A distinctive characteristic of Zionist strategy is that it does not want to resolve the conflict. It is rather directed at prolonging it. The resolution of conflict would mean abandonment of the fruits of aggression which would ultimately mean the abandonment of a cherished dream and a well-thought out policy, namely, the establishment of a State in consonance with past Israeli history and glory. The expansionist ambitions of Israel constitute a significant link in Zionist conspiracy against the Arabs to destroy their independence and freedom by its planned perfidious attacks. The most important tactic of Zionist diplomacy is military action. This diplomatic military strategy is used as an effective vehicle for territorial expansion which is an expression of the policy of force. A cardinal principle of the strategy is the necessity to carry out "defensive" war outside Israeli territory and to never allow the adversaries to penetrate inside Israel's boundaries. Thus the concept of defensive war is equated with preventive war and it is closely related with the question of boundaries. Israel, in its attempt to thwart the enemy's power of pre-emption always seeks extended borders through territorial expansion and the occupation of more and more Arab territory to effect mass eviction of the Arabs and correspondingly mass immigration of the Jews. Hodgkin, the Foreign Editor of The Times recording his verdict on the Israeli occupation and eviction of the Arabs said the act to be cruel, repressive and profoundly depressing. (1) Israel wanted to displace the Arabs because it thought that unless the Arabs were pushed to desperate conditions they

would not agree to have peace with Israel. Professor Jacob Talmon, one of Israel's foremost historians and leading intellectuals, said: (2) "This is a basic discrepancy in a motto which becomes a disease and which states that Arabs do not understand except the language of power and will even never surrender or agree to peace unless placed under desperate condition". Israel has always launched a war to create "desperate" conditions. The government and people of Israel have, by and large, accepted the 'doctrine' that Israel's security lies in periodic warfare which after every few years must reduce the Arab States to impotence. The doctrine of "periodic warfare" is aimed at delivering a severe blow to the economy and national life of the Arabs. It is also intended to cause "the extensive damage to property and the expulsion of very large number of the Arabs by "applying terror, bloodshed, destitution and misery" (3) in order to establish a 'purely Eretz Israel' on Arab land. Israeli attack of June 5, 1967 on Egypt, Syria, and Jordan was an important link in a chain of events which had started as early as 1947 when Israel came into existence. The war in June 1967 was a very significant event because it further enabled Israel to extend its borders deeper into Arab lands.

The war started with swift and surprise Israeli attack on June 5, 1967 upon Egyptian aerodromes. Israel also invaded the West Bank of the Jordan River and Syria. Israel claimed that it went into action in self-defence against a possible attack by Egypt. It further claimed that its sole aim in using force was to defend its territorial

integrity against Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran on May 22, 1967. The incident of the Straits of Tiran was not a cause but it was merely a pretext. The theory of self-defence has also been falsified by Israeli leaders through their public utterances. General Rabin in an interview published in the Le Monde said: (4) "I do not believe that Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent into Sinai on May 14, would not have been enough to unleash an offensive against Israel". Later on Levi Eshkol also stated: (5) "The massing of Egyptian troops in Sinai before the outbreak of hostilities was of a defensive nature".

It is obvious that the causes of the 1967 June war, which were built up sometimes on the sabotage, raids and the other upon the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba for Israeli ships, or the defence pact between Egypt and Syria and between Jordan and Egypt, were not the real causes of the six day war. These developments were immediate excuse for Israeli aggression. The roots of the conflict lie in certain provocative acts committed by Israel much before Nasser announced the closure of Tiran for Israeli ships. The most provocative incidents had occurred in Israeli-Syrian demilitarized zone which was established under the Syrian-Israeli Armistice Agreement of July 20, 1949. Israel constantly disregarded its obligations and committed many breaches of the Armistice Agreement for which it was censured and condemned by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission and the Security Council. Israel turned a deaf ear to their resolutions and requests and erected fortifications and placed police personnel in

the zone in utter violation of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. Ultimately Israel established complete control over the demilitarized zone. As Colonel Hutchison, an observer of the UNTSO stated: (6) "the situation on the Syrian-Israeli border was aggravated by Israel's constant attempt to exert total control over the Demilitarized Zones that separate the two countries in some sectors."

General von Horn, Chief of Staff of the UNTSO has also confirmed that Israel was guilty of violating the terms of the Armistice Agreement. General Von Horn observed: (7) "The Jews developed a habit of irrigating and ploughing in stretches of Arab land, for the ground was so fertile that every square foot was a gold mine in grain. Gradually, beneath the glowering eyes of the Syrians, who held the high ground overlooking the zone, the area had become a network of Israeli canals and irrigation channels edging up against and always encroaching on Arab owned property".

Israel was appropriating Arab owned land with the objective to rehabilitate more and more Jewish immigrants in the Demilitarized zone. Israel boycotted all meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission and did not allow the United Nations personnel to conduct investigations against Israel regarding the Demilitarized zone. The United Nations Secretary General brought this point before the Security Council in his report. He stated: (8)

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"Since June 1956, United Nations Military observers have been prevented by Israel from carrying out investigations in the Hagrovrim and Susita areas. Access to the Dardeera area, in the central sector of the D/zone, has also been refused to United Nations Military observers. Such restriction has prevented the investigation of Syrian complaints relating to Israeli fortifications in the Demilitarized zone."

The Secretary General also dealt at length with the Israeli policy of forcibly evicting the Arabs and appropriating their land. He said (9) that on the Western Bank of the Demilitarized zone "Arab villages have been demolished. Their inhabitants evacuated. Their lands on the Western Bank of the river, and the Khoury farm in the same area, are cultivated by Israel nationals".

Israel, however, did not abandon its policy of using the Arab owned land for cultivation. On April 3, 1967 Israel decided to cultivate all areas of the Demilitarized zone. Israeli armoured tractors helped by regular arm forces started cultivation. It was a clear attempt at instigation. Syria defended its land but Israeli planes bombarded Syrian villages. Syria lodged a complaint with the Security Council in which it stated: (10)

"The Israelis continued to cultivate the disputed areas in the Demilitarized zone for the sole purpose of instigating hostilities. This they did by armoured tractors protected by tanks and every armament, illegally placed in the Demilitarized zone, in violation of the General Armistice Agreement. This demonstrates beyond any doubt a clear criminal intent to provoke a large scale war with Syria".

This incident was a rather very serious one and according to one writer, it was "curtain-riser to the six day war". (11) According to

9. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
another observer of Middle East politics this incident was the biggest since 1956 aggression. He wrote: (12) "On April 7, the biggest Arab-Israeli battle since 1956, was fought over Syria. It precipitated all the events which led to the larger war almost exactly two months later".

Israel had launched a massive raid on April 11, 1967 and caused a serious clash by its provocative cultivation of Arab-owned lands. Israel was also responsible for aggravating the situation by its threats to invade Syria and occupy its capital Damascus. General Odd Bull, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization appealed to the two Governments to exercise the utmost restraint, to observe the ceasefire and to use the Mixed Armistice Commission to resolve differences which might arise between them. (13) U Thant also endorsed General Bull's efforts and supported (14) his "intention to continue, in the light of the responsibilities entrusted to UNTSO by the Israel Syria General Armistice Agreement and by the relevant Security Agreement and by the relevant Security Council resolutions, to exert every possible effort to help maintain an atmosphere of quiet by averting incidents between the parties".

Israel refused to lend ears to the voices of sanity and moderation and its leaders issued and delivered extremely provocative statements. Charles Yost has quoted (15) many utterances of Israeli Chief of Staff said on May 10, 1967 that Israeli forces might "attack

14. Ibid.
15. Yost Charles, op. cit.
Damascus and change its Government". On May 13, Israel's Prime Minister Levi Eshkol said that Israel would take drastic measures against Syria "at the place, the time, and in the manner we choose". On May 12, a British United Press message from Jerusalem (Israeli sector) carried the report (16) that "a highly placed Israeli source said here to-day that if Syria continued the campaign of sabotage in Israel it would immediately provoke military action aimed at overthrowing the Syrian regime". There was also a strong rumour that the USSR had warned the UAR about a probable attack on Syria by Israel. Le Figaro, has quoted a Soviet statement distributed by Tass giving the information that the Security Sub Committee of the Knesset had, in its meeting held in early May, empowered the Israel Government to take retaliatory action against the Syrians. (17) The Arab newspapers also expected Israeli aggression against Syria and other Arab States. The Al-Gumhurya gave a warning: (18) "Israel prepares aggression on a broad front in the North." The Al-Huriya (19) expected an aggression by Israel in the near future and also predicted that the Western Powers would help Israel in launching aggression against the Arabs. One day before the war an Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz published a speech by the Minister of Labour Yigal Allon wherein he said: (20) "There is not the slightest doubt about the outcome

19. Al-Huriya (Beirut), April 24, 1967.
of this war, and each of its stages and we are not forgetting the Jordanian and the Syrian fronts either."

The Israeli threats and the intemperate and bellicose utterances by its leaders deteriorated the situation further. The Secretary General of the United Nations in his report made a reference to these inflammatory speeches with a sense of great concern. He wrote: (21) "Reports emanating from Israel have attributed to some high officials in that state statements so threatening as to be particularly inflammatory in the sense that they could heighten emotions and thereby increase tensions on the other side of the lines". The Secretary-General expected concern at the "steady deterioration along the line between Israel and Syria, particularly with regard to disputes over cultivation rights in the Demilitarized zone, since the first of the year". (22)

The mobilization of Israeli armed forces was a direct threat to Syria and its territorial integrity. The Israeli strategy and policy of provoking a large scale war appeared to be abundantly clear. Syria was forced to seek Egypt's assistance under the Mutual Defence Pact of November 1966. Egypt was under an obligation to come to Syria's help in case it was threatened by any foreign power and Egyptian troops started moving towards Alexandria and Ismailia.

Nasser took such a step for two reasons. First of all both in Cairo and Damascus there existed a genuine fear of an impending Israeli aggression against Syria. Nasser wanted an effective deterrent to demonstrate Arab strength in order to prevent the situation

22. Ibid.
from escalating further. He explained his point when asked as to why he chose that time for the confrontation with Israel by requesting the UN to withdraw the UNEF. Nasser replied: (23) "When Lshkol threatened to occupy Syria it became our duty to come forward to help our Arab brothers. Thus we have to ask for the withdrawal of the UNEF".

The second reason for Egypt's response to Syria's request was severe criticism of Nasser's policy in the Arab world. Jordan and Saudi Arabia were charging Nasser of playing soft with Israel. The Israeli attack on the Jordanian village of Samou on November 13, 1966 which was condemned unanimously by the UN Security Council (24) and Israeli aggression against Syria on April 7, 1967 had gone unpunished and Nasser was under severe criticism for his utter inaction and passivity in the face of Israeli aggression. Egypt was thus placed in a difficult position. It had to face the situation and help Syria in case of the latter was attacked by Israel. But the Egyptian troops could move up to the Egyptian Israeli Armistice line only and so Egypt had to ask for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force stationed on its territory after the 1956 tripartite aggression. The UNEF was created by the proposal originally mooted by Lester Pearson of Canada on November 1, 1956 and the General Assembly Resolution of February 2, 1957 which stated that (25) the "scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement requires the placing of the UNEF on the Egyptian Israeli armistice demarcation line and the imple-

mentation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary General's report ... with a view to assisting in achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area". There was first a demand for partial withdrawal but the Secretary General said that it could only be total. This left Nasser with no choice for if he had bowed down at that stage, he would have lost prestige both at home and abroad. The demand for total withdrawal was thus forced upon him by U Thant. Nasser made it not out of choice or preference but unwillingly and under pressure of circumstances over which he had no control.

On May 16, 1967, Egypt requested the Secretary General to withdraw the United Nations Emergency Force from the Demilitarized zone along the Egyptian Israeli border. General Fawzi, the Chief of Staff of the United Arab Republic Armed Forces sent a message to Major General Rikhye, Commander of the UNEF, to remove his men from Sinai, and to group them in the Gaza Strip to ensure their safety, should military action become inevitable. (26) General Rikhye immediately communicated the message to the Secretary-General. On May 18, the Secretary General received a request for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the UAR Foreign Minister. On May 19, U Thant announced (27) that "the buffer function which the UNEF had been performing was eliminated". The withdrawal of the UNEF was criticized as a decision in great 'haste' and 'hurry'. Some people thought that the Secretary General should not have readily

complied with the UAR's request for the withdrawal of the UNEF. The United Nations was the only hope for keeping peace in the region and disillusionment became great when it failed to live up to the aspirations set for it. Many were incredulous to see that the complex and magnificent edifice of the peacekeeping UNEF had proved so fragile. The UNEF was likened to a 'fire brigade which vanishes from the scene as soon as the first smoke and flames appear' (28). The withdrawal of the UNEF was a clear indication of the situation worsening further and it created, among many countries, a sense of irritation with the United Nations and its Secretary General. Preventive diplomacy was conceived by Dag Hammarskjold as an international version of the policy of preventing further escalation of a crisis. This preventive diplomacy was institutionalized by the creation of the UNEF and with its withdrawal the chances of containing the conflict vanished. The armed forces of Egypt and Israel were brought face to face and it was no longer possible for the United Nations to perform the functions of the shock absorber. The Secretary General wanted the presence of the United Nations and he tried to reactivate the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission. His efforts did not yield any fruit because the Israeli Government refused to have anything to do with it. The decision regarding the withdrawal of the UNEF was highly resented by Israel. It questioned the power of the Secretary General to grant UAR's request for the withdrawal of the United Nations forces. The Secretary General confronted Israel with the suggestion that the United Nations forces should also be stationed on Israeli side of the armistice line. Israel saw in that

suggestion an attempt to tamper with its territorial sovereignty and it turned it down as being "entirely unacceptable". (29)

The Secretary General had acted according to the terms and conditions laid down at the time Egypt agreed to keeping the UNEF on its soil. The Secretary-General in his report submitted to the Security Council explained his position and tried to justify his stand. He stated: (30)

"The UNEF was introduced into the territory of the UAR on the basis of an agreement reached in Cairo between the Secretary General of the United Nations and the President of Egypt, and it therefore has seemed fully clear to me that since UAR consent was withdrawn it was incumbent on the Secretary General to give orders for the withdrawal of the Force. In the face of the request for the withdrawal of the Force, there seemed to me to be no alternative course of action which could be taken by the Secretary General without putting in question the sovereign authority of the Government of the UAR within its own authority."

With the withdrawal of the UNEF the Egyptian troops occupied areas including Sharm El-Sheikh, the most strategic area overlooking the Straits of Tiran. President Nasser took another logical step when he announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to all ships flying Israeli flag or carrying strategic material. On May 22, 1967, in a speech given at the airforce headquarters in Sinai, he said: (31)

"We are now face to face with Israel and if they want to try their luck without Britain and France we await them. The Israeli flag will not pass through the Gulf of Aqaba and our sovereignty over the entrance to the Gulf is not negotiable". With the closure of the Straits

of Tiran Nasser had restored the *status quo ante* existing before 1956 aggression.

The position of Egypt and other Arab States was very clear over the question of the Gulf of Aqaba. Since the position of Israel on the Gulf was not fixed by any permanent boundary decision, Israel did not have any sovereign right over the Gulf of Aqaba. The countries having permanent boundaries with the Gulf, namely, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia had agreed to close it to Israeli ships and their action was lawful. Israel has treated the closure of the Straits of Tiran as a *casus belli*. Levi Eshkol, the Prime Minister of Israel declared (32) that the blockade was a violation of international law and constituted "an act of aggression against Israel".

On May 23, President Johnson of the USA declared (33) that US considered the Gulf of Aqaba "to be an international waterway and feels that a blockade of Israeli shipping is illegally and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace". The US Ambassador to UAR Richard H. Nolte submitted a five point formula on behalf of the United States of America. The major provisions of the formula were: (1) UNEF troops would not be asked to withdraw; (2) the UAR would not send troops to Sharm El-Sheikh; (3) UAR forces would be barred from entering the Gaza Sector of the UAR-Israeli borders; (4) the United Nations would administer Gaza until the crisis was settled; and (5) UAR and Israeli troops would pull back from the border areas.

Egypt rejected the formula and the Egyptian newspaper the *Al-Ahram* reported (34) that the formula was not acceptable because

34. Al-Ahram, May 26, 1967.
it would not help solve the problem. The situation was deteriorating rapidly and there seemed to be no sign of amicable settlement of the conflict. Nasser's announcement of the closure of the Straits of Tiran was regarded as an act of war by Israel. He did not want war; his purpose was, as the Observer said, "to deter Israel rather than provoke it to a fight". (35) The withdrawal of the UNEF and closure of the Straits of Tiran had given Nasser much the coveted diplomatic victory and he was ready to negotiate a political settlement of the Palestine Problem. The basic problem was not Aqaba or Tiran or UNEF. Nasser himself declared (36) in the Egyptian National Assembly that "the question today is not of Aqaba nor is it the Tiran Straits or the United Nations Emergency Force. It is the rights of the people of Palestine". The basic problem was that of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs who had been driven out of their homes by Israel. All other problems were ancillary. Nasser's intentions were obvious. Charles W. Yost, US Special Envoy to Cairo, observed: (37) "There does not seem to have been any intention in Cairo to initiate a war". Nasser also told Christopher Mayhew, a member of the British Parliament that if the Israelis do not attack, "we will leave them alone". (38)

Egypt had made a public announcement and issued a declaration renouncing the use of force and assuring that it did not want war.

38. Ibid.
Israel did not follow Egypt. It did not issue any public declaration renouncing its intention to attack Syria. Israel, it seemed, was not interested in a peaceful settlement. The real problem before Israel was not of territorial security because its military superiority made it dominate its neighbours. War with Arab States, however, to the Israeli leaders was the only way out to relieve Israel of its economic hardships and severe recession. Since 1965 when the repatriations of West Germany were exhausted, Israel's economy had deteriorated and the rate of growth had fallen sharply, resulting in a peculiar situation, namely, the persons emigrating from Israel exceeded those immigrating to Israel. This process seemed to threaten the very existence of political Zionism as a philosophy. About the deteriorating economic conditions of Israel the Time Magazine wrote: (39) "Crisis was permeating in every sphere of Israel life ... in 1965 Israel's economy began to slow down".

Israeli Labour Minister Yigal Allon also admitted it when he said: (40) "there were 15,000 unemployed Israelis". "A day later the State Bank put the figure 35,000 to 40,000 and two days later the Government's own economic Planning Authority decided that the figure was closer to 60,000 (nearly 10 per cent of the national labour force) and growing". The number of unemployed had reached 100,000 in 1967 and "Labour riots had broken out in Tel Aviv on March 16, 1967". (41)

A military campaign against the Arab world to be justified

41. Cattan, Henry, op. cit., p. 102.
in terms of "self-defence" was the most feasible alternative to put Israel's house in order. Israel's real intentions were, therefore, not to defuse the crisis. It rather wanted to escalate it and looked only for an opportune moment. Before striking against the Arab States Israel wanted to ensure the support of the United States and neutralization of the United Nations. The Arab States seem to be convinced of the fact that Israel was acting in collusion with the United States. Military experts are of the view that Israel could not have carried out its attack on the Arab States without effective assistance of its western supports chiefly the United States. The experts also point out that the vast air operation conducted by Israeli airforce against Egypt, Syria and Jordan could not have remained undetected by the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. (42)

The US ship "Liberty" torpedoed by Israel was only 15 miles away from shore. The ship was spying and knew what was going to happen. The very fact that American warships equipped with the most modern and sophisticated electronic devices to detect air attack did not warn the UAR of the impending attack made one suspect the United States intentions. Before the June war "a joint memorandum had been drawn up by the Secretary of Defence and Secretary of States." They advised President Johnson that the United States was faced with two basic policy choices in making good its commitments to Israel. They were: (1) "to permit Israel to deal with the problem alone which in official circle is referred to as the "unleashing Israel" alternative; (2) for the United States to assume responsibility for opening

the Straits. (43) The United States of America seemed to be possess-
ing information leading to the conclusion that Israel was preparing
for a strike but the United States did not warn Israel against such
an attack, much less caution to the UAR against it. The Central
Intelligence Agency's Director Richard Helms had his own assessment
of the whole situation in the Middle East and he was sure of Israel's
victory within four days if it took the initiative. (44) General
Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the USA expressed
the considered assessment of the situation by the Department of Defence
when he said: (45) "He had no information of any Egyptian intention
to attack, if anything, it was the Israeli army that was pressing to
begin hostilities. Israel had nothing to fear. Her army was far
superior to that of Egypt."

Israel started war with the connivance of the USA who had asked
the UAR to play cautious and not to take the initiative. The United
States of America was a major ally of Israel and had a vested interest
in its survival as a viable political entity. For its security, Israel
mainly depended upon the United States. Having been incessantly
backed and supported by Western Imperialism, the "protection of Israel's
security" said (46) the Israeli Prime Minister, "depends on the pre-
sence of the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean".

The strategic policy of Israel to launch a massive surprise
attack on the Arab States became possible only with the aid and assistance

45. Kimche and Bawly, op. cit., p. 126.
of the United States as Israel's survival is believed to be of vitally important for strengthening and preserving American interests in the region. The United States wanted to use Israel to encircle the revolutionary movements and to tighten imperialist control over the Arabs to guarantee to western monopolies support in their oil interest. "The continued flow of oil at economically reasonable rates to Western Europe" outlined, (47) Alexis. Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for political affairs, "is of great importance ... Access to the air and sea routes to and through the Near East is important to us commercially and militarily". According to US assessment, the main problem or threat in the Middle East is not provided by the Arab-Israeli conflict, but by the progressive policies of the Arab States, adversely affecting Anglo-American interest and promoting the cause of communism. Senator Joseph Clark appeared before the Congressional Sub-Committee on Peace in the Middle East and he said (48) in his testimony that the obstacle "to peace" in the region is the UAAn and its progressive orientation. He called for the 'destruction of the progressive regimes' in the Arab world and a greater commitment to Israel as the bulwark of American interests in the region. President Johnson was confronted with intensified American Jewish Community criticism over his Vietnam policy. He argued that the American Jews continually exerted pressure on US Administration to support Israel but were opposed to their commitments to South Vietnam. He raised the issue with Abba Eban when he visited Washington in February 1966. Johnson sought American Jews' support for his policy

in Vietnam in return for military aid to Israel. Israel was conducting negotiations for the delivery of American arms, missiles and aircraft. Israel and its supporters agreed to work to muzzle Jewish opposition to his Vietnam policy as a price for U.S. military aid.

Israel is a state created by imperialist powers and propping it to contain the forces of progress in the Middle East. The United States of America was at the time itching to let the UAR down for its anti-American politics. Rabbi Emile Berger studied the conflict at the level of international politics and according to him the real target of 1967 conflict was neither Aqaba nor the Straits of Tiran nor the Straits of Tiran nor was the issue of Israeli sovereignty. The real aim or object rather was that "both the British and the United States wanted Egyptian forces out of Yemen". (49) Issac Deutscher has blamed the USA for having encouraged Israel to wage war in order to get rid of Nasser. Had Nasser fallen "Egypt might have become another Ghana or Indonesia". (50) In Issac's opinion Israel acted not only with the knowledge of Western powers but was "absolutely sure of American and to some extent British moral, political and economic support." (51) The United States of America was the most important factor behind Israeli bellicosity.

The United Nations had a special responsibility to maintain peace in the Middle East. The Secretary General had not lost all hopes, he undertook his historic mission of peace to Cairo on May 23-25, 1967.


51. Ibid.
U Thant had discussions with Nasser, General Rikhye and General Bull but failed to exercise any tangible effect and the situation further worsened. The success of his attempt depended on the Great Powers sharing the Secretary General's perception of the situation and readiness to adopt suitable measures to prevent the outbreak of major hostilities between Israel and the Arab States.

The Security Council was called into session in the absence of the Secretary General. Its first meeting of the year was called at the request of Canada and Denmark on May 24, 1967. The representative of Denmark said: (52)

"There has been a military build-up along the borders of Israel and the United Arab Republic, and there is no way of denying that the stage is set for a major military clash.... the slightest miscalculation, the slightest misunderstanding of one or the other wise of the opponents' intentions, could lead to large-scale hostilities."

The Security Council met twice on May 24 but no positive result seemed to be flowing out of it. A Canadian-Danish Draft resolution was presented before the Security Council which gave "full support to the efforts of the Secretary General" and requested the member states "to refrain from taking any steps which might worsen the situation". (53)

The resolution was not put to vote because of Russian opposition. The Soviet Union considered that the Security Council meeting should not have been called. On May 23, the Soviet Government issued a policy statement on the Middle East situation which was read in the Security Council on May 24. The Soviet Representative Fedorenko said: (54) "Let

54. UN Doc. S/PV./1342, May 24, 1967, p. 27.
no one have any doubts about the fact that, should anyone try to unleash aggression in the Near East, he would be met not only with the united strength of Arab countries but also with strong opposition to aggression from the Soviet Union and all peace-loving states."

The United States of America also presented a Draft Resolution which called upon the parties to comply with the Secretary General's appeal for restraint and caution. (55)

The United Arab Republic also presented proposals which declared that "the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement was still valid" and the United Nations machinery should be fully operative. It asked Israel to abide by the provisions of the Agreement. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO was requested to reinstate the Mixed Armistice Commission within two weeks in El-Auja Demilitarized zone. (56)

The Security Council could not take any decision on any draft because there was no agreement among the Great Powers. In the face of the failure of the Security Council the only hope of averting a major conflagration in the Middle East was U Thant who was assessing the situation in Cairo. On May 26, 1967, the Secretary General presented before the Security Council his report. The Secretary General said: (57)

"President Nasser and Foreign Minister Riad assured me that the United Arab Republic would not initiate offensive action against Israel. Their general aim, as stated to me, was for a return to the conditions prevailing prior to 1956 and to full observance by both parties of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel".

The Secretary General renewed his call for reviving the Mixed Armistice

56. Ibid.
Commissions to allow the presence of the United Nations to act as a shock absorber. He was of the opinion that a breathing spell was required for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. He urged: (58)

"All the parties concerned to exercise special restraints, to forego belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions. There are other possible courses of action which might contribute substantially to the reduction of tension in the area.... the Armistice Agreements constitute an important step towards the establishment of permanent peace in Palestine".

In this context, U Thant pleaded for the resurrection of the Egypt Israel Mixed Armistice Commission to provide a limited form of United Nations presence in the area. The Secretary General admitted: (59)

"The problems to be faced are complex and the obstacles are formidable. I do not believe, however, that we can allow ourselves to despair."

"It should be kept always in mind that in spite of the extreme difficulties of the situation, the United Nations has played an essential and important role for more than eighteen years in maintaining at least some measure of peace in the Near East. In that task it has encountered many setbacks, frustrations, crises, conflicts and even war, but the effort continues unabated. We are now confronted with new and threatening circumstances, but I still believe that with the cooperation of all parties concerned the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, must continue to seek, and eventually to find reasonable, peaceful and just solutions".

U Thant had referred to the role of Big Powers in maintaining peace in the Near East. The Soviet Union and the United States of America were conducting their battle in the Council but they were extremely cautious and trying to avoid a direct confrontation. "There

58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
were exchanges between Washington and Moscow", wrote Laquair, (60) "about the Middle East situation from May 19, each assuring the other of their desire to preserve peace in the area. It does not seem that any constructive measure was suggested; perhaps these exchanges were thought necessary in view of the movements of the Eastern Mediterranean task force of the Sixth Fleet, and the gradual Soviet naval build-up in the Mediterranean". France wanted the Big Powers to work jointly. George Gorse, Minister of Information of France declared that (61): "the 1950 Tripartite Declaration was no longer binding. The Security Council was powerless to act without agreement between America, the Soviet Union, Britain and France, and its was therefore the special responsibility of these four to meet and to take joint action to preserve peace".

There were hectic activities within the United Nations to revive preventive diplomacy propounded by former Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold. Outside the United Nations the parties concerned were drifting towards more belligerent position. On May 28, Levi Eshkol, the Israeli Prime Minister declared (62) that his Government was fully prepared for any military eventuality and also maintained that the USA, Britain and France were ready "to work without delay for a rapid lifting of the blockade" and the mobilization of Israeli defence force was a "decisive factor in the speeding up of international political activity". The United States of America wanted to


61. Ibid., p. 186.

ensure for Israel the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran. Washington had thrown its full weight behind the British move to rally the maritime nations against the blockade. Most of the countries approached were reluctant to sign a joint declaration which would have led to the loss of oil concessions and other complications with the Arab States. The prevailing view in the State Department and the Pentagon was that the use of military force should be avoided. Such a view emanated from the belief that Israel was militarily superior and General Wheeler, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff had predicted (63) that "the Israelis would win the war within three or four days if they brought off the first air strike."

By May 29 it was clear that Washington, in spite of earlier pronouncement regarding the closure of Tiran, was not "prepared to take or support physical action to enforce freedom of navigation". (64)

Abba Eban met President Johnson to pressurize him into resorting to the use of force to ensure for Israel free passage through Aqaba. Johnson seemed to have offered Israel "an American commitment to maintain its economic viability". (65) Washington, told Johnson, was willing to sustain Israel's economy, its oil requirements if Israel refrained from using force to break the blockade.

According to one reliable source the substance of American offer to Israel was: (66) "The United States can offer you firm guarantees against your destruction, even including air cover for your

cities against Egyptian bombers provided that a shooting war is unleashed on the Arab side... If, however, Israel makes the first move the United States can offer little but words of sympathy and expression of goodwill."

The State Department of the United States evolved a new compromise formula asking for free passage for all but Israeli ships during an 'interim period', in the course of which a permanent solution would be sought. (67)

The United States of America's stand was dictated by one overriding consideration: what would the Soviet Union do? The USA did not want to risk another confrontation with the Soviet Union as it was deeply involved in Vietnam. The focus of American effort to solve the Middle Eastern problem without using force was, therefore, in the United Nations. The Security Council met on May 26, 1967.

Arthur Goldberg of the United States told (68) the Security Council:

"The attitude of the States was not partisan. The United States was committed to supporting political independence and territorial integrity of all nations of the area, and opposed aggression by anyone in any form, whether overt or clandestine. In the view of his Government, the first thing the Council must do - as an interim measure and without extended debate - was to endorse the Secretary General's appeal and call on parties concerned 'to exercise special restraint, to forego belligerence'. (69)

According to Goldberg "foregoing belligerence must mean foregoing any blockade of Aqaba during the breathing spell as requested by the

69. Ibid., p. 16.
Mohammad Awad El Kony of the UAAC accused Israel of contemplating "an attack against Syria". He said: "The Israeli authorities claimed the right to navigate in the Gulf. That was without foundation. The Gulf had been under uninterrupted Arab control for over 1,000 years. It had always been a national inland waterway subject to absolute sovereignty. It was a mare clausum and so was not an international waterway. There is no shade of a doubt as to the continued existence of the state of war between the Israelis and both the Arabs of Palestine and their brethren in the Arab countries... My Government has the legitimate right, in accordance with international law, to impose restrictions on navigation in the Straits of Tiran with respect to shipping to an enemy". El Kony charged (71) Israel of "unilateral denunciation of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement" and asked that "this Council should, in its endeavor to deal with the present situation, recognize the continuing validity of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement and that the United Nations machinery emanating therefrom should be fully operative". He asked the Council to call on the Israeli government to respect and abide by its responsibilities under that agreement.

Rafael of Israel said: (72) "Every interference with the freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba was an act of aggression against Israel, an infringement of the sovereign rights of all nations to unimpeded use of this international waterway, and a gross violation

70. Ibid., pp. 36-37.
72. Ibid., p. 17.
of international law". George Tomch of Syria said: (73) "The crisis in the Middle East was the direct outcome of the unprovoked, massive attack by regular Israeli forces against the Syrian people and territory on April 7. In its wider and deeper context, it was but a manifestation of the Palestine Question.

Mohammad El Farra of Jordan said: (74) "Israel's persistent violations of the Armistice Agreement had caused the present tensions in the area. War was a tragedy. Nobody wanted war. But when the Council allowed injustice to continue because of power politics and political expediency in order to secure a so-called peace, no peace was secured". About the Gulf of Aqaba and Israeli claim El Farra said: "It must be remembered that Israeli presence on the Red Sea was a military presence resulting from an act of occupation in violation of Security Council ceasefire resolution. The Gulf of Aqaba was an Arab Gulf. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom was entitled to become self-appointed jurists or to pass judgement on the status of Arab waters".

Fedorenko of Soviet Union condemned Israel for its warlike preparations. He said: (75) "The real culprit in the dangerous aggravation of tensions once more was Israel, which could not have acted as it had without the direct and indirect assistance of certain imperialist powers seeking to restore colonial domination over the Arab lands. The Security Council must decisively condemn provocations and threats against the Arab States."

Parthasarthi of India supported the Secretary General's suggestions and said: (76) "The United Arab Republic was exercising its

73. Ibid., p. 20.
74. Ibid., p. 23.
75. Ibid., p. 19.
76. Ibid., p. 18.
sovereignty in asking for the withdrawal of UNEF. The Gulf of Aqaba was an inland sea and entry into it lay within the territorial waters of the United Arab Republic. No State or group of states should attempt to challenge by force the sovereignty of the United Arab Republic over the Straits of Tiran.

The Security Council could not adopt any resolution and in the meantime the situation in the Middle East was rapidly deteriorating and assuming alarming proportions. The United Nations failed to comprehend the speed with which the situation was worsening. "In view of the extreme gravity and urgency of the situation", observed (77) Arthur Lall, "it was not time that the Council lacked but unfortunately, a clear perspective of the dangers involved and a determination to grasp the full nature of its own responsibility".

Israel had, it seemed, made up its mind about recourse to the use of force. A cabinet reshuffle was announced in Tel Aviv on June 1 which brought Moshe Dayan, a hawk, back as Defence Minister of Israel. Dayan the master of deceit played soft with the press about the prospects of Israeli attack. He said: (78) "it was too late for any military attack and too soon for diplomatic activities and if some formula could be achieved in time he would be glad and surprised". Dayan's appointment as Israel's Defence Minister was the most unambiguous hint of Israeli intentions. Dayan's comeback was the most sensational peace in the whole drama and now subterranean emotions surfaced in patriotic demonstrations throughout the country. It was a

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victory for military sector. The chief characteristic of Israeli political system is the constant power struggle between the military sector and the civilian sector. The ascendancy of Eshkol, Ebban, and others was regarded as a victory of the civilian sector. In May-June the people of Israel were getting impatient with political leaders who were talking about peace. "They had become increasingly annoyed with Eban, who they believed had allowed his zeal for peace to impede his judgement". (79)

The appointment of Dayan as Defence Minister was a positive victory of the Militants who had always distrusted Israeli politicians talking softly. They wanted action which meant war with the Arabs and it came on June 5 when in the early hours Israeli airforce bombarded the airfields of the UAR, Jordan, Syria and Iraq. The UAR promptly declared national emergency while Algeria, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait and Sudan announced that they were at war with Israel. The Israeli forces advanced swiftly and by 10 June Israel was in possession of the whole of Sinai, Gaza, Jordan's West Bank and the Golan Heights of Syria.

Israeli Prime Minister told the nation that Israel was trying to repulse an aggression. He told his people and the people of the world a blatant lie when he said: (80) "Egypt has imposed a military battle on us. The army and the people will stand firm... We have the power to foil the design of the attacker. Israel seeks peace. It defends peace... Our only aim is to rid our borders of every threat of sabotage and every danger of aggression".

79. Kimche and Bawly, op. cit., p. 151.
Kafael of Israel repeated the same lie in the Security Council when he informed (81) the world organization: "Egyptian armoured columns moved in an offensive thrust against Israel's borders. At the same time Egyptian planes took off from airfields in Sinai and struck out towards Israel. Egyptian artillery in the Gaza Strip shelled the Israel villages of Kessufni", etc. "Israel forces engaged the Egyptians in the air and on land and fighting is still going on". Israel was trying to justify its aggression by telling the United Nations that it had been attacked by the UAR.

The Security Council had a letter from the representative of the UAR which stated (82) that Israel had "committed a treacherous premeditated aggression" against his country. The United Arab Republic "in repelling this aggression ... had decided to defend itself by all means in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations." The Secretary General in his report told (83) the Council that "there was a serious military action on land and in the air at a number of points which was spreading". He also told that "three UNEF soldiers in the Indian contingent were killed and an undetermined number wounded when Israeli aircraft strafed a UNEF convoy". Partha Sarthi of India asked the Council to condemn Israel (84 for the "wanton irresponsible and brutal action" in which Indian soldiers were killed.

83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
El Kony of UAR stated (85) in the Council that "for several hours now the Israeli armed forces and the Israeli Air Force have again committed a cowardly and trecherous aggression against my country". "This aggression," asked El Kony, "be vigorously condemned by the Security Council."

On June 6, 1967 the Security Council adopted a resolution unanimously. It said: (86)

"The Security Council,

"Nothing the oral report of the Secretary General in this situation;

"Having heard the statements made in the Council,

"Concerned at the outbreak of fighting and with the menacing situation in the Near East,

"1. Calls upon the Governments concerned as a first step to take forthwith all measures for an immediate ceasefire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area;

"2. Requests the Secretary General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation."

Arthur Goldberg of the United States welcomed the resolution because, according to him, (87) "the ceasefire was the urgent first step to restore peace to the Near East. Once that was done the Council should turn its immediate attention to achieving a more lasting peace". Lord Caradon of Britain welcomed the resolution and said: (88) "The Council had taken a first essential step and only a supreme effort could enable it to rise to its obligation to establish a just settlement and to restore the authority of the United Nations. He

87. UN Doc S/PV. 1348, p. 7.
88. Ibid., pp. 18, 20.
trusted the Council would not fail to make that supreme effort".

India welcomed the resolution but made it clear that it would have preferred a resolution calling for (89) "a withdrawal of armed forces to positions held by them prior to the outbreak of hostilities, that is as on June 4, 1967 along with the ceasefire".

The Soviet Union adopted the same line and its representative Fedorenko stated: (90) "The Soviet delegation decisively condemns the aggression of Israel, considers it to be the bounden duty of the Security Council to adopt without any further delay a decision concerning the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the forces of the aggressor beyond the Armistice Lines".

Eban of Israel also spoke in the Security Council. He said: (91) "The Government and people of Israel were disconcerted by some aspects of the role of the United Nations in the conflict. Israel welcomed the appeal for the ceasefire as formulated in the resolution, but its implementation depended on the absolute and sincere acceptance and cooperation of the other parties".

George Tomch of Syria said: (92)

"It was clear from the statement of the Secretary General and the death of the UNF soldiers, that Israel started the aggression against the United Arab Republic. All subsequent events flowed from the premeditated and well prepared Israeli attack on the United Arab Republic. As for the resolution which the Council has just adopted, his Government opposed any gains made by Israel through a fait accompli. It was the duty of the Council to condemn Israel, the aggressor, and to apply the sanctions provided for in the Charter".

89. Ibid., p. 46.
90. Ibid., p. 27.
92. Ibid.
The ceasefire orders were not observed by Israel and it continued with its plan of expansion and occupation. On June 7, the Secretary General reported Israeli violations of the ceasefire order of June 6. He said: (93) "Israeli forces continued bombardment of Mount Scopus in Jerusalem, and occupied the crest". The Secretary General also "informed (94) the Council that "Jordan had accepted the ceasefire resolution and had stated that immediate orders were issued to the armed forces to ceasefire except in self-defence".

Fedorenko of the USSR charged: (95) that "Israel was not heeding the Council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire". He categorically condemned Israel for its unjustified aggression against the Arab States and introduced a resolution which was adopted unanimously.

The Security Council's resolution of June 7, 1967 noted that military activities in the Near East were still continuing. The resolution demanded "that the Governments concerned should as a first step cease-fire and discontinue all military activities at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967".

Eban of Israel charged (96) that the "Arab states had not complied with the ceasefire resolution". "The Soviet draft resolution lacked balance and distributed responsibility inequitably". Tarabanov of Bulgaria gave Eban a fitting reply when he said: (97)

94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., p. 14.
96. Ibid., p. 15.
"The United Arab Republic could not stop resisting aggression until aggression ceased. It could not be contended that the victims of aggression should not defend themselves against a foreign invader only when aggressor had ceased fire and had stopped its military activities, and only then, could a ceasefire begin."

Israel disregarded ceasefire orders and its armed forces kept advancing. Commenting upon Israel's flagrant violations of the Security Council's directives, Arthur Lall has observed:(98) "The strongest debating point against Israel was that, after the Council had adopted its first resolution on a ceasefire, Israeli forces had continued to advance. Indeed, they had continued to advance after Eban himself had reiterated solemnly in the Council his government's acceptance of the ceasefire."

The Secretary General had information about Israeli violation of the ceasefire which he reported to the Council on June 9, 1967. He said: (99) "The Chairman of ISMAC had informed him that the first confirmed bombing by Israeli aircraft north and east of Lake Tiberias was at 0746 hours GMT that day and that bombing, napalming and strafing had been continuous up to 1218 GMT. The Chairman had also confirmed bombing in the vicinity of Damascus at 1246 hours GMT."

Tomeh of Syria also charged Israel of disregarding the ceasefire resolutions of June 6, 7. He said: (100) "An hour after his Government had accepted the ceasefire resolution of June 6 and 7, Israel had unleashed vast air and land operations against it. These operations were proceeding with increasing intensity, leaving no

98. Lall, Arthur, op. cit., p. 66.
100. Ibid.
doubt that their aim was a total invasion. The ruthlessness of the attack was indescribable. Israel's non-compliance with the directives of the United Nations cast enormous reflection on the international organization which had the job to maintain peace in the world. The Arab States were demanding that Israel should be asked to withdraw from all occupied areas but Israel was non-yielding and insistingly clinging to the policy of aggression. "A new political reality", said (101) Levi Eshkol, "in the Middle East has been created."

He was hinting at the new situation which had arisen as a result of Israeli aggression and occupation of Arab areas. The Arab states wanted the United Nations not to allow the aggressor to enjoy the fruits of aggression. The Soviet Union and India held the same opinion and wanted Israel to vacate the areas it occupied during the June War.

Fadorenko of the USSR was critical of Israel and its main allies. He demanded: (102) "Israel must also immediately and unconditionally withdraw its troops from their (the Arab States) territories.... We cannot allow the forces of aggression to remain on the territory seized by them. This situation brooks of no delay".

Parthasarathi of India also made the same demand when he said: (103) "The Council should, first, reinforce its call for a ceasefire and immediately order withdrawal of all armed forces to positions they occupied before the outbreak of hostilities".

103. Ibid.
Israel continued committing serious violations of the ceasefire directives issued by the Security Council. That Israel did not have any respect for the United Nations and its efforts to maintain peace was shown by Moshe Dayan's remark quoted by the USSR representative in the Security Council. Fedorenko charged Dayan of having stated: (104) "I certainly cannot recall that any problem was ever settled by diplomacy or through the United Nations".

Such was the Israeli contempt for the United Nations and its resolution that Israeli leaders poured (105) "fire and brimstone on the UN". "The United Nations" they said, "has become the paradigm of perfidy, the epitome of hypocrisy". The use of force was the only way for Israel to satiate its hunger for expansion. Israel was using force even after the ceasefire orders. Israel was bombing the Arab States in utter disregard of the UN resolutions. Israel had occupied the town of Kuneitra and was pressing forward towards Damascus. The Secretary General read out a report from General Bull, the Chief of UNTSO. (106) "Most immediate Report received from Chairman of Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. Damascus at 0923 hours GMT Air attack on Damascus going on". The attack on Damascus was confirmed by another message from the chairman of ISMAC. The Secretary General read; (107) another message "confirming attack at 7.35 GMT in area - repeat area - of Damascus airport. A second air attack south of Damascus at 8.55 GMT. And a further attack at 9:19 GMT north of Damascus".

104. UN Doc. S/PV.1357, pp. 22-25.
107. UN Doc. S/PV.1355, pp. 3-5.
Fedorenko of the Soviet Union expressed his country's indignation and commented: (108) "The circle is complete. The perpetration of the crime is proved...." He asked the Security Council to adopt stern measures to deal with Israeli acts of violation and also be prepared to act according to the Charter to force Israel to comply with the UN resolutions.

The Security Council failed to adopt measures of economic sanctions in order to compel Israel to comply with the ceasefire orders. On June 12 another resolution was unanimously adopted which condemned (109) "any and all violations of the ceasefire". It also requested "the Secretary General to continue his investigations and to report to the Council as soon as possible". It affirmed "that its demand for a ceasefire and discontinuance of all military activities includes a prohibition of any forward military movements subsequent to the ceasefire. Calls for the prompt return to the ceasefire position of any troops which may have moved forward subsequent to 1630 GMT on 10 June 1967".

Apart from the violations of the United Nations ceasefire orders and occupation of Arab areas, another major consequence of June War of 1967 was the aggravation of the Palestine refugee problem. Israel occupied large chunk of Arab territory: the West Bank of the Jordan, the Sinai, the Gaza, the Golan Heights and the Straits of Tiran. The Arabs living in these areas were forcibly expelled. Over (110) 400,000 Palestinians were expelled by Israel or had fled under terror

108. Ibid., p. 6.


from the new occupied territories to the East Bank, so that Jordan had become a large refugee camp. Israel treated the Arab population as war hostages and subjected them to torture and great sufferings. The Security Council adopted a resolution on June 14, 1967, calling upon (111) "the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of these inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities".

Israel appeared to be yielding to international protest against its policy of expulsion. But it was merely a gesture. It announced to allow the return of refugees to the occupied West Bank in August and approved applications for the return of 170,749 Arabs. By August 31, 1967 deadline Israel fixed for its implementation, only 14,027 refugees had actually returned. (112) Israel did not listen to the United Nations and disregarded the directives of the Security Council and flagrantly violated the Geneva Convention of 1949 on human rights. Israel's treatment of the UN was a replica of Germany's treatment of the League of Nations after the rise of Nazi regime.

The Soviet Union wanted (113) the Security Council to condemn Israel for "its aggressive activities and continued occupation of part of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan, and ask Israel to withdraw all its troops from those countries". The Soviet Union did not succeed in the Council so it turned to the General Assembly and invoked Article 11 of the UN Charter which empowered the

112. The Arab World, vol. IX, Nos. 5-6, May-June 1968, p. 5.
113. S/7951/Rev. 2.
Assembly to discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of peace and security". The Soviet Union asked for special emergency session of the General Assembly through a letter addressed to the Secretary General from Andrei Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. The emergency session of the Assembly was being convened (114) in order to consider the prospects of "liquidating the consequences of Israel's aggression against the Arab States and the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops behind the armistice lines".

The United States of America opposed the Soviet move to convene special emergency session of the General Assembly. Goldberg said: (115) "The United States Government does not believe that a situation has arisen in which the Security Council fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Accordingly, the United States is not able to concur in the request for the holding of an Emergency Special Session at this time".

Despite the U.S. objections the emergency session was held on June 17, 1967. Israel was adamant and had made it clear that it would not withdraw its armed forces from the occupied areas. On June 18, 1967, Lban of Israel stated: (116) "If the General Assembly were to vote by 121 to 1 in favour of Israel returning to the Armistice line tomorrow, Israel would refuse to comply with that decision. This has been made clear to the major powers". The General Assembly

heard Alexi Kosygin who demanded (117) the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces to the armistice lines and for "full elimination of the consequences of the aggression". He expressed the hope that the General Assembly will take an effective decision ensuring... the restoration and consolidation of peace and security in the Middle East".

Noureddin Attassi President of Syria stated: (118) "We shall reject any conditions or discussions based on an invasion. We ask you to firmly condemn aggression and to immediately liquidate its traces".

Mahmoud Fawzi, Deputy Premier of the United Arab Republic dealt with the US Israeli collusion in launching attack against the Arab States. He drew (119) the attention of the General Assembly to "a great number of unbelievable atrocities", Israel committed in the invaded and occupied territories. These atrocities included bombardment of hospitals, killing great number of civilians, using napalm bombs, destroying all constructions and projects.

Mahgoub, Prime Minister of Sudan argued that even conceding the provocation caused by the massing of Arab troops on its frontiers (120) "the action taken by Israel was not legitimate self-defence within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter because no armed attack on its territory had in fact occurred". He insisted on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories.

Jordan was represented by King Hussein who described Israel as

119. A/PV. 1529, p. 36.
120. A/PV. 1530, p. 36.
"the aggressor". He told the world Assembly: (121) "sympathy for the past sufferings of the Jews should not mean accepting aggression. The Arabs wanted peace with justice, not peace by submission. The Hour of decision had come, and unless the Assembly acted speedily and effectively, the plight of the refugees would be doubled. There must be a clear recognition by the Assembly that one member state of the United Nations had deliberately violated the territory of three member states". He said the duty of the UN "can be nothing else but the swift condemnation of the aggressor and the enforcing of the return of Israeli troops to the lines held before the attack of June 5.

Sharifuddin Pirzada, Foreign Minister of Pakistan also spoke about Israeli aggression against the Arab countries. He said (122) that the Assembly should examine all outstanding issues in the Middle East. If the UN Charter is properly applied then "the only course of action for us is to condemn the aggression launched by Israel on 5 June and to demand the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories, including the Holy Places, to positions prior to hostilities... The wrong done to the Arabs must be righted".

M. C. Chagla, Indian Foreign Minister also supported the view that Israel must be made withdraw from all occupied territories. According to him (123) "the foundation of a lasting peace in the region could only be based on total, immediate, unconditional withdrawal

121. Doc. A/PV. 1536, p. 11.
122. A/PV. 1531, p. 67.
of Israel from the areas now under its occupation". He asked the Assembly to request the Security Council to take the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

From among the western bloc the most outstanding speech made was by Britain's Foreign Minister, George Brown who laid down the stipulation that there should be no territorial acquisitions for Israel as a result of the war. He said: (124) "In my view, it follows from the words in the Charter that war shall not lead to territorial aggrandizement".

Goldberg of the United States of America presented before the Assembly a draft resolution embodying Johnson's Five Principles enunciated in his speech of May 23, 1967. Goldberg opposed the Soviet Union's draft resolution which according to him in effect was (125) "a prescription for renewed hostilities". He said "there were legitimate grievances on all sides of the conflict and a full settlement should deal equitably with them and with outstanding questions from which ever side they were raised".

Maurice Cauve de Murville, Foreign Minister of France said: (126) "The indispensable task was a solution in substance of the existing problems which were, apart from navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba, the situation of the Palestinian refugees and the conditions of vicinity of the States concerned". "Israel had occupied territories belonging to the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria and no fait accompli on the spot regarding the territorial boundaries and the situ-

124. A/PV.1529, p. 11.
126. Ibid., pp. 45-46.
ation of the citizens of the States concerned could be considered as permanent".

Eban of Israel expressed his country's stubborn attitude over the question of withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories. He said: (127) "The suggestion that everything go back to where it was before June 5 was totally unacceptable, Israel would reject the concept of returning to the situation of belligerency out of which the crisis arose".

The absence of a consensus was the hallmark of the emergency session of the General Assembly. It was apparent from the very beginning that the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States of America were as divergent as ever and the chasm between the two appeared to be unbridgeable. The Soviet Union was trying to mobilize support behind her demand for a total and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories.

The United States held the view that withdrawal of Israeli armed forces should not be a pre-requisite to any possible political settlement of the conflict. According to the USA the withdrawal of Israeli army from occupied Arab territories should form an integral and inseparable link to the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East. The US position was in keeping with its policy of supporting Israel and its aggression against the Arab States. The two sides, i.e. the Soviet Union and the USA were trying to secure endorsement for their respective position. On July 4, after a marathon speech making session, two draft resolutions were there before the General Assembly. One resolution was submitted by Yugoslavia on June 28. It called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories. It urged

127. Ibid., p. 36.
"all states to render every assistance to the Secretary-General" (128) in helping him to implement it. The Yugoslav draft resolution was a resolution of non-aligned states which according to Lall was (129) "less drastic than that of the Soviet Union and less sweeping than that of the United States".

The second draft resolution was sponsored by the Latin American countries and presented before the General Assembly on June 30, 1967 by Dr Solomon of Trinidad and Tobago. The Latin American draft resolution also called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces but linked such a withdrawal with an end to all forms of belligerency between Israel and its Arab neighbours. It requested (130) "the Security Council to continue examining the situation in the Middle East with a sense of urgency, working directly with the parties and relying on the presence of the United Nations".

The Arab States opposed the Latin American draft resolution for in it the withdrawal of Israeli forces was conditional to peace negotiations. Habib Bourguiba Jr. of Tunisia said: (131) "The majority of nations represented here, and particularly by the four Great Powers, none of which has ever called into question the actual existence of Israel as a state, whereas in our eyes it is the very existence of Israel which constitutes permanent aggression." It was made clear that direct negotiations with Israel were ruled out.

According to the Syrian representative the Latin American draft resolution (132) "comes just to deepen our wounds and humiliation. The

128. A/L. 522, par. 6.
131. A/PV. 1543, p. 32.
The countries of Latin America...have confirmed that while their hearts are on our side, their swords are brandished against us".

Eban of Israel also spoke and he opposed the non-aligned draft resolution which according to him, (133) "requires Israel to act as though there were peace, while allowing the Arab states to act as though there were war".

Both draft resolutions fell because none of it could secure the required two-thirds vote. The vote on the Yugoslav draft resolution was 53 to 46 with 20 abstentions while that on the Latin American draft was 57 to 43 with 20 abstentions. (134)

The General Assembly found itself seriously deadlocked. The positions of the USA and the USSR were irreconcilable and no agreement in the United Nations was in sight. Israel was aware of the Big Powers' antagonism and it utilized the cleavage to its full advantage. Israel was effectively combining its military strategy with diplomacy. It was steadily pursuing its policies without any consideration or regard of approval or disapproval by the international community. Intemperate and bellicose utterances had become routine. On July 14, 1967 Ben Gurion defended the Zionist policy of colonialism. He told the Jewish community representatives from the USA: (135) "We have to colonize Jerusalem and its outskirts and colonize and industrialize the Negev."

Israeli leaders were refusing to withdraw from occupied Arab territories on the ground of security and survival of Israel. Moshe Dayan stated (136) in August: "We must not allow other countries, acting

133. A/PV. 1547, pp. 28-30.
in their own interest, to force us to the situation.... We need to consider the reality of 1967 and the 1967 map. We need not only permanent borders but frontiers that will ensure tranquillity".

The Israeli leaders made their intentions known even to the United Nations as they had fully grasped the realities of international politics and its mechanism. Eban had the courage of defiance when he told the General Assembly session in September that the suggestion to withdraw troops to pre-5th June positions could not be accepted by Israel. (137) "Our road does not lead backward to an armistice eroded by belligerency, destroyed by sovereignty. History summons us forward to a new spirit and structure of relations". Eban repeated Israeli arrogance and stubbornness in the Security Council which met to consider the Middle East situation in November. The Israeli spokesman spoke in a manner reminiscent of the thirties when Hitler hurled defiance right and left and even seemed to hold civilization and humanity cheap as compared to the realization of Nazi aims. Eban stated (138): "It is our firm resolve never, never to return to the danger and vulnerability from which we have emerged. This resolve must prevail over every other consideration. To avoid a return to any of the conditions which prevailed on 4 June is a supreme national purpose worthy of any effort and any consequence".

After a long spell of consultation, negotiations, differences were sought to be ironed out between the USA and the USSR. King Hussein's visit to the USA was instrumental in taking much wind out of Israel's propaganda sails. The USA understood the Arab position better than ever before and tried to win over the Arab States by showing some

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Signs of helping them in meeting their demand about the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories.

Lord Caradon, the British representative submitted to the Council a resolution which was unanimously adopted on November 22, 1967. The resolution of November 22 was the most important directive of the Security Council. It emphasized (139) "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and further affirmed that the lasting peace in the Middle East included the application of both the following principles:

1. "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict";

2. "termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries from threats or acts of force".

3. "affirms further the necessity:

(a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem..."

The resolution of November 22, 1967 made the most important contribution when it requested the Secretary General "to designate a special


The Security Council had adopted a resolution (S/2322) on September 1, 1951, calling upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal. The United Arab continued its policy of blockade of Israeli shipping. President Nasser had clarified the United Arab position, in a Press interview on October 8, 1959 that the resolutions concerning Palestine are indivisible entity - the right of the refugees to return to their homeland, their right to their properties or compensation for their properties, and their right to the Palestine territory cannot be divided... the only starting point would be to implement all the UN resolutions. UN resolutions cannot be imposed on us alone while Israel is allowed to ignore them. Al Ahram, October 9, 1959.
representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution."

The Secretary-General was swift and quick on November 23, he had designated Gunnar Jarring of Sweden as his special representative in accordance with para 3 of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. The appointment of Gunnar Jarring as the UN mediator to conduct negotiations with Israel and the Arab States was welcomed in the Arab world but Israel could not conceal its unhappiness. The appointment of Gunnar Jarring was a negation of the Israeli policy of direct negotiations with the Arab States. Israel's interpretation of November 22 Resolution was totally unacceptable to the members of the United Nations and subsequently questioned by them. Eban while commenting on the resolution said (140):

"The policy of the Israeli Government and nation remains as it was when I formulated it on 13 and 16 November, namely, that we respect and fully maintain the situation embodied in the cease-fire agreement until it is succeeded by peace treaties... Those are our aims and positions. They emerge from five months of international discussions unchanged, unprejudiced and intact. It is now understood as of a lasting peace establishing recognized and secure boundaries."

Eban's interpretation had meant that it was only with the establishment of a permanent peace and secure, recognized boundaries that other principles could be implemented. Israel did not comply with the resolution of November 22, 1967. The Arab countries had agreed to implement the resolution and as an indication of their willingness Mahmud Kiad, Foreign Minister of the UAR made the following declara-

"We have already emphasized our acceptance of the Security Council resolution which includes the freedom of passage through the Suez Canal. In return to this Israel has to carry out its responsibilities and obligations which include the withdrawal of forces from the Arab territories it occupies, and the settlement of the problem of the refugees. If Israel carries out its obligations we will carry out ours also, thus making for a more stable peace in the Middle East area."

Israel insisted on concluding peace treaties with the Arab States on the basis of direct negotiations. The Arab States rejected Israeli claim because the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 did not mention direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab States. The Secretary General of the United Nations fully vindicated the Arab position when he declared at a Press Conference (142):

"The most comprehensive and, in my view, the most important resolution adopted by the Security Council regarding the situation in the Middle East is the one adopted on November 22, 1967. I do not think there was any mention of direct talks in that resolution."

But there was mention of the Secretary General's Representative promoting agreement between the parties directly involved.

Israel flagrantly violated the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 by not withdrawing from occupied Arab territories and by undertaking periodical raids of Arab areas. The Security Council on April 1, 1969 adopted (143) a resolution condemning Israel for "its premeditated air attacks on Jordanian villages and populated areas in flagrant violation of the UN Charter and the cease-

fire resolutions".

Israel was not in the habit of listening to noble words of caution and restraint. It did not refrain from indulging in nefarious activities to destroy human life and property of the Arabs. On August 12, 1969 the representative of Lebanon addressed a letter to the Security Council President requesting an urgent meeting to consider (144) "the situation endangering the peace and security of Lebanon" as a result of Israeli raids on civilian population and villages in southern Lebanon.

The Security Council met and unanimously adopted a resolution on August 26, 1967 condemning the premeditated air attack by Israel on villages in Southern Lebanon and deploiring all violent incidents in violation of ceasefire. The Council also deplored (145) the extension of the area of fighting and declared that "such actions of military reprisals and other grave violations of the ceasefire could not be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts".

The Security Council and its resolutions fell on deaf ears and Israel continued its occupation of Arab territories, made no move to solve the refugee problem as envisaged under November 22 resolution. On the other hand it adhered to its policy of annexation to strengthen its hold over occupied Arab areas. The State Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tanzania told the United Nations (146): "In spite of the UN resolutions of November 1967, Israel has not only maintained...

145. Ibid., Resolution 270, August-September 1969, p. 69.
146. Ibid., vol. VI, No. 9, October 1969, p. 157.
its occupation of Arab areas, but has also acted to strengthen its hold on them."

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia was also of the opinion that Isreal's intransigence had spoiled all chances of peaceful settlements of the Middle Eastern problem. He said: "Israel to this date has not accepted the Security Council resolution of 1967, has not ceased to insist upon the annexation of occupied Arab territories and maintain a ruthless attitude towards the Palestinian population."

To this day Israel has not accepted or shown willingness to comply with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

The Arab States had made it abundantly clear that they were willing to maintain peace in the Middle East but direct negotiations could never become a condition for a peaceful settlement. The Arab States had rejected direct negotiation because the party primarily responsible for discussing the fate of that area is the people of Palestine whom Israel refuses to recognise. No Arab state has a right to dispose of a portion of Palestinian territory. It is up to the Palestinians to decide what they agree and what they do not agree to, by way of ultimate disposition of their land.

The second most important implication of Israeli insistence on direct negotiation is to leave out the United Nations. The United Nations has been, from the very beginning, a party in Palestine conflict and any move to resolve this conflict without the United Nations seems to be unconceivable as far as the Arabs are concerned.

The war unleashed by Israel on June 5, 1967 was the most important link in the chain of Israeli policy of aggression, it has
resulted in the aggravation of the political, human and economic issues that existed before the conflict.

The war had cost the Arabs about 20,000 soldiers but the most significant aspect of the human situation is the refugee problem. The Government of Jordan has estimated that about 410,248 persons were displaced from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. To the number of Palestine refugees who were displaced from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, one must add 16,000 Palestinians registered with UNRWA as refugees of the 1948 conflict and 3,000 to 4,000 Palestinian young men, also previously registered with the UNRWA, who were expelled by Israel from the Gaza Strip to Egypt. (147)

The total number of registered Palestine refugees with UNRWA according to the report of September 15, 1967 was (148) "to be 70 per cent of the total number of refugees and displaced persons". In another report dated June 30, 1968, UNRWA's figure of refugees was 1,364,298. (149)

The condition in which Palestine refugees have been forced to live is far more important than the number of the refugees.

Israel on several occasions had bombarded the dwellings of Palestine refugees. On November 20, 1967, the refugees camp at Karamch was heavily fired by Israeli artillery which caused enormous loss of human life including children. (150) On February 15, 1968, twenty villages and refugee camps across the Jordan River became victims of the most cruel attack by Israel. This attack took a toll of more than

148. UN Doc. A/6721, p. 66.
149. UN Doc. A/7213, p. 18.
150. UN Doc. A/6956.
one hundred human lives and forced some 70,000 people to move deeper in the hills to search security of life. On March 21, 1968 a huge and well equipped Israeli force attacked Karamah destroying several hundred houses and abducted more than one hundred and fifty Arab Commandoes.

The Security Council adopted a resolution on March 24, 1968 condemning Israel for its brutal attack (151) "in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the ceasefire resolutions". The Commissioner General of UNRWA reported to the Security Council about the demolition of refugees shelters in Jabaliya and Rafah in Gaza Strip. (152)

The Security Council Resolution of June 14, 1967 requested (153) that "essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war". The resolution also asked that "all the obligations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949 should be complied with". It also called upon Israeli Government "to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities".

Israel, however, went ahead with its policy of repression, destruction and terror in violation of the Security Council resolution of June 14, 1967. The occupation of Arab territories during 1967 war put the inhabitants of Gaza, Sinai, West Bank and the Golan Heights under Israeli administration. The situation in the occupied territories

152. UN Doc. A/6723/Add 1, July 4, 1967.
153. SCOR, No. 23/, June 14, 1967.
was shocking and paled even the atrocities committed by Hitler. A team of correspondents visited the occupied areas and wrote about the shocking scenes they saw and heard about the torture meted out to the Arabs. They wrote: (154)

"We saw 22 years old corporal Souilen Abdel Hasoul Gadak, who had been in a tank near Kafat, in the Gaza Strip. He had lost his left arm and been hit by nine bullets. He had been held for 72 hours and had been hung upside down by his feet. When he asked for a drink they shot at him. A bottle of water."

The United Nations, through many resolutions, recommended to Israel strict compliance with civilized code of behaviour and requested Israel to respect the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of the prisoners of war and the protection of civilians in times of war.

Israel's answer to the United Nations and to its calls for civilized behaviour in keeping with the letter and spirit of international law was its policy of psychological warfare against the Arab inhabitants of the occupied areas. E. C. Hodgkin visited Gaza and the West Bank and witnessed Israeli policy of repression in action. Writing about Israeli occupation Hodgkin wrote (155): "It is not to be expected that such an occupation will be popular; but what surprised me was the intensity with which the Israelis are hated everywhere by all sections of the populations. The mood is perhaps similar to that in occupied France at the beginning of 1942. Repression is severe, and acts of resistance are multiplying." The British journalist saw the destruction of houses (156) "7140 Arab houses have been blown up. This includes entire villages which have been destroyed, innocent or guilty,

156. Ibid.
tenant or visitor or owner, the explosives go in". The Arabs were forcibly deported from occupied territories. Most of the people deported (157) "were prominent in West Bank life - the former Mayor of Jerusalem and the present Mayor of Ramallah: judges, lawyers, doctors, teachers and so on". The Arab inhabitants were treated as fifth columnists and put behind bars without giving them a fair trial or a chance to defend themselves. The prisoners were also treated with brutality. An American newspaper wrote (158): "Beatings to extract information from prisoners are routine". The Economist observed (159): "The allegations of brutality to prisoners under interrogation appear to be substantiated by such evidence as is obtainable by a visiting foreign journalist. Your correspondent has spoken to three people who claim to have been badly beaten or tortured with electrical devices, and he is satisfied that the first hand account of their experiences lends weight to evidence obtained from other sources".

The Arab population of occupied territories was condemned to constant mental and physical torture by Israeli authorities. This policy was aimed at terrifying the people compelling them to leave. The well-known writer Malcolm Muggeridge witnessed a horrifying scene in Jerusalem about which he wrote in the Observer (160): "I was quite abnormally horrified to see in Jerusalem two Arabs, one of them a youth, being arrested, beaten up and then with black bags over their heads, driven away at top speed in a jeep. I wanted to rush after them.

157. Ibid.
shouting impotently, "It's like Berlin. You should not be doing this."

The Le Monde also wrote about Israeli torture which did not discriminate among the Arabs even on the basis of age. "A 75 year old Arab from the Gaza Strip was sentenced to life imprisonment by an Israeli Military Court". (161) To force them out of their houses, many Nazi-like tactics were resorted to. Their houses were blown up and their villages were bulldozed. Many refugees living in Jordan and elsewhere were those who "have left because their houses were blown up or knocked down. Not only has much of Qalqilya been bulldozed; about 10 other villages have suffered the same fate. In Jerusalem we saw the rubble of Arab houses which have been demolished to make a large piazza and a car park in front of the Wailing Wall." (162) It was in violation of Article 33 of the Geneva Convention which said "Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited."

The L'Orient wrote about the destruction of Arab property by Israel. "On December 8, 1967, 100 houses, two mosques and a school in the Jericho were destroyed by the Israeli Army". (163)

The United States of America warned Israel against its policy of destroying Arab houses. Robert McCloskey strongly condemned Israel which implied (164) that "the Israeli Army violated an international agreement by dynamiting homes of suspected Arab terrorists in Jerusalem."

The Israeli statesmen disregarded American objection and per-

sisted in their activities. They indicated that "there would be no change in their policy of demolishing the homes of suspected Arab terrorists". (165)

In the Latrun area the villages of Yalu, Emmaus, Beit Nouba and Beit Sir were "systematically and completely destroyed by the Israelis 19 days after the ceasefire". (166) In the Hebron area two villages Beit Awa and Beit Mersim were also bulldozed. The Secretary General's Special Representative Gussing submitted a report to the Security Council where he stated that in Beit Awa and Beit Mersim more than 90 per cent Arab houses were completely destroyed. "The Israeli troops demolished the houses with dynamite and bulldozers. Groves around the village were burnt". (167) The destruction of Arab houses was condemned by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on March 8, 1968. It asked Israel "to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes of the Arab civilians". On May 7, 1968, the United Nations Conference on Human Rights held at Tehran renewed the call upon Israel to desist from destroying the Arab houses and to respect and implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. (168)

The Israeli administration resorted to the policy of collective punishment which was a contemporary version of Nazi policy of "Peace Keeping Operations" in occupied Europe. Article 33 of the 4th Geneva Convention stated: "Collective penalties are prohibited." Israel dis-

165. Ibid., March 12, 1968.
166. The Times, September 13, 1967.
regarded this provision. The civilian population was treated harshly and their movements were terribly restricted by imposing curfews.

Michael Adams wrote about the curfew (169):

"When I left Gaza this morning three refugee camps housing 100,000 Palestinian refugees were under day and night curfew and there was sporadic shooting in the streets of Gaza City which served no apparent purpose beyond the intimidation of the civilian population. No distribution of food was allowed; not many managed to get water."

The Observer also wrote (170): "Curfews in refugee camps are often accompanied by the rounding up of all male inhabitants between the ages of 16 and 60 and compelling them to spend hours in some cases up to three days in open compounds."

The hospitals also were made target of destruction by Israeli army. "The worst hit building in the whole of Jerusalem", wrote (171) The Economist, "is the Augusta Victoria hospital on a hill next to the Mount of Olives... One whole wing was destroyed and with it research work of a lifetime". The Life verified it by saying that (172) "four Israeli jets dropped Napalm canisters on the Augusta Victoria (hospital) in Jerusalem."

The Israelis also resorted to shooting at groups of people. The Arab demonstrations were wantonly fired at. In May 1968 "Five girl pupils of a secondary school in the Gaza Strip were shot and wounded."

The Arab educational institutions were also subjected to Israeli

171. The Economist, July 1, 1967.
scheme of depriving them of their Arab character. The occupation authorities confiscated all the books proscribed in the schools.

By September 27, 1967, 79 of 134 Jordanian textbooks were cut. One hundred of the 139 books found in Egyptian desks and two-thirds of those taken from Syria were expurgated. Books of literature, geography, religion, Arabic language and even of mathematics were changed. (174) The Executive Board of the UNESCO passed a resolution expressing regret that the textbooks approved by the Director General of UNESCO were not used in the schools operated by the UNRWA for Palestine refugees in the Near East. It called upon the Government of Israel to remove immediately any obstacle to the import and use of the books. (175)

Racial discrimination is instinctive in Israel, it is even taught to children at school. An Israeli newspaper wrote (176): "The contempt in which the white Jews in Israel hold their black brethren is unequalled anywhere else in the world. This is due to the instinctive, deeply rooted chauvinism which is common among European Jews."

Israel discriminated against the Arabs reducing them to the status of second class citizens. What is left of human rights which Israel has not entirely destroyed with regard to its Arab citizens. Aggression, violence, oppression and underhand dealings are all that the Arab inhabitants can expect from the Israeli authorities. The Third Committee of Social, Humanitarian and Culture approved a draft resolution on November 2, 1969, concerning Israeli practices towards

the civilian population in territories occupied by Israel. The draft resolution (177) "called upon the Government of Israel to desist forthwith from its reported repressive policies and practices towards the civilian population in the occupied Arab territories."

The special working group was appointed by the United Nations to investigate into the violations of the Geneva Convention committed by Israel. The group confirmed that there were violations of the convention which the occupying power had committed. The group recommended that Israel should cease all its oppressive policies and comply with the Geneva Conventions on Human Rights. The group also recommended that the "occupying power should refrain from demolishing houses for reasons not provided for in the 1949 Convention and grant adequate compensation in all cases of demolition in violation of the Convention." (178)

These and other United Nations recommendations and directives could not secure Israeli compliance and remain mere palliatives in the absence of an effective international enforcing machinery.

**Consequences - Economic**

The most significant and severe impact of June 1967 war was registered in the economic sphere. The loss of the West Bank including Jerusalem and the closure of the Suez Canal depriving Egypt of its enormous revenues dealt shattering blows to the economies of Jordan and the UAR. One of the most important motivating factors behind Israeli aggression against the Arab States has been, as indicated above, to cripple Arab economy and arrest its forward march. The June War of

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1967 lasted only six days but in terms of its economic losses it proved to be more shattering and devastating than the 100 years war between England and France. Jordan was the country which suffered the heaviest economic losses. Jordan had lost the entire West Bank; and consequently one-third of its national product. In terms of production the West Bank produces over 65% of the olives and about 30% of the cereals. (179)

In the industrial sector there were in the West Bank over 3,700 industrial establishments or about 48% of the total number of industrial establishments in Jordan employing about 14,000 persons or 37% of the total industrial employment. (180)

Jordan's total foreign exchange earnings in 1966 were roughly $200 million. Jordan's loss in this sphere because of Israeli occupation of the West Bank would be $80 million but it constitutes the main bulk of Jordan's foreign exchange other than grants and aid from foreign countries. The loss of the West Bank brought some indirect effects on its economy. The size of Jordan's consumer market is reduced with its consequent effects on creating excess capacity for the industries and services of the East Bank which would have to look for either new export opportunities or partially close down. Jordan's economy used to get a substantial amount of revenues from tourist trade. With the loss of Jerusalem, Jordan lost the greatest attraction of the tourists and the biggest source of revenues and foreign exchange.

One very significant indirect consequence of the June war was a substantial reduction in the flow of foreign investments in Jordan's


180. Ibid., p. 3.
economic development programme. The lack of genuine political sta-
bility has aggravated the problem in the sphere of foreign private
investment. One more important economic consequence of the Six-Day
War is a radical shuffling of national economic priorities. The
perpetual Israeli aggression creates a situation of insecurity and it
subsequently spells a shift from development to military budget.

As far as economic structure of the country is concerned,
Jordan finds itself in a very bad situation. With the influx of
Palestine refugees Jordan's population has swelled and the problems
of housing, food and clothing have got aggravated. A substantial in-
crease in population coupled with a major reduction in its sources of
revenues made the survival of Jordan as a viable political and geo-
graphical entity extremely difficult. The Development Board of Jordan
is engaged in preparing development projects provide job opportunities
for skilled and unskilled labour. There are various other schemes at
hand aiming at bettering irrigation and agricultural prospects in
Jordan.

The UAN suffered enormously and the rate of its economic pro-
gress slowed down because of the Six Day War. As a result of Israeli
aggression, navigation in the Suez Canal had come to a standstill because
the Canal is closed to traffic. This has produced grave consequences
affecting the interest of a large number of countries apart from the
UAN. The Canal is the most important link between the West and the
West. The goods passing through the Canal in 1966 represented 14% of
world trade and it was a matter of grave concern that the movement of
oil from its source to consumer market was affected.

The closure of the Suez Canal has resulted in increasing the
shipping costs and insurance rates because the Cape route is longer.
The distance between the Arab Gulf ports and the United States has thus increased by 40%. The UAK has lost an annual revenue in foreign exchange of more than £100 million representing about 5% of its gross national income. Thousands of workers engaged in the Canal and others who depended for their income on the Canal were rendered unemployed. There are other countries which have suffered because of the closure of the Suez Canal. Among these are the Arab countries, India, the People’s Republic of China, Pakistan, Western Europe and other countries.

India suffered a great loss as a result of the closure of the Suez Canal. According to one estimate the increase in cost of freight from Europe and the USA was about 40%. However, India has been able to compensate some of its losses by increasing its exports of steel and engineering commodities to the Middle East and the Far East, Australia and New Zealand.

The People’s Republic of China too suffered some losses and delay in importing phosphates from Morocco. Pakistan was also a sufferer because its wheat requirements were always coming through the Suez Canal. Additional financial liabilities shouldered by European countries importing oil as a result of higher freight costs between June and December 1967 were estimated at about £452 million. The total losses suffered by West European countries until 1968 were estimated at £583 million. (181) Consequently due to the closure of the Suez Canal, Western Europe increased its volume of trade exchange with the United States and came under the American influence. The French paper Tribune des Nations wrote (182): "For the first time in history, the


United States, together with Israel have imprisoned Western Europe in the Mediterranean Sea, barring its road to the Far East and cutting its communication with the West Indies and the Indian Ocean. Europe's future is threatened in Suez, the meeting point of the Mediterranean Europe and the Afro-Asian world; indeed, a vital point since it constitutes the heart of modern industry and civilization."

The closure of the Suez Canal has led to the re-routing of international trade which became a source of great benefit to the United States of America since the closure has won her new markets for her oil products and foodstuffs. Before the closure of the Canal, 20% of Europe's oil passed through the Canal. After its closure the shortage in Europe was covered by oil imports from the USA.

South Africa was the happiest country and benefited most out of the crisis created by the closure of the Suez Canal. The ships started calling at South African ports and an increase in revenues from transit fees, bunkering, ship repairs was registered. During 1966 and 1967 the total number of ships which called on South African ports did not exceed 7,370 but by 1969 the number had shot up to 14,000. Israel also benefited from the closure and it developed its Elat port in order to maintain its trade with East Africa and Far East. The United States and Israel developed a vested interest in seeing the Canal closed. Julian Amery, member of the British Conservative Party once said: (183) "All considerations taken, the interests of the free world are better served by keeping the Canal closed." Israel prevented Egypt from reopening the Suez Canal in 1968.

The Egyptian tourist trade also suffered a serious setback, the loss of military equipment costing enormous money to the UAR, destruction of important factories put Egyptian economy in dire straits but a total breakdown was prevented.

An Arab Summit Conference was held at Khartoum from August 29 to September 1. The Conference decided on measures to replenish the tottering economies of Jordan and the UAR. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya decided to make an annual contribution of £55 million, £60 million, and £30 million, respectively to help the war torn economies of the UAR, Jordan and Syria. The Conference also decided to "face any possible economic pressure from outside." (184)

Repercussions - Political

The most immediate and significant political development after the June War was that public opinion in the Arab capitals had plunged from the height of elation, of absolute confidence in victory into the depths of despair. The internal political crisis in the UAR seemed far more difficult. The June war of 1967 also gave rise to two military and political developments.

The most significant is the resurgence of a new military-cum-political factor, namely, the Palestinian Resistance Movement which had always been in existence since the inception of Israel but now became more active and more popular-based. The Palestine Resistance Movement is a movement for the liberation of homeland.

The Palestine refugees wanted justice and when the United Nations

failed to give them justice they realized that what they had lost by force could be regained only by force. "After seventeen years of patient waiting" (185) said a spokesman of the Palestine Arabs in the United Nations Special Political Committee, "they had lost all faith in the United Nations". The establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1963 was a milestone in the Arab struggle to liberate Palestine and it "had reawakened their hopes and afforded them an opportunity to renew the struggle for their homeland". The Palestine Liberation Organization is not the only organization, there are other organizations like the 'Al Fateh' committed to the liberation of Palestine and establishment of a secular democratic state in Palestine. The intensification of revolutionary movement institutionalized by the Al Fateh posed a grave threat to Israel's survival as a religio-cum-racial state. Israel has started a campaign of vilification against freedom fighters by calling them as "terrorists and saboteurs". The Palestine Resistance Movement is not an isolated phenomenon, it is a part of world wide revolutionary movements for liberation as, for instance, in Viet Nam. The Palestine freedom fighters realized that "Imperialism can only be felled by a mature and armed population and that the only way to confront the imperialist war machinery is through popular war - through the transformation of the people into a revolutionary reserve armed with political awareness and through the use of the strategy of long-term war to overcome imperialist technological superiority and its blitzkrieg strategy". (186)

The Palestine Liberation Movement is not a sectarian movement

which was meant for a particular community professing a particular religious belief. It is a secular, broad based democratic movement and its objective of "the liberation of Palestine" ultimately means the liberation of the needy, toiling Jews oppressed by Zionism to co-exist with other peoples of the world and within Palestine without any discrimination". (187)

Israel's entire existence seems to be in jeopardy at the hands of Palestine liberators and Israel has adopted a policy of repression against these fighters and it also launches raids on the Arab States to wipe off the bases of the Arab commandos.

Jordan and Lebanon have been victims of Israeli raids to intimidate these Arab States. On November 20, 1967 the refugee camp at Karameh was attacked causing huge loss of human lives. Israel undertook many raids to crush Palestinian resistance and punish the Arab States for supporting them. In 1968 Israel turned its wrath upon Lebanon when Beirut Airport was attacked and thirteen planes belonging to the Arab States were destroyed. The Israeli representative in the Security Council tried to justify the attack as a reprisal against the attack made two days earlier by two Commandos on the Israeli Airline at Athens. Such an argument is totally untenable under the accepted principles of international law. The Arab States cannot be held responsible and accountable for the acts of Palestinian Freedom Fighters whom Israel has forcibly thrown out of their homeland. The President of Lebanon was forthright and outspoken when he said (188) "That Israel,

187. Ibid.
not Lebanon, is responsible for the presence of Palestinians in Lebanon, responsible for their plight and that Palestinians have got every right to fight for the recovery of the motherland."

The Israeli raids could not be justified under any canon of law and morality. Its attack against Lebanon was motivated by its desire and scheme of advancing up to more defensible frontier of the Litani river in Lebanon.

The Security Council condemned Israel on December 31, 1968 (189) "for its premeditated military action in violation of its obligations under the Charter and the ceasefire resolutions". The Council took very strong note of the Israeli attack on the Beirut airport and warned Israel that "if such acts were to be repeated, the Council would have to consider further steps to give effect to its decisions". The resolution considers that "Lebanon is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it suffered, responsibility for which has been acknowledged by Israel." Israel followed the policy of thousand eyes for one eye, retaliation against all the Arab States. Israel's emphasis on peace, negotiated settlement and its theory of retaliation remain irreconcilable. One Israeli Minister has been quoted as saying (190): "I have never heard of peace by retaliation."

Israel has tried, through its theory of retaliation, to cloud the real issue. The acts of the Palestine Freedom Fighters are secondary matters which are nothing but human and natural responses to Israeli acts of "retaliation" undertaken for softening up, terrorising, and expelling the Arabs out of their old homes. The Arab Commandos

190. Menuhin, Moshe, op. cit., p. 572.
are resorting to force because they have been forced to believe that injustice done to them could be undone only through force. The present escalation cannot be reversed so long as the Palestinians remain deprived of their national rights. Israel is worried by the fact that its international lines of communications have become vulnerable. Israel cannot have peace unless and until the rights of Palestinians are restored to them. The establishment of a secular democratic Palestine is the only rational solution. "Peace in the area", says Professor Machower, (191) "can only come through the de-Zionisation of Israel and the termination of the Zionist regime, and this means the renunciation by the Israelis of the absolute priority of preserving a Jewish State."

Another major development resulting from the war has been the Great Powers' involvement with greater intensity in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The USA believes Israel to be a bastion of Western interests and has lent it full support against the Arab world. The Soviet Union which had originally supported the creation of Israel and still stands by its commitment to the territorial integrity of Israel started cultivating Arab friendship to counter the all-out US support to Israel. In 1962 the USA embarked on its policy of 'open door' towards Israel and started open supply of arms to keep the military balance in favour of Israel. In 1966, 200 Patton Tanks were given to Israel and it also received Skyhawk light bombers. The supply of Skyhawks gave Israel "a new striking force". (192) The supply of Skyhawk light bombers got the USA directly involved in the arms race in the Middle East. The

USA has also given Israel complete political support. In 1967 war, the role the USA played was always to the advantage of Israel. There were incidents during June War which confirmed the fact of Israeli-American collusion. The USA was asking Nasser to exercise restraint and through the President's Personal Representative Nasser was requested not to fire the first shot. The USA fully knew that Israel with its strategy of surprise attack could emerge victorious helping the USA to get rid of Nasser - a potential threat to American interests in the area. "The combination of Israel muscle and United States sweet talk had enunciated satisfactory results". (193) President Johnson "knew he could afford to smile suggestively and leave the fighting to General Dayan." (194)

The USA was neutral so long Israel had an upper hand in the military balance and strategy. One American journal has spelled out the US policy in a very forthright manner (195): "Neutral to a point, US Hinges its policy on Hopes that Israel will win - and Quickly: Washington fears it will be Forced to intervene Alone if Arabs Get Upper Hand". The USA was ready to help Israel militarily if it was in danger. One newspaper wrote (196): "The President...ordered alerts to the 82nd Airborne Division and to the 101st Airborne...Divisional officers were summoned to secret briefings at Ft. Bragg, N. C. and assigned their missions and targets in the Arab world which included protection for American oil installations."

The Soviet Union's interest in the Middle East is not recent. She was instrumental in the creation of Israel but a major breakthrough in her relations with the Arab States occurred in 1955 when Egypt struck an arm for cotton deal with Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union became a main supplier of economic and military aid to the UAR. The Soviet military aid to the Arab world notwithstanding her role in 1967 crisis remains highly ambiguous. It was Soviet Union's intelligence network which gathered the information about probable Israeli attack on Syria and passed it on to Nasser. On May 23, 1967 Moscow cautioned Nasser not to strike first and refrain from taking the initiative which was complied with. The Russian naval fleet equipped with modern radars was present in the Mediterranean and in all probability was capable of detecting even the manutest air activity. That the Soviet Union chose to be silent and did not inform the UAR of the impending danger remains a riddle shrouded in great mystery. After the war was over the Soviet Union tried to help the Arab tottering economy and badly shattered military power.

The Arab Israeli conflict is acquiring global dimension because of greater involvement of the USA and the USSR. Issac Deutscher sees the Palestine problem as an element of the Soviet American competition. He has said (197): "We have to relate this war to the great power struggle and ideological conflict in the world which form its context." This academic verbosity of enlarging the scope of Arab Israeli conflict by putting it in global setting cannot belittle the reality that the essence of the conflict is the rights of the Arabs of Palestine. Unless they are restored their homes and other rights the conflict would remain as a cancer eating up the body politic of the Middle East.