EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY
DEVELOPMENT OF EXISTENTIAL THOUGHT

(The roots of existential thought can be traced throughout the history of philosophy and literature.) It, however, found its first profound expression in the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813 - 1855) and reached its apex in the present century through the philosophies of Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre, Karl Jaspers and Gabriil Marcel and through the literateure like Dostoiveski, Unamuno, Camus, Kafka and Sartre (to quote only a few names). (Before working out the reasons for its revival in our century, it is imperative to define the term 'existentialism'—its roots and meaning. It may, however, be mentioned, at the very outset, that it might be a somewhat futile enquiry as to how far are the present Indian conditions conducive to the development of such type of philosophy. Nevertheless, concern for human existence and suffering, has been shown by the authors of Upnishads and Budha as well. Classical Sanskrit literature and Bhakti poetry of the medieval India
may be also studied with a view to trace the elements of an existential philosophy.

It is well established that all the traditional philosophies were essentialistic in nature, for, they emphasized reason as the essence of man to such an extent that the very existence of man was totally blurred or subordinated to a universal concept of man.

Essence and existence can be distinguished by their respective meanings; while essence denotes an idea or a mental abstraction, existence is concrete, or it is facticity. The two terms, as is evident, are related but irreducible to each other. Kant illustrated it very beautifully by saying that the definition of the essence of a hundred dollars has no bearing as to whether or not this sum exists. Its existence or non-existence (in one's pocket), however, makes a great difference. On the basis of this distinction between essence and existence, it can be held that when we define something we express its essence, because whatever is definable in a thing is nothing other than its essence. Thus existing things are reduced to mere ideas or a bundle of characters common in a class of objects. Therefore, any attempt to define existence will involve the paradoxical task of defining the essence of existence. Though existence may not altogether be incomprehensible, yet it is undefinable and unanalyzable in precise terms. Moreover,
essence in every particular case has the possibility of infinite structures and relations. Existence, on the other hand, implies only one fact and that is, a thing either exists or does not exist. There is absolutely no intermediate position between existence and non-existence, between being and not-being.

Therefore, all those systems of thought which give superior rank to essence and at times reduce existing objects to essences, can be classified as essentialist. All those systems of thought which accept the primacy of existence and hold that essence of a thing is merely a logical construction, which is neither the source of existence nor its end, can be classified as existentialist.

Plato's theory of ideas is the first systematic expression of essentialism. Platonic tradition dominated the western philosophy for two thousand years. Its anti-thesis, existentialism, remained suppressed throughout the ages. However, Hegel's philosophy is the boldest expression of essentialism. Hegel completes the process of absorbing existence into essence through his dialectical mechanism when 'being' (thesis) is merged with 'not being' (anti-thesis) giving rise to 'becoming' (synthesis). Hegel rejected the causal theory on the ground that it did not explain the origin of existence in terms of first cause. He conceived the world as a dialectical process.
of the unfoldment of reason. Reason as a universal principle
is at work in space and time. Expression of reason in time
is history and its unfoldment in space is the world of physical
objects. Therefore, according to Hegel, the first principle is
not the cause of which the universe is the effect but reason of
which the world is the effect. In this sense reason is consi­
dered to be absolute reality. God is Absolute Reason and the
entire span of space-time is a manifestation of a rational
process. For Hegel, what is real is rational, and what is
rational is real. Accordingly, man was also reduced by him to
reason, or in Aristotle's words 'a rational being'.

It was this essentialism of Hegel in which existence
was not only sub-merged into essence but was actually sacrificed
at the alter of reason. Against this Kierkegaard reacted
vehemently. Natanson has remarked that "Kierkegaard is Hegel's
punishment". Kierkegaard's thought in this perspective can
be called as anti-Hegelinism or anti-rational—the term applied
to most of the 20th century existentialists.

From one point of view, existentialism can be understood
as an open revolt against the domination of reason. Limitations
of reason had been pointed out by Kant, who enumerated the
antinomies of reason. This task at another level was taken up
by existentialists. "All the experience shows", as pointed
out by Paul Ruibiezek, "that a purely logical, rational,
scientific way of thinking illuminates only a strictly limited sector of reality. Before analysing other factors that helped in the development of existentialism in our century, let us summarise Kierkegaard's basic stand on the issue of the primacy of existence as against reason.

That reality is entirely individual and particular and not universal is the nucleus of Kierkegaard's philosophy. The characteristic feature of his philosophy is that subjectivity becomes the very foundation of knowledge. In the sphere of religion he attacked institutionalised religion in the form of Church, and his philosophical attack was mainly directed against absolute rationalism of Hegel. Unlike modern existentialists, Kierkegaard used the term 'existence' in a very definite sense viz. subjectivity. He arrived at this point due to the Christian theological refusal to accept objectivistic conception of truth and rationalistic explanations of universe and man. "But this does not mean"; Dr. Waheed Akhtar points out, "that Kierkegaard's religiousity ignored worldly aspect of man's existence. He used to say that his was Socratic task—know thyself. He tried to overcome a 'dissolute pantheistic contempt for the individual, characteristic depravity of his age."\(^4\)

Kierkegaard expounded his theory of subjectivity in his 'Concluding Unscientific Postscript'\(^5\) and the theory of being (ontology) in his 'Philosophical Fragments'. In these works,
Kierkegaard has furnished only some hints, some fragments or some psychological analysis of these theories. It was not until the present century experienced the horrors of two world wars that existentialism became a philosophical movement and Kierkegaard was rediscovered as the founder of this movement. Though contemporary existentialists do not accept Kierkegaard’s approach, in calling subjectivity the core of existence, they, however, developed a philosophy of being on the foundation laid down by him in the 19th century. They applied existential approach to all the situations in which an individual found himself entangled. They renewed their attack (with more success) on all the traditional philosophies for their endeavour to de-existentialise human being. This, however, does not imply that the contemporary existentialist movement is an attempt for the revival of Kierkegaard in the 20th century; it is rather vice-versa, for Kierkegaard’s revival is the result of a new awareness of a being. "The adoption of Kierkegaard by modern existentialism", Helmut Kuln observes, "is a creative rather than an imitative process."7

Following the foot-steps of Kierkegaard, modern existentialists were inevitably interested in analysing such existential conditions of man as dread, anxiety, anguish, death, freedom, despair, love etc. Existentialism becomes an analysis of such subjective states because of its emphasis on the subjectivity of existence. But if existentialism is
only an analysis of such irrational aspects of man which are themselves purely subjective, the question arises, whether we can define it at all? "Being merely a subjective emotional condition", Alfred Stern points out, "existence is even beyond the reach of explanation because explanation is made up of objective concepts. ...In trying to objectivize existence, concepts denature it, thus changing it into something else, namely another variety of abstract being." Probably, this should have been the reason why Kierkegaard did not create any systematic philosophy. Kierkegaard himself held that existence itself was not a system of objective laws and therefore, it could not be arrested in a system of coherent and consistent objective facts and laws. Sartre did not name his magnum opus as 'Existence and Nothingness' but entitled it as "Being and Nothingness", and similarly Heidegger entitled his main work not as 'Existence and Time' but "Being and Time". The reason for choosing the term being for these titles is given by Alfred Stern, who holds, that both Sartre and Heidegger wanted to offer an ontology—a theory of being. In an ontological theory existence disappears, since it cannot be objectivized.

Despite not making use of the term 'existence', apparently a contradiction of their own emphasis on existence, different exponents of this philosophy accepted the basic principle: existence precedes essence, although all of them define their approach variously. Karl Jaspers maintains that existentialism is:
"To catch sight of reality at its origin and to grasp it through the way in which I, in thought, deal with myself—in inner action."  

(Paul Tillich is of the view that:  

"Existentialism as a universal element in all thinking is the attempt of man to describe his existence and its conflicts, the origin of these conflicts, and the anticipation of overcoming them—wherever man's predicament is described either theologically or philosophically, either politically or artistically, there we have existential elements."  

Walter Kaufman holds that:  

("The refusal to belong to any school, the repudiation of the adequacy of any body of beliefs whatever, and especially of systems and a marked dissatisfaction with traditional philosophy as superficial, academic, and remote from life—that is the heart of existentialism."  

In the words of H.J. Blackham:  

("Existentialism begins as a voice raised in protest against the absurdity of pure thought, a logic which is not logic of thinking but
the immanent movement of Being. It recalls the spectator of all time and of all existence from the speculations of his own conditional thinking as an existing individual seeking to know how to live and to live the life he knows.\textsuperscript{13}

Blackham further adds that:

"The business of existential philosophy in helping the person to make himself and get his experience, is to furnish analysis of the concrete structures of first hand experience in which ambiguities are operative."\textsuperscript{14}

Marry Warnock is of the opinion that:

"The appeal of existentialism has been largely practical, and the people have been fascinated by it because they actually want to put its principles of individual freedom into practice in society."\textsuperscript{15}

H.H. Titus maintains that:

"Existentialism represents an attitude or outlook that emphasizes human existence—that is, the distinctive qualities of individual person—rather than man in the abstract or nature and the world in general."\textsuperscript{16}
In view of all that has been stated till now, we cannot but agree with Dr. Waheed Akhtar that: "existentialism is not in the strict sense a system of philosophy but an approach to the study of man". I may venture to add that being a purely radical movement, at least in our century (though in the western world only), it is not only the expression of the moods and experiences of man but also an agonised cry against all the processes of dehumanization, essentialisation, objectivisation, bad faith, alienation and an all embracing intellectualism.

For J.P. Sartre, whose philosophy is the central theme of the present study:

"Existentialism is a doctrine that does render human life possible; a doctrine also, which affirms that every truth and every action imply both an environment and a human subjectivity." 

Before we expound and analyse Sartre's ontological position from his philosophical works, so as to understand what he means by 'human life' or 'human subjectivity', it will be proper to portray human life, as we have it, in the present century, of which he was a product and most probably, for which, he wrote.

Sartre dramatizes the man's historic situation in the 20th century in one of his plays "Altona". In this play, Sartre depicts the alienation of its main character Franz.
Von Gerlach. After the defeat of Germany in the Second World War, Franz, imprisoned in his subjectivity asserting his freedom, which is denied to him, addresses the 'masked inhabitants of the ceilings':

"Masked inhabitants of the ceilings, your attention... They are lying to you. Two thousand million false witnesses! Two thousand million lies a second! Listen to the plea of mankind: We were betrayed by our deeds. By our words, by our lousy lives! Decapods, I bear witness that they do not think what they were saying, and that they did not do what they wished... Dear listeners, my century was a jumble-sale, in which the liquidation of the human species was decided upon in high places... Me. Man is dead, and I am his witness. Centuries, I shall tell you how my century tasted, and you will acquit the accused..."\(^\text{19}\)

Later in the same play Franz declares:

"Everything is in place. History is sacred. If you change a single comma, nothing will be left... You, me, all the dead, mankind. Be on your guard. They are watching you. No one is alone... Don't throw my century into the dustbin. Not without hearing me... Take care, you Judges! If I rot, my century will be engulfed."\(^\text{20}\)
Sartre concludes this play with the following lamentation of Franz:

"Centuries of the future, here is my century, solitary and deformed—the accused... The century might have been a good one had not man been watched from time immemorial by the cruel enemy who had sworn to destroy him, that hairless, evil, flesh-eating beast—man himself... The beast was hiding, and suddenly we surprised his look deep in the eyes of our neighbours... I struck. A man fell, and in his dying eyes I saw the beast still living—myself... Where does it come from, this rancid, dead taste in my mouth? From man? From the beast? From myself? It is the taste of our century. Happy centuries, you who do not know our hatreds, how could you understand the atrocious power of our fatal loves? Love—Hatred. One and one... Acquit us! My client was the first to know shame. He knows he is naked. Beautiful children, you are born of us, our pain has brought you forth. This century is a woman in labour..."  

Lamenting upon his century, Franz calls the future centuries with an agonized cry, presenting the full picture of his century—a century which is deformed, 'accused', 'solitary'—a century which is a 'woman in labour'. This
is absolutely an absurd as well as a very testing situation that is being faced by human beings in our century. It is in these conditions—challenging human freedom and depriving men of their authentic existence—that gave rise to existential thought. Dr. Waheed Akhtar has given an appropriate interpretation of Franz’s character in his article entitled "Urdu novel Par Wujūdiyyat Kē atharāt: Āag Kā Daryā Kā Tajziyyētī mutāliāh" |Influence of Existentialism on urdu novel: an Analysis of Āag Kā Daryā (River of Fire)|. Dr. Akhtar says:

"Having passed through the dread of death in life (Being-unto-death) Franz is now carrying on a dead being—a life which is not life because it has experienced death. He runs away from death and is now imprisoned in his dead isolation. This tragedy is not the tragedy of the new generation of the present century only but is a tragedy of many generations. Those who are old, those who are of the middle age, those who are young and those who are still crawling; all have fallen into the same state of dead life, trying to hide from their unavoidable end. This tragedy, unprecedented throughout human history, is the cause of the birth of existentialism."  

*English translation is ours.
Sartre's works present only one version of existentialism in creative literature; Camus, Kafka and Destoeveski's works unfold other possibilities of creative expression of this philosophy. In all of them we find the innermost experiences of human beings expressed in a forceful way. The chain of thought set in motion by Socrates (through his dictum—know thyself) was accelerated in 19th century in the philosophical revolt of Kierkegaard against the Western tradition of ignoring the individual man. Destoeveski, Kafka, Sartre, Camus and other writers gave it literary acceptability and expression; and in academic philosophy it found its exponents in Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel and Sartre. Sartre has the distinction of expounding existential philosophy both artistically and logically in a systematic way.

Sartre's definition, 'existentialism not only renders human life possible but also affirms that every truth and every action imply both an environment and a human subjectivity', is based on the principle of the priority of existence over essence. This principle is fundamental to the whole thought system of Sartre. Though the theistic and atheistic existential philosophers hold divergent opinions about different notions, the principle of the 'primacy of existence as against essence', is the real point of their convergence. By this principle, Sartre implies that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards. Man, for Sartre, is not definable because he is nothing;
"He will not be anything until later; and then he will be what he makes of himself."^{23}

Unlike Heidegger, Sartre holds that there is no human nature because there is no God to have a conception of it. Though for Sartre, man simply is, yet he is not simply what he himself conceives to be. Man is what he wills. Sartre holds that "man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself."^{24} This, for Sartre, is the principle of subjectivity. It is this human subjectivity which not only renders human life possible but also affirms the truth of every other object and every action of an authentic human existence. At the same time the principle of subjectivity makes a man a project:

"Before that projection of the self nothing exists; not even in the heaven of intelligence: man will attain existence when he is what he proposes to be."^{25}

Thus the first effect of existentialism, according to Sartre, is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the whole responsibility upon his shoulders."^{26} At the same time, Sartre, holds that man should not be held responsible only for his own individuality, but he is responsible for the whole epoch in which he finds himself placed. He says:

"When we say that man chooses himself, we do mean that everyone of us must
choose himself; but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself he chooses for all men... In fashioning myself I fashion man."\(^{27}\)

By 'fashioning my image I am fashioning the image of man' implies one's profound responsibility for human image. But this responsibility, according to Sartre, is always accompanied with anguish. Any person who refuses to accept this responsibility or escapes from making his choice as a free being is simply 'dissembling' his anguish. While making any decision one cannot feel but anguish. Simultaneously, if 'existence precedes essence', all the human values are created in the acts of choice. Though the act of choice is a self-conscious choice, according to Sartre, existential choice is always there. In all circumstances and in all situations, choice is there—it occurs. Whether a man, Sartre maintains, determines this choice actively or passively (because the choice is always there) is not of much importance; what is important is the fact that there is no escape from the responsibility of one's choice and no one can choose for us.\(^{28}\)

Moreover, in order to establish the principle of the primacy of existence, Sartre divides being into two poles viz. 'Being-in-itself' and 'Being-for-itself'. Being-in-itself is undifferentiated, 'massive', timeless self-identity—it is what it is; 'Being-for-itself', on the contrary, never is but
continually has to be. Since there is no moment at which it is in the sense of being identical with itself, it may be called a 'hole'. It is its own naught. It is continuously escaping from itself which makes its existence possible.

"Through determinate negations, the for-itself carves out of the block of the in-itself the shifting patterns of multiple things which constitute the world, thus revealing itself as an active, 'naughting naught'."  

Though it is claimed that Sartre's philosophy is indebted with the projected ontology of Heidegger but in fact, his distinction of being into 'in-itself' and 'for-itself' is much Hegelian than Heideggerian. J. Wahl points out that Sartre's interpretation of being as 'being-in-itself' and 'being-for-itself' corresponds to Realistic and Idealistic tendencies respectively. This interpretation of Sartrian terms is totally wrong, because it reduces these two modes of being to traditional ontological notions which is an attempt incompatible with the basic approach of Sartre. Sartre could however be seen in the tradition of Husserl and Heidegger. Natanson has rightly observed that Sartre, has attempted to cut across the traditional positions of idealism and realism in founding a radically new ontology.

It, however, seems a justified claim that "Sartre tries to make existence great at the expense of essence." Though
the subtle balance between existence and essence within the concept of being cannot be disregarded but the critics of Sartre have pointed out that he ends up, in a very particular sense, in essentializing existence itself. Existence, no doubt, should be the fountainhead of the essential being, but Sartre stretched the meaning of existence exactly to the same limits which were prescribed for the term 'essence' in classical tradition. Essentialists totally ignored the existence and Sartre totally ignored the essence. Essentialists essentialized existence, Sartre existentialized essence, thus the other way round essentializing existence.

It however, seems that Sartre reached this extreme position, because existentialism, in itself, was a philosophy of taking extreme positions. Existentialism has a dynamic potentiality of developing and flourishing in extreme situations. Such extreme situations which may develop this thought could arise out of the conditions imposed upon man by war, politics, physicalism, rule of technocracy, diseases and even extreme poverty and exploitation. France, at the time when Sartre's creative genius blossomed, was experiencing the unprecedented horrors of war. It was a situation of extreme crises that compelled free man to keep silent, to negate himself. On the whole it was a situation highly conducive to the development

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*This aspect of existential thought is discussed in detail in the latter part of our thesis under the sub-heading 'Commitment.'
of existential thought.

The factors responsible for the rise of existential thought during the present century are discussed in detail in the sub chapter entitled 'Commitment' of the present work. It may, however, be inferred from what has been stated in the preceding pages that existentialism is not a systematic world outlook, but a revolutionary radical approach to the understanding of human existence in its historic set-up. While affirming existence to everything, it denies existence to everything of which we are not immediately aware. It tries to describe the things rather than deduce or analyze them. It tries to describe what man "is" rather than to justify his presence in the world. It reduces life from what we would like it to be to what it is.

Before closing the present topic it is essential to assess whether this movement has any relevance to the present Indian situation. Despite the fact that hundreds of thousands of young men from our undivided country were recruited to fight against the axis of Nazi Germany and Japan to defend the interests of the British imperialism in the world, including our own land, the Indian continent did not experience those horrors of the war that shattered the very core of human existence and its values in the West. The western man experienced it directly and his idealism was shattered, as a result of which he was disillusioned with all the philosophies.
Therefore, he was in an urgent need of developing a philosophy that could express and justify the despair, anguish, disillusion and discontent of his existence which was totally ignored by all these philosophies that projected man as an essentially good creature and defined him in terms of pure rationality. Anyhow, our country was influenced indirectly by the experiences of the west.

The two great world wars in the West were the most horrible expressions of man's irrationality. Hence it is justifiably claimed that existentialism is the world out-look of the western Europe only. Nevertheless, the sources of this philosophy can be traced in the early philosophy of the East as well. Although there can be some existential elements present in many thinkers of this part of the world, but most of the existential concepts have remained unrealized. For example, one of the central concepts of existentialism, 'Alienation', was emphasized by the western traditions right from Hegel and Marx upto the present day, but in the Indian tradition of Pantheism it had no meaning, because alienation has been entirely inconceivable in the Hindu view of life which identified man with nature and God. Despite rigid cast system, howsoever alienated one may feel himself, the society in the Indian conditions was so structured that it absorbed everyone in its fold. This was what Kierkegaard termed in the 19th century European context as an all embracing pantheism
of a social order. In all the three fields viz; moral, political and psychological, where alienation has been discovered to raise its head, the experience of alienation itself remained unrealized in our society and absolutely alien to our set-up. In morals the existentialist concept of alienation owes its origin to Christianity which has never been a vital part of our morality. In politics it owes its origin to the division of the capitalist society into bourgoesi and proletarian; and in so far its psychological content is concerned, the supressed class of Indian society was never allowed even to realize its own deprivity, for, they were denied even the right to know themselves and to contemplate. However, the voices of mystic thinkers and saints, particularly those who emerged from the lower strata of the Indian society, echo an intense feeling of alienation. In the Muslim tradition of literature and poetry, too, this experience was expressed. Ironically all these attempts ended up in an attempt to deallenate this tendency within the society through social reforms. The term as such may be a new one, but the problem, in one way or the other has been in every society. And the East is no exception.

With the advent of large scale industry and mass migration of rural 'not-haves' to the urban areas, alienation was experienced at different level in various groups. The process of westernization culminated in alienating Indian educated Hindu
and Muslim from their cultural roots and religious traditions. The partition of the sub-continent, in the wake of independence, caused millions of people to cross the new political borders, drenched in their own blood and to pass through a jungle of dead corpses, devastated villages and crops, looted and burnt houses, and demolished worship places. These uprooted people, in millions, could not settle in their newly chosen and promised lands for years to come and even a considerable part of them is still called refugees or mahajirs. All these factors combined with the aftermath of the reorganization of the Western and Eastern states and the experience of the American and Russian imperialism, proved instrumental in further disillusionment of the intellectuals in the sub-continent. Though in philosophy the theme of alienation, may seem to be based on an alien concept, in literature and arts it found expression as an aesthetic experience.

Similarly, the sense of 'guilt' supposed to be altogether absent in Indian conditions, may be traced, in one or the other form, in our literature. Undoubtedly the theories of original sin and guilt have their origin in Christianity but they have some affinities in Islamic mysticism as well as in Hinduism.

In literature, some parallels may be drawn between the concepts common in existential literature and the literature of Indian languages, as Dr. Waheed Akhtar observes in his article
But it never implies that such parallels are identical with the contemporary western meaning of existentialism. The holy scriptures of the East may contain some elements of existentialism, for religious experience is very close to what is called existential experience. All that is important in a work of religion is the human existence in relation to God. The problems faced by existential philosophy are not Divine problems, for God is absolute and perfect, and not in the process of creating Himself. On the contrary existentialism deals with the problems faced by man in his acts of free choice. Hence the thrust in religious scriptures is different from that of existential philosophy.

We have perhaps reached the stage where it can be claimed that existentialism, as a philosophy, though the outcome of the most crucial contemporary events of the western part of the world, is basically an agonised cry against all the processes of dehumanization, crude objectivity, bad faith and alienation. However, it should not be accepted as a creed. The ground for the emergence of existential thought was prepared by the two world wars, and popularized by a literary movement in the rareguard of which were Sartre and Camus. Sartre, who actively
participated in the Resistance Movement in France, and latter who raised his voice against all political injustices in various parts of the world, e.g. the Vietnam war and the freedom struggle of Algerian people, popularized this philosophy through his creative writings which are among the best literary products of our time.
In all the traditional metaphysical theories the status of 'being' or 'existence' has been either compromised or totally neglected. To restore priority of 'being', Husserl gave a call to go back to things themselves. Rejecting the Kantian position that reality is hidden behind the appearance, Husserl maintains that it is the phenomenon itself that one must look into to find the essence of that which is and that there is no reality which is hidden behind the appearance. Sartre finds this part of Husserl's phenomenological analysis as a sincere and serious attempt in bringing philosophy into real contact with the world, but rejects the role assigned to neosis and neoma. In Husserlian thought system, neosis is the primary reality whereas neoma is dependent upon and secondary to neosis. The neoma or the object is the constitution of the neosis, i.e. object is dependent upon the subject. The dependence of the object on the subject, according to Sartre, leads Husserl to the analysis of things as they appear
to human consciousness. Due to this approach, phenomenology becomes in the hands of Husserl, a study of the structure of human consciousness itself. The duality of subject and object, the phenomenon and the reality thereof is, in Sartre's view, imaginary and consequently fatal to philosophy. At the very outset, in the first chapter of 'Being and Nothingness', Sartre categorically rejects the traditional philosophical dichotomy of 'being' and 'appearance', according to which reality was divided into the interior and the exterior in the same existent. Sartre says:

"There is no longer an exterior for the existent if one means by that a superficial covering which hides from sight the true nature of the object."\(^{35}\)

"...It does not point over its shoulder to a true being which would be for it, absolute. What it is, it is absolutely, for it reveals itself as it is."\(^{36}\)

The traditional philosophies had maintained a kind of dualism of being and appearance to an extent that the appearance had been presented as a purely negative thing. Rejecting the concept of appearance as that which is not-being, Sartre sees it as 'positivity'. He holds that "if we no longer believe in the being-behind-the-appearance, then the appearance becomes full positivity; its essence is an 'appearing' which is no longer opposed to being but on the contrary is the measure of it."\(^{37}\)
So what appears of an existent is exactly equivalent to its being, neither more nor less. It does not indicate some true being which would be, for it, absolute. It reveals itself as it is, it is absolutely whatever it is.

With the same reasoning, Sartre rejects the Aristotelian doctrine of potential and Actual Reality and the dualism of appearance and essence. He holds that whatever is, is actual and behind the actual there is neither 'potential nor virtue'. Being is always actualized, whatever it is, it is actual. For example, Sartre holds, we should refuse to understand by genius a particular capacity to produce a certain work which could not be actualized in the life of a person. The genius of a person "is neither the work considered in isolation nor the subjective ability to produce it; it is the work considered as the totality of the manifestation of the person." The essence is not hidden in appearance, essence is revealed in appearence. Essence is not a property "sunk in the cavity of an existent. "The phenomenological being manifests itself; it manifests its essence as well as its existence and it is nothing but a well connected series of its manifestations." This stand distinguishes Sartre's philosophy from that of Husserl. While Husserl stressed upon human knowledge, Sartre emphasized human action.

Description of human consciousness is the starting point of every phenomenology and self-identity is the core of
human consciousness. Husserl tried to solve the problem of self-identity on epistemological plane only. But Sartre holds that epistemological side is not the only feature of human consciousness. Without ignoring the importance of the epistemological features of human consciousness, Sartre upholds the importance of man's actions and reactions to different things and situations to which he finds confronted in the world. All the literary works of Sartre substantiate this view in concrete human characters acting in actual situations. Analysis of things as they appear to human consciousness, leads Sartre, as is the case of Husserl, to the study of human consciousness itself, which according to him can never reveal 'what man is'? Husserl laid aside the real existent world, hoping to re-establish it within the structure of consciousness. This resulted in the rejection of the real world. In one of the famous passage of Being and Nothingness, Sartre clearly says that:

"It is futile by a sleight of hand to attempt to found the reality of the objective on the subjective plentitude of impressions and its objectivity on non-being; the objective will never come out of the subjective, nor being from non-being."\(^40\)

What Sartre wants to establish is that the notion of the dependence of the object upon the subject is an off-shoot of Husserl's phenomenological analysis. Though Heidegger stressed the mutual dependence of the subject and the object,
Sartre turned the very thesis of Husserl upside down by advocating the dependence of the subject upon the object. And if the basic axiom of phenomenology, viz. 'consciousness is consciousness of something' is to be understood and explained in its true spirit, according to Sartre, "this means that transcendence is the constituting structure of consciousness, that is, that consciousness emerges supported by a being which is not itself." On the basis of this ontological proof, as Sartre calls it, "we have left pure appearance and have arrived at full being. Consciousness is a being whose existence posits its essence, and inversely it is a consciousness of a being, whose essence implies its existence; that is, in which appearance lays claim to being. Being is everywhere." Adding to Heidegger's definition of Dasein, viz. it is a being such that in its being, its being is in question, Sartre maintains that "consciousness is a being such that in its being, its being is in question insofar as this being implies a being other than itself." This position necessitated the study of human consciousness and its involvement in the objective world on the one hand, the results of which are found in his novels, particularly 'Nausea' and 'Roads to Freedom', on the other, it helped him to arrive at a definite and concrete explanation of being. "Being", he holds, "is". Being is in-itself. Being is what it is." Being is neither more nor less than that what it is.
Being can neither acquire nor produce nor does it have being because it is itself a being. Moreover, being is always whatever it is, it cannot be what it is not.

Closely connected with this issue and equally significant for the understanding of being is Sartre's distinction between existence and essence.

Existential philosophers may be, at least, placed into two general groups: theists and atheists. While Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Marcel can legitimately be placed in the theistic group, Heidegger, Sartre and most of the French Existentialist philosophers can be grouped roughly and broadly as atheists. Not only the philosophers of these two groups differ on many points but within the same group also they differ on many points. However, in spite of these differences, all existentialists accept that 'existence precedes essence'. This position is radically opposed to the Essentialistic view i.e. 'essence precedes existence'. It was a revolt against the Platonic tradition of the Western philosophy that had maintained the primacy of universal ideas over particular existents. Nearly all the Western philosophies upto 20th century, in one way or the other, accepted the priority of general ideas over the individual existents. There were only a few exceptions like Kierkegaard and Marx, who anticipated the notion of the primacy of concrete existence over ideas. Essentialists were also in search of general concepts, universal categories and
definitions of every class of beings.

Existential philosophers on the contrary, advocate the primacy of the individual, subjective, concrete existent over the general, objective essence. The main argument of existential philosophers is that it is individual existent from which a general concept is derived, it exists while a general concept, being a mental abstraction and construction, does not.

Theistic philosophy maintains that 'each individual man is the realisation of a certain conception in the Divine understanding', and this concept which is realized in every man is his essence by which man can be defined. Sartre being an atheist, maintains that 'if God does not exist, there is at least one being whose existence comes before it can be defined by any conception of it'. Sartre says, 'that being is man', while Heidegger puts it as the 'human reality'.

All existentialists, whether theists or atheists, hold that man cannot be defined in terms of 'essence' or a fixed nature. Every individual man is an indefinable reality or rather an actuality. There can be no general definition of man. Psychological theories try to fit the human existence in the framework of a general theory. That is why most of the psychological schools fail to understand man. Only a being that is fully determined by its essence and the laws governing it can be defined and reduced to a general definition. Man
is undetermined actuality. Existentialist psychology should take every individual man as an independent reality. It is action through which human existence unfolds itself and realizes what it is not. Being-in-itself is grounded in freedom, and freedom is transcendence. It is on this understanding of man that Sartre says that: 'man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards'. "Man", Sartre holds, "is not definable, it is because he is nothing. He will not be anything until latter; and then he will be what he makes of himself. Man is not what he conceives to be, but he is what he wills and makes of himself."
Sartre distinguishes between two types of being, Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself. A comparative analysis of these two facets of being reveal that while being-in-itself is invariable, unchangeable and self contained, being-for-itself is subject to change, has the ability to evolve and possesses an unlimited and ceaseless movement.

Though, according to Sartre, man is being-for-itself, yet it also includes being-in-itself, that is, all the biological constituents of human body. In this respect man is not different from other beings, but his 'being-for-itself' is constituted by consciousness, freedom and transcendence. These three are, in a sense, synonymous in Sartre's philosophy. A penetrating analysis of these notions in Sartre's philosophy leads to the conclusion that consciousness as well as freedom have their origin in 'nothing'; transcendence also means to be what is not—that is, to realize nothingness.
Throughout the *Being and Nothingness* Sartre emphasizes that being-in-itself is, and whatever can be said about it is that it simply exists. It can never be anything other than what it is. It is the object of consciousness or 'ios-chooses' as described in his "Nausea". "It is the transcendent essence of human existence, hence beyond the framework of space and time." It has no within which is opposed to a without. "It has nothing secret, it is solid (massif)." "It has no negation; it is full positivity. It is itself indefinitely and it exhausts itself in being." Being self contained and totally incapable of movement, it is just like a chess-board every part of which is occupied. It is 'as full as an egg'. "In the in-itself there is not a particle of being which is not wholly within itself without distance. When being is thus conceived there is not the slightest suspicion of duality in it... it is fullness." The in-itself is not only identical with itself but is the complete and plentiful being. Sartre puts it in the following words:

"The in-itself is full of itself, and no more plentitude can be imagined, no more perfect equivalence of content to container. There is not the slightest emptiness in being, not the tiniest crack through which nothingness might slip in."  

In comparison to being-in-itself or nature which is what it is, being-for-itself or consciousness, according to Sartre, is what it is not, and is not what it is. Being-for-itself is
a continuous process of negating itself—'a nihilation'. It is capable of change and evolution; it questions itself and by this process of negation it transcends its own being. Forever trying to fulfil itself, it is constantly trying to be what it is not and consequently negating what it already is. Therefore it is always in the state of flight from itself.

When Sartre says that 'Being-for-itself' or man is what it is not and is not what it is, he simply means that man is not a 'soldier' or a 'grocer' or a 'tailor' or a 'Professor' in the sense as a table is a table. 'Soldier' or 'grocer' or 'tailor' or 'professor' is the "person who I have to be and who I am not... it is a 'representation' for others and for myself which means that I can be he only in representation. But if I represent myself as him, I am not he; I am separated from him as the object from subject, separated by nothing, but this nothing isolates me from him. I cannot be he, I can only play at being him; that is, imagine to myself that I am he. And thereby affect him with nothingness. ...what I attempt to realize is a being-in-itself of the cafe waiter."53

Being-for-itself is always in the pursuit of Being-in-itself which it never attains. Hence man is never subjected to the principle of identity. It is a hallow, an emptiness, a void which is never filled.

Being-for-itself, which according to Sartre, is much akin to his concept of 'bad faith'. The problem presented by
bad faith is to expose the duality of the deceived and the deceiver existing within the same consciousness at one and the same time. For example, Sartre raises the question as to how is it possible for a coward to acknowledge his cowardice and at the same time declare to be courageous. All such situations, according to Sartre, can be understood by postulating consciousness that is 'within itself, separated from itself'. What happens is that a person in order to perceive himself as a coward necessarily effects nihilation. By the nihilation or negation of cowardice, the notion of courage evolves. So within the same consciousness, at one and the same time, both cowardice and courageousness exist. That is why Sartre defines the concept of being-for-itself as something which 'is what it is not (cowardly) and is not what it is (courageous) or "is what it is not (homosexual) and is not what it is (non-homosexual). Therefore, in order to be one thing, consciousness, man or being or being-for-itself, it is necessarily another and the whole system is Nothingness." 54

As elaborated earlier, Being-in-itself is pure positivity; it is as full as an egg and has not a trace of negation. Being-for-itself, on the other hand, being not what it is, is far from being as full as an egg; it is a void to be filled which is to proceed ceaselessly towards a future and it is the "being through which Nothingness comes into the world." 55 And Nothingness comes into the world with man. Similarly man's tendency to
question is also meant to negate. "The being by which Nothingness arrives in the world is a Being such that in its being, the Nothingness of its being is in question. The being by which Nothingness comes to the world must be its own Nothingness." Sartre holds that it is not a anihilating act of being but purely an ontological character of being.

Sartre uses the concept of Nothingness for making a distinction between human consciousness and the world. The main function of consciousness or pour-soi is to observe the things or 'En-soi' and give meaning to them. This can be done only through selection. But selection necessarily involves detaching an object from other objects so as to give it a meaning. For example, if I say there is 'pierre', my consciousness distinguishes 'pierre' from other people who constitute the 'en-soi'. In this process our consciousness anihilates and nulifies rest of the en-soi or in other words while giving meaning to pierre, existence is denied to everything else which then becomes Nothingness. This, whole process is called by Sartre 'Negatities'.

The whole process of Nothingness or Negatities is an human endeavour. Sartre has already told us that Nothingness comes into the world through human being. And this being, as we know, is what it is not and is not what it is; hence it remains always in the process of becoming. Human existence
never coincides with himself; it is always following the
'\textit{en-soi}', full of negation, an empty vessel, ever questioning
and negating itself; a void projected towards future. As a
conclusion it can be said that while being-in-itself implies
passivity, being-for-itself implies activity and creativity,
and the main function of Nothingness is to select and render
meaning to things, which constitute being-in-itself.
Sartre’s discussion of bad faith follows from his definition of man which is based on the premise that consciousness is a process of continued negation, a nihilation. Man, for Sartre, is the being who is what he is not and who is not what he is. He is freedom and freedom is nothingness. Man, Sartre holds, must actualize nothingness in order to transcend his being. He must recognize that he alone evolves the values by which he lives. He is not provided with a ready made self or nature but rather must be constantly making himself. He is nothing; he is always to be whatever he chooses because in him existence always precedes essence.

The realization that he is empty not only within but also without, the realization that all the values he lives by and the projects and proposals of his life are sustained by his free choice, places a great burden on him. He has to accept the sole responsibility of his life. From this responsibility no one can save him, neither God nor others.
He is his own fate. He, therefore, tries to flee, to escape from this burden. He takes refuge in a world where he imagines his life and actions are determined and guaranteed by others; he imagines to be a being "whose reality does not have the slightest trace of nothingness and whose being is identical with itself." Whether it is God, nature or transcendental society, he thinks, "the order of things is absolute. It is a serious world." This attitude of consciousness, "which is essential to human reality and which is such that consciousness instead of directing its negation outward turns it towards itself," is, for Sartre 'bad faith' (mauvaise foi).

This mode of Dasein is called by Heidegger 'Being-in-the-world' or "Day-to-day-Being". It is inauthentic. Inauthenticity is an attempt to flee from oneself. Its mode of operation is bad faith in Sartre's terminology.

Man, for Sartre, comprehends the serious world by bad faith. He contrasts this spirit of seriousness with a lighter attitude of one playing a game. The rules of the game are already prescribed and the player is bound to abide them, no matter how serious the stacks be. But there is always the possibility of change of rules. There is also the possibility of initiating an entirely different game if one so chooses. For Sartre, every life is exactly similar to a game, because everyman has to make it himself. Man has to play the game of life according to the book of rules, but such a book is not handy.
Serious world, on the other hand, is absolutely opposite to that of playing a game. In this world, no doubt the rules are also invented but there is absolutely no possibility of any change in them. Each and every rule and regulation is predetermined. Man tries to escape into such a world by bad faith.

Such a description of bad faith is tantamount to falsehood or lying to oneself or in other words it is a sort of mechanism of escape. But Sartre allows that "bad faith is a lie to oneself." Only. It should neither be identified with lie nor with falsehood. "Bad faith is self-deception. It is a lie to oneself." Sartre defends this position on the proviso that lying to oneself is distinguished from lying in general or falsehood.

Sartre agrees that lie is a negative attitude "but this negation does not bear on consciousness itself, it aims only at the transcendent." The essence of the lie is that the liar is actually and completely in possession of the truth which he is hiding. One cannot lie about what he is ignorant of. "The ideal description of the liar would be a cynical consciousness, affirming truth within himself, denying it in his words, and denying that negation as such." In lying, therefore, the transcendency of consciousness remains unaffected and negation does not touch the inner structure of consciousness. In other words the object of lie is transcendent; it is always outside consciousness. The liar intends to deceive the other
and does not seek to hide his intentions from himself. Even when he says "I would never want to deceive you; this is true; I swear it; all this of course, is the object of an inner negation, but also it is not recognized by the liar as his intention. It is played, initiated, it is the intention of the character which he plays... but this character, precisely because he does not exist, is a transcendent." "Through the lie, consciousness affirms its existence as hidden from the other, and exploits for its own ends the ontological duality between myself and myself viewed from the eyes of the other." "On the other hand "one who practices bad faith is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting as truth a pleasing untruth." In appearance, bad faith, then has the structure of falsehood but there is a marked difference between the two attitudes. In bad faith, the duality of the deceiver and the deceived does not exist, while in falsehood it exists. Bad faith entails the unity of a single consciousness; there is no ontological duality between the deceiver and the deceived. The one who lies and the one to whom the lie is told are one and the same consciousness. What Sartre wants to point out is the fact that in bad faith the deceiver, in his capacity of the deceiver, knows the truth which is hidden from him in the capacity of the one as deceived.
In Sartre's analysis, man was and is, in two modes of being. He was in the manner of Being-in-itself; he is in the mode of Being-for-itself so far as his present and future are concerned. His past action was an event or object in the world. For example, if a man has stolen or has behaved like a coward, then he was a thief or a coward just as the table was a table or the tree was a tree. But in the mode of Being-for-itself, i.e. so far as his present and future are concerned, we cannot say that he is a thief or a coward; for it depends upon him to choose whether to be a thief or not in present or future. Therefore, man in Sartre's analysis has the being-in-itself of things in the world, but at the same time he is not that which he chooses to make himself. This vacillating structure of Being makes it easy for the man in bad faith to deceive himself by a 'metaphysical play of words'.
But then what must be the being of man if he is capable of being in bad faith? Sartre tries to fix up more exactly the condition for the possibility of bad faith in 'the patterns of bad faith'.

Sartre's phenomenological description of the erotic behaviour of a coquettish woman appears to give him a basic insight into the mechanism of bad faith. In this typical but amusing example when a women consents to go out with a particular man for the first time, she understands very well the intentions, which the man who is seeking her company cherishes regarding her; she does not want to read the real meaning of phrases addressed to her, like 'you look very charming', 'I find you so attractive' etc. She decides to take these phrases on their face value as merely respectful or admiring. Since she does not quite know what she wants, she sees only the explicit meaning of his utterances and completely strips them of their sexual background. She takes the utterances of her friend as objective and sincere as a 'table is round' or 'the wall colouring is blue or grey'. Since she wishes neither to commit herself to the future nor to remove all the possibility of any involvement; she gives everything the quality of being-in-itself. She is well aware of the desire she invokes in her companion "but the desire cruel and naked would humiliate and horrify her."68 She does not altogether want to get rid of that desire nor is she satisfied by the mere respect offered to her. To satisfy her,
there must be a feeling which is addressed wholly to her personality, i.e. to her full freedom. But at the same time this feeling must be wholly a desire; that is, it must address itself to her as object. The woman is clearly in two minds; she wants not only her freedom be respected but also the charm and beauty of her body be appreciated. But then suddenly her companion grasps her hand because he is unwilling to leave the things as they are. Grasping of hand is to force a decision, i.e. to change the situation. Now it is a very crucial moment for the woman. Leaving the hands in the warm hands of her companion implies to consent in herself to flirt, to engage herself; which she does not want. To withdraw it is 'to break the troubled and unstable harmony which makes the hour charming'. In the conflict of decision, the young lady leaves her hand there. But she does not notice it, because as it happens, by chance, she becomes at this moment, all intellect. She draws her companion upto the most lofty regions of sentimental speculations. She speaks of life, of her life, she shows herself in her essential aspect—a personality, a consciousness. And during this time the divorce of the body from the soul is accomplished; the hand rests inert between the warm hands of her companion—neither consenting nor resisting—a thing.69

Sartre holds that this woman is in bad faith. She used various procedures to maintain herself in bad faith.
She has disarmed the actions of her companion by reducing them to being only what they are; that is, to existing in the mode of in-itself. She is actually playing a game, just like the game of sea-saw. She plays one idea against negation thereof and vice-versa.

The human being, for Sartre, is at once a facticity and a transcendence, i.e. given and possible projects associated with his freedom. To her advantage, the woman uses this double property of human reality. Though aware of the first approach, i.e. facticity, she uses the second approach i.e. transcendence. "She is aware of the desire she evokes but purifies it of anything humiliating by acknowledging it only as pure transcendence."70 While attempting to transform facticity into transcendence and vice-versa, she feels that she is escaping all reproaches. "But she does so at the price of arresting of glueing down, of thingifying, her possibilities—of objectifying her transcending freedom."71

In one of the famous passages of 'Being and Nothingness', Sartre says:

"The basic concept which is thus engendered utilizes the double property of the human being, who is at once a facticity and a transcendence. These two aspects of human reality are and ought to be capable of a valid coordination. But bad faith does not wish either to coordinate them or to surmount them in a synthesis. Bad faith
seeks to affirm their identity while preserving their differences. It must affirm facticity as being transcendence and transcendence as being facticity, in such a way that at the instant when a person apprehends the one, he can find himself abruptly faced with the other.\(^7\) 

No doubt this 'facticity-transcendence' character of human reality serves to illuminate what Sartre intends by bad faith but it does not eliminate his dilemma concerning it. Because inspite of the facticity-transcendence character of human reality, "consciousness affects itself with bad faith."\(^8\) As a consequence, consciousness must be aware of its intention of hiding truth from itself.

However, Sartre's facticity-transcendence relation of human reality draws us back to his initial distinction between 'Being-in-itself' and 'Being-for-itself'. For Sartre Being-for-itself is a distinctive human reality, 'which is what it is not and which is not what it is'. Unlike Being-in-itself, Being-for-itself is not a 'what' or object or thing. That is to say it is not what it is, it lacks identity or "a certain coincidence with itself."\(^9\) It has no nature or fixed essence. On the other hand it is what it is not; its future is undetermined. To say it differently, the being of human reality is not what it is and is what it is not because it is free.
Understanding the connection between the 'Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself' and the 'Facticity-transcendence character of human reality' is essential to throw some more light on the concept of bad faith. Assuming its possibility, bad faith cannot affirm facticity as being transcendence and transcendence as being facticity, unless human reality were a being, that is, what it is not and which is not what it is. Unless within the human reality there were the possibility of free interplay between what it is and what it is not, the game of facticity-transcendence could not be possible. Precisely it is so, as Sartre advocates, there is already a 'built in tension' between 'what it is' and 'what it is not' of the human reality; because human being as 'Being-for-itself' exists 'at a distance from itself', that it can move freely between facticity and transcendence.

With this elaboration it can be inferred that the woman referred to in the example 'is what she is not' and 'is not what she is'. She has the possibility of being complete intellect when in fact she is being advanced otherwise, i.e. to sexuality. In the situation that is provided to her, she shifts to what she is not or transcendence. But still she is in bad faith, because she cannot be 'all intellect' in the manner that an 'inkwell is an inkwell'. She is a being who is not what she is and is what she is not; she is free
though without identity. That is why Sartre says that "the condition of the possibility for bad faith, in its most immediate being, in the intra-structure of the pre-reflective cogito, must be what it is not and not be what it is." It implies that if man is what he is, bad faith is forever impossible. "Bad faith requires that there be an imponderable difference separating being from non-being in the mode of being of human reality." The interchange between transcendence and facticity could not be attempted if the human reality were not so constituted.

Though this metastable concept of transcendence-facticity is one of the basic instruments of bad faith, it is not the only one of its kind. "Another duplicity", according to Sartre, "derived from human reality is to regard being-for-itself as complementary to Being-for-others." The woman specified in the example has also used this device. She considers herself to be a "being-in-the-midst-of-the-world, i.e. of our inert presence as a passive object among other objects— in order to relieve herself suddenly from the functions of her being-in-the-world, that is, from the being which causes there to be a world by projecting itself beyond the world towards its own possibilities."

Such an attitude, which is actually the attitude of bad faith makes a very confusing synthesis by saying at once that 'I am what I have been' and that 'I am not what I have been'. Since Sartre's basic concept of human reality is that

*Subject to sudden change.
of a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is, he proceeds to analyse the more subtler structure of bad faith, viz. the pursuit of sincerity.

Sincerity which seems to be the antithesis of bad faith demands that "a man be for himself only what he is". In other words, sincerity is a sort of determination to be for oneself and for others to be what one really is. But this is precisely the definition of being-in-itself. Man cannot be what he is in the manner of the being-in-itself. This implies that the concept of sincerity cannot represent the constitutive principle of human reality because human reality cannot be, in Sartre's system of thought, what it is, it must be able to be what it is not.

It therefore, follows that if man is what he is, bad faith is impossible for ever and the project of sincerity ceases to be his ideal; it rather becomes his being. But man is not what he is because how can he be what he is, when he exists as consciousness of being. If sincerity is a universal concept, then its definition "one must be what one is" cannot be the regulating principle for the judgements and concepts through which we express what we are. It is not an ideal of knowing but the ideal of being; it is an absolute equivalence of being with itself as the prototype of being. In this sense it is necessary that we make ourselves what we are. "But
what are we then if we have the constant obligation to make ourselves what we are, if our mode of being is having the obligation to be what we are?" Sartre illustrates his point with the example of a cafe waiter. The cafe waiter tries to reduce himself to a being-in-itself of the cafe waiter. He is playing as being a waiter in a cafe. He is playing his role in order to realize it. Simultaneously, from within, the waiter in the cafe cannot be immediately a cafe waiter in the sense that 'this glass is a glass'. It does not, however, follow that he cannot form the "reflective judgements or concepts" regarding his condition. But all his judgements and concepts refer to the 'transcendent—they are the matter of abstract possibilities'. "And it is precisely this person who I have to be (if I am the waiter in question) and who I am not." It is not that he does not wish to be this person but rather there is no common measure between his being and mine. It is a representation for others and for myself which means that I can be he only in representation. Sartre says:

"But if I represent myself as him, I am not he; I am separated from him as the object from the subject, separated by nothing, but this nothing isolates me from him. I can not be he, I can only play at being him; that is, imagine to myself that I am he. And thereby I affect him with nothingness. In vain do
I fulfill the functions of a cafe waiter.
I can be he only in the neutralized mode,
as the actor is Hamlet... what I attempt
to realize is a being-in-itself of the
cafe waiter."82

Sartre, therefore, maintains that the cafe waiter is
in bad faith because he has ignored his transcendence in the
face of his facticity. The example furnished and analysed
by Sartre is highly significant, because it brings out
clearly the two roles of human existence i.e. its facticity
and transcendence.

Sartre illustrates his point yet by another example,
viz. that of a confidential meeting of a homosexual and
his friend. The homosexual, in this example, suffers from
a feeling of guilt that he absolutely denies of being a
'paederast'. Since he has not chosen a life as such, he
declares that 'He is not really a paederast' even though
he admits to having indulged, on occasion, in homosexual
relations. Sartre says "his case is always 'different',
'peculiar'; there enters into it something of a game, of
chance, of bad luck; the mistakes are all in the past;...
Here is assuredly a man in bad faith who borders on the comic,
since, acknowledging all the facts which are imputed to him,
he refuses to draw from them the conclusion which they
impose."83
The 'homosexual' in this example is nothing different from the 'cafe waiter' or the 'young lady' of the previous example. They are all in bad faith. All the three viz. the young lady, the cafe waiter and the homosexual, are absolutely right in choosing to think of themselves only in terms of their freedom. Homosexual, in the above example, is right in holding that he is not a homosexual absolutely in the way that, this table is a table; implying thereby that the established patterns of conduct cannot define a man's essence. But the homosexual is absolutely wrong in applying this freedom with respect to his past activities. Sartre holds that in so far as he has committed these acts in the past, he is a 'paederast' because he cannot disown the responsibility of what he has done but he cannot be said to be 'paederast' in any absolute sense, that is, with respect to his present and future. What the homosexual is trying to do is to use simultaneously and dishonestly the two meanings of 'to be'. "He understands 'not-being' in the sense of 'not-being-in-itself'. He lays claim to 'not being a paederast' in the sense in which this table is a table. He is in bad faith."

What makes the argument interesting is the fact that homosexual's friend urges him to be sincere, implying to accept to be a paederast in the absolute sense of the term. To admit to be a paederast is, to his friend's mind, sincerity. But Sartre holds that the argument of the homosexual's friend
becomes as avenue to bad faith. Because he wants his friend to admit to be a homosexual in the sense that this table is a table. To Sartre, so far as his past actions are concerned, he must be sincere i.e. he must admit to be a paederast and that is good faith but in so far as his present and future are concerned his sincerity falls prey to bad faith. Hazel E. Barnes however, observes that "with regard to the present, sincerity is in good faith in so far as one describes his projects as they actually seem to him to be rather than as he merely desires another to see him. But if a person makes himself the project of being which he is, this is not sincerity but bad faith."^5

This point will however, become clear if we see what is the goal of sincerity and that of the bad faith. For Sartre, the goal of sincerity and the goal of bad faith are not so different. With regard to past if one admits what one had been, it is sincerity. It is because in his fall into the past, the being of man is constituted as a being-in-itself. The goal of sincerity, in so far as it aims at itself in 'present immanence', is to confess what one really is, so that he may finally coincide with his being i.e. to be, in the mode of being-in-itself, "what I am in the mode of not being what I am."^6 Its fundamental assumption is that I am already, in the mode of the in-itself, what I have to be. "Thus we find at the base of sincerity a continual game of mirror and
reflection, a perpetual passage from the being which is what it is to the being which is not what it is and inversely from the being which is not what it is to the being which is what it is. And when we examine the goal of bad faith we find that its aim is to cause me not to be what I am, in the mode of 'being what one is', or to be what I am in the mode of 'not being what one is'. Thus we find at the base of bad faith the same game of mirror and reflection as was detected in sincerity. And in fact, in order for me to have an intention of sincerity, I must at the outset simultaneously be and not be what I am. Sincerity does not assign a particular quality but it aims at making me pass from one mode of being to another in relation to that quality. "The second mode of being, the ideal of sincerity, I am prevented by nature from attaining; and at the moment when I struggle to attain it, I have a vague prejudicative comprehension that I shall not attain it." This implies that bad faith is possible only because sincerity is conscious of missing its goal inevitably, due to its very nature. That is why Sartre maintains that "...in order for bad faith to be possible, sincerity itself must be in bad faith. The condition of the possibility for bad faith is that human reality, in its most immediate being, in the infrastructure of the pre-reflective cogito, must be what it is not and not be what it is." Sartre concludes his discussion of bad faith on the 'faith of bad faith'. He holds that if bad faith is a belief
then the essential problem of bad faith is a problem of belief. The 'waltanschauung' of bad faith is that "it believes itself and does not believe itself in bad faith, it believes itself and does not believe itself in good faith." 90

The criterion of truth held by bad faith is totally different from that of good faith. For bad faith, truth is only a "method of thinking, a type of being which is like that of objects, the ontological characteristic of the world of bad faith is that: that here being is what it is not and is not what it is." 91 It is a sort of 'non-persuasive evidence'. It apprehends evidence but rejects it in advance so as not to be persuaded and transformed into good faith. This 'original project' of bad faith is a decision in bad faith on the nature of faith. Sartre says that in bad faith "...there is no question of a reflective, voluntary decision, but of a spontaneous determination of our being. One puts oneself in bad faith as one goes to sleep and one is in bad faith as one dreams. Once this mode of being has been realized, it is as difficult to get out of it as to wake oneself up; bad faith is a type of being in the world, like walking or dreaming, which by itself tends to perpetuate itself." 92

Since there is an initial decision not to make a decision and its criterion is not that of the good faith, bad faith is resigned in advance not to be transformed into
good faith. And the conclusion that can be derived from it is that bad faith is a constant threat to for-itself or consciousness, which is an unavoidable menace. Sartre accordingly maintains:

"If bad faith is possible, it is because it is an immediate, permanent threat to every project of the human being, it is because consciousness conceals in its being a permanent risk of bad faith. The origin of this risk is the fact that the nature of consciousness simultaneously is to be what it is not and not to be what it is." ^93

Being an immediate and permanent threat to every human project, bad faith becomes the most common theme of Sartre's literary works. The analysis of any of the literary works of Sartre is beyond the scope of this work, hence a passing reference to them should suffice.

While discussing the various existential concepts like freedom, subjectivity, choice, anguish, obscene, prejudice, human relations, historical situation, religion, politics etc. throughout his plays and novels, bad faith remains a persistent theme, 'coiled like a worm' at the heart of being. Lucin Fleuruer of "The Childhood of a Boss" ^94 is a perfect and penetrating study of a man in bad faith. While "Anti Semite and Jew" ^95 is a study of bad faith in prejudice, "Lucifer and the Lord" and "The Flies" ^96 are the most illuminating examples
of bad faith in religion. Sartre's triology, "The Roads to Freedom", represents a vast panorama of characters of the world-war affected individuals acting in bad faith.

What Sartre establishes in his 'Being and Nothingness' is artistically exemplified in his novels and plays in concrete form in actual situations. That all the human relations are exercises in bad faith is established by the fact that all these relations are debased by their internal negation and that a tragic failure is inherent in their very structure. That is why almost all the characters of his novels and plays have finally chosen to live in bad faith—the only possibility if one chooses to exist.

Barness E. Hanzel is however of the view that "Man can live without illusion... The discovery of freedom is also the discovery of future. And to discover a future means to determine a future." If one accepts this view, then not only have we to reject the very notion of bad faith but also the entire ontology of Sartre. If the discovery of future implies determination of future, then being will always remain at the stage of Being-in-itself with no possibility of its projection in Being-for-itself. The discovery of freedom is possible in the state of authentic existence only. If attained, it does not stay for more than a moment. It is, however, in these moments that man can live without illusions. For rest of the life, according to Sartre, being exists only
in bad faith. If one has to exist one cannot avoid bad faith.

The views similar to that of Hazel are equally unjustifiable from Sartrian viewpoint. The claim of any thinker that "if man is able to recognize and accept the reality of his being, it is possible to consider human conduct based on good faith" is merely an illusion. This is because 'recognizing and accepting the reality of one's being' is not a logical process—it has an existential import, which has a depth significance of realizing and feeling and not of recognizing and accepting, the reality of one's being. Moreover, Sartre's footnote statement in 'Being and Nothingness' that "these considerations do not exclude the possibility of an ethics of deliverance and salvation" is made in a different context, not supporting the views that advocate for the possibility of good faith.
Psycho-analysis is a method of applied investigation as well as a technique. Both theoretically and practically it influenced almost all the disciplines of knowledge and areas of human activity. It was natural requirement of the late 19th century individual's alienation as a result of accelerated transition from a life of 'Gemeinschaft' to 'Gesellschaft'. Gemeinschaft, a social unit, is a conscious and deliberate design of unity, inspite of occasional separateness, and Gesellschaft signifies separation, inspite of occasional unity. Notwithstanding the physical presence of parent or parents, the increasing number of fatherless or motherless children was an indication of the total alienation of man. All the rational philosophers from Descartes to Kant were being challenged by this unique phenomenon. Phenomenology and Existentialism were gathering momentum. The technological revolution, which was in the offing at the turn
of the century, was not the only factor responsible for this change but the pre-war individual existence, which was at the cross roads of 'to be or not to be' was equally responsible for evolving a technique to probe into human psyche.

Sigmund Freud, mediciner turned psychologist, is considered to be the pioneer of psycho-analysis. Himself, he writes, "Psycho-analysis is my creation; I was for ten years the only person who concerned himself with it." Broadly speaking psycho-analysis has two parts viz. psycho-analysis as an investigating tool and psycho-analysis as a therapy. Freud was basically an investigator but latter he switched over to therapy and worked over it so as to bring a revolution in the whole field of psychological treatment of human beings.

Existential psycho-analysis can also be considered as consisting of an investigating tool as well as a therapy. Sartre is of the opinion that existential psycho-analysis as therapy has not evolved as yet. "This psycho-analysis has not found its Freud." This might have been true in 1943 when Being and Nothingness was written but after fifties a lot of work has been done in existential psycho-analysis particularly by Binswanger and M. Boss usually known as existential psychiatrists. In his existential psycho-analysis Binswanger gives a profound "synthesis of psycho-analysis, phenomenology and existential concepts modified by original
insight." Boss, staunch follower of Heidegger, in his Daseinsanalytic re-evaluation of psycho-analytic therapy and theory shows their "intrinsic harmony and the impact of Daseinsanalysis on traditional psycho-analytic techniques." However, existential psycho-analysis used as an investigating tool or as a therapy cannot be conceived without Freud as its predecessor, if not its founder. Whether Sartre accepts it or not is of little importance because inspite of certain points of disagreement on many points they agree in toto. A brief exposition of the points on which they agree or disagree will be given here, as a perface to the existential-psycho-analysis,

The point of departure of all the psycho-analysis, traditional or modern, is man. The traditional psycho-analysis particularly behaviourists, had explained the human conduct as a mere response to stimuli. Sartre agrees with Freud in holding man to be a unified whole rather than an arithmetical sum. Sartre maintains "The principle of this psycho-analysis is that man is a totality and not a collection." Now if man is a totality then he expresses himself as a whole even in his 'most insignificant and most superficial behaviour.' All actions of a man are revealing only when related to one's basic outlook of life. Therefore, the goal of existential psycho-analysis is mainly 'to decipher' and explain the 'empirical behaviour patterns of man'. For example, most of the people ignore or do not understand certain gestures
or a sign or a word. The 'revelations' even if seemingly non-sensical, have meaning and can be deciphered if the man question is considered in his totality. But, "the truth" Sartre holds, "is not encountered by chance, it belongs a priori to human comprehension and the essential task is an hermeneutic, that is, a deciphering, a determination, and a conceptualization."107

Hence the starting point of Sartre's existential psycho-analysis is experience i.e. 'pre-ontological comprehension which man has of the human person'. But the behaviour, conduct, sign or gesture or the revelations of a person are symbolized in a peculiar manner by his own choice. At the same time each individual disguises his choice under occasional character of choice and its historical situations. So comparison is the only method to understand these revelations which men express in different ways.

Sartre agrees with Freud on the basic principle that "all objectively discernible manifestations of 'psychic-life' maintain a symbolic relation to the fundamental total structure which constitutes the individual person."108 Both of them refuse to accept what Sartre refers to as 'primary givens' the great explanatory idols of our time viz. heredity, character, environment etc. Existential psycho-analysis refuses to recognize anything 'before the original upsurge of human freedom.' The Freudian libido is also a virgin wax before
the history of an individual is known. For both it is as incorrect to imagine a man born with ready-made disposition as it is incorrect to conceive him to be manipulated mechanically by forces of nature or society.

Empirical psycho-analysis (as Sartre calls it) as well as existential psycho-analysis "consider the human being a perpetual, searching historization". While analyzing such a being, existential psycho-analysis does not uncover the static and constant givens i.e. heredity and character etc., it discovers the meaning, orientation and adventures of (individual's) history. Both the methods analysis do not consider man to be simply present in the world without any links but take into account the total situation in which the man is historically placed. Each 'historical fact' is considered at once as a factor of the psychic evolution and as a symbol of that evolution.

Within an existing situation both the analyses search for a fundamental attitude which is beyond the simple and logical definitions. It is because this attitude is basically prior to all logic, hence it required a reconstruction according to the laws of specific synthesis. Freud calls this search for the fundamental attitude 'complex' and Sartre calls it 'original choice'.

Both these psycho-analyses refuse to admit that "the subject is in a privileged position to proceed in these
inquires concerning himself." The patient is not to be believed on his own account of himself. Strict objective methods using documentary evidence are required by both the analyses. Freud believes that the patient lies continuously without being aware of it because he is hindered by determinate unconscious motivations. Sartre rejects the unconscious psyche of Freud since it escapes the intuition of the subject. He makes the psychic act co-extensive with consciousness.

Whatever may be the differences between Sartre and Freud on the existence or no-existence of unconscious psyche, the nearest equivalent of Freudian unconscious psyche is the concept of 'bad faith' in Sartre. Bad faith is the inauthentic existence of man whose opposite, Sartre calls, 'Project of Sincerity' and that is authenticity. Just as according to Freud, man is hindered by 'determinate unconscious motivation', hence continually lying without being aware of it, similarly, in Sartre's view it is too difficult to escape 'bad faith' and establish authenticity or the project of sincerity. In fact, "authenticity is one's capacity to hear the cry of his inner most being in the stillness of his solitude; it wells forth from the depths of man's consciousness just like true love. The moments of authenticity are usually limited and in such moments one may even weep... but the tears he sheds are fit for purifying the angels." So unless the patient reaches such a level of his existence or consciousness, he cannot be believed to be revealing his own true self.
Sartre does not hesitate to reject the Libido theory of Freud as he thinks that we cannot explain all the psychic manifestations in terms of instincts. Libido theory reduces man to his biology. "The libido of the 'will to power' in actuality constitutes a psycho-biological residue which is not clear in itself and which does not appear to us as being beforehand the irreducible limit of the investigation." \(^{112}\) Freddian psycho-analysis gives contingent results which are not convincing as it is experience which establishes that the foundation of complex is libido. Therefore the original and undifferentiated project of human reality is neither constituted nor represented by libido. It is the choice, Sartre proposes, by which a person acts one way rather than another, to relate himself to Being. The choice is conceived as a fundamental characteristic of being by which being makes itself and explores its immense possibilities. All the possibilities grounded in one thing, receive legitimacy as a result of choice. Each such result will be at once fully contingent, legitimately irreducible and will always remain particular. The details of behaviour will particularize the choice but they cannot "make it more concrete than it already is. "That is because the choice is nothing other than the being of each human reality... as there is no difference between existing and choosing for itself."\(^{113}\)

From this it follows that in existential psychoanalysis we have not to proceed from the fundamental 'Complex', which
is exactly the choice of being, to an abstraction like Libido which would explain it. The complex is the ultimate choice, it is the choice of being and makes itself such. Accordingly Sartre maintains that the libido and the will to power are neither as general characteristics common to all mankind nor as irreducibles which would determine human behaviour.

What Sartre wants to establish from this comparison is that existential psycho-analysis is a method which brings to light the subjective choice by which each person makes himself what he is. Since it is a choice of being, it reduces particular behaviour patterns to fundamental relations of being expressed in the individual's behaviour, not to libidinal or sexual instincts of Freud or 'will to power' of Adler. The behaviour studied by this psycho-analysis will include not only dreams, failures, obsessions, and neuroses but also and especially the thoughts of waking life successfully adjusted acts, style etc."114 Rest of the existential psycho-analysis of Sartre is largely concerned with establishing its relation with his ontology.
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