortal and eternal. Being immaterial they must all be imperishable.

It is another way of saying that their source is immortal and imperishable and with the dissolution of the body they will return to their source. This does not prove personal immortality. But so far as the human soul is concerned Ibn \textsuperscript{T}ufayl seems inclined to believe in personal immortality. As we shall see in connection with his views regarding the Reward and Punishment of the next life, Ibn \textsuperscript{T}ufayl speaks of everlasting joy and everlasting misery,\textsuperscript{85} which imply the continuity of the soul's existence after death.

If some one were to ask him how the individuality and immortality of human soul can be reconciled with the Unity of God he will give the oft-repeated answer that the Divine world is such that the notions of our sensible world do not apply to it.
VII. Human Soul and the Knowledge of God.

God is an Immaterial Essence, free from all attributes of body. He cannot be apprehended through senses or imagination. But the human soul, which is Immaterial like the Divine Essence and is derived from Him, has the capacity to know God. The animals and other creatures of this world, who do not possess this noble essence, have no knowledge of God. The reason why human essence alone can know God is this: God is an Immaterial Essence. To know Him is to possess Him. To possess Him is to be like Him. So His knowledge is His actual presence. Now this presence cannot be with the body. Nor can the body possess Him or resemble Him. Obviously, it is the immaterial human essence through which one can have knowledge and vision of God.

VIII. The Reward and Punishment of the Soul in the Hereafter.

The question of the reward and punishment of the soul in the next life is a delicate problem of Religion. Most religions promise some kind of reward to the virtuous, and threaten the evil-doers with some kind of punishment, in the life after death. Islam does the same. It gives a graphic description of the pleasures of the Paradise and
of the tortures of the Hell. Now the rationalists sometimes raise the following objections against the Islamic view of reward and punishment. First, why should God feel pleased or displeased with an insignificant being like man? It reduces Him to the status of a despotic monarch who wants to impose His will on others. Secondly, why the pleasures and pains of the next life should be described in such sensuous terms. Several answers have been given to these objections. But Ibn Tufayl tries to answer them in his own mystical way. He says: When a man endowed with sight has his eyes open we say that he sees actually. When his eyes are shut, then we say that he sees potentially or he has the power to see. Now if a man has never actually apprehended any object he will have no particular desire for it (eg. a man who is born blind). But if he once used to apprehend the object actually and then he is reduced to the state of 'power' only, he will naturally have a desire to apprehend 'in act', and will feel grief and sorrow over loss of it (eg. a man who has lost his sight recently). The more beautiful and glorious is the object the greater would be his grief for the loss of it.

A man who is deprived of sight would feel greater grief than one who is deprived of smelling, because the objects of sight are more beautiful and perfect than those
of smelling. But if there is an object of infinite beauty, glory and perfection, and one is deprived of the sight and knowledge of it after being once acquainted with it, his anguish and suffering would be unlimited. On the other hand, one who continues to enjoy the sight of it, his felicity and joy would have no bounds.

So this is the essence of the Punishment and Reward of the next life, according to Ibn Tufayl. One who devoted himself, during his lifetime, to seeking the knowledge and vision of the Divine Being (who is most Perfect, Beautiful and Glorious) will continue to enjoy that sight and vision after his death and will be in a condition of unbounded felicity and joy for ever.

On the other hand, a man who had some knowledge and notion of that Being and His Perfection but turned away from Him and remained so till death overtook him, will be deprived of that vision and will feel inexpressible anguish and torture on that account.

Now there are several categories, according to Ibn Tufayl, in this respect:

(i) Those who were never acquainted with the Divine Being and never heard of Him in this life, will
have no desire for Him, and will feel no pangs on being separated from Him in the next life too. The desires for sense objects will also disappear with the death of the body. So their souls will practically disappear. Animals deprived of a rational essence, and human beings who belong to the same stage, come under this category.95

(ii) Those who did acquire a notion of this Being and His Perfection during their lives but afterwards turned away from Him and remained in this condition till death, they will have a desire for that vision, and being deprived of it, will feel lasting pain and torture. Their suffering will be all the more intense as there will be no objects of sense and sensuous pleasures to engage them.96

(iii) Those who acquired the notion of the Self-subsisting Necessary Being, and with all their thoughts and abilities sought His knowledge and vision they will enjoy uninterrupted vision in the hereafter as there would be no objects of sense to distract them, and they will be in a state of everlasting pleasure, joy and felicity.97
Thus Ibn Tufayl explains the Reward and Punishment of the next life as a natural outcome or a logical consequence of the life in this world. One gets what he seeks. If one turns his face against the sun he himself is responsible for not seeing the sun. Similarly, if a man seeks the vision of God he will find it. If he turns his face he will be deprived of it.

This is the answer of Ibn Tufayl to the first objection mentioned in the beginning of this section. The second objection is also solved indirectly by the same answer. The sensuous and physical description of Paradise and Hell is by way of metaphor, to suit the general level of understanding. Its essence lies in the joys of the vision of God and pangs of separation from Him.

These were the conclusions to which Ibn Tufayl was led through his reasoning. He finds their confirmation in his mystical experiences also. In his mystical experience, in connection with the last stage of emanation, Hayy finds three categories of immaterial essences. He saw some immaterial essences that were beholding the Divine Essence and had great felicity and perfection. There were some immaterial essences who were like rusty looking glasses
covered with filth. "They had turned their face against the source of light and so were deprived of the vision of God. They were in infinite pain and misery — they were scorched with the fiery veil of separation, and sawn asunder by the saws of repulsion and attraction." Besides, there were some other essences that appeared and straight way vanished— they took form and were soon dissolved. These three classes exactly correspond to the three categories discussed before.

C. THE PHYSICAL WORLD

I. Ibn Tufayl's Notion of body.

When we look around, the first thing that meets our glance is the body or bodies. To discover the true nature of these bodies has been the object of philosophy from the days of Thales. Ibn Tufayl also starts with the same quest. He bases his philosophy on the notion of Body. This is how he proceeds in the analysis of Body.

The notion of Body comprises two aspects — corporeity and something superadded to corporeity, i.e. form.
Corporiety (just the fact of being a body or having extension) is common to all bodies. They are indistinguishable from one another in this respect. It is something superadded to corporiety which distinguishes one body from another. It makes a body what it is. It is responsible for giving individuality and its peculiar characteristics to the body.

This corporiety and something superadded to it correspond to the distinction of Matter and Form as held by philosophers.

So a body is composed of matter and form. To make this distinction clear Ibn Tufayl gives an illustration. Take a ball of clay. It has a certain proportion in its dimensions. Now change it into a cubical or oval figure. The proportions and dimensions have changed. Yet something has remained the same which we call clay. The clay which remains the same throughout the various alterations represents the notion of 'matter'. The particular proportions and dimensions that it successively assumes represent the notion of 'form'. It is obvious that neither of them can subsist without the other. The clay cannot be found without certain proportions and dimensions. Similarly, these dimensions and proportions cannot be found to exist by themselves.
The analogy of clay and its particular proportions does not fully apply to form and matter. In fact the clay is not equivalent to matter because it already possesses certain attributes which distinguish it from wood, iron, gold, etc. Matter, on the other hand, is a notion devoid of all attributes. The moment any attributes are added to it it becomes a body, and remains matter no more.

II. Grades of Body, According to Form

We have seen that form is responsible for the distinctive features, properties and functions of a body. Bodies are distinguished from one another with regard to their forms.

Bodies show a graded classification on the basis of their common functions or similarity of form, e.g. man, animal, plant and inanimate objects. The inanimate objects have the poorest form as they show a few elementary functions only, e.g. levity, gravity, etc. The plants have a higher form because they, in addition to the functions of inanimate objects, show their peculiar functions also, viz. nutrition and growth. Animals possess a still higher form as their functions include sensation and movement, in addi-
tion to the functions of the preceding two classes. Man has the highest form. He possesses the forms of inanimate objects, plants and animals, and also his own peculiar form, i.e. rational soul.

Now, if we search for those bodies which possess the simplest form, we arrive at the (so called) four elements—earth, water, air and fire. These are the bodies with the simplest form, and it is with their different proportions and combinations that complex bodies result.

We see that bodies differ with regard to their functions and durability. What is the principle behind these differences? Why some bodies have easier access to the state of life? Why some bodies are less subject to corruption than others? Ibn Ṭufayl explains it thus:

The bodies whose essence was endowed with most forms had the richest operations and had more ready entrance to life.

The bodies which had one single form only, like four elements, were lowest in the rank of existence. They had a very weak life. Their operations were weak because every one of them had an adversary to oppose its tendency.
The same is the case with some compound bodies in which the elements have not mingled harmoniously. They are at war with one another and try to oppose and neutralise one another with the result that ultimately one of those elements prevails. So the compound shows the nature of that prevailing element, with very little portion of life.\textsuperscript{109}

But if there is a compound body in which the elements were all equally mixed, and the nature of one element did not prevail over the other, but all worked and cooperated harmoniously, then this body will have nothing contrary to its form, and will be most disposed to life.\textsuperscript{110}

Now, animal spirit\textsuperscript{111} is such a body. It has most even temperature. It is of the nature of a mean between all the elements. That is why it is capable of receiving the Form of animality.\textsuperscript{112}

As the animal spirit has no opposition to its form, and the forms of all the four elements have been harmoniously merged together in it, it shows no absolute tendency, either upward or downward. If it were possible to put it in the middle space it would remain there. If it is moved locally it will move in a round way and would assume a spherical figure.\textsuperscript{113}
In short, the animal spirit has a most superior body, just like the Heavenly Bodies. Through the resemblance of the animal spirit with the Heavenly Bodies Ibn Tufayl is seeking to explain various questions about the nature and movements of Heavenly bodies. However absurd and ridiculous these views may appear to us yet they mark his effort to find a rational and scientific explanation of some observed phenomena.

III. Unity of the World.

It has been the yearning of philosophy to discover a principle of unity behind the multiplicity of the world. Ibn Tufayl also tries to reduce the multiplicity of bodies to unity through the following arguments:

(1) In spite of the apparent multiplicity of bodies the whole world, the whole orb of Heavens and what is contained in it, is one thing, compacted and joined together. The multiplicity of bodies within it does not disprove its unity. It is like the multiplicity of limbs in an animal body. Even a small body like a stone or a piece of iron is not an absolutely simple body. It is composed of smaller parts. Similarly, we may take the
whole world as one huge Body composed of smaller parts. Its continuity and compactness make it one.

(2) All bodies, from the point of view of their matter or corporiety, are indistinguishable from one another. They all have extension. So this matter or corporiety is the common principle behind all bodies. But matter is a weak basis for unity, because, in ultimate analysis, it is reduced to nothing. Ibn Ḥūfayl, therefore, proceeds to point out a more reliable principle of unity, i.e., form.

(3) The form is that which distinguishes one body from another. It appears to be a source of multiplicity. But we find one form changing into another. The ice changes into water and the water condenses into ice. The wood changes into coal and coal changes into smoke, and so on. Thus the change of bodies from one form to another suggests that they are at bottom one.

(4) An important argument for the unity of bodies is derived from the nature of Form. A body is composed of matter and form.
In matter, we have seen, bodies are indistinguishable from one another. Forms give them multiplicity. But, are forms really multiple? Ibn Tufayl answers it in the negative. Forms are immaterial. The notion of multiplicity does not apply to them. As forms constitute the essence of bodies, so bodies are in their essence one.

(5) Again, all bodies are subject to generation and corruption. They stand in need of an Immaterial Agent, the necessarily Existent Being. In relation to this Being, and in being produced and controlled by Him, they are all one.

(6) Lastly, we have the mystical argument. A mystic, during his mystic states, sees all forms emanating from God, just as light proceeds from the sun. Suppose this light of the sun, reflecting through a series of mirrors, ultimately falls on fluctuating water. There, the image of the sun seems to be multiplied. But in spite of this apparent multiplicity the sun and its light are one. Similarly, the graded emanations of Immaterial Essences of different spheres and a thou-
sand-faced essence of this Physical World do not imply any multiplicity in God. Being immaterial, they are all one with God. They appear 'many' in relation to Bodies. But bodies depend wholly on these essences. Matter too is nothing apart from them. The whole world owes its reality and existence to these emanations from God. It is nothing apart from God. So in reality it is one.

IV. The Reality and Status of the World.

The sensible world, according to Ibn Tufayl, does not possess any independent status or reality. It is like a shadow of the Divine World. It stands in need of the Divine world; the Divine world does not need it. It proceeds from God. As the forms emanate from God the world also comes into being.

Ibn Tufayl does not deny the existence of the world or its reality as such. But as an independent being and as a rival to God it has no reality.

In a sense, he takes it even as immortal. "It is absurd," he says, "to suppose a possibility of its annihi-
lation because it follows the Divine world."\(^{123}\) The corruption of the world, according to him, does not mean total annihilation but change from the present form to some other form. He tries to find support for his point of view in the verses of the Quran, describing the Day of judgement as "the day when Earth will be changed into another Earth, and the Heavens likewise."\(^{124}\) In short, the world is nothing but the manifestation of the Divine Essence. So long as the Essence is there the manifestation will continue though forms of it may change.

V. The World is Limited in Space.

According to Ibn Tufayl the notion of unlimited or infinite body is absurd.\(^{125}\) He tries to prove it by an ingenious argument. The argument is primarily meant to prove the Heavenly body to be finite, but it applies to all bodies with equal force. It is as follows:

It is obvious that body of the Heaven is terminated on this side which is facing us. Suppose it is infinite on the other side. Further, suppose two parallel straight lines are drawn through the body of the Heaven ad infinitum. Now cut off a long part from one line. Is it still infinite?
No. If it is taken to be infinite it will be equal to the other line, which is obviously absurd, as a part has already been cut off from it. Thus it is finite. Now add to it the part which had been cut off from it. The line still remains finite because by adding one finite to another finite you cannot get an Infinite. This finite line is just equal to the other line as it has regained its cut-off part. The other line too is therefore finite. But it has been drawn throughout the length of the Heavenly body. So Heavenly body must also be finite.

In a similar way, we may suppose two parallel straight lines drawn throughout the body of the world, extending ad infinitum on both the sides. Then cutting off a portion from one of the lines we render it finite. And by adding the cut-off piece we restore it to its previous length and make it again equal with the other line. But it still remains finite. And thus the other line is also proved to be finite, and so also the whole world.

VI. Is the World Eternal or Created in Time?

The question of the eternity of the world has been a thorny problem for theistic philosophy. But it is here that Ibn Tufail shows the great strength of his philosophy
and his modern spirit. He finds plausible arguments on both the sides and does not commit himself either way. His subtle and penetrating arguments remind one of the Antinomies of Kant. It is surprising to see how, long before Kant, he boldly affirmed the limits of human knowledge and tried to set limits to human reason.

First, he examines the thesis that the world is eternal. He finds the following objections against it:

(1) The notion of infinite existence is as absurd and inconceivable as the notion of infinite extension.

(2) The world cannot be said to be more ancient than its accidents and phenomena. Now these accidents are produced in time. It means that the world itself has been produced in time. So it cannot be eternal.

Now, taking the antithesis that the world is not eternal or it has been produced in time he finds it equally impossible to believe, on account of the following arguments:

(1) To believe that the world was produced in time implies that there was time before it. But time is insep-
rable from the world and its phenomena.\textsuperscript{130} So the world could not be supposed to be later than time, and in other words, it has had no beginning in time, so it is eternal.\textsuperscript{131}

(2) Moreover, if the world was produced anew it needed a producer. Why did this Producer make the world at a particular moment and not at another time? Was it because of some new chance or happening? But it was not possible. The world had not yet come into being and so there could be no happening to serve as occasion for creating the world. Was it due to some change in His own Nature? But there was nothing besides Him to produce that change. So we cannot suppose the world to have beginning in time.\textsuperscript{131}

Finding arguments on both the sides equally forceful and cogent he gives up the effort to prove it this way or that. But he wants to see what implications the two positions have for his belief in God. He finds that both the views lead him to the same conclusion that there is an Immaterial Agent or Creator.

If the world was created in time it was obvious that it could not have come into existence of itself, and
needed an Agent to produce it. If that Agent is supposed
to be a body then it would be a part of the world and a
created being itself. So there must be an Immaterial Agent
as the producer of the world.  

Now suppose the world to be eternal. The motion that
we find in the world, for instance in the Heavenly bodies,
must also be eternal. The eternal motion would be something
unlimited and infinite. The power that produces this infi­
nite effect should also be infinite. But this infinite
power cannot be found in a body as all bodies are finite
and a finite body cannot possess infinite power. So there
must be an Immaterial Agent possessed of infinite power
and perfection, as the mover of the world.  

That a finite body cannot possess infinite power is
proved by Ibn Tufayl by the following argument:

Any power which is diffused through a body is divided
when the body is divided; and it is doubled when the body
is doubled. Take for instance a stone. It possesses gra­
vity-tendency to go downward. If you divide the stone into
two parts the gravity will also be divided. If you add
to it a stone of the same size the gravity will be doubled.
If you go on adding stones, the gravity will go on increas­
ing. Since the stone, being a body, will always be finite, there shall always be a possibility of adding more to it. Similarly, there will always be room for increase in its gravity. So the gravity possessed by a stone will always be finite. The same is true of other bodily attributes and powers.\textsuperscript{135}

Thus Ibn Tufayl is able to prove the need for an Immaterial Agent even on the basis of the eternity of the world.

But here a difficulty arises. If God is eternal, and the world is also eternal, how can one be the cause or the producer of the other? Ibn Tufayl solves this difficulty in a subtle way. The world, he says, is posterior to God in Nature if not in time.\textsuperscript{136} The world is caused and created by Him out of time. This he tries to explain by means of an analogy. Suppose you hold a ball in your hand and then move your hand. The movement of the ball is not posterior to the movement of the hand yet it is caused by the hand and is dependent on the hand. The same relation may be conceived between God and the world, if the world is to be taken as eternal.\textsuperscript{137}
But a more serious objection may be raised against this position. If the world is supposed to be eternal it becomes a rival to God and leads to Dualism. Ibn Tufayl's answer to this objection is typical of his philosophy. The world, being a huge body consists of matter and form. Matter has no independent reality. It depends on form and form is dependent on God. It is a mere disposition to produce certain actions. The reality of the whole world consists in its disposition to be moved by this Mover or the Immaterial Agent. It can never be His independent rival.  

D. SOME OTHER IMPORTANT PROBLEMS

I. The Summum Bonum of Human Life.

The highest Happiness, or Summum Bonum of human life is the knowledge and vision of God and Union with God. There are several considerations leading to this position:

(i) There is a nobler part, a rational soul, in man which distinguishes him from other animals. It shows that he is destined for a higher end. And that higher end is the knowledge and vision of God.
(ii) The human soul is an immaterial form or essence which resembles the Divine Essence and is derived from Him. It is natural that it should have inclination towards its source.

(iii) We have seen that God is the true Agent behind all occurrences and phenomena of the world. Whatever elegance, beauty or perfection we find in any object it proceeds from God who is infinitely more elegant, beautiful and perfect. He alone should be the true object of our love and yearnings.

(iv) The mystical experience confirms these conclusions of our reason. The mystic states reveal Him to be possessed of such beauty, elegance, splendour and perfection that no eye has ever seen, no ear ever heard, and no heart has ever conceived. The mystic finds in that vision such supreme joy, bliss and happiness that cannot be expressed in words. Now it is no more a question of arguments but a matter of direct attraction. Having tasted that pleasure once one cannot desire anything else. He wants to have that vision perpetually before him, and not to lose sight of it for a moment.
Moreover, if one understands the nature of the reward and punishment of the next life he knows that to be indifferent to that vision in this life may mean eternal misery, agony and torture.\textsuperscript{143}

Here a question may be raised as to the possibility of that vision or union. Ibn Tufayl most categorically believes that it is possible—may, his whole philosophy is based on this belief.

First, he acquires the knowledge of God through rational method. Then through contemplation and mystical experience he is confirmed in it. He argues to himself like this: God is an Immaterial Essence. He cannot be known through sense or imagination. Since I know Him I also possess an immaterial essence like Him. Moreover, for the same reason that He is an Immaterial Essence and I am also an immaterial essence, in knowing Him I come to possess Him and become one with Him.\textsuperscript{144} However, the final proof of all this, according to Ibn Tufayl, lies in attaining to that state.

II. The Method of attaining to the Vision of God and union with God.

According to Ibn Tufayl, human nature comprises
three aspects - the gross physical body, animal spirit, and the immaterial essence (the rational soul). In the first he resembles the brutes; in the second, heavenly bodies; and in the third, God. To satisfy all these aspects three "assimilations" are necessary for him. The first assimilation consists in imitating the actions of the animals; the second, in imitating the actions of the Heavenly bodies; and the third, in trying to resemble God or to be one with God. The third assimilation is desired for its own sake as it leads to the vision of God which is the highest end of man. The second assimilation (the preservation of animal spirit) is necessary because it too leads to the vision of God but not in an unmixed form. The first assimilation is apparently a hindrance to the vision but it is also indirectly necessary as it is a necessary means of preserving the animal spirit.

The first assimilation implies two kinds of duties:

(i) To make up for the deficiency of the body and to provide it with food, etc.

(ii) To save the body from external dangers and injuries.
In this connection Ibn Tufayl preaches a most ascetic way of life. As indulgence in physical desires diverts the mystic from pursuing his highest end - the Vision of God, Ibn Tufayl would have forbidden it totally. But it is necessary to preserve the body for the sake of animal spirit and it is necessary to preserve the animal spirit for the sake of the Vision of God. However, Ibn Tufayl permits only the minimum possible attention to the needs of the body. Moreover, plants and animals are works of God. To eat them would amount to destroying the works of the Creator and opposing His design. But total abstinence would lead to the destruction of a higher work of God, i.e. human body. He prescribes, therefore, that food may be taken under very rigid restrictions - just so much as is necessary for keeping the body and soul together.

In connection with the second assimilation he finds it necessary to imitate the three kinds of attributes possessed by Heavenly bodies:

(i) They are clear, bright and pure, free from all dirt; and their motion is circular.

(ii) They are a source of advantage to others as they provide light and heat to other creatures.
(iii) They are continually beholding the Necessarily Existent Being and have a desire towards God, and are obeying His will.

Accordingly, three kinds of duties are enjoined upon a mystic:  

(i) He should keep his body clean and pure, and should occasionally indulge in a kind of ecstatic dance—a circular motion round his own self.

(ii) He should show benevolence and kindness to all beings—even to plants and inanimate objects. He should remove obstacles from their way.

(iii) He should concentrate on the Divine Essence, and should try to seek His Vision, cutting himself off from everything else.

With regard to the third assimilation, Ibn Tufayl recommends the imitation of the Positive and Negative attributes of God:  

(i) The positive attributes are knowledge, power, wisdom, etc.

(ii) The negative attributes imply freedom from all bodily attributes and imperfections.
In both these attributes the mystic has to guard against the error of ascribing bodily attributes or limitations to God. One important attribute of bodies is multiplicity. The Divine essence is to be conceived as free from multiplicity. The attributes of God are in reality one with His Essence.

Moreover, as the Divine Essence is Immaterial it cannot be present anywhere but with itself. It cannot be known by the sense or imagination. It is through our immaterial essence (the rational soul) that we know Him. To know Him is to possess Him and to be one with Him, because there can be no duality or multiplicity in the Divine Essence.

Thus the proper way of imitating the Divine attributes is to know Him, and to seek His Vision. This can be achieved by withdrawing from everything other than God (including one's own self), and concentrating all thoughts and meditations on the Divine Essence, His knowledge and Vision.

This is in brief the practical programme laid down by Ibn Tufayl for attaining to the highest happiness (Summum
Bonum) of human life. It is clear that he prescribes three kinds of duties — duties to God, duties to self and duties to others. The first type of duties are most important, and serve as the basis of the other two kinds. The Vision of God is desired for its own sake, while preservation of the body and the animal spirit is necessary as a means to this end. In a way, all duties are duties to God. But since in having the knowledge and Vision of God lies perfection and happiness of the soul, we may say that all these duties are duties to self as well. They are the way to self-realization.

It is significant to remember that Ibn Tufayl recognizes duties to animals, plants and inanimate objects even.

**IV. Theory of Knowledge.**

In modern philosophy theory of knowledge has assumed special significance. Before constructing their philosophical systems various philosophers deem it necessary to decide as to the nature and source of knowledge. In some cases philosophy has been equated with an epistemological enquiry.
At the very outset of modern period we have two rival schools of philosophy – Rationalism and Empiricism. The rationalists, like Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, hold that reason is the source of all knowledge. The Empiricists, like Locke, Berkeley and Hume, consider all knowledge to be dependent on sense-experience.

It is a peculiar feature of Ibn Tufayl that he cannot be brought under either category. He does not exclusively subscribe either to Rationalism or to Empiricism, but combines in his theory of knowledge elements of both the schools. In this respect he is somewhat nearer to Kant. For Kant, mere experience, without the synthetic activity of the mind or understanding, cannot give knowledge. Kant utilizes this analysis of knowledge to arrive at his well-known position, confining all knowledge to phenomena and excluding noumena from its reach.

But Ibn Tufayl believes in three stages of knowledge:

(i) Empirical knowledge e.g. knowledge of everyday life or the scientific knowledge gained through Induction.

(ii) Rational knowledge e.g. philosophical knowledge about soul and God arrived at through Rational method.
(iii) Intuitive knowledge, i.e. knowledge and Vision of God gained through mystic experience.

Let us consider these stages or forms of knowledge, one by one.

1. **Empirical knowledge**

Ibn Tufayl believes in the usually-accepted five senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. These five senses function with the help of the animal spirit. The seat of the animal spirit is the heart. From the heart it reaches the brain. The sense organs receive the animal spirit from the cavities of the brain by means of nerves. The brain gets the report of the functioning of these organs through the same passages i.e. nerves. The brain is the seat of several faculties which are concerned with various functions, e.g. perceiving and discriminating colours, smells, tastes, etc., feeling pleasure and pain, pleasant and unpleasant, being attracted to the former and repelled by the latter, memory and imagination, etc. Thus we see that Ibn Tufayl seems to incline towards the school of Faculty Psychology, which betrays the influence of Aristotle on him. It is also significant that he subscribes
to the same division of human mind into three aspects (cognition, affection and conation) as advocated by Stout and some other modern Psychologists.162

About the functioning and limits of the sense there is a very significant passage in Hayy Ibn Yaqzan which shows Ibn Tufayl's great insight and depth of knowledge. We may quote it here at some length:

"He was desirous to know by what means he had attained this knowledge, and by which of the faculties he had apprehended this Being, i.e. God. At first he examined all his senses, viz. his hearing, sight, smelling, tasting and feeling, and perceived that all these apprehended nothing but body, or what was in body. For the hearing apprehended nothing but sounds, and these came from the undulation of the air, when the bodies are struck one against another; the sight apprehends colours; the smelling, odours; the taste, savours; and the touch, the temperature and dispositions of bodies such as hardness, softness, roughness and smoothness. Nor does the imagination apprehend anything but that which has length, breadth and thickness. Now all these things, which are thus apprehended, are the adjuncts of bodies."163
This, however, should not be interpreted to mean that Ibn Ṭufayl is in perfect agreement with the Empiricists with regard to his analysis of sense-experience. He also recognizes the part played by reason or intellect, without which there would be no knowledge worth the name. The following quotation will bear it out.

"For that understanding which he, and such as he, mean, is nothing else but that Logical Faculty which examines the individuals of sensible things, and from them gets an universal notion."\(^{164}\)

These words clearly indicate that Ibn Ṭufayl, while speaking of this logical faculty, had Inductive reasoning in his mind. In tracing the development of Hayy Ibn Yaqẓān he shows greatest command over Induction and scientific method. Hayy's various discoveries and inventions,\(^{165}\) his acquaintance with the properties of different objects,\(^{166}\) his classification of natural objects into various classes and species,\(^{167}\) and above all, his search for the cause of death,\(^{168}\) all reveal his familiarity with Inductive method and its intricacies. He uses it with great dexterity and confidence. It is perhaps due to his training as a physician.
Moreover, Ibn Tufayl is not one-sided in his use of Induction. He considers deduction to be an integral part of his method. He employs deductive verification for the confirmation of his results. Unlike Francis Bacon, he has no aversion to hypothesis. He starts his enquiry with some hypothesis which he frames with great care and caution, in the light of his past experience, or on the basis of plausible reasoning. Then through some crucial observation or experiment the hypothesis is rejected or verified.

In short, Ibn Tufayl makes use of the scientific method with the same precision and thoroughness as we find in scientific researches to-day.

2. Knowledge based on Rational Method.

We have discussed Ibn Tufayl's views with regard to empirical knowledge. Even at this stage he is not a pure empiricist, for he believes in the part played by the intellect in drawing universal notions from particulars. But if we take his philosophy as a whole he clearly inclines towards Rationalism and Idealism. For instance, referring to Hayy's discovery of forms Ibn Tufayl says: "And thus he attained a notion of the forms of the bodies, according to
their differences. These were the first things he found out, belonging to the spiritual world; for these forms are not the objects of sense, but are apprehended by intellectual speculation." 172

This quotation is very significant as it brings to clear relief what Ibn Tufayl understands by philosophical or intellectual speculation. The discussion of all those realities or truths which cannot be perceived through senses or through imagination comes under this head. It is this theoretical speculation that leads him to the notion of the forms and the Immaterial Producer of forms. Again, it is the same philosophical speculation or rational method that enables him to regard the necessarily Existent Being as the source of all immaterial essences (forms or souls), and makes him conceive the Divine world as transcending the notions of unity and multiplicity. 173

Ibn Tufayl is most emphatic with regard to the suprasensuous nature of this knowledge. He believes that there is an immaterial essence (the rational soul) in us which is the source of this knowledge. 174

3. Knowledge based on intuition or mystic experience.

This is the highest kind of knowledge according to
Ibn Tufayl. When the seeker after God concentrates all his thoughts and meditations on God, withdrawing his thoughts from everything else, he sometimes enters into a state of total absorption. Then the Heavens and the earth, and whatever is between them, and all immaterial essences including his own essence, disappear like scattered dust and there remains nothing but the One, True, Perpetually self-existent Being. During this state, which is somewhat like a state of intoxication, the mystic witnesses that which neither eye hath seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of any man has ever conceived. He finds such joy and felicity in this state as no words can describe.

This experience possesses the following characteristics, according to Ibn Tufayl.

(i) It is immediate and direct. There is no process of reasoning or inference involved in it.

(ii) As it is direct and immediate it carries its own certainty with it. The man who has this experience does not entertain the slightest doubt about its truth.

(iii) It is personal and private.

(iv) It is non-communicable. It cannot be expressed
in words. However, some remote and indirect ideas about it may be conveyed through metaphors and parables. 178

(v) Since it relates to the Divine Essence and the spiritual world it is free from all attributes of physicality; it cannot be had through sense or imagination or any other physical faculty. Its source is the immaterial essence in us. 179

(vi) The distinctions of multiplicity and unity, many and one, much and little, which are intelligible with reference to bodies only, have no application to it. 180

(vii) At the time of this experience the mystic is simply absorbed in it. 181 But on returning to his normal condition he draws certain inferences from it and tries to 'rationalise' on its basis.

Now, it is significant how these three stages of knowledge are related to one another. Ibn Tufayl does not take them as isolated and independent of one another. They indicate a progressive gradation corresponding to the stages of development of human knowledge. The third stage, no doubt, represents the highest stage of knowledge. But one
should first pass through the second stage - the stage of intellectual knowledge - to prepare himself for the third stage. Here Ibn Tufayl seems to be in agreement with the modern advocates of Intuitive knowledge, like Bergson and Iqbal.

Again, a similar relationship exists between the first stage and the second stage. The Reason or Intellect cannot operate without the data of empirical knowledge. It is significant that Ibn Tufayl has no use for purely a priori arguments for the Existence of God. First, he shows the development of empirical knowledge, in Hayy, upto a certain stage. Then, in the light of this knowledge and experience, Hayy acquires the knowledge of Forms. Perceiving the changes of forms in bodies he makes a search for the 'cause' or the Producer of these forms. Ultimately, to avoid infinite regress, he arrives at the notion of an Immaterial Agent as the efficient cause of all the phenomena. Only in this last step he may be said to be going beyond the limits of all empirical knowledge and experience. But this last step was made possible by the earlier steps based on experience and empirical knowledge.

Some superficial readers of Ibn Tufayl are puzzled by the two apparently diverse trends of his philosophy. On
the one hand, he is a Rationalist,\textsuperscript{185} relying on the rational proofs for the existence of soul and God. On the other hand, he is a great advocate of the Intuitive method, and a champion of mysticism.

However, if we understand the nature of his mysticism and its relation to the 'Intellectual knowledge' the apparent contradiction will disappear.

Ibn Tufayl, in his Introduction to Hayy Ibn Yaqzān, makes this point very clear. First, he gives a very significant and important quotation from Ibn Sīnā to explain the nature of mystic states.\textsuperscript{186} Then he most expressly says that nothing is revealed in these states that may be contradictory to what is revealed through intellectual method. However, there are two points of difference. The former (the mystic state) is distinguished from the latter (knowledge based on theoretical method) in being marked by far greater clarity and in being accompanied by excessive joy and felicity.\textsuperscript{187} He gives a beautiful example to illustrate this point. Suppose there is a man who has been born blind but is endowed with keen intellect and strong memory. He is brought up in a city with which he is quite familiar. He moves about freely and recognizes persons and objects by means of his senses.
other than sight. He even knows the distinctions of colours with the help of their names and descriptions. All of a sudden his eye-sight is restored. Now, he goes round the city and does not find anything contrary to his former belief. But his present state of knowledge differs from his former state in so far as it is far more clear and is accompanied by great joy and pleasure. Similar is the difference between the state of intellectual knowledge and the mystic state.\(^{188}\)

Ibn Tufayl believes that the mystic experience, by its very nature, is non-communicable. If any one tries to express it in language it will change its nature and will become something belonging to the second stage, i.e. intellectual knowledge. Moreover, it will be susceptible of varied interpretations and different expositions, making it difficult to arrive at the truth.\(^{189}\)

IV. Ibn Tufayl's Philosophy of Language.

The problem of language is closely allied to the problem of knowledge. During recent years it has assumed special significance due to the development of the schools of logical Positivism and Philosophical Analysis.\(^{190}\) How-
ever, philosophy of language is much older than these movements. The credit of pioneer work in this field is usually given to Locke and Hume. But here again, as in Induction, we find Ibn Tufayl to have laid the foundation of the philosophy of language, several centuries before Locke and Hume.

Ibn Tufayl frequently enters into the discussion about the nature of language, its possibilities and limits. He believes that language has developed in the context of the physical world. It has essential reference to bodies, their properties and adjuncts. It is not capable of expressing the truths of the Divine world which is far removed from bodies and their attributes. Whenever we employ any such word, as our ears are used to, to describe those experiences, it insinuates some physical attribute or notion contrary to those truths. Ibn Tufayl is very emphatic on this point. He says: "And whosoever asks to have that state explained, asks an impossibility; for it is just as if a man should have a mind to taste colours, quatenus colours, and desire that black should be either sweet or sour." It is because we cannot express anything by words, which is not first conceived in the heart, and the truths of the Divine world are such
In his views Ibn Tufayl seems to be anticipating two divergent schools of thought. On the one hand he is in perfect agreement with the Logical Positivists, like Wittgenstein and others, in regarding language as confined to the sensible phenomena only. On the other hand, he seems to anticipate Kant in a way. Kant, on the basis of his distinction between Phenomena and Noumena, had asserted that the forms of our understanding and categories of our knowledge do not apply to the latter. Ibn Tufayl maintains that the truth of the Divine World cannot be expressed in words. It amounts to the same thing. What cannot be expressed in words, cannot be conceived either. So the Divine World for Ibn Tufayl like the 'Noumena' of Kant, transcends the ordinary categories of knowledge and lies beyond the reach of language. Kant promises a glimpse of the noumenal Realities (soul and God) through the practical consciousness or practical Reason. Ibn Tufayl, trained in the traditions of Oriental Mysticism, believes in direct intuitive experience or Vision of God. But he is very emphatic with regard to the impossibility of bringing this experience under familiar logical forms or within the bounds of language. That is why, in referring to the beauty and perfection of the Divine world he so often repeats the statement that 'no
eye hath seen, no ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive'. It is not the fact of its rarity but the nature of this experience that forbids communication. If every human being could be so fortunate as to be blessed with this experience even then it would be impossible to convey it through words for the simple reason that our language has a necessary physical bias and those truths belong to a different category. To illustrate his point Ibn Tufayl just takes one example—the notion of 'one and many'. Logical understanding tells us that a thing should be either one or many. But Ibn Tufayl would say that 'one' and 'many' have reference to bodies only. We cannot say about the immaterial essences that they are one or many. In reality they are above these distinctions. That is why the emanations of different essences or the presence of different attributes does not imply a multiplicity in God. Nor can we speak of a pure abstract unity in the case of the Divine world.

Similarly, no words of our language can be applied to the Divine world, in their usual sense. All explanations or descriptions of those states should be taken as metaphors, or by way of parables.

Here a question arises. If Ibn Tufayl believes that the Divine world transcends all forms of language and
thought how can he assert the harmony between the Intuitive knowledge and the intellectual knowledge? How can intellect deal at all with the truths of that world which is inaccessible to it? Ibn Tufayl would answer this objection by pointing out that the harmony should be taken in a general way - not with regard to details. At the intellectual level there is only a dim and vague knowledge of these truths - a sort of indirect acquaintance just like the indirect acquaintance of the blind man with the colours through their names. But at the intuitive level there is direct acquaintance, which may be compared to the state of a man whose sight has been restored. Now he actually understands what colours are like.199

Returning to Ibn Tufayl's philosophy of language. It is obvious that he does not regard language to be co-extensive with thought. He believes that there are many things that our heart conceives yet they cannot be expressed in language.200 Then there are things (truths of the Divine world) which no one can ever conceive because they transcend the categories of our thought. There is no question of expressing them in words. Ibn Tufayl believes that mystic experience takes place without the help of language and words. Ordinarily, when we have an experience, say of green colour, there is a simultaneous judgement, viz. 'There
is a green colour', or "I am seeing a green colour before me". This judgment may be explicit or implicit, yet it is there. But the case is different with mystic experience, according to Ibn Ṭufayl. The experience is such that no words are adequate to express it. This is why 'Hayy Ibn Yaqqān', the imaginary hero of Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophical romance, is shown to have passed through all stages of mystic development without developing the ability of language. Ibn Ṭufayl, in one of his passages, most clearly and beautifully brings out this fact. He says:

"And then both the Heavens and the Earth, and whatsoever is between them, and all spiritual forms... disappeared and vanished "like scattered dust", and amongst them his own essence disappeared too, and there remained nothing but this One, True, Perpetually self-existent Being, who thus spoke in that saying of His (which is not a notion superadded to His Essence): To whom now belongs the Kingdom? To God, the One, the Almighty, which words of His Hayy Ibn Yaqqān understood, nor was his being unacquainted with words, and not being able to speak, any hindrance at all to the understanding them."201

Here Ibn Ṭufayl is hinting at the possibility of communication from the Divine Being without the medium of language.202
V. How Religion is related to Philosophy.

Ibn Tufayl has dealt with this problem towards the close of his book. According to some historians and critics it was the main object of Ibn Tufayl, in writing Hayy Ibn Yaqzan. We have already seen that the problem of the relation of Religion to Philosophy had assumed vital importance in the period to which Ibn Tufayl belonged.

Anyhow, the views of Ibn Tufayl on the relation of Religion to Philosophy may be summarized as follows:

From the point of view of the ultimate truth there is perfect harmony between religion and philosophy. There is nothing in religion which may contradict our rational conclusions or philosophy. An unbiased philosopher can discover all the truths of religion with the help of his experience, reasoning, contemplation and intuition.

Philosophy and Religion both aim at the same Ultimate Reality, the truujy self-existent Being, i.e. God. But with this fundamental agreement there are some differences also.
Philosophy relies on experience, reasoning and intuition as its method or as means of knowledge. The Prophets too have intuition and direct experience but the main source of their knowledge is revelation from God. In other words, they do not reach the stage of direct knowledge through preliminary intellectual effort, but are brought to it direct by the Grace of God. It is wrong to suppose, as Omar Farrukh seems to imply, that Ibn Tufayl regards the status of the Prophet as inferior to that of the philosopher. Ibn Tufayl shows great reverence and respect for prophethood. He severely criticises Farabi for equating prophethood with the faculty of imagination and for holding philosophy as superior to it.

In fact he never made a comparison between a Prophet and a philosopher. However, we find a comparison between a follower of the Prophet and the model of a true philosopher, viz., Asal and Hayy Ibn Yaqzan. In this comparison Hayy comes out in a more favourable light. The reason is obvious. So far as the ordinary adherents of religion are concerned their beliefs are based on traditions. They have had no direct and personal experience of those truths.

There is another important difference between religion and philosophy. Philosophy tries to grasp the
truths of the spiritual world as they are in their true, direct and naked form. Religion, on the other hand, expresses them in an indirect form - through metaphors and analogies.

(3) Philosophy is meant for the chosen few, for those who have reached a particular level of intellectual development, and are endowed with a particularly inquisitive and contemplative nature.

Religion is concerned with the reform and welfare of mankind in general.

(4) The point of view of philosophy is personal, while that of religion, social and collective. Philosophy is something private and personal for a man. It tells him the way to his highest happiness and personal salvation. But religion tries to uplift the masses and teaches them the art of living together in society.

(5) Philosophy aims at the whole truth and demands total absorption in it, and undivided devotion to it.

Religion tries to enlighten its followers to the extent of their capacities. It gives a 'necessary minimum' for them, and beyond that minimum, allows them
indulgence in worldly affairs, under certain prescribed rules and restrictions.

The source of these differences lies in the fact that the Prophets have as their mission the benefit of mankind in general. The masses, unfortunately, are at a very low level of development. All of them, with a few exceptions, are just like irrational animals or brutes. They cannot see beyond this sensible world. All their desires are confined to the objects and pleasures of this life and they have no care for the next. They seem to have no craving for the knowledge of God or the Divine world. It is with such men that the Prophets have to deal mostly. So they prescribe a 'necessary minimum' for them.

It is the wisest course about them, for they have no other way to salvation. If they are raised to the realms of speculation it will add to their confusion. They will waver in their beliefs and will fall headlong into errors. Similarly, if they are asked to devote their whole time to the contemplation and Vision of God, they will turn their backs upon religion, and will thus be totally deprived of its benefits.
Before closing this discussion it seems desirable to remove certain misconceptions that are likely to arise in connection with this problem.

We have already challenged Omar Farrukh's interpretation of Ibn Tufayl's views on Prophethood. Omar Farrukh further represents Ibn Tufayl as implying that salvation reached through religion is of a lower grade than that reached through philosophy. Here again Omar Farrukh is taking into consideration the lowest level, 'the minimum necessary' of religion. But religion does not forbid a man to go beyond. A man of higher aspirations can aim higher, and religion offers sufficient guidance for such persons also.

In a way, Ibn Tufayl implies the superiority of religion over philosophy. Inspite of all his mystic development and philosophical attainments, Hayy Ibn Yaqzan is ultimately shown by Ibn Tufayl as 'believing in the Prophet, and affirming his veracity and bearing witness to his Divine mission.' Moreover, he accepted his teachings with regard to prayers, alms, fasting and pilgrimage and such other observances, and began to practice them in obedience to his commands.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. H.Y.O., 50, p. 94.
2. Ibid. 49, p. 92, 93.
3. Ibid. 50, p. 94.
4. For the explanation of Form see section I, Part C of this chapter. Here it may be briefly mentioned that Body, according to Ibn Tufayl, comprises two notions, matter and form. Matter is that common aspect in which all bodies are indistinguishable from one another. Form is what distinguishes one body from another. All the qualities, shape and functions of a body proceed from its form.

5. H.Y.O., 38, p. 79.
7. Ibid. 44, p. 85.
8. Ibid. 49, p. 93.
9. Ibid. 39, p. 80.
10. Ibid. 39, p. 89.
11. Here, Ibn Tufayl is anticipating Hume's analysis of cause. Hume's doctrine of causality is mainly based on the denial of necessary connection between cause and effect. Cf. Hume's Treatise on Human Nature, Part III, Sec. II.

12. These views have close resemblance with the Occasionalism of Guillinx and Malebranche. They believed that body and mind cannot influence one another. They are only the occasional causes while God is the real, efficient cause.
13. Sahih al-Bukhari bk. 81: Ch. 83.
15. Ibid. 86, pp. 140-141.
16. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
17. Ibid. 86, p. 141.
18. Ibid. 85, pp. 139-140.
19. Ibid. 85, p. 140.
20. Ibn Tufayl's Introduction (See Appendix).
22. For the proof of the finite nature of bodies, see section V, Part C, of this Chapter.
24. Ibid. 58, p. 106.
25. Ibid. 58, p. 106.
26. Ibid. 58, p. 105.
27. Ibid. 88, p. 143.
This proof comes very near to the Proofs of the Existence of God given by St. Anselm and Descartes. See for reference, Meditations on the First Philosophy by Descartes, and History of Medieval Philosophy by M. De Wulf p. 125.
29. Ibid. 58, p. 106.
30. Ibid. 58, p. 106.
The last sentence has been quoted from the Qur'an (XXXVI, 82).
32. Ibid. 58, p. 105.
33. Ibid. 49, p. 92.
34. Ibid. 87, p. 142.
35. Ibid. 59, p. 106.
36. H.Y.O., 59, p. 107. This last sentence has also been borrowed from the Qur'an (XXXIV, 3).
37. Ibid. 56, p. 102. Here again we find a quotation from the Qur'an (XVII, 14).
39. Ibid. 60, p. 107.
40. Ibid. 56, p. 102.
41. Ibid. 88, p. 143.
42. Ibid. 63, p. 111.
43. Ibid. 57, p. 104.
44. Ibid. 61, p. 108.
45. Cf. Ethics of Spinoza and Spinoza's Philosophy by M. De Wulf.
47. Ibid. 83, pp. 136, 137.
48. Ibid. 83, p. 137. This doctrine betrays the influence of the Mu'tazilites on Ibn Tufayl.
49. Cf. Meditations on the First Philosophy by Descartes.
50. H.Y.O., 63, p. 111.
51. Ibid. 6, p. 46.
52. *H.Y.O.*, 6, pp. 46, 47.
53. Ibid. 6, p. 46.
54. Ibid. 5, p. 47.
55. Ibid. 7, pp. 47, 48.
56. Ibid. 58, p. 105.
57. Ibid. 87, p. 142.
58. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
59. Ibn Tufayl's Introduction, (See Appendix)
60. Ibid.
62. Ibid. 87, p. 142.
63. لا يصدر عن الواحد الا واحد
65. Ibid. 93, p. 149.
66. Ibid. 93, p. 149.
67. Ibid. 93, p. 150.
68. Ibid. 91-92-93, pp. 147-150.
69. Ibid. 91-92-93, pp. 147-150.
70. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
71. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
72. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
73. Spinoza believes in a Psycho-Physical Parallelism which is based on the Monism of Substance. For details see Ethics by Spinoza.
75. H.Y.O., 41-42, pp. 83, 84.
76. Ibid. 43, p. 85.
77. Ibid. 44, pp. 86, 87.
78. Ibid. 44, pp. 86, 87.
79. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
80. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
81. Ibid. 93, pp. 149, 150.
82. Ibid. 6, pp. 46, 47.
83. Ibid. 64, p. 112.
84. Ibid. 93, p. 149.
85. Ibid. 66-67, pp. 116, 117.
86. Ibid. 63, p. 110, 111.
87. Ibid. 88, p. 143.
88. Ibid. 65, pp. 112, 113.
89. Ibid. 65, p. 113.
90. Ibid. 65, p. 113.
91. Ibid. 65, p. 113.
92. Ibid. 65, p. 113.
93. Ibid. 66, pp. 113, 114.
94. Ibid. 66, pp. 114, 115.
95. Ibid. 66, p. 115.
96. Ibid. 66, p. 115.
97. Ibid. 66, p. 116.
98. The famous Urdu poet, Ghaliib, has expressed the same sense in a beautiful verse:
The Theory of Four Elements is borrowed from the Greek Philosophy. Empedocles is said to be its founder. For reference see Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers by K. Freeman (Sec. 31).

For details about Animal spirit, See the previous chapter of this Thesis.
Bodies marks the weakest spot in Ibn Tufayl's philosophy. But it would be unfair if we judge him by our modern standards. Such views were common among the medieval and ancient philosophers. Even philosophers like Plato and Aristotle were not free from them. See, for instance, Plato's *Timaeus* and Aristotle's *De Caelo*.

117. Ibid. 48, p. 92.
118. Ibid. 37, pp. 78, 79.
119. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
120. Ibid. 49, pp. 92, 93.
121. Ibid. 91-92-93, pp. 147 - 150.
122. Ibid. 97, p. 153.
123. Ibid. 97, p. 154.
124. Qur'an XIV, 49.
126. Ibid. 52, p. 95, 96.
128. H.Y.O., 55, p. 100.
129. Ibid. 55, p. 100.
130. Ibn Tufayl's conception of time seems to have a modern touch about it. He shows awareness of the intricacies of the problem of time and its relation to the world of phenomena.
Here Ibn Tufayl comes very close to Plato's view. According to the latter, we know Ideal world, with all its beauty and perfection, through reason above. But the sensible objects, in so far as they are copies of that ideal world, can also give us a glimpse of that ideal beauty but it is clothed in sensuous details.
152. For further details please see the previous chapter.


154. Ibid. 83-84, pp. 136, 139.

155. Ibid. 88, p. 143.

156. Ibid. 88, p. 143.

157. Ibid. 84, p. 138.

158. See for details "The History of Philosophy by Windelband", The History of Modern Philosophy by Falkenberg, The History of European Philosophy by Bertrand Russell, etc.


161. Ibid. 29, p. 71.

162. For details of this school see Contemporary Schools of Psychology by Woodworth.

163. See Manual of Psychology by Stout.

164. H.Y.O., 63, pp. 109, 110.

165. Ibid. 90, p. 146.

166. For instance, see Hayy's preparation of dress for himself, (H.Y.O., 15, p. 56).

167. See Hayy's discovery about fire (Ibid. 24, p. 66)

168. Ibid. 34-35-36, pp. 75-78.

169. Ibid. 17, p. 57.

170. Ibid. 17, p. 58.

171. Hayy's investigation about the cause of death, and his dissection performed on the dead body of the
roe, furnish beautiful examples of the use of Hypothesis.

172. H.Y.O., 90, p. 146.
173. Ibid. 42, p. 84.
174. Ibid. 63, p. 111.
175. Ibid. 85, pp. 139, 140.
176. Ibid. 85, p. 140.
177. Ibn Tufayl's Introduction, (See Appendix)
179. Ibid. 63, p. 111.
180. Ibid. 89, p. 145.
181. It is just like Bradley's 'whole of experience' which is above relational way of thought. See "Appearance and Reality" by Bradley, for details of his position.

182. Bergson also believes that intellectual discipline is a necessary condition for Intuition. Cf. Creative Evolution by Bergson, p. 186.

183. For Iqbal too there is no contradiction between Intellect and Intuition. Intuition only supplements and completes the work of intellect. Cf., Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam by Iqbal.

184. It would be interesting to compare Ibn Tufayl's three stages of knowledge with Sri Aurobindo's various "levels of consciousness." For Aurobindo too, the higher level of consciousness does not
exclude the lower level, but presupposes it as a necessary condition. Cf. Life Divine by Sri Aurobindo.

185. Even as a Rationlist, his Rationalism is limited and curtailed. Unlike other Rationalists, he recognizes the importance of empirical knowledge and Induction. Moreover, he frankly admits the inability of human reason to solve certain problems e.g. the problem of the eternity of the world.

186. Ibn Tufayl's Introduction (See Appendix)
187. Ibid.
188. Ibn Tufayl's Introduction (See Appendix)
189. Ibid.
190. Cf. (i) Language, Truth and Logic by Ayer
    (ii) Philosophy & Logical syntax by Carnap
    (iii) An Examination of Logical Positivism by Weinberg, etc.

192. Ibid. 86, p. 141.
193. Ibid. 86, p. 141.
194. Ibid. 93, p. 150.
195. Wittgenstein, who is one of the founders of Logical Positivism sums up his position in the form of a maxim which runs as follows: The sense of a proposition is the method of its verification. See for details Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein, p. 63.


198. Ibid. 90, p. 146.

199. Ibn Tufayl's Introduction (See Appendix).


201. Ibid. 85, pp. 439, 140.

202. The Urdu Poet, Ghalib, refers to such an experience in one of his verses:

كس منه سے شکر کمیٹی اس لطف خاص کا
برسمی هی اور بائی سخن درمان نہیں
(دیوان غلب - ردیف ن)


204. ابن طفيل وقصة حياة ابن يقطان عمر نورingham صفحات 172, 173, 174.


206. For instance, Asal begins to look upon Hayy as his spiritual leader and guide.


208. Ibid. 119, pp. 175, 176.

209. ابن طفيل وقصة حياة ابن يقطان عمر نورingham صفحه 83.


211. Ibid. 112, p. 168.