CHAPTER VI

CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

We have so far confined ourselves to a faithful and systematic exposition of Ibn Tufayl's philosophical position. Before attempting this exposition we gave a summary of the story of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan on which we have based our account. In the first two chapters we have discussed the general trends of the period of Ibn Tufayl and his life history, which serve as the necessary background for the understanding of his point of view. We have avoided raising the critical issues, as far as possible, so that our comments and criticisms may not interfere with the understanding of the original position. It is always useful to have a sympathetic understanding of the picture as a whole, before dissecting it and subjecting it to a critical analysis. Now, we are in a position to undertake this latter task. For this purpose, we propose to divide our discussion in various sections, dealing with critical problems relating to different aspects of Ibn Tufayl's philosophy.

I. Ibn Tufayl's Purpose in Writing Hayy Ibn Yaqzan.

It is interesting to note that different critics and writers have read different purposes into the work
of Ibn Tufayl. It often happens with a great thinker, whose philosophy comprises several aspects, that subsequent thinkers pick up this or that element from his philosophy, which strikes them as most important. In case of Ibn Tufayl there is a definite reason also which leads to these divergent views. His choice of a story as the medium of his philosophy has contributed, in no small measure, to this divergence. The writer of a story has the advantage or the disadvantage of concealing his real intentions behind the details of the plot. Thus we find different persons interpreting his intentions and purpose in different ways.

'Abdul Wahid al-Marrakushi, the famous historian of Spain, is of the view that Ibn Tufayl's purpose in writing Hayy Ibn Yaqzan is to explain the origin of human species. This view is obviously wrong as Ibn Tufayl has only incidentally touched upon the problem of the spontaneous birth of Hayy in the earlier portion of his book. It is just one version out of the two given by Ibn Tufayl. It does not form vital part of the book. It appears that 'Abdul Wahid had hurried through the first few pages of the book and had based his opinion on the contents of these pages alone.
Dr. Yusuf, who has brought out another Urdu translation of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, is of the opinion that the main purpose of Ibn Tufayl was to show how (one who has been all alone from his very birth) can manage to satisfy his physical and spiritual needs. This point of view lays stress on the story - aspect of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan but does not specify the main purpose behind the story.

Somewhat allied to this is the view of A.S. Fulton who characterizes the book of Ibn Tufayl in these words: "It is the pilgrim Soul's upward progress; its return home to its "Father" through a series of ascending stages. In short, one of the main objects of this modest little book is nothing less than to dramatize the process of continuous development from sense perception up to the beatific Vision of the One." This really sums up the whole story of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan but does not tell us which part of the story is most important. Moreover, it unnecessarily tries to give a Christian touch to the story.

Von Grunebaum describes the book, Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, as "an autobiography of the confessional type." To some extent it is true, but it does not convey the whole idea of the book. No doubt, Ibn Tufayl has made Hayy Ibn Yaqzan
the mouth-piece for his own thoughts and experiences, but why has he selected a solitary man, brought up in insolation from Society, as his hero? The purpose of 'confessions' would have been better served by a direct narration like that of Ghazali or St. Augustine.

O'Leary seems to give central importance to the theme of the relation of religion to philosophy. The little space that he allows to Ibn Tufayl, in his book, is devoted mostly to the description of the two islands and the meeting of Hayy and Asāl — the portion dealing with the problem of the relation of religion to philosophy. Shustry also subscribes to the same view but he includes science also in his trio. He suggests that the object of Ibn Tufayl was to prove that there is no antagonism between philosophy, religion and science — all are the same and harmonious with each other.

The problem of religion, no doubt, is an important problem, but it is not the only problem, nor the most important problem of the book. The problem emerges, in clear perspective, only towards the end of the story. It is not the vital part of the plot, but only incidental to it. So we cannot agree with the view that assigns foremost position to this problem. With regard to Shustry's assertion that philosophy, religion and science are all
the same and harmonious with each other, we do not find much evidence in favour of this thesis, in Hayy Ibn Yaqzân.

According to de Boer, the principal endeavour of Ibn Tufayl was 'to combine Greek Wisdom and Oriental Science into a modern view of the world.' In a general way the statement may be true about Ibn Tufayl's philosophical effort but it does not indicate the specific purpose of Ibn Tufayl in writing Hayy Ibn Yaqzân.

The famous Orientalist, Carra de Vaux quotes Ibn Tufayl as saying in his Introduction that the object of philosophy is union with God. So Ibn Tufayl's purpose, according to Carra de Vaux, in writing Hayy Ibn Yaqzân, was to throw light on the way to the attainment of this goal. Unfortunately, we do not find the statement, referred to above, in Ibn Tufayl's Introduction. However, the initial remarks of Ibn Tufayl do show that he is writing the book in response to the request of a friend who had asked him to explain some of the secrets of the Eastern Philosophy presented by Ibn Sīnā. In the same Introduction, Ibn Tufayl has tried to distinguish between knowledge gained through intellectual method and knowledge based on mystic intuition or ecstasy. It is the latter that he promises to convey, however indirectly, through Hayy Ibn Yaqzân. Thus it is obvious that Hayy Ibn Yaqzân is primarily a Treatise on Mysticism, although it includes other aspects as well.
But late Professor Ali Mahdi Khan of Allahabad University (India) challenges this view, in these words:

"It is rather unfortunate that Ibn Tufayl indulged in Mysticism towards the close of his book, but probably it does not form an integral part of his philosophy."¹²

This view is obviously wrong as it goes against the explicit statements of Ibn Tufayl in his Introduction.

Avoiding the onesidedness of these interpretations, Kamāl Yāzījī has thought it safe to enumerate several purposes underlying Hayy Ibn Yaqzan. Some of them are mentioned below:¹³

(1) To show that human intellect can apprehend the highest truths through reasoning and contemplation.

(2) The perfect human intellect does not stand in need of Shari'at for its progress and culture.

(3) To present the philosophical problem in a simplified manner, for the masses.

(4) To impress on the ordinary students of philosophy that true knowledge consists in the apprehension of the truths of the Spiritual world, grounded in the belief in God.
(5) The fact that Ibn Tufayl has adopted the form of a story implies that instruction should be given to men in accordance with their capacities.

(6) The value of a thing depends on its ultimate result; for instance, the eternity and non-eternity of the world both lead to the notion of an Immaterial Agent.

(7) Knowledge, in the beginning, is based on sense, then on inference and theoretical investigation. But in the last stages it depends on an inner Intuition.

(8) The laws of nature are practical expressions of the Divine will.

(9) There is an essential harmony between nature created by God and the words revealed by God. If there is any apparent disharmony the revelation should be interpreted so as to remove that discrepancy.

(10) Ibn Tufayl follows the method of experience and investigation, not only in philosophical problems but in the matters of everyday life also.

This is the sample of the purposes enumerated by Kamāl Yazījī. Similarly, he adds several other minor items to the list. But the most fundamental and primary
objective of Ibn Tufayl, according to Yaziji too, is to show the harmony between Shari'at and philosophy.

In our opinion, each of the above mentioned views is partly true. But we have no reason to doubt the testimony of Ibn Tufayl himself, who unequivocally tells us that the book has been written to convey, in an indirect form, his own mystic experiences, and to encourage and persuade his readers to follow the mystic path. This is undoubtedly the central purpose of the book. But mysticism itself, as Palmer says, is an attempt at reconciling philosophy with religion, and assigning an allegorical interpretation to all religious doctrines and precepts. Thus it is natural that, side by side with the exposition of his mystical point of view, Ibn Tufayl should also take up the problem of the relation of religion to philosophy. Moreover, the problem had assumed a special significance in that period and offered a challenge to the philosophers. It can be taken as the second important purpose of Ibn Tufayl.

But why does he present his mystic philosophy through the medium of a story? We shall discuss this point in a subsequent section but here it may suffice to say that the delicacy of the subject-matter recommended this form to Ibn Tufayl. 'Omar Farrukh tells us that
Ibn Ṭufayl was a timid man and did not possess the courage to express his views publicly. So he made Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān the mouth-piece for his views. But why did he think it necessary to make a solitary and isolated child his hero? Most probably because, it gave him an opportunity to make a beginning from a blank sheet, as was done by Descartes and Bacon. He wanted to show that his philosophical conclusions are so inevitable and beyond doubt that any unbiassed and unsophisticated thinker would reach the same position.

In this connection it is desirable to consider the sub-title of the book, which seems to have some significant indications with regard to our present problem. The sub-title of the book, in some editions, is given as (Secrets of the Philosophy of the East). There are reasons to believe that Ibn Ṭufayl himself gave this sub-title to the book. In his Introduction he clearly mentions that he intended to explain the secrets of the Mashriqīyah (i.e. Eastern) philosophy as presented by Ibn Sīnā. The contents of the book, however, show his bias towards the philosophy of Illumination (Ishraq). So some critics are of the opinion that (Secrets of the Philosophy of Illumination) would have been a more apt sub-title. Fortunately, in some editions of the book, as mentioned by Carra de Vaux,
it is actually given as ١٩ اسوارالحكمة الإشراقية. Now it raises another question. How did these two apparently differing versions find their way into the book? Which of them represents the intentions of the author more truly? A solution of this difficulty is offered by Max Horten. He tries to read مشرقية (Mushriqīyah) in place of شرقية (Mashriqīyah), and insists that his is the correct reading. By so changing the vowel he believes that المكلمة الشرقية comes to mean the same as المكلمة الشرقية which stands for the Philosophy of Illumination. He objects to its translation as the Philosophy of the East on the ground that it is really the Western Philosophy as its origin can be traced to Plato. It is a significant suggestion no doubt, and, from the point of view of Arabic grammar, there is some plausibility in this interpretation. But the difficulty is that the word الشرقية is never used in Arabic language in this sense; and in language, particularly in Arabic, the usage is more reliable than a mere grammatical justification. This inclines us to reject the explanation offered by Max Horten.

However, there is another way of reconciling the two versions. We maintain that the two sub-titles, in reality, signify the same thing: المكلمة الشرقية obviously refers to the Philosophy of Illumination. But المكلمة الشرقية is usually translated as the Philosophy of the Orient.
Now Orient has a special significance in the literature of mysticism. Juzjānī (a disciple of Ibn Sīnā), in his commentary on Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān of Ibn Sīnā, writes: "Orient is the place where the sun rises; the author defines the Orient as the place of Form and the Occident as the place of Matter. . . . . . . . . . . . and Matter has the nature of non-being." 21

So Orient, in Ibn Sīnā's Recital, and also in that of Suhrawardī, 22 signifies the region of Light or the place of Form. We find similar ideas in the Gnostic texts also. For instance, the Hymn of the Soul (in the Act of Thomas) depicts the story of a young prince who sets on a journey to Egypt, from his native land, the Orient, in quest of the matchless pearl. 23 In this story, Orient signifies the region upward or the spiritual world—the abode of the pure beings of light.

From this discussion we can clearly see that Oriental philosophy does not simply mean the philosophy of the Oriental people. It has a deeper significance. It is somewhat equivalent to the philosophy of Light. Since religious and mystic elements have been dominant in Islamic Philosophy so the whole of Islamic Philosophy is sometimes designated as the Oriental Philosophy.
But the term primarily and strictly applies to philosophies like those of Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī and Ibn Ṭufayl. Viewed from this point of view it becomes immaterial whether we read the sub-title of Ibn Ṭufayl's book as اسرارالحكمة الاشراقية or اسرارالحكمة المدرسيم. In both the cases it signifies the same thing, i.e., philosophy of Light. It is the presentation of this philosophy which is the primary purpose of Ibn Ṭufayl.

II. Forerunners of Hayy Ibn Yaqẓān.

Hayy Ibn Yaqẓān has often been described as an allegory. In fact it is a story intended to describe the mystic experiences of Ibn Ṭufayl and to throw light on some important problems of mysticism and philosophy.

However, Ibn Ṭufayl is not the first philosopher to use the story-form as the medium of his views. Before him several other writers have tried somewhat similar experiments. To understand the full significance of Ibn Ṭufayl's effort it would be useful to consider it along with other similar attempts. It would enable us to see how far Ibn Ṭufayl has been influenced by those examples, and how far does his effort show uniqueness and originality.
Ibn Sīnā's recitals — Ḥayy Ibn Yaqqān and ʿSalāmān and Ṭabsīl — and Ibn Bajja's "المراد" are often mentioned as forerunners of Ibn Ṭūfayl's Ḥayy Ibn Yaqqān. No doubt, there are some affinities between them. But with a few affinities there are vital differences also. Moreover, we do not see any reason why the comparison should be confined to these alone. There are many other works which would make equally significant studies, side by side with Ḥayy Ibn Yaqqān of Ibn Ṭūfayl. It is with this aspect of the problem that we propose to deal in this section.

But before proceeding further it would be profitable to say a few words about the reasons why a philosopher is tempted to have recourse to an allegory, in preference to a direct expression of his views. There may be different reasons for it:

(i) Sometimes it is used to make the ideas more fascinating. The allegory captures our imagination and fancy more readily than an ordinary narration. That is why poetry often makes use of the allegorical form.

(ii) Sometimes the ideas are so abstract and difficult that they cannot be grasped by the common people. The allegory makes them intelligible and accessible to such people also who cannot grasp truth in its abstract form.
(iii) Allegorical form is also used sometimes to disguise one's meaning. A direct expression of one's views may be too offensive to an important section of the people. The allegory renders it innocent and harmless. This is one of the reasons why the mystical literature abounds in allegories. The mystics often deviated from the orthodox viewpoint of religion. In a society based on religion an open revolt against religion could not be tolerated. The mystic, who had an urge to communicate his views and experiences to others, could do so only by clothing them in the garb of an allegory. Thus he escaped the censure of the formalists and the orthodox people. But those who were guilty of indiscretion in these matters had to pay the penalty with their lives. The case of Shihābuddīn Suhrāwardī Maqtūl is a clear illustration of this fact.

(iv) Sometimes the author wants to vest his views with higher significance and authority and so traces them to a higher source, with the help of an allegory.

(v) Henry Corbin, the French Orientalist, offers an interesting and original viewpoint in this connection. He objects to the use of 'allegorical adaptations' for such narrations. He criticises the Commentators and interpreters of these "Symbolic Visions" for their attempt "at reducing the ineffable reality, that can be spoken
and seen in symbols, to the plane of logical patencies." In other words, he wants to emphasize the fact that the so called allegories are as direct an expression as possible of the realities experienced by the mystic philosophers.

Corbin has expressed these views with regard to the Visionary Recitals of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), but they apply, with greater justice, to the works of Ibn Ṭufayl also. Ibn Ṭufayl is never tired of reminding us that the truths of the divine world can neither be conceived nor communicated directly. All that he promises to convey through his book is an indirect expression of those truths, through metaphors and parables.

There is another misconception about Hayy Ibn Yaẓān which should be corrected here. Several critics have tried to interpret Hayy in a symbolic way. For instance, De Boer sees in Hayy 'the personification of the natural spirit of mankind illuminated from above.' A.S. Fulton considers Hayy as the symbol of pilgrim soul. The story depicts "the pilgrim soul's upward progress and its return home to its Father." Carra de Vaux takes Hayy as the symbol of Reason. Ibn Yaẓān (the son of the Wakeful One) suggests to him that Ibn Ṭufayl regards Hayy as Son of God. Kamāl Yaẓijī is of the opinion that Hayy Ibn Yaẓān represent the bright (pure and uncorrupted) human intellect that is seeking God.
In our opinion all these views are off the point. They take it for granted that Hayy Ibn Yaqzân is an allegory, and so they proceed to decipher its symbolism. They are led to this view by the supposed similarity between Ibn Tufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqzân and Ibn Sînâ's Recitals — 'Hayy Ibn Yaqzân' and 'Salamân and Absâl'. Ibn Sînâ has undoubtedly made use of allegory. In the recital of Salamân and Absâl, towards the close of the Story, Ibn Sînâ himself admits this fact in these words:—

"If among other recitals, the recital of Salamân and Absâl has struck thine ear, and its development has been well narrated to thee; then know that Salamân is a figure typifying thyself, while Absâl is a figure typifying the degree thou hast attained in mystical gnosis. Therefore, resolve the symbol, if thou canst. Various commentators have accepted this challenge of Ibn Sînâ and tried to resolve the symbolism."

On the analogy of Ibn Sînâ the critics have tried to discover symbolism in Ibn Tufayl also. Ibn Tufayl's own statements in his Introduction and in the main text of Hayy Ibn Yaqzân have also been wrongly understood to give support to this interpretation. Ibn Tufayl, after stressing the impossibility of directly expressing the truth of the Divine world, promises a sort of indirect
description of those truths through metaphors and parables.\textsuperscript{35} This statement was interpreted to mean that every thing said by Ibn Tufayl had a symbolic significance. But it was not the intention of Ibn Tufayl. The use of metaphors and parables referred to the analogy of the Sun and the Mirrors and such other metaphors in the book. These analogies were the nearest approach to the relation between God and the Immaterial Essences that Ibn Tufayl wanted to convey. But why should Hayy be used as a Symbol? What truth did he intend to conceal? What advantages did he stand to gain by means of this alleged symbolism? Ibn Tufayl's own statement in his Introduction establishes it beyond any shadow of doubt that he is giving an account of his own intellectual and spiritual development through the medium of Hayy.\textsuperscript{36} To give a dramatic touch to the story and to throw incidental light on certain secondary issues, Ibn Tufayl has vested Hayy with certain peculiar qualities. But the obvious moral of the story is that the experiences narrated by Ibn Tufayl belong to a human being and any other human being can have them if he tries earnestly. That is why Ibn Tufayl invites his friend to traverse the same path.\textsuperscript{37}

There is another reason which seems to be responsible for the symbolic interpretation of Hayy. There is a tendency among certain Orientalists, like Carra de Vaux
and A.S. Fulton, to regard Ibn Tufayl as a thorough-going Neo-Platonist. But they do not find in his work any direct mention of 'Active Intellect' and 'need for unification with Active Intellect,' and such other saturated concepts of Neo-Platonism. But by interpreting Hayy as symbol of intellect or Active Intellect they gain their point. Moreover, by a literal translation of the name of Ibn Tufayl's hero they prove him to be the Son of God. Thus Hayy becomes a symbol of the Active Intellect (i.e., Archangel Gabriel) and of the Son of God (Christ) at the same time. And the mystic progress of Hayy is now taken as the journey back to the Father, i.e., God. This interpretation is obviously far-fetched and unwarranted.

According to our interpretation, Ibn Tufayl has chosen the name Hayy Ibn Yaqzan to imply that his hero, who was not taught by any human teacher, received his inspiration and guidance direct from Divine grace. It has a metaphoric significance only. Had Ibn Tufayl intended Hayy to represent the Son of God he would not have given the popular version of his birth through human parents.

In view of these considerations we reject the symbolic interpretations of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan and believe that Hay stands for an unsophisticated natural philosopher, who has been used by Ibn Tufayl as his mouth-piece. Similarly, Salamān and Asāl are not to be taken as symbols of any
abstract qualities. They are the types of men ordinarily found among the followers of religion. The former represents those who lay emphasis on form; while the latter represents those who emphasize the inner spirit of religion.

This much about the alleged symbolism of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan. Now let us come to our main purpose, i.e., the comparative study of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan along with somewhat similar recitals.

1. Parmenides' Celestial Ascent:

Parmenides\(^{39}\) is perhaps the first philosopher who has used the story-form to convey his philosophical ideas. He has expressed his views through a beautiful poem. This is how he begins his narration.

"The Car that bears me carried me as far as ever my heart desired, when it had brought me on the renowned way of the goddess, which leads the man who knows through all the towns. On that way I was borne along............. when the daughters of the Sun, hasting to convey me into the light, threw back their veils from off their faces and left the abode of Night".
"There are the gates of the ways of Night and Day. They are closed with mighty doors, and the Avenging Justice keeps the keys that fit them. Her the maidens entreat with gentle words and cunningly persuade to unfasten without demur the bolted bars from the gates. .......Straight through them, on the broad way, did the maidens guide the horses and the Car, and the goddess greeted me kindly and took my right hand in hers, and spoke to me these words:

"Welcome O Youth, that comest to my abode on the Car that bears thee tended by immortal Charioteers. It is no ill chance but right and justice that has sent thee forth to travel on this way. Far, indeed, does it lie from the beaten track of men! Meet it is that thou should learn all things, as well as the unshaken heart of well-round truth, as the opinions of mortals in which is no true belief at all."40

After this prologue Parmenides gives the details of The Way of Truth and The Way of Belief (Opinions of the mortals), through the mouth of the goddess. But this part is irrelevant for our purpose.

2. Zarathushtra's Ecstasies:

In Zorastrianism we find a similar ascent. Zarathushtra's ecstasies lead him to the presence of Ahuramuzda
and the Archangels. It is something like Buddha's attaining to gnosis ( ज्ञान ) in course of his meditations. Since these personalities are also claimed as Prophets of two famous religions we leave out further details of their inspirations from our account.

3. The Hymn of the Soul.

In the medieval Christian literature we come across an allegory in the form of the Hymn of the Soul (in the Act of Thomas). The Hymn narrates the story of a young prince who sets on a journey in quest of the 'matchless pearl'. He proceeds from his native land, the Orient, and goes to Egypt. There he partakes of some food which makes him forget his origin and purpose. At last a 'messenger' comes from his parents and awakens him from his forgetfulness. He puts on his garment of light, and taking possession of the 'matchless pearl' sets out for his homeland, the Orient. The Symbolism of this story is so transparent that we may not dwell upon it any further.


(1) Hayy Ibn Yaqzan:

The following is the summary of Ibn Sīnā's Hayy Ibn Yaqzan:
The writer, who is desirous of reaching God, meets a Sage whose name is Hayy Ibn Yaqzan. The Sage warns the writer against his companions - the passions and the physical organs, etc. The road which leads to his goal is forbidden to him unless he is separated from his companions. The guide also tells him of the three climes; One, between the Occident and the Orient; the other, beyond the Occident; and the last, beyond the Orient. No one can reach the last two regions except the elect-those who gain sufficient strength by immersing in the water near the spring of Life.

According to Corbin, Hayy Ibn Yaqzan here represents the Active Intellect or the Archangel, Gabriel.43

(ii) Ibn Sina's Recital of Salaman and Absal

Salaman and Absal were half brothers on the mother's side. Absal was marked for his beauty, intelligence and noble character. Salaman's wife developed passionate love for him and tried to seduce him. But Absal resisted the temptations. She got him married to her sister and slipped into her bed on the first night. But a flash of lightning revealed her identity and Absal repulsed her contemptuously. Now Absal set on a journey to conquer East and West on behalf of his brother. He routed the enemies of his brother and made great conquests. But Salaman's wife
made the officials of the army betray Absāl and so he was defeated and wounded in the battle. A wild beast nursed him and fed him with her milk. Recovering from his wounds, he again came to the help of his brother and defeated his enemies who were besieging him. This time Salamān's wife entered into a plot with a Cook and a major domo who administered poison to Absāl and he died.

Salamān, struck with grief, gave up his Kingdom and retired to a life of prayer and devotion. The Lord revealed to him the truth about Absāl's death. So he condemned his wife, the major domo and the cook to drink poison and to die.⁴⁵

We have referred to the attempts of Fakhruddīn Rāzī and Nasīruddīn Tūsī at interpreting the symbolism of this story.⁴⁶ Henry Corbin, however, perceives in the story "the autobiography, the adventure of the mystical soul", "and not some trite allegory of the union of soul and body without any bearing on the context of mysticism."⁴⁷

5. The Hellenistic Version of Salamān and Absāl.⁴⁸

In ancient times, there was a King named Heramanos, who ruled over Byzantine Empire. He had great aversion to women yet he had desire for a son. The Sage, Aqlīqulas, determining a suitable 'ascendence' by astrological obser-
vation, put a little of the King's semen in a mandragora and left it in a suitable environment, till it was ready to receive a soul. Thus, through an alchemical operation, a child was born who was named Salaman. A beautiful young woman, Absāl, was appointed as his nurse. When Salaman grew up he fell in love with Absāl. Now he began to neglect the orders of his father and his higher goal - the pursuit of the world of light and ideal realities.

The King, with the help of the sage, tried to dissuade him from indulging in the world of sensible things. The Sage also promised him a Celestial bride who would be united to him for all eternity. But his love for Absāl was too strong for these temptations.

Salaman planned to fly away with Absāl from the Kingdom of his father. The King was enraged and punished them by destroying the spiritual entities of their desires. Now they could not unite inspite of their ardent love. Finding this punishment intolerable they plunged themselves into the sea. Salaman was rescued by the order of the King but Absāl was allowed to be drowned. Salaman's grief knew no bounds. The Sage again came to his rescue. In company with Salaman, he offered invocations and prayers to Venus for forty days in a cave. On each day Salaman saw the form of Absāl and enjoyed her company and conversation. At the end of forty days the figure of Venus
herself appeared, wrapped in exquisite beauty and perfection. Salamān fell in love with her and cried out, "O Sage, help me, I want naught save this figure." Here the story ends.

Tūsi tries to decipher the symbolism of the story in the following manner:-

The King is the Active Intelligence; the Sage is the guidance that it receives from the Intelligence above it; Salamān is the thinking Soul; Absāl the vital powers of the body; their punishment is the persistence of the soul's inclinations despite the physical decline due to old age; the suicide of the two lovers is their fall into death; Salamān's escaping death from drowning is the survival of the immortal soul, and so on.

According to Corbin, however, the figures of the story typify the states and relations of consciousness. "The King-father is the world of traditional consciousness, the masculine world of Day, the world of official norms and strict imperatives of reason. Absāl typifies the feminine world of premonitions of coming birth, of palingenoses still closed in fecund Night, with no norm except the spontaneities of love. Between these two universes, these two faces of the soul, consciousness
is constantly being rent asunder. So long as the mystical child born of the mendragora has not succeeded in integrating these two worlds with its being, the lamentable vicissitudes and failures described by the recital will be repeated. This integration is the outcome not of a rational dialectic but of a terrifying and painful experience, nothing less than a descent into the depths, such as a spiritual initiation cannot but be.\textsuperscript{50}

The influence of Jung's psychology of the Collective unconscious is clearly visible in this interpretation.\textsuperscript{51} It is not possible to find any verification for such details but the central point of this interpretation seems to be substantially correct — that the story is an intimate account of the experiences, conflicts and final integration of the consciousness in a mystic.

This Hellenistic version is important because Ibn Sīnā seems to have drawn upon it, both in his characters and theme.\textsuperscript{52} But there is one important difference. The original version had an obvious Platonic bias. Salamān, from the love of a sensible beauty passes on to the love of the ideal beauty. Ibn Sīnā gives the story a clear neo-Platonic turn. But inspite of Ibn Sīnā's modification the original story continued to inspire mystic literature of Islam.\textsuperscript{53}
6. Ibn Sīnā's Recital of the Bird:

A troop of birds fell into a snare spread by a party of hunters. For some time they felt the pain and the misery of their bondage and imprisonment in a cage but gradually got accustomed to it and forgot their previous state of freedom.

One of these birds, whom Ibn Sīnā makes to narrate this story, one day saw a party of free birds. Though a cord was still tied to their feet yet they had freed their heads and wings and were ready to fly away. These birds also enabled the encaged one to gain a similar freedom and so they all started on a flight to their desired goal. They passed several enchanting scenes and crossed beautiful mountains but the fear of falling again into the hands of the hunters spurred them to further flights. Ultimately they were told that there is a city beyond the eight mountain where the supreme King resides. He alone could give them permanent shelter and deliverance from injustice and suffering. When they reached the presence of the King and narrated their story, he said to them, "No one can unbind the bond that fetters your feet save those who tied it. Now will I send them a Messenger to lay it upon them to satisfy you and to remove your fetters. Depart, then, happy and satisfied, with
the King's Messenger." The story ends here but Ibn Sīnā, in the Epilogue, adds these words: "How many of my brethren will there not be who, my recital having struck their ears, will say to me, "I see that thou art somewhat out of thy wits, unless sheer madness hath fallen upon thee...." Then he replies to their criticism by saying, "But in God be my refuge, towards men my freedom."

According to Corbin this Recital too is an account of Ibn Sīnā's mystic experiences. The Recital depicts the story of initiation into the mystic path. The Messenger of the King signifies the Active Intelligence or the Archangel Gabriel or his Perfect Nature. The story teaches us the moral that the desired goal, freedom from the fetters and bondages of the world, cannot be achieved by an escape from life. The fetters are to be unfastened in the context of this life, under the guidance of the Messenger of the King.

There is a similar recital attributed to Al-Ghazālī. It is interesting to compare it with the recital of Ibn Sīnā. Though the themes are somewhat similar yet the tone and the conclusions of the two recitals are fundamentally different and are typical of their authors.
7. Al-Ghazālī's Recital of the Bird.

There was a big assembly of the birds including all varieties and species. The birds thought that they should have a King and decided to approach the bird 'Anqa' for accepting this honour. They learnt that 'Anqa' resides in a distant and inaccessible island and the way to that island lay through endless deserts and unsurmountable difficulties. They, however, set on the journey. Many perished on the way and only a small band reached the island. They found the King in an inaccessible castle. When they sent word to the King about the purpose of their journey the following answer came from Him. "You have wearied yourselves in vain. We are King, whether you consent or refuse, whether you come or depart. We have no need of you." On hearing this answer they succumbed to despair and shame. But then a heartening message came, "Away, away with despair! For only they who are without faith despair of God's mercy (Qur'an XII. 87). Now that you have experienced the measure of your impotence to know our measure, it befits us that you have here your dwelling."

The symbolism of this recital is obvious. The content of the story is typical of Al-Ghazālī's philosophico-mystic position. It is not the mystic's struggle but the Divine grace that leads to gnosis and deliverance from doubts.
8. **'Attar's Recital - The Language of the Birds.**

In this connection one feels tempted to refer to 'Attar's Recital, The Language of the Birds (مَصْرِيق الطَّيْر), although chronologically it comes after Ibn 'Tufayl's work. It is a vital part of the series and throws significant light on some intricate problems of mysticism. As it has some affinities with Ibn 'Tufayl's ideas we give a brief summary of it below:

**Summary of 'Attar's Language of the Birds:**

Thousands of birds set out on a journey in quest of Si-Murgh, which was their cherished object of love and adoration, and their desired goal. A few of them, only thirty, reached the destination. Others perished on the way or gave up the quest. The thirty birds got a glimpse of the Majesty, Beauty and Grandeur which was indescribable. The herald of His Majesty brought the following message to them: "O raving band, who dyed yourselves like the rose with the blood of your hearts, whether you exist or do not exist in the Universe, the King exists no whit the less eternally. Hundred of thousands of Universes filled with creatures are as an ant at the gates of the King." But to their relief the birds were given a mysterious scroll and were asked to read it to the end, for its symbols
contained the secret of their adventure. This mysterious scroll was the document that Joseph, (the symbol of most exquisite beauty), had presented to his step brothers. It was a reminder to them of their disgraceful act in parting with their lovable brother, Joseph. Now the birds were asked to decipher the symbols of that document. When they tried to decipher it raised in the mind of each of them the same reproach: "Knowest thou not, O wretched creature of naught, that at each moment thou sellest a Joseph!"57 When the mystic pilgrims became conscious of this fact their souls were overwhelmed by trouble and shame, and this purged their hearts of their impurities. The Sun of nearness shone upon them and they beheld the beauty and grandeur of the Sī-Murgh. But it was a meeting of the Self with the Self. The Sī-Murgh was none other than the Reality underlying those thirty birds. They were amazed to find that there was Sī-Murgh twice, and yet there was only one; yes, one alone and yet many.'

In the conclusion 'Attār emphasizes the impossibility of expressing the mystery in language. He holds that there must be no sacrifice of pluralism to monism, nor of twoness to Unity, and so on.
Shiḥābuddīn Suhrāwārdī Maqtūl’s Recitals:

Shaykh al-Ishrāq Suhrāwārdī has written several treatises on mysticism, some of which have allegorical form. We have already referred to the Recital of the Bird which is attributed to him but in reality is a Persian translation of Ibn Sīnā’s recital. However, the most important of his Recitals is his Occidental Exile. It finds its point of departure in the concluding lines of Ibn Sīnā’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaẓān. The Sage Ḥayy Ibn Yaẓān, after pointing at the way leading to God and the prerequisites of the journey to God, says to the adept: "Now, if thou wilt, follow me, come with me toward Him. Peace." Ibn Sīnā ends the story at this point. But Suhrāwārdī is not satisfied with this abrupt ending. He picks up the thread of narration and depicts the journey of the Occidental Exile (the mystic soul) to the Orient (the place of light). In his prologue to the Occidental Exile he invites his readers to first read Ibn Sīnā’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaẓān. But it has close affinities with Ibn Ṭūfayl’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaẓān too. Suhrāwārdī is a younger contemporary of Ibn Ṭufayl. Ibn Ṭufayl died at the age of 75 years or so in the year 1185. Suhrāwārdī was put to death at the age of thirtysix or so, in 1182. Though we do not know the exact dates of the completion of the two works, yet in view of the older age and seniority of
Ibn Tufayl, we can safely assume that Suhrawardi was familiar with Ibn Tufayl’s philosophy and must have necessarily been influenced by his ideas, specially because both of them are prominent exponents of the philosophy of light. In view of these considerations it would not be proper to include Occidental Exile among the forerunners of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan. However, for the continuity of the series and for the benefit of a comparative study we take the liberty of quoting it here in some details.

Suhrawardi’s al-Gharibah al-Gharbiyah:

I and my brother, Asim travelled from Transoxania to Qayrawan. The unjust inhabitants of that city knew that we were descendants of the Shaykh Hadi b. Abi al-Khayr al-Yamani. They imprisoned us in a cave ("Well"). A lofty palace overlooked the cave. In the evenings we were allowed severally to come out of the well and to go to the palace. But the mornings had to be spent in the dark prison. The time I spent in the palace was enlivened by the reminiscences of the Yemen which had its symbols in the light and the fragrance that permeated the whole place. So we had longings for our native place. In the course of our downward and upward movements in day-time and by night, we once saw the Hudhud. It had brought a
letter from our Father who had remonstrated with us for our forgetfulness in return for His love and anxiety. He had called upon us to come away to Him at once. He had also advised us to get rid of all that might encumber us at the time of our voyage across the Nile.

So we embarked upon the journey homewards. The ship that carried us had to weather the fury of the waves which brought death and destruction upon my "son" (Cf. the Quran on the Deluge). In order to avert the danger I had to face, I had to part company with the gazelle which had suckled me (in my childhood). And I had to scuttle the ship lest I should excite the avarice of a King (Cf. the Qur'an on al-Khidr).

We passed the city of Yājūj and Mājūj. The demons (Jin) who served me raised a Barrier to forestall the evil creatures. Further on, I had a view of the desolate habitat of 'Ād and Thamūd.

I took the earth and the heavens and the Jin and put them into a glass container I had designed. Then water parted off from the mass and the air evaporated. I put the heavens on the Spheres. Subsequently, the revolutions that took place brought the Sun and the moon and the stars into being. I then devised fourteen Tābūts.
The way of God was pointed out to me. I woke up to realize that it was my Way.

My sister who had been asleep amidst the darkness of the night had been exposed to the influence of Incubus. But then I saw a Lamp whence light radiated far and wide. Then the Sun shone forth. But the source of its rays could not be discovered by any one --- except by its Creator and by those who may be firmly established in Knowledge (Cf. the Qur'an).

With us we had a flock of sheep which we had to abandon in the desert. Earthquake and Thunder destroyed them.

When the distance had been traversed, I had a glimpse of the heavenly bodies. When I approached them, I could hear their Symphony. The sound through which their teachings were communicated to me resembled the sound of bells (Cf. the description of Revelation in Bukhārī). The pleasure I had experienced was likely to dis sever my life from all that had gone before.

But the Fish that had devoured me (Cf. the story of Yūnus) disgorged me. On regaining free activity, I betook myself to the Stream of Life. On my way to it,
I found a Rock. I asked the Fish and the Fauna that basked in the shade: What is the Rock and the place to which I have come? The fish I had addressed plunged into the water to thread its labyrinthine course. And I heard it say: 'This is what we looked for (Cf. the story of Moses and his Companion). You have come to Mount Sinai.

On climbing up, I saw our Father resplendent with Light so intense that it could cause the heavens and the earth to fall to pieces. With tears in my eyes, I prostrated myself before Him and told Him of my sufferings in the prison at Qayrawan. He said: 'Now you are free. However, it is necessary for you later on to go back to the western prison. This Warning filled me with grief and consternation. I implored my Father to make things easier for me to bear. He said: 'The Return is inescapable.' But you can have Glad Tidings on two counts. First, on your return to Prison, it will be possible for you to ascend up to Our presence whenever you will. Secondly, there will be a time at last when you will depart from the Western Cities never again to go back to them.' From these words I took comfort.

And my Father said: 'This mountain is Mount Sinal. Still higher up beyond this mountain is the abode of my own Father. I am related to Him as you are related to Me.
And we have other Ancestors till at last the genealogical series comes to an end with a Great-grand-father. All of Us are the servants of that prime Ancestor who is supreme above all Supremacy.'

Since I had been a prisoner in the Western Regions in the midst of a people not describable as Believers, the events narrated above brought Joy and Felicity. But the pleasurable experience thus acquired soon disappeared, for it was but a dream that comes and goes. May God free us from the bondage of Matter and Nature.

And let this story be called al-Gharībah al-Gharbiyah.

Now, it is obvious that it is an allegory with a complicated symbolism. Suhrawardi is fond of using the Qur'ānic situations and verses and the traditions of the Prophet in the course of his narration which add to the complication of his symbolism. Very often one set of symbols imperceptibly gives place to another set, one metaphor changes into another metaphor. Thus the sense is confused beyond comprehension. However, leaving out the complicated details, it is obvious that the exile into the occident represents the journey and the adventure of the Soul in this world. The Orient stands for the
angelic world or the world of Light which is the true abode of the soul. The descent of the soul into this world is its imprisonment in matter. The message through Hudhud stands for revelation. The ascent on the Mount Sinai, to the presence of the Father, symbolizes the highest mystic experience which reveals the genealogy of the Soul, after neo-Platonic fashion, from the Primal One, through several intermediary stages. The soul after this mystic ascent, has again to go back to the western prison. But it will be possible for it to attain to the presence of the Father i.e., to have that mystic experience again, until it is finally released from the prison of the matter and returns to its homeland, the Orient.

The bias of neo-Platonism and of the Ishrāqī philosophy is quite evident in the story.

10. Hermit's Guide of Ibn Bājja:

Ibn Bājja's Hermit's Guide (تذیب المتنحد) has often been mentioned as a forerunner of Ibn Ṭufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqẓān. In this treatise Ibn Bājja lays down the programme of life for the solitary Individual, who is his model of a philosopher. Such a solitary individual or indivi-
duals who are seeking perfection should try to live in a model State. The model state of Ibn Bajja's conception will have no need of magistrates and Physicians. The interpersonal relationships in that state will be based on love. Every member of the state will be guided by perfect knowledge and rational motives, and there will be no cause for friction. But for the realisation of such a state it is necessary that all the members of the society should have attained a high degree of perfection. So long as this condition has not been fulfilled the solitary individual or individuals would be like strangers in their own society. Nevertheless they should live and behave as if they are members of a perfect State. In other words, the solitary individual or individuals will live in the Society yet they would be isolated and secluded in it. They should not mingle with common people who are seeking baser ends of life. They should not waste their time in trying to reform other people but should pursue gnosis secretly as if it is something to be ashamed of. They should continue in their own way, seeking their highest good i.e., Union with the Active Intellect. To attain this Union they will have to pass through a certain programme consisting of various types of activities. Ibn Bajja divides these activities into three kinds—bodily activities, spiritual activities and
rational activities. The bodily activities are to be indulged in just to the minimum necessary limit. The spiritual activities are to be followed more frequently but they are necessary only as a means to the third grade, i.e., rational activities. The rational activities are an end in themselves, and they are to be pursued for their own sake. The first type of activities help him to live as a man, the second raises him to the status of higher beings; and the third enables him to assimilate Divine Attributes. In this third programme lies his highest happiness and perfection.

Ibn Bājja, however, does not recommend absolute withdrawal from Society. But the solitary individual or individuals will try to create a model Society within the Society in which they can move and mix with persons of their own level – those who are moved by the rational end of perfection.

11. A Folk Story from Andalūsia:

Before concluding this section it would not be out of place to refer to a story which has also been mentioned among the sources of Ibn Ṭufayl. Fraciam Baltazar refers to a story which was famous in the folk lore of Andalūsia in the days of Ibn Ṭufayl. The story is woven round the
figure of Alexander. It is said that Alexander found a big statue in an island, with some words inscribed on it. When Alexander got the writings on the statue translated by a scholar it was found to be the life-story of the person whom that statue represented. He was the grand son (from the daughter's side) of a king. As soon as he was born his mother threw him into the sea. The waves carried him to an uninhabited island where a female deer nursed him. When he grew up his mental faculties also developed. Then another man reached the island who taught him and imparted learning to him. This man was in reality the son of the Vazir and the father of the young man. The King being displeased with him on account of his secret marriage with his daughter had thrown him on this island. Ultimately, a ship passed their way and picked up the father and the son.

III. General Remarks - A Comparative Study of the Recitals:

After giving brief summaries of these Recitals it seems proper to mark their similarities or dissimilarities with Ibn Tufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, and to determine their influence, if any, on the latter.
Let us, first of all, compare Ibn Tufayl's *Hayy Ibn Yaqzan* with Ibn Sīnā's Recitals—'Hayy Ibn Yaqzan' and 'Salamān and Absāl'.

According to Ibn Tufayl's own admissions he has borrowed the names of his characters from Ibn Sīnā. The title of his book, *Hayy Ibn Yaqzan*, has also been borrowed from Ibn Sīnā's work having the same title. The themes of both the philosophers relate to mystic philosophy. Both have chosen the story-form as their medium. Ibn Tufayl, in constructing his philosophy, acknowledges his debt to Ibn Sīnā and claims to have written *Hayy Ibn Yaqzan* to explain certain points of Ibn Sīnā's philosophy. Besides this outward resemblance, there are some similarities in contents also. Ibn Sīnā's *Hayy Ibn Yaqzan* plays the part of a Sage or a Guide on the mystic path. Ibn Tufayl's *Hayy Ibn Yaqzan* also serves as a guide to Absāl whom he meets on the island. Ibn Sīnā's *Hayy Ibn Yaqzan* warns his follower that unless he is separated from his companions—the passions and the bodily organs etc., the road that leads to his goal (i.e., God) will be forbidden to him. Ibn Tufayl's *Hayy Ibn Yaqzan* seems to give the same message. His life has been so regulated by reason from the very beginning that there is very little room for passions. Moreover, when he consciously chalks out a programme of life for himself, to attain to
the vision of God, he allows himself indulgence in bodily
wants just to the extent necessary for keeping body and
soul together. It seems that he has killed all his
desires and passions. Only one desire is left in him
and that is for God. In Salamān and Absāl of Ibn Sīnā
a wild beast is shown to have nursed and fed Absāl with
her milk, when he was wounded on the battlefield. We find
a similar phenomenon in Ibn Ṭufayl, when the infant Ḥayy
Ibn Yaqẓān is nursed and reared by a female deer on the
island coast.

But with all this apparent resemblance there are
fundamental differences between the works of the two
masters. In the first place, Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān
is not an allegory in the strict sense of the word. The
characters of Ibn Ṭufayl are not symbols of any abstract
qualities as we find in the recitals of Ibn Sīnā. It is
only the mystic experience of Ḥayy, particularly about the
relation of God to other Immaterial Essences, that finds
expression through analogies and metaphors of the Sun and
its reflection in the mirrors. This may be taken as the
allegorical part of the story but it was necessitated by
the limitations of language. Ibn Sīnā's recitals are
ture allegories. The allegory is used there not as an
inevitable necessity but as an ornamental medium. The
views expressed through these allegories could be very
well conveyed through direct narration.

The motive to conceal the real meaning also does not apply to these recitals as the points contained in them find mention in several other works of Ibn Sīnā. The only object of these recitals seems to be to convey some mystical ideas in an interesting way so as to make them accessible even to the lay man. But Ibn Ṭufayl has a definite purpose in using the story-form for conveying his philosophy. First, he wants to show the natural and inevitable character of his philosophy. Secondly, he wants to avoid giving a direct shock to the Orthodox public opinion of his period.

Ibn Sīnā's recitals have value in so far as they are typical of his views. But they are very brief and deal only with specific problems and with some particular aspect or aspects of mysticism. Ibn Ṭufayl expresses his whole philosophy in the story-form. Nay, even the practical training, scientific learning and the development of religious and mystic ideas have been described in a most graphic and realistic manner. And all this had to be discovered by Ḥayy without the aid of a teacher. This further adds to the difficulty of Ibn Ṭufayl's task. But in spite of these restrictions Ibn Ṭufayl succeeds in retaining the high standard of the story and making it
a master-piece of literature. His language and style is far superior to that of Ibn Sīnā. According to Brockelmann Ibn Sīnā's Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān is a "dry allegory" as compared to Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān.

The Hellenistic version of Salamān and Absāl is the forerunner of Ibn Sīnā's Salamān and Absāl and so it also has an indirect bearing on Ibn Ṭufayl's book. But its structure is Platonic while Ibn Ṭufayl, like Ibn Sīnā, shows clear leanings towards neo-Platonism. Moreover, Absāl, in the Hellenistic version, is a female character, and symbolizes the bodily passions and powers. In Ibn Ṭufayl's story Absāl is a pious devotee, seeking God through prayers and meditations. Thus we see that Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān does not show any direct resemblance with Hellenistic version of Salamān and Absāl, either in objectives or in plot and characters. But there is one thing which Ibn Ṭufayl seems to have borrowed from this story. The Hellenistic Story describes the birth of Salamān through an alchemical operation. A somewhat similar explanation is given by Ibn Ṭufayl about the spontaneous birth of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, with the difference that Ibn Ṭufayl adds to this explanation elements from his knowledge about natural sciences, Geography, Physics, etc. Moreover, Salamān was shown to have been born without a mother, the semen of the King Hermanos being left in a māndragora to
develop into a human child; but Hayy Ibn Yaqẓān was represented by Ibn Ṭufayl to have been born, of natural elements only, without the intervention of father or mother.

Now coming to the Recital of the Bird by Ibn Sīnā. Though it seems to be much different from Ibn Ṭufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqẓān in outward story and characters yet there are some underlying similarities between them which attract our attention. In the first place, both the stories deal with mystic themes. They try to convey, through the story-form, the highest type of the mystic experience that has fallen to the lot of their authors. The stories possess a common nucleus of content which is indicative of the possible debt of Ibn Ṭufayl to Ibn Sīnā's Recital of the Bird. For instance, the description of the beatific Vision, as given by Ibn Ṭufayl, has striking resemblance to the description of the beauty and grandeur of the King (God), as given by Ibn Sīnā. We find the following words in Ibn Sīnā's Recital of the Bird:

"Whereupon my brothers pressed about me, urging me to recite to them the beauty of the King, I shall describe it in a few summary yet sufficient words. Harken: whatever be the beauty that thou beholdest in thy heart, without any alloy of ugliness—whatever perfection thou imaginest, untroubled by any defect—in the King I found..."
it who is in full possession thereof. For all beauty in the true sense is realised in Him; all imperfection even in the sense of a metaphor, is banished from Him."

Again, in the same recital, we find Ibn Sīnā renouncing reason in these words:

"How many of my brothers will there not be who, my recital having struck their ears, will say to me: "I see that thou art somewhat out of thy wits, unless sheer madness hath fallen upon thee. Come now! It is not thou who didst take flight; it is thy reason that has taken flight ........." To these imaginary critics Ibn Sīnā gives the following retort: "But in God be my refuge; towards men, my freedom".

We find the exact echo of these words in Ibn Tufayl. When, after describing the mystic experiences of Hayy Ibn Yaqẓān, he condemns his imaginary critics in the following words:

"And here methinks I see one of those bats, whose eyes the Sun dazzles, moving himself in the chain of his folly, and saying, "This subtlety of yours exceeds all bounds, for you have withdrawn yourself from the state and condition of understanding men, and indeed rejected the authority of Reason......"
Thus it will not be unfair to suppose that Ibn Ṭufayl was familiar with Ibn Sīnā's Recital of the Bird and, to a certain extent, had been influenced by it. But it will not be fair to stretch the resemblance too far. There are fundamental differences also between the two stories. Ibn Sīnā's Recital of the Bird is an allegory while Hayy Ibn Yaqẓān of Ibn Ṭufayl is not. Moreover, the former deals with the possibility of realising the mystic ideal in this very life and throws light on various stages of mystic path and the hardships through which a mystic has to pass. If we accept the interpretation of Henry Corbin and others, that the noble Messenger is the Active Intellect, then the story has an obvious neo-Platonic bias. Hayy Ibn Yaqẓān of Ibn Ṭufayl also deals with the mystic Ideal and its realisation but it deals with many things more. It deals with practically all the problems with which the philosophy of that period was faced. It too has leanings towards neo-Platonicism but Ibn Ṭufayl does not seem to be committed to any particular school of thought completely.

Al-Ghazālī's Recital of the Bird has no direct bearing on Ibn Ṭufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqẓān. But a comparative study of the two will enable us to appreciate the worth of the latter in a better way. Al-Ghazālī's recital is a brief allegory written in the typical style of Al-Ghazālī. The quotations from the Qur'ān and Arabic verses are
liberally used. The grim tone and the moral of the story are typical of Al-Ghazali's philosophy and personality. It has anti-intellectualistic bias. It is not through rational contemplation or personal effort that the mystic is admitted to the Divine presence but it is the Divine grace consequent upon the realisation of one's impotence to know God that leads to the final goal. In other words, it is love and the torments of the beloved's inaccessibility that are emphasized by Al-Ghazali. In contrast to Al-Ghazali, Ibn Tufayl sounds a more optimistic note. He is not anti-intellectualistic in his approach. Reasoning forms part of the mystic journey, at least in its initial stages. Moreover, the emphasis in Ibn Tufayl is on the Vision of God and its accompanying bliss and joy, and not on His inaccessibility and its consequent torments. Apart from this difference in the tone and the outlook, Al-Ghazali's Recital of the Bird is only a modified version of Ibn Sīnā's Recital. Its importance lies in its being just a link in the series of similar recitals. But Ibn Tufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqẓān has an independent value as a unique work in the whole field of philosophical literature.

We have mentioned Farīduddīn 'Attar's Recital, The Language of the Birds, as a continuation of the series, but as 'Attar comes after Ibn Tufayl we will discuss his
recital later, in connection with the influence of Ibn Tufayl on subsequent writers.

With regard to Suhrawardi’s Occidental Exile and Ibn Tufayl’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaqqān one cannot fail to mark the close affinities between the two.

Both have presented their ideas in the form of stories. Both take their point of departure from Ibn Sīnā’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaqqān. Both have dealt with mystic themes and show their bias towards neo-Platonism and philosophy of Light. But Occidental Exile is an allegory with very obscure symbolism. Its symbols are not easy to decipher even for a most sophisticated philosopher. Ibn Tufayl’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaqqān is not an allegory but a lucid description of the intellectual and mystic development of a man—the supposed hero of the story. No doubt the hero, Ḥayy Ibn Yaqqān, is an imaginary character but the experiences attributed to him are the genuine experiences that can occur to an exceptionally gifted real man.

Ibn Tufayl has wonderfully succeeded in expressing most clearly and forcefully the whole of his philosophy and the most delicate mystic experiences through the medium of the story. At the same time, he has done full justice to the literary and artistic side of the work. In short,
simplicity and directness of Ibn Ṭufayl's Ḥayy Ibn Yaqtan, and its wonderful plan, appear in sharp relief, when contrasted with the obscurity and vagueness of Suhrawardī’s Occidental Exile.

Now coming to Ibn Bajja’s The Hermits Guide. It has often been mentioned as a precursor of Ibn Ṭufayl’s Ḥayy Ibn Yaqtan. No doubt, in several of his ideas Ibn Ṭufayl shows clear debt to Ibn Bajja. But it would be wrong to suppose that Ḥayy Ibn Yaqtan is nothing but an enlarged edition of Ibn Bajja’s work. They have points of agreement as well as points of difference, as we shall presently see.

Ḥayy Ibn Yaqtan is in the form of a Story, while the Hermits Guide is an ordinary philosophical treatise.

The object of Ibn Bajja is collective rather than individualistic. He wants to realise an Ideal State or society within the society, and tells us how the solitary individual or individuals, as citizens of that Ideal State, should behave. Ibn Ṭufayl’s point of view is individualistic. He is concerned with the mystic Ideal - the programme for the salvation of each individual.
Ibn Bājja wholly relies on intellect or reason. The highest end, according to him, is union with the Active Intellect. But Ibn Ṭufayl believes in a direct apprehension or intuition which is superior to intellectual apprehension.

So far as the originality, artistic ingenuity, and fascinating style of Ibn Ṭufayl’s Hayy Ibn Yaqẓān is concerned it has no parallel.

But inspite of these fundamental differences Ibn Ṭufayl shows agreement with Ibn Bājja in several points: Both show disgust of the masses and the society in general. Both consider it futile to waste their time in trying to reform the masses. Both believe that the highest truths should be concealed from the masses. According to Ibn Bājja gnosis should be pursued as if it is something to be ashamed of.

Both of them recommend a kind of seclusion from the Society and favour association with kindred souls only.

Lastly, the detailed instruction and programme of life which Ibn Ṭufayl has chalked out for Hayy Ibn Yaqẓān (i.e., the three assimilations) are wholly based on the three kinds of activities recommended by Ibn Bājja for the solitary individual or the hermit. This cannot be
treated as an accidental similarity or coincidence. It shows that Ibn Tufayl has borrowed from Ibn Bājja on a vital point in his philosophy. It is perhaps because of this debt that Ibn Bājja's influence on Ibn Tufayl has been so much emphasized by various writers.

The folk-story referred to by Graciam Baltazar has certain incidents in common with Ḥayy Ibn Yaqzān. The secret marriage of the King's daughter, throwing of the son into the sea, nursing of the child by a female - deer, etc., find an exact echo in Ibn Tufayl's work. But there is nothing strange about it. It is only an accidental part of Ibn Tufayl's story, relating to one version about the birth of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqzān, that reproduces some incidents of the folk-story. Even then it is not the only source. We find, in the Bible and the Qur'an, similar stories about the birth of Moses. In fact, a story-writer does not usually create incidents or situations but borrows them from real life or from other stories, and weaves them into a new pattern of his own. His greatness lies in the originality of his total pattern and his treatment of the subject-matter of the story. From this point of view Ḥayy Ibn Yaqzān still remains unsurpassed, whatever be the debt of Ibn Tufayl to this or that author with regard to scattered fragments of the story or the details of its subject-matter.
IV. Ibn Tufayl's Predecessors:

The critics and interpreters of Ibn Tufayl are not all agreed as to the characterization of his views. This is perhaps natural in case of a philosopher who has chosen an indirect form, the medium of a story, for the expression of his views. Thus we find a bewildering divergence in the interpretations of his philosophy. The same divergence makes it difficult to name the sources that have exercised a determining influence on his philosophy. However, in the light of our studies and analysis we will try to find out the truth in this matter.

Let us first mention different opinions and statements by some responsible writers on Ibn Tufayl.

According to De Boer, Ibn Tufayl's philosophy is a combination of Greek science and Oriental wisdom, fitted into a modern view of the world. The system of Ethics, which Ibn Tufayl has presented in the book, is regarded by De Boer as having Pythagorean appearance.

O' Leary is of the opinion that Ibn Tufayl's teaching is in general conformity with that of Ibn Bājja.

A.S.Fulton holds the view that it was Al-Fārābī from whom Ibn Tufayl 'drew his inspiration most.'
Further on, the same author gives expression to the view that the story is fashioned out of neo-Platonic and Aristotelian elements, with here and there a confirmatory passage from the Qur'an.\(^2\)

Gordon Leff, discussing the sources of Ibn Tufayl's philosophy, refers to the mingling of Plato and Aristotle, with further addition of the view of light as the fount of being, gradually fading the further it goes from its source in God.\(^3\)

Carra de Vaux regards Ibn Tufayl's philosophy as 'neo-Platonic Scholasticism in its most mystic form'.\(^4\)

'\(^5\)Omar Farrukh also subscribes to the same view and takes Ibn Tufayl's philosophy as a product of neo-platonic mysticism.'

According to A.J. Arberry and Sir Thomas Adams it was Ibn Sīnā's Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān that inspired Ibn Tufayl to write his book.\(^6\)

Dr. Abdul Halim Mahmood denies the influence of Al-Fārābī or Ibn Bājja on the philosophy of Ibn Tufayl. He does not take him as a follower either of Ibn Sīnā or of Al-Ghazālī but regards him as following his own independent line of thought.\(^7\)
In our view Ibn Ṭufayl is indebted, more or less, to all these philosophies and philosophers as pointed out by his interpreters, but he is not wholly committed to any one of them. He is one of those philosophers whom it is difficult to bring under any one category. Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Ibn Sīnā, Al-Fārābī, Al-Ghazālī, Ibn Masarrah, Ibn Bājja have all contributed to the shaping of his views. Even some traces of Pythagorean, Indian and Persian influences are also visible in his philosophy. But it should not be understood to mean that there is nothing in Ibn Ṭufayl but an echo of his predecessors. In this section we propose to trace various elements of Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy to their sources and to discuss the nature of debt that he owes to them.

1. **Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus.**

Let us first begin with the influence of Plato and Aristotle on his philosophy. Ibn Ṭaímīyya regards him as a peripatetic. No doubt, several Aristotelian elements are fitted in his philosophy but he differs from Aristotle on many fundamental points. His discussion of Form and Matter, classification of nature into three kingdoms—inorganic objects, vegetative kingdom and animal kingdom,
his doctrine of the Plurality of Forms, his leaning towards the doctrine of the eternity of the world, his view that the end of every object is its perfection, and many such ideas can be traced to Aristotle. But Ibn Ṭufayl has not borrowed these elements directly from Aristotle. They have reached him through Ibn Sīnā, Al-Fārābī and others. As the analysis of the Body and the doctrine of Form and Matter form the starting point of his philosophy, and they carry the mark of Aristotelian teaching, one gets the impression that Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy is Aristotelian in essence. But the mystic elements in his philosophy give a lie to this supposition. These trends bring him closer to neo-Platonism, and also to some elements of Plato's philosophy. His insistence that matter is mere non-being and that Form is every thing, his philosophy of the relation of One and many, his consideration of knowledge as the supreme good of man, his view that the sensible objects also give a mixed vision of God, remind one of similar doctrines in Plato. But he seems to have no sympathy with Plato's theory of Ideas, the most vital part of his philosophy. He does not subscribe to the unbounded Rationalism of Plato. In this respect he differs from Plato and Aristotle both and shows leanings towards neo-Platonism. He believes with Plotinus in a mystic pantheism. He takes help of the principle of emanation,
although in a metaphoric way, deriving everything from
God. He considers the vision of God and Union with God
as the highest good of man. He gives to love and supra-
rational intuition or direct observation an important place
in his philosophy. He derives these elements not directly
from Plotinus but from his predecessors among Muslim
philosophers. However, Ibn Ṭufayl's greatest credit lies
in his critical attitude and in separating what is acceptable
from what is unacceptable in a philosopher.

He fits the acceptable elements into his philosophy,
leaving out the crudities and extremes for which he does
not find warrant. It has been rightly remarked about
Ibn Ṭufayl that he does not follow the emanationist neo-
Platonic astronomy which Al-Fārābī and Avicenna had
introduced into their otherwise Aristotelian description
of the world above the moon and which Avempace and Averroes
accepted without criticism. He rather inclines towards
Islamic Theology in this respect and does not establish
any 'secondary causes' as the powers ruling the different
celestial spheres. God, the highest being, is the only
efficient cause. It shows that Ibn Ṭufayl can hold his
own when great figures of Islamic Philosophy, like Al-
Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Bājja and Ibn Roshd succumb to the
powerful currents of thought peculiar to their age.
2. **Al-Fārābī.**

Now coming to the influence of his immediate predecessors on his philosophy. Let us begin with Al-Fārābī. Ibn Ṭufayl, in his Introduction, severely criticises Al-Fārābī for some of his contradictions. He emphatically denies any influence of Al-Fārābī on his main position. He is rather strongly opposed to Al-Fārābī's sole emphasis on intellect. He criticises him for equating prophethood with an intellectual capacity. He has no sympathy with his belief in Union with Active Intellect as the highest stage of perfection. Again, Al-Fārābī's emphasis on 'organized society' is absent in Ibn Ṭufayl. Ibn Ṭufayl emphasizes individual salvation and recommends a kind of withdrawal from society. In view of these facts it is difficult to agree with those who regard him as a follower of Al-Fārābī or see in his philosophy major traces of the influence of Al-Fārābī. However, in some details we find Ibn Ṭufayl showing agreement with Al-Fārābī. The doctrine of the Unity of Intellection - that intelligent and the intelligible are one - finds an echo in Ibn Ṭufayl's view that to know God is to be one with God. Like Al-Fārābī, Ibn Ṭufayl also regards a minimum satisfaction of bodily wants as necessary for the realization of the highest good. The distinction between the ignorant masses and the selected few as emphasized by Ibn Ṭufayl in the last section
of Ḥayy Ibn Yaẓān, has also some resemblance with Al-
Fārābī's view that the majority of the people can have
imaginative knowledge of the prophetic and philosophic
truths by means of allegories, and can achieve Sa'adah by
imaginative knowledge and by action according to that
knowledge.

3. Ibn Sīnā.

Now coming to Ibn Sīnā. We find that Ibn Ṭufayl
shows greater influence of Ibn Sīnā than of any other
philosopher. In his Introduction to Ḥayy Ibn Yaẓān he
acknowledges the fact that he is writing the book to
explain "the principles of the philosophy of Illumination"
of Ibn Sīnā. In his criticism of other philosophers he
spares no one except Ibn Sīnā. In explaining the nature
of the direct and intuitive knowledge of the saints
(اتراك اهل ولايت) he quotes sympathetically from Ibn
Sīnā. The very name of the book, Ḥayy Ibn Yaẓān, and the
names of its characters (Ḥayy, Asāl and Salamān) have been
borrowed from Ibn Sīnā. Besides, there are many points
of agreement in details between them.

Ibn Ṭufayl's conception of Form and Matter has been
borrowed from Ibn Sīnā, while the latter borrowed it from
Aristotle. Ibn Sīnā's emphasis on corporiety and analysis
of body also find echo in Ibn Ṭufayl and serve as the starting point of his philosophy.

The doctrine of the plurality of Forms, an obviously Aristotelian element, reaches Ibn Ṭufayl through Ibn Sīnā. Like Ibn Sīnā Ibn Ṭufayl also distinguishes between the vegetative soul, the animal soul and the human soul. He further agrees with Ibn Sīnā in his doctrine of oneness of soul. Both believe that souls are numerically distinct by reason of their bodies. Ibn Sīnā regards human soul as identical with intellect. Ibn Ṭufayl calls it the rational essence or rational form of man. Both of them regard the form as the true cause of a thing. For Ibn Sīnā, matter is mere receptivity. For Ibn Ṭufayl it is nothing by itself. It comes into being with the individualization of the form. Both are of the view that the plurality of Intelligible forms does not plurify God. Their ideas regarding time are also similar. Ibn Sīnā believes that time is inseparable from motion. If there were no motion there would be no time. Ibn Ṭufayl considers time as inseparable from the occurrences of the world. So there can be no time before the existence of the phenomenal world. Ibn Ṭufayl’s argument for the existence of an Immaterial Agent based on the eternity of the world has also been derived from Ibn Sīnā. Ibn Sīnā, discussing the cause of the eternal motion of the celestial bodies, holds that
eternal motion is identical with infinite motion. A body cannot be its cause. So there must be an Immaterial Agent as its cause. But there is one important difference between their points of view. Ibn Sīnā believes in intermediary intelligences as causes of motion. But for Ibn Tufayl God is the cause. Ibn Tufayl believes in the rational essences of the spheres. He also believes that these essences enjoy the contemplation and vision of God. But he is not prepared to go the full length of the emanation theory as upheld by Al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and other neo-Platonists among the Muslim philosophers. Moreover, Ibn Tufayl does not subscribe to the doctrine of the Agent Intellect. He does not accept the union with the Active Intellect as the highest goal. He is not a complete follower of neo-Platonism in this respect. The fundamental difference between Ibn Tufayl and the neo-Platonists among the Muslims (including Ibn Sīnā) lies in the fact that Ibn Tufayl does not show as much reliance on intellect, for giving the highest knowledge, as is done by these neo-Platonists. For him the relation between God and the human soul or other essences is not susceptible of being explained by reason or of being expressed in language. The philosophers who try to make that relation intelligible through emanation theory or any other theory try the impossible. Ibn Tufayl is wise enough not to do that. He regards it as a matter of direct
intuition. He tries to give only a remote and indirect idea of it through metaphors. These metaphors (of the light of the Sun and its reflection in different mirrors, one after another) has some resemblance with the theory of emanation. But Ibn Ṭufayl further limits the resemblance by insisting that this analogy should not be taken too literally.

So in our view, Ibn Ṭufayl is not a faithful follower of Ibn Sīnā even, although he holds him in great esteem and borrows freely from him in working out the details of his philosophy. Ibn Sīnā is more of a rationalist than Ibn Ṭufayl. He has tried to fit neo-Platonism in Aristotelian frame work but the two trends do not seem to be fully compatible. This confusion among the Muslim philosophers arose from the so called Theology of Aristotle, which passed among them as an Aristotelian work but in fact it was borrowed from Plotinus' Enneads, Book IV-VI. But Ibn Ṭufayl is free from this confusion. He is not committed to follow Aristotle or Plotinus or any other philosopher, not even Ibn Sīnā. He selects the acceptable elements from different sources and moulds them into a pattern of his own.
4. **Al-Ghazālī.**

In discussing the influences on Ibn Ṭufayl’s philosophy the name of Al-Ghazālī cannot be ignored. His influence is not so apparent, yet it is there. Apparently there are basic differences between them. Al-Ghazālī holds reason and intellect in contempt while Ibn Ṭufayl believes that reason can give us knowledge of God but this knowledge is inferior to the knowledge of the saints. In other matters too (e.g. causality, etc.) Al-Ghazālī is sceptic about the powers of reason, but Ibn Ṭufayl considers it a reliable guide, so far as it goes.

In their ethical outlook too they show some divergence. Ibn Ṭufayl’s ideal is individual salvation but Al-Ghazālī emphasizes social obligations also and shows keen appreciation of socio-cultural problems of man.

But inspite of these apparent differences there are some basic affinities in their philosophies. Both are mystical in their outlook. Margaret Smith attributes to Al-Ghazālī the belief in the theory of emanation on the ground that he speaks of the Unitarian seeing things as a multiplicity, but he sees the many as emanating from the one, the supreme; and also because he (Al-Ghazālī) states that God is the First in relation to existent things,
and all have emanated from Him in their order. In our view, Al-Ghazālī’s attitude to emanation theory is similar to that of Ibn Tūfayl. He accepts the underlying principle of it but does not subscribe to its details. It is interesting to note that Ibn Tūfayl was aware of this point of view of Al-Ghazālī. In his introduction he mentions the charge brought against Al-Ghazālī by his critics, of introducing plurality within the Divine Being. Ibn Tūfayl indirectly supports Al-Ghazālī by saying that in his opinion he (Al-Ghazālī) is one of those persons who have attained to the highest degree of Happiness, and who have arrived at these noble and sacred positions. In fact Ibn Tūfayl’s own views are in line with Al-Ghazālī on this point, which may be taken as an indication of the influence of the latter on his philosophy.

Ibn Tūfayl shows another marked resemblance with Al-Ghazālī with regard to the Ishaqī aspect of his philosophy. Al-Ghazālī makes frequent use of imagery derived from light to express his meanings. In emphasizing the Unity of God and in refuting the Christian doctrine that Christ was God he puts forward the analogy of the mirror. One who looks in a mirror which reflects a coloured object, and supposes that reflection to be the form of the mirror, is mistaken. To strengthen this analogy he quotes the following lines of the poet Ibn 'Abbād:
"Fine is the glass and the wine is fine:
They are com mingled and seem to be one,
As if there were only wine and no glass,
Or as if there is only glass and no wine."

Again, Al-Ghazali goes on to say: "The term 'light' applied to any but Him is merely metaphorical, without real meaning—God is the highest and ultimate light.\(^88\) Al-Ghazālī also makes use of the analogy of 'the light of the sun falling on the moon, then on the wall, and, then on the floor'. Then he concludes, "The term, 'light', therefore, can worthily be applied only to ultimate light, above whom is no light and from whom light descends upon all else".\(^89\)

We have quoted Al-Ghazālī at some length in order to show how closely and faithfully Ibn Tufayl follows him in his analogies and metaphors.

Margaret Smith regards this use of imagery derived from light as of Hellenic origin,\(^90\) and quotes Plotinus as regarding knowledge as "the light within the soul which enlightens it, a light lit from above which gave the soul its brighter life".\(^91\) But it is not necessary to go as far as that. The analogy of light is so common and so obvious that we find it in most religions and in many philosophies.
The Qur'an also makes use of the symbol of light at various places. So it is more probable that these philosophers borrowed this symbolism directly from the Qur'an.

Another important agreement is found with regard to their theories of knowledge. Margaret Smith sums up Al-Ghazālī's theory of knowledge by enumerating the following five faculties possessed by human soul:

1. The sensory faculty
2. The Imagination
3. The Intelligence
4. The Reasoning power.
5. The Divine prophetic spirit or intuition.

If we study Ibn Tufayl closely we will find that knowledge, according to him does not fall outside these five sources. But for the sake of convenience he divides knowledge into three grades:

1. Knowledge of physical things
2. Knowledge of Metaphysical things

These grades of knowledge virtually exhaust the kinds of knowledge enumerated by Al-Ghazālī.
There are other minor points of resemblance also but we leave them out.

5. **Shahrastānī**.

Ibn Ṭufayl is also indebted to Shahrastānī (1086-1153) for some of his arguments. His argument or rather illustration about the eternity of the world and its relation to God has been derived from Shahrastānī. Shahrastānī illustrates the relation between God and the world by means of the analogy of the sun and its rays. Both may be eternal and yet the sun is the source (or cause) of its rays. He also gives the analogy of the hand and the sleeve. The hand moves with the sleeve but the movement of the sleeve is dependent on the hand. Ibn Ṭufayl expresses the same sense by the analogy of the hand moving with a ball. But Shahrastānī has gone further in the analysis of the argument. He explains why temporal priority does not apply to God. It is because God is not of time and His being is not temporal.

Again, the credit for the ingenious proof to show that bodies are essentially finite, by supposing two infinite lines drawn through them, goes to Shahrastānī. Ibn Ṭufayl has borrowed it from him. But the achievement of Ibn Ṭufayl lies in fitting it into the framework of his philosophy.
In discussing the influences on Ibn Tufayl's philosophy it is but natural that we should pay special attention to Spanish philosophers. In this connection, two names seem to be noteworthy - Ibn Masarrah and Ibn Bājja. Though Ibn Tufayl does not show his indebtedness to these philosophers in his fundamental position — he rather criticises Ibn Bājja severely for his too much dependence on intellect — yet he agrees with them in many details.

Ibn Masarrah was born in Cordova, in 883 A.D. and died in 931 A.D. His father was inclined toward asceticism and had studied Mu'tazelite and mystical philosophy in the East. Ibn Masarrah founded an Ishrāqi and pseudo-Empedoclean school of philosophy in Spain. Finding the city life uncongenial to his taste he retired with his pupils to the solitude of mountains. This earned him the title of al-Jabālī (the man of mountains). Ibn Masarrah, in his philosophy, shows a strange combination of Mu'tazelite doctrine of freedom and a mystical philosophy of illumination. With Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā he believes in the emanation theory and the existence of immaterial essences. According to him prophecy is "a philosophic sanctification, a purifying illumination which is the result of an ascetic rapture."
Now it is evident that Spain had a tradition of mystical philosophy before Ibn Tufayl which must have necessarily influenced him. An interesting feature of this tradition was the alliance between neo-Platonic Ishraqī mysticism and Mu'tazelite rationalism. Ibn Tufayl imbibed this tradition and that is why his philosophy also tries to harmonize the two trends. The influence of Ibn Masarrah is also visible in the Ishraqī aspect of Ibn Tufayl's philosophy - his metaphors of the light of the sun and its reflection in different mirrors, etc. His emphasis on withdrawal from society also finds support in Ibn Masarrah's retired life and seclusion. Some traces of emanation theory and belief in immaterial essences also show his agreement with Ibn Masarrah. But these were the common property of the Muslim philosophers and it is not necessary that Ibn Tufayl should have borrowed them from Ibn Masarrah particularly. However, it shows that Ibn Tufayl did not effect a sudden breach from the existing tradition in Spanish philosophy. But he did not agree with Ibn Masarrah with regard to his Empedoclean bias. Moreover, he does not subscribe to the philosophic interpretation of prophecy as offered by Ibn Masarrah. He simply asserts the agreement between mystical intuitions and prophetic revelations but does not further explain the nature of the latter.
7. Ibn Bājja

With regard to Ibn Bājja Ibn Ṭufayl is very critical in his Introduction. No doubt, there is a fundamental difference between their approaches. Ibn Bājja preaches the logical approach to ultimate Reality. He was anti-mystical and criticised Al-Ghazālī for his leanings toward Sufism. He held that man can achieve the greatest happiness "through knowledge and thought and not by mortifying the senses and exaggerating the imagination as the sufi devotees do."

But in spite of this fundamental difference Ibn Ṭufayl admires Ibn Bājja's "penetrating mental powers, and sound method of enquiry." It is to be remembered that Ibn Ṭufayl believes in the harmony between the theoretical knowledge (إدراك أهل فكر) and the intuitive knowledge (إدراك أهل شاف). He gives credit to Ibn Bājja for having attained to the former. Since Ibn Ṭufayl's book, "Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān", combines both the approaches it is obvious that his theoretical and rational approach, so far as it goes, must show agreement with Ibn Bājja.

Moreover, in many details and practical teachings, Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān shows marked resemblance with تدبير المتون of Ibn Bājja. Ibn Bājja was the first Spanish philosopher to make a distinction in his works between religion and
philosophy. This distinction finds an important place in Ibn Tufayl's philosophy and moulds his theme to a considerable extent.

8. Some other Influences:

So far we have been discussing the influences of particular philosophers on Ibn Tufayl's philosophy. It will not be out of place here to take note of some wider influences, as some critics have pointed out. The foremost influence on Ibn Tufayl is that of Islam. Ibn Tufayl is at pains to bring his philosophy in conformity with the Qur'an. He quotes the Qur'anic verses frequently in support of his point of view. It is not a shallow and superficial loyalty. He believes in Islam and has a firm faith in God and the Prophet, as pointed out by his biographers. In his Introduction he criticises Al-Fārābī for his equating prophethood with an intellectual power and for other unorthodox beliefs. To reconcile philosophy with Islamic faith was a real problem with Ibn Tufayl and he found the solution of this problem, like many others, in a sort of mystical philosophy expressed through Ishrāqī imagery. This imagery of light itself betrays various influences - the influences that can be traced back to Qur'anic source, to neo-Platonism and to the ancient Zoroastrian philosophy of Persia.
In his Ethics Ibn Ṭufayl reveals some influence of Pythagorean teachings, as has been pointed out by De Boer. To some extent we may discover the Buddhistic and Indian influence also in the ascetism and dietary restrictions imposed upon himself by Hayy. But this is a common feature of several forms of mysticism which may or may not betray the influences of Indian philosophy and Buddhism.

V. IDENTIFICATION OF IBN TUFAYL'S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION

Having pointed out various influences on Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophy, we are in a better position to determine the exact character of his philosophy and to identify his position. Is it Rationalism or Mysticism or what? We have said earlier that it is difficult to bring Ibn Ṭufayl under any one category. He is not a Rationalist in the ordinary sense because he believes in a supra-rational intuition and also takes the help of experience in building up knowledge, at least in the initial stages of his philosophy. But he also makes reason his guide in discussing various problems of his philosophy. He believes that reason, if rightly used, can discover the metaphysical truths — the nature of the body, soul and God, and their inter-relationships. But reason has its limits. It only gives a general and vague sort of knowledge of ultimate reality. It cannot reveal its ultimate nature to us. It
does not bring us face to face with ultimate reality. In other words, reason is inadequate and insufficient for the highest knowledge of Reality. It is mystical intuition which gives us the direct experience and vision of God.

It is obviously a mystical position. Whatever be the initial path, be it sense experience or reason, but when a philosopher reaches this stage he deserves to be called a mystic. That Ibn Tufayl is a mystic philosopher is not open to doubt. There are so many reasons that compel us to regard him so:

(i) He speaks of direct observation, intuition and immediate presence of Divine Being.

(ii) This direct observation or experience is accompanied by clarity and extreme joy and ecstasy.

(iii) This experience cannot be expressed in language. The things that are revealed during this experience, (for instance, relation of the One to many), cannot be understood or made intelligible by reason.

(iv) A certain way of life or a practical programme is necessary to qualify for that experience. In other words, it comes through practical striving and not by mere theoretical contemplation.
Ibn Tufayl also refers to the experience of union with God. During that experience all essences and everything, including the self of the mystic, disappear and there remains nothing but the Divine Essence.

He considers God as the object of highest love and strongest yearnings. It is not a mere intellectual curiosity that leads one to seek the knowledge of God. Having come to know the attributes of Perfection possessed by God one is irresistibly attracted towards Him, to the exclusion of all else.

Ibn Tufayl distinguishes between theoretical or metaphysical knowledge and the knowledge of the saints. He criticises Ibn Bājja for denying the latter and for confining himself to the former only. He has no sympathy with philosophers like Ibn Bājja and Al-Fārābī on account of their intellectual approach and shows respect for men like Al-Ghazālī and such other mystic philosophers.

He explains away matter as unreal or nothing — as a mere fitness for receiving certain forms. Then he denies the independent existence of
forms and regards them as manifestations of Divine
Essence. Inspite of their apparent plurality they
do not plurify God. This is a kind of Pantheistic
Idealism combined with Ishraqī mysticism.

But it is to be remembered that Ibn Tufayl's mysticism,
considered in all its details, is of a unique pattern. It
cannot be equated wholly with neo-Platonic mysticism or
with Ishraqī philosophy or with any other particular system
of philosophy.

VI. IBN TUFAYL'S INFLUENCE ON SUBSEQUENT THOUGHT

As most of the histories of philosophy have failed
to do full justice to Ibn Tufayl and his philosophy it is
but natural that his influence on subsequent thought should
also remain obscure. But such a powerful current of thought
cannot sink into oblivion without leaving important traces
of its impact on the surroundings. Moreover, Ibn Tufayl
was undoubtedly one of the greatest philosophers of his
period. The evolution of thought, which is a continuous
process, could not have taken a jump over him. Ibn Tufayl
reveals the traces of the influence of his predecessors.
His successors should carry over, and they do carry over,
the marks of his influence.
1. Ibn Tufayl's Influence on Spanish Thought

(i) Ibn Roshd: Ibn Roshd was the younger contemporary and, according to some traditions, a pupil of Ibn Tufayl. Ibn Roshd's philosophy is the work of his own independent and vigorous mind, yet it is not free from Ibn Tufayl's influence. It is true that Ibn Roshd deviates considerably from Ibn Sīnā's traditions in philosophy. He revolted against the predominance of neo-Platonism and followed Aristotle more closely. But it was Ibn Tufayl who had prepared the way for this divergence. He had already made a beginning in this direction by dropping the neo-Platonic astronomy and the doctrine of intermediary intelligences. Again, Ibn Tufayl had deviated from Ibn Sīnā on another point. Ibn Sīnā regarded the One alone as necessary. So he needed a hierarchy of emanations, from intelligence to intelligence, which was independent of the One. Ibn Tufayl does away with this hierarchy and regards God, the necessary Being, as the uncaused cause of all multiplicity. Ibn Roshd shows agreement with Ibn Tufayl on this point. He holds that God, as pure act, is Himself the Intelligible or the first Intelligence. He is the uncaused cause and source of everything.

One element of neo-Platonism (i.e., the doctrine of Active Intellect) which had been dropped by Ibn Tufayl, is
still found in Ibn Roshd’s philosophy. Even on this point
he does not fully agree with Ibn Sinā. For Ibn Sinā the
function of the Active Intellect was to create forms. For
Ibn Roshd, its function was to transform potential being
into actual being. Since all form is actual and all matter
is potential it is the Active Intellect that gives form
to matter or makes it actual. This is the solution of the
problem of the eternity of matter advanced by Ibn Roshd,
and it is identical in substance with that of Ibn Tufayl.

But the greatest and closest influence of Ibn Tufayl
is visible in Ibn Roshd’s views on the relation of philosophy
to religion. Ibn Roshd divided men into three classes:

(a) Those who had attained to the highest state of
    wisdom and needed absolute demonstration to
    convince them.

(b) The dialectical men who were satisfied with
    probable arguments.

(c) The simple and the unenlightened ones for whom
    faith and obedience to authority was sufficient.

The Qur’an, he believed, was addressed to all the
three classes of men. Every one had a right to interpret
it according to his own capacity and understanding. Its
exterior, with symbolic meanings, was meant for the un instructed. Its interior, with a hidden meaning, was meant for the philosopher.

If there was any conflict between the apparent text of the Qur'an and its demonstrative conclusions the philosopher could find the underlying harmony. But he should not divulge the deeper meaning of the Qur'an to the inferior minds who are not capable of grasping that truth. In all these ideas one finds an echo of Ibn Tufayl's views and traces of his direct influence.

(ii) Ibn al-'Arabī: Ibn al-'Arabī of Murcia (1165-1240) is another important Spanish philosopher who comes after Ibn Tufayl. He is an adherent of Ishrāqī mysticism and a follower of Wahdat-al-Wajūd in its extreme and most mystical form. Though in his extreme point of view he goes far beyond Ibn Tufayl, yet it seems quite reasonable to suppose that the tradition of Ishrāqī mysticism should have reached him through Ibn Tufayl. In his Futūḥat he describes the celestial ascent of two persons; one is a philosopher relying on his own reason and judgement, and the other is an adept initiated into the tradition by a master. The philosopher is denied access to the regions which are reached by the adept.
The anti-intellectual bias of Ibn al-'Arabi is absent in Ibn Tufayl but the allegorical form of the story betrays the influence of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan and other similar stories in the mystic literature of that period.

Besides this formal resemblance there are further agreements between them in some matters of details. Ibn al-'Arabi, like Ibn Tufayl, makes use of the metaphor of the mirror to express the relation between God and the phenomenal world. The analogy of body and its members given by Ibn al-'Arabi, to express the unity of being, also reminds one of similar statements of Ibn Tufayl in his Hayy Ibn Yaqzan.

(iii) Ibn Sab'in: There is another Spanish philosopher, 'Abd al-Haqq ibn Sab'in (1217-61) who was also an advocate of the philosophy of light. He wrote a book named "Asrar al-Hikmat al-Mashriqiyah." It will be remembered that the sub-title given to Hayy Ibn Yaqzan contained the same wordings. So it is probable that Ibn Sab'in was inspired by Ibn Tufayl's work to write his book.

With regard to the development of Muslim philosophy in the East the influence of Ibn Tufayl seems to be negligible, or very remote and indirect. Many exponents of Ishraqi philosophy and mysticism appeared in the East, such
as Shihābuddīn Suhrawardī Maqtūl, Yaḥyā al-Suhrawardī, Farīduddīn 'Attār, Jāmī and others. But it cannot be asserted with certainty that they owed all their ideas to Ibn Tufayl. They can be more justifiably connected with the neo-Platonic and Persian traditions.

2. Influence on the Western Philosophy:

The western philosophy, however, tells a different tale. The two greatest philosophers of Spain, Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Roshd, made great impact and exercised direct influence on the development of philosophy in medieval Europe. To understand the nature of this influence closely we will have to turn to the conditions obtaining in Spain of those days.

(i) Jewish Philosopher, Moses Maimonides:

In the early days of Muslim rule in Spain the Jews enjoyed peace and prosperity which was denied to them in many other countries of Europe. It brought them nearer to the Muslims and made them adopt 'Arabic language as their medium of thought. Many of them mastered 'Arabic learning and philosophy available in Spain. Inspired by a similar religious interest they often moulded their philosophico-theological speculation on the pattern of the writings of
the Muslim philosophers that impressed them. It was natural that they should be drawn more closely to the Spanish Muslim philosophers who flourished about the same period. These Jewish philosophers of Spain transmitted the ideas of Muslim philosophy, and specially the ideas of Muslim philosophers of Spain, to the Christian world. The most noteworthy among these Jewish philosophers of Spain were Solomon Ibn Gabirol (1021 - 1058), known to the scholastics by his Latin name Avencebrol or Avicebron, and Moses ben Maimon or Moses Maimonides (1135-1204). The former inclined towards neo-Platonism which had earned him the title of Jewish Plato. The latter showed greater affinity with Aristotelianism. He was well-known among the scholastics for his famous work "Guide for the Perplexed." This work, on many vital points and arguments, reveals the clear influence of Ibn Tufayl's teachings.

Maimonides believed that pure Intelligences are free from matter, and that celestial bodies are also composed of matter and form, but their matter is different from that of terrestrial bodies. He believed in God as the necessary Being and the primary mover. He does not regard the question of the eternity or non-eternity of the world as capable of demonstrative proof, but tries to establish the existence of God, whether the world was created in time or existed
from all eternity. He also tried to harmonize between the Old Testament and philosophy. All this clearly shows his closeness to Ibn Tufayl's views on philosophy.

(ii) Thomas Aquinas:

Maimonides in turn influenced Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 A.D.), one of the greatest figures in Christian philosophy.

According to Etienne Gilson, their (Maimonides' and Aquinas') philosophies, barring a few items, "were in harmony with one another on all the really important points. The argument about the Existence of God, irrespective of the eternity or non-eternity of the world, also appears in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. Thomas Aquinas also accepted from him the distinction between Faith and Reason which plays so important a part in his philosophy and in the writings of other Christian philosophers.

There is one difference however. Unlike Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Roshd, Maimonides believed in the priority of revelation. He starts with the tenets of Jewish faith as given in the old testament and tries to justify them rationally, with arguments borrowed from Ibn Tufayl or other Muslim philosophers. It was this aspect of his philosophy
which exercised a formative role in the subsequent development of Augustinianism and Thomism in the 13th and 14th centuries.

In the beginning, St. Thomas, under the influence of Farabi and Ibn Sīnā inclined towards the neo-Platonic conception of God as an indirect mover. But later on, he turned to the Aristotelian conception of God as the first Mover. This may have been due to the influence of Ibn Tufayl who was the first among the Spanish Muslim philosophers to free himself from the unlimited allegiance to neo-Platonism.

The Augustinian school adopted the doctrine of Active Intellect preached by Farabi and Ibn Sīnā, to harmonize with the theory of "illumination from God." This modification saved the individuality of the soul which was threatened by extreme neo-Platonism. This again is a point which brings them closer to Ibn Tufayl.

The influence of Ibn Tufayl was not confined to Jewish philosophers or to a few Christian philosophers alone, but it was extended to the whole Christian world in the Middle Ages. Spain was the centre of learning to which philosophers and scholars were drawn from various European countries, and after drinking deep at this fountain of learning they carried away the ideas of Muslim philosophers to their respective
places, and influenced others who came in contact with them. It is not possible to discuss here the debt that each philosopher owed to Ibn Tufayl or to other Muslim philosophers of Spain, but we can just take note of some landmarks or important trends in that direction.

(iii) The Philosophy of Light and its Influence: on Augustinian Scholastics:

We have seen that the movement of the Philosophy of Light, which reached its climax in Ibn Tufayl and Ibn al-'Arabi, had been popular in Spain. The illuminative life and the symbolism of light was also present in Christianity from the very beginning. For instance, a mystical movement in Syria, in pre-Islamic days, emphasized the three stages of mystic experience - Purgation - Illumination - Perfection. Dionysiüs, a Syrian monk, writes: "Every process of illuminating light, proceeding from the Father, whilst visiting us as a gift of goodness, restores us again gradually as a unifying power......." But as the Spanish Arabist, Asin Placios points out, it was from al-Andalusia (Spain) that the ideas of this school (of light) were transmitted to the so called Augustinian scholastics, such as Alexander Hales, Duns Scotus, Roger Bacon, and Raymond Lull. The same author finds a close connection between Dante and Sufism. "An essential element
he says, "of Ishrāqī philosophy - the metaphysical doctrine of light with which we shall be concerned later - reappears in the Divine Comedy." Gordon Leff, in his book, "Medieval Thought", also admits the powerful effect of the theory of light upon later Christian thought.

(iv) Roger Bacon (1214-1294 A.D.):

Besides this general influence, we also find evidence of more direct and closer indebtedness to Ibn Ṭufayl in case of some important philosophers and writers. For instance, Roger Bacon is generally regarded as the first champion of Inductive method in medieval Europe. He was the first person in the history of human thought to have used the term scientia experimentalis (Experimental science) in its present connotation. The following quotation will throw light on his views: "There are, in fact, two ways of knowing: reasoning and experiment. Theory concludes and makes us admit the conclusion, but it does not give us that assurance free from all doubt in which the mind rests in the intuition of truth, so long as the conclusion is not arrived at by way of experiment. Many people have theories on certain subjects, but as they have not had experience of them, these theories remain unutilized by them and incite them neither to seek a certain good, nor to avoid a certain evil. If a
man who has never seen fire were to prove by conclusive arguments that fire burns, that it spoils and destroys things, his listener's mind would remain unconvinced, and he would not keep away from fire until he had put his hand or some combustible object in it, to prove by experience what theory had taught him. But once having made the experiment of combustion, the mind is convinced and rests on the evidence of truth; reasoning, therefore, is not enough, but experiment does suffice. That is clearly evident in mathematics, whose demonstrations are the surest of all. We have given this long quotation from Roger Bacon to emphasize his contribution in this direction. Long before Francis Bacon, he enumerated four obstacles which should be removed from the path to learning. These obstacles are: (i) Blind belief in authority; (ii) The fact that men are imitating each other, inspite of thousand falsehoods current among men; (iii) The reign of prejudice (iv) Pride which leads men to conceal their ignorance and display mock learning.

Roger Bacon conceives experiment as of two kinds, one internal and spiritual (like mystic experience) and the other, external, based on senses. It is the latter that is the source of all our veritably certain knowledge and of experimental sciences.
Thus we see that Roger Bacon was one of those pioneers who have been responsible for ushering in an era of scientific progress and empirical method in European thought. But on a close study of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan one is struck with surprise at the close affinity between Ibn Tufayl's theory of knowledge and that of Roger Bacon. Ibn Tufayl also accepts reason, sense experience and internal experience (i.e. mystic experience or intuition) as the only sources of knowledge. Moreover, his elaborate description of the empirical learning in the life-story of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan entitles him to be ranked as the forerunner of the two Bacons who are usually regarded as the founders of the Inductive method of knowledge. Their affinities cannot be explained away as matters of mere coincidence.

In view of the popularity of Ibn Tufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqzan in medieval Europe and Roger Bacon's mastery of Arabic language and oriental learning it will not be too much to suppose that Roger Bacon was well-acquainted with Ibn Tufayl's ideas and had been consciously influenced by them.

(v) **Francis Bacon:**

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) is another English philosopher who has made great contribution to the development of Inductive method. In his chief work, Novum Organon,
be has formulated the principles of this method.

Francis Bacon has stressed the need of freeing the mind from various idols before starting the voyage for true knowledge. These idols are:

(i) Idols of the Tribe (i.e. false ideas common to human race)

(ii) Idols of the Den (i.e. the prejudices of the individual).

(iii) Idols of the market (i.e. false ideas arising through human intercourse or through the improper use of language.

(iv) Idols of the Theatre (i.e. assumptions and false theories of the philosophers).

But we find that the views of Francis Bacon are nothing but an echo of the views of Roger Bacon. And since Roger Bacon is indebted to Ibn Tufayl, Francis Bacon too cannot be said to be independent of Ibn Tufayl's influence.

(vi) Spinoza

Not only the two Bacons but the modern philosophers like Spinoza and Leibnitz were also familiar with Hayy Ibn Yaqzan and were impressed by its philosophy. The touches
of oriental mysticism in Spinoza's philosophy may, in some measure, be attributed to Ibn Tufayl's influence.

Ibn Tufayl's mysticism, however, begins with reason or intellect and ends with Intuition. That is why he distinguishes between Intellectual Comprehension (إدراك العقل) and Comprehension of the Saints of God (إدراك نظر أهل الولي). It seems that Spinoza's philosophy is confined to the former stage alone. Even his Love of God is intellectual.

(vii) Defoe's Robinson Crusoe and Hayy Ibn Yaqzan:

Before ending this section it will not be out of place to make some reference to another important evidence of Ibn Tufayl's influence, not in philosophy but in the field of literature. The famous story of Robinson Crusoe, written by Daniel Defoe in 1719, seems to be an imperfect copy of Ibn Tufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqzan. The philosophical romance of Ibn Tufayl offers an interesting study along with Defoe's Robinson Crusoe. Defoe's work has enjoyed exceptional popularity and fame in the history of English literature. Robinson Crusoe, the hero of Defoe, is a shipwrecked sailor who reaches the shore of an uninhabited island. With his inventive genius and practical ability he constructs various things and provides for his different needs. Thus,
he passes some of his time in that island till some passing ship picks him up and carries him once more to the civilized society.

Now it will be evident to a careful observer that Robinson Crusoe is only an imperfect copy of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan. Crusoe's adventures reproduce the practical achievements of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, without his scientific, philosophical, moral, and intellectual development. Moreover, Defoe's task was much easier. He had to depict the adventures of a grown up adult who was already equipped with the fruits of education, training and experience in a civilized society. But Hayy Ibn Yaqzan starts with a total blank. He is deprived of all education and guidance from society. He has to learn everything with his own native intelligence and with the resources of his own mind. He learns to satisfy all his bodily needs. Then he proceeds to satisfy his scientific curiosity and seeks the solution of various philosophical, moral and religious problems raised by his inquisitive mind. All this is done in a most natural, realistic and psychological way.

However, it is not our aim here to dwell upon the superior merits of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan. Our main concern is to point out the influence that Ibn Tufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqzan might have exercised on Defoe's Robinson Crusoe. And it is
not a mere guess or a wild hypothesis. There are facts to support it. In the first place, there is the internal evidence - the close affinity between the two themes and the working out of the details by the two masters.

Ibn Tufayl's work was written probably in the latter half of the 12th century A.D., while Defoe's Robinson Crusoe was written about 1719 A.D. Moreover, 'Hayy Ibn Yaqqān' was one of the most popular books in medieval Europe and every educated and learned man was expected to be familiar with it. Its translations in various languages of Europe began to appear as early as 14th century A.D. The first English translation of Hayy Ibn Yaqqān by George Keith the Quaker appeared in 1674. It was followed by another English translation by George Ashwell in 1686. Then Simon Oakley's translation appeared in 1708. It was reprinted in 1711. All these editions and translations of Hayy Ibn Yaqqān come before Robinson Crusoe. It was not possible for a man like Defoe to have remained ignorant of such an important work in those days of scarcity of published books. The literary beauties of Hayy Ibn Yaqqān and masterly treatment of its theme by Ibn Tufayl should have given Defoe an idea of attempting a somewhat parallel work in English.

The tendency to imitate the story of Hayy Ibn Yaqqān continued even after Defoe. In 1761, we find "The Life and
Surprising. Adventures of Don Antonio de Trezzamio being published anonymously. It was nothing but a Crusoe story paraphrased and modified from Ockley’s version. This shows what a deep impression Hayy Ibn Yaqzan had made on the literary circles of England.

To sum up, Ibn Tufayl exercised great influence on the development of Jewish and Christian thought in medieval ages and thus indirectly contributed to the rise and development of Modern philosophy. The following quotation from O’Leary, about the influence of Spanish philosophy on the West, is equally true of Ibn Tufayl’s philosophy: “After a chequered career in the east it (philosophy) passed over to the western Muslim community in Spain, where it had a very specialized development, which finally made a deeper impression on Christian and Jewish thought than on that of Muslims themselves, and attained its final evolution in North East Italy, where as an anti-ecclesiastical influence, it prepared the way for the Renaissance.”

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS:

So far we have confined ourselves to a systematic exposition and analysis of Ibn Tufayl’s philosophy, its sources and its influence on subsequent thought. Now in this last section we may venture a critical evaluation and
assessment of some aspects of his philosophy and its contribution to human thought.

As we have already pointed out in earlier sections, Ḥayy Ibn Yaẓān is unique in several aspects. In the originality of its plan and masterly working out of its theme it is unsurpassed in the whole philosophical literature. No other philosophical story can claim the same measure of success as is achieved by Ḥayy Ibn Yaẓān. Apart from its philosophical aspect, Ḥayy Ibn Yaẓān can be ranked among the best classics of the world literature.

So far as the philosophy of Ibn Ṭufayl is concerned, various elements constituting it are not absolutely new. Ibn Ṭufayl borrows freely from Aristotle, Plato, Neo-Platonism, Ishrāqī philosophy and similar other sources, but his own genius moulds them into a new pattern. There is a modern touch about his philosophy. His philosophy includes elements from older philosophies but its spirit is modern. Modern philosophy begins in a revolt against dogmatism. It doubts every established opinion in order to reconstruct knowledge on a surer foundation. It is this desire for emancipation of human thought which is prominently visible in the two pioneers of modern philosophy, Descartes^114 and Bacon^115. Even the French sensationalist,
Condillac (1715-1780) tries to give the exposition of his philosophy by supposing a marble statue or a human child with marble coverings blocking his senses. One by one, the marble coverings are lifted from various sense organs, and thus Condillac traces the development of sensations and ideas from the very beginning. The idea is that the whole knowledge should be reached by tracing its developmental process so that no uncertainty or unwarranted idea may find a place in knowledge. In short, it is this spirit of emancipation and quest for certainty that characterizes Modern philosophy.

Ibn Tufayl's philosophy is also saturated with this spirit. He makes a newly born child the hero of his story. This child is cut off from society. He is deprived of all guidance and benefits of experience of others. Even the use of language is denied to him. Thus, unaided and unguided by any human teacher, he begins to learn about life, about science, philosophy and religion. The same motive is operating here as in case of Descartes and Bacon, that the philosophy developed by this natural philosopher should be free from all bias and dogmatism. It should be the philosophy to which any unsophisticated and unbiased seeker after truth may be inevitably led, in the light of his own reasoning and experience. However, it is far from
our intention to imply that Ibn Tufayl's philosophy possesses all the merits of the modern philosophers or all its elements are acceptable to our modern sense and taste. All that we aim to show is that in certain trends of his philosophy Ibn Tufayl comes very close to some important philosophers of modern period.

Take for instance the sceptic philosopher of Scotland, David Hume (1711-1771). His revolutionary ideas about 'Cause' have earned him immortal fame. He challenges the very basis of causality and denies necessary connection between cause and effect. Ibn Tufayl, in his discussion of Form, comes very close to this position. He comes to the conclusion that we have no direct knowledge of the Form of any body. We find a fitness or disposition for certain actions in a body and regard it as its form. These actions do not seem to have any necessary connection with that body. If actions of an animal were to proceed from a plant we would suppose the animal form to be present in the plant.

The German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is universally acknowledged as one of the greatest philosophers of modern period. His contribution lies in giving a critical analysis and justification of knowledge avoiding the extreme points of view of Rationalism and Empiricism.
He set limits to human reason and showed that there are matters beyond its reach. If reason tries to indulge in those matters it is involved in antinomies.

This critical spirit is, at times, visible in Ibn Tufayl also. With regard to the problem of the eternity or non-eternity of the world he frankly admits the incapability of reason to commit itself either way. Again, in the discussion of unity and multiplicity he shows great reserve and balance in his judgements. He stresses the inaccessibility of 'noumena' for ordinary knowledge from a somewhat different angle—from the standpoint of a philosophy of language which is essentially modern in its spirit and scope.

Ibn Tufayl, like Kant, is also free from the defect of partiality to reason or to sense experience. In his own way, he gives to them their respective fields of activity. In short, with the help of sense experience, reason and intuition he wants to build up a philosophical system which should satisfy human nature as a whole.

But here again we may stress the fact that we do not claim infallibility for his point of view. His philosophy suffers from various shortcomings. Like all rational systems his philosophy promises more than what it can give.
It pretends to discover rationally the nature of the world, Soul and God. It is not free from undue assumptions and logical flaws. His proofs are not conclusive. Their fallacies are too obvious to need any detailed discussion in this section.

Again, the criterion of truth for the mystic experience is wanting. There are assertions and assertions but no proof. However, it may be said in justification of Ibn Tufayl that he does not claim for these assertions the status of proved facts. It is a particular type of experience which he refers to. He invites his readers to verify it by undergoing a certain process of discipline. Even then, it may become a certainty for the adept but it cannot become a piece of knowledge for others.

Further, Ibn Tufayl is not very convincing in his views about the relation of religion to philosophy. He is guilty of prescribing double standards — one for the chosen few and the other for the masses. His ethics is an escape from the realities of life. It teaches withdrawal from society and from social responsibilities. Ibn Tufayl throws out useful hints about the philosophy of language but there is no detailed working out of the problems of language.
The same inadequacy is felt with regard to his description of the psychological development of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan. He gives just a side light and does not tackle many vital issues connected with this problem. The reason perhaps is that he is dealing with a hypothetical case and not with a living, growing, actual child.

Inspite of these shortcomings we must give him the credit of being a pioneer in many fields. He shows modern spirit and anticipates some modern trends in his philosophy. He is the real founder of the Inductive Method and has successfully used it in building up his knowledge of Science and philosophy.

Moreover, he must be judged in relation to his period. In the words of E. Gilson, he was a man of encyclopaedic learning, whose-learning far exceeded the knowledge of the Christians of his times.

In short, Ibn Tufayl was much in advance of his age. By influencing the Jewish and Christian philosophy of Medieval Europe he prepared the way for Renaissance. Thus he deserves an unquestionable place among the forerunners of modern thought.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. "عَلَيْهِ خِلَافَةٌ مَّوْجُودَةٌ وَلَيْدَ الْوَاحِدَ الْمَرَاكِشَينَ" - جَيْنِا سَجَّنَتْ ۹۰۳۰۵۰۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵۲۵
15. Ibn Tufayl's Introduction (Appendix).


17. Ibn Tufayl's Introduction (Appendix).


19. Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. II, p. 424. One edition of the book, printed in 1909, belonging to the personal Library of Prof. Umaruddin, Head of the Department of Philosophy and Psychology, Aligarh Muslim University, also shows the sub-title as


21. Section 10 of the Commentary dealing with the Orient and Occident of the Universe - Juzjânî.

22. Occidental Exile - Suhrawardî.


25. It is very much like the Symbolism of dreams, with the difference that dream symbolism is an unconscious process while allegorical representation is deliberately planned.

For details of dream Symbolism see Interpretation of Dreams by Sigmund Freud.

26. Otto Spies and S.K. Khattak, in their introductory note on the life and work of Suhrawardî, write:
"Inspe of the storm and stress of youth he did not dare to pronounce his doctrines publicly; and so he clothed them in the garb of allegory. When he later on professed his ideas boldly and openly at Aleppo he had to suffer death for his outspokenness. (Three Treatises on Mysticism" p.3).

27. Avicenna and the Visionary Recital by Henry Corbin page 169.


29. The History of Philosophy in Islam by De Boer p.185.


32. إعلام الفلسفة العربية صفحات 803-805

33. Kitāb al-Ishārāt, with Tūsī's commentary.

34. For instance, Fakhruddīn Rāzī is of the view that Salamān represents Adam and Absāl represents Paradise. The story depicts the whole history of psyche, the exile from the Paradise, and the progressive return to the original state of bliss and perfection. (See Fakhr Rāzī's Commentary published at Constantinople 1290 A.H.) According to Nasīruddīn Tūsī, Salamān is the typification of the human soul. Absāl represents the upper face of the soul, the intellectus Contemplativus. Salamān's wife represents the vital powers of the body, or the elementary Matter. Her sister is the practical intellect, which is also the soul at peace. (Cf. Tūsī's Commentary on Ishārāt).

36. * * * * Ibn Tufayl's Introduction (Appendix)

37. * * * * Ibid.

38. Hayy = living; Ibn = Son; Yaqzan = Wakeful, i.e., God.

39. Parmenides who flourished about 504-500 B.C., was a Greek Philosopher who founded the Eleatic school of philosophy. He is not a mystic Philosopher. His philosophy of Being is based on purely logical arguments. But the earlier part of the poem, describing his celestial ascent, has a mystic touch about it. That is why we have included him in our list. For details see History of Early Greek Philosophy by Burnet (pp. 169-196); also Ancilla to Pre-Socratic Philosophy by Kathleen Freeman (pp. 41-51).

40. Early Greek Philosophy by John Burnet p. 172.

41. Zarathusht - Nama (F. Rosenberg's Tr.) p. 28.

42. Die Gnosis - Leisegang p. 136 f.


44. The original text of Salamān and Absāl has been lost. But Ibn Sīnā has made a reference to it in Ishārāt and Nasīruddīn Tūsī has given a brief Summary of it in his commentary.

45. Cf. Kitāb al-Ishārāt with Tūsī's Commentary.

46. See Section II, Ch. VI. of this Thesis.

48. The Original Greek version has been lost. We know it through its translation by Hunain Ibn Ishāq (d.874 A.D.) Tūsī has also given a summary of it in his Commentary on Ishārāt.

49. Cf. Tūsī’s Commentary on Ishārāt.

50. Avicenna and the Visionary Recital - Henry Corbin p.220


52. Ibn Tufayl is also indirectly indebted to the Hellenistic version as he has borrowed the names of his characters from Ibn Sīnā.

53. For instance, the great mystic poet of Persia, Jami (d. 1492 A.D.) has written a beautiful mystical epic which is also entitled Salamān and Absāl. It is mostly based on the Hellenistic version.

54. Risalat al-Ṭayr was written by Ibn Sīnā in Arabic. The original text along with a French translation of it can be found in Mehren’s edition. Shahrazūrī, a Commentator of Suhrawardī, includes a Recital of the Bird among Suhrawardī’s works. But this Recital of the Bird, attributed to Suhrawardī, is found to be a translation of Ibn Sīnā’s Risalat al-Ṭayr. A translation by Umar ibn Sahtān Sāwajī (middle of the 12th Century) and other Persian translations of the same also exist.
55. Abu Hamid Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111 A.D.) is said to have written it in Arabic. His brother, Ahmad Ghazālī translated it into Persian. Some writers on Al-Ghazālī doubt the genuineness of its source but Henry Corbin, Ritter, and Brockelman support its attribution to Al-Ghazālī, and the internal evidence of the work is in their favour. The position taken up in the recital is in strict harmony with Al-Ghazālī's general philosophical outlook.

56. Farīduddīn 'Attār (d. 1229 A.D.) was a mystic poet of Persia. He combines a deep and penetrating insight with poetic imagination. He has a peculiar style of presenting his ideas which is reflected even in the summary given above.

57. Joseph stands here for the eternal self.

58. The Arabic title of this recital is غریث الفردیم or غریث الفردیم, as found in the edition of Ahmad Amin, who has published three works in one edition with the title حین ابن بقیان لاین سنیا راین ذهنی و السبیرین ین. Ibn Tufayl. However, there is one difference. The three characters of Ibn Tufayl have been borrowed from two Recitals of Ibn Sīnā. But one character, viz., Asāl occurs as Absāl in Ibn Tufayl, which implies the difference of a dot only. It is possible that Ibn Tufayl had intended it to be Absāl (ب اسال) but the dot of was omitted by mistake of some one who copied the manuscript and thus it was changed into Asāl (اسال).
61. It is interesting that 'Omar Farrukh, in his book criticises Ibn Tufayl for excluding woman and sex altogether from the life of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqqān. In our opinion this criticism is unjustified as Ḥayy was so absorbed in contemplation on God that it left no room for other desires and passions.

62. See for instance, Kitāb al-Shifā, Ishārāt, Asrār al-Hikmat al-Mashriqia etc.

63. Dr. Abdul Halim Mahmood, a scholar of Arabic and Philosophy, writes in his book on Philosophy of Ibn Ṭufayl, "Ibn Ṭufayl is superior to Ibn Sīnā from the point of view of language and literature. Ibn Ṭufayl's expression is clear and full of literary beauties. But Ibn Sīnā's expression is difficult and complicated".

64. Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur, 2nd edition.


67. In this introduction Ibn Ṭufayl distinguishes between and attributes the latter to Ibn Bājja. See Ibn Ṭufayl's Introduction (Appendix).


69. The History of Philosophy in Islam - De Boer, p. 182.

70. Ibid., p. 186.

71. Arabic Thought and its Place in History - O'Leary, p. 251.


74. Medieval Thought - Gordon Leff p. 145.


76. ابن طفيل وقصة حق ابن بقظان - عمر فريخ صفحه 86


78. طسوس ابن طفيل ورسالة حق ابن بقظان - ذاكر عبد الحليم محمود


81. See Enneads by Plotinus, for his detailed view.


83. Ibn Tufayl's Introduction (Appendix).

84. Ibid.

85. History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages - Etienne Gilson, p. 182.

86. Al-Ghazālī the Mystic - Margaret Smith, p. 106.


88. Ibn Tufayl's Introduction (Appendix).
89. Mishkāt al-Anwār, p. 100.
90. Mishkāt al-Anwār, p. 110.
91. Al-Ghazālī the Mystic by Margaret Smith, p. 106.
93. For instance, the Qur'an says (God is the light of the Heavens and the earth).
94. Al-Ghazālī the Mystic - Margaret Smith, p. 142.
96. Ibid., p. 4.
97. Ibn Tufayl's Introduction (Appendix).
98. The History of Philosophy in Islam, p. 186.
99. The same idea is conveyed by Rūmī in one of his verses:

من زوران بزکیدم غفراء
پوست را بپچی سگان اندادم

100. Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages - Etienne Gilson p. 229.
103. Ibid., p. 5.

106. Ibid.

107. Medieval Thought, Ch. IV, p. 145.

108. Roger Bacon was born in England about 1214 A.D. He studied at Oxford and then went to Paris. He was one of the versatile thinkers of his period. He was well-versed in Arabic and Oriental learning. His chief works are Opus Majus (Longer work), Opus Minus (the shorter work) and Opus Tertium (the Third work).

109. See Novum Organon by Francis Bacon

110. Opus Majus, IV.

112. This fact has been admitted by various writers on Ibn Tufayl. Cf. (i) The Arab Genius in Science and Philosophy by Omar A Farrukh p. 103. (ii) Muslim Thought, its Origin and Achievement by M.M. Sharif, p. 103.


114. Descartes (1596-1650 A.D.) was the famous French philosopher whose method of Doubt earned him the title of the Father of Modern philosophy.

115. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was the English philosopher who, in his Novum Organon, formulated the principles of Inductive Method. As a pre-condition of true knowledge, he believes the mind should be freed from all prejudices and preconceived notions - the idols.
116. For details see Condilac's works:
   (i) An Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, and
   (ii) Treatise on sensations.


119. History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages
    by Etienne Gilson, p. 217.