CHAPTER III

NEW PERSIA FACES ANGLO-RUSSIAN MANCE
There were a large number of Russian troops in Persia during the constitutional crisis. It was the declared intention of the Russian Government that the forces would be withdrawn as soon as normal conditions were restored in Persia as they would no longer be needed for the protection of lives and property of the foreigners. They were instructed neither to intervene in the internal affairs of Persia nor to assume any administrative duties. But the Russian troops went much beyond the declared limits, inspite of the fact that the revolutionaries were very cautious in their dealings with the foreigners and every possible measure was taken to ensure the safety of the Europeans. It was, therefore, natural for the nationalists to resent and protest against the prolonged presence and misdeeds of the Russian troops in their country.

The British Government also dispatched a small number of blue jackets to Persia for the protection of persons and property of the foreigners there. But, unlike the Russian troops, they neither interfered in the internal struggle nor assumed any administrative duties. Consequently, the Persians did not complain against them.

(Apart from sending gun boats to certain ports in the Persian Gulf, notably, Bushire and Bandar-i-Abbas, the reference to which has been made in Chapter II, the British Government sent fifty men and one maxia gun to Shiraz from Bushire on July 25, 1909) see No.4120, No.169, p. 72.
The continued presence of the Russian troops, after the overthrow of Mohammad Ali, convinced the Persians about the malicious designs of the Russian Government. The Nationalists viewed the situation with anxiety. It was suspected that the Russians had come with the intention of permanent occupation.

The mere capture of power and assumption of authority by the revolutionaries does not necessarily mean that the revolution has been completed. It remains in continuation till the undesirable old institutions are replaced by desirable ones and despised elements are crushed. During this period, reactionaries naturally resist and disorder prevails. It takes time to put everything in order. So was the case with Persia. Locally, there were some disorders, especially in Ardabil, where Shahsevans were playing the role of plunderers\(^1\) and had become a source of constant trouble to the national government. Moreover, anti-Russian agitation was common in Tabriz. These incidents gave a pretext to the Russian Government to justify the injustice which she did the Persian nation by sending her troops there. Instead of withdrawing her troops, the Russian Government warned the Persian Government with more drastic measures. On July 22, 1909, M. Sabline, the Russian Minister at Teheran, addressed two notes verbales to the Persian Government dealing with the anti-Russian agitation at Tabriz.

\(^1\) CD 5120, Enclosure in No. 218, p. 113.
and disorders in the neighborhood of Ardebil created by the Shahsevan tribe. He suggested the Persian Government to take immediate effective steps to control the tribe and ensure the security of the traffic. He warned that in case of failure, the Russian Government would herself take necessary measures to safeguard her rights there. The British Minister, Sir J. Barclay supported Mr. Sabline's representation.\(^1\) Desirous to avoid further Russian armed intervention, the Persian Government hurriedly issued a circular on July 24, 1909, to the Chief Provincial assemblies to take all possible measures to put an end all anti-Russian agitations.\(^2\) On July 28, 1909, the British Acting Consul-General at Tabriz, Mr. W.A. Smart informed Sir Barclay about the situation of the town as follows:

"The anti-Russian agitation has collapsed for the present, and it is unlikely to become general unless the Russian troops are not withdrawn after arrival of Governor-General with sufficient escort. The behaviour of the private soldiers continues to be on the whole, exemplary."\(^3\) He added that the

\(^1\) Ibid., No. 163, p. 70.
\(^2\) Ibid., No. 165, p. 70.
\(^3\) On one side, the British Consul-General reported the behaviour of the private soldiers (fedais) as exemplary on the other side, the Russian authorities complained that the fedais were practising extortion to obtain money from the residents and fomenting agitation against Russian troops. This sharp difference in the two reports clearly shows the ill-intention of Russia — see Cd. 5120, No. 146, p. 66.
\(^3\) Ibid., Enclosure in No. 218, p. 113.
appointment of Muhkber-as-Sultan as Governor-General of Tabriz had soothed the feelings of the residents and caused general satisfaction. General condition of the province was, however, reported unsatisfactory; Shahsevans being a constant source of trouble. As regards to Ardebil, the report stated that the town was quiet due to arrival of 100 Russian cossacks.  

The peacefulness of Tabriz was ever recognized by M. Sazonov, the Acting Foreign Minister of Russia. On July 27, 1909, he stated that 'he had received no news of a disquieting character from Tabriz during the last two or three days', but expressed his anxiety over the prevailing disorders in Ardebil. On August 1, 1909, the Russian Government informed the Persian Government that 'unless a strong governor with suitable escort was dispatched to Ardebil by the 4th August, they would themselves send troops in to keep order'. The British Minister at Teheran supported the Russian government's demands regarding the governor and the escort to accompany him. The Persian government complied with the Russian demand by hurriedly

Although, the appointment of Muhkber-as-Sultan caused general satisfaction, but Russia wanted to have a man of her own liking, therefore, she protested against the appointment. The British Government in view of European necessity, desired not to antagonize Russia, consequently, she supported Russia. Notwithstanding the representations of the two governments the National government of Persia persisted on the appointment of Muhkber-as-Sultan — see Ibid., No. 217, p. 112.

1. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 218, p. 113.
2. Ibid., No. 177, p. 84.
3. Ibid., No. 178, p. 84 and Enclosure in No. 220, p. 119.
appointing Fath-es-Sultaneh as governor of Ardebil on August 2, 1909. The Persian Government promised to hand over a note to M. Sabline by the evening of 4th August 1909, regarding the departure of the governor for Ardebil with a strong escort. Thereupon, the Russian Government postponed the dispatch of her troops to Ardebil. The Acting Minister for Russian Foreign Affairs informed Mr. O’Birne on August 4, 1909 that his Government had made no preparations to dispatch an expedition to Ardebil but added that it had been decided in principle to send troops in case the Persian government failed to restore peace and order there.

Although the Persian Government accepted all such demands of the Russian Government which did not undermine her sovereignty, yet the Russian troops were not withdrawn. Naturally, a strong feeling of anxiety and resentment prevailed throughout the whole country. It was a test of patience and wisdom of the Persian people and they very wisely did not lose their patience. Had they not done so, they would have ceased to be a free nation? The obstinacy of Russia was, however, realized by Britain and Sir H. Grey repeatedly warned Benckendorff and Isvolsky not to make Russia unpopular in Persia or at Westminster by what looked like a permanent occupation. He renewed his

1. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 220, p. 119.
2. Ibid., No. 181, p. 85.
3. Ibid., No. 182, p. 88.
advice when the Russian Foreign Minister accompanied the Czar to Cowes. Isvolsky repeated his old arguments regarding the presence of the Russian troops in Persia. He explained that it was quite contrary to the policy of the Russian Government to send her troops to Persia but the deteriorating situation in that country made the dispatch of the Russian troops essential. He further stated that he was desirous to withdraw them at the earliest, and was waiting anxiously for the opportunity to do so but at the same time, he added that unless and until order was restored and all danger to foreigners and foreign interests had been removed, the withdrawal of troops would be unwise. He remarked that 'if the troops were withdrawn, and had then to be sent back again it would be exceedingly difficult to recall them to Russia a second time'. He told that as soon as a competent Governor-General with sufficient force was established at Tabriz, the Russian troops would be withdrawn from the town. He, however, complained that against the wishes of Russian Government a man (Mukhber-es-Sultanah), who did not enjoy the confidence of Russia, had been named to Tabriz instead of

* As referred above, Mukhber-es-Sultanah was appointed as Governor-General of Tabriz. He, however, reached Tabriz on August 20, 1909 from Europe via Julfa — see Cd. 5120, Enclosure in N°233, p.133.
Ala-ed-Dowleh. Isvolsky bitterly criticized the new chief of police at Teheran and alleged that the man appointed as Chief of Police was a Caucasian terrorist who had committed several crimes in Caucasus. He also expressed his doubts about the nature of the Bakhtiyaris — who had played most prominent part in the revolution and who dominated the national government and remarked that they had no great reputation as peace-loving community. Sir E. Grey assured M. Isvolsky that his government would co-operate with Russia in urging upon the Persian government to take such effective steps which would hasten and facilitate the return of normal condition in the country and make the presence of the Russian troops in Persia unnecessary. At the same time, he pointed out that due to the continued presence of Russian troops, the chances of anti-Russian agitation had increased in the country.

Moreover, the long stay of the Russian troops had provided an excuse to the Turkish government for delaying the evacuation of Persian territories occupied by them during the recent constitutional struggle. M. Isvolsky told that the Turks had begun

+++ Monsieur Yeprem (or Ephrem) was appointed as Chief of Police at Teheran. He, with Sardar Assad fought against the royalists and made the revolution successful — See Browne, The Persian Revolution, pp. 437, 440, Cd.6120, Enclosure in No. 229, p. 118.

+++ During the constitutional struggle, the Turkish troops crossed the frontier and occupied a part of Persian territories. This annoyed the Russian government (as she had perhaps reserved for herself the right of sending the troops to Persia). Count Benckendorff addressed a memorandum to British Government on July 8, 1909. The memorandum stated that "the Turks were sending troops in ever-increasing numbers to the Urmi district, were occupying villages which were unquestionably Persian, and, taking advantage
the encroachments upon Persia long before the present troubles and added that they had captured strategic positions which the Russians had not done; they had brought Kurds with them; they had taken possession of lands; they had assumed administrative duties and had accorded Turkish nationality to the local population. Sir E. Grey told Isovolsky that he was ready to join the Russian Government in pointing out these things to the Turkish Government but was sure that the Turks would not withdraw their troops till they were assured of evacuation of Persian territories by Russian troops. On one point when Isovolsky remarked that it was the presence of Russian troops at Kavvin which prevented the nationalist from committing excesses in Teheran, Sir E. Grey desurred and replied that the mere impression upon the nationalists that any attack on the

- of the violences committed by the Kurds, were inducing the population to ask for Turkish nationality*. An indirect reference was made in the memorandum regarding the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which had recognized the

integrity of Persia (although, Russia had not herself observed the principles of the convention). It also referred to the strategical importance of the Urmia district from Russian point of view and proposed that a joint Russian-British protest should be made at Constantinople requesting the recall of the troops and urging them to abstain from interfering in the affairs of Persia and from according Turkish nationality to the local population. The British Government agreed with Russian proposal and accordingly a joint representation was made. The representation made a considerable impression and the Turkish Government declared that she had no desire to occupy the Persian territories, but the troops were sent only to protect the Turkish nationals. The Ottoman Government also announced to send a Commission to enquire into the alleged irregularities and promised to withdraw Turkish protection where it would be found to have been improperly given. The Turkish Government further added that the Ottoman consul at Urmia would be changed. However, the troops were not withdrawn and it seemed that the withdrawal would not be ordered till the Turks were assured of evacuation of Persian territories by Russian troops. As regards Russia, she was annoyed due to the fact that a
foreigners would certainly lead to Russian intervention, would
by itself, have been sufficient. Sir E. Grey also made known
to the Emperor of Russia at Cowes that the continued presence
of Russian troops in Persia had convinced a section of British
people that Russia was determined to establish a military
occupation or at least some sort of protectorate in North Persia
and emphasized the need of the withdrawal of the troops. On
August 10, 1909 Sir J. Barclay reported to Sir E. Grey that
order had been speedily restored and successfully maintained
in the capital by the National Government. He further reported
that the news of the revolution had generally good effect in
provinces but added that due to the financial embarrassment,
the Government had not been able to take effective measures
in subduing the lawlessness prevailing in many districts. He,
however, expressed, his satisfaction as to successful endeavour
of the National Government in producing a detente by issuing
urgent injunctions to the reactionaries of chief provincial
towns, and in some cases averting imminent disorders.

strategical place like Urmia was occupied by Turkey. Moreover,
she believed that the Persian national movement was much
encouraged by Committee of Union and Progress — See F.O.
371/976, 159/159/10/38, Gooch and Temperley, Vol.X, Part I,
No. 746, p. 739.

Nicolson, August 3, 1909, pp. 34, 35; No. 32, Memorandum by Sir E.
Grey, Foreign Office, Aug. 6, 1909, pp. 37; No. 33, Memorandum by Sir
E. Grey, Foreign Office, Aug. 6, 1909, pp. 40-41; also see CD.
5120, No. 184, pp. 85-86.

2. CD. 5120, No. 217, pp. 111-112.
The new rulers of Persia had, however, realised that to get the Persian territories evacuated by Russian troops, would be a difficult task, even after the restoration of peace and order. The Russian seemed to have come to stay permanently. Nevertheless, the National Government tried her level best to re-establish peace in the country and proved herself capable of maintaining law and order. At least, the situation was not out of control. But the Russians had always some pretexts at their disposal. Incapable of getting Russians withdraw, the Persians looked towards Britain, at least for moral succour. They hoped that Britain would influence Russia to withdraw. However, the European situation was not propitious for the materialisation of such a Persian aspiration. Not only the British hesitated to support the Persian cause but sometimes, they tried even to justify the Russian action. On August 17, 1909 the Persian Minister at London called on Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary. He informed Sir E. Grey that the retention of Russian troops had aroused anti-Russian feelings in Persia and expressed his doubts that they might advance on Teheran. The British Foreign Secretary unexpectedly replied that these were the matters to be discussed and settled between Persian and Russian Governments and added that M. Isvolsky was desirous to recall the troops but difficulty in doing so was that no one could be sure that the law and order was firmly established. He informed the Persian Minister that Isvolsky did not think it proper to recall and then to send back the
troops to Persia. Sir H. Grey further stated that there were still much disorders in Persia; the roads in South Persia were not safe and complained of loss to the British trade there. He also remarked that had the situation been same in North Persia, it would be difficult for Russia to withdraw her troops. However, he promised to discuss the problem with Russian Government though he expected that it would yield no fruitful result in the light of disturbances which had occurred in Persia. The Persian Minister strongly denied any kind of disturbances and stated that complete order existed in Teheran and Kaskin. The British Foreign Secretary replied that he had no doubt that 'with the situation as it was at present the Russian Government could not have sent troops. But as their troops were already on the spot, they were afraid to withdraw them until they felt sure that the situation would go on improving'.

During the period, the British Foreign Office was in a state of dilemma. Britain desired the withdrawal of Russian troops from Persian territories but could not stress upon Russia emphatically to do so lest the Russian ally be antagonized and broke the ententes. Consequently, a very cautious policy was followed by Britain. On the one side, she emphasized upon Persia the need for speeding restoration of complete law and order in the country, on the other hand, she mildly but persistently reminded Russia to recall her troops as there were no more disturbances in Persia. But, Russia was determined to

1. Ibid., No.201, pp.106-107.
exploit the situation. The correspondent of 'Times' from St. Petersburg reported that the Russian official was very much pessimistic regarding the situation prevailing in Persia. It was asserted by them that anarchy was increasing in many of the Persian Provinces; the roads were infested with the robbers and trade was losing heavily. Sir J. Barclay strongly contradicted the Russian allegation that things had gone from bad to worse since the Nationalists had captured power. He wrote to Sir E. Grey on September 9, 1909 that it was not due to the inefficiency of the new Government which had made the roads unsafe; the roads were infested with the robbers since long. The Russian allegation that the commerce was losing heavily was reported by the British Minister at Teheran as wrong. On the contrary, he stated that the northern custom receipts were increasing. He further stated that the assertion regarding increasing anarchic situation in Persia was also incorrect. There were, no doubt, disorders prevailing in certain districts, but he denied that it was a new development and remarked that unless and until the Persian Government was furnished with substantial monetary assistance, it would be unwise to expect any great improvement, no matter what Government ruled at Teheran.

1. Ibid., No. 231, p. 127, also see British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. C III, pp. 819-820.
The Persian Government was not only accused of inefficiency by Russia but on one occasion, Monsieur Stolypin, the Russian Prime-Minister went so far as to remark that there was not even a single man in Persia capable of handling the situation. He claimed that it was due to the lack of men of abilities that the country was drifting helplessly about and alleged that Persian Government was determined to damage the Russian prestige. He also regretted the Persian attitude towards Russia but repeated the oft-repeated statement that the Russian Government would withdraw her troops as soon as circumstances permitted. All these allegations were made because the Persian Government had not appointed a man of Russian choice as Governor of Tabriz and had refused to accept such Russian dictations which would have undermined her sovereignty. Moreover, her repeated request to recall the troops had also enraged Russia. Although, the Russian attitude was quite stiff towards Persia, yet the British diplomacy of mild but persistent reminder for withdrawal had not gone waste.

On October 5, 1909 when Count Benckendorff called on Sir E. Grey to inform him that he was going for a holiday, the British Foreign Secretary again utilized the opportunity and urged the importance and necessity of reduction in number of Russian troops. Count Benckendorff replied that as things were not

altogether quiet and incidents were occurring constantly, it would be difficult to recall the troops. The British Foreign Secretary promptly caught the point and replied that he had not spoken of complete withdrawal, though such a step by Russian Government would be highly appreciated by Britain and remarked that he meant only reduction in number. He reminded the Count that the presence of Russian troops had aroused anti-Russian feelings amongst the Persians and pointed out to him that the recall would undoubtedly have good effect. He also requested Count Benckendorff to convey to Russian Government the views of the British Government regarding the importance and necessity of reduction in the number of troops.\(^1\) On October 7, 1909 Sir J. Barclay reported to Sir J. Grey that Enzeli-Teheran road was safe. Complete law and order had been restored and maintained in the Capital and anti-Russian feelings had subsided. He, however, expressed his doubts as regards to the re-occurrence of anti-Russian agitations, had the Russian troops stationed at Kazvin not been withdrawn and added that the Russian troops had got no opportunity to deal with the dangers which they were intended to combat. He further stated that at present, there was no danger to the foreigners and remarked that though it was difficult to make any prophecy, but the present moment, if utilized, would be well-timed to recall the Russian troops. He strongly recommended the withdrawal of Russian forces from Kazvin.

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2. CD 5120, No. 237, p. 138.
The continuous British representations caused a slight change in Russian Policy and on October 10, 1909 the new Russian Minister at Teheran, M. Poklowski, informed Sir J. Barclay that his Government had decided to reduce immediately the Tabriz force by one half. The same information was given by M. Sazonow to Sir A. Nicolson at St. Petersburg. The British Minister expressed his satisfaction on the decision of Russia regarding reduction and enquired whether some reduction was not possible in the force stationed at Kauvin. M. Sazonow replied in negative as according to him, appropriate moment had not arrived for such a step. On October 12, 1909 the "Official Messenger" published a news, stating that the Russian Government had decided to recall from Tabriz four companies of infantry, a half company of engineers, and a battery of field artillery. The paper also stated that the two companies of infantry, four sotnias of Cossacks, one battery of mountain artillery, and a half company of engineers would be retained there. These, the paper further stated, would be withdrawn as soon as the Russian Government was satisfied that permanent law and order had been re-established.

On October 16, 1909 two companies of infantry and one grenadier battery left Tabriz for Russia. They were followed on 19th

1. Ibid., No. 238, p. 138.
2. Ibid., No. 242, p. 139, also see British and Foreign State Papers, op. cit., pp. 833-834.
3. CD 5120, No. 243, p. 139.
October by two companies of infantry, a half company of Sappers and some men and horses of mountain battery. General Snarsky and his staff left on October 21, and it was announced by Russian Consul-General on October 23, that there remained 1,000 men at Tabriz, 100 infantry at Urmia, and 100 Cossacks at Ardabil. Complete withdrawal was, however, not obtained, as the Russian Government considered that the Persian Government was not supplied with sufficient force to support his authority and maintain order. The presence of the Russian force at Kazvin seemed less necessary even than that of the force at Tabriz, but the Russian Government was not prepared to make any reduction there. It was alleged that since the deposition of Mohammed Ali, the situation at Teheran had not been so stable as to justify the recall of the troops. Moreover, the Persian Government was accused of being unfriendly towards Russian and until, the Persian Government be friended, the Russian Government was not inclined to recall her troops. 'Be friendly' definitely meant full acceptance of all Russian dictates by Persia.

On October 30, 1909 H.Isvolsky informed Sir A. Nicolson that his Government had decided to recall practically all the troops from Kazvin, leaving only fifty or sixty Cossacks there.

1. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 269, p. 154.
3. Ibid., p. 736.
as a Consular guard. He, however, stated that some troops would stay at Resht and Kuzeli but affirmed that the total number would not exceed more than a regiment of Cossacks. He further stated that he was sending a telegram to this effect to Poklveski so that he could convey the decision to the Persian Government and explain to them that Russia had no desire to cause any embarrassment to the Persian Government but had a spirit of good will towards Persia. At the same time, M. Poklveski was to warn the Persian Government that if any undesirable event occurred in future, the Russians would return with greater force and with more serious intent. On November 1, an official communique to this effect was also published. M. Poklveski was also instructed to persuade the Persian Government to settle the outstanding questions between the two Governments but was forbidden to intermix the question of the withdrawal with that of the settlement. At the same time, M. Isvolsky requested that the British Minister at Teheran should be instructed to advise the Persian Government to be more friendly and conciliatory towards Russia. The British Government agreed to instruct Sir G. Barclay in the above sense. To the misfortune of the

2. CD 5120, No. 260, pp. 149-150, also see British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. C III, op. cit., p. 645.
Persian nation, the situation at Ardebil, in the meantime, deteriorated much and provided a pretext to Russia to send her army there. Perhaps, the reduction of Russian force at Tabriz and declaration of the intention for the reduction of the Russian force at Kazvin was made in order to camouflage and to create a false impression that Russia had no desire either to occupy Persian territories or transform that country into a protectorate, as Russia knew that the disquieting situation at Ardebil would enable her to return with a greater force and with a better opportunity to pursue the desired policy in Persia. By using the disorders prevailing in Ardebil, as an instance, Russia expected to prove the inefficiency and incapability of the Persian Government to restore and maintain peace and then to justify the dispatch of further troops. On November 3, 1909, the Russian Government published a communiqué in 'Official Messenger' which expressed grave concern over the situation at Ardebil. The

The Shahsevans and Kardaghis tribes under the leadership of notorious Rahim Khan, were the main source of trouble. They seriously threatened Ardebil Rahim Khan declared that he was trying to re-establish the ex-Shah's regime as he had no confidence in the constitutional Government Rahim Khan and his associates (chiefs and Shahsevans and Kardaghis) also addressed two telegrams to the ex-Shah and to the two Bakhtiyari Chiefs Amir Hafa Khan and Samad-i-Jang to the effect that the constitutionalists had created disorders committed murders and plundered properties. They also accused the nationalists as anti-religious and affirmed to destroy them. The British Minister at Tehran, however, believed that it was a looting rather than a political movement. The Persian Government took active measures to crush the rebels. Sattar Khan, with a force of 1,000 men, was sent to Ardebil to re-establish peace and order. Unfortunately, he met with no success and to reinforce him, Mukhbar-e-Sultaneh dispatched 1,500 men under Baker Khan. Samad Khan at Maragha,
comuniche stated that the situation at Ardebil was growing worse day by day and accused that the Persian Government was unable to restore peace and order. It reserved for the Russian Government right to take measures for the safety of her people and their property and concluded as follows:

had 800 men at his disposal, ready to march on Ardebil, when ordered. Meanwhile, the Governor-General at Tabriz sent Kasim-ul-Hulk with 100 Persian Cossacks to Sarab to negotiate with the rebels. From Teheran, a force of 1600 men of all arms had been dispatched to Ardebil under the command of M. Yepirin, the Chief of Police. The British Government was satisfied with the measures taken by the Persian Government and Sir A. Nicolson, during a conversation with M. Isvolsky remarked that the troops being sent by the Persian Government would certainly relieve the situation but M. Isvolsky doubted the capabilities of the Persian forces. He, however, warned the Persian Government to be responsible for the losses and injury which might occur to the Russian subjects. Fahim Khan was also warned to be personally responsible for the damages done to the lives and property of the Russian nationals. In the meantime, the Russian Consul at Ardebil, applied to His Govt. for a force to protect the lives and property of the Russian subjects. This provided the chance to the Russian Government to dispatch her troops to Ardebil.

See CD 5130, No. 239, p. 139, No. 242, p. 139, No. 244, pp. 139-140, No. 245, p. 140, Enclosure in No. 249, p. 143, No. 250, p. 146, No. 253, p. 147, No. 255, p. 147, and see CD 5656, Enclosure 1, 2 and 3 in No. 8, pp. 4-5.
In view of such a situation, and of the undoubtedly danger threatening our vice consul and Russian subjects, the Russian Government have taken measures for the immediate reinforcement of the consulate guard at Ardebil by any portion of the troops in the adjoining military district of the Caucasus, as the arrival at Ardebil of any portion of the Russian column would require much more time. 1

The above decision by Russian Government was taken when Sattar Khan, who had been surrounded in Ardebil by Rahim Khan with Karadaghis and Shahsevans, escaped with a few men to Sarab and Russian Vice-Consul applied to his Government for a force to protect the Russian nationals. 2

The delay in dispatching the Persian forces to reinforce Sattar Khan, due to certain unavoidable circumstance, had provided a fair chance to the rebels and they became the master of the situation. However, on November 5, 1909 Ardebil was captured and plundered by Rahim Khan and his followers. The local authorities and some others had taken refuge in the Russian Vice-Consulate. The rebels demanded their surrender. In the meantime, one battalion of Russian infantry, two squad of Cossacks with two machine guns and a detachment of

1. CD 5120, No. 261, pp. 150-151, also see British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. C III, pp. 844-845.

2. Ibid., No. 255, pp. 147-148, also CD. 5656, Enclosure in No. 19, p. 7.
engineers were on way to Ardebil. Another column of sufficient strength was also being dispatched to 'calm' and the situation at Ardebil. The instructions given to them were similar to those given to the detachment at Tabriz to refrain from all interference with the administration but they were to repress plundering on the road from Astara. They were also authorised to take action against the caravans charged with plunder, and raid the stores of loot.

At the time, when Russian Government decided to dispatch troops to Ardebil, M. Isvolsky had stated that this measure would not effect the Russian Government’s decision regarding the withdrawal of the troops from Karvin. But the promised withdrawal was, however, not fulfilled for two reasons. Firstly, Bahia Khan after occupying Ardebil, declared his intention to march on Teheran. Secondly, the Russian press protested against a too hasty withdrawal of the troops. The Russian press, taking Ardebil as an instance, argued that situation in Persia was exceedingly perilous and uncertain and that no order existed at the places where there were no Russian troops. The marching and counter-marching of Russian troops was strongly criticised. They argued it to be an

1. CD 5120, Nos. 257, 298, p. 148, No. 259, p. 149, also CD 5120, enclosure in No. 10, p. 7.
2. CD 5120, No. 264, p. 152.
unsteady and unstable policy. They also urged their Government
to consider solely Russian interests and not to give much
weight to British advice.1 As referred above, by 11th November
1909, a Russian battalion was, however, on its way to Ardebil
from Astara with order to keep the road open and take action
against the caravans carrying loot. A Russian regiment was
also at Astara to march on Ardebil, if required. On November
16, 1909 two Russian battalions and 200 Cossacks arrived at
Ardebil.2 Meanwhile, the rebels appointed a certain Shaffar
Khan as Governor, retired out side the town and encamped
there. It seemed as if the authority of the rebels had been
established but the measures taken by Persian Government
compelled the Shahsevens to negotiate. A force of 3,000
men, under the supreme command of Bashid-ul-Mulk with Samad
Khan and Baker Khan as his associates, appeared at Sarab to
crush the rebels. A detachment was at Astara and other
detachment had fortified the Beasht road in Khal Khal.3 Rahim
Khan, at this time, was trying to secure the open assistance
of Russian. He paid a visit to the Russian Consul, expressed
his fidelity with Russia and suggested that 'that country
(Russia) should take over all the districts in Persia where her

2. CD 5656, Enclosure in No.10, p.7.
3. Ibid., Enclosure I in No. 8, p. 4,
troops were located'. However, the Russian refused to do so. A too hasty engagement with the rebels would have proved futile to the Russian interests and would have caused a wide spread outbreak not only in Persia but in Britain also; therefore, the Russian authorities were pursuing a very careful policy. Perhaps, they would have concluded certain agreements with Bahim Khan, had they been sure about his ultimate victory. A careful analysis of the conversation between M. Isvolsky and Sir A. Nicolson, clearly throws light on Russian dilemma regarding ultimate results of the rebellion. On November 11, 1909, Sir A. Nicolson told Isvolsky that a considerable and fairly well-equipped Persian force was hastening from Teheran to Ardebil. M. Isvolsky replied that the two forces would probably come into collision, and if the Government troops were victorious, it would be a satisfactory sign that the Persian Government were capable of re-establishing order with their own resources. If, on the contrary, Bahim Khan were to obtain the upper hand, he might march on Teheran or Tabriz with the prestige of success. He further stated that under present circumstances, it was necessary to retain the Russian force at Kazvin until the issue of conflict was decided. However, Russia, undoubtedly, was engaged in some

1. CD 5120, No. 267, p. 152.
2. CD 5120, No. 267, pp. 152-153, also see British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. CI, p. 847.
or other type of conspiracy with Rahim Khan against Persia. The greater friendship shown by the Russian Consulate at Tabriz towards Rahim Khan, confirmed this belief. The Russian officers could not hide their sympathy with that brigand and went so far as to get themselves photographed with him, holding his hand. Moreover, the attitude of the Russian Government in connection with the extradition of Rahim Khan (to be referred later on) furnished with a further proof of Russian Conspiracy against the integrity of Persia. However, the active measure taken by the Persian Government compelled the Shahsevans to retire to their winter quarter at Moghan and Rahim Khan fled to Karadagh of which, he was a native. In the meantime, a Russian force consisting of 3,200 troops occupied Ardebil, but having no pretext to justify the retention of the force, the Russian Government announced the withdrawal of majority of her troops from that place. Meanwhile, Rashid-ul-Walk with Government troops, reached Ardebil and assumed the Governorship of that place. On December 13, 1909, the Russian Government published a communique regarding the situation at Ardebil. The communique, instead

2. Ibid., p. 347.
4. CD 5120, No. 270, p.158.
5. CD 5120, No.277, p. 159, also see CD 5656, Enclosure in No.10, p. 7.
of recognizing the Persian Government's successful efforts to restore peace and order, stated that since the arrival of the Russian troops, peace had been re-established in and neighbourhood of Ardebil. Recognizing the restoration of law and order, the communiqué stated that under the present peaceful situation the retention of a larger force was no more necessary and consequently declared the withdrawal of the majority of the troops, leaving 'with in the Ardebil district five companies of infantry, a mountain battery, three sotnias of Cossacks, and a section of engineers' to protect and guard the Russian Consulate and nationals as well as to ensure the free movement for trading caravans along the Astara-Tabriz route.¹

Later on, Rahim Khan was defeated by the Persian Government's force under the command of M. Yeprim and Sardar Bahadur, son of Sardar Assad. Rahim Khan, therefore, applied to Russian as well as Turkish Consuls-General for protection. Both the Consuls, however, refused to render him any protection, whereupon, he managed to escape to Russia together with 100 families.²

The Russian Government, in plain defiance of Article XIV of the Treaty of Turkomenchai (1828), permitted him to carry in the

¹. Ibid., No. 5, p. 2.
². Ibid., Nos. 21 and 22, p. 17, No. 21 and Enclosure in No. 30, p. 22.

According to Article XIV of the Treaty of Turkomenchai, the Russian Government promised 'not to permit Persian deserters to establish themselves or to remain fixed in the Khanats of Karabag or Nakhitchewan or in the part of Khanat of Crivan situated on the right bank of Araxe'. See Hurasita, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. I, p. 93.
Russian territory, where he was safe from pursuit and where he remained until January 1911, when he again returned to Tabriz to become a further source of trouble to the constitutional Government.\(^1\) The Persian Government demanded his extradition,\(^2\) which was refused. A communiqué in that regard was published on February 13, 1910.\(^3\) At all stages of Rahim Khan's rebellion, the Russian Government supported him. According to the Persian Government's version, a detachment of Russian troops supported Rahim Khan, while he was engaged in fighting with the Government forces. When the Russian detachment was withdrawn, he was defeated.\(^4\) The refusal to extradite him was regarded by British authorities as an embarrassing attitude of Russia towards Persia.\(^5\)

The embarrassing attitude of Russia continued and promised evacuation was not carried in to effect. Even the speech from the Throne on 15th November 1909, on the occasion of opening of the Persian Parliament, which lamented the

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2. CP, 5656, No. 23, p. 17.
presence of foreign troops in Persia, was regarded by the Russian Press as improper and ungenerous. They argued that it was the presence of Russian troops which saved Tabriz from being captured by the ex-Shah's forces and claimed that the sense of security which prevailed during the crisis which ultimately led to the deposition of Mohammad Ali, was only due to the despatch of Russian troops to Kauan. They accused the Persians to be incapable and incompetent to maintain peace and alleged that the security which existed on trade routes was solely due to the presence of Russian troops. The serious attack of November 24, 1909 on the Russian Consul-General and his staff and caravan, near Shiraz, was cited as undoubted confirmation of the reasoning of the Russian Press. Of course, there were stray disturbances but it did not mean in any way that the Persian Government was powerless to handle the situation.

+ A large caravan which was accompanied by M. Passak, the Russian Consul-General at Bushire and N. Radloowsky, Secretary, of the Russian Consulate-General at Bushire was attacked on their way from Shiraz to Bushire by Poir-Ahmadis, a branch of the Kuhgalu tribes. Several members of the escort were wounded and a Russian Cossack was killed. Two Persian Cossacks were wounded and ten or twelve other Persians with the caravans were killed. The telegraph doctor, Woollat*, accompanied by British Consul at Shiraz with an escort of Indian, Cossars and Persians were immediately sent to their assistance. N. Iswolsky decided to demand the punishment of the robbers and compensation for the losses from the Persian Government - See CD 5120, Nos. 271, and 272, pp. 158, No. 274, pp. 158–159, also see CD 5656, Enclosure in No. 10, p. 9.

The Persians dealt firmly with the disturbances, controlled the situation and maintained peace. But Russia fabricated the facts, refused to recognize the abilities of Persians of restoring order and claimed that existing order was due to the presence of the Russian troops on Persian soil. The Russian allegation could not even satisfy the British and Sir C. Hardinge wrote to Sir A. Nicolson on January 18, 1910 that Russia did not appear to be in any hurry to move their troops from Kazvin, where there was really no need for them to remain any longer.

The continued presence of the Russian troops at Kazvin, Tabriz and Ardebil was a constant source of friction, consequently the year 1910 was marked by an increase in anti-Russian feeling in Persia. On February 5, 1910, there was a debate in the Persian Parliament on this subject. Ala-es-Sultan, the Foreign Minister was strongly criticised. The answers given by the Foreign Minister were considered to be unsatisfactory and when the motion was put, the Foreign Minister could not obtain a vote of confidence. Consequently, he resigned.

2. Ibid., Vol. IX, Part I, No. 747, p. 740, Extract from the Annual Report for Russia for the year 1910 (Enclosure in Dispatch from Sir J. Buchanan, No. 66 of March 22, 1911, R. March 27, 1911.)
Tabriz was the main scene of anti-Russian demonstration. It was alleged by Russia that the followers of Sattar Khan and Baker Khan in conjunction with fedais from Caucasus, who were with M. Xeprim, were contemplating an attack on Russian banks. M. Ivolsky instructed the Russian Minister at Teheran to urge the Persian Government to take immediate steps for the subjugation of Sattar Khan and Baker Khan. The Russian Minister was also instructed to warn that in case of failure of the Persian Government to do that, the Russian Government would take measures which she would deem necessary.

The British Consul at Tabriz confirmed that among certain classes of the population, the agitation against the presence of Russian troops had recurred. However, the Minister of Interior assured Sir J. Barclay that the Governor-General had sufficient force at his disposal and no trouble was expected. He also stated that the Khans were coming to Teheran. Meanwhile, the British Consul at Teheran reported that unless and until the above mentioned Khans were removed from Tabriz, peace could not be expected. Consequently, Sir J. Barclay presented a note to the Persian Government to this

1. CD 5656, No. 38, p. 25.
4. Ibid., No. 44, p. 27.
effect. The Russian Minister at Teheran had already demanded their expulsion.\(^1\) The Persian Government ever anxious to satisfy her great neighbours, ordered the Khans on March 17, 1910, to leave the town immediately. Some difficulties arose in this connection but ultimately Khans left Tabriz for Teheran on 19th March with 100 horsemen. The town was quite and no incident was caused by their departure. The most remarkable thing throughout the events which led to the expulsion of the Khans from Tabriz was that no disturbances occurred. On an enquiry made by British Minister at Teheran regarding the anti-Russian agitations at Tabriz, Mr. Shipley reported on March 12, 1910, that the town was quiet. Nevertheless he recommended the removal of Khans from the town.\(^2\) Meanwhile, the Persian Government successfully re-established peace in other parts of Northern Persia. The Shahsevan and Karadagh Chiefs, including Rahim Khan's nephew, Kerim Khan made peace with the Government. The Shahsevans not only made their submission but also promised to restore the plunder taken during the late rising.\(^3\) All was quiet. The peace prevailed but the Russian withdrawal was not secured. Not only Russia did not withdraw the troops but a certain Darab Mirza

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1. Ibid., No. 43, p. 27.
2. Ibid., No. 54, pp. 32-33, Nos. 55, 56, 57, p. 33 and Enclosure in No. 69, p. 37.
3. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 69, p. 37.
4. Ibid., No. 46, p. 29, and Enclosure in No. 47, p. 30.
of Persian origin, who had been naturalized as a Russian subject and was attached to Russian force, stationed at Kazvin, started a movement in the end of May, 1910 in favour of ex-Shah and threatened the authority of the Constitutional regime. The Russian Minister at Teheran stated that the officer obtained leave of absence and started for Azerbaijan in company of an official of the ex-Shah's court, where, he with the help of a small force, attacked Zinjan. Inspite of the protests of the Persians who wanted to deal with the insurrectionaries themselves, a Russian detachment consisting of sixty men was sent to arrest Darab Mirza. He was also immediately dismissed from the Russian army. The measures taken by Russia were highly appreciated by Mr. O'Seirne, Councillor of British Embassy at St. Petersburg. The Russian soldiers captured Darab Mirza on June 3, 1910. Truly speaking, he was nominally arrested. In reality, he was rescued from being captured by Persian force. While, the Russian soldiers with Darab Mirza, were returning to Kazvin, they attacked the Persian force which was sent to crush the rebellion, and killed Ali Khan, the Persian General. On an

1. Ibid., No. 100, p. 49.
2. Shuster, op.cit., pp. III - IIII.
3. CD 5656, No.1009 p. 49.
4. Ibid., No.101, p. 49.
5. Ibid., No. 102, p. 49.
enquiry made by Sir E. Grey, regarding the incident, Sir Narling reported from Teheran that the Russian force was fired first, yet it was proved that a certain Russian Colonel at Kazvin had guaranteed the safety of the rebels. A number of Darab's associates were furnished with letters signed and sealed by the Colonel himself. The bearers of the letters were declared to be under the protection of Russia and severe punishment was threatened for those who might interfere with them or their followers. The aim of the Russians was nothing else than to foment disorders in order to justify their presence on the Persian soil. The British Government continually requested the Russians to withdraw but Russia turned a deaf ear. At last, the cat was out of the bag and in the end of May 1910, the Russian Minister at Teheran communicated the Persian Government certain demands as the precondition to the withdrawal of troops from Kazvin. Russia demanded the extension of the Russian mining concession at Karadagh and an automobile concession for the Enzeli - Teheran road. In addition to these demands, Russia put forward certain requirements to be fulfilled by Persia regarding the status of the

1. CD. 5656, No. 114, p. 57.
2. Ibid., No. 116, p. 58.
Cossack Brigade. Persia strongly protested against these demands. The British charge d'Affaires at St. Petersburg stated that the imposition of these conditions was "obviously illogical, since Russia had undertaken to withdraw her forces on the restoration of order" but tried to minimise the severity of the demands by stating that "the conditions in themselves were not very onerous". However, the demands were not accepted and consequently withdrawal was not ordered. It seemed that the Russian troops would remain in Persia until the doomsday unless some superior force expelled them.

B - The Increasing Lawlessness on the Southern Roads: The British Ultimatum

In Northern Persia where Russian forces were stationed, British supported the Persian cause. Although, Britain refrained from addressing any protest to Russian Government yet the repeatedly advised Russia about the desirability of the withdrawal of the troops. But the British authorities did not follow exactly the same policy in Southern Persia — their own

sphere of interest, as they wished to be pursued by Russia in Northern Persia. Nevertheless, Britain did not go so far as Russia had gone. The British followed a mild and comparatively less harmful policy to Persia. However, a small number of British troops as has already been referred to, were dispatched to certain ports in the Persian Gulf, notably Bushire and Bander-i-Abbas. As the blue jackets did not intervene in the internal affairs of Persia, no protest was lodged against them by the Persians. But the constitutional struggle witnessed rapid deterioration in the situation of Fars. There were sharp differences amongst the tribal chiefs. The Governor-General of Fars was powerless to do anything. The whole internal politics revolved around the Kawan-ul-Mulk, Sayyid Abdul Husain of Lar, Soulat Dowleh, the Kashgal Chief, and Asafedd-Dowleh, the Governor-General. Instead of the differences, a meeting was held at Shiraz on March 24, 1909, in which prominent nationalists participated. The Governor-General's Vizier was also present. The meeting decided to inaugurate the constitutional Government of Fars, to send messenger to Sheikh Zakariyeh and Sayyid Abdul Husain of Lar to induce them to remain quiet; and also to Soulat Dowleh to enlist his support. These Chiefs had long been stirring up the people to join

1. CD, 4733, No. 173, p.84, also see Enclosure in No.293, p. 126.
the righteous cause of the constitution. It seemed that the
differences amongst the tribes would no longer exist and they
would work in complete harmony. The next day, on March 25,
1909, Noim-ul-Islam, one of the most civilized members of the
popular party visited the British Consulate and made the
following statement to Mr. Bill.

'The movement had been going on for some time, but had
been delayed by the necessity of obtaining unanimity by
negotiation with the Kavamis, and c. All parties were now
agreed on the object of the movement, which was the attainment
of the national rights as provided in the Constitution to which
the Shuh had sworn. The leaders were all democratic reformers;
but all others, including the Governor-General, had now come in.

At the meeting held on the 24th it was agreed that fifty
persons should be chosen, including all members of the former
Local Assembly, to meet in the building which was formerly
made over to the use of the Local assembly, on the afternoon
of the 26th. It was to be opened by the Governor-General, in
conjunction with Mirza Ibrahim. The object of all parties was
to conciliate the goodwill of the foreign powers, especially
the two neighbouring Powers, and of these especially Great
Britain, as a Parliamentary country. Unfortunately, the
programme of the nationalists could not make much progress.
The Governor-General telegraphed to the Grand Vizier in
apologetic terms, to the effect that a meeting of all the
principal persons of Shiraz had decided to establish a local
Assembly and he was helpless. In spite of the treacherous
attitude of the Governor-General, the proposed Assembly met
under the presidency of Governor-General’s Vizier on 25th, 27th, 28th and 30th March. Several important decisions were taken. Asef-ed-Dowlah, the Governor-General also visited the Assembly, delivered a long speech and assured them that he was with them in heart all along. But it was clear like crystal that Shirazis were as hopelessly divided as ever. On April 3, 1909, Mr. Bill reported that the situation was very bad. He stated that the Shah’s authority was dead, at least temporarily but there was no faith in the Assembly too. Robbery was reported to be common on both the Isfahan and Bushire roads. ¹

The Kawamis had made some arrangement with the Assembly and they were supporting it, but Soulat Dowlah and Seyyid Abdul Husain Lari were against Kawamis. There were difference between the Assembly and the Governor-General too. The attitude of the Governor-General was not clear. On one side, he declared his sympathies with the Constitution, on the other side, he was loyal to the Shah. At last, the Assembly decided to ask the Governor-General to explain his position in writing. He was told either to accept his appointment at the hands of the

¹. CD 4733, Enclosure in No. 283, pp. 126-128.

⁺. The Head of the Kawami Party, Nasr-ed-Dowlah attended the meeting of 24th March, which decided to proclaim the establishment of a Constitutional Government of Fars. — see CD 4733, No.173, p.84, Enclosure in No. 283, pp. 126-127.
Assembly and denounced the Shah or to resign. In the former case, he was to provide 10,000 l., which he might recover from the revenue, and another sum of the same amount which would be raised as an advance on the revenue payments. The Governor-General replied that he had always been in favour of the constitution, of which Mohamed Ali Shah was an integral part, that as the constitution was now in force in Shiraz, he considered himself a constitutional Governor, but if the constitutionalists would insist on explicitly renouncing his allegiance to the Shah, he would like to resign. The reply was evidently designed by its author to splitting up the opposition and it served its purpose. The extremists considered that it was tantamount to resignation where as the large number of those who were reluctant to commit anything, hopelessly declared that there must be a Governor-General, and it was better to have one with some status rather than the mere nominee of the Shiraz Assembly. However, Soulat-Dowlah came forward to help the Governor-General. On April 24, 1902, he informed the local Assembly that if Asef-ed-Dowlah was not maintained and properly obeyed as Governor-General, he would come himself to Shiraz and compel obedience to the Governor-General. He also disapproved the arrangement of the Assembly with the Kawamis, and of the method of selection of the Assembly, which he claimed was quite irregular. Nevertheless, he promised to co-operate with a constitutional Government of Fars which would consist with a properly constituted local council with Asef-ed-Dowlah as Governor-General. The message of Soulat upset the whole
scheme of the constitutionalists. Two prominent members of the Assembly rushed to Soulat’s camp. The Kawami also sent a messenger to him. In the meantime, Sayyid Abdul Russin Lari had issued a notice to all Shirazis through which he instigated the inhabitants of Shiraz to take vengeance on the Kawamis. He warned those people, who had helped the Kawamis with arms and money and declared that if anyone would do this in future, he would be regarded as infidel with arms in hands, and his blood would be lawful to all Mohammedans. The Kawami-ul-Mulk called on Mr. Bill on April 25, 1909, complained against the Lari Sayyid who was openly threatening him and firmly stated that had he been forced to fight against the Sayyid, it would not only be against his will but would have also no concern with the general political situation. He sought the advice of Mr. Bill. The British representative replied that so far as the constitutional question was concerned the British had nothing to do with it. The real problem was the security of the trade routes which had effected everyone in Fars — either Persian or foreigner. Mr. Bill then suggested to the Kawami that he and Soulat being in a position to restore

+ The Kawamis brothers had led an expedition against the Lari Sayyid who was fighting for the constitution. Later on, the Kawamis associated themselves with the nationalists at Shiraz. Naturally, the Sayyid had no faith in Kawamis sincerity — See CD 4733, Enclosure in No. 81, p. 50, Enclosure in No. 110, p. 61, Enclosure in No. 174, p. 84, No. 173, p. 84.
peace, should unite and adopt joint measures to keep these roads opened and properly policed. In doing so, Mr. Bill continued to state, they would not only render greater public service, but it would be beneficial to their own interest. The Kawam-ul-Hulk replied that he had already sent a messenger to Soulat to make him known that Asef-ed-Dowlah was determined to create a gulf of difference between them. Mr. Bill then suggested that a personal interview between the two great men would tend to smoothen the difficulties, and that the Imam Jureh being a common friend of both parties, would be a suitable person to arrange it. Mr. Bill expected that Soulat and the Kawam might cooperate with each other as both had no real convictions on the constitution and would readily follow any Government which could maintain itself. As the description of the internal politics does not come with in the scope of this work, it is sufficient to point out that the differences amongst the tribes could not be reconciled as the result of which lawlessness increased, the trade routes became more and more unsafe and there was a dead lock in business transactions. In early June of 1909 the Bishire Chamber of Commerce requested the British representative to make fresh urgent representations regarding hopelessly insecure state of the roads and continued dead lock in the trade. On 12th June, the Acting Russian Consul-General at Bushire, while on his way to Shiraz, was fired.

1. CD. 5120, Enclosure in No. 41, pp. 18-20.
upon. In the meantime, the leading Persian merchants at Shiraz telegraphed to the Persian Minister of Interior complaining bitterly of the state of public order and the incapacity of the Governor-General.¹ The increasing lawlessness convinced Sir H. Barclay that the appointment of a new strong Governor-General of Fars was essential for the maintenance of peace and order. Consequently, he telegraphed to Sir E. Grey on June 14, 1909, that he did not expect any improvement unless the Shah appointed the Zil-es-Sultan as Governor of Fars, or, failing that, a corps of the road guards, properly drilled and paid, was instituted.² One June 21, 1909, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Persia informed Sir H. Barclay that His Highness Zil-es-Sultan was about to return from Europe. He had been offered the governorship of Fars, which he had gladly accepted.³ The Kawamirs were also in favour of Zil-es-Sultan. On June 25, 1909, the Kawam informed Mr. Bill that if Zil-es-Sultan was appointed as Governor-General of Fars, he and his brother would leave for Europe as soon as

¹ CD 5120, No.53, p. 28, also see Enclosure in No.90, p.49.
² Zil-es-Sultan, son of Nasirud-din Shah, once governed the most of the southern provinces of Persia. He was hated by the Persians and was famous as an Anglophile. However, after the Anglo-Russian entente and the coup d’etat of June 1908, the two Powers combined to bring about his departure from Persia. He had to go to Europe. Since then he was at Vienna.
³ Ibid., No.54, p. 28.
⁴ Ibid., No. 61, pp. 30-31.
His Highness would arrive. At last, the British Minister in concert with the Russian chargé d'affaires urged upon the Persian Government to make an announcement to the effect that Zil-es-Sultan had been appointed as Governor-General of Fars. Consequently, the declaration regarding Zil's appointment was made by Persian Government on July 13, 1909. It was also announced that Sardar Massood, the son of Zil-es-Sultan would act as his deputy, pending his return to Persia. Before the arrival of Zil-es-Sultan, the Shah was deposed and Asef-ed-Dowleh, the ex-Governor-General refused to vacate his office on the ground that the Government responsible for his dismissal and Zil's appointment, no longer existed. Mr. Bill telegraphed Sir G. Barclay that unless the appointment of Zil-es-Sultan was confirmed and ex-Governor-General was not recalled immediately, peace would not be restored. In case of the failure of the Persian Government to act in the above sense, Mr. Bill recommended the immediate dispatch of British troops from Bushire to Shiraz. Consequently, Sir G. Barclay made a representation to the Minister of Interior on July 18, 1909, regarding the situation in Fars and insisted for the confirmation of Zil's appointment. The Minister of Interior refused to accept the British advice and informed Sir G. Barclay that he intended to appoint Ala-ed-Dowleh as Governor of Shiraz.

1. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 176, p. 82.
2. Ibid., No. 111, p. 57.
3. Ibid., No. 113, p. 57.
renewed his representation next day regarding the confirmation of Zil's appointment and immediate removal of the ex-Governor-General from Shiraz. He also informed to the Minister of the Interior that he would defer ordering the dispatch of reinforcement, until to-morrow to see what steps were being taken by the Persian Government to restore peace in Shiraz. However, the new Persian Government refused to accept the British dictations regarding the appointment of the Governor but took immediate effective steps to re-establish peace at Shiraz. The British Minister, however, decided to wait for further report from his Consul at Shiraz before ordering the dispatch of reinforcement from Bushire.

On July 21, 1909, Sir J. Barclay reported that Ala-ed-Dowlah had been appointed as Governor-General at Shiraz and that the ex-Governor-General had been recalled. He further reported that the strict instructions had been issued to the new Governor-General to take effective steps for the restoration of peace and order. The appointment of Ala-ed-Dowlah was received with somewhat mixed feelings. The respectable class welcomed the appointment whereas the professional agitators resented it. On July 22, 1909, an agitation was started against Ala-ed-Dowlah and in favour of Zil-es-Sultan's return.

1. Ibid., No. 144, pp. 65-66.
2. Ibid., No. 150, p. 67.
3. Ibid., No. 158, p. 69.
23rd, Soulat Dowleh telegraphed to Asef-ed-Dowleh telling him not to leave Shiraz and that if he did so, he (Soulat) would bring him back. However, Asef-ed-Dowleh left Shiraz on the 24th July. Soulat started for Shiraz with a large force on July 25, 1909. He also sent a force to Absheh to prevent Ala-ed-Dowleh reaching Shiraz. Under these conditions, Mr. Bill requested Sir J. Barclay to allow the reinforcement of the Consular guard. The move was sanctioned. Consequently, fifty men and one maxin gun left Bushire to Shiraz to reinforce the Consular guard there. The British force reached Shiraz on August 2, 1909. Meanwhile, Soulat, who was marching towards Shiraz, encamped himself with 2,000 men at a distance of twelve miles from Shiraz. Sir J. Barclay instructed Mr. Bill to endeavour to persuade him not to advance. Mr. Bill visited him and reported to Sir J. Barclay on August 3, 1909, that Soulat did not wish to be Governor-General. He would accept anyone except Ala-ed-Dowleh whose enmity was of long standing and who was untrustworthy. Mr. Bill further reported that Soulat would withdraw every Kashgai from Shiraz the day another Governor-General was appointed. He consented not to advance and promised to wait for three days to see his demands fulfilled provided that the Kawam did not advance on Shiraz and Al-ed-Dowleh did not start to Shiraz from Teheran. However, the

1. Ibid., Enclosure, No. 220, p. 122.
2. Ibid., No. 169, p. 72.
3. Ibid., No. 180, p. 84.
Persian Government cancelled the appointment of Ala-ed-Dowleh and appointed Saham-ed-Dowleh as Governor-General of Fars on August 11, 1909.  

The main cause of the anxiety which compelled the Britiishes to take active interest in the internal problem of Southern Persia, was the insecurity of the southern roads on account of which the British trade suffered considerably. As back as July 18, 1909, Major P.Z. Cox, the British Consul-General for Fars, had despatched a memorandum regarding the deplorable condition of the trade-routes. It was drawn up by H.J. Chick, the British Vice-Consul there. The memorandum stated that as the result of two years fighting amongst the Kashgai, Lur and Arab tribes in the vicinity of Shiraz and along the caravan routes leading to that business centre, the dispatch of goods in the districts which were fed by Shiraz, had become exceedingly difficult. Consequently, there was over flooding and congestion of goods in Shiraz. In addition to the unsafety of the trade-routes, political troubles and bad harvest were stated to be another cause which undermined the position of trade in Southern Persia. It was further stated that British firms like Messrs. David Sassoon and Co., Ltd., Messrs. Dixon and Co., Messrs. Livingstone, Zeytoon and Co., Ltd., Messrs. Grey, Paul, and Co., etc. had either collapsed or functioning in very unsatisfactory conditions.  

1. Ibid., No. 180, p. 34, also Enclosure in No. 220, pp. 122-123.
A British Indian firm was stated to have decided to close up its Bushire Branch. There was a considerable reduction in the goods imported from Britain. The year 1908-1909 witnessed the decrease in the import of Manchester goods alone in Bushire from 439,937 l. to 318,375 l.; the year 1909-1910 was also exceedingly unpromising. The first quarter's figure being only 41,585 l. The memorandum declared that the proclamation or inception of a constitution did not offer any probability of the slightest improvement in the safety of the Bushire-Shiraz and Sunder-i-Abbas — Kerman routes. It was feared that Pars would take years to return to normalcy.

Under the sub-heading 'Extortion by Khans along Roads', the memorandum stated that the local chieftains along the 180 miles of the Bushire-Shiraz road had challenged the authority of the Governor-General of Pars and had become independent. They were fighting amongst themselves. The posts were being tampered with and robbed off commonly. The memorandum complained that against the article 4 of the Commercial Convention of 1903, rahadri was being extorted by armed tribesmen along the route in ever-increasing amounts and when protested in 1907, the local Governor replied that he was powerless as the Minister of Finance still included this item in schedule of revenue. Dealing under the heading 'State of the Main Route', the memorandum stated that the Imperial road, passing through Borazjun, Daliki, and up the mountains to Kazerun, had been block for the last two months.
Traffic being unsafe on the main road, the native merchants endeavoured to get permission to use Feruzabad route. Due to the absence of telegraph on this route, the increased chances of robbery, the dearth of forage, provisions and caravan accommodation etc., the British merchants hesitated to use this route for the transport of their goods. Under the title 'Dearth of Transport', the non-availability of the muleteers was described. Being ill-treated and plundered by the robbers and road guards, the muleteers migrated either to Yezdi road or to Resht road. The another sub-heading 'Price of Transport', dealt with increasing cost of transport. An increase from 1s. 9d. to 5s. 3d. was stated. The rate of insurance was reported to have enormously increased as the result of which the risk of robbery was described to have fallen on the British exporters rather than on the Insurance Companies or on the Persian buyers. The whole memorandum after describing the darkest and gloomy picture of the situation, expressed its doubt as to the abilities of any Governor-General of Fars to restore peace and maintain order. Under these conditions, Major Cox suggested his Government either to take some definite action or to cooperate with the Central Persian Government, in any form, to enable her to restore order and maintain peace.

1. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 183, pp. 87-89, also see British And Foreign State Papers, Vol. CIII, op. cit., pp. 784-86.
2. CD 5120, No. 183, p. 87, also see British And Foreign State Papers, op. cit., p. 783.
Sir E. Grey refrained to take any action but instructed Sir J. Barclay on August 18, 1909, to insist upon the Persian Government to put an end to exaction of mahdari. He, however, stated that the whole matter was one of considerable importance and decided to wait till he received a report from his Minister at Teheran. On September 23, 1909, Sir J. Barclay addressed a note to Sardar Assad, the Minister of the Interior, drawing his attention towards the deplorable condition of the trade-routes in Southern Persia, and more especially to that between Bushire and Shiraz. It was stated that the Bushire-Shiraz route had been practically closed for the use of commercial transportation due to the disturbances, robberies, and illegal exactions. Sir J. Barclay expressed his great anxiety on the failure of the Persian Government to maintain peace on account of which heavy losses had been incurred on British Commerce. He urged upon the Persian Government to take immediate effective steps to make the road safe and insisted for the suppression of the illegal exactions on the roads which were against the article 4 of the Anglo-Persian Commercial Convention of 1903. Sardar Assad, during a conversation, informed Sir J. Barclay that he was engaged in preparing a scheme of road-guards, which, he

2. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 247, pp. 140-141, also see British And Foreign State Papers, op. cit., Vol. CIII, p. 635.
was confident, would restore order on the roads.\footnote{CD 5120, No. 247, p. 140, also see British and Foreign State Papers, op. cit., p. 834.} Later on, it was reported that the new Governor-General of Fars, Saham-ed-Dowleh, who arrived at Shiraz early in September, had turned his attention to the conditions of the roads and had dispatched troops to open them up. On October 7, 1909 Sir B. Barclay informed Sir E. Grey that he had received good reports about the abilities of the new Governor-General of Fars, who promised to deal with the situation firmly.\footnote{CD 5120, Enclosure No. 249, p. 145.} On October 30, 1909, Sir B. Barclay recognized that there was some improvement in the condition of the southern roads.\footnote{Ibid., No. 248, p. 142, also see British and Foreign State Papers, op. cit., p. 837.} But the situation deteriorated again. The condition of the roads grew worse. The month of November (1909) witnessed increased lawlessness. Several robberies occurred. In addition to the robberies, M. Passek, the Russian Consul-General at Bushire, was attacked by Boir-Ahmadis while he was on the way from Shiraz to Bushire. He was compelled to discontinue his journey (the incident has been referred at length). The Bushire road was quite unsafe. The telegraph line was constantly being interfered with by Kashgais who, on one occasion, detained and beat a signaller. The Boir-Ahmadis
were also active on Fars-Isfahan border. They plundered caravans and killed five men. It was reported that nothing short of a strong expedition would bring the Boir-Ahmadis in to order. The Governor-General was powerless to punish the tribesmen. Under these conditions, the British Minister urged the Central Government to send immediate support to the Governor-General. The Governor-General was so powerless as to declare in the end of October that he would not be responsible for the safety of Firuzabad route. Consequently, the caravans began to use the Kazerun route. But this route was placed in charge of Kawamis — the traditional enemies of Kashgais.

Naturally, the Kashgais did not cooperate with the Kawamis and began to molest the caravans. In addition to this, the Khans of Daliki and Borasjun began to extort illegal road tax. The growing anarchy annoyed the Britishers and Mr. J.H. Bill, the Acting British Consul at Shiraz recommended Sir G. Barclay on December 15, 1909, to notify the Central Government of Persia that on account of (a) the extreme danger to the foreign subjects whose legitimate avocations compel them to travel from place to place in Persia; e.g. in 1909 alone, the robbery of Mr. Gentleman in March, Mr. Linton and Mr. Smith in April, Mr. Middleton in June, Messrs Wright and James in August, and the Russian Consul-General in November, every one of which robberies has remained absolutely unfurnished; (b) the ever growing list

1. CO. 5556, Enclosure in No. 10, p. 9.
of foreign claims for goods robbed on the trade route, which has risen in 1909 in Fars alone from 40,609.3 tomans to 57,063.8 tomans; (c) the regular increase in the wilful damage account of the Indo-European telegraph Department which is already about double the last year's total (1st Feb. 1908 - 1st Feb. 1909), and of yet more importance, the continual danger of assault and robbery run by the telegraph ghalams on repairing duty, which has frequently manaced the line with total interruption owing to the natural reluctance of the men to go out, the time has come for the Persian Government to show its ability to establish and maintain order, or to acquiesce in the punishment of the most prominent offenders by a British force, the cooperation of Persian force, if though desirable, being welcomed. On the eventual collapse of the Persian efforts, it made at all, the landing of a British punitive force would follow. Mr. Bill emphasised that there was no alternative except the above mentioned regarding the restoration of peace and pointed out that if the necessity of active measures was recognized, the sooner they were undertaken the better, as with each successful robbery, the robbers were becoming better armed, better organized and bolder. Mr. J. Barclay refrained from recommending his Government to dispatch an expedition to punish the tribes. He telegraphed to Sir E. Grey on January 1, 1910 that by deprecating such a step at the present moment, it was hard to avoid the conviction

1. Ibid., Enclosure 1 in W. 28, p. 20, for the full text of Bill's despatch, see pp. 18-20.
that we should be forced at no distant date to consider the necessity of departing from our policy as formulated in your telegram to Sir A. Nicolson of the 3rd February 1903, unless the Persian Government was promptly and supplied with funds. He stated that only prompt financial help would enable the Persians to restore peace. Citing the example of Rahim Khan's defeat at the hands of Government's forces, he claimed that this would certainly add to the prestige of the Government and advocated that the present moment was especially opportune for the grant of an advance. Meanwhile, the authority of Saham-ed-Dowleh, the Governor-General of Fars was being seriously threatened by Soulat-ed-Dowleh. The Governor-General had no alternative but to present the following demands as the condition of retaining office:

1. That Soulat should be ordered to cooperate in the maintenance of order, in default of which he should be dismissed as chief of his tribe.

2. The Governor-General should be empowered to employ the entire revenue of province of Fars for the period of one year to satisfy pressing local needs, but, above all, to organize necessary force of troops.

The following policy regarding Persia was formulated by Sir E. Grey:

"His Majesty's Government are disposed to think that the best course to adopt would be for Great Britain and Russia to stand entirely aloof from the internal affairs of Persia, allowing the existing chaos to endure till whatever element in the country is strongest gains the day. During this interval, they would be prepared to face the danger which might be involved to British commercial interests". CD. 4733, Enclosure in No. 70, p. 45.

1. CD 5656, No. 11, p. 10.
2. Ibid., No. 1, p. 1.
On the other hand, Soulart put forward certain demands as the pre-condition for restoration of peace and order. He demanded that the entire road in Fars should be placed under his control and that he should be given the governorship of several districts bordering on it, independent of Isfahan. The acceptance of these demands, Sir J. Barclay commented, would certainly result in the shape of resignation of Isfahan had Karjuzar and would lead to the renewal of disturbances among the Khamseh tribesmen, whereas if the demands were not accepted, the British Minister believed that dis-orders on Isfahan and Bushire roads would continue. However, the Persian Government refused to accept the demands of Soulart, as the result of which, the situation deteriorated rapidly. Shiraz appeared to be on the mercy of Soulart. All traffic between Shiraz and Bushire practically ended. However, Soulart made an arrangement with the merchants by which he guaranteed the safety of the road via Jim-eh, but the refusal of the Governor-General to endorse his guarantee prevented the merchants from using this route, the traders feared that the Central Government would repudiate the liability for losses. The incapabilities of the Governor-General to deal with the situation and growing differences between him and Soulart resulted in his dismissal sometimes in January 1910. Farman Farma was appointed in his place. Later on, on February 1, 1910 Sir J. Barclay telegraphed to Sir J. Grey that he had

1. Ibid., No.3, p. 2*
2. Ibid., No.18, 19, p. 16 No.29, p.21, Enclosure in No. 39, p.23*
received a written communication from the Minister of the Interior that the Jirreh route, which was practically safe, had been substituted for the Shiraz - Bushire road. Sir G. Barclay interpreted this communication as the acceptance of responsibility for the safety of the route by the Persian Government and declared that he would hold the Persian Government responsible for the robberies on goods being transported on it. In the months of February and March 1910 the caravans used to route via Jirreh from Bushire to Shiraz freely but all was dependent on the good pleasure of Soulat. The Persian Government was unable to subdue him. The Kazerun route to Bushire and Isfahan road continued to be unsafe. Several posts were robbed. The telegraph line was also repeatedly interfered with. Farman Farma resigned the post of Governor-General. Zafer-es-Sultaneh was appointed in his place. In short the situation continued to be alarming. At last, a worst possible incident happened. Mr. Bill, the British Acting Consul at Shiraz was attacked by robbers on April 15, 1910, between Kungsheh and Abadeh while he was on way to Isfahan. Two Indian sowars of his escort were killed. In a telegraphic message to Sir E. Grey, Sir G. Barclay stated that recent outrage had made it absolutely necessary that we should take some over action with a view both to rousing the Persian Government to make serious effort for the re-establishment of its authority in those regions, and to ensuring the safety...

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1. Ibid., No. 20, p. 16.
2. Ibid., No. 46, p. 29, Enclosure in No. 47, p. 31, No. 68, pp. 35-37, Enclosure in No. 69, p. 39.
3. Ibid., No. 71, p. 33.
of our officials in future against such attacks. He further stated that he was consulting the British Consular officers at Isfahan, Shiraz, and Bushire regarding the measures to be taken in Persia. On April 22, 1910, Mr. Harling the British Charge d'Affaires, reported to Sir E. Grey that the British Consular officers at Isfahan, Shiraz and Bushire had unanimously recommended the occupation of the roads by British forces as it was unavoidable in order to check further attacks on European officials. Under these conditions, Mr. Harling sought the permission of Sir E. Grey to state that if within six weeks, security was not established, the British Government would take her own measures to restore peace. In reply, Sir E. Grey authorised Mr. Harling on April 26, 1910 to demand from Persian Government a compensation of 5,000 tomans each for the murder of two sowars and to inform them that the British Government would not tolerate continued outrages on European officials. He was also authorized to urge upon the Persian Government to arrange for proper policing of the roads without delay. In addition, Sir E. Grey advised the British Consular officers to avoid travelling in the interior. If at all, the necessity of travelling arose, a large escort was

1. Ibid., No. 74, p. 39.
2. Ibid., No. 75, p. 40.
advised to accompany them. On the instructions of Sir E. Grey, Mr. Maling addressed a note to the Persian Government, on April 28, 1910 claiming compensation of 10,000 tomans for murder of the two Indian sowars. He also warned the Persian Government that continuance of such outrages on European official would not be tolerated in future. But the Persian Government returned, no reply. Consequently, Mr. Marling communicated another note in this respect on May 11, 1910. On May 25, 1910 the Minister of the Interior promised to do all in his power to improve the security of trade-routes. He stated that the caravans would be able to travel in a few weeks. But as the situation in Fars was precarious, Mr. Marling, the British Charge d' Affaires doubted any real improvement. Nevertheless, he believed the sincerity of the Minister of the Interior.

The Persian Government, inspite of her repeated promise to restore peace, could not get success in improving the situation. Practically all main routes used by British traders were reported on July 2, 1910, to be unsafe. The British Charge d' Affaires urged upon the Persian Government both verbally and in writing, the paramount importance of taking effective steps to put an end of the existing state of

1. Ibid., No. 77, p. 49.
2. Ibid., No. 105, p. 52. Enclosure in No. 105, pp. 52-53, Enclosure 2 in No. 105, p. 53.
3. Ibid., No. 96, p. 48.
affairs. Mr. Harling, however, doubted as to whether the representations would serve any purpose. He recognized that the Persian Government was quite alive to the situation but she had neither money nor men to accomplish her plans regarding the re-establishment of peace. Nevertheless, he suggested that a warning should be given to Persian Government to the effect that if, by the end of September, such a degree of security as to permit ordinary caravan traffic to be resumed, was not established, the British Government would take necessary steps in this respect. The warning, Mr. Harling considered, would encourage the few Persians who realized that until European assistance in shape of advisers and instructors, was enlisted, no progress in the field of reorganisation and reformation could be achieved, consequently, they would plead their views more vehemently. It would bring the Government and the Majliss face to face with their desperate financial position, to which they had shut their eyes. Mr. Harling believed that under the pressure of this kind of threat, the Persian Government would find means to restore order. He expected that the warning would compel the Persian Government to send M. Yezdim to Fars to restore peace. M. Yezdim had recently crushed the rebels in Azerbaijan successfully and Mr. Harling believed that it was Russian threat which compelled the Persian

+ The financial problem and the loan negotiations will be dealt later on.
Government to afford him to Azerbaijan to control the situation there. In the meanwhile, there had been a notable increase of insecurity on the main roads. The Kashgai robbers were reported to be very active. They were terrorising the environs of Isfahan. Under these conditions, Mr. Harling decided to send Abbas Kuli Khan as his agent, to inform the Council of Ministers that the British Government would no longer tolerate the almost total suspension of her trade in Persia. Abbas Kuli Khan called on the Council of Ministers on July 7, 1910, and in the presence of all Ministers, read out the notes which Mr. Harling had written regarding the deplorable situation prevailing in southern Persia. He also enquired from the Cabinet of the ultimate result of the growing lawlessness. Sardar Assad, Minister of War, promptly replied that the Persian Government had highly appreciated the friendliness hitherto shown by the British Government in avoiding to make a military demonstration in the country and that the Government would take energetic measures to restore peace in Fars and elsewhere as she had done in north. The Sardar informed the British agent that the Bakhtiyaris had been ordered to pursue and punish the Kashgai brigands near Isfahan. As regards to Fars, he stated that a radical change in the administration of that province was absolutely necessary and that the Cabinet was engaged in discussing the matter, the result of which would be communicated to the British Legation.¹ The moneyless Government of Persia,

¹. Ibid., No. 122, p. 63, No. 145, pp. 70-71 and Enclosure in No. 145, p. 71.
earnestly wished to restore peace so that she could avoid British armed intervention, but could do nothing. Situation in Kermanshah and Hamadan also deteriorated. Sir H. Grey decided the desirability of joint Anglo-Russian representation regarding the state of affairs and consequently, telegraphed on July 28, 1910, to Sir A. Nicolson, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg to urge on Isvolsky to that effect.1 According to the instruction, Sir A. Nicolson called on M. Isvolsky on July 29, 1910, and conveyed the message of his Foreign Minister to him. Isvolsky promised that he would shortly give his reply in this regard.2 But the prevailing disorders had made the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs so much annoyed that he could not even wait the reply of his proposal put forwarded to Russian Government and prepared a new scheme for the maintenance of peace in Southern Persia. On August 8, 1910, he informed Mr. O'Beirne, the Councillor of the British Embassy at St. Petersburg (sometime, Charge d'Affaires) that the British Charge d'Affaires at Tehran had recommended that the Persian Government should be informed that if order on the southern road was not restored by September, the British Government would herself undertake to perform the duty. But as the policy of active intervention, Sir H. Grey stated, was open to objection, he did not wish to commit his Government to such a policy and proposed the formation of a body of road-

1. Ibid., No. 136, pp. 67-68.
2. Ibid., No. 138, p. 68.
guards consisting of some 1,000 or 1,200 men, levied and officered by eight or ten officers of Indian army, but by the Government of India. He hoped that this measure would prove sufficient to attain the object in view and instructed O'Beirne to explain the nature of the scheme to the Russian Government. The British Charge d'Affaires was also instructed to propose to the Russian Government that the representatives of the two nations at Teheran would insist on its acceptance by the Persian Government. 1 According to the instructions, Mr. O'Beirne handed over an aide-memoire to Mr. Sazonow, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on August 12, 1910. The aide-memoire suggested that the Persian Government should be informed that if she failed to restore peace on the southern roads by the end of September, the above mentioned scheme for the policing of the trade-routes would be imposed upon her. It also proposed that the instructions should be sent to the representatives of the two nations at Teheran to make a strong joint representation to the Persian Government regarding the insecurity of the trade-routes, and to insist on the acceptance of the scheme in question by the Persian Government. On August 22, 1910, Mr. Sazonow communicated an aide-memoire to Mr. O'Beirne, in reply to the British note. It is stated that the Russian Minister at Teheran had been instructed to join his British colleague in making a strong representation regarding the insecurity prevailing on southern roads. It also

1. Ibid., No. 152, pp. 77-78, also see British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. CIII, op.cit., pp. 925-926.
declared that the Russian Government had no objection to the proposed formation of a force, analogous to the Persian Cossack Brigade, levied and officered by the Indian officers but suggested that the period of two months, given to Persian Government for restoration of peace and order, should be extended to three months. The extension of period, the Russian aide-memoire pleaded, was desirable particularly in view of the impending appointment of a new Governor-General of Fars,—probably Prince Ain-ed-Dowlah. On August 24, 1910, Sir J. Barclay, the British Minister at Teheran, agreed to the Russian suggestion that a period of three months should be given to the Persian Government in order to re-establish peace. In a telegraphic communication to Sir E. Grey, Sir J. Barclay stated that the Persian Government was intending to appoint Ain-ed-Dowlah in place of Zafer-es-Sultanah as Governor-General of Fars. He expressed his hope that the new Governor-General would be able to improve the situation. As regards to the joint Anglo-Russian representation, Sir J. Barclay stated that though, he still adhered to the advisability of such a step,


+ Zafer-es-Sultanah was dismissed from the Governorship of Fars on August 9, 1910. The recall of Zafer-es-Sultanah was stated by Mr. Harling as an indication of healthy sign — CD 5656, No. 159, p. 81, and Enclosure in No. 159, p. 85.
yet, if the representation was not accompanied by an offer of money, it should be postponed for the present. Moreover, the new Cabinet was reported to be promising. It had already announced that the restoration of peace would be one of its first tasks. Consequently, Sir E. Grey instructed Mr. O’Beirne on August 27, 1910, to inform the Russian Government that the representations should be deferred for a while.

Zafer-es-Sultaneh, the ex-Governor-General had left for Teheran on August 17, 1910. A’in-ed-Dowleh was appointed as Governor-General of Pars in his place. As the new Governor-General of was in Teheran, Kawam-ul-Mulk was appointed as Acting Governor-General. He maintained good order in the town, but was powerless in the province. The Kazerun road to Bushire remained closed, but caravans used the Feruzabad road. The main road to Isfahan was practically at the mercy of Kashgai and Arab tribesmen who used to rob the post regularly. The telegraph line was being continually interrupted and the men sent out to repair them, were robbed and beaten. The Governor of Darab and all the officials were reported to have abandoned their posts, leaving the districts at the mercy of Baharlus. The Kashgais under Soolat-ed-Dowleh were reported to

1. CD 5656, No. 157, p. 79.
2. Ibid., No. 157, p. 79.
be migrating southwards. They plundered the country side, south of Abudeh and were raiding even the outskirts of Shiraz. In short, the situation had become very alarming. Meanwhile, the departure of Ain-ed-Dowleh was delayed, the Government being unable to find funds for equipping a force to accompany him. The resignation of Farman Farms, the Minister of the Interior, in the month of September 1910, from the Cabinet, added much to the anxiety. He resigned due to the difference of opinion with his colleague respecting the attitude to be adopted by the Government towards Soulat-ed-Dowleh, the Kashgai chief. The Minister of the Interior favoured the retention of Soulat as Chief of Kashgai, at least till the arrival of a Governor-General at Shiraz. He maintained that to dismiss Soulat at this juncture would bring about a worse situation in Fars than actually existed, whereas the Cabinet favoured his immediate dismissal. At last, Sir G. Barclay delivered the Persian Government the famous ultimatum on October 14, 1910, complaining of the condition of the southern roads and trade-routes. Sir G. Barclay warned the Persian Government that if within three months, order was not restored upon the roads from Bushire to Shiraz and from Shiraz to

1. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 181, p. 101.
2. Ibid., No. 181, p. 95.
Isfahan, the British Government would herself take necessary steps for proper policing these roads. The British Minister informed the Persian Government that in case of her failure to maintain peace, the British Government would organize a local force, consisting of 1,000 to 1,200 men, levied and commanded by a number of British officers from Indian army. The expenses of the force would be met in part by a surcharge of 10 per cent on the custom duties on all goods imported at the southern ports, and in part from the revenues of province of Fars. In reply to the British ultimatum, Husein Kuli Khan, the Foreign Minister of Persia, communicated a note to Sir O. Barclay on October 21, 1910. Refering the deplorable and most disturbed condition of the country at the time when the Nationalists assumed power, the note claimed some definite improvement in the situation, although, the presence of foreign troops on the soil of Persia caused public resentment and provided pretext for incitement and intrigue to those persons who profited themselves by the former disturbances. Furthermore, the incidents at Karalagh, Ardebil, Zenjan, Veramin and other places constantly occupied the attention of the Government. The note, however, acknowledged that disorders were still prevailing at certain places but pleaded that it were due to fact that there were persons, who for their personal interests, were engaged in intrigue against the Government and who desired the country to remain in a state of unrest. These persons, when discovered used to take

refuge in various legations. Thus they availed themselves of foreign protection and considered themselves exempted from inevitable exile which was customary for such refugees. They used to intrigue with in and without the precincts of the legations. There were some others, who were foreign nationals but mixed themselves with the Persians by pretending that they were Persian subjects and committed crimes without let or hinder and declared themselves to be foreign subjects to evade the jurisdiction of the Persian Government. There were Persian subjects too, who illegally pretended to be foreign nationals and committed various crimes of sedition. These conditions were stated to be responsible for provoking disturbances in the country. Moreover, the continued presence of the foreign troops had encouraged persons, who were treacherously engaged against the Government. The prolonged stay had also encouraged the seditious people to unfoundedly hope of the return of the former regime. Further more, the financial straits and embarrassment of the Persian Government were stated to be another cause of the incompetency of the Persian Government to maintain the desired peace. The note referred to the endeavour of the Persian Government to get a loan from the two great neighbours (Russia and Britain) so that a considerable portion of it could be devoted to increase the security of roads but which could not be obtained due to the humiliating conditions imposed by these powers. The acceptance of such conditions would
have been contrary to the independence of the kingdom (the loan negotiations would be dealt later on). However, the Persian Government was engaged to secure a loan from other sources and as soon as money was obtained, she would endeavour to fully eradicate the sedition and incitement in the country. Along with the negotiations to secure a loan, the note stated, the Government was considering the ten per cent increase on the custom revenues, as suggested by the above mentioned British note. The Persian note further stated that as the suggestion contained in the British note was contrary to the independence of the Persian Government, the Government would never give her consent to it but promised that an increased ten per cent tax on custom revenues would be levied by the Government herself to maintain her independence and to remove the cause of British anxiety. Lastly, the note claimed that the commerce had not suffered at all and in proof, it drew the attention of the British Government to the extraordinary increase of the custom receipts from the south. Furnishing with the statistical figures, the note stated an increase of 100,000 toman in the Arabian custom receipts in the year 'Takagouli-il' (1909-10), as compared to the previous year. Extraordinary increase during the running year was also stated. The note further claimed an increase of about 19 per cent in the whole of Persian imports during the year 1909-10 over the imports of the year 'Phichi-il' (1908-9). During the five months of that running year, an increase of 20 per cent was stated. The note concluded by stating that in view of the above facts, the foreign subjects and no reason of complain regarding the
trade with Persia.\(^1\) In addition to the note, Sardar Assad called on Sir J. Barclay on November 11, 1910, and requested for an extension of the period of three months — given to the Persian Government for restoration of peace and order. Sir J. Barclay replied that unless the British Government was satisfied that the Persian Government was taking effective measures to cope with the disorders on the roads, the question of postponing the execution of the scheme did not arise. He, however, suggested to Sardar Assad that it would be in the interest of the Persian Government to draw up such a scheme for the restoration of peace which would itself create confidence in the British Government about the capabilities of the Persian Government to maintain law and order.\(^2\) Neither the Persian note could satisfy Sir J. Barclay nor the Sardar's interview could create any considerable change in the attitude of the British Minister of Teheran, who addressed to Persian Government another note on November 17, 1910. It was a reply to the Persian communication of October 21, 1910. Dealing with the presence of the foreign troops on the Persian soil, a reference to which had been made in the Persian note, the new British note stated that the British Government was not

\(^1\) CD 5656, Enclosure in No. 199, pp. 106-109, also see British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. CIII, op. cit., pp. 957-961, see Appendix No. 2.

\(^2\) CD 5656, No. 201, p. 109.
concerned with this problem. His Majesty's Government was concerned, the note stated, with the disorders prevailing on the southern roads and the reference to the presence of the foreign troops on Persian soil in this connection was irrelevant. As regards to the Persian claim concerning the increase in the total volume of the trade for the year 1908-10 (Takhgouli), as compared with the year 1908-9, and the further increase during the first five months of the current year, the British note pointed out that the increase in the volume of the trade had not taken place in the south but in the north. Contrary to the claim of the Persian note, the British note asserted that a considerable decrease had occurred in the Bushire customs receipts during the preceding years. However, the note acknowledged an increase in the southern customs receipts during the first five months of the running year but the increase was attributed to the exceptionally good harvest. An increase of some 12 per cent was accepted in the Bushire receipts. Notwithstanding the accepted increase, the British note stated that it could not be denied that certain southern roads were practically closed for transportation due to the prevailing disorders. The note, then suggested to the Persian Government to take effective steps to establish peace. According to it, it could be accomplished with the help of British officers, lent from the Indian army. As the officers lent from Indian army would take service under the Persian Government, the note pleaded, it would not be country to the sovereign rights of Persia. Lastly, the note declared that the contemplated 10 per cent surcharge on goods passing through
the southern customs would be consented by the British Government only on the condition that the proceeds were to be spent effectively on securing the safety of the southern trade-routes. The acceptance of the scheme proposed in the British note of October 14, 1910, the note further declared, would satisfy this condition. However, a slight change in the tone of the British note as compared with her previous note, was notable. Instead of direct execution of the scheme for policing the roads by British Government herself, the present note proposed to the Persian Government to take up the task herself. There would have been a more favourable change in the British attitude, had the riots at Shiraz not

1. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 206, pp. 114-115, also see British And Foreign State Papers, Vol. CIII, op. cit., pp. 968-69. See Appendix No. 3.

The anti-jews riots occurred in Shiraz on October 30, 1910. The basis of the riots was reported to be alleged murder of a Muslim girl by Jews. The rioters broke into the Government house, completely sacked the court of justice, and destroyed or carried away every thing including the archives. They even threatened Kavam-ul-Mulk, the Acting Governor-General, who, however, drove them out. Later on, the rioters attacked the Jewish quarters. Eleven Jews were killed and fifteen wounded. Great harm was done to the Jews, their properties were looted and houses were destroyed. Soldiers sent to defend the Jews, joined the rioters in pillaging. Kashghairs also join them. It was reported that Soulat-ed-Dowleh had instigated the riot in order to compel the Central Government to give him full powers so that he could turn out the Kawams. However, Mr. Smart, the British agent, arranged a relief subscription with the local authorities to help the Jews. Sir J. Barclay also addressed a note to the Persian Government holding her responsible for harm to British lives and property. — CD. 5656, Enclosure in No. 203, p. 112, No. 190, p. 104.
occurred and if Lingah would have not been threatened by Ghulam Husain Khan. Moreover, a Baluchis force under Jehind and Mohammed Fesha Khan threatened to advance on the district of Wurmarshur. The situation in Kermanshah was also reported unsatisfactory.

The British note of 14th October caused great resentment amongst the Persians. A circular was widely distributed in Teheran, calling on all patriots to meet on 17th November, 1910 in Artillery Square to demonstrate against the continued presence of Russian troops and against the British note.

It was reported on October 22, 1910, that a well-known marauder named Ghulam Husain Khan of Warawi was marching on Lingah with a large following. The situation was alarming and the British Vice-Consul asked for the presence of a warship there. Consequently, a British warship 'Fox' was ordered to proceed. It arrived off Lingah on 24th October. On 25th October, the British Minister at Teheran, authorised the landing of a sufficient force for the protection of lives and property of the foreigners, if an attack appeared eminent. At the same time, Ghulam Khan was warned against marching to Lingah. A Persian force dispatched to stop the marauders was reported to have been defeated on 27th Oct. This development in the situation alarmed the Britishers. Consequently, 160 men with 4 guns were landed from 'Fox' on Oct. 29th. The chief of Maskur was reported to have embarked 800 men at Shirah to attack Lingah. A British ship named 'Odin' was sent to deal with him. CD 5656, Enclosure in No. 203 p. 113.

1. CD 5656, Enclosure in No. 203, p. 112.

This demonstration was organized to protest against the British note of October 14, 1910. The new British note of November 17, 1910, added much to the fuel. A few weeks ago a demonstration, in favour of Persia, had already been organized at Constantinople (Turkey) against the action of Great Britain and Russia in Persia.
respecting the condition of the south. At appointed time, people assembled and the principal Mujtahid declared the proceedings opened. The action of England and Russia was characterised by the various speakers as directed towards the termination of Persia's independence. Sir J. Barclay tried to minimize the importance of the demonstration by reporting that only few hundred people participated and that the meeting could not evoke much patriotic enthusiasm amongst the 'indifferent' gathering. He, however, acknowledged that the interpretation of the British note by a section of European press as fore-runner of the partition of Persia between Great Britain and Russia, had not fallen unheeded in Persia. He further reported that the articles published in European press had been translated and published with exaggerated comments. An open letter from the chief Priest of Najaf to the foreign representatives at Tehran, was reported to have been published in the Persian press, in which a fervent appeal was made to justice and honour against the aggressive aims of Great Britain and Russia. Nevertheless, the Persian Government was taking such steps as to satisfy the British, so that the threatened intervention could be avoided. In order to appease the British Government, the Persian Government authorities decided to appoint Zil-es-Sultaneh, the Anglophil, as Governor-General of Fars. On November 3, 1910, the Cabinet sent a telegram to Zil-es-Sultaneh, offering him the Governorship, but Jellal-es-Dowleh the Zil's son, telegraphically advised his father not to accept
Thereupon, the Persian Government appointed Nizam-es-Sultaneh as Governor-General of Fars. He had been a successful Governor of Kermanshah and had some influence in the province of Fars. The Minister of War had undertaken to despatch a force of between 2,000 and 3,000 men to Shiraz. Meanwhile, it was announced that Soulat had guaranteed the safety of the main route from Bushire to Shiraz. In addition to these measures, the Persian Government constituted a Committee to deal with the disorders prevailing in Persia. The Committee was reported to be engaged in considering the desirability of organizing a force of road-guards to be commanded by Swedish officers. Sir J. Grey receiver favourably to this report and wrote to Sir J. Barclay that any expressed intention on the part of the Persian Government to engage as officers of proposed police force the national of a minor power must be accepted as an earnest of their sincere intentions.

2. Ibid., No. 201, p. 109.

It seems desirable to point out that in order to maintain peace and to increase the impetus of reformation in the country, the Persian Majilis had decided in September 1910, to engage a French assistant for the Ministry of Justice and several Italian instructors for the gendarmerie, in addition to American advisers for the Finance Department. But considering these measures against their interest, the two big Powers (Russia and Great Britain) instructed their Minister at Teheran to dissuade the Persian Government from engaging any subjects of a European Great Power. M. Sazonow went so far as to suggest to Sir J. Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh on September 14, 1910, to give a joint warning to the Persian rulers to the effect that if they did not alter their generally refractory attitude in regard not only to the question of foreign advisers, but to various other questions such as conversion...
of the Russian Bank debt, the satisfaction demanded for attacks on British and Russian Consular officers, and the conditions attached by Russia to the withdrawal of the Karvin force, strong and energetic measures would be taken by the two Governments. Among the means of the pressure suggested by M. Sazonow were threats to seize the customs, to increase the Russian forces, to suspend the transit of military stores for Persia through Caucasus. However, the British Government strongly deprecated the course proposed, considering that it would not be likely to result in the formation of a more conciliatory Persian Cabinet, and fearing that it might lead to an occupation of North Persia. Failing to enlist the British cooperation, M. Sazonow abandoned the idea of joint pressure, though he intimated that his Government might use pressure on its own account. Russia, in fact, desired a more submissive Cabinet in Persia. M. Poklewska, the Russian Minister at Teheran, endeavoured to bring about the downfall of the Cabinet in Power, but Sir J. Barclay thought that there was no prospect of its being replaced by one less extremely nationalist. Consequently, a pronounced divergence of opinion was reported to have been driven between the two representatives. Meanwhile, the British Government had decided to deliver an ultimatum to the Persian Government (the ultimatum was delivered on October 14, 1910) and the co-operation of Russia in this respect was deemed necessary. Breaking all the rules of international morality, the British Government instructed her Minister at Teheran not to allow any divergence of view with the Russian Minister and to give active support to the demands made by Russia as conditions for the withdrawal of the Russian troops, even if the joint pressure of the two representatives should endanger the existence of the then existing Persian Cabinet. This blackmail enabled the British Government to secure the Russian support — See Gooch and Temperley, Vol. X, Part I, p. 744.

However, there was some definite improvement in the situation. Therefore, on December 28, 1910, the Persian Government confidently communicated a reply to the British note of November 17, 1910. Referring to the problem of the presence of the foreign troops on the Persian soil, which was stated by the previous Persian note as one of the sources responsible for the disturbances prevailing in southern Persia but which reference in connection with the lawlessness in southern Persia was described by the British note as irrelevant, the new Persian note stated that the continued stay of the foreign troops had naturally engaged the attention of the Government and caused her prestige to suffer as well as caused the good intention of the Government to maintain complete order unproductive of result. Regarding the communications between Bushire and Shiraz, the note stated that in order to uphold commercial relations, Soulated-Dowlah had been appointed to maintain law and order on the Bushire-Shiraz road. In addition, the note enumerated several preliminary measures being taken by the Persian Government for the maintenance of peace. The Persian note categorically rejected the British charge that the British commerce had suffered and statistically proved that the general trade in south had increased and progressed. Regarding the surtax of 10 per cent on the southern customs, the note stated that in view of the supreme importance attached by the Persian Govt. to the perfection of order and the consolidation of commercial relations, the Persian Government would institute a scheme by which the revenue derived from that source would be
effectively applied to the expenditure in view. Sir J. Barclay communicated the reply of the above Persian note on January 21, 1911. He expressed his satisfaction on the special measures being taken by the Persian Government to restore order on the southern roads. He, however, doubted on the basis of the reports sent to him by the British Consular officers that the diminution of robberies on the main route from Bushire to Shiraz during the past few weeks was due to the arrangements made by Soulat-ud-Dowlah. Unusual severity of the weather was doubted to be the cause of inactivities of the robbers. Consequently Sir J. Barclay stated until and unless the significance of the measures taken by the Persian Government was proved, the British Government would not decide as to whether steps taken by the Persian Government were likely to form an acceptable substitute for the British scheme outlined in British note of 14th October 1910. Nevertheless, the British Minister at Teheran recognized that the Persian Government was determined to do her level best to restore peace on southern routes. This fact led him to decide not to press on the Persian Government for the implementation of the British scheme and to wait the results of the measures in question. However, Sir J. Barclay made it clearly known that in case of recrudescence of disorders on the Bushire-Isfahan road, the British Government would reconsider her

1. CD. 6104, Enclosure in No. 7, pp. 6-7, also see Appendix No. 4.
expectant attitude. He also reserved the right to insist on the engagement of British-Indian officers at any moment should his Government perceived that the measures taken by the Persian Government were not likely to suffice for the prompt re-establishment of law and order. Regarding the proposed customs surcharge, Sir I. Barclay pointed out that as the surcharge would be virtually a tax on British trade, therefore, the imposition of this additional burden would be considered by the British Government justifiable temporarily only if the British officers, responsible to the Persian Government were appointed for the organisation of the force. The British Government would, however, not give her consent to it merely as a means of enabling the Persian Government to attempt to perform a duty which ought to be a fix charge on the ordinary Persian revenues, without any guarantee of the success.  

C - The Financial Embarrassment: The Search for a Loan.

One of the main causes of the failure of the Persian Government to restore law and order in the country other than foreign intrigue and intervention in the internal affairs

1. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 10, p. 10, See Appendix No. 5.
of Persia, was her empty treasury. The financial embarrass-
ment of the Persian Government was even recognized by the
British Consul officers in Persia. The British representative
at Tehran recommended his Government to furnish the Persian
Government with a considerable loan too. Although, the Persian
nationalists, during the constitutional movement, strongly
opposed any foreign loan, yet, when they assumed the responsi-
bility of the Government, having no other alternative,
realized the necessity of raising a loan in the foreign
countries. The situation was deteriorating rapidly. The
lawlessness was increasing in the country. The Government
was quite alive to the situation and, for the maintenance
of order in the country, the Cabinet submitted to the National
Assembly the following ministerial programme on November 30,
1909:-

1. To maintain a well-organized force, and to station it
   permanently in different parts of the country;

2. To employ regular road-guard for the protection of
   trade routes; and

3. To arrange an efficient police force in all the towns.
   The Assembly approved the programme. But, for the
   implementation of the programme, money was urgently
   needed. Consequently, it was decided to raise a loan
   of which 5,00,000 l. was needed atonce. The engagement
   of foreign advisers was also decided. On December 12,
   1909, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Persia called
   privately at the two Legations (British and Russian).
   He explained the two representatives of the pressing
   needs of the Persian Government and informed them that
   the application for the advance would be made on the

1. CD 5658, Enclosure in No. 14, p. 11.
following day. On December 13, 1909, the Minister for Foreign Affairs accompanied by the Minister of Finance visited the two Legations and applied for the advance from the two Governments of 5,00,000 l., which the two Persian Ministers declared to be imperatively needed for the restoration of order and for reforms in the administration, especially in the Department of Finance. Both the representatives promised to telegraph the application to their respective Governments. They, however, endeavoured to elicit the views of the Persian Government as to the security for advance, employment of money, control of expenditure, and the engagement of foreign agents. The Persian Ministers were unable to state their views in this regard with more precision, however. Sir E. Barclay gathered the following information from the conversation, which he telegraphically reported to Sir F. Grey:

"Persian Government offer at present no security. They hope for a considerable loan later for consolidation at low interest of the floating debt, which would reduce charges on customs-house, thus enabling them to provide for necessary security. Ministers stated that money was to be used for restoration of order, for which formation of an army and gendarmerie was needed and for reforms, especially financial. They said they were preparing and would communicate to the two Legations a detailed programme of expenditure, and also a scheme of control, of which we could gather no clear idea except that M. Bizot was to be given more influence than heretofore, and was to superintend its execution. If foreign advisers were found necessary they would be engaged, the

1. Ibid., No. 14, p. 11, and No. 2, p. 1.
2. Ibid., No. 2, p. 1.
Majlis having approved their employment in principle, but as regards finances they wished for the present to try how far changes in Persian staff and the employment of enlightened persons would suffice to effect necessary reforms.\(^1\) commenting on the above conversation, Sir J. Barclay stated it to be not very encouraging, nevertheless, he recommended that the two Governments (Russia and Great Britain) would not refuse to discuss an advance. He acknowledged that the Persian Government was for the first time trying sincerely to prepare a sensible budget and a scheme for control.\(^2\) In response to Sir J. Barclay's recommendation to discuss an advance, Sir J. Grey telegraphically informed on December 15, 1909, that the Imperial Government and the Government of India were prepared to make a joint advance of 2,00,000 £., provided that the conditions of the advance were satisfactory and proper security could be obtained.\(^3\) On the following day, in another telegram to Sir J. Barclay, Sir J. Grey stated that to grant an advance to the Persian Government was absolutely necessary and consented to offer the advance even on minimum security. He further stated that if the Russian Government would contribute a sum of 2,00,000 £., then the British would also grant a sum equal to the Russian contribution but expressed his inability to contribute more. On January 6, 1910.

\(^1\) Ibid., No.2, p.1.
\(^2\) Ibid., No.2, p.1.
\(^3\) Ibid., No.4, p.2.
\(^4\) Ibid., No.6, p.3.
Sir A. Nicolson, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported to Sir E. Grey that the Russian Government had agreed in principle to grant an advance to the Persian Govt. though they were convinced that an advance of even 400,000 l. would not lead to an effective improvement of the situation. They feared that the advance would be exhausted speedily. Consequently, the Russian Government recommended that an advance should be made in close connection with a more considerable loan, as the latter could alone provide necessary funds for the introduction of urgent reforms and for extinction or conversion of floating debts, which were so burdensome to the Persian Treasury. Furthermore, the attention of the British Government was drawn by the Russian Government to the fact that only by means of negotiating a large loan, Russian and British would be in a position to insist on the institution of an effective financial control. The Russian Government, Sir A. Nicolson reported, was of the view that a control of the expenditure of the advance was absolutely necessary and it would be entrusted to a special financial commission. Expressing his views on the Russian proposal regarding the advance to the Persian Government, Sir E. Barclay, in a telegraphic message to Sir E. Grey stated that although it was impossible to assert that the financial assistance would really enable the Persian Government to restore normal condition in the country, yet, there was a chance of success, which demanded a trial. He further stated that the important factor in grant-

1. Ibid., No. 11, p. 10.
ing the advance was not the 'magnitude' of the sum to be given but it was the 'practicability' which would count. Moreover, Sir J. Barclay commented that the authority of the Persian Government would be greatly strengthened in the provinces by the mere fact that she was being jointly assisted by Britain and Russia. However, on February 13, 1910, Sir A. Nicolson reported to Sir E. Grey from St. Petersburg the willingness of the Russian Government to join in immediate advance of 400,000 l. to the Persian Government. The Russian Government, Sir A. Nicolson's report further stated, had also agreed with the British Government that too much onerous conditions should not be attached with the advance. The agreement being reached between Britain and Russia regarding the advance to the Persian Government, the representatives of the two Powers handed over a joint note to the Sakat-almulk, the Acting Foreign Minister of Persia, on February 16, 1910, stating the conditions on which the two Powers were prepared to make a joint advance of 400,000 l. While handing over the note, the two representatives expressed their hope that the Persian Government would accept the terms, which, they stated, were consistent with the line of Policy of the two Powers under the Anglo-Russian Agreement. The conditions attached with the advance may be summarised as follows:

1. Ibid., No. 13, p. 11.
2. Ibid., No. 27, p. 18.
3. Ibid., No. 45, p. 27.
1. The Persian Government was to submit a programme of the expenditure, to be approved by the two Legations and to be controlled by a commission composed of the Financial Adviser, the Administrator-General of the Customs, two members of the Majlis and two Persian officials. The commission was to be presided by the Minister of Finance.

2. The programme of expenditure must provide for the appointment of seven French officials in the Ministry of Finance, with executive powers.

3. It must provide for the organization of a sufficient armed force for the security of trade-routes. The Persian Government was to engage foreign instructors in this regard immediately but no foreign instructor should be engaged for any armed force without the previous consent of the British and Russian Governments.

4. Persia must grant no railway concessions without previously offering the option to the British and Russian Governments. The Persian nationals could receive the railway concessions provided that they had no foreign capital behind them.

5. The concession for the Navigation on Lake Urmia to be given to the Tabriz-Julfa Road Company.

6. This advance should constitute the first instalment of the loan, for which the Persian Government had applied, should it be agreed to by the British and Russian Governments. In the contrary event, this advance, at the rate of 7 per cent per annum, should be redeemed in ten annual instalments secured on the custom revenues and if those were insufficient the revenues of the mint should serve as additional security. The conditions attached with that small loan was too much onerous. Their acceptance would have certainly been contrary to the independence of the Persian Kingdom. A strong agitation against the acceptance was set on foot in Majlis. Even before the submission of conditions to the Assembly, a section of the Majlis engineered popular demonstration against their acceptance in the form of petition.

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2. Ibid., Enclosure in No.199, p.107.
signed by many members of the mercantile community.
The clergy of Najaf and other places also telegraphically protested against them.1 So was the popular resentment against the conditions attached to the proposed advance that the Minister of Finance of Persia had no other alternative but to inform Mr. Churchill, the Oriental Secretary of the British Legation on March 17, 1910 that it would be useless to submit them to the Majlis, for in their present form the Assembly would certainly reject them.2 In the meantime, while the proposed joint advance was under consideration and had not been finally rejected by the Persian Government, a firm known as International Oriental Syndicate was reported to have offered a British firm the option of making a loan to the Persian Government. The security was reported to be as follows:

1. Interest held by Persian Government in D'Arcy oil concession.
2. Mint profits.
3. Receipts of postal and telegraph departments, after deducting that portion of them which had been pledged to the Government of India in 1903 and 1904, and uncharged State revenues generally.

This change in the situation alarmed Sir S. Gray, who on March 8, 1910, telegraphically instructed Sir A. Nicolson the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to acquaint M. Isvolsky with the above developments and to suggest that following joint communication should be made to the Persian Government:

'that the two governments cannot sanction the pledging of any source of public revenue as security for advances other than the proposed joint advance so long as not only the two banks but also the two governments are not

1. CD. 5656, No.34, p. 24.
receiving the payments due to them, and so long as negotiations are still proceeding for a joint advance.¹

M. Isvolsky agreed with the British proposal and instructed to the Russian Minister at Teheran to join with his British colleague in warning the Persian Government as suggested.² Consequently, Sir O. Barclay was instructed on March 12, 1910 to warn the Persian Government in conjunction with M. Poklewski.³ The joint warning was handed over to the Prime-Minister of Persia on March 15, 1910.⁴ Referring the loan offer of the International Syndicate (Limited) to the Persian Government and the security to be furnished with in this regard, the warning stated that 'as long as the joint advance of 400,000 l. offered to the Persian Government by the British and Russian Governments on the 13th Ultimo is under consideration, and so long as the Persian Government are in arrear in their payment of interest and of principal to His Majesty's Government and to the Imperial Bank of Persia, His Majesty's Government cannot agree to the hypothecation by the Persian Government of any sources of its public revenue to any advance except that now under negotiation between the British and Russian Governments on the one side and the Persian Government on the other'.⁵

Mr. S. Shaffari

1. D. 5656, No. 37, p. 25.
4. Ibid., No. 250, p. 32.
5. Ibid., Enclosure in No. 67, p. 36.
communicated the reply of the above warning to Sir J. Barclay on March 20, 1910, which runs as follows:

"Firstly, that the Persian Government is convinced, and of course your Excellency will also admit, that the only negotiation of an advance and a loan between the Persian Government and the Governments of Great Britain and Russia cannot do away with the full power of the Government over its uncharged sources of revenue which are feasible for all kinds of transaction; secondly, that my Government gives assurances that any arrangements made by the Persian Government with your well-respected Government in connection with any of the sources of the revenue of the country will always be fully respected. More or less a similar reply was communicated to the Russian Government. But the reply of the Persian Govt. could not satisfy Sir J. Barclay and he suggested his Government to address another note. Sir E. Grey consulted Mr. Iswolsky in this regard through his ambassador. M. Iswolsky agreed and consequently a joint note was addressed to the Persian Government on April 7, 1910. The note recognised Persia’s right to borrow money from outside quarters, provided that the sources of revenue already pledged as security for the British and Russian loan were not made security for the new loans, and

1. Ibid., Enclosure 2 in No. 67, p. 36.
2. Ibid., No. 60, p. 34.
3. Ibid., No. 61, p. 34.
4. Ibid., No. 62, p. 34.
5. Ibid., No. 69, p. 35."
2. that a previous arrangement be arrived at regarding the debts of the Persian Government to England and Russia, so that the interests, the mode of payment, and the source whence they would be paid could be known. In addition, the joint note asked that no concessions which were likely to be prejudicial to the political or strategical interests of the two Powers be granted to the subject of other Governments.\(^1\)

The reply of the joint note being not returned, M. Poklowski and Mr. Marling called on the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs on May 4, 1910 and pressed for a reply. With regards to loans, Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that Government had discussed the question and were willing to give the assurances required. With regard to concessions, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the Government was ready to give a satisfactory assurance on that point also, if it referred to railways only. He, however, made it clearly known to the two representatives that the Persian Government had decided not to grant any railway concession at all. The representatives of the two Powers replied that the narrow interpretation of the conditions referring to concessions was not acceptable to them. However, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he would communicate a reply by the end of the week after consulting the Cabinet.\(^2\) As promised, the Persian Government communicated the reply to joint note on May 7, (20) 1910 to the representatives of the two Powers. The

\(^{1}\) Ibid., Enclosure in No.87, p. 43.

\(^{2}\) Ibid., No. 81, p. 41.
Persian Government accepted conditions 1 and 2. As to the last point of the joint note, the Persian Government stated that as it was vague they would defer their reply until the receipt of a written explanation from the two Governments. The explanation required was communicated to the Persian Government on the same day and runs as follows:

"In view of the difficulty of defining concessions which might injuriously affect their political or strategic interests, the two Powers expect that before granting any concessions for means of communications for telegraph or harbours to a foreign subject, the Persian Government will enter into an exchange of views with them in order that the political or strategic interests of the two Powers may be duly safeguarded. Any act in contravention of this principle would be regarded as contrary to the traditional friendship so happily existing between Persia and Russia and Great Britain." The Persian Government was not invited to return any answer to this communication. On June 7, 1910, Sir H. Grey instructed Mr. Marling to endeavour to dissuade the Persian Government from sending reply to the above joint declaration. In case of his failure in that regard, Mr. Marling was instructed to convey the Persian Government, provided the Russian Government concurred, a verbal expression of regret pointing out the

1. Ibid., No. 90, p. 46. For the text of the letter of the Persian Government, See Enclosure 1 in No. 106, pp. 53-54.
2. Ibid., Enclosure 2 in No. 106, p. 54.
consequences which the Persian Government would have to suffer in disregarding the British wishes. On June 9, 1910, Mr. O’Birne informed Sir E. Grey that M. Isvolsky had expressed his entire approval regarding the communication to be made to the Persian Government in case the latter insisted on sending a reply in writing to the notes respecting concessions. Consequently, Mr. Harling was authorised to proceed on the agreed lines. But the Persian Government, inspite of the repeated Russo-British advice to leave the joint note unanswered, communicated the reply on September 3, 1910. The Persian note, while assuring the two Powers that the Persian Government will not take steps which would be contrary to 'courtesy, friendship and good relations', stated that the Government of Persia had no thought at present of granting to foreigners concessions of the kind indicated in the joint note. The note further stated that the Persian Government was, however, obliged to protect her independence and undoubted right of freedom. In other words, the note affirmed the right of the Persian Government to act as she would like in the matter. The representatives of the two Powers decided to return the note. The two dragomans, who handed over the Persian note to Husein Kuli Khan, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, verbally stated that the Russo-British note of 7th(20) May required no answer, as it merely conveyed a

1. CD. 5656, No. 107, p. 54-55.
2. Ibid., No. 109, p. 55.
3. Ibid., Enclosure 1 in No. 172, p. 93.
warming as to the consequence of Persia's failure to comply with the 'Legitimate' desire of the two Powers. The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs was much surprised at the return of the note. He considered the wording of the Persian Government's note absolutely satisfactory and laid great stress on the paragraph relating to the Persian Government's resolve to take no steps contrary to the friendship and good relations existing between the Persian Government and the two Powers. The dragomans drew his attention to the words 'for the present' as well as to the portions dwelling on the obligation of the Persian Government to protect her independence and rights of freedom. Husein Kuli Khan argued the matter at great length, but the dragomans, after having reminded him that the two representatives had repeatedly urged him not to send any reply at all, left the note with him and retired. Thus, the insistence of the two Powers to accept their conditions regarding the grant of concessions, the acceptance of which would have undoubtedly rendered Persian independence illusory, led the breaking off loan negotiations. Moneyless Persian Government was helpless and could not restore law and order in the southern Persia as the consequence of which the British Govt. delivered her famous ultimatum on October 11, 1910, which has been dealt in this chapter under sub-heading 'The increasing Lawness on the Southern Roads: The British Ultimatum'.

1. Ibid., No. 172, pp. 92-93.